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The right of access to information and the South African intelligence services
Sandy Africa
Well-kept SecretS
Institute for
Global Dialogue
The right of access to information and the South African intelligence services
Sandy Africa
Well-keptSecretS
Jointly published by:
Institute for Global Dialogue IGD House, Thornhill Office Park Bekker Street, Vorna Valley Midrand, South AfricaP O Box 32571, Braamfontein 2017Tel +27 11 315-1299 Fax +27 11 315-2149 info@igd.org.za www.igd.org.za
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique Office Avenida Tomás Nduda 1313Maputo, Mozambique Tel: +258 214 912 31 Fax: +258 214 902 86 fes@tvcabo.co.mz
First impression in May 2009
© Copyright in the text vests in the author.© Copyright in this published work vests in the publisher.
All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged.
ISBN: 978-1-920216-22-1
Designed and produced by Acumen Publishing Solutions, JohannesburgPrinted by Paarl Print
Contents
Preface 9Foreword 11Introduction 15
Part OneContext and background
Chapter 1: Secrecy and transparency in the governance of intelligence 31 services
Chapter 2: The policy framework for official secrecy prior to 1994 47
Chapter 3: The transition to democracy, and its implications for intelligence 64 accountability and transparency
Part TwoThe new dispensation
Chapter 4: Mechanisms facilitating access to information about the 87 intelligence services
Chapter 5: PAIA and its implications for the intelligence services 97
Chapter 6: The intelligence services and the right of access to information: 115 three case studies
Part ThreeLessons, conclusions, and policy recommendations
Chapter 7: Comparative international experiences 135
Chapter 8: Conclusion and policy recommendations 149
Interviews and references 166
ACRonYMs AnD ABBReVIAtIons
AC AmalgamationCommittee
ADS AfricanDefenceSystems(Pty)Ltd
ANC AfricanNationalCongress
AU AfricanUnion
BOSS BureauforStateSecurity
CCII CCIISystems(Pty)Ltd
CDRC Classification/DeclassificationReviewCommittee
CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency
CODESA ConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfrica
COSATU CongressofSouthAfricanTradeUnions
COMSEC ElectronicSecurityCommunications(Pty)Ltd,2002
CSIS CanadianSecurityIntelligenceService
DOD DepartmentofDefence
DOJ DepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment
DIO DeputyInformationOfficer
DIS DepartmentofIntelligenceandSecurity
DMI DirectorateofMilitaryIntelligence
DMI DivisionofMilitaryIntelligence
EU EuropeanUnion
FOIA FreedomofInformationAct
GFC GermanFrigateConsortium
HOCS HeadsofCivilianServices
HRC HumanRightsCommission
IAAC InformationActAdvisoryCommittee
ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights
ICD IntelligenceCoordinationDivision
Acronyms AnD AbbrevIAtIons / 7
IO InformationOfficer
ISCOR IronandSteelCorporation
ISSUP InstituteforStrategicStudies,UniversityofPretoria
IRC InterdepartmentalReviewCommittee
JCIC JointCoordinatingIntelligenceCommittee
JSCI JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence
KGB Komityet Gosudarstvyennoi Biezopasnosti (Committee forState
Security)
MISS MinimumInformationSecurityStandards
NGO Non-governmentalOrganisation
NIA NationalIntelligenceAgency
NCC NationalCommunicationsCentre
NICOC NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee
NIS NationalIntelligenceService
NP NationalParty
NSA NationalSecurityAgency
NSMS NationalSecurityManagementSystem
OAU OrganisationofAfricanUnity
OB OssewaBrandwag
PAC PanAfricanistCongress
PAIA PromotionofAccesstoInformationAct,2000
PFMA PublicFinanceManagementAct,1999
PKO PeacekeepingOperation
RCMP RoyalCanadianMountedPolice
RSA RepublicofSouthAfrica
SACP SouthAfricanCommunistParty
SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
SADF SouthAfricanDefenceForce
SAHA SouthAfricanHistoryArchive
SANAI SouthAfricanNationalAcademyofIntelligence
8 / Acronyms AnD AbbrevIAtIons
SANDF SouthAfricanNationalDefenceForce
SAP SouthAfricanPolice
SAPS SouthAfricanPoliceService
SARS SouthAfricanRevenueService
SASS SouthAfricanSecretService
SIRC SecurityIntelligenceReviewCommittee
SSAC StateSecurityAdvisoryCouncil
SSC StateSecurityCouncil
TBVC Transkei,Bophuthatswana,Venda,Ciskei
TEC TransitionalExecutiveCouncil
TRC TruthandReconciliationCommission
UDF UnionDefenceForce
UDF UnitedDemocraticFront
UN UnitedNations
UNITA NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola
USA UnitedStatesofAmerica
USSR UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics
WHAM WinningHeartsandMinds
Civilian intelligence services are oftenperceivedasoccupyingarecondite
world,characterisedbysecrecy,ambiguity,andconcealment.Butnotalways
understood is that they are subject to stringent oversight and accountability
imperatives,whichareoftenlegallyenshrined.Accesstoinformationisthusan
importantnormativeaspirationforanysocietythatseekstopromotethevirtues
ofdemocracy.Oneoftheseistherightofthepublictoknowaboutthenatureof
intelligenceworkwithregardtoitspolicy,operationalandregulatorydimensions.
Thistakesonaddedmeaningandrelevanceindefiningtheparametersofhow
politicalpowerisexercisedandmanaged.
ThecaseofSouthAfricaisthusespeciallyintriguing,interestingandimportant.
Thestate’spreviouscivilianintelligenceapparatusoccupiedthedarkrecessesof
illegality,whereithelpedtoupholdandprotecttheapartheidregimeanditssecu-
ritydictates.Inthecurrentdispensation,ithasemergedintothebroaddaylightof
beingsubjecttopublicscrutiny,transparency,anddemocraticaccountability.How-
ever,astheauthortrenchantlyargues,thischangedrealityshouldnotmaskthe
persistenceofawkwarddilemmas,tensionsandambivalencesinlaw,policyand
practice.Indeed,thesewillcontinuetodefinethechallengeshighlightedinthis
enquiry,cruciallygiventhattherulingparty,theAfricanNationalCongress,hadits
ownintelligencesystemsandculturewhileconductingitsstruggleforliberation.
Rich in texture and nuance, judiciously balanced by the perspectives of a
formerpractitionerandscholar,andinformedbycomparativeexperiences,this
bookrepresentsapioneeringattempttoimposeanalyticalandnormativeorder
onhowconstitutionalprerogativeshaveshapedtheinterfacebetweenthecivilian
intelligencearchitectureandaccesstoinformationinthefirstdecadeofSouth
Africa’stransitiontodemocracy.
TheFriedrichEbertStiftungandtheInstituteforGlobalDialoguehavecome
together inacollaborativespirit tomake thispublicationpossible.This isnot
only indicative of their recognising the value of this book but also reflects an
abidingcommitmenttobringitintothepublicdomainwhereitdeservesawide
readership.
PReFACe
10 / PrefAce
Manfred Öhm
Resident Representative
FES: Mozambique
Garth le Pere
Executive Director
IGD: South Africa
Wetakethisopportunitytothanktheauthor,ProfSandyAfrica,forhercoop-
erationthroughoutaswellasherdedicationinupdatingthestudywithnewand
relevantmaterial.ThelastwordofgratitudeisreservedforRiaandeVillierswho
ablyturnedadoctoraldissertationintoahighlyengagingandreadablenarrative.
This volume is based onmydoctoraldissertation,andrepresentsanattemptto
makethestudyasaccessibleaspossibletoawideraudience.Ihopeitwillbe
readbymembersoftheSouthAfricanintelligenceservices,pastandpresent,and
thattheywillfinditafairrepresentationofthewayinwhichthepost-apartheid
civilianintelligencedispensationcameintobeing,andhowthechallengesthat
emergedinthecourseofthatprocesshavebeenaddressed.Ialsohopeitwillbe
readby,andbenefit,otherpolicyactors–theexecutive,membersofparliament,
andmembersofhumanrightsbodies–aswellasstudentsinpolicyandsecurity
studies.
Mostimportantly,Ihopethatmembersofthepublic,whomayhavebeenmys-
tifiedorintriguedbythelimitedinformationabouttheSouthAfricanintelligence
servicesinthepublicdomain,willfeelinclinedtoexplorethisstudy.Certainly,
members of the international policy community have displayed considerable
interestintheSouthAfricanmodelof‘securitysectorreform’,thecatchphrase
forinclusiveeffortstosubjectsecurityinstitutionstouniversallyagreedinstru-
mentsofcontrol,accountability,andoversight.OtherAfricancountriesemerging
fromconflicthavealsodisplayedaninterestintheSouthAfricanexperience,as
haveanalystsandothersinmorestablesocietieswitharenewedinterestinthe
accountabilityoftheirsecurityandintelligenceinstitutions.Ihopethisbookwill
enrichtheirenquiries.
Manypeoplehavecontributedtoitsevolution.ProfessorGavinCawthrawas
anunassumingyetknowledgeablesupervisorduring the lengthydoctoraldis-
sertation process. Several of my bosses in the intelligence services, including
Tim Dennis, director-general of the South African Secret Service (SASS), and
LindiweSisuluandRonnieKasrils,ministers for the intelligenceservices,suc-
cumbedtomyratherimpertinentrequestsforsabbaticalleave.Interviewsand
discussionswereaninvaluablesourceofinformation.Iinterviewedorhelddis-
cussionswithexpertsinvolvedindraftingthePromotionofAccesstoInformation
Act(PAIA);officialsoftheDepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment,
theleaddepartmentresponsibleforimplementingtheAct;theheadoftheSouth
FoRewoRD
12 / foreworD
AfricanNationalArchives;constitutionalandstatutorybodiesaimedatensuring
transparencyandaccountability,includingtheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCom-
missionandtheOfficeoftheAuditor-General;freedomofinformationadvocacy
groups,suchastheSouthAfricanHistoryArchiveTrust,ontheirexperienceof
gainingaccesstoinformationheldbythestate;andseniorofficialsoftheintel-
ligence services, on their implementation of the constitutional and legislative
requirementsforaccesstostateinformation.
Myownpositionasaseniormanagerintheintelligenceservicesprovidedme
withaccesstorelevantofficialsandpolicyactors.Atthesametime,Ioftenexperi-
encedadegreeoftensionbetweenbeingpartofthesystemandexplainingaway
itsfailures,andadoptingamorecriticalperspectivewithaviewtostimulating
debateandencouraginghigherstandardsofaccountability.
Colleagues, friends, and family members who shaped or shared my ideas,
helpedtosourceinformation,orcommentedonpartsoftheearlierdissertation
includedVerneHarris,PinglaUdit,WayneHendricks,DennisDlomo,Kerenza
Millard,RachmatRassool,LornaDaniels,JenniferBrady,HowardVarney,Taki
Netshitenzhe,WillemHanekom,andRieaz(Moe)Shaik.SiyabongaCweleand
ZolaNgcakanioftheintelligenceoversightcommunityencouragedmetopub-
lish the dissertation. The late Joe Nhlanhla personified the new intelligence
dispensation,andtheframeworkcraftedunderhisleadershipandthoseofother
visionariesacrossthepoliticaldivideinspiredmetoperseverewiththedisser-
tationandthisbook,inasmallefforttopreservethevisionandidealismofthe
earlyefforts.TheseidealshavespreadacrossAfrica,wherethereisasteadybut
growingappreciationoftheneedforintelligencereform,andwhereSouthAfrica’s
modesteffortsinthisregardarebeingemulatedandeven–withthebenefitof
hindsight–improvedupon.
Ireceivedencouragementfrommanyothers,aswellasspaceandpatientbid-
ingattheUniversityofPretoriafromProfessorMaxiSchoeman.Moralsupport
andencouragementwereprovidedingenerousamountsbymyhusband,Vejay;
mychildren;myfatherandsiblings,evenastheenddrewnearformyterminally
illmother;andrelativesandfriends.
IamgratefultotheInstituteforGlobalDialogue(IGD)foragreeingtopublish
thebook,andtotheFriedrichEbertStiftung(FES)foragreeingtofinanceit.I
alsowishtothankRiaandeVilliers,whoexpertlyguidedtheconversionofastiff
academicdissertationintoamoreconversational,morereadable,andhopefully
moreinterestingtext,andhisteamatAcumenPublishingSolutionsforproducing
anattractiveandeasilyreadablebook.Atthesametime,Iremainresponsiblefor
whateverinaccuraciesanddeficienciesmayremain.
foreworD / 13
Abookonthistopicbegsthequestionofwhatimpactintelligencehasonthe
livesofordinarycitizens,andwhetherandhowtheyshouldinfluencethedebate
ontheroleofthesekindsofinstitutions.Intheend,IamnotsurewhetherIhave
answeredthisquestion.Iarguetheneedforacomprehensivesetofpolicymeas-
uresaimedatbroadeningthepublic’sunderstandingof,andcapacitytodiscuss
andengagewiththeintelligenceservices.Aninformedpublicisthemosteffective
waytoensurethatstatestructureswithsuchpotentpowersareheldtoaccount.
Iarguethatsuchapolicyshouldprovideaclearframeworkintermsofwhich
informationshouldbeprotectedfromdisclosure,or,toputitmoredirectly,the
conditionsunderwhichsecrecyshouldbeallowed.Ontheotherhand,public
policyshouldalsoprovideclearcriteriafordecidingwheninformationnolonger
requiressuchprotection.Whilesomewouldprobablydisagree,Iarguethatintel-
ligence services have a legitimate role in South Africa’s new democracy. The
challengeistoensurethattheydonotunderminetheverydemocracythattheir
chartersrequirethemtoprotect.
Followingdecadesofsecrecy,promotingaccesstoinformationisarelatively
newexperienceforSouthAfrica.Itisparticularlychallenginginanareasuchas
intelligence,whichhastraditionallybeenclosedtopublicscrutiny.Balancingthe
roleofthestateinensuringthesecurityandwell-beingofitscitizensandthecon-
stitutionalrightofcitizenstoaccessinformationheldbythestateinvolvesdifficult
choices.However,thehistoryofunaccountableandsecretiveconductonthepart
ofSouthAfricansecurityactorssuggeststhatpolicyactors ingovernmentand
elsewhereshouldcontinuetoregardthisasanationalpriority.
Sandy Africa
April2009
32. Access to information
Everyone has the right of access to any information held by
the state …
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this
right …
36. Limitation of rights
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of law of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom …
… Except as provided in subsection (1), or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right
entrenched in the Bill of Rights …
Extracts from the Bill of Rights, Chapter 2, Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa
IN 1994 South Africa emergedfromaperiodofminorityrulecharacterisedby
excessivegovernmentsecrecyandthedenialofbasichumanrights.Onesuch
rightwastherightofaccesstoinformationgeneratedandheldbythestate.While
post-apartheidgovernmentshavebeenfarmoretransparentthantheirpredeces-
sors,policy-makersofthenewpoliticalorderhavenotreflectedadequatelyon
theimplicationsoftransparencyfortheintelligenceservices.Consequently,South
Africa does not have an explicit and coherent policy on access to information
abouttheintelligenceservices,ortheinformationtheyholdorgenerate.Among
otherthings,itisnotaltogetherclearwhatinformationorrecordscreatedorheld
bytheintelligenceservicesneedtobeprotected,fromwhom,andwhy.
Asaresultofthispolicyvacuum,thepost-apartheidintelligenceserviceshave
beenambivalentaboutandinconsistentinapplyingtheconstitutionalprinciple
oftheuniversalrightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,aswellaslegisla-
tionaimedatgivingeffecttoit.Oneconsequenceofthisisthatcitizensaswell
asorganisationsfunctioninginthepublicspheredonotalwaysunderstandtheir
rightsinthisrespect;specifically,theyoftendonotunderstandthattherecordsof
theintelligenceservicesareinfactpublicrecords.
Theconcernedcitizen,however,wouldwanttoknowthefollowing:whatare
themechanismsformanagingtherecordsoftheintelligenceservices?Arethese
filedsafelyandsecurelysothattheycanberetrievedwhenneeded–forinstance,
whenthoseservicesreceiverequestsforaccesstoinformation?Dotheservices
actuallyknowwhatrecordstheyhave,andgiventhesecrecyinvolvedinintelli-
gence,isitpossibleforthemtoknow?Aretherecordstamper-proof?Whatisthe
retentionsanddisposalspolicyoftheintelligenceservices,andunderwhatcondi-
tions,ifany,arerecordsreleasedforpublicconsumption?
Anotherlayerofquestionsrelatestosecrecy.Whichdocumentsareclassified
assecretorconfidential,andwhy?Whotakesthesedecisions,andunderwhat
authority?Forhowlongmaysuchdocumentsbeclassifiedassecret,andwhat
happensifthisstatusisnolongernecessary?Lastly,isthereanyoversightofwhat
happenstotheserecords,andhowcanthepublicbeassuredthattheircustodian-
shipisingoodhands?
IntRoDuCtIon
16 / IntroDuctIon
BACkgRounD
Priorto1994theSouthAfricanintelligenceserviceswerevirtuallyimmunefrom
publicscrutiny.TheOfficialSecretsActsof1912and1956,theSecurityIntelli-
genceandStateSecurityCouncilActof1972,theBureauforStateSecurityActof
1978,theProtectionofInformationActof1982,andvariouslawsrelatingtothe
financingofthesecurityservicesallservedtodrawaveilofsecrecyaroundthem
(Mathews1978;Africa1992).
The post-apartheid constitution – which came into force in 1996 – estab-
lishedanumberofinstitutionsaimedatsupportingarights-basedconstitutional
democracy. These include a Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission,
the Commission for Gender Equality, the Commission for the Promotion and
ProtectionoftheRightsofCultural,ReligiousandLinguisticCommunities,the
Auditor-General,andtheIndependentElectoralCommission(Constitution,1996,
chapter9).
Thestatutebookhasbeenextensivelyrevisedtoalign itwiththeconstitu-
tion.Hundredsofapartheidlawshavebeenrepealedormodified,andnewlaws
adopted.SomeprovideforinstitutionsaimedatpromotingandupholdingtheBill
ofRights.Forexample,arisingoutofaconstitutionalprovision,theIntelligence
ServicesControlActof1994providesfortheestablishmentofamultipartyparlia-
mentaryoversightcommitteeandtheappointmentofinspectors-generaltasked
withinvestigatingcomplaintsagainsttheservicesbymembersofthepublic.
The new constitution also stipulated that national legislation should be
introducedtogiveeffecttotherightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,
resultingintheadoptionofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct(PAIA)
of2000.Thislawrequiresstatesecurityorganstoactivelydiscloseinformation
aboutthemselves,andrespondtorequestsforaccesstotheirrecords.However,
someobserversarguethatthesecurityservicescontinuetoresistdisclosure,thus
underminingtheconstitutionalprincipleofaccesstoinformation(Harris2002;
Currie&Klaaren2002).
Gearingthepost-apartheidintelligenceservicestowardsdischargingtheircon-
stitutionalobligationstoimplementPAIAcarriessignificantchallengesinrespect
ofcapacity.TheActisrelativelycomplex,anditsimplementationrequires,among
otherthings,theproductionofmanuals;acapacitytorespondinatimelyfashion
torequestsforaccesstorecords;anabilitytoprocessappeals,alongsidetherole
ofthecourtswhichmustbecomeinvolvedwhenrequesterswishtoseekrecourse
tojustice;andcompliancewithasystemofannualreporting(McKinley2004).
