check Morales as they were able to do in 2005, whenPODEMOS lost the presidency but won a plurality in theSenate. Changes in the electoral systemalsobenetedMASatthe margins. Under the previous electoral system, whichguaranteed the second-placed party in each province oneSenate seat, MAS would have won only 15 of 27 Senate seats(60%). Under the new rules, MAS was able to win enough

ld forearlyted to be won by MASlurinominal seats hurtade

Morales commands a signicant following that has carried

Andean departments also approved a referendum forregional autonomy. In April 2010, voters in all nine Boliviandepartments will go to the polls to elect governors and

Morales coalition.Already a rift has opened between MAS and a key ally,

References

, J

all, Ro

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 746765 761While Evo Morales clearly won a popular mandate,there are signs that he will face serious challenges duringhis second term. Despite winning substantial supermajor-ities in the legislature, MAS faces important constraintsimposed by the new constitution, which included radicalreforms to decentralize the country. In addition to votingfor presidential and legislative candidates, voters in the ve

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.08.003

The presidential election in Ukraine

Erik Herron*

Department of Political Science University of Kansas, 1541 Lilac Lane, Blake H

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 5 May 2010Accepted 22 September 2010

* Tel.: 1 785 864 9027.E-mail address: eherron@ku.edu.anuaryFebruary 2010

om 310, Lawrence, KS 66044-3177, USA

1. Background

The 2010 presidential electionwas Ukraines fourth sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.1 The

1 Onearlier presidential elections, see (Birch,1995, 2002) andHesli (2006).IPSOS, May 11 2009. Informe de Opinin Bolivia Available at: http://eju.tv/2009/06/ipsos-apoyo-opinion-y-mercado-encuesta-de-mayo-de-2009 (accessed 15.01.10.).

Mayorga, R.A., 1997. Bolivias silent revolution. Journal of Democracy 8 (1),142156.

La Razn, 2009. El voto urbano y rural en el pais, 7 December.Singer, M.M., Morrison, K.M., 2004. The 2002 presidential and parlia-

mentary elections in Bolivia. Electoral Studies 23 (1), 143182.years. The feat is even more remarkable when oneremembers that MAS made its electoral debut in 2002.his party to several electoral victories over the past ve6. Conclusions

The 2009 election consolidated a bipolar politicalsystem marked by a dominant MAS on the left and anantagonistic, fractured, but entrenched opposition on theright. MAS has not fully transformed itself from a loosecollection of social movements and political organizationsinto a modern, institutionalized political party, but Evo

with helping Morales to appeal to middle-class voters. Asa reward, MSM and other middle-class candidates weregiven choice positions on party lists. After MSM announcedthat it would campaign independently of MAS in the April2010 local elections, Morales became openly hostiletowards the party, which has generated tension in thelegislative ranks. Already plagued by important defectionssince 2005, the greatest challenge for Morales may be tokeep his expanded coalition together.where the new indigenous districts clboth because such seats were expeccandidates and because the loss of pthe opposition where it could have mtional losses in uninominal districts.up for dispropor- theMovimiento SinMiedo (MSM) party of Juan Del Granado,the popular mayor of La Paz. As a key ally, MSM is creditedPaz, Oruro, and Potosi). The same he the lower houseadvantagedMAS,

regional bases (especially in the media luna where oppo-sition parties are expected towin) while testing the unity ofvotes to win all four Senate seats in three departments (La give the opposition opportunities to reinforce theirassemblies for newly organized autonomous governments.In addition, voters in several municipalities voted forspecial recognition as indigenous communities, withspecial constitutional legal status. These elections will both

previous election, held in 2004, was beset by controversyafter egregious violations of fair practices and appropriateelectoral administration seemed to yield a victory for ViktorYanukovych, the candidate supported by the ruling regime.Mass demonstrations, popularly labelled the Orange

sition to Yanukovych in 2004, aligned with Yanukovych toform a coalition government in 2006. Over the next few

unconstitutional. While parliament again attempted to passan amended presidential election law in December, itstalled in the chamber and failed on the second reading(ZIK, 2009). As the election approached, campaignscontinued to dispute the administrative details, with a last-minute controversy erupting over the use of mobile ballotboxes for indigent voters. Some controversy also emergedover the timing of the election3 but the rst-round wasnally scheduled for 17 January 2010 with a second roundon 7 February should no candidate emerge with a majority

would be a strong contender for third place. Arseniy Yat-

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 746765762months, Yushchenko successfully manoeuvred to dissolveparliament, and the early 2007 parliamentary electionyielded a bare majority supporting a return of Tymoshenkoto the prime ministers post. The 2010 presidential electionoccurred in the context of highly contentious politics, deepeconomic crisis, and a steep decline in popular support forPresident Yushchenko after his 2004 victory.

