0 JFORCES Communications Capabilities. 1Constructs Super Sets/Domains CollectionsObjectsEntities Systems Systems Subsystems Subsystems Components Components

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JFORCES Communications CapabilitiesJFORCES Communications Capabilities

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ConstructsConstructsSuper Sets/DomainsSuper Sets/DomainsCollectionsCollectionsObjectsObjectsEntitiesEntities SystemsSystems SubsystemsSubsystems ComponentsComponents ParametersParameters

RequirementsRequirementsInterfacesInterfacesInputsInputsOutputsOutputs

EnvironmentEnvironmentSpaceSpaceAtmosphereAtmosphereSurfaceSurface GroundGround SeaSeaSub-surfaceSub-surface GroundGround SeaSea

FunctionsFunctions ExistExist Organize/StructureOrganize/Structure ActAct MoveMove DeployDeploy PosturePosture CommandCommand DirectDirect InteractInteract Sense Sense Track Track CommunicateCommunicate EvadeEvade EngageEngage DefendDefend KillKill

ControlsControlsEventsEventsTriggersTriggersRulesRulesProcessesProcessesStrategiesStrategiesDoctrineDoctrine

ControlsControlsTimingTimingSynchronizationSynchronization

CONTEXTCONTEXT

Structural Structural (Who)(Who)

FunctionalFunctional(What)(What)

SpatialSpatial(Where)(Where)

TemporalTemporal(When)(When)

ProceduralProcedural(How)(How)

JFORCES DIMENSIONSJFORCES DIMENSIONS

Create/DefineCreate/DefineEdit/ModifyEdit/ModifyDeleteDeleteArchiveArchiveRetrieveRetrieveProcess/AnalyzeProcess/AnalyzeSummarizeSummarizeDisplayDisplay

InheritanceInheritance

Encapsulation

TransitivityTransitivity

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The JFORCES Framework Provides Modules and Inter/Intra-Module Services to Support Architectural-Level Evaluation Based on Physics-

based Engineering-Level Models

Static Database Manager Interfaces

Standard Graphics Workstation/PC

• Other Special-purpose

Enhancements/Options:• Additional RAM• Graphics Accelerator Boards• Image Processing Boards

Adjuncts

Open System

LINUX & UNIX

GL graphics

GR

AP

HIC

AL

US

ER

IN

TE

RF

AC

E

Simulation Executive

SENSOR MODULE

FUNCTIONS/DYNAMICS MODULE

COMMUNICATIONS MODULE• Propagation• Media States• Network Protocols• Determination of Communication Events

LOGIC/REASONING MODULE• Intelligent Processes/Rules• Cognitive Processes/Rules• Classification Rules• Interpretive Logic Rules• Situation Assessment Rules

OBJECTS MODULE• Object States (Including Systems, Subsystems & Components) - Location - Orientation - Awareness - Thresholds• Motion/Propulsion Utilities• Object Awareness

ENVIRONMENT MODULE• Local States• Earth - Terrain - Features• Cartographic Utilities• Atmospheric Phenomena• Exo-atmospheric Phenomena

• Acquisition• Tracking & Correlation• Multi-sensor Fusion• Determination of Detection Events

• Object Actions

• Object Interactions

AUTOMATED DIRECTION/CONTROLMODULE

• Process Rules & Sequences• Strategies• Doctrine• Tactics

"FRIENDLY" COMMAND & CONTROL"HOSTILE/OPPOSING FORCE" C2

EXECUTIONLOG

FILES

Application Libraries

• Motion Utilities• Functional Algorithms Object Actions Dynamic Inter-actions• Data Transform Utilities• Process Definitions/Rules

Databases

Scenario ArchivesLog-file Archives

Real Objects/Nodes

EX

TE

RN

AL

G

AT

EW

AY

S

ANALYTICAL MODULE• Statistical Packages• Presentation Graphics• After-Action Debrief

SIM DEVELOPMENT• Create Object Classes• Define Entities• Input/Edit Parameters• Select Application Fidelity

PREVIEW• Verify Objects/Entities (Menu/Tables)• Animate/Verify Motion, Interactions, Timing & Spatial Relationships• Verify Scripted Events, Missions/Routes