In 1995 the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the South African Secret
Service(SASS),andtheNationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee(NICOC)
IntroDuctIon / 17
were established, constituting the civilian intelligence sector. Since 2000 the
sectorhasbeensignificantlyexpandedwiththeformationoftheSouthAfrican
National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI); Electronic Communications Secu-
rity(Pty)Limited; theOfficefor InterceptionCentres(OIC);andtheNational
Communications Centre (NCC). It is safe to assume that the secret records of
theintelligenceserviceshavegrownexponentially.Publicignoranceandintelli-
genceserviceambiguityarelikelytopersistuntilclearpolicyguidelinesforthe
managementofdifferentcategoriesofrecordsheldbytheintelligenceservices
areformulatedandmadeknown.Giventhesecrecysurroundingtheintelligence
services,andthepotentialforabusethatsuchsecrecycarries,citizensmustbe
assuredthatthereareclearparametersandpolicyguidelinesfortheexerciseof
secrecyandtransparency.
the AIM oF the stuDY
Whenoneassesseswhethertheintelligenceserviceshavecompliedwiththeircon-
stitutionalobligationsinthefirstdecadeoftheirexistence–thatis,from1995
to2004–itappearsthatboththeservicesandrelevantpolicy-makershavebeen
ambiguousabouthowappropriateandmeaningfullevelsoftransparencyshould
bepursued,andunderwhatconditionstheservicesmayinvokearighttosecrecy.
Amorepessimisticanalysiswouldbethatthewayinwhichtheintelligenceserv-
iceshaveretreatedintojustificationsofsecrecyevenwhengreateropennessand
publicdisclosurewouldnothavethreatenednationalsecurity,displaysasignifi-
cantcontinuitywiththeapartheidpast.Howarewetounderstandandexplain
thisambivalence,andpresentpolicyalternativesthatwillcompromiseneitherthe
intelligenceservices’executionoftheirmandatenorthepublicrightofaccessto
informationheldbythestate?
Thisstudyisbasedonthepremisethatthepost-apartheidintelligenceservices
areguidedbythecountry’sconstitution,includingitsinjunctiononaccesstoinfor-
mation.Oneshouldrememberthattheservicesthemselveshavebeencreatedin
termsoftheconstitution,whichindicatesthatitsarchitectsforesawtheneedfor
entitieswhosefunctionswouldincludethegatheringofintelligenceinpursuitof
nationalsecurity,presumablyintheknowledgethattheywouldcarryoverinto
thenewdispensationthosemethodsandpractices–ofintrusion,surveillance,and
restrictionsonaccesstoinformation–thatareinimicaltothedemocraticideal,
butpartoftherealitiesofgovernanceinthemodernworld.Theconductofthe
intelligenceserviceswouldthereforehavetobealignedwiththeirstatusascon-
stitutionalentities,andthedutiesimposedbythisimperative.Thisincludesbeing
18 / IntroDuctIon
subjecttotheBillofRights,whichguaranteestherightsoffreeassociationand
expression,privacy,dignity,life,andaccesstoinformationheldbythestate.This
isachallengingreality,butonewhichtheSouthAfricapolityandcitizenrycanbe
gratefulfor.
Bywayofbackground,andinordertoimproveourunderstandingofthecur-
rentlegalandpolicyenvironment,thisstudyexploresofficialsecrecyinSouth
Africaintheyearsofwhiteminorityrule.Ittracesthepoliticalimperativesthat
causedsuccessive20th centurygovernmentstointroducelegislationthatensured
theircontinueddominanceoverthecountry’sblackmajority.
Thestudyalsoassessesthestateofaccesstoinformationabouttheintelligence
servicesintheperiodduringwhichthecountry’snegotiatedsettlementgaverise
toanewintelligencedispensation.Oncetheybegantodiscussanewintelligence
dispensation, the parties to the process – principally the National Party (NP)
governmentandtheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)–rapidlyagreedonthe
strategiesappropriatetoconductingthistypeofwork.Secrecywouldbeanec-
essaryandunavoidablestrategicimperative.Eventhoughtheymighthavebeen
polesapartpoliticallyandideologically,themainpartieswereunitedonthecore
issueofhowtheintelligenceservicesshouldgoabouttheirbusiness.
Thisstudyaddressestheissueofwhetherthemethodsofsecrecyemployed
by the post-apartheid intelligence services are legitimate and sustainable in a
democracy,andwhethersufficientsafeguardshavebeenputinplacetoensure
thatabusesofpowerareavoided,orcanatleastbedetected.Asnotedearlier,the
intelligenceserviceshavebeencreatedundertheconstitution,andaresubjecttoa
numberofdemocraticprinciples.Inthisregard,thefirstquestioniswhetherthey
operateunderenablingconditions,whethertheirmandatesandfocusareclearly
andexplicitlyspeltoutintheirfoundinglegislation,andwhethertheirefficacyis
enhancedbythegovernancerequirementsimposeduponthem.Asecondques-
tionconcernstheimpactoftheseeminglycontradictorypolicy,legislative,and
regulatoryarrangementsunderwhichtheintelligenceservicesfunctioninrespect
ofpublicaccesstoinformation.Themaincontradictionisthat,whiletheconstitu-
tionconfersarightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,someorgansofstate
(notablytheintelligenceservices)arealsodirectedtoconducttheiraffairsinrela-
tivesecrecy(Currie&Klaaren2002).ThustheIntelligenceServicesActof2002
requirestheheadsofthoseservicestoprotecttheidentitiesofmembers,sources,
andmethodsofcollection(Qunta2004).AndtheProtectionofInformationActof
1982,whichhascoexistedsince2000withPAIA,providespenaltiesfordisclosure
oforunauthorisedaccesstoamuchwiderspectrumofinformationandrecords
thancontemplatedinthelatteract(Currie&Klaaren2002).Athirdexampleis
IntroDuctIon / 19
thatwhiletheNationalArchivesActof1996providesforthedeclassificationof
recordsafter20years,itdoesnotstatehowrecordsoriginallyclassifiedassecret
onthegroundsofnationalsecurityaretobehandledafterthe20-yearperiod
(McKinley2004).
The current situation is that information is classified in terms of a cabinet
guideline,theMinimumInformationSecurityStandards(MISS).Whatprovides
cause for concern is that while the MISS requires officials in all government
departments, without regard for their levels of authority or responsibility, to
adheretoitsprescriptionsforsecrecy,itdoesnotprovideanyoversightmecha-
nisms. Officials are required to classify ‘sensitive’ information as ‘Top Secret’,
‘Secret’,‘Confidential’,or‘Restricted’,dependingontheperceiveddegreeofharm
tonationalsecurityshouldtheinformationbedisclosed(Currie&Klaaren2002).
Thecriteria forclassifyingrecords,andtherefore forwithholding information
fromthepublic,arenotcontainedinanylegislation,creatingconcernthatthe
MISSinfactcontradictsPAIA.Thisstudyexplorestheimplicationsofthesegaps
inthelegislativeandpolicyframework,andrecommendsoptionsforaddressing
them.
A third question is whether the custodianship of intelligence records is
regulated in a way that guarantees their safety and integrity. This concern is
particularly germane to information about – and records of – the intelligence
services,becausetheyaregenerallyclosedtopublicscrutiny(Posel&Simpson
2002).Membersoftheseservicesaresworntosecrecyandmaynotdisclosetheir
activities;onlyalimitedamountofinformationabouttheactivitiesofthesestruc-
turesisreleasedtothepublic,andevenoversightbodiesareoftennotatliberty
topubliciseallaspectsoftheirinteractionswiththesestructures.Yet,asSouth
Africa’sownhistorydemonstrates,itispreciselyundersuchconditionsthatsecu-
rityforcesandintelligenceservicescancommitmajormisdeeds,allinthenameof
nationalsecurity.ThustheTruthandReconciliationCommission(TRC)–abody
establishedbythefirstpost-apartheidgovernmenttofacilitateredressforpoliti-
callyinspiredcriminalactscommittedunderapartheid–emphasisedtheneed
forthepreservationofofficialrecordsinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica.Interalia,it
exposedthefactthattheapartheidgovernmenthaddestroyedmostofitsrecords
initsfinalmonths(TRC1998).Theimpunitywithwhichthiswasdoneserves
asareminderthatwholechaptersofexecutiveactioncanbewipedofftheslate,
renderingstateactorsunaccountableandunpunishableforanymisdemeanours.
Thestudyraises theneed tobettercharacterise thesecurity threats facing
SouthAfrica,andthekindsofintelligenceinformationthatshouldbekeptsecret
asaresult. Italsoraisestheissueofwhoshouldhavetheauthoritytoclassify
20 / IntroDuctIon
information,andintermsofwhatcriteria.Itilluminatesthechallengeoffinding
aformulaforpreservingandhandlingtherecordsoftheapartheidintelligence
services, especially in the context of processes to encourage disclosure about
humanrightsabusescommittedbytheapartheidsecurityforces.Thiswillplayan
importantroleinbringingclosuretothatperiodinSouthAfricanhistory.Afinal
questionconcernsthedurationofclassificationandthecriteriafordetermining
whenamattercanbedeemedtohavelostitssensitivityandthereforeitsclassified
status.Putdifferently,thereshouldbesafeguardstoensurethattheclassifica-
tionordeclassificationofinformationisinthepublicinterest,buttheseareeither
inadequateordonotyetexist.
LoCAtIng the stuDY
Like theircounterpartsaroundtheworld, theSouthAfrican intelligenceserv-
iceskeepsecrets–usuallyinthenameofnationalsecurity.Morethananyother
departmentofstate,theyroutinelywithholdinformationfromthepublic,and
evenfromothergovernmentdepartments.Asaresult,membersofthepublicas
wellassomemembersoftheexecutiveknowrelativelylittleabouttheiractivities,
withthefurtherconsequencesthatmisconceptionsaboutthemabound.Under
thesecircumstances, the intelligenceservices tend tobecomedefensiveabout
theiroperations,andambivalentaboutissuesoftransparency.Thisisoneofthe
mostsignificantchallengeswhichpost-apartheidSouthAfricamustovercome.
Inademocracypurportingtoupholdthepublic’srightofaccesstoinformation
heldbythestate,questionsariseaboutwhenthenon-disclosureofinformation
is justified, and whether keeping these services going is an acceptable way of
spendingtaxpayers’money.Intheirdefence,theintelligenceserviceslayclaim
toaprofessionaldutyofsecrecy(toprotectvulnerableinformants,forexample,
ortopreservetheconfidentialnatureofintelligenceliaisonbetweenstates).They
alsopointoutthattheyarerequiredbylawtokeepinformationsecretundercer-
taincircumstances,atpainofcriminalsanction.Thereassurancethatmatterswill
notgetoutofhand,theyclaim,canbefoundinthecountry’sconstitution,which
unequivocallystatesthattheconductofintelligenceservicesmustconformtothe
ruleoflawaswellasinternationalhumanitarianlaw.
Policyanalystsoftenassumethatthereisacausallinkbetweengovernmental
secrecyandtheabuseofpower–and,conversely,thatgreaterpublicaccessto
information,particularlyaboutsecurityandintelligenceservices,automatically
promotesfairandjudiciousgovernment(Halperin&Hoffman1977;Richelson
1989;Steele2001;Hodess2003).InSouthAfricathereisagrowingexpectation
IntroDuctIon / 21
thatmoreandmoreinformationaboutthesecurityandintelligenceserviceswill
bemadepublic,andthatthesebodieswillbeheldaccountablefortheiractions,
both past and present (Africa 1992; Nhlanhla 1992; Harris 2000; Bell 2001;
Klaaren2002;Levy2004).
Executivesecrecyisgenerallyfrowneduponbycitizensinademocracy,andin
thissenseintelligenceservicesarenotalone.Anyformofofficialsecrecytendsto
createaclimateofdistrustbetweengovernmentandcitizens,andthatthecycleof
governmentalsecrecyandpublicalienationareafeatureofmanywesterndemoc-
racies.Thiscyclereproducesitselfinthefollowingway:peopletendtobelieve
lessandlessofwhatgovernmentsaysbecausetheyfeeltheydonothaveaccess
tocorroborating information.Aperceptionofgovernmentmisinformingthem
setsin,evenwherethisisnotthecase,whilegovernmentbecomesincreasingly
frustratedbythesimplisticanalysesofthepublicwhoseoppositionisperceived
to be motivated by misunderstandings and simplistic and extreme responses
(Mathews1978).
Evenwherecountrieshaveenactedaccesstoinformationlegislation,itdoes
notalwaysmeanthataccessisguaranteed.Inmanycountries,enforcementmech-
anismsareweak,andgovernmentsoftenresisthaving torelease information.
Alternatively,bureaucratsdelaytheprocessingofrequestsforinformation(Martin
&Feldman1998).Notsurprisinglythen,aroundtheworld,intelligenceservices
areincreasinglycloselyscrutinised.Citizensandtheirrepresentativeinstitutions
areaskingtheirgovernmentstoexplainwhattheseinstitutionsarecontributing,
especiallyintimeswhenhardpolicychoiceshavetobemade.
whY thIs DeBAte Is IMPoRtAnt FoR south AFRICA
There are a number of reasons why this study is particularly relevant today.
SouthAfricaisarelativelynewdemocracy,andeventhoughthegovernanceof
itsintelligenceservicesbeendebatedandscrutinisedbothbeforeandafterthe
firstdemocraticelections,greaterattentionneedstobepaidtodetail.Thedebate
aboutthetensionbetweensecrecyandtransparencyispartofasetofwidercon-
cernsabouttheaccountabilityofsecurityservicesindemocraticsettings.Inturn,
theseconcernsrelatetohownationalsecurityisconceptualisedandadvancedby
asocietyanditsgovernment.Thedebateaboutnationalsecurityhasbeeninflu-
encedbytheassumptionsandworldviewsof thedifferentproponents. In the
westernworld,conceptionsofnationalsecuritywereanimportantdimensionof
internationalrelationstheoryduringtheColdWar.
Themainobjectiveofthetwoleadingprotagonists–theUnitedStatesand
22 / IntroDuctIon
theSovietUnion–wastogaintheleadintheraceforstrategicglobaldominance.
Intelligenceservices–notablytheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)andCommit-
teeforStateSecurity(KGB)–playedaprominentroleintheconflict.Intelligence
servicesofothercountriesthroughouttheworldfoundthemselvesinthesphere
ofinfluenceofeitherofthesetwowell-resourcedgiantsintheworldofspying,
oftenservingassatellitesofoneortheother(Ray1979).IntheWest,thedomi-
nantobjectivewasthatofdeterrence–preventingcommunistEastbloccountries
fromextendingtheirinfluence,particularlyinthethirdworld,andensuringthat
westerncountriesremainedaheadinthenucleararmsrace.Inthe1960sthegen-
erationofintelligenceinformationproliferated,withwesternpowersspending
massivesumsondevelopingtechnologiestogivethemanadvantageinthespy
warsagainsttheSovietUnion.
Africadidnotescapethesealignments.ModernAfricanstateshadtheirorigins
inthecolonialpartitionsthattookplaceattheBerlinConferenceof1884(Smith
1983). In thecarvingupof thecontinent thatcharacterisedthis ‘scramble for
Africa’,theneedsandaspirationsofAfricanswerelargelyignored,andtheadmin-
istrativestructurescreatedbyEuropeansweremainlydesignedtofacilitateaccess
tothecontinent’sabundantnaturalresources.Nationalidentitieswereimposed
onAfricans,withhistoricallyspecificidentitiesandtheheterogeneityofAfrican
societiesbeingignoredormisunderstood.Veryoften,theonlyunifyingfactorin
agivencolonywasthefactthatitwassubjecttoasinglecolonialpower.Ironi-
cally,thecommonexperienceofcolonialoppressiongraduallycreatedasenseof
nationhoodamongthepeopleforcedtogetherinthisway,resultingintheforma-
tionofresistancemovements,anddemandsforindependencefromcolonialrulers
(Smith1983).
When independence came, however, many of the colonial administrative
structuresremainedintact,orservedasmodelsforthenewpost-colonialstates.
Post-colonial intelligence services often merely reflected core–periphery rela-
tions,evenafternominalindependencefromcolonialpowershadbeenattained.
SouthAfrica’sdemocratictransitioncoincidedwiththepost-ColdWarera,and
theintelligenceservicesthereforehadanidealopportunitytoeffectgovernance
arrangementsthatputaccountabilityandprofessionalismbeforeideology.This
studywillhopefullyshowtheextenttowhichtheintelligenceserviceswereable
toadheretotheseprinciplesinthefirsttenyearsoftheirexistence.
Thestudyalsocomesatatimewhennumerousdemocraciesthreatenedby
violenceandextremismarethinkingaboutrestrictingtheircitizens’civil liber-
tiesintheinterestsofnationalsecurity(Todd&Bloch2003).Duringthe ‘War
ofTerror’,theUnitedStates,followedbyseveralwesterncountrieswhichprided
IntroDuctIon / 23
themselvesontheircivillibertiescredentials,extendedtheirintelligenceservices’
useofsecret,intrusiveand,itwaswidelysuspected,illegalmethods.Thedebate
onhowmuchsecrecyasocietyshouldtolerateisparticularlypertinenttoSouth
Africa,giventhat,havingemergedfromapast inwhichthestatedisregarded
humanrights,anyreversalorevenqualificationofthefundamentalrightspro-
videdfornowwillbesubjecttothetestofconstitutionalism.Thisstudyrecognises
thehumanrightsunderpinningsofthepost-apartheidsecuritydispensation,and
attemptstofindpolicysolutionswithinthisparadigm.Thedebatearoundaccess
toinformationheldbythestateistakingplaceatatimewhenrapidtechnologi-
caldevelopment,andaninformationexplosionhaveexposedjusthowvulnerable
andpenetrabletheinformationsystemsofgovernmentreallyare.Communica-
tionstechnologyhasdevelopedtosuchanextent–thereisamultitudeofsatellite,
digital,andelectronicpossibilities–thatmostgovernmentsadmittheycannot
guarantee that the informationtheycollectandstore is invulnerable tounau-
thorisedaccess(Lipinski1999).Thisaffectsthedurabilityandefficacyofsecrecy
regimens,andcallsintoquestionthefundsneededtosecureinformationsystems
andpersonnelentrustedwithinformationsecurity.
Anotherfactoraffectingtheefficacyofsecrecysystemsisglobalisation,andthe
growthofmultinationalgovernmentalandprivateentities.Identitiesareincreas-
inglydefinedintransnationalterms,andindividualloyaltytoacountrymight
existalongsideorevenbesurpassedbyidentificationwithmultinationalcorpora-
tions.Theimplicationsofthisphenomenon–whichisdramaticallyfacilitatedby
newtechnology–isthatpeopleareincreasinglyidentifyingwithcausesregardless
ofgeographicalboundaries.Inatechnologicallylinkedglobalenvironment,where
accesstoinformationisoftenthekeytoprosperity,andterritorialidentitiesare
beingsubsumedbyotherformsofidentity,actorswhohavetodevelopappropri-
atepoliciesforpromotinganddefendingnationalsecurityfacemajorchallenges.
Finally,thestudyisrelevantbecauseitexplorestheinterplaybetweenvari-
ouspolicyactorsinthecourseofprovidingaccesstoinformation.Theseinclude
theexecutive,parliament,officialsoftheintelligenceservicesandotherrelated
departments,oversightbodies,andorgansofcivil society.While theybroadly
agreeonprinciples, theyoftenhavedivergent interests,which leads todiffer-
encesininterpretingandapplyingpolicy.Iconductedinterviewswithsomeof
theseactors,includingofficialsintheintelligenceservicesandothergovernment
departments,draftersofthelegislationpromotingaccesstoinformation,mem-
bers of various oversight structures, academics, and representatives of NGOs.
Understandingtheperspectivesofpolicyactors–wheretheyconverge,andwhere
theydiffer–isanimportantpartofthepolicy-makingprocess,whichmustseek
24 / IntroDuctIon
tomanagethesetensionsintheinterestsofthevariousstakeholders(Lee1991).