2. Electoral rules

According to Ukraines constitution, the president holdsofce for a ve-year term. Candidates may be placed on theballot through nomination by political parties or as inde-pendents. Voters select a candidate, or vote against allcandidates, by placing a simple mark in a box next to theirpreferred option. The winner is determined by a majority-runoff formula. While the basic electoral system has beenstable, elements of election legislation have changed overtime. Notably, barriers to entry, campaign regulations, andadministrative processes have been modied and were thetarget of election reform efforts prior to the 2010 contest.

Beginning in the summer of 2009, parliamentarydeputies sponsored amendments to the existing presiden-tial election law, passing a bill on 24 July.2 PresidentYushchenko vetoed the amended law on 18 August but hisveto was overridden by parliament on 21 August (RIANovosti, 2009). A Constitutional Court ruling on October19 determined that some elements of the new law were

2 Among these modications were a reduction of the campaign periodto 90 days from 120, an increase in the deposit for candidates and thethreshold for recovering that deposit, and authorization to alter thevoting lists on election day (Kyiv Post 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).Revolution, drew hundreds of thousands of protesters, andopposition groups occupied the capitals main square forweeks. The election drama continued until the SupremeCourt voided the results of the second round, a settlementwas brokered, and a repeat of the second round was held.The new election yielded a victory for the oppositioncandidate, Viktor Yushchenko.

Over the intervening ve years, divisions among poli-ticians associated with the Orange Revolution deepenedand the loose association of political forces that preventedYanukovych from claiming the presidency in 2004 splin-tered. Yushchenko initially appointed Yuliya Tymoshenkoas prime minister, but their antagonistic relationship ulti-mately led to her ouster in 2005. The subsequent 2006parliamentary election gave Yanukovychs Party of Regionsthe largest number of seats, and after a contentiousgovernment formation process, he emerged as primeminister. A key to Yanukovychs return to the primeministers seat was another defection from the Orangeteam. The Socialist Party, which had also joined the oppo-seniuk had been considered a rising star in Ukrainian

3 Parliament initially set the date for the elections rst round 25October 2009 but the Constitutional Court supported Yushchenkosappeal to have the election postponed until early 2010. A compromise inparliament re-set the rst round for 17 January.4 Election results are available at the website of the Central Electoral

Commission (http://www.cvk.gov.ua/).5 Personal communication with the author, January 2010.6 In addition to serving (alongside Tymoshenko) as an ofcial in the

government of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, Tihipko had alsodirected the Yanukovych campaign in 2004.on the rst ballot.

3. First-round campaign

Eighteen candidates registered to compete in the rst-round of the election, including politicians associated withall of the political parties represented in parliament. ViktorYanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko were widely expectedto pass through to a second and decisive round of compe-tition. Yanukovych, leader of the Party of Regions, relied oncore supporters from Ukraines eastern and southernregions, while Tymoshenko, the prime minister and leaderof her eponymous political party, had her core support inthe west of the country.

In addition to the two front-runners, the campaignfeatured other prominent Ukrainian politicians. Mostnotably, PresidentYushchenko sought re-election. Followinghis victory in the 2004 presidential election, Yushchenkospopularity waned while support for his erstwhile allyTymoshenko increased. While Yushchenkos Our Ukraineparty received nearly 24% of the party list vote in the 2002parliamentary election, this had fallen to just 14% in theelections of both 2006 and 2007.4 One month before the2010 election, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology(KIIS, 2009a) reported that only 3.5% of respondents ina nationwide public opinion survey intended to vote forYushchenko. Over the course of the campaign, his campreported improved results and, two days before the election,Yushchenkos campaign team was asserting that, accordingto its private polls, he was closing the gap between himselfand Tymoshenko.5 The conventional pre-election wisdomremained that Yushchenko would nish well below the toptwo candidates, however.