DATA ANALYSIS

• Insert Data Probes• Set Data Logging Specifications• Set "Watchdog" Specifications• Define Capture Specifications

RUNTIME CONTROLS• Interactive Object Controls/Displays• Interactive Situational Displays• Simulation Controls - Reverse

- Re-plan- Checkpoint Event or Time-Step

- Start - Stop- Pause- Replay- Fast Forward

CONFIG. MANAGEMENT• Set Configuration Specifications for Nodes & Networks• Input Runtime Specifications (e.g., Timing & Synchronization)• Invoke Archive Management Tools• Optimize Parallel Processing Topology• Rapid Prototype Operator Interfaces

• Select Environment/Granularity• Define Object Associations• Define Object Missions• Define Route/Motion Specifications• Define Scripted Events• Define Object Initial States• Define/Select Rules

SCENARIO GENERATION

Wide AreaNetworks

DistributedRuntimeDatabases

Other Simulators

Real Software

Other Simulations

• Object Sensing

• Simulation Runtime Controls• Message-Passing Controls• Event Calendar Management• Module Controller• Network Controls

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TRAAC Definitions

C4ISR Messages provide the appropriate degree of correct data required to support plans & operations at a level to ensure mission success

C4ISR Messages may be pushed or pulled from designated sources whenever required to support plans & operations at a level to achieve mission success

C4ISR Messages are received within time increments that are appropriate to support conduct and execution of planning and operations that ensure mission success

C4ISR Messages provide the level of content and detail necessary for the proper conduct and execution of plans and operations to assure mission success

Accuracy

Availability

Timeliness

Completeness

Relevance

C4ISR Messages are transmitted to the appropriate command authority, via available media with the correct priority, only when required to support the conduct and execution of current plans & operations and when required to update correct situation awareness or insure mission success

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JFORCES Communications Analysis Options:

• Communications Service and Customer Demand Analysis

• Adaptive Network Link Analysis

• Packet-level/Protocol Analysis1. Requires Federation/Integration 2. Application Options include OpNet/QualNet, Network 2.5, other

Optional Communications Modes/Military Utility Analysis

1. Use JFORCES ISR/Sensor Module to Define Communications Loadingif the value of (n*ISR messages = x*Mbps) can be established for each critical C2 message type; else

2. Input communications data loadings through JFORCES Mission Planner

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Communications Service and Customer Demand Analysis

Primary Purpose:

Evaluate the capabilities of alternative Communications Architectures/Systems/Subsystems/Components to meet various user demand loading scenarios

Typical Elements:Link BudgetsOperational Duty CyclesEphemeredes for Space Assets (CommSats and Relays)Parameters that define System/Subsystem/Component CapabilitiesAlternative Bandwidth Services to Satisfy AISR Mission RequirementsAssumptions regarding message quality, security, and other measures of Performance (MOPs)Service Satisfaction and Bandwidth Capacity are primary MOEs

Relevant JFORCES Experience and Developed Capabilities

Support to NSSO (COMM/FIO) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for Airborne Intelligence/Surveillance & Reconnaissance• Developed accredited worldwide ISR collection simulation for Joint DoD and Intelligence Community Users

(2006 thru 2025 AISR and Space Satellite Programs of Record and all major planned programs/initiatives)• Cross-model V&V with Aerospace CASA and Boeing BEAST models• SCI database, scenarios and analytical results (Reference Baseline and numerous Development Alternatives)

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JFORCES Graphical Route & Duty Cycle Planner

Assets assigned to this route will attempt to communicate beginning at leg #3 for 1000 minutes each time the route is flown

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Typical Communications Supply/Demand Input

For Each Airborne User Mission & Each Communications Subsystem:Customer Name/Vehicle TypeUser Platform Initial Take-off TimeAltitudeSpeedRoute:

Waypoint to begin communications activityWaypoint to end communications activityLanding time/placeDuty Cycle (Rates/Repetitions)

Communications Medium:User Transmit Frequency (Mhz)Server Max./Min. Receive/ Transmit FrequencyBandwidth (KHz)Max. Data rate (Mbps)# Beams/Antenna # Simultaneous User ContactsNoise Temp (degK)