Theconcludingpolicyrecommendationsrepresentsomethingofabalancingact,
andrecognisethatmostoralldivergentviewsarepartlyvalid.
the sCoPe oF the stuDY
ThetermsanddefinitionsusedinrespectofSouthAfrica’sstatutorysecurityinsti-
tutionsarederivedfromtheconstitution.Chapter11oftheconstitutionrefers
to ‘securityservices’,comprisingthenationaldefenceforce,thepoliceservice,
andtheintelligenceservices.Theactualshapeandfunctionsoftheintelligence
communityweretheproductofextensivedebatebetweenthepartiesinvolvedin
negotiatingSouthAfrica’spoliticalfutureintheearly1990s.
Oneofthemajordeparturesfromtheapartheiddispensationwastoestab-
lishtwocivilianintelligenceservices,onefordomesticintelligenceandanother
forforeignintelligence.Underapartheidthepremiercivilianintelligenceservice
wastheNationalIntelligenceService(NIS),whichcollectedbothdomesticand
foreignintelligence.Inaddition,the‘Bantustans’ofTranskei,Bophuthatswana,
andVendahadtheirownintelligenceservices.ModelledontheNIS,theylargely
concentratedonflushingoutanti-apartheidactivists,andreliedheavilyonPreto-
riafordirectionandresources.Whentheintelligenceserviceswereamalgamated
in1995,themembersofthesesatelliteserviceswerealsoabsorbedintothetwo
newservices.
InlinewiththeWhitePaperonIntelligenceandNationalStrategicIntelligence
Actof1994,themissionofthedomesticintelligenceservice–theNIA–istocon-
ductsecurityintelligencewithinthebordersoftheRepublicofSouthAfricain
ordertoprotecttheconstitution.Itsaimistoensurethesecurityandstabilityof
thestate,andthesafetyandwell-beingofitscitizens.
InSouthAfricanlaw,‘domesticintelligence’meansintelligenceonanyinternal
activity,factorordevelopmentdetrimentaltothenationalstabilityoftherepublic,
orthreatsorpotentialthreatstotheconstitutionalorderoftheRepublicandthe
safetyandwell-beingofitspeople.Themissionoftheforeignintelligenceservice
–theSASS–istoconductintelligenceinrelationtoexternalthreats,opportuni-
ties,andotherissuesthatmightaffecttheRepublic,withtheaimofpromoting
nationalsecurityandtheinterestsofthecountryanditspeople.Thelawdefines
‘foreignintelligence’asintelligenceonanyexternalthreatorpotentialthreator
potentialthreattothenationalinterestsoftheRepublicanditspeople,andintel-
ligenceregardingopportunitiesrelevanttotheprotectionandpromotionofsuch
IntroDuctIon / 25
nationalinterestsirrespectiveofwhetherornotitcanbeusedtoformulateforeign
policy(RSA,NationalStrategicIntelligenceAct1994).
Thisstudydoesnotaddressindetailthemanagementofaccesstointelligence
informationheldbytheSouthAfricanPoliceService(SAPS)andtheSouthAfri-
canNationalDefenceForce(SANDF),althoughthequestionsposedaboutcivilian
intelligenceareequallyrelevanttothosesectorsofthesecurityservices.Thereis
roomforbroadeningtheanalysisinthisarea,notleastbecausetheintelligence
communitystraddlesthedefenceandpolicingenvironments(Africa&Mlombile
2001).ThisismadeclearintheNationalStrategicIntelligenceActof1994which
outlinesthestrategicintelligence-gatheringmandatesoftheNIA,SASS,Defence
Intelligence,andCrimeIntelligence.
This study focuses on policies and policy alternatives for managing intelli-
genceinformation,definedasrecordsgeneratedbytheintelligenceservicesin
thecourseof theirwork.These include theraw informationdocumentedand
compiled fromanumberofsources, including informers, technicalandsignal
collectionpoints,writtenreports,andanalysescompiledbyintelligenceofficers;
andtheassessmentsandreportsgeneratedfromthisdata,usuallyassessments
of threatsorperceivedthreats tonationalsecuritypresentedtopolicy-makers
(Richelson 1989). It also includes dossiers on people and organisations, and
recordsofthemethodsusedtogathertheinformationinquestion.
Thedefinitionofintelligencerecordsalsocoversrecordsaboutgovernanceof
theintelligenceservices,includinghumanresources,assets,andfinancialman-
agement.‘Intelligenceinformation’mayormaynotbehighlysensitive(inother
words,itspublicdisclosuremayormaynothavegraveimplicationsfornational
security),dependingonthecriteriaandconsiderationsusedtoevaluateit.
Thestudyalsoexploresissuesaroundthestatus,legitimacy,andownershipof
intelligenceinformationinthecountry’smovementfromauthoritariantodemo-
craticrule.Asabackdropitreviewsandassessesthepoliticalprocessesleadingto
theestablishmentofthenewintelligencedispensation,notablytheformationof
theNIAandSASS,whichweretofunctionunderachangedsetofpoliticalrules.
Acorefocusofthisstudyiswhether,inthecourseoftheirformationandearly
development,theyhaveadaptedtotheserulesofaccountabilityandregardforthe
constitutionandthelaw.
Itseekstoanalysehow,inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,allthreearmsofgov-
ernment–thelegislature,executive,andthejudiciary–aswellasofficialsofthe
intelligenceserviceshavedefinedtheirrelationshiptointelligenceinformation
byhighlightingthechoicestheyhavemadeinrelationtovariouschallenges.The
oversightstructurescreatedintermsoftheconstitutionandnationallegislation
26 / IntroDuctIon
–theAuditor-General,theJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence(JSCI),and
theInspector-GeneralforIntelligence–interactwiththeintelligenceservicesin
linewiththeirrespectivemandates.Theirrecordinplayingtheseoversightroles
isbrieflyreviewed.Itiswidelyknown,andevenaccepted,thattheintelligence
servicesdomuchoftheirworkinsecret,givingrisetothecentraldilemmaexer-
cisingthisstudy:howcrediblepolicycanbemadeandimplementedinacontext
wherepublicscrutinyis limited(Lustgarten&Leigh1994).Intheintelligence
environment, much information, even relatively innocuous information, finds
itselfbeyondpublicscrutiny.Thestudyattemptstoaddresstheimplicationsof
thiscondition,andtointerrogatetheimperativesthatmakeitpossible.
Finally,itexaminestheexperiencesofseveralcountriesthathavegrappled
withtheissuesofmaintainingasuccessfulbalancebetweentransparency,secrecy,
andnationalsecurityinmanagingtheirintelligenceservices.Oversightmecha-
nismshaveplayedaprominentrole,especiallyintheWest,andformanimportant
partofthedemocraticarmouryagainstbureaucraticexcess.Itwouldobviously
have been valuable to compare South Africa’s experiences in this regard with
thoseofotherAfricancountries,butfewseemtopromoteaccesstotherecordsof
theirintelligenceservicesinasimilarfashion.Giventhis,developed,largelywest-
erncountrieshadtobeexamined.Whilethechoiceofcountriesisnotexhaustive,
andtheirexperiencescannotbedirectlycomparedwithSouthAfrica’s,theydo
offerinsightsintohowcivilsocietyandsecurityestablishmentsinvarioussocieties
havedifferedontheseissues,andhowpolicy-makershaveintervenedtoresolve
disputesanddemarcatetheboundariesmoreclearly.
Ultimately,thisstudyseekstocontributetopublicpolicy.Itidentifiesaneed
for effective policy responses to the enduring problem of balancing secrecy
andtransparencyinintelligencework,andsuggestshowsuchpolicyshouldbe
evolved,implemented,evaluated,andadjusted.Intheprocessitdrawsonseveral
academicfields–law,history,philosophy,politics,andinternationalrelations–
whichisnotunusualintheareaofpolicystudies(Lee1991;Dunn1994;Parsons
1995).
Heymans(1996)hasofferedthiscommon-sensedefinitionoftheroleofpublic
policy:
Thebusinessofgovernmentistomakechoices,andtostrategicallymanage
resourcestowardsachievingthegoalsthesechoicesimply.Publicpolicyisthe
product of these choices, setting the parameters within which government
departmentsandothersoperatingwithinthesphereofparticularpolicesare
eitherintendedormadetofunction.
IntroDuctIon / 27
Settingoutthechallengesofpolicy-makinginademocracysuchasSouthAfrica,
he spells out three attributes that must be present for government to make,
analyse,implement,andevaluatepolicy:
… political leadership (to make choices and take responsibility for their
outcomes);administrativemanagement(tomakethingshappen);andana-
lyticalsupport(toidentify,exploreandpackagepolicy-relevantoptionsand
information)(Heymans1996:30).
Thisstudyfundamentallyinterrogatesapolicyproblem:howmuchinformation
shouldgovernmentsingeneralandtheSouthAfricangovernmentinparticular
makeavailabletothepublic,or,conversely,howmuchinformationisitentitledto
withholdfromthepublicdomain?Ifinformationaboutthesecurityofacountry
anditspeopleisapublicmatter,arepolicy-makersmakingappropriatechoices
aboutaccesstosuchinformation;andhowarethesechoicesbeinginterpretedand
implementedbythebureaucracyandtheintelligencebureaucracyinparticular?
stRuCtuRe
Thisbookisdividedintothreeparts.PartOneprovidesacontextforandback-
groundtotherestofthestudy,anddealswithconceptualissuesrelatingtosecrecy
andtransparencyinthegovernanceofintelligenceservices;officialsecrecyprior
to1994;andthetransformationoftheintelligenceservicesinthecourseofthe
transitiontodemocracy.
PartTwodealswiththenewsecuritydispensation;morespecifically,itdeals
withstatutoryinstrumentsfacilitatingaccesstoinformationabouttheintelligence
services;aswellasPAIAanditsimplicationsfortheintelligenceservices.Italso
reportsontwocourtcasesandacommissionofinquirycentringontheintelli-
genceservicesandtherightofaccesstoinformation.
PartThreeconcludes thebookwith lessons frominternationalexperience,
conclusions,andpolicyrecommendations.
IN SOUTH AFRICA, as inother societiesaround theworld, secrecyarises in
varioussocialcontexts,presentingarangeofpolitical,legal,andethicaldilem-
mas.Someofthesedilemmasareuniversal,andhavebeenwithusforaverylong
time.Medicalsecrecy,asembodiedintheHippocraticOath,obligesdoctorsto
treatdisclosuresbypatientsasconfidential.Thelegalprofessiontoomustcontend
withthedilemmaofsecrecy.Straussdescribesthisasfollows:
Attorneysandadvocatesareethicallyboundinthesamewayasadoctoror
priesttomaintainconfidentialityinregardtoinformationdisclosedtothem
inconfidencebytheirclients.Failuretocomplywiththisdutycanresult in
disciplinaryactionbeingtakenagainstthelegalpractitioner…inthetechni-
calsenseoftheword,itcanbecategorisedas‘arighttounfetteredfreedom
fromthestate’scoerciveorsupervisorypowersandfromthenuisanceofits
eavesdropping’.Althoughgenerallyknownasalegalprofessionalprivilege,it
isreallyarightwhichtheclienthastowithholdfromacourtoflawcommu-
nicationsmadetohis lawyer,andtopreventthelatterfromdisclosingsuch
communicationsasevidence(1983:26).
Athirdareainwhichissuesofsecrecypresentthemselvesisjournalism.Journal-
istsaresensitivetoanexpectationoftrust,andareoftenpreparedtodefythe
authoritiesinordertoprotecttheirinformants.Matthewsattemptstodescribe
whatiscommontoallthreeoftheseareasofsocialinteraction:
seCReCY AnD tRAnsPARenCY In the goVeRnAnCe oF InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
1
32 / chAPter one
Thelawyerandhisclient, thedoctorandhispatient, the journalistandhis
informer,thecorporationmanagersandtheGovernmentmayallreasonably
claimtheprotectionofthelawforcertaincommunicationsorinformation.In
eachcasethefundamentalrationaleforsecrecyisthat inabilityoftheindi-
vidualorinstitutiontofunctioneffectivelywithoutlegalguaranteesagainst
disclosure.Butthereisanothercommonfactorofequalorgreaterimportance,
andthatisthatineachcasetheinterestinsecrecyornon-disclosureisatbest
aqualifiedinterest.Themattermaybeexpresseddifferentlybysayingthatin
everyinstancetheclaimthatsecrecyshouldbemaintainedisopposedbya
compellingclaimfavouringdisclosureoraccesstoinformation.…Thelaw’s
taskistoreconciletheopposingclaimsbydemarcatingthelegitimatebound-
arieswithinwhicheachissovereign,andbydeterminingwhenandtowhat
degreetheonemaybelimitedintheinterestsofanotherorothers(1983:36).
TheAmerican-ScandinavianphilosopherSisselaBokaddressestheethicaland
philosophicaldimensionsofsecrecyinherbookSecrets – on the Ethics of Conceal-
ment and Revelations (1982).Sheoffersa‘neutral’definitionofsecrecy,describing
itas ‘intentionalconcealment’ involvingthedeliberatewithholding,hiding,or
concealingofinformationinordertopreventsomeoneelsefromuncoveringit.
Despitethissupposedneutrality,secrecyisusuallyunderpinnedbysociallyinflu-
encedchoices.Bokdescribessomeofthesocialcontextsinwhichsecrecymight
ariseorbeapplied,includingmedicalresearchandpractice,secretsocieties,trade
negotiations,research,andmilitaryandstateactivity.
AccordingtoBok,secrecycanbeutilitarianandjustifiable.Oneexampleis
withholdingsensitiveinformationfromchildren.Anotheriswithholdinginfor-
mationfromparticipantsinresearchprojects–suchaswhichparticipantsina
medicaltrialhavebeenissuedwithaplacebo.Athirdisrestrictinginformation
toparticipantsinsensitivetradeorcommercialtalksifdisclosurecouldaffectthe
outcometothedetrimentofeitheroftheparties.
Thisraisestheissueofwhensecrecycanberegardedasacceptable,andwhen
not.AccordingtoBok,thetestshouldbewhetherthereasonscanbeconvincingly
defendedinpublic.Moreover,thecriteriaforsecrecyshouldneverrequirecon-
cealment.Inthisregard,Bokisparticularlysuspiciousofstatesecrecy,andargues
infavourofseverelylimitingtheuseofsecrecybythestatebecauseofitsasso-
ciationwithpower.Shearguesthatthesecrecysurroundingmattersofstateare
oftensimplyanexcusetowieldexcessivepower,andthattherightsofthepublic
areseverelyrestrictedwhenthisisthecase.
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 33
Bok’s book about secrecy follows an earlier analysis of a related subject,
entitledLying – Moral Choice in Public(1978).Inthiswork,sheattemptstodem-
onstratethatliesanddeceptioncouldariseorbeappliedinanumberofsocial
contexts,andthattheir impacthastobeassessedinthiscontext.Contextsfor
lyingincludewhitelies(usuallyconsideredtobeharmless);lyingtoenemies(tac-
ticallyappliedinastateofwar);deceptivemethodsofsocialscienceresearch;and
paternalisticlies(concealinganunpleasanttruthfromachild,ordeceptionofthe
terminallyillaboutthestateoftheirhealth).Shearguesthattheconsequencesof
truthfulnessordeceptionshouldbecarefullyconsidered,wheneversuchachoice
has to be made, but accepts that major dilemmas may arise in exercising this
choice.Shenotesthatanorderlysocialsystemdependsuponareasonabledegree
oftruthfulness,andsuggeststhatthetruthshouldnotbeundulysubverted.The
socialcostsoflying,shewarns,includeadisproportionateandunfairdenialof
powertogroupswhicharealreadydisempoweredduetotheirlackofaccessto
reliableinformation.Asaresult,thedisempoweredareunabletomakeappro-
priatechoicestofurthertheirownwell-being.Inaddition,thevictimsofliesare
forcedtocarryapsychologicalandemotionalburdenofuncertainty.
Bok’sworksarerelevanttoourenquirybecausetheypromptustoconfront
the complexity and consequences of secrecy and confidentiality. Intelligence
serviceskeepsecrets,andengageinprocessesthatcanbeconstruedtobedecep-
tive–bothinthenameofnationalsecurity.Wheretheyhavebeenestablished
by constitutional injunction, this makes for a fascinating subject. The South
Africanconstitution,tobesure,issilentonthemethodstobeusedbytheintel-
ligenceservices,thoughitstatescategoricallythatthesemethodsmustbelawful,
andconsistentwiththeruleof law, includinginternationalhumanitarianlaw.
Yettheintelligenceserviceswouldclaimtohaveaprofessionaldutyofsecrecy
necessitated,forexample,bytherelationshipbetweensecrethumansourcesof
informationandtheservices,andtheconfidentialnatureofintelligenceliaison
andexchangesof informationbetweenstates. Inaddition,even indemocratic
states, such secrecy is specifically provided for in law, its breach carrying the
burdenofcriminalsanction.
Robertson(1999)hasalsowrittenaboutthepolicyquestionofsecrecy,this
timeinrespectofthesecurityestablishmentintheUnitedKingdom.Infact,hehas
criticisedBok’sworkonthegroundsthatitdoesnotprovideanyconvincingcri-
teriaforjudgingwhensecrecyhasbecomeexcessive.Thisdivertsfromherstated
goalofaneutralapproachtosecrecywhenaddressingtheroleofthestate.He
accusesherofallbutcondemningthestateforhavingignobleintentionswhen-
everitconductsitsaffairsinsecret,nomatterwhatthepurposemaybe:
34 / chAPter one
ThemainthrustofBok’sanalysisisthatsecrecyisparticularlydangerouswhen
thosewhoemployitareholdersofpower,forintheabsenceofaccountability
andsafeguards,secrecymakessuchpeopleevenmorepowerful.Thebalance
ofthemoralargumenthasdramaticallyswitchedsothatwhatwasseenasa
mechanismofdefence,protecting the integrityof thepersonality, isnowa
weaponofoffence,associatedwiththeaggrandisementofpower(Robertson
1999:12).
Robertson’sobjectiontoBok’sassumptionthatsecrecyingovernmentisgenerally
badforsocietyisrelevanttoourstudy.Theintelligenceservicesindemocracies
–includingtheUnitedKingdom–aretypicallyrequiredbylawtoconducttheir
operations insecret.Wheretherearechecksandbalancesontheirpowers,as
exercisedthroughoversightmechanisms,Robertsonarguesthatitissimplisticto
concludeorassumethattheywillabusetheirpowers.Helamentsthefactthat
Bok,whohasmadethecaseforsecrecyinotherspheresoflifesocompetently,has
notbeenabletoprovideamorebalancedaccountofitsutilitywhenexercisedby
thestate.
Robertsonisconcernedabouttheimpactofsecrecyanditspotentialtoturn
democracies into ‘surveillancesocieties’ inwhichcitizensarecontinuallyscru-
tinised by the state. He is however, equally cynical about the effectiveness of
freedomofinformationlaws–or‘accesstoinformation’legislation,asitisother-
wisereferredto–asavehicleforopengovernment,andfacilitatingmeaningful
insightintopolicymatterstotheordinarycitizen.ForRobertson,freedomofinfor-
mationlegislationinmanycountrieshasbeenintroducedinresponsetocrises
precipitatedbygovernmentexcesses,andservestostreamlinethechannelsof
communicationbetweenthepublicandthestateratherthanopeningupavenues
forinfluencingdecision-making.Hearguesthatrestrictingtheprocessesthrough
which information held by the state can be accessed is, ironically, potentially
immobilising to citizens. Even though those in power must consider requests
forinformationheldbythestatefrommembersofthepublic,theyareinavery
powerfulposition,andinformationinadvertentlybecomesaleverofpower.More-
over,theytendtoreleaseinformationonlywhenrequestedratherthanbuilding
andpromotingageneralcultureandclimateofopenness.