Other candidates also received attention during thecampaign process. Serhiy Tihipko, a former governmentofcial associated with several major forces in Ukraine,6

portrayed himself as a centrist choice between Yanuko-vych and Tymoshenko. Polling suggested that Tihipko

politics, especially after he obtained the parliamentaryspeakers post at a relatively young age. However, hiscampaign was poorly managed, portraying him as a mili-tary-style leader in stark contrast to his previous image asa young reformer. By election day, Yatseniuk trailed in thepolls. Several of the remaining candidates were allegedlytechnical candidates; that is, contenders connected to themajor candidates and nominated to provide benets such

7

a February 2009 poll, 80% of respondents indicated that

followed by Tymoshenko with 25.1% (Table 1). Tihipkonished in third (13.1%), Yatseniuk was fourth (7.0%) andYushchenko trailed in fth (5.5%).

The regional distribution of voting conrmed that themain rivals performed especially well in areas considered tobe their electoral strongholds. Yanukovych received strongsupport in the eastern and southern regions, especiallyDonetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. Tymoshenko performed bestin western regions, especially Volyn, Vinnystia, and Rivne.Rival candidates also showed areas of regional strength:Tihipko showed strongest in the urban areas of Dniprope-trovsk and Odesa; Yatseniuk in his home region of Cher-nivtsy and in neighbouring Ivano-Frankivsk; and ViktorYushchenko in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk.

5. Second-round campaign

Tymoshenko emerged from the rst round with a signif-icant gap to make up on Yanukovych. While she wasexpected to gain in the regional strongholds of some of therst-round losers, notably Yatseniuk and Yushchenko, manyof Ukraines most populous regions are more closely asso-ciatedwithYanukovych.Nevertheless, both campaigns facedthe tasks of mobilizing their core supporters and alsoattracting votes from rst-round losers in order to securevictory in the second round. Tihipkos rst round perfor-mance put him in a position to exert particular inuence,assuming that his endorsement would induce rst roundsupporters to follow him. Hence both campaigns courted

Source: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 746765 763they had experienced effects of the economic crisis throughrising prices, 44% through decreased income, and 11%through job loss. While these problems affected all regionsof the country, respondents in the east reported highersensitivity to ination (Kyiv International Institute ofSociology, 2009b). In a poll held one month prior to theelection, more than two thirds of respondents identiedjob creation as the most important issue for the newpresident to address; it was followed closely by reducingination. Survey responses reected deep pessimism in thepopulace as 74% of respondents indicated that Ukraine wason the path to instability. By contrast, only 13% hadresponded in this way in February 2005, just after Yush-chenko became president (see Kyiv Post, 2009d).

Despite the signicant economic challenges facingUkraine, the campaigns differed little on their policyprescriptions (Reuters, 2010). Instead, they focused on thecandidates images and allegations that opponents wereplanning to commit fraud towin the election. Yanukovychscampaign appeal emphasized his ability to bring aboutstability in contrast to the bickering former allies in theOrange Revolution. Tymoshenko promoted her image asa populist opposing entrenched corruption.

4. First-round results

Reported turnout in the rst round was lower than inprevious contests, with almost exactly two in three voters(66.8%) participating in the election compared to 75% in therst round in 2004 (and 70% in previous years) (Herron,2009). The results were closely in line with pre-electionpolling and the exit poll results released shortly after votingended. Yanukovych won the most votes, receiving 35.3%,

7 In discussions, one Ukrainian political observer indicated that,according to his contacts with local party organizations, both the Yanu-kovych and Tymoshenko campaigns were managing the registration anddeployment of polling station commission members for minor candidatesas well as their own campaigns.

8 See, for example, information from the State Employment Service athttp://www.dcz.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id186054&cat_id10046147.as support on local electoral commissions.Ukraine faced several challenges at the time of the

campaign: divisions based on contentious and sometimesacrimonious interpretations of Ukrainian national identityand history, deteriorating relations with Russia, andsubstantial economic challenges. Ukraine experiencedsignicant negative effects of the global nancial crisis,including a drop in the value of its currency and an increasein the unemployment rate.8 The salience of macroeconomicproblems was underscored in public opinion surveys. InTable 1Results of the 2010 Presidential Election in Ukraine.