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JFORCES Analytical OutputsSatellites that have the number of antenna beams and compatible bandwidth to meet data rate and bandwidth capacity requirementsprovide services to current and future versionsof airborne ISR platforms IAW user prioritiesAnd allocated loading requirements

Output reports correctly depict dynamicrelationships between airborne assets and communication satellites

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JFORCES Interactive Communications Interface Display

• Provides depiction of geospatial relationships between assets

- Beam shape/dimensions

- Communications closings

- User platforms in satellite beam footprint(s)

• Visually verifies analyticalInputs & results

• Allows analyst to control simulated assets and to inject events & state changes

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JFORCES Analytical OutputsOutputs depict demand in terms of critical communications resource utilization and present the shortfalls in the current architecture in order to identify requirements for full demand loading satisfaction.

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JFORCES Analytical Outputs

Analytical outputs provide data describingthe dynamics of communications demand by band,by user type, and by individual customerand the relative robustness of the architecture,systems, subsystems and components available to respond to the demand.

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JFORCES Analytical Outputs

Summary reports detail communications capability and overall requirement satisfaction for each platform/subsystemin the scenario (by coverage and by bandwidth capacity).

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JFORCES Analytical OutputsGraphical displays describe causes and duration of failures to communicate as a result of insufficient geographical coverage, insufficient bandwidth, and/or pre-emptionby users with higher priority.

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JFORCES Analytical OutputsComparing Communications ArchitecturesThree alternative communication Architecturesare shown; each with a different level of user satisfaction…((total serviced hours/total hours of demand) X 100). This empirical MOE is included in Cost, Scalability,

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JFORCES Adaptive Communications Network Analysis

Primary Purpose:

Evaluate the capabilities of alternative Communications Networks to meet various user demand loading scenarios& identify likely impact of delays or critical message corruption on outcomes of military scenarios

Typical Elements:Operational Duty CyclesEphemeredes for Space Assets (CommSats and Relays)Parameters that define System/Subsystem/Component Capabilities at each network nodeHighly articulated Network routing and processing definitionsParameters affecting message quality, security, and other measures of Performance (MOPs)Message Quality and Network Processing Delays are primary MOEs


Support to Decision Support Center for New Triad Communications Study

• Developed Network Analysis tools for simulation & Evaluation of Joint DoD New Triad Communications Networks• Developed MOEs & MOPs for Alternative Communications Network Evaluation in Nuclear Threat Environments• Characterized Threat Environment for New Triad Joint Communications Network Evaluations

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JFORCES network analysis functionality begins when a critical event occurs, for example when an emitter is detected on a source satellite.

JFORCES objective is to ascertain if the communications networks can route the information to a decision maker

destination reliably and quickly.

Sat1Net2Sat2Net2

Sat3Net2

Sat1Net0

Sat3Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Key event detection

source

NCA

destination

sat2net3

sat1net2

sat2net1

sat1net3

sat2net2

sat1net1

sat3net3

sat3net1

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JFORCES analyzes complex communications environments, notably the interoperability between satellites, constellations, relays and ground links. Multiple routing options between satellites as well as communications suites are evaluated for the most reliable route as well as overall source-to-destination reliability.

relay

Sat1Net2Sat2Net2

Sat3Net2

Sat1Net0

Sat3Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

Sat1Net2

source

NCA

destination

sat2net3

sat1net2

sat2net1

sat1net3

sat2net2

sat1net1

sat3net3

sat3net1

relay relay

Communications Modeling Methods

Relay NCA

Ground Net 1

L4

L3

L2

Tertiary

Secondary

Primary – Route 1 Sat Net 3 (source) Sat Net 2 Sat Net 1 Ground Net 0 … NCA (destination)

Routed Through Tiers of Comm Protocols for Various Missions Evaluating Redundancy and Delays

Sat1Net2 Configuration

GeneralAsset Orbit, Type, …

Comm Suites 1: name , type 2: name, type

…

Each Consisting of Specific Assets with Detailed State and Configuration Specification

Each with one or more Comm Suites with Details to Support Detailed Analysis of:• Throughput Success• Delays• Propagation Evaluation in Adverse Environments