Theoneadvantageofaccess to information,Robertsonconcedes, is that it
helpstoensurethatrecordsaremoreaccurate,whichbenefitsgovernments;and
fairer,whichbenefitscitizens.Thisisespeciallytrueofpersonalrecordsretained
bygovernments,andwhichcitizensmightbeentitledtoreviewthroughaccessto
informationlegislation.However,hewarnsthat:
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 35
Theproblemsarisewhenthismodestbutworthwhilereformisconfusedwith
opengovernment.FOIisnotanimportantpartofcreatingmoreopengovern-
ment,makingtheprocessofpoliticaldecision-makingmoretransparentand
more open to citizen participation. There are quite other mechanisms that
dothis.Thecreationofamorefederalstructure,withcompetingcentresof
decision-making,isfarmoreimportanttothisprocess(Robertson1999).
This analysis cautions us against regarding access to information as the only
measureofaccountableandopengovernment.Alongwithentrenchingtheright
ofaccesstoinformation,theSouthAfricanconstitutioninstitutionalisesarangeof
measuresandinstrumentstofacilitateopenandaccountablegovernance.These
includetheseparationofpowersbetweenthelegislature,executive,andjudiciary;
theestablishmentofparliamentaryoversightcommittees;andtheindependent
auditingofthefinancialstatementsofallgovernmentdepartments(RSAConsti-
tution,1996).Anyassessmentofaccountabilityoftheintelligenceservicesmust
thereforetakeintoaccounthowtheseinstitutionalmeasuresareappliedinrela-
tiontothem.
Some20yearsago,AnthonyMathews,aSouthAfricanconstitutionalexpert,
consideredtheimpactofsecrecyonwesterngovernmentsasabackdroptohis
seminalstudyThe Darker Reaches of Government: Access to Information about Pub-
lic Administration in Three Societies (1978). He arguesthattheoreticalwritingson
liberaldemocracyhavelongsupportedthenotionthattherighttoknowabout
theactionsanddecisionsof theexecutiveand itsadministrationareessential
elementsofthesystemofdemocracy.ForMathews,extensivesecrecyintheexec-
utivebranchanditsdepartmentsisincompatiblewithdemocracy;however,the
evidencepointstothegrowingmightofbureaucracyinwesternpoliticalsystems:
Thebureaucracies,itisnowclear,havebecomecentresofpowerinallwestern
democracies,includingthosethathavepresidentialtypeexecutives.Viewed
from the perspective of access to information, this is an alarming develop-
mentsinceofficialsecretsweretheinventionofthebureaucracy.Secrecyhas
been,andremains,oneofthemosteffectivetechniqueswhichofficialshave
employedtoenhancetheirpower(Mathews1978).
Mathewsargues thatofficial secrecycreateaclimateofdistrustbetweengov-
ernmentanditsofficialsontheonehand,andcitizensontheother.Thecycle
of governmental secrecy and public alienation are a feature of many western
democracies.Thiscyclereproducesitselfasfollows:peopletendtobelieveless
andlessofwhatgovernmentsays,becausetheyfeeltheydonothaveaccessto
36 / chAPter one
corroboratinginformation.Aperceptionofgovernmentmisinformationsetsin,
evenwherethisisnotthecase,whilegovernmentbecomesincreasinglyfrustrated
bythesimplisticanalysesofthepublicwhoseoppositionisperceivedtobemoti-
vatedbymisunderstandingandsimplisticandextremeresponses.
Mathews’sanalysis ispertinent toourstudyofaccess to intelligence infor-
mation.Perhapsmoremarkedlythananyotherdepartmentofstate,theSouth
Africanintelligenceservicesroutinelywithholdinformationfromthepublic,and
evenfromothergovernmentdepartments.Asaresult,littleisknownabouttheir
functions,bothbythepublicandtoanextent,somewithintheexecutive.Because
of thisstateofaffairs,misconceptionsabout the intelligenceservicesabound.
Hardlysurprisingly,theintelligenceserviceshavebecomeincreasinglydefensive
andambivalentaboutmeaningfultransparency.Thisalienationoftheintelligence
servicesisoneofthemostsignificantchallengesfacingthepost-apartheidSouth
Africanstate.
All threewriters–Bok,Robertson,andMathews–makevalidpoints.Bok
correctlyarguesthatsecrecyisnotalwaysasocialevil,andthattheremaybe
conditionsunderwhichitshouldbeaccepted.Thisisevidentfromtheexamples
shecites:therightofconfidentialityofpersonalmedicalrecords;client–lawyer
privilegeinlegalproceedings;andjournalists’protectionoftheirsources,torecall
afew.Evenlyinganddeceptionmaybejustifiedandsociallyacceptableincertain
contexts,includingtheelementofsurprise,stealth,andsecrecyoftenrequiredin
timesofwar;ordecliningtodisclosetheterminalnatureofanillnesstoarelative.
Insimilarvein,itcanbearguedthatatleastsomesecrecyanddeceptioninrespect
ofintelligencemaybejustified.
Bok’swarningthatstatesecrecycouldbeusedasacoverfortheabuseofpower
hasproventobeprophetictooofteninrecenthistory,andthisisthecasewith
manyofthescandalsassociatedwithintelligenceservices:theyhappenunder
coverofsecrecy,andtheinabilityofthepublictoobjecttoquestionableactivities
beforeitistoolate.YetRobertsonbelievesthatBokhasnotshownconvincingly
enoughthatsecretgovernmentisworsethanopengovernment.Atonestagehe
evenpointsoutthatshehasconcededthatgoodadministrationrequiresadegree
ofsecrecy:fordeliberations,fortiming,andtomaintaintheconfidenceofthose
whohaveexchangedinformationontheunderstandingofconfidentiality.The
factthatBokconcedesthatshedoesnothaveananswerforthequestionsofwho
shoulddeterminethatsecrecyisnecessary,andforhowlong,doesnotmakethem
goaway,soitisjustaswellthatshehasraisedthem.Thesearedifficultissues,
andtheonlywaytoresolvethemistomakepolicychoicesandevaluatethem
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 37
afteraperiodofimplementation,inordertoassesswhethertheyhavehelpedto
amelioratetheproblemstheysetouttoaddress.
Finally,Mathewshasbeenpropheticinthewayinwhichhehasforeshadowed
the dilemmas of the post-apartheid bureaucracy. The classical scenario of the
bureaucracyasageneratorofsecrets,fuellingsuspicion,andalienatingitselffrom
thepublicwhichitsetsouttoserve,istheveryprecipicethatistheconcernof
thisbook.Mathewseffectivelyjuxtaposedthesituationinrespecttosecrecyand
accesstoinformationinapartheidSouthAfricatothatinBritainandtheUnited
States.SouthAfricahasnowcaughtupwiththesecountries;itisademocracy
withaconstitutionendorsedbya representative parliament, and in which all
citizenshavetherighttopoliticalparticipation.Italsohasaconstitutionalprovi-
sioninrespectofaccesstostateinformation,andlegislationonthissubjectthat
isbindingontheintelligenceservices.Thequestionthatmustbeconsideredis
whetherthisfactormakestheintelligenceservicesmoretransparentthanin1978
whenMathewswrotehisbook.Inotherwords, it isaquestionofwhetherthe
transparency requirement has made a difference to the quality of intelligence
governance,andwhetherthisinturnhashadanimpactontheeffectivenessand
accountabilityoftheintelligenceservices.Inaddition,thequestionthatarisesis
whethertherequirementoftransparencyissufficient,orwhetherthereisneedfor
furtherinstrumentstoensureaccountability.
BALAnCIng seCReCY AnD ACCess to InFoRMAtIon In InteRnAtIonAL ReLAtIons
Access to information is recognisedasabasichumanright in several interna-
tionalcovenants.However,internationallawpermitsgovernmentstolegislatein
favouroftheprotectionofstatesecrets(D’Souza1999),andseveralinternational
covenantswhichpromote freedomof information subject this right to certain
qualifications. Evatt (1999) points to the International Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights(ICCPR),adoptedbytheUnitedNations(UN)in1966.Article19
oftheICCPRguaranteesfreedomofopinionandexpression,butsubjectsthese
rightstocertainrestrictions,includingtheprotectionofnationalsecurityorof
publicorder.
Evattpointsoutthatsomeguidelinesforensuringthecompatibilitybetween
individualstates’legislativeregimesandtheICCPRareavailable,butthatitisup
tothestatetoshowthelegalbasisforanyrestrictionsimposedontherighttofree-
domofexpression.InassessinganinstrumentsuchastheCovenant,onehasto
assesswhatimpactithashadongovernanceinindividualjurisdictions.Itseffects
38 / chAPter one
seemtohavebeenminimalinrealterms,atleastintheareaoffreedomofexpres-
sion.AtbesttheHumanRightsCommitteeoftheUNhasbeenabletohighlight
individualstates’deficiencies,buttheseinterventionsdonottranslateintopuni-
tivemeasuresforastatewheretherearedigressions(Evatt1999).
TheEuropeanUnion(EU) isanotherexampleofasupranationalauthority
whoseinstrumentsarebindingonallmemberstates.WhiletheEUissaidtobe
foundedonfourfreedoms(ofmovementofpersons,capital,andgoodsandserv-
ices),eachinterestmaybecurtailedintheinterestofnationalsecurity.Moreover,
Nichols(1999)informsusthat,undertheTreatyoftheEU,nomemberstateis
obligedtosupplyinformationifsuchdisclosurecanbeconsideredtobecontrary
toitssecurity.Also,anyEUmemberstatemaytakeanystepsitconsidersneces-
sarytoprotectitssecurity,particularlyinconnectionwiththeproductionofor
tradeinarms,munitions,andwarmaterial.
TheEUhasmadestridesindefiningthecategoriesofinformationthatmust
bemadepubliclyavailable,includinginformationfromprivatesectorcompanies,
andinformationheldbypublicauthoritiesabouttheenvironment.Memberstates
arenotobligedtodiscloseinformationregardinginternationalrelations,national
defence,andpublicsecurity.Moreover,theEUdirectiverequiresmemberstates
toallowapersonwhoconsidersthathisorherrequestforinformationhasbeen
unreasonablyrefusedorignoredorhasbeeninadequatelyansweredbyapublic
authoritytoseekajudicialoradministrativereviewofthedecisioninaccordance
withtherelevantnationallegalsystem(Nichols1999).
Therightofaccessto informationhasalsofeaturedinAfrican instruments
ofco-operativegovernance.TheAfricanCharteronHumanandPeople’sRights
(theAfricanCharter)wasacceptedbythemajorityofmembersoftheOrganisa-
tionofAfricanUnity(OAU),anditsAfricanCommissionofHumanandPeople’s
Rightswasmaderesponsibleforsupervisingthecharter.However,liketheICCPR,
itsimpacthasbeenlimited.Chapter9stipulatesthateveryindividualshallhave
therighttoreceiveinformation,andexpressanddisseminatehisopinionwithin
thelaw.Nevertheless,thisrequirementisnotcarriedoverinthenationallegal
frameworksofmanyAfricancountries,andwhereitis,thepracticeisoftenvery
differenttowhatisspeltoutinlaw.
Secrecyisrecognisedashavingalegitimateroleintheinternationalpolitical
system.Intelligenceisthereforeregardedbystates,andinternationalandinter-
governmentalbodiessuchastheUN,EUandAU,asbeingasrelevantasever,
ifnotmoresotodaythanpreviously. Inan increasinglyuncertainworld,even
multilateralinstitutionssuchastheUNareconsideringtheroleofsecretintel-
ligence:thisisachallengeforanorganisationsuchastheUN,giventhattheworld
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 39
bodyisdevotedtotransparency.Increasingly,initspeacekeepingrole,andforthe
securityofitsownhumanitarianoperations,theUNseemstobecomingtothe
conclusionthatitdoesafterall,requireasecretintelligencecapacity.Dorn(1999)
makesastrongargumentforUNsecrecy,particularlywherethesuccessofaUN
peacekeepingoperation(PKO)maydependonsecrecyandearlywarninggained
throughintelligence-gathering.Heargues:
SecretintelligenceisevenmoreimportantinmodernmultidimensionalPKOs
withtheirexpandedresponsibilities:electionsmonitoring,whereindividual
votesmustbekeptsecret;armscontrolverification,includingpossiblesurprise
inspectionsatunannounced locations, lawenforcementagencysupervision
(to‘watchthewatchmen’);mediationwhereconfidentialbargainingpositions
thatareconfidentiallysharedbyonepartywiththeUNshouldnotberevealed
to theother; sanctionsandbordermonitoring,whereclandestineactivities
(e.g. arms shipments) must be uncovered or intercepted without allowing
smugglerstotakeevasiveaction(ibid:3).
Dorn(1999)isconcernedthattheUNdoesnothaveanyguidelinestodealwith
sensitiveinformation,andthatthevariancesintheinformationmanagementsys-
temsofindividualPKOsunderminetheeffectivenessoftheinstitution.Heurges
thattheUNneedstoacquirethemeanstomakeeffectiveuseofbothopenand
secretinformation.Aswithanyintelligencesystem,standardsshouldbecreated
fordeterminingwhatinformationshouldbegatheredandheldopenly,andwhat
should be gathered and held in secrecy, and for what duration. He offers the
guidelinesthat informationshouldbeopenunlessdivulgingitwouldresult in
deathorinjurytoindividuals,bringaboutfailureofaUNmissionormandate,
violatetherighttoprivacyofoneormoreindividuals,orcompromiseconfidential
sourcesormethods.
Insummary,theliteraturedemonstratesthattherightofaccesstoinformation
isstronglyestablishedinvariousinternationalinstruments.Thisdoesleavethe
impressionthatthecaseforsecrecy,inthepost-apartheiddispensationmaywell
havebeenneglected.Justifiably,outofconcernforarepeatoftheexcessesofthe
past,therehasbeenmuchattentionpaidtotherightofaccesstoinformationin
academicanalysis.However,itmaywellbetimeforabodyofresponsibleanalysis
thatputsforward,againstarealisticassessmentofthreatstosecurity,acompel-
lingcaseforconfidentialityandsecrecy.Itisoutofsuchcountervailinganalyses
thatabalancedpolicyanalysisandoptionsmayemerge.
40 / chAPter one
ACCess to InFoRMAtIon AnD PoLItICAL PoweR
TheSouthAfricanintelligenceservices,liketheircounterpartsinmanyparlia-
mentarydemocracies,conductmuchoftheirwork–aimedatpromotingnational
security–underconditionsofsecrecy.Inthewesternliterature,itisoftenassumed
thatthereisacausallinkbetweengovernmentsecrecyandtheabuseofpower.
Itisalsosuggestedthatthereisanimplicittendencytowardsfairandjudicious
governmentwhengreaterpublicaccess to information,particularlyabout the
securityandintelligenceservicesofacountry,istheorderoftheday(Halperin&
Hoffman1977;Richelson1989;Steele2001;Hodess2003).InSouthAfricathere
isanincreasingpublicexpectationthatmoreinformationaboutthesecurityand
intelligenceserviceswillbemadeavailabletothepublic,andthatthesebodies
willbeheldaccountablefortheiractions,pastandpresent(Africa1992;Nhlanhla
1992;Harris2000;Bell2001;Klaaren2002;Levy2004).
Intheliteratureontherelationshipbetweensecrecyandtransparencyina
democracy,wealsoencounterseveralanalysesofthesocialandpoliticalcostsand
benefitsofthesepolicyimperatives(Franck&Weisband1974;Paraschos1975;
Turner1986;Shulsky1991;Halperin&Hoffman1977).Someofthesestudies
derivefromtheauthors’involvementinthesecuritycommunitiesoftheircoun-
tries,andtakeasagiventheroleofespionageininternationalrealpolitik.Franck
&Weisband(1974)pointoutthatthedelicatebalancebetweenthegovernment’s
needforsecrecyandthepeople’srighttoknowhasbeenthesubjectofintense
academicandpublicconcerninmanywesterndemocracies.
The contradiction in managing the conflict between the secrecy required
by intelligence activities and the normal openness of democratic societies is
addressedbyTurner(1986),whopointsoutthatthereasontheUnitedStates
governmentintroducedmeasurestocounterbalancesecrecywithtransparency
measuresinthe1970sand1980swasitsexperiencesofunacceptableconduct
withinthesecurityservices,especiallytheintelligencecommunity.
Somewritershavearguedthatalackofopennesshasfuelledsuspicionanda
publicbeliefthatthesecretserviceshavehiddenandsubversiveagendas(Aubrey
1981;Cohen1982;Mates1989).Thedilemmafortheintelligenceservicesofa
democraticstateisthatsuchananalysis,carriedtoanextreme,maydemonise
them unfairly, and fail to recognise the role that they could play in providing
earlywarningaboutthreatstothesecurityofacountryanditspeople(Todd&
Bloch2003).Inaddition,thereisdebateindemocraticsocietiesabouttheextent
towhichstatesshouldinstitutesecrecymeasures.Steele(2001)hasarguedthat
muchintelligenceandearlywarningaboutsecuritythreatscanbegleanedfrom
openlyavailablesourcesofinformation.
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 41
Thewayinwhichcountrieswhosesecurityandintelligenceservicesaresubject
toaccesstoinformationlegislationmanageinpracticetheirresponsestorequests
fordisclosureabouttheactivitiesorconductoftheirintelligenceserviceisoften
fraughtwithcontradictions(Rankin1986;Hazell1989;Leigh1997;Coliveretal
1999;D’Souza1999).Banisar(2002)cautionsthatthemereexistenceofaccess
to information legislation does not always mean that access is guaranteed. In
manycountries,enforcementmechanismsareweakandgovernmentsoftenresist
releasinginformation.Alternatively,bureaucratsdelaytheprocessingofinforma-
tionrequests(Martin&Feldman1998).
Intelligenceserviceshaveundergonesignificantchangesinthepost-ColdWar
period,particularlyintheirrelationswiththeircountries’owncitizens,andone
wouldassumethatthiswouldmeangreateraccesstoinformationabouttheintel-
ligenceservices,ifonlyabouttheirpast.Yetthepicturehasbeenamixedone.
Manystudieshavesoughttouncovertheinnerworkingsoftheformereastern
Europeanintelligenceservices,usingrecordsdisclosedintheperiodfollowingthe
ColdWar(Childs&Popplewell1996;Williams&Deletant2001).Thedeclassifica-
tionofrecordsincountrieswherethishasoccurredhasplayedasignificantrole
inrevelationsabouttheroleofintelligenceservices.Nevertheless,fulldisclosure
remainsaproblem,evenforbodiesconstitutedattheinstanceofthestate.Hayner
(2001)writesaboutthedifficultiesthattruthcommissionsoftenencounter in
accessingofficialrecordsofformerrepressiveregimes.Somestatesundergoing
transitionshavebeenabletofill the informationgapbyaccessingdeclassified
recordsofotherstates,wheretherehavebeengapsintheirownrecords.Inthe
caseofboththeSalvadoranandGuatemalantruthcommissions,extensiveuse
was made of records declassified in terms of the US Freedom of Information
Act.Thesecommissionsmadeuseofnon-governmentorganisationssuchasthe
National Security Archive that had experience in declassification procedures
(Hayner2001).TheSalvadorancommission,forexample,reliedonthefilesof
alreadydeclassifieddocuments,butalsoappliedforthedeclassificationofaddi-
tionaldocuments.Althoughitinitiallymetresistancefromsomedepartmentsof
theUnitedStatesgovernment,co-operationimprovedwiththeinaugurationof
PresidentBillClintoninJanuary1993.TheGuatemalancommissionmademuch
moreextensiveuseofUnitedStatesdocumentation,andthroughtheNational
SecurityArchivessubmittedfreedomofinformationrequestsonoverthreedozen
casestheywereinvestigating.Thereleaseoftheinformationandtheuseofdeclas-
sifiedrecordsplayedaninvaluableroleinexplainingtheAmericangovernment’s
relationswiththesestates,andprovidinginsightintotheroleoftheAmerican
intelligenceservicesinthe1960sand1970s.