Round 1 Round 2

Candidate Votes Votes(%)

Votes Votes(%)

ViktorYanukovych

8,686,642 35.3 12,481,266 49.0

YuliyaTymoshenko

6,159,810 25.1 11,593,357 45.5

Serhiy Tihipko 3,211,198 13.1Arseniy Yatseniuk 1,711,737 7.0Viktor

Yushchenko1,341,534 5.5

Petro Symonenko 872,877 3.5Volodymyr Lytvyn 578,883 2.4Oleh Tyahnybok 352,282 1.4Anatoliy

Hrytsenko296,412 1.2

Inna Bohoslovska 102,435 0.4Oleksandr Moroz 95,169 0.4Yuriy Kostenko 54,376 0.2Lyudmila Suprun 47,349 0.2Vasyl Protyvsikh 40,352 0.2Oleksandr Pabat 35,474 0.1Serhiy

Ratushnyak29,795 0.1

MykhailoBrodskiy

14,991 0.1

Oleh Ryabokon 8334 0.0

Against All 2.2 4.4Invalid Ballots 1.7 1.2Total votes/

turnout24,588,268 66.8 25,493,529 69.2

Tihipko as apotential nominee for thepostof primeminister,but he declined to ally formally with either Yanukovych orTymoshenko.

The second round campaign was also rancorous and

the rule proposed by Yanukovychs supporters and upheldby the Constitutional Court (ZIK, 2010), Tymoshenko wasousted as prime minister and Yanukovychs allies took

accession to NATO.Just as Yushchenkos victory in 2004 reshaped the

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 746765764focused on allegations of manipulation and fraud. Yanu-kovychs Party of Regions engineered a change to theelection law that altered administrative rules days beforethe second round, prompting Tymoshenkos campaign toassert that the electoral process was being falsied. Thenew rule altered the quorum for electoral commissions toa simple majority (Kyiv Post, 2010b). The Tymoshenkocampaign argued that this rule change would allow Yanu-kovych supporters to approve improperly prepared proto-cols without input by her representatives. Yanukovychsteam countered that the rule change was necessary toprevent Tymoshenkos representatives from sabotaging thevote counting process by failing to attend procedures inregions where Yanukovych was traditionally strong.9

6. Second-round results

Turnout increased in the second round with 69.2% ofeligible voters participating. One possible reason for theincrease was the closeness of the race, as reected in thenal result: Yanukovych received 48.9% and Tymoshenko45.5%. The proportion of voters casting ballots against alldoubled from the rst round to reach 4.4%. In spite of fallingshort of 50%, Yanukovych was declared the winner havingwon the most votes of the two candidates. He once againdominated the east, taking around 90% of the vote inDonetsk and Luhansk. Tymoshenko beat Yanukovych bya similar margin in the western regions of Lviv, Ternopil,and Ivano-Frankivsk.

While the contenders campaign teams had accused oneanother of fraud of various kinds, international observersgenerally praised election procedures, noting that theywere in line with international standards for free and fairpractices. Indeed, both the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe and Commonwealth of IndependentStates two organizations that often differ in theirassessments of elections in the region delivered positiveverdicts (Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope, 2010; Interfax, 2010). While Tymoshenko initiallychallenged the election results, she later withdrew herformal complaint. Viktor Yanukovych was inaugurated on25 February 2010.

7. Implications

Yanukovychs early actions as president have generatedseveral controversies and prompted strong reactions fromthe new opposition. Prior to constitutional reforms thattook effect in 2006, Ukraines president could dismiss theprime minister. The amended constitution indicated thatthe prime minister would be appointed and dismissed bya parliamentary majority. Due to a new interpretation of

9 For this exchange of views, see http://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/article/n4nvv2vm and http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/eng/pr-east-west/4b6a7d4d91520/.nature of political competition in Ukraine, Yanukovychswin in 2010 could have similarly far-reaching effects. Hissuccesses in re-interpreting constitutional provisions oncoalition formation and on the presence of foreign militarybases on Ukrainian soil suggests that the countrysdomestic politics and international orientation may be setfor major change. If Yanukovychs allies were able to attractadditional defectors from the opposition and increase thenumber of reliable deputies to 300, the coalition couldenact constitutional reforms. Given the intensity ofopposing views on the optimal direction for Ukraine totake, political life should remain acrimonious and conten-tious in the immediate future.

References

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10 For example, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggestedmerging Russias Gazprom with Ukraines Naftohaz (Barry, 2010).control of the cabinet. This controversy was exacerbated bythe appointment of some divisive ofcials (Kyiv Post,2010a).