Loading from Scenario & non-Scenario Messages with Appropriate:• Size• Content• Format (optional)

Baseline C4ISR Architecture Strategic/Operational Support

NationalAgency

JWICS

T/C/D

SIPRNET

JIC

CJTF

T/C/P/E/A/D

JFCCs

C2

C

D

D

T/E/A

C

DCGSs

COCOMs

GCCS

AWACSJSTARS

JTIDS

NMCC

MGSCGS

InformationStore

InformationDelay

DecisionDelay

Transmission Delays Also Occurat Selected T/C/P/E/A/D Nodes

T/C/P/E/A/D – Tasking/Collection/Processing/Exploitation/Analysis/DisseminationC2 – Command and Control

BA C2 NC Information Flowto CJTF/JFCCs

T/C/P/E/A/D

OV-2

GBSIBSDDS

UFODSCS

MILSTARDSCS

CommercialKa Band

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JFORCES analyzes complex communications environments, notably the interoperability between satellites, constellations, relays and ground links. Multiple routing options between satellites as well as communications suites are evaluated for the most reliable route as well as overall source-to-destination reliability.

Relay NCARelay

Ground Net 1 Ground Net 0

L4

Link4

L3

L2

L1

Link1

Link2

Link3

Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3

Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

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Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3JFORCES Adaptive Communications Network Analysis

Configuration information will be stored for each link in a communications network.

Relay NCARelay


L4

Link4

L3

L2

L1

Link1

Link2

Link3

Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

Sat1Net2 Configuration

GeneralOrbitType…

Comm Suites 1: name , type 2: name, type

… Ancillary Information Encryption

Ground Ctl Station

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Relay NCARelay


L4

Link4

L3

L2

L1

Link1

Link2

Link3

Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

Communications Directive Chain

Tertiary

Secondary

Primary – Route 1

Sat Net 3 (source) Sat Net 2 Sat Net 1 Ground Net 0 NCA (destination)

Analyzing message routes will be based on directive chains – including pre-assigned message routes based on a network’s ability to communicate with other networks. Any number of directive chains may be defined to analyze the effectiveness of alternate routes. JFORCES will analyze system health every test interval by evaluating the chains in a pre-defined order.

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Relay NCARelay


L4

Link4

L3

L2

L1

Link1

Link2

Link3

Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

Directive Chains

Secondary Route

Primary – Communications

Directive chains will be supported for functions other than communications. Analysis of network health will also include directive chains to support the order of events required to restore the network from an event trigger. The analysis addresses five critical functions: Force mgmt (FM), Assignment, Training, Deployment, Maintenance and Logistics, as the information is provided. It will provide outcome statistics based on analysis in regular intervals, with logistical considerations including locating applicable ground control station(s) and acquiring repair authorization, to assessments of point attacks and area-wide attacks.

Tertiary Route

Primary – Damage Control Primary – Maintenance

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Relay NCARelay


L4

Link4

L3

L2

L1

Link1

Link2

Link3

Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

In the event of an outage, for example an ASAT destroying or disabling a satellite, JFORCES will analyze the best alternate route(s) and evaluate the loss in terms of overall system health. This analysis also applies to outages due to a failure on the satellite, jamming, or NUDET.

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Relay NCARelay


L4

L3

L2

L1

Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

JFORCES analyzes Probability of Correct Message Receipt (PCMR) reception from end to end, as well as the individual links between each relay point. For example in this illustration, Sat2Net3 detects an event. On Route1, a PCMR will be calculated at Sat2Net2 for Link1, Sat3Net1 for Link2, as well as the PCMR at the destination (the whole route). Where multiple comm suites apply, PCMR’s will be calculated for each comm suite. Values are based on

environmental conditions, including satellite condition, nudet, and jamming. Probability of Acceptable Message can be distinguished from PCMR’s if desired.