42 / chAPter one
Thisfactorandthesestrategies–accesstothedeclassifiedrecordsofformer
authoritarianregimes–maybeparticularlyrelevanttoSouthAfrica,inviewofthe
apartheidexperienceofthedestructionofintelligencerecords.Asrevealedduring
thehearingsoftheTRC–initiatedthroughalawofparliamenttouncovergross
humanrightsviolationsthathadbeencommittedduringtheapartheidperiod–
thepreservationofofficialrecordsisattheheartofpreservingnationalmemory,
yethugevolumesofrecordsweresystematicallydestroyedastheapartheidyears
drewtoaclose.
Measuresofredressthatmaybechosenbystatesintheaftermathofperiods
ofatrocityareoftendependentonaccesstoreliablerecords.Thisisthecontext
inwhichtheneedtopreservethemforposterityaspublicrecords,andnothave
themregardedastheexclusivepropertyofanyoneagency,mustbeseen.The
SouthAfricanexperienceofmanagingofficialfilesfromtheapartheideracon-
trastssharplywiththecaseofseveralformereasternEuropeancountrieswhere
filesoftheformersecurityserviceswerethrownopentothepublicforscrutiny,
followingthecollapseofcommunistregimes.Theargument inthecaseofthe
easternEuropeanpost-communistauthoritieswasthatdisclosurewasanecessary,
ifpainful,exerciseincomingtotermswiththepast.Thesecontrastingexperiences
leadustoconsidertheroleofthearchive,andtheprocessofrecordinganddocu-
mentinghistory,asafundamentalpreludetoaccessinginformation.
the ARChIVes AnD InteLLIgenCe ReCoRDs
Hamilton(2002)andPetersen(2002)havequestionedthetraditionalconception
androleofstatearchives.Statearchives,theyargue,reinforcetheisolationand
secrecyofinformation:onceburiedinthearchives,recordsinawaynolonger
exist,exceptforthosewhoareitsimmediatecustodians,andotherswhodevelop
somearcaneinterestinit.Theywarnthatstatearchivescanfalselyconstructthe
pastthroughthecontrolofselection,description,andaccesstoinformation.Asa
result,historianshavebeencautiousaboutrelyingexclusivelyonpublicandmore
specificallygovernmentrecords.ThisisespeciallythecaseinSouthAfrica,where
archivesareperceivedtoreinforcecolonialandlaterapartheidbiases.
Thereconstitutionofthearchivesinpost-apartheidSouthAfricacreatesan
opportunitytoredressthislegacy.Themostimportantchallengeistoincorporate
theexperiencesofdiversestakeholders.Archivesshouldthereforenotonlyreflect
howstateswanthistorytoberecorded;theyshouldalsoexpressthedocumented
strugglesandexperiencesofallthepeopleswithinacommonpoliticalspace,irre-
spectiveofwhetherrecordshavebeencapturedbythestateornot.
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 43
This brings us to the question of the duty of the state to preserve public
records,andfacilitatethepreservationofnon-governmentalrecords.InSouth
Africa, the records of the intelligence services have been particularly vulner-
abletodisposalonpoliticalwhim,ashappenedintheclosingdaysofapartheid
whenstaterecordsweredestroyedunderthedirectionofthestate’sintelligence
services.Thisdestructionofrecordscontinuedwellintothefirstyearsofthenew
democracy,aclearsignthattheparadigmhadnotchanged,despitethefactthat
thoserecordswereaclearlinktothepastthatstillneededtobeunderstoodand
assimilated.Moreover,Pigou(2002)recountsthedifficultiesingainingaccessto
officialinformationencounteredbytheinvestigationunitoftheTRC,andclaims
thattheSAPS,SANDFandNIA,tovaryingdegrees,blockedaccesstotherecords
oftheirpredecessors.
Theseperspectivesonthestatearchive,andaccessingofficialrecordsduring
thetransition,arerelevanttothedebateonsecrecyandaccesstoinformation
generatedinthecontextofnationalsecurityimperatives.Alessonfromthisdebate
isthatweshouldbecarefulnottomistakethestate’srecordorversionofreality
asthefinalreflectionofthetruth.Arangeofnon-stateactorsmaywellviewthe
samephenomenathroughentirelydifferentlenses,andthisdoesnotmaketheir
reflectionslessimportantorvalid.It isthereforeimportantthattheprocessof
documentingthesedifferentrealitiesaretakenintoaccountwhenappraisingany
pastreality,andthatthestate’sofficialpolicyonnationalsecuritybeappropriately
formulated,ratherthancontinuingtomarginaliselesspowerfulgroupsinsociety.
Thesecondlessonarisingoutof thisdebate is theneedtoseriouslyrecon-
siderhowtoimproveaccesstostaterecordsandarchives,andavoidtheperilsof
underminingpublicownershipofacountry’shistory.Apartfrommarginalising
significantvoices intheSouthAfricanarena,theStateArchivesServiceunder
apartheiddidnotintervenewhenstatestructureswentaboutdestroyingofficial
history.Theneedtopreservehistory,unalteredandrepresentative,istherefore
anotherlessonfromourpast.Howtheselessonsaretobeappliedinthecontext
ofstatestructureswhichexistintheshadowsisahugechallenge.Thisstudywill
deconstructtheimplicationsofaccesstoinformationaboutorfromtheintelli-
genceservices.Presumably,anyinformationthatfallsoutsidethescopeofoneof
PAIA’sgroundsforrefusalofaccesstoinformationmayberequestedandpoten-
tiallyanswered.
Practicalchoiceshavetobemadebythepublicandbytheintelligenceservices
andotherpublicbodiesregardingtheirrelationshiptoinformation.Important
intermediariesaretobefoundinthepolicy-makingandgovernancecommunities,
andinnon-stateactors.Asinmydiscussiononthephilosophicaldimensionsof
44 / chAPter one
secrecy,andthepracticeofsecuritization,itseemsthatonceagaintheunderlying
powerrelationsunderscorethechoicesthataremade.
ACCess to InFoRMAtIon AnD the LAw In ConteMPoRARY south AFRICA
ThereissignificantlegalprecedenceinSouthAfricaaroundaccesstoinformation
andthedisclosureofinformationinvariouscontextsotherthantheintelligence
services,someofitpredatingthenewconstitution.Someanalysescentreonthe
rightofaccesstopolicedocketsorrecordsbyadefendantinacriminalmatter:
theyincludethoseofBursey(1990),Cassim(1996),Jazbhay(1997,1998,and
2002),Meintjies-vanderWalt(1995),andDeVilliers(2003).Thefollowingwrit-
ershaveexploredthequestionofaccesstoinformationconcerningenvironmental
rights:Glazewski(1994),DuPlessis(1998,1999),Kidd(1999),andGrinlinton
(1999).Concerningaccesstomedicalrecords,studiesincludethoseundertaken
byVanWyk(1996),Driver-Jowet(1998),VanderPoel(1998),Strauss(1998),
VanOosten(2000),Gaum(2001)andBlackbeard(2002)whilstDeale(1994),
Landman(1996),Grogan(1997)andLeRoux(2001)coverthesubjectofaccess
toinformationinlabourrelations.Finally,thefollowingwritershavecommented
onaccesstocorporateinformation:Malan(1989),Solomon(1995),Carnelley
(1999),Pimstone(1999),Matlala(2003)andSchulze(2004).Alltheseanalyses
attempttoapplyortoestablishlegalprincipleinresolvingcontradictionsbetween
societyontheonehand(eitherasacollectiveortheindividualstherein),andthe
stateoritsinstitutionsontheother.
TheintroductionofaBillofRights,bothintheinterimconstitutionof1993
andthefinalconstitutionof1996,wasthebasisforseveralmoregeneralanalyses
oftherightofaccesstoinformationinSouthAfrica.Somewritersonthesubject
included Mureinik (1994), De Villiers (1995), De Vos (1995), Burns (1997),
Currie(1999,2000)andWessels(2002).TheintroductionoftheOpenDemoc-
racyBillin1998andthepassingofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationActin
2000werethebasisforthecommentariesofGovender(1995),Roos(1998),and
Visser(2002).Allthesewritershaveconsideredtheimplicationsforthepolicy
andjudicial landscapeoftheintroductionofaconstitutionalrightofaccessto
information.
AcentralthemeinmodernanalysesofgovernmentalsecrecyinSouthAfricais
thattheyarelocatedinatimeandframeworkofdeepconcernabouttheexcesses
of the apartheid era, during which secrecy was used to cover governmental
excesses(Mathews1978;Currie&Klaaren2002;Levy2004;Qunta2004;Steytler
2004).Post-1994analystsareconcernedthatsocietyshouldnotreverttothat
secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 45
darkpast.Anunintendedconsequenceofthisconcernmaywellbethat,whilethe
casefortransparencyiscompellinglymade,thecaseforlegitimatesecrecymaybe
neglected.
ConCLusIon
Managingthetensionsbetweensecrecyandtransparencyinademocracyisoften
acomplextask.Theentrenchmentofaconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinforma-
tionhasbeenadefiningfeatureof thepost-apartheidpolitical landscape,and
chimes with international trends in democratic political systems. However, in
internationallaw,thedutyofstatestoprotecttheirsecretshasalsobeenalong-
recognisedprinciple(Evatt1999;Nichols1999).Whilethisisalsothecaseinthe
SouthAfricancontext,whereaccesstoinformationlegislationco-existswithleg-
islationprotectingotherinformation,theacademicliteraturehastendedtofocus
ontheconstitutionalrighttoknow,ratherthantherightofthestatetoprotect
informationfromdisclosurewherenationalsecurityconsiderationsjustifythis
(Mathews1978;Currie&Klaaren2002).Thispolarisationofthepolicydebate
suggeststhatthereisnoconsensusbetweentheintelligenceservicesandimpor-
tantstakeholdersinthepublicdomainonwhatconstitutesathreattosecurity,
andwhatinformationthereforewarrantsprotection.
Most writers on the subject agree that transparency can be leveraged to
givecitizensaccesstoinformationtheyneedtodefendtheirrights,andtogive
marginalisedgroupsmeaningfulinsighttotheworkingsofstate(Mathews1978).
However,asRobertson(1999)pointsout,accesstoinformationlegislationaround
theworldhasnotresultedinsignificantshiftsinpowerrelations,andmustlead
ustoconsiderwhetherthisaloneisasufficientrequirementforaccountableand
transparent government. It appears not to be, and therefore any remedies for
governanceofthesecuritysectorshouldincludearangeofoversightandaccount-
abilitymechanisms.
ManywouldarguethatbecauseSouthAfricaisnotinastateofinternalor
externalconflict,itdoesnotneedtoresorttoextremesecrecy,suchasthatwhich
characterisedtheapartheidperiodortheColdWar.However,itisincreasingly
acceptedthattheworld,apartfrombeinginterconnected,isfairlyunpredictable,
andthatthereisstillavarietyofthreatsforwhichtheearlywarningcapabilities
ofintelligenceservicesarerequired.
Importantworkhasbeendonearoundthesignificanceofaccesstotherecords
offallenauthoritarianregimes,whenthisbecomespossibleunderachangeof
government. Such access has enormous social and political value, and allows
46 / chAPter one
asocietytocometotermswithitspast,particularlythepastroleofitssecurity
forces.This ispertinent toSouthAfrica,where theTRCrevealedasystematic
destructionofstaterecords.Becausethearchivalrecordisnotaneutralentity,it
shouldbeviewedasonlyonerepresentationofreality,whichisalsocontinuously
shapedbynon-stateactorsthroughotherformsofrecordingmemory.Particu-
larlyrelevantisthecaseofintelligencerecordsthatcontinue,afterapartheid,to
besubjecttoconsiderablecontrolandsecrecy.Opacityaroundstateinformation
holdingswhicharenotreadilyaccessibletothepublicraisesthespectreofthe
vulnerabilityofthesedocumentstodistortionandevendisposal,allpossibilities
whengovernancemechanismsarenoteffective.Inpracticalterms,andfortrans-
parencytobegivenmeaningfuleffect,thefullweightofcountervailingsystems,
includingoversightofintelligence,shouldbebroughttobear.
THIS CHAPTER examines the policy framework for official secrecy under
whiteminorityrule.Theperiodunderreviewbeginsattheturnofthe20th
century,andendsinFebruary1990whentheANC,SouthAfricanCommunist
Party(SACP),Pan-AfricanistCongress(PAC),andotheranti-apartheidorgani-
sations were unbanned. In this period, successive white regimes attempted to
maintaintheirpoliticalandeconomicdominance,andentrencharacialnotionof
SouthAfricancitizenship.
Fivephasesseemtodefineshiftsinthestate’sapproachtosecurity.Priorto
Unionin1910bothBoersandBritonsestablishedinstitutionsaimedatwarning
themtimeouslyofthreatstotheirinterests.Thenextphasestartsin1910when
SouthAfrica’sfourwhite-controlledcolonieswereunifiedunderacentralgov-
ernmentthatoweditsallegiancetotheBritishcrown,andcontinuestotheend
ofWorldWarTwo.Thenextphase,followingWorldWarTwo,coverstheperiod
whentheAfrikaner-basedNProsetopower,andbegantoconsolidateracially
exclusiveandsegregationistpolicies.Thenextphasestartswiththebanningofthe
liberationmovementsin1960andtheirsubsequentresorttoanarmedstruggle,
andendswiththeSowetouprisingin1976.Excessivestatesecrecy,alongwiththe
suppressionofcivillibertiessuchasfreedomofexpression,associationandmove-
ment,werefundamentalpillarsofwhiteminoritycontrol.Thelastphasecovers
theperiodofmasspoliticalresistance,heightenedstaterepression,anddeepening
politicalcrisisinwhichtheapartheidgovernmentbegantorealisethatitneeded
tonegotiateapoliticalsettlementwiththeliberationmovements(Gerhardt1978;
Davidsonetal1976;Magubane2004).
the PoLICY FRAMewoRk FoR oFFICIAL seCReCY PRIoR to 1994
2
48 / chAPter two
Thisstudyofofficialsecrecypolicyunderminorityruleexamines, foreach
period, thepolicy imperativesof thegovernmentsat that time, the legislative
framework,theadministrationofthesystemofsecrecy,theshapeoftheintel-
ligence and security forces, and the ensuing resistance against secrecy and
repression.Itismeanttoprovideabackgroundtothepost-apartheidsecrecysys-
tem,sketchingtheoriginsofcontemporarypolicyaswellasitsflawedpolitical
foundation,whichhelpedtocreateitslegislativeandadministrativeshortcom-
ings.Althoughitstartsatthebeginningofthe20thcentury,theapartheiderais
emphasised,sinceitwasthelegacyofsuccessiveapartheidgovernmentsthathad
tobeundonewhendemocracywasformallyattainedin1994.
the PeRIoD PRIoR to 1910
The white regimes in the territories that later constituted the Union of South
Africabelievedtheyfacedsufficienthostilitiestojustifytheuseofsecretagents.
BlackburnandCaddell(1911)capturedthemoodinwhichsecretservicefirsttook
rootincolonialtimes:
In the early days of political stress in the Cape Colony, a system of secret
intelligence was developed automatically, particularly at the period of the
Britishoccupation,whentheBoerswerebecomingrestless,andthegrowing
discontentmanifesteditselfinmoreorlessopenmeetingsatremotefarms,
andsecretmutteringsinthemarketplace,oratthegreatquarterlyreligious
gathering,Nachtmaal…It is justifiabletosaythatthemenandwomenof
theSouthAfricanColonieswhohaveactedassecretconveyersofinformation
togovernmentsortheirrepresentativeshave, inthevastmajorityofcases,
beenactuatedbysomethingsufficientlyfarremovedfromsordidmotives,to
warrantitsbeingaccountedtothemforrighteousness,ifnotforthepurest
patriotism.Thisisprobablytrueofthemen–andwomen–whoassistedboth
sidesduringthelastBoerWar(1911:3).
Accordingtotheseauthors,secrecyandespionageinthisperioddealtwithissues
thatwenttotheheartofcontroloverresourcesandthesubjugationofindigenous
people:theillicitliquortrade,gunrunning,andthesmugglingofpreciousmin-
erals.RegardingtheformationofaBoersecretservice,theydescribetheroleof
DrWilliamLeyds,SecretaryofStateoftheTransvaalRepublic,ascentral.After
completinghis legalstudiesintheNetherlands,Leyds,abrilliantstudent,was
recruitedbyascoutwhorecommendedhimtoPresidentPaulKruger.TheDutch
wereverysympathetictowardstheBoersduringtheirwarsagainsttheBritish,
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 49
asentimentsharedbyLeyds,whodidnothesitatetotakeupKruger’sofferto
assumethepostofprosecutorintheTransvaal(VanNiekerk1985).
LeydssoonrosetothepositionofSecretaryofState–apivotalposition in
Kruger’sexecutive.UnderLeyds’sguidance,ahighlyorganisedsecretservicewas
established:
When the Kruger Executive began to realise that European opinion was a
thingthatmattered,andthattheSouthAfricanRepublicreallyhadaforeign
policyandforeignrelationslikeotherrespectableandold-establishedcoun-
tries…aseparateaccount[was]votedandkeptfor ‘informatie’.Withinten
yearsthesecretserviceoftheTransvaaldevelopedfromaprimitiveaffairof
privateinquiries...intooneofthemostexpensiveandextensiveintheworld
(Blackburn&Cadell1911:237).
Acharismaticfigure,Leydsplacedgreatstoreineffectivecommunications,and
developedanextensivenetworkofcontactsintheEuropeanmedia,thusseeking
toinfluenceopinioninfavouroftheTransvaalRepublic.Heandothermembersof
theTransvaalgovernmentprobablyhadasimilaroutlooktothatwhichheldsway
intheBritishEmpire–thenthemostpowerfulintheworld–whichmaintained
anextensivenetworkofinformantstoensurethattheCrownwaswellinformed
aboutalldevelopmentsinitsfar-flungrealm.
OfficialsecrecyinmodernSouthAfricacanthereforebetracedbacktothe
periodprecedingtheformationoftheUnionofSouthAfricain1910underthe
SouthAfricaActof1909,whichwaspassedbytheBritishparliament(Bindman
1988). The unification of the two former Boer Republics (the Transvaal and
OrangeFreeState)withtheBritishcoloniesoftheCapeandNatalwaspreceded
byanationalconventionatwhichdelegatessoughttoagreeonhowwhitesfrom
various language groups could coexist while excluding blacks from the rights
ofcitizenship.TheexclusionofblacksfromtheUnion’spoliticalandeconomic
mainstreamformedthecoreofthedomesticsecuritypolicyofsuccessivewhite
governments. They sought to manage the demands of white workers, while
continuing to exclude the black majority from economic benefits, often using
organisedforcetoupholdthisstrategy.
FRoM 1910 to 1948
Inthisperiod,theUnionwassubjecttoBritishlegislationonofficialsecrecy.An
OfficialSecretsActwasfirstpassedinBritainin1889,andsupersededin1911
byanamendedAct.AccordingtoMathews(1978), theActmighthavebeena
50 / chAPter two
responsetoleaksofofficialdocumentsaboutforeignaffairs,includingasecret
treaty between the United Kingdom and Russia in 1878. The law prohibited
Britishcitizensfromdisclosingstatesecrets;thusthebasiccrimeitcreatedwas
thecommunicationofofficialinformationandnotespionage.