Yanukovych subsequently completed a new agreementwith Russia extending access to the port of Sevastopol forRussias Black Sea Fleet, in exchange for reduced natural gasprices and an amnesty for nancial penalties that Russiaclaimed were owed by Ukraine. The ratication of this dealtriggered a widely-publicized political spectacle in whichopposition politicians unfurled a large Ukrainian ag, peltedthe speaker of parliament with eggs, and set off a smokebomb in the plenary hall (BBC, 2010). Themelee underscoreshow easily divisions in Ukraine translate into protest.Opposition politicians have expressed deep concerns aboutincreased Russian involvement in Ukraines domestic affairsand the potential undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty.10

Many Yanukovych supporters had expressed comparableconcerns about Ukraines western orientation under Yush-chenko, and bitterly opposed policy initiatives such as

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2009b. On the Ukrainianpopulation feeling consequences of the economic crisis. Availableat. http://www.kiis.com.ua/txt/doc/26022009/pr4.doc (accessed 05.01.10.).

Kyiv Post, 2009a. Deputy head of CEC criticizes amendments to law on

Kyiv Post, 2010b. Update: Ukrainian parliament adopts amendments to

Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, United

Among the events since 2005 that are important for the nations of the UK may raise tensions in the constitu-

party system. Eleven parties are now represented in

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoraexpenses crisis. The campaign saw the rst televised debates between the

leaders of the three main parties. Support for the LiberalDemocrats in thepolls rosedramaticallyafter therstof these.

The Conservatives won but failed to achieve an overallmajority. Together with the Liberal Democrats, they formedthe rst coalition government since 1945. This minimum-winning coalition was formed despite greater ideologicalproximity between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, andsome minor parties that may have supported a progressivecoalition.

E-mail address: stephen.sher@trinity.ox.ac.uk.parliament. The share of the vote for the two main partieswas the lowest since 1918 (65%) and that for the threemainparties was the lowest since 1832 (88%).

Turnout, at 65%, was higher than in 2001 and 2005, butlower than that at any election between 1922 and 1997.

Appendix Supplementary information

This article is presented mainly in video format which isavailable as supplementary information associated withthis article at doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.05.003.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.05.003three main parties, the recession and the parliamentary

understanding this election are leadership changes for all tional settlement post-devolution.

There were indications of further fragmentation of theand the implications for British politics. There are also preliminary observations on whatthe pattern of constituency results tell us about how the recession and the expenses crisisaffected outcomes.

2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Highlights

Research Highlights:

The Conservatives won a majority of the seats in England,while Labour performed relatively well in Scotland andWales. This further widening of the partisan gaps betweenKingdom

a b s t r a c t

This video election note is a very brief introduction to some of the main points of interestregarding the 2010 UK general election. It touches on events since the 2005 election, thecourse of the campaign, the salient issues, policy differences between the main parties, keyfeatures of the outcome for the major and minor parties, turnout, government formationStephen D. FisherVideo election note: The UK General Election of 2010presidential election. Available at. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/46000/ (accessed 05.01.10.).

Kyiv Post, 2009b. Experts criticize new law on presidential election. Avail-able at. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/45857/ (accessed05.01.10.).

Kyiv Post, 2009c. Western information agency: Verkhovna Rada RailroadsNew law on electing president. Available at. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/45873/ (accessed 05.01.10.).

Kyiv Post, 2009d. Voters Unhappy with Choices, Want Jobs. Available at.http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/55401/ (accessed 02.05.10.).

Kyiv Post, 2010a. Furor over Tabachnyk appointment rising. Available at.http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/62086/ (accessed 02.05.10.).

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.014law on presidential election proposed by regions party. Available at.http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/58582 (accessed 05.01.10.).

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2010. Ukrainepresidential election 17 January and 7 February 2010. ODIHR, War-saw. Available at. http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/04/43675_en.pdf (accessed 02.05.10.).

Reuters, 2010. Policies of Ukraines election frontrunners. Available at.http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6160K220100207 (accessed07.02.10.).

Novosti, R.I.A., 2009. Ukraine parliament overrides presidential veto onelection law.Available at. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090821/155881153.html (accessed 05.01.10.).

ZIK, 2009. Rada Derails changes to presidential election law. Available at.http://zik.com.ua/en/news/2009/12/03/207039 (accessed 05.01.10.).

ZIK, 2010. Constitutional Court Gives Green Light to ruling coalition.Available at. http://zik.com.ua/en/news/2010/04/07/223848 (accessed05.01.10.).l Studies 29 (2010) 746765 765

The presidential election in Ukraine, JanuaryFebruary 2010BackgroundElectoral rulesFirst-round campaignFirst-round resultsSecond-round campaignSecond-round resultsImplicationsReferences