PCMR=99.0 Link4

PCMR=99.8 Link2

PCMR=99.5 Link3

PCMR=99.9Link1

Route 1 PCMR=98.2

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Relay NCARelay


Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

Redundancy will be handled as established criteria through multiple routes to the destination. Where Route 1 and 2 may provide 98.2% and 97.9% PCMR, their composite PCMR will be 99.96%:PCMR Route 1 = 98.2%, so PF Route 1 = 1.8%

PCMR Route 2 = 97.9%, so PF Route 2 = 2.1%

PCMR Combined & Independent = 100*(1-.018*.021) = 99.96%

PCMR=99.0 Link4

PCMR=99.8 Link2

PCMR=99.5 Link3

PCMR=99.9Link1

Route 1 PCMR=98.2

PCMR=99.9 L1

PCMR=99.0 L2

PCMR=99.6 L3

PCMR=99.4 L4

Route 2 PCMR=97.9

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Relay NCARelay


Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

In some cases the PCMRs are not independent, but share resources. In this case an alternate combined probability of comm failure is compared. Where: Pf Combined & Independent = 100*(1-.018*.021) = 99.96%

Given a .1% shared resource:Pf Combined, 0.1% Shared Pf = (100-0.1)*(1-.017*.020) = 99.866%

PCMR=99.0 Link4

PCMR=99.8 Link2

PCMR=99.5 Link3

PCMR=99.9Link1

Route 1 PCMR=98.2

PCMR=99.9 L1

PCMR=99.0 L2

PCMR=99.6 L3

PCMR=99.4 L4

Route 2 PCMR=97.9

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Relay NCARelay


Sat Net 1

Sat Net 2

Sat Net 3


Route1

Route2

Key event detection

Route3

Route4

JFORCES can also analyze PCMR within the guidelines of acceptable delivery time to destination. Delays can be calculated in to the analysis. While instantiation and recognition delays can be a factor, JFORCES will only analyze transmission and relay delays.

PCMR=99.0 Link4

PCMR=99.8 Link2

PCMR=99.5 Link3

PCMR=99.9Link1

Route 1 PCMR=98.2

PCMR=99.9 L1

PCMR=99.0 L2

PCMR=99.6 L3

PCMR=99.4 L4

Route 2 PCMR=97.9

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Study Methods

1. Each initial point in a subnet is be considered a potential data source from the #1 (source subnet) directive chain.

2. in the same way, each end point/destination in the last directive chain subnet, is a potential sink

3. For each directive chain the analyst specifies a test interval.4. A communication from each potential data source will be tested to any

destination (sink) at every test interval.

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PCMR

time

Healthy system

99.9%

99.5%

The JFORCES analysis will be summarized into brief displays and/or reports. If Mission Criteria specifies 99.9% for a healthy system, then we will detect when a network can maintain that level of reliability from a data source to the destination.

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PCMR

time

Healthy system

99.9%

99.5%

If greater detail is desired to reflect the health of the system, JFORCES could provide detail for any given point in time on the summary chart, by indicating the reliability of all of the satellites in the network at that given time, with a best, median, and worst case noted.

Distribution

Satellite Reliability in the Network

25%

75%

95%

median

best

worst

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PCMR

time

Healthy system

99.9%

99.5%

Additional analysis can be performed to evaluate the reliability of communications given a particular satellite failure, or two, or three simultaneous satellite failures.

add Sat1 Net3 failureadd Sat 4 Net0 failureadd Net3 Sat2

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Mission Success Criteria

Healthy System

Situation 99.0% 99.3% 99.5% 99.9%

100% 100% 100% 95%

Sat1Net3 failure

100% 98% 95% 80%

Sat 4 Net0failure

Net3 Sat2failure

98% 95% 93% 77%

89% 85% 78% 60%

Ultimately we can produce a chart indicating the probability of acceptable reliability based on the particular test situations and the criteria provided to indicate mission success.

The 93% in the 99.5% column, row “Sat 4 Net0 failure”, indicates that if the mission success criteria has been indicated to be 99.5%, then the System will be reliable only 93% of the time when the system has a Sat4 Net0 AND Sat1 Net3 failure.

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Mission Success Criteria can be reported for multiple conditions and architectures for comparison.