The English law, in the form of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 was applied
in South Africa. This law was generally applied in British dominions, such as
Australia, New Zealand and India in the early 20th century (Mathews 1978;
Geldenhuys 1984). After 1911, subsequent amendments passed in the British
versionoftheActwerenotincorporatedintheSouthAfricanlaw,withtheresult
thatthelatterremainedunchangeduntilitwasrepealedandreplacedin1956
(Mathews,1978).TheOfficialSecretsActcreatedthecrimeofspying,committed
byanyonewhoendangeredthesafetyorinterestsofthestatebyengaginginany
oneofthreeactivities:approaching,inspecting,passingover,entering,orbeing
intheneighbourhoodofaprohibitedplace;makingasketch,plan,modelornote
whichmightbeorwasintendedtobeusefultoanenemy;orobtaining,collect-
ing,recording,publishingorcommunicatingtoanyotherpersondocumentaryor
otherinformationthatmightbeusefultoanenemy.Italsoprohibitedtheuseof
officialinformation,includinginformationaboutmunitionsofwar,forthebenefit
ofaforeignpower,aswellastheuseofofficialdocumentsforanypurposepreju-
dicialtothesafetyorinterestsofthestate(Mathews1978).
UnderaUniongovernment,moresignificant thanrelationsbetweenwhite
South Africans and the British government, was the exclusion of blacks from
politicallife.Governmentwasnotaccountabletothismajority,whichincludeda
peasantrythatwasbeingforcedofftheland,agrowingunskilledworkingclass,
and a politicised but small black elite (Gerhardt 1978). Each of these groups
respondedtotheirmarginalisationthroughvaryingformsofprotest.Collectively,
thepeasantswhoresistedtheirdispossession;theblackworkerswhoclashedwith
whiteminersintheurbanareas,andtheblackelitewhichpetitionedtheoverseas
centresofpowerinprotestagainsttheirpoliticalexclusion,shapedtheearlyUnion
government’sdomesticpolicy.Whiteworkersweregivenpreferentialtreatment
includingaccesstomoreskilledpositionsintheeconomy,alongwiththeprivi-
legeofpoliticalinclusion;thiswasthegovernment’sdominantresponsetothe
majorsecurityissueofthetime,commonlyreferredtoasthe ‘Nativequestion’
(DeKiewiet1941).
DuringtheearlyUnionperiod,foreignpolicyissueswererarelydebatedin
parliament,anddecisionswereoftentakenattheexecutivelevel.Nonetheless,
internationalrelationsconstitutedanimportantpartoftheUniongovernment’s
survivalstrategy.TheInformationService,whichfellundertheDepartmentof
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 51
ExternalAffairs,wasthechannelofforeignrepresentation.InitiallySouthAfrica
did not have an independent international status, as the British government
handledtheforeignrelationsofitsdominionsdirectly.The1926BalfourDeclara-
tiondefinedtherelationshipbetweenBritainanditsdominionsasonebetween
autonomouscommunitieswithintheBritishEmpirewhichwereequalinstatus
except in the spheres of foreign affairs and defence, which would remain the
responsibilityoftheBritishgovernment(Geldenhuys1984).
Theconsolidationofwhitepoliticalpowerwasaccompaniedbytheestablish-
mentofsecurityinstitutionsthatunifiedtheformercomponentsofthevarious
coloniesandBoerRepublics.TheUnionDefenceForce(UDF)andSouthAfrican
Police(SAP),bothformedshortlyafterUnion,facedthetaskofintegratingdis-
paratesecuritycultures.Seegers(1996)notesthatthroughtheseinstitutionsthe
systemofsecrecydevelopedatanearlystage.BoththeBothaandSmutsgovern-
mentsfocusedtheattentionoftheSAPonBolshevikelementsinthetradeunions.
Correspondingly,between1910and1920theBritishpolicefocusedtheiratten-
tionontheactivitiesof theBritishCommunistPartyand leftists in the labour
movement.LondonandPretoriasharedinformationsuppliedbytheirrespective
informers.Seegersalsonotesanearlyrelianceon‘blackdetectives,informers,and
trackersinstocktheftcases,whowerepraisedfortheirzeal’(1996:51).
Theperiodbetweenthetwoworldwarssawthedevelopmentofvariousinfor-
malinstitutionsaimedatconsolidatingthepositionofAfrikanersinSouthAfrican
society.Theformationin1918oftheBroederbond,asecretorganisationaimed
at advancing Afrikaner interests and Nationalism, was one such initiative. In
the1940s,NazisupportersinSouthAfricaformedtheOssewaBrandwag(OB).
Several right-wing nationalists were later recruited into the first formal civil-
ianintelligenceorganisation,theBureauforStateSecurity(BOSS),established
underPrimeMinisterBJVorster,whohimselfhadbeeninternedduringthewar
(Grundy1986).Seegers(1996)observesthattheSAPwasthefirstsecurityagency
torespondtotheinformation-gatheringneedsofthewarwhenitwasorderedto
respondtoasignificantshowofpro-NazismintheterritoryofSouthWestAfrica,
atthetimeaSouthAfricanmandate.
EncroachingonpersonallibertieswasanintegralwayoftheUnion’smachin-
eryofsecrecyandstatesecurity.Mathews(1971)notesthattheIndemnityand
SpecialTribunalActof1915provided fordetentionand imprisonmentduring
WorldWarOne,andthattheWarMeasuresActcontainedsimilarsanctionsduring
WorldWarTwo.Boththesemeasureswerewithdrawnafterthesewarsended;
however,Mathewsrecords,
52 / chAPter two
AsectionoftheNatalBantuCodewhichempowersthedetentionofAfrican
(Bantu) persons without trial has been a long-standing exception to the
temporarynatureofsuchprovisions.TheprovisionauthorizestheSupreme
Chief(StatePresident)toorderthedetentionofanyAfricanifheissatisfied
thatheisadangertothepublicpeace(1971:131).
MathewscitestwojudgmentsconcerningtheOfficialSecretsActduringWorld
WarTwo,whichisthecontextinwhichthelawwasmostextensivelyapplied.In
onecase(R v Wentzel),theaccused(Wentzel)waschargedwithhavingprepared
forpostage,informationthatmighthaveassistedaforeignpowerthatwashos-
tiletoSouthAfrica.Atthattime,SouthAfricawasatwarwiththeNazialliance.
Wentzeldefendedhimselfbysayinghehadnotintendedtoposttheinformation,
buthadhelditinreserveshouldtheneedarisetoexplainhimselfasaGerman
national to a future Nazi government, which seemed probable at the time.
Significantly,hewasacquittedonthegroundsthatthestatehadfailedtoprove
hisintentiontocommunicatethecontentsofthelettertotheenemy,whichwasa
requirementoftheOfficialSecretsAct(Mathews1978).
Inanothercase,(R v Vorster) the accused (Vorster)wasconvictedofcollecting
informationaboutthemunitionsandpersonnelatthenavalbaseinSimonstown.
Inthiscase,theappealcourtacceptedthat,becausetheinformationhadbeen
obtainedfromapersonnotauthorisedtocommunicateit,theaccusedcouldbe
assumedtohaveobtainedtheinformationforreasonsthatwereharmfultothe
interestsofthestate(Mathews1978).
Theclassificationofrecordsorinformationwasofnoconsequenceindecisions
relatingtowhetheracrimehadbeencommittedundertheOfficialSecretsAct.
Classificationwasmerelyanadministrativeprocedureappliedbygovernment
departments.ApersoncouldbeprosecutedundertheActeveniftheinformation
disclosedwasunclassified.ThiswasthesubjectofreviewintheUnitedKingdom
in1957.Acommitteelookingintoadministrativeproceduresandtribunals–the
FranksCommittee–raisedconcernsabouttheclassificationsysteminplaceatthe
time.Thissystemessentiallyrateddocumentsaccordingtotheharmthatcould
resultfromtheirunauthoriseddisclosure,asfollows:TopSecret(exceptionally
gravedamagetothenation);Secret(seriousinjurytotheinterestsofthenation);
Confidential(prejudicialtotheinterestsofthenation);andRestricted(undesir-
ableintheinterestsofthenation(Mathews1978:117).
TheFranksCommitteequestionedwhetherthesecriteriawerebeingappliedin
areasonableandconsistentmanner,andraisedconcernaboutthefactthatclas-
sificationdecisionswerenotsubjecttoreview.Moreover,theonuswasplacedon
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 53
arecipientofclassifiedinformationtodestroyit,ratherthantoseekareviewofits
classificationstatus.Thisledtoconcernsbyhistoriansthatdocumentswerebeing
tamperedwithbeforebeingmadeavailablewhenthetimecameforpublicrelease
afterthe30yearperiodstipulatedinthePublicRecordsAct(ibid).
Asearlyas1957,theFranksCommitteemadethecaseforarevisionofthe
classificationsystemintheUnitedKingdom.Oneoftherecommendationswas
tolinkthesystemofclassificationwiththecriminallaw.SouthAfricaatthetime
wassinkingfurtherandfurtherintoracialexclusionandpoliticalsuppression.By
1957,theNPgovernmenthadallbutinstitutionalisedsecrecy.
Extensivesecrecymeasureshadbeenputinplaceintheperiod1910–1945,
withtheOfficialSecretsActof1911asthemainvehicle.Theirusebythestatewas
drivenbythreekeydomesticandinternationalimperatives:addressingthe‘Native
question’,controllingthegrowthofthelabourmovement,andassistingtheAllies
inthewar.Theinstitutionsthatdevelopedoutofthisefforthadsomeofthehall-
marksofmodernsecurityorganisations,but thesewereovershadowedby the
factorofracialexclusivity,whichbecamemorepronouncedaftertheNP’sascent
topower(Grundy1986;Cawthra1986).TheBritishapproach–particularlythe
promulgationanduseoftheOfficialSecretsAct–wasparticularlyinfluentialin
shapingsecurityandintelligencepolicy.ItwasaprimarytoolintheUniongovern-
ment’sresponsestovariousthreatstoitsperceivedinterests.Onemajorperceived
threatwasblackresistance,afactorthatshapeddomesticsecuritypolicyaswell
astheroleandorientation ofthesecurityforces.
FRoM 1945 to 1960
TheperiodafterWorldWarTwowasmarkedbyaheightenedstandoffbetween
EastandWest,intheformoftheColdWar.Inlinewithglobaltrends,intelligence
servicesbecameamoredominantfeatureofSouthAfricanpolitics.TheSecurity
BranchoftheSAPwasestablishedin1947.DrawnfromtheSAP’sdetectiveserv-
ice,itactedasanelitepoliticalpolice.Domestically,itwasprimarilyengagedin
tacticalintelligence;itgatheredinformationaboutopponentsofapartheid,and
pursuedshort-andmedium-termobjectivessuchasdetentions,prosecutions,and
imprisonment.
SouthAfrica’sforeignrelationsinthisperiodwerearesponsetoitsgrowing
isolation,andhadtobeconductedinanincreasinglystealthymanner.Gonewas
theinternationalstatureandprominencethatGeneralJCSmutshadachieved
duringhistenureasprimeminister,apositionthatsawhimserveasamember
oftheBritishWarCouncil.Informationofficerspostedabroadweretaskedwith
54 / chAPter two
countering‘hostilepropaganda’(Geldenhuys1984).Thenumberofinformation
officesmultiplied,andanexpandedSouthAfricanInformationServicewasestab-
lishedin1957,taskedwithwinningforeignsupportforSouthAfrica’sdomestic
andforeignpolicies.TheUnitedStates,Britain,andWesternEuropeweresingled
outaspriorityareas.Africawasnot,andtheNPgovernmentmaintainedonlyone
officeinthe‘north’–inSalisburyinSouthernRhodesia(Geldenhuys1984).
Followingitsascenttopower,theNPgovernmentintroducedpoliciesaimedat
enforcingracialseparationandwhiteprivilegeinallwalksoflife(Grundy1986;
Bindman1988;VanDiepen1988).Strongmeasureswererequiredtosecurethe
continuedcomplianceofanincreasinglydefiantblackpopulation,andtheperiod
after1948sawtheestablishmentofstrengthenedsecurityservicesandtheintro-
duction of a plethora of laws designed to enforce apartheid (Bindman 1988).
Besideslegislationexplicitlyaimedatcounteringpoliticalresistance–commonly
labelledas‘communism’–manyotherareasofpubliclifeweresubjectedtogrow-
ingsecrecy.Amongothers,theWageActof1957,theIndustrialConciliationActof
1956,theBantuLabourRelationsActof1953,andtheReserveBankActof1944
containedsevererestrictionsonthepublicdisclosureofcertaintypesofinforma-
tion(Mathews1971).
Lawsaimedat suppressing freedomofexpressionandpoliticalassociation
includedtheSuppressionofCommunismActof1950;theInternalSecurityAct
of1950;thePublicSafetyActof1953;theRiotousAssembliesActof1956;the
DefenceActof1957);andthePoliceActof1958.Theywereintroducedinacon-
textofincreasedblackoppositiontowhiterule(Gerhardt1978;Davidsonetal
1976).Thisoppositionwaslargelypeaceful,thoughmass-based,andwascharac-
terisedbyincreasingcollaborationbetweendifferentracialandethnicgroups.In
theColdWarcontext,theNPregimelabelledalmostallresistancetowhiterule
as‘communist’,andthebarrageoflegislationpassedintheearly1950swasbased
onthisassumption.
Mathews(1971)hascomparedSouthAfricawithothercountriesthatplaced
restrictionsonpoliticalassociationandaccesstoinformationintheearlypartof
the20thcentury. In1917theUnitedStates introduceditsEspionageStatutes,
aimedatdefiningthecrimeofespionageasthecommunicationofdocumentary
orother informationrelatingtonationaldefencetoa foreignnationoragent.
TheUnitedStateswasalsooneoffewwesterndemocracieswithextensiveanti-
communist laws, which encroached upon basic freedoms of expression and
informationaswellaspersonalprivacyandliberty.
There, the Smith Act of 1940 was introduced to counter the activities of
NaziandFascistgroups;however,itwasusedextensivelyagainstcommunists.
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 55
OtherlegislationincludedtheSubversiveActivitiesControlActandInternalSecu-
rityActof1950,andtheCommunistControlActof1954.Mathews(1971)notes
that,unlikeitsSouthAfricanvariants,theAmericanlegislationdidnotenjoyfree
passage,andhadtoberefashionedtoaccordwiththeruleoflawandrequire-
mentsofdueprocess.InSouthAfrica,however,semi-authoritarianruleallowed
thefreepassageoflawsthatroutinelyrestrictedinformation,andundermined
personalliberties.
Among other things, South African legislation in this period continued to
emphasisethesuppressionofinformation,ratherthanpublicaccess.Even‘white’
institutions–includingparliamentandthemedia–weresubjectedtogrowing
restrictions.TheDefenceActof1957prohibitedthepublicationofthreeclasses
ofinformationwithoutministerialauthority,thuseffectivelydeprivingthepublic
oftherighttovirtuallyall informationconnectedwithdefence,andmakingit
acrimeforanygovernmentemployeeorcontractor,oranypersontowhomthe
informationhadbeengiveninconfidence,todiscloseitwithoutauthority.The
threeclassesofinformationwere:
• informationaboutthecomposition,movements,ordispositionoftheSouth
Africanorforeignarmedforcesortheirarmaments;
• statements,commentsorrumoursaboutamemberoractivityoftheSouth
African or foreign armed forces calculated to prejudice or embarrass the
governmentortoalarmordepressmembersofthepublic;and
• secretorconfidentialinformationrelatingtothedefenceoftheRepublic.
Thislastcategoryhadfar-reachingimplications;allinformationrelatingtothe
defenceoftheRepublicwaspresumedsecretorconfidentialunlessthecontrary
was proved, and any information relating to military equipment was deemed
secretunlesspublicationhadbeenauthorised(Mathews1971).
TheInternalSecurityActof1950authorisedthestatepresidenttobanapubli-
cationcontaininginformationcalculatedtoachievetheobjectivesofcommunism,
orendangerthesecurityofthestateorthemaintenanceofpublicorder.
ThePrisonsActof1959madeitacrimetosketchorphotographaprisonor
anyportionofaprison,or topublishthesewithouttheauthorityof theCom-
missionerofPrisons.Similarly,photographsofprisonersordetaineescouldnot
betakenwiththeintentionofpublishingthemunlessusedforofficialpurposes.
Effectively, this Act placed restrictions on making known the poor conditions
underwhichprisonersmightbekept.Significantly,itwasintroducedafterthe
‘Treason Trial’ of 1956 involving Nelson Mandela and other anti-apartheid
56 / chAPter two
activists.Theirphotographs–andtheircause–werewidelypublicised,whichno
doubtspurredthislatestformofcensorship.
FRoM 1960 to 1976
Growingresistancetoapartheidledtointensifiedrepression.In1961theANC
wasbanned,anditsremainingleaderswentintoexile(Davidsonetal1976).In
responsetotheradicalisationofliberationpolitics,thegovernmentexperimented
withdifferentmodelsofintelligencecoordination.In1963itestablishedaState
Security Committee and a Working Committee (National Intelligence Service
1994).Bothhowever,werepart-timestructures,andtherefore largely ineffec-
tive.OnereasonwasthattheStateSecurityCommitteedidnotmeetregularly.In
1966intelligenceco-ordinationwasagainreviewedandthethenprimeminister,
DrHFVerwoerd,decidedthattheStateSecurityCommitteeshouldbesubsti-
tutedbyaStateSecurityAdvisoryCouncil(SSAC).Thelatterhadasecretariat,
knownastheIntelligenceCo-ordinationDivision(ICD).Exceptforitsdirector,the
ICDconsistedofnon-permanentmemberswhodependedonfull-timeofficialsfor
basicintelligence.
Inthelate1960sthecabinetfeltitneededtobebetterinformedonsecurity
issues,andtheprimeminister,BJVorster,taskedahigh-rankingpoliceofficerand
closeconfidante,GeneralHJvandenBergh,withestablishinganewintelligence
organisation. Initially, itwasenvisagedthatVanDenBerghwouldcontrol the
SecurityPoliceandDefenceForceIntelligence.However,headvisedagainstthis
conflationandaninquiryintothematterwasheld.Thedepartmentalintelligence
serviceswerenotenthusiasticaboutacentralintelligenceorganisationasthey
feareditwouldencroachontheirmandates(NationalIntelligenceService1994).
In September 1969 the government appointed Appeal Court Judge
HJPotgietertoexplorethefuturepositioningoftheintelligencedepartments.
CompletedinAugust1970,hisreportadvocatedthecreationofaBureauforState
Securitytoinvestigateandevaluateallmatters–whetherwithinthecountryor
abroad–thatthreatenedorhadabearingonthesecurityorsafetyofthecoun-
try,andtoadvisetheprimeministeraboutthem.Thegovernmentacceptedthis
recommendation,andformedtheBureauforStateSecurity,orBOSS(National
IntelligenceService1994;Grundy1986).
The functions of BOSS were to collect, evaluate, correlate, and interpret
national security intelligence for the purpose of defining and identifying any
threatorpotentialthreattothesecurityoftheRepublic;prepareandinterpretfor
theStateSecurityCouncilanationalintelligenceestimateconcerningthesecurity
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 57
oftheRepublic;formulate,forapprovalbytheCouncil,policyrelatingtonational
securityintelligence;co-ordinatetheflowofintelligenceamongdifferentgovern-
mentdepartments;andmakerecommendationstotheStateSecurityCouncilon
intelligencematters(Africa1992;SecurityIntelligenceandStateSecurityCouncil
Act,1972).
Inordertofacilitatetheworkofthecountry’sfirsteverspecialisedintelligence
service,thegovernmentintroducedtheSecurityServicesSpecialAccountActof
1969,whichenabledittocreateanaccounttocontrolandutilisefundsforcon-
fidentialservicesandexpensesconnectedwiththeBureau.BOSSsoonbecame
knownforitsheavy-handedandintimidatoryactivities.Eventhoughitdidnot
havepowersofarrest,itscrudeandheavy-handedtactics–harassmentofjournal-
istsandeditors,blatantsurveillanceofpoliticalmeetings,tappingoftelephones,
and opening of mail of opponents of apartheid – quickly made it notorious
(Magubane2004).
BOSSoperateddomesticallyaswellasabroad.Geldenhuys(1984)observes
that intelligenceservicesoperatingsecretlyareoftenvery influential,andthis
soonhappenedinthecaseoftheBureau,whichcametoplayasignificantrolein
foreignrelations.GeneralVanDenBergh,asheadoftheBureauwasparticularly
activeinsouthernAfricaasanemissaryofVorsterinthedétenteeraofthe1970s;
forexample,hehelped toorganise thehistoricVictoriaFalls summitbetween
VorsterandPresidentKennethKaundaofZambiainAugust1975.FormerBOSS
officialshavestatedthatmuchoftheiroperationaleffortwasaimedatending
SouthAfrica’sinternationalisolation.NISoperativesweredeployedtothisend
bothinsidethecountryandabroad(NIS1994).
BesidestheBureau,theothermembersofthestatutoryintelligencecommu-
nityandthestate’ssecrecysysteminthisperiodweretheSecurityBranchofthe
SAP,andtheDivisionofMilitaryIntelligence(DMI)oftheSouthAfricanDefence
Force(SADF).Bothwereinvolvedinpoliticalconflict.Inthe1970sworkerand
communityresistancetoapartheidintensified,resultinginintensifiedrepression
bythesecurityforces.TheSecurityBranchwastaskedwithmonitoringpolitical
resistance,anddidsobyco-ordinatinganextensivenetworkofinformersaswell
asutilisingdraconianmeasuressuchasdetentionwithouttrial,andtheharass-
mentandsurveillanceofopponentsofthestate.TheBranchkeptfilesonmany
anti-apartheidfigures(Brogden&Shearing1993).
ThemoststrikingfeatureoftheDMIwastheextenttowhichitengagedin
attacksonanti-apartheidactivists,manyofwhomwereinexile,inbannedpoliti-
calorganisationssuchastheANCandPAC,UmkhontoweSizweandPoqo(the
armedwingsofthesetwomovements),andtheSACP.Thisclearlydeviatedfrom
58 / chAPter two
theconventionalroleofadefenceforce,namelytodefendacountryagainstfor-
eignaggressors. InSouthAfrica’scase the ‘enemy’was theso-called frontline
states,orindependentsouthernAfricanstatesborderingonSouthAfrica,which
hadtobearathreefoldburden:economicdominationbySouthAfrica;thespon-
sorship of counterrevolutionary movements by Pretoria, notably Renamo in
MozambiqueandUnitainAngola;andregularstrikesonANCbasesontheirown
soil,oftenatthecostofcivilianlives(Davidsonetal1976;Cawthra1986).
Besides the Defence Act, other security legislation also restricted access to
information.Muchinformationaboutthedefenceforcewasblackedout, thus
evenpreventingthemediafromreportingoneventsofpublicinterest.Thusthe
SouthAfricanmediawereunabletoreportonSADFincursionsintoneighbouring
territoriessuchasAngola(Mathews1978).
TheAtomicEnergyActof1967criminalisedthedisclosureorunauthorised
publicationofinformationrelatingtosourceornuclearmaterials,orresearch,
inventions,ordiscoveriesrelatedtonuclearoratomicenergy.Thereceiptofsuch
informationwasalsoacrime.TheNuclearInstallationActof1963andregulations
undertheUraniumEnrichmentActof1970containedsimilarprovisions.Again,
theseprovisionswereasbroad,ifnotbroader,thanthoseintheOfficialSecrets
Act,withtheresultthatthereachofthelawextended
…outsidetheappropriategovernmentdepartmentsorgovernment-created
boardsorcorporationstoinformationinthehandsofprivatebodiesorciti-
zens.Itcoversresearchersinthefieldofnuclearscienceandeventeacherswho
couldbreachtheprovisionsoftheactbydiscussionintheclassroomorwith
colleagues(Mathews1978:148).
Accesstostaterecordsbymembersofthepublic,includingresearchersandthe
media,wasstrictlyregulated.TheArchivesActof1962gavethedirectorofthe
StateArchivessignificantpowerstomanageofficialrecords.Amongotherthings,
thedirectorhadtoprescribeconditionsforthephysicalcareofallrecords,their
classificationaccordingtoanapprovedsystem,conditions foraccessingthem,
theirinspection,andtheirultimatedisposal(interviewwithDrGrahamDominy,
2September2003).
IntermsoftheAct,staterecordscouldonlybemadeavailabletothepublic
after 50 years. Moreover, their legal disposal involved either a transfer to the
Archivesordestructionintermsofadisposalauthority.Until1979astatutory
body,theArchivesCommission,wasresponsibleforauthorisingthedestruction
ofrecords.In1979theActwaschanged,givingthedirectorofarchivesthispower.
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 59
However,severaldepartmentsmadeuseofambiguousformulationsinthelawto
avoiditsdisposalrequirements(TRC1998).
Censorshipofthemediaalsoplayedasignificantroleinrestrictingaccessto
information.ThePublicationsActof1974prohibitedthedistribution,publication,
orexhibitionof‘undesirable’publications,filmsandentertainment,andenabled
acommittee toexercise its judgmentaboutwhichmedia fellwithinthescope
ofacceptablenorms.Thecommittee’sdecisionswerebindingincriminalcases.
AccordingtotheAct,materialwasdeemedundesirableifitwas‘prejudicialtothe
safetyoftheState,thegeneralwelfareorthepeaceandgoodorder’(Mathews
1978:151).In1976theActwasinvokedtobanaChristianInstitutepublication
entitledSouth Africa –APolice State? becauseitlistedpeopledetainedundervari-
oussecuritylaws,describedmajorpoliticaltrialsduringthepreviousthreeyears,
andoutlinedtypesoftortureusedbythepolice.
Apartheidlegislationalsoinfringedonpersonallibertiesandprivacy.Section
118A,insertedinthePostOfficeActin1972,allowedmailandtelephonecalls
tobeinterceptedifdeemedtobeintheinterestsofthesecurityoftheRepublic
(Mathews1971).
FRoM 1976 to 1990
In1976,followingtheSowetouprisingagainsttheintroductionofAfrikaansas
amediumof instruction inblackschools,hundredsofyouths left thecountry
totakeuparmsagainsttheapartheidgovernment.Theunprecedentedpolitical
resistance,andSouthAfrica’sconsequentincreasinginternationalisolation,led
itsrulerstoreviewtheirsecuritystrategy.Accordingtothe1977WhitePaperon
Defence,theroleofthedefenceestablishmentwastoupholdtherightofself-
determinationofthe‘whitenation’(Cawthra1986;Grundy1986).
Co-optionwasasignificantfeatureoftheapartheidgovernment’sstrategyfor
maintainingwhitedomination.TheTBVCstates–the ‘independent’Republics
ofTranskei,Venda,BophuthatswanaandCiskei–hadpowerstolegislateoncer-
tainareasofservicedelivery,thusgivingrisetoamythofpoliticalindependence
(Bindman1988).InrealitytheywereeconomicallyentirelydependentonSouth
Africa;andtheinternationalcommunity,includingmultilateralbodiessuchas
theUNandtheOAU,regardedthemasextensionsoftheapartheidorder.Besides
these,Pretoriacreatedseveralotherself-governingnationalterritories,or‘home-
lands’, which were rejected by the majority, and internationally unrecognised
(Bindman 1988). In terms of the Self-Governing Territories Act of 1971, their
60 / chAPter two
governingauthoritiescouldmakelawsaboutpolicing,butnotaboutintelligence.
Allsixterritorieschosetoestablishtheirownpoliceforces.
TheTranskeiIntelligenceService,theBophuthatswanaNationalIntelligence
Service,andtheVendaNationalIntelligenceServiceweremodelled–inlawat
least–ontheapartheidgovernment’sNationalIntelligenceService,butstaffed
bytheirown‘citizens’.Likethemainstreamservices,theTBVCservicesfocused
on frustrating their political opponents. They received training and resources
fromtheSouthAfricangovernment,andservedthesameends,namelytoprevent
thecountryfromfallingintothehandsofthedisenfranchisedmajority.Inaddi-
tion,thepoliceforcesofallthesehomelandswereextensionsoftherepressive
machineryoftheapartheidstate.Forexample,whileKwaZuluneverdevelopeda
statutoryintelligenceservice,itspolicecolludedwithwarlords,certainchiefs,and
vigilantegroupstoquellpoliticaloppositiontoitschiefminister,DrMangosuthu
Buthelezi.
TheDefenceWhitePaperof1977introducedthenotionofa‘totalstrategy’to
countera‘totalonslaught’ontheSouthAfricansocialorder.Allaspectsofnational
life–military,economic,political,sociological,technological,ideological,psycho-
logicalandcultural–weretobeco-ordinatedtothisend(Hansson1990).Inthe
1970sand1980sSouthAfricansocietybecameincreasinglymilitarised.Among
themorenotorioussecurityinstitutionswastheCivilCooperationBureau(CCB),
anoffshootoftheSpecialForces,whichengagedinanextensivepoliticalassas-
sination campaign (Cawthra 1986). At the height of apartheid in this period,
security policy and strategy were co-ordinated by the State Security Council
(SSC),acabinetcommitteechairedbythestatepresidentandlargelycomprising
ministersresponsibleforthecountry’ssecurityservices.
Significantly, theheadsof the intelligenceservicesalsoservedontheSSC,
givingthemgreatinfluenceinnationaldecision-making.TheSCCwasestablished
undertheSecurityIntelligenceandStateSecurityCouncilActof1972.Influential
innationalpoliticstotheextentthatthecabinetmerelyservedtorubber-stampits
decisions,theSSCintroducedtheNationalSecurityManagementSystem(NSMS)
in1979,whichsought to integrate thesecurityandwelfareaspectsofa ‘total
strategy’,aimedatmaintainingwhitepoliticalcontrol(Cawthra1986;Grundy
1986).Therationaleofthisstrategyof‘winningheartsandminds’(WHAM)was
thatagoverningpowercoulddefeatanyrevolutionarymovementifitadopted
arevolutionarystrategyandprinciplesandappliedtheminreverse.TheNSMS
continuedtoevolvenewformsofcontroltocountergrowingnationalresistance
andthefailureofgovernmentreforms.Bythemiddleofthe1980sstatestrate-
gistsbegantodescribeSouthAfricaasbeinginvolvedina‘waroflowintensity’,
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 61
requiringthemobilisationoftheentirepopulation,includingblackpeopleatthe
grassroots(Hansson1990;Haysom1992).
Seegers(1996:25)describesthecontestforinfluenceandcontrolbyelements
ofthesecurityforcesinthemid-1980sasfollows:
Securityintelligencewasimpededbyrivalryamongthestatesecuritybodies
andbyalackofup-to-dateinformationaboutactivitiesatthelocallevel.The
coreproblemseemedtobeagapbetweenplanningandexecution.Thiscon-
textwasripefortheexecutionofamilitarysolutionthatstressedcoordination
andefficiency....TheofficeofExecutiveStatePresident,institutedinthenew
constitutionof1983,wasareadybasisforamoreexecutivestyleofgovern-
ment.Itwashardlysurprisingthen,thatpowerrelationswithinthestatewere
restructuredtowardsanexecutivedominatedbythemilitary.
More legislationaimedatconsolidatingsecrecyandstatesecuritywaspassed
duringthistime.TheSecretServicesAccountActof1978providedfortheestab-
lishmentofanaccountforsecretservices.Theministeroffinancecouldtransfer
funds to the following accounts, at the request of the ministers concerned: a
ForeignAffairsSpecialAccountestablishedbytheForeignAffairsSpecialAccount
Actof1967;theSecurityServicesSpecialAccount;theSpecialDefenceAccount,
establishedbytheDefenceSpecialAccountActof1974;theInformationService
ofSouthAfricaSpecialAccount,establishedbytheInformationServiceofSouth
AfricaSpecialAccountActof1979;andtheSouthAfricanPoliceSpecialAccount,
establishedbytheSouthAfricanPoliceSpecialAccountActof1985.
The effect of this legislation was to tighten control over information, and
furtherrestrictoppositiontogovernmentpolicies.Moreover,thelegislationwas
generallyintrusive,givingthestateaninordinatedegreeofcontroloverpeople’s
lives.
TheProtectionofInformationActof1982supersededtheOfficialSecretsAct
of1956,theOfficialSecretsAmendmentActof1956,section27CofthePoliceAct
of1958,sections10,11and12oftheGeneralLawAmendmentAct,1969,and
section10oftheGeneralLawAmendmentAct,1972.Itstronglyresembledits
primaryprecursor,theOfficialSecretsAct,1956andprohibitedthedisclosureof
certaininformation.Morespecifically,itproscribedobtainingsecretstaterecords
information and disclosing such information to any foreign state or its agent.
Secretinformationwasdefinedasinformationrelatingtoanyprohibitedplaceor
anythinginanyprohibitedplace,oranyarmament;thedefenceoftheRepublic,
anymilitarymatter,anysecuritymatter,orthepreventionorcombatingofter-
rorism;andanyothermatterorarticlewhichmightbeofusetoaforeignstateor
62 / chAPter two
hostileorganisation(ProtectionofInformationAct1982).Itplacedaheavyonus
onindividualstoidentifymattersthatmightprejudicetheinterestsofthestate.
TheActwasclearlydesignedtodenyaccessto informationbothtoforeign
statesand toopponentsofapartheid.Theemphasiswasondenyingaccess to
information,andthiscreatedbarrierstothepublic’srighttoinformationinorder
toplayameaningfulroleinpublicpolicyformulation.TheProtectionofInforma-
tionActisstillinforcetoday,andsitsuneasilyalongsidethePromotionofAccess
toInformationActof2000aswellastheNationalArchivesActof1996.
Like the Official Secrets Act, the Protection of Information had no formal
relationshipwithprevailingsystemsofclassification.In1978thecabinetintro-
ducedasetofguidelinesaimedatensuringuniformstandardsforthehandling
ofclassifiedinformationbypublicservants.CommissionerTertiusGeldenhuys,
headofLegalServicesintheSAPS,describedthebackgroundtotheintroduction
oftheseguidelines.PriortothistheOfficialSecretsActwasinplace,butthere
werenogovernmentregulationstostandardisethehandlingofsensitivegovern-
mentinformation.Theresponsibilityforsecuringinformationthereforelaywith
individualministersandheadsofdepartment.Theguidelinesfollowedinterna-
tionalnormsandprovidedforinformationtobeclassifiedunderdifferentlevelsof
secrecy,aswellasproceduresfortheirhandlingandsafekeeping(interviewwith
DrTertiusGeldenhuys,7October2003).
Insummary,itcanbearguedthatallthecomponentsofthestatutoryintel-
ligencecommunity–NISanditspredecessor,BOSS;theSecurityBranch;Military
Intelligence;andthe intelligenceservicesof theTBVCstates–collaboratedto
ensurethemaintenanceofapartheid.Thisisnottodenythattherewerecontra-
dictionsbetweentheseroleplayersfromtimetotime.Attimes,therivalryamong
MilitaryIntelligence,theSecurityBranch,andNISwasquitemarked.Butcollec-
tivelytheseagencieswieldedconsiderablepower.
ConCLusIon
Before1990SouthAfricangovernmentwasclosedandsecretive.Officialsecrecy
andpoliticalexclusioncombinedtomarginalisethecountry’sblackmajorityas
wellasopponentsoftherulinggovernments.From1912onwardsthecountry
wassubjecttotheBritishOfficialSecretsAct,whichcontainedseverepenaltiesfor
thedisclosureofstatesecrets.Domesticforeignpolicywasdrivenbytheimpera-
tivetoresolvethe‘Nativequestion’,whichcametoaheadfollowingtheascent
topoweroftheAfrikaner-dominatedNP.Insubsequentyears,muchoftheleg-
islationaimedatconsolidatingwhiterulehadtheeffectofsilencingopposition
the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 63
andsuppressingbasichumanrightssuchasfreedomofspeech,movement,and
expression.Asshownintheearlierdiscussionofinternationalconventions,the
denialofthesefreedomsistantamounttothedenialofaccesstoinformationin
thebroadersense.
TheProtectionofInformationAct–whichsupersededtheOfficialSecretsAct
–reinforcedacultureofpenalisingthedisclosureofsecrets.Importantissuesof
accountability,ofwhodefineswhatcanbewithheldassecretorconfidential,and
whichchecksandbalancesexistoverhowofficialsmanageinformation,contin-
uedtobeignored.Thisisnotsurprising,giventhatapartheidSouthAfricawas
facinganunprecedentedcrisisatthattime.
TheroleoftheStateArchivesServiceinmanagingsecurityrecordsappears
tohavebeenambiguous,creatingasituationseeminglyexploitedbythesecurity
services.Manydocumentsweredestroyedintheearly1990s,eradicatingalarge
partofSouthAfrica’sofficialmemory.
In the period reviewed in this chapter, the security policies and secrecy
measuresofsuccessivewhiteminoritygovernmentswereaimedatconsolidat-
ingwhiterule,whileinfluencinginternationalopinioninfavourofSouthAfrica’s
domesticpolicies.Intheapartheidera,SouthAfricahadneitheraspecificsystem
fordeclassifyingsecurity-sensitiveinformation,noraregimeofaccesstoinforma-
tion.Inreportingonandassessingtheimplicationsofthedestructionofrecords,
theTruthandReconciliationCommissionpointsoutthatthemainguidelineto
publicaccesstostaterecordsunderapartheidwastheArchivesActof1962,which
establishedthataccesswasaprivilegetobegrantedbybureaucrats.
Theapartheidinheritanceincludedaclassificationsystemcontainedinthe
cabinetguidelinesfortheprotectionofclassifiedinformation.Theclassifications
mostcommonlyusedbyofficialswere ‘TopSecret’, ‘Secret’, ‘Confidential’,and
‘Restricted’.ThesewerecapturedinacabinetdocumententitledMinimumInfor-
mationSecurityStandards(MISS),andallstatedepartmentswereexpectedto
complywithitsstipulations.Theguidelinesdonotcovertheissueofwhichoffi-
cialshavetheauthoritytoclassifyinformation,howthatauthorityisderived,and
underwhichconditionsinformationmaybereclassified.
Secrecyinpre-1990SouthAfricawaspervasive;itformedanintegralpartof
thecolonialandapartheidorder,andcausedmuchsufferingformanypeople.
Thetransitiontoanewpoliticaldispensationwasmarkedbythetransformation
ofmanyinstitutions,includingtheintelligenceservices.Thisisthesubjectofthe
nextchapter,whichinterrogateshowfundamentalthistransformationhasbeen,
andwhether,andtowhatextent,theoldpatternsofsecrecyhavepersisted.
The mid-1980s to the early1990swasanexceptionallyviolentperiodinSouth
African history. The UDF, a broad front of extra-parliamentary organisa-
tions,waslaunchedin1983toopposeattemptedgovernmentreforms,including
araciallybasedtricameralparliament.TheSouthAfricanstate,particularlythe
securityforces,respondedwithagrowingshowofforceandincreasingrepression:
detentionswithouttrial,prosecutionsandimprisonmentunderanti-terrorismand
internalsecuritylegislation,politicalassassinationsbyapartheidhitsquads,and
theinstigationof‘black-on-blackviolence’(Collinge1992).