Architecture C:

Architecture B:

Architecture A:

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Loading the Test Data into JFORCES

Data inputs can be broken down into:

1. Scenario data (probably already set, so we’ll ignore it for now)

2. Communications Suite Dataa. Platform Definitionsb. Communications Suite characteristics

3. Network Definition

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Communication Suite Data

First requirement is for a Communications Suite to Platform Type MapWe can read this in from a simple flat file (preferably comma separated)

Limitations -Platform name must be no longer than 16 characters-Basic Platform Definition (e.g. is it a ground base or a satellite) must be provided-Communications Subsystem name must be no longer than 16 characters-Communications data (defined below) must be roughed out, though subsequent updates are easily made.

Communications Suite Definition Must be in Accordance with Stratcam Requirements

(described on the next page)

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Network DefinitionNetworks (and associated tests) are defined in a three-tier approach, each with a related database table. The info below is just a review to the approach described earlier in this presentation.

Tests – This defines the tests to be run, success criteria, and test interval

Directives – This defines the series of networks to used to accommodate a function (e.g. satellite maintenance or Early Warning). This includes the networks to be used, how they’re to be employed, the order of communications, and any alternate routing that can be employed

Network Assets – This specifies all entities that are part of a named network. A network is not necessarily a complete route to accomplish a directive; instead it can just be a set of entities used to relay the message through one part of the communications path.

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42

Packet-level and Protocol Analysis

Primary Purpose:

Evaluate the design and performance of alternative Communications Architectures/Systems/Subsystems/Components Including message processing and node design issues at the network nodes

Typical Elements:Network Protocols and message processing parametersProcessor and peripheral hardware/software descriptions and parametersParameters that define Network System/Subsystem/Component CapabilitiesHighly detailed hardware/software concepts related to message quality, security, and other measures of Performance (MOPs)Message management, processing delays, message delivery and quality measures are primary MOEs


Developed and implemented mature and fully functional HWIL/SWIL capabilities with near plug-and-play interfaces to manyMilitary & IC systems

Developed and successfully implemented message-based simulation framework with interfaces to live/virtual/constructive Applications

Demonstrated data coupling capabilities with OPNET applications

Developed MCO-2 simulation and integration/federation concept fro JCS/DSC for evaluation of Nuclear C2 and Defense Global Network (DGN)

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Application of M&S to Essential Elements of Analysis

Question Capability Assessment

Short Description of Approach Metrics

1.1 Performance Against Fixed Levels of Attack

High JFORCES- Architecture and NWE

OPNET-Sim of IP-based network performance

1.2 Impact of time to generate and number of users

High Same as 1.1

1.3 Availability of information at key nodes

High Same as 1.1

2.1 Compare system performance with respect to strategic warning time

Medium OPNET-Sim of IP-based network performance with emphasis on IW response

JFORCES- Architecture and NWE

3.1 Compare system performance with respect to tactical warning time

Medium Same as 2.1- related analyses

4.1 Perf of system architectures with respect to gateways

High JFORCES-Architecture and NWE

5.1 Compare system arch. with regard to NTPC and STPC criteria

High JFORCES- Architecture and NWE

OPNET-Sim of IP-based network performance with emphasis on IW response

6.1 Evaluate survivability of functionality

Low This problem does not lend itself to M&S-based analysis

Model Capabilities that are Applicable

• JFORCES model for Military Utility Analysis— Use Existing MCO-2 Scenario and Add Nuclear Engagement— Import Previously Developed EAM Model— Sim Includes NWE Model for RF Propagation and Physical Damage— Can simulate point-to-point networks

• OPNET/QUALNET used to simulate the IP-Based Behavior of the DGN— OPNET/QUALNET contains modules to perform IP-based network

analysis— Detailed node stack and process models are available— Provides delay distribution data back to JFORCES

• Metrics to be collected include PCMR and aggregate delay for the networks being compared

1. Survivability, Flexibility and Utility Comparison1.1 Compare Legacy NuclearC2 and Defense Global Network (DGN) Performance Against Fixed Levels of Attack and Impacts on Desired Strategic Effects and Metrics1.2 Examine Impact of Time to Generate and Number of Users on legacy NC2 and DGN performance1.3 Compare availability of information at key nodes with legacy NC2 and the DGN against fixed levels of adversary attack and impacts on desired strategic effects and metrics

• Analytical Approach— NC2 Performance

Using the MCO-2 Scenario previously developed for the JFORCES model, the operation of NC2 at fixed levels of attack with respect to agreed-to metrics like PCMR and throughput will be analyzed

— DGN Performance We will then model the DGN using OPNET, a commercial network tool that

is used extensively within the government The DGN will be analyzed for MOPs of throughput and delay performance These MOPs will then be passed back into JFORCES to determine the

Military Utility of this network configuration After a baseline run to collect unperturbed metrics, JFORCES will then be

run at the first threat level to determine the nodes that are debilitated These nodes will then be debilitated in the OPNET model and the model will

be re-run to determine the effect on the MOPs of this degraded network. This process is repeated for as many threat levels as required

— Metrics to be collected and compared include PCMR and aggregate delay against each attack for each network

2. Compare Network Response to Alert2.1 Compare performance of DGN and legacy NC2 as a function of strategic warning alert time, time to generate, probability of false alarm and ability to sustain generated posture and impacts on desired strategic effects and metrics.

3. Compare Network Response to Alert 3.1 Compare performance of DGN and legacy NC2 with and without strategic and tactical warning and impacts on desired strategic effects and metrics .

• Analytical Approach— Need two simulation steps for each network

Without Strategic/Tactical Alert– Nodes are more vulnerable and susceptible to damage

Physical IW Disruption (EMP, Jamming)

— Model usage will parallel task 1 where JFORCES is used to evaluate the NC2 using previously developed scenario and OPNET is used in conjunction with JFORCES to evaluate DGN performance

Metrics on network performance such as PCMR and total aggregate delay can be collected and analyzed

4. Utility of Gateways4.1 Compare performance of DGN with given number and types of gateways against

fixed levels of adversary attack and impacts on desired strategic effects and metrics.

• Analytical Approach— Use JFORCES model for Military Utility Analysis

Reuse Existing MCO-2 Scenario Add Nuclear Engagement and Gateway Architectures to be

evaluated Metrics such as PCMR will be basis for comparison of

architectural alternatives

5. Compare Performance Against Criteria5.1 Compare performance of DGN and legacy NC2 with respect to NTPC and STPC criteria, identifying risk against all four strategic challenges

• Analytical Approach— Determine an analytical subset of the NTPC and STPC

parameters that are applicable to the four strategic challenges — Develop scripts to access the appropriate data from the post-

simulation database— The model processing flow is similar to task 1 where JFORCES

and OPNET are used in tandem to model the operation of the networks being compared

49

M&S Approach uses complimentary strengths of our models

• OPNET/QUALNET provides detailed modeling of IP-based networks like the DGN

• JFORCES provides military utility, natural and induced environments and automated metric generation

OPNET/QualNet• IP-Based Networks

• Detailed TCP/IP Stack Model•Node Process Model•IW Effects (DOS, …)

JFORCES• Military Utility• Environments• Delay Model

From JFORCES to OPNET/QualNet• Architecture• NWE on RF Links• Message Parameters

From OPNET/QualNet to JFORCES • Network Delays• Throughput

Additional Data Required

• Operational definition of Strategic Effects and Metrics

• Updated WESCOM/DTRA ASSIST/RFPROP code for integration into JFORCES

• Architecture of NC2 and DGN including node and link parameters and locations, hardness, network loads and node processing. NC2 Data was developed in a previous effort.

• Definition of: Minimal Essential Functions” and priorities

51

52

Employing JFORCES to Evaluate Architectures & Support MUA

Look/DetectNon-Cooperative

Information Gathering

Engage

Analyze/Plan

Direct

Decide

The Scenario dictates a series of interrelated, localized action streams defining Offensive and Defensive Operations. Each of these

actions is evaluated using low-level (engineering-level) models

these small operations is folded into the ongoing scenario to provide the basis for C4ISR Evaluation, Operations Analysis, Military Utility Analysis, and realistic Architectural Capability Assessment

The Situation and Time-based results of each of

Orient/Assess

Communicate

53

The Scenario Defines the Requirements and Provides a Basis for Architectural Evaluation & MUA