Throughmostofthe1980sthePWBothagovernmentchallengedtheANC
torenounceviolence,whiletheANC,retortingthatitwasthegovernmentthat
shoulddoso,encourageditsfollowerstocontinuetopursueanarmedstruggle,
massaction,andSouthAfrica’sinternationalisolation.Thegovernment’sposture
changeddramaticallyafterFWdeKlerksucceededBothaasstatepresidentin
1989,although,evenunderthelatter,secrettalkswereinitiatedwiththeANCto
explorethepossibilityofanegotiatedpoliticalsettlement.
De Klerk’s unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other restricted organi-
sationstookobserversaswellastheliberationmovementsbysurprise.Nelson
Mandela and other high-profile political prisoners were released, and exiled
leadersreturnedtopavethewayfornegotiations(Haysom1992).InMay1990the
governmentandANCsignedthehistoricGrooteSchuurMinutewhichexpressed
a‘commoncommitmenttowardstheresolutionoftheexistingclimateofviolence
and intimidation from whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to stability
the tRAnsItIon to DeMoCRACY, AnD Its IMPLICAtIons FoR InteLLIgenCe ACCountABILItY AnD tRAnsPARenCY
3
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 65
andtoapeacefulprocessofnegotiations’(ISSUP1992:17).Theyreaffirmedthis
commitmentinthePretoriaMinutelaterthatyear.
Intheearly1990sthegovernmentdiscoursearoundsecuritybegantochange.
ShortlybeforetheunbanningoftheANC,DeKlerkaddressedameetingofthe
country’stop500policeofficersatwhichheimpresseduponthemthattheyhad
newresponsibilities,andurgedthemtoleavepoliticstothepoliticians(Nathan&
Phillips1992).
From February 1990 onwards, political parties and organisations across
the political spectrum began to give urgent attention to formulating alterna-
tivepolicies.TheANCheldamajorpolicyconferenceinJune1991.Meanwhile,
implementation of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, particularly the
return of exiles and the accompanying amnesty process, the release of politi-
calprisoners,andmeasurestocontainpoliticalviolencestillragingacrossthe
country, proceeded with difficulty. The main parties made accusations and
counter-accusationsabouttherealintentionsoftheircounterparts.Bythisstage
some10000peoplehadlosttheirlivesinpoliticalviolencesince1986,andmore
than30000hadbeendisplaced(Haysom1992).Levelsofpublicconfidencein
theabilityofthesecurityforcestocontaintheviolencewereverylow,andinApril
1991theANCthreatenedtosuspendnegotiations.Thestop-startprocesscontin-
uedforseveralmonths,butthegovernmentandotherpartiesfinallyagreedon
multipartytalkstodiscussaninclusivepoliticaldispensation.Thisresultedinthe
ConferenceforaDemocraticSouthAfrica,orCODESA(Friedman1993).
CODESA’sfirstmeeting,heldinDecember1991,providedaplatformforthe
variouspartiestoexpresstheirintentiontonegotiateapoliticalsettlement.But
mostof theworkwasdone infiveworkinggroups,dealingwithaclimate for
freepoliticalactivity;constitutionalprinciplestobeincludedinanewconstitu-
tion,andaconstitution-makingforum;transitionalarrangements;thefutureof
theTBVCstates;andtimeframesandmodesofimplementation(Haysom1992).
Whileinitiallyunhappyaboutthisproposal,thegovernmenteventuallyagreed
thatdecisionstakenatCODESAwouldbebinding.Thepartiesalsoagreedthat
decisionswouldbetakenonthebasisof‘sufficientconsensus’amongparticipants.
ThiseffectivelymeantthatthegovernmentandtheANCwouldhavetoagreeif
theprocesswastomoveforward.
Discussions in the working groups continued over the next year, and
CODESA2convenedinMay1992toconsidertheresults.However,theCODESA
processbrokedownbecauseimportantissuesrelatingtotheconstitution-making
processhadnotbeenresolved.ThegovernmentandANCbegantalksaimedat
gettingthenegotiationsbackontrack.
66 / chAPter three
Thevolatilepoliticalclimatedidnotlenditselftotheresolutionofdifferences,
butbythisstageboththegovernmentandtheANCrealisedthattheywereso
deeplyembroiledintheprocessthattheydarednotletitfail(Friedman1993).
InSeptember1992theysignedaRecordofUnderstandingwhichdealtwitha
numberofoutstandingissues.
Whilenegotiationscontinued,withabroadrangeofoppositionorganisations
rallyingbehindtheANC,citizensmadelimitedinputs.TheANCtriedtobroaden
participationbyholdingconsultativemeetingswithotherorganisations,includ-
ingitsalliancepartners,theSACPandCongressofSouthAfricanTradeUnions
(COSATU), and holding public meetings, but policy and strategy were largely
determinedbyitsleaders.Similarly,inFebruary1992thegovernmentcalleda
referendum to seek endorsement for the adoption of an interim constitution
(Friedman1993).
the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon DuRIng the negotIAtIons
Thetransitiontoanewintelligencedispensationformedpartofabroaderprocess
ofpoliticalaccommodationthatstemmedfromtheworkofWorkingGroupOneat
CODESA.WorkingGroupOnedealtwiththecreationofaclimateforfreeandfair
politicalactivity,anditsplitupfurtherintothreesub-workinggroupsdealingwith
thereturnofexilesandthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners,therepealofsecurity
legislationandotherrepressivelaws,andthefutureofthesecurityforces(Fried-
man1993).Initsfinalreportitrecommendedthatthesecurityforcesbesubject
totheconstitution;politicallynon-partisan;respecthumanrights,non-racialism
anddemocracy;andstrivetoberepresentativeofthesocietyasawhole.Working
GroupThreeagreedthatthesecurityforcesshouldbecontrolledbytheinterim
government.
Atthistime,the1983tricameralconstitutionwasstillinforce.Whileitdidnot
createarightofaccesstoinformation,politicswerebeingliberalised,enabling
themediatoreportmorefreelyonsignificantnationalevents.However,security
legislationsuchastheInternalSecurityAct,theRiotousAssembliesActandthe
TerrorismActremainedinplace.Intelligenceservicesweremanagedasseparate
entities,andtheintelligenceinformationofthestatewasfirmlyunderlockand
keyinstatehands,unauthorisedaccesstoitbeingacriminaloffence.
Intelligenceservicesplayedasignificantroleinthenegotiations,andrepre-
sentativesofservicesonbothsidesweredrawnintotheprocesstomapoutanew
intelligencedispensation(O’Brien1996).TheANC’sDepartmentofIntelligence
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 67
andSecurity(DIS)hadbeenformedin1969,tocounterattemptsbytheSouth
AfricanstatetocrushUmkhontoweSizwe.
In1992,JoeNhlanhla,theANC’sheadofintelligence,wrotethattheapart-
heidsecurityserviceswerepervadedbyamilitaristicandracistethos,servedthe
interestsoftheNPregimeratherthanthoseofthepeople,andweresteepedina
cultureofsecrecyandlackoftransparencyandaccountability.Becauseofthis,
theywereabletoresorttodetentionandtorture,assassinations,andkidnappings.
Thiswasaninward-focusedapproachwherethegreatestthreattonationalsecu-
ritywasseentocomefromfellowSouthAfricans.However,hesaidintelligence
servicesdidhavearoletoplayintheaffairsofstate,andaddedthat
the world over, intelligence activity is, by its very nature, characterised by
secrecyandstealth…anunderstandableandoftennecessaryfeature,asthe
defenceofnationalsecurityoftenrequiresthewithholdingofinformationthat
mightbeusedagainstacountrybywould-beaggressors(1992:70).
NIS claimed it had played a constructive role during its existence, which was
roughlyaslongasthatofDIS.DanielBarnard,aformerheadofNIS,saiddur-
inghistermofofficeithadnotonlysuppliedintelligence,buthadalsofacilitated
negotiationsbetweentheapartheidgovernmentanditsopponents.HesaidNIS
hadbeenabletoplaythisrolebecauseitwas‘schooledintheage-olduniversal
fundamentalsoftheintelligenceprofession:itseeksthetruth,andundauntedly
conveysittothegovernment’(NationalIntelligenceService1994).
In1992thenewdirector-generalofNIS,MikeLouw,spokeof theneedfor
greateropenness in intelligencematters,andpromisedthat theagencywould
becomemoretransparent(SundayTimes,23February1992).UnderPresident
DeKlerk,controlovertheintelligenceserviceswasshiftedfromtheStatePresi-
dent’sofficetotheministerofjustice.
TheANC’sframeworkforsecuritypolicywasverysimilartothoseofliberal
democraciesinthepost-ColdWarera.Itadoptedthefollowingresolutionatits
June1991policyconference,whichbecamethebasisforitsinputintothenegotia-
tionprocess:
Thenationalintelligenceagencywillberesponsibleforgathering,collatingand
evaluatingstrategicinformationthatpertainstothesecurityofthestateand
thecitizenry;
The national intelligence agency shall respect the rights of all South
Africanstoengageinlawfulpoliticalactivity;
68 / chAPter three
Intelligenceactivitiesshallberegulatedbyrelevantlegislation,theBillof
Rights,theConstitutionandanappropriateCodeofConduct;
Allintelligenceinstitutionswillbeaccountabletoparliamentandsubjectto
parliamentaryoversight;
Thepublicshallhavetherighttoinformationgatheredbyanyintelligence
agencysubjecttothelimitationsofclassificationconsistentwithanopenand
democraticSouthAfrica;
Thenationalintelligenceagencyshallbepoliticallynon-partisan;and
The national intelligence agency shall guard the ideals of democracy,
non-racialism,non-sexism,nationalunityandreconciliation,andactinanon-
discriminatoryway(ANC1991).
AccordingtoseniorANCmembers,theNPgovernmentinitiallyresistedtheidea
ofnegotiatinganewintelligencedispensation,onthegroundsthatintelligence
issuescouldnotbediscussedinopenpoliticalforums.Itofferedtosimplyabsorb
membersoftheintelligenceservicesoftheliberationmovementsandTBVCstates
into NIS. The ANC rejected this proposal, and the political players, including
representativesofthevariousintelligenceservices,wentontonegotiateanew
intelligencedispensation(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).
DISandNISweredeterminednottoallowsetbacksinthepoliticalnegotia-
tionstoderailtheireffortstofindcommonground.Theyheldaseriesofbilateral
meetings,resultinginagreementsonasetofbasicprinciplesforintelligencework
inthenewdispensation,theneedfortheestablishmentofasubcouncilonintel-
ligenceundertheauthorityoftheimpendingTransitionalExecutiveCouncil,and
thetermsofreferenceofsuchasubcouncil.
Itwasduringthisearlyperiodofthetransitionthathugequantitiesofapart-
heidsecurityrecordswereapparentlydestroyed.Thepreviouschapterhasalready
examinedtheimplicationsofthestate’sviewthat‘sensitiverecords’felloutside
theambitoftheArchivesAct.In1992theANCCommissiononMuseums,Monu-
mentsandHeraldryproposedamoratoriumonthedestructionofstaterecords,
butwaspowerlesstoseethisthrough(interviewwithVerneHarris,1Septem-
ber2003).Instead,thecabinetauthorisedvariousgovernmentdepartmentsto
destroysensitiverecords.
Thedevastatingconsequencesofthisdecisionwasrecordedbythecountry’s
TruthandReconciliationCommission,establishedbya1995actofparliament.In
asixtoeightmonthperiodin1993,NISalonedestroyedabout44tonsofdocu-
mentsandmicrofilm–allofficialrecords.Allstatedepartmentswereinstructed
totransferdocumentsthathadoriginatedasStateSecurityCouncilSecretariat
records to NIS, which at the time provided secretariat services to the State
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 69
SecurityCouncil.Amongotherdestructionfacilities,thefurnacesoftheIronand
SteelCorporation(ISCOR)plantinPretoriawereusedforthismassiveincinera-
tionexercise.AccordingtotheTRC,muchofthedestructiontookplaceoutside
theparametersoftheguidelinesforthedisposalofrecords,andwasintended
toobliterateall informationaboutoperations,sources,orothercompromising
informationthatthesecurityestablishmentmighthavetoexplaininthefuture.
ThiscreatedamassivevacuuminthecorporatememoryofNISaswellasother
securityinstitutions(TRC1998).
TheANCandotherliberationmovementswereprobablyunawareoftheextent
ofthedestructionofrecordsinthisearlyperiod,andpowerlesstopreventitinany
case.Thegovernmenthadonlyjustlifteditsrestrictionsonthemovement,which,
togetherwithextraparliamentaryorganisations,hadbeenintenselyscrutinised
bystatesecurityforcesandintelligenceservices.Thefactthatthetwosideswere
engagedintalksdidnotmeanthateitherwaspreparedtosharesecrets,since
theirmostpotentsecretswereabouteachother.
the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon unDeR the teC
Thestatus,legitimacy,andownershipofintelligenceinformationinthecourse
ofthetransitiontodemocracyiscentraltoourenquiry.Thiswasundoubtedlyan
areaofcontestation.Ananalysisofpolicy,legislativeandadministrativeinstru-
mentsestablishedorenforcedinthatperiodsuggestsanambiguousimpacton
accesstoandcontroloverinformationgeneratedbytheapartheid-erasecurity
institutions.
TheTransitionalExecutiveCouncilActof1993gaveexpressiontothearrange-
mentsagreedtointhenegotiationprocess.Whiledemocraticelectionswerebeing
prepared,thecountrywouldbejointlygovernedbytheNPandmajorentities.
Sevensubcouncils–ondefence,lawandorder,intelligence,finance,thestatusof
women,foreignaffairs,andregionalandlocalgovernment–weresetuptofacili-
tatethisprocess.Theirroleamountedtoaformofmultipartyscrutinyoverthese
areas of governance. The role of the subcouncil on intelligence, as prescribed
bytheact,wastodevisebasicprinciplesforintelligenceworkwhichcouldalso
anchoranewdemocraticdispensation.Itwasalsotaskedwithformulatingacode
ofconductthatwouldbindallservicesduringthetransitionalperiod,andfore-
shadowacodeinademocraticSouthAfrica(TECAct1993).
UndertheTEC,theintelligenceservicesoftheNPgovernment,theTBVCstates
andtheliberationmovementswouldremainintact.Theywouldcontinuetopro-
videtheirprincipalswithinformationduringthisvitalperiod,butwereexpected
70 / chAPter three
to start crafting a unified intelligence framework. Unavoidably, the leaders of
theseintelligenceinstitutionsweredrawnintonegotiatingtheircommonfuture.
The TEC Act also provided for the establishment of a Joint Coordinating
IntelligenceCommittee(JCIC),taskedwithprovidingtheTECwithestimatesof
thesecuritysituationintherun-uptotheelections.TheANCinitiallywantedall
intelligencestructurestoreporttotheJCIC,butbackeddownwhenNISinsisted
thatalltheservicesshouldretaincontroloftheirday-to-dayactivities.TheJCIC
comprisedtheheadsofallthecivilian,police,andmilitaryintelligenceservices,
andeffectivelymanagedthemduringthisperiodoftransition.Besidesproviding
theTECwithintelligence,theJCICplayedavitalroleintherun-uptotheelection
byensuringthatallfactorsthatcouldderailtheprocessweremonitored(inter-
viewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).
After completing its task, the JCIC – following a recommendation of the
subcouncil–establishedaforumcalledtheHeadsofCivilianServices(HOCS),
comprisingtheheadsofthevariouscivilianintelligenceagencies,andaprovi-
sionalnationalintelligenceco-ordinatingcommittee.ThetaskofHOCSwasto
continuedevelopingproposalsforafutureintelligencedispensation,begununder
the auspices of the subcouncil. The task of the coordinating structure was to
ensurethatthejointintelligenceprocesscontinuedbeyondthelegalmandateof
theTEC.
WhileNISandDISco-operatedtosomedegree,theywerestillonopposite
sidesofthepoliticaldivideinthiscriticalperiod.Despitetheformalco-operation
introducedbytheestablishmentoftheTEC,secretinformationwasacontested
area.BoththeNPgovernmentanditspoliticaladversaries,particularlytheANC,
wereawareofthehugeinfluenceofintelligenceagenciesinthissensitiveperiod,
andkeptuptheir intelligenceoffensives inorder to learnasmuchaspossible
abouttheotherside.Theexistenceofalegislativeregimethatcriminalisedthe
disclosureofinformation,internalregulationsthatboundmembersofthesecurity
servicestosecrecy,andtheabsenceofrecordsmakeitalmostimpossibletoassess
objectivelytheroleofNISatthattime.
Thewide-rangingProtectionofInformationAct,1982andotherdraconian
security laws such as the Internal Security Act remained in force, even as the
opposing political forces engaged each other. A double-edged sword, security
legislation was probably as much directed at the liberation movement, with
whichthegovernmentwasbusynegotiatinganewpoliticaldispensation,asthe
whiterightwing,whichwasengagedinviolentattemptstoderailthetalks.The
volatilityofthesituationshouldnotbeunderestimated.Thereweremajordivi-
sionsintheapartheidsecurityforces,withanumberofmembersalignedwith
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 71
theextra-parliamentarywhiterightwing.Thegovernmentandothersfearedthat
securityinformationmightbeleakedtotherightwing,andaclimateofmutual
fearanddistrustpervadedtheranksofthesecurityforces(Haysom1992).
Akeyissuewasthestatusofintelligencerecordsvis-à-visthestatearchives.
AccordingtotheTRC(1998),the1978cabinetguidelinesontheprotectionof
informationempoweredtheheadsofgovernmentdepartmentstoauthorisethe
destructionofstaterecords.Intheprocess,theguidelinesignoredtheprovisions
oftheArchivesAct,whichgavefinalcustodianshipofallstaterecordstotheState
Archives.Theguidelinesdidnotexplicitlystatethatthepowersgiventothedirec-
toroftheStateArchiveswerebeingreplacedorretracted.Buttheweightofa
cabinetdecisionwassufficienttoallowgovernmentdepartmentstoactwithout
hindranceindestroyingstaterecords.Thispowerwasexercisedroutinelywithin
thesecurityestablishment.TheStateArchivesServiceclaimeditonlybecame
awareoftheguidelinesduring1991.
From 1983 the routine destruction of records was commonplace in NIS,
whichassumedthatitsrecordsfelloutsidetheambitoftheArchivesAct.Marius
Ackerman,formerstatelawadvisorintheStatePresident’sOffice,indescribing
thestatusofofficialdocumentsinthecustodyofNIS,pointedoutthat:
There was a difference of opinion between the State Archives and security
departmentsonthemeaningandeffectoftheArchivesAct.Theformerwereof
theviewthatallstatedocumentationeventuallyhadtobeundertheircontrol,
while the latter held the view that ‘sensitive documentation’ could never
besubmitted inthatwaybecausestatesecurityandespeciallythesafetyof
individualscouldbecompromised(interviewwithAdvocateMariusAckerman,
3August2003).
In testimony before the TRC, former NIS officials admitted that the organisa-
tionhaddestroyedabout44 tonsof records in themonthspreceding thefirst
democraticelections.Thousandsofofficials in thesecurity servicesandother
government departments shredded and burnt all records that could give the
ANC-led government insight into the methods, informants, and operations of
theapartheidintelligenceagencies.TheTRCnotes,however,thatrecordswhich
couldnotbetracedincludedthoseoftheNationalSecurityManagementSystem
(NSMS), a substructure of the State Security Council (TRC 1998). President
FWdeKlerkdisbandedtheNSMSin