Scenario Generates Communications Requirement

Scenario Deployment and Architecture Define Possibilities

System, Threat, and Environmental Attributes Define Local Success

Information Permits (or Improves) Attack

Results are Maintained for Architectural Comparison

The Success (or Failure) of Each Mission Feeds Back into the

Scenario to Change Operations

54

Scenario Specification Permits Detailed Evaluation Using Natural Interrogation Methods

Scenario Context Provides:• Who• Why• When• Where• How

What

Who

How

Architectural Elements are Tasked in an Understandable Why, Who, What, Where, When, and How Approach

• Engineering Models are used to Define the “How” Component

The Amphibious Assault Vignette Is Evaluated in the Context of the Overall Scenario

TMDIADS

ForcePreservation& Counter AirOperationsFo

rce

Mob

iliza

tion

Sovremeny Destroyer Screen (Naval SAMs)

Convoy (Mixed Military Vessels with Some

Commercial Transports)

It’s a Busy Scenario with Many Missions Contending for Communications Resources. All Missions are Modeled in this Evaluation, But Mission Success in Stopping the Amphibious Assault is the MOP

Without Adequate Targeting Information Red Destroyers will Severely Cripple the F-5 Force Assigned to Engage the Amphibious Elements

• Red’s Initial SSM Surprise Attack Against Blue Airbases and AD Reduces Blue’s Air Power Initially• Most of the Blue Ally’s Naval Forces have been Disabled at the Commencement of Red’s Attack.• Remaining Blue Air Power Focuses on Other Missions (Notably Defensive Counter Air). • Blue’s ROE Requires Unambiguous EO Confirmation of Targets Prior to Attack• The Only Assets Assigned to Attack the Initial Amphibious Assault are:

o 20 F-5’so 20 Ship-borne Harpoons

Communications Linkages

This Architecture Leads to the Following US Strategic Implementation in this Vignette:

To support this tactical information dissemination in the Blue Ally’s Possession

Including a combination of:Satellites (Milstar, DSCS, and/or improvements)Mobile and Fixed Ground StationsKey Fixed C4 installations Combining RF, land lines, and possible laser comm

Communications Priorities

Communications Prioritization In this Vignette is Predicated on the Threat Immediacy. The Resultant Priorities are:

1. Early Warning2. Force Preservation3. TMD4. IADS5. Attacking the Amphibious Force6. Force Mobilization7. All Others

Comm Success dictates Operational Options. In this defense Operational MOPs include:— Red Amphibious Assault Craft Lost— Blue Losses Attacking the Red Amphibious Assault

Operational Effects of Communications in this Vignette

Red Amphibious Losses are significantly higher with reduced communications delays.

• Only the landing vessel results are shown here, but the associated transport costs seriously hamper the invasion.

Preliminary

Operational Rationale for Communications Effects in this Vignette

Information to vector aircraft to the assault group is available at all communication levels. The difference is the ability to successfully use the Harpoons against the destroyers. The strait is a busy shipping lane, so the requirement for unambiguous EO detection for targeting is demanding. The Harpoon’s limited terminal acquisition basket and destroyers’ high speed and assumed non-linear path requires that imagery be delivered in-theater within 5 minutes.

• Without this imagery the F-5’s must attack the Amphibious force unsupported— The Destroyers are adept at shooting down F-5s

• With the imagery for confirmation and identification the Harpoons can be directed against the Destroyers.

— Given an initial attack by Harpoons to weaken the Destroyer screen, the F-5s can focus on the Amphibious Landing Vehicles. This increases both their effectiveness and survivability

Effects of Communications on Blue Losses in this Vignette Blue Losses are less with improved communications,

although not as dramatic as the Red Kills. But the extra 10 F-5’s surviving with better communications will hamper Red’s Amphibious operations using commercial shipping on subsequent days.

Preliminary

Communications Metrics

Composite Network Loading for US ISR and Force Protection. Results are in bps. The spikes correspond to the SSM flights, but additional monitoring clearly requires significant bandwidth at the beginning of hostilities

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Communication Metrics (con’t)

• These two Charts indicate the System network routing and processing delays that resulted in the inability of the Harpoons to be targeted on the destroyers with unambiguous data

Baseline Improved Communications

Note: The black line in each diagram indicates the mean delay, and the grey lines indicate the 90% and 50 % populations

Documents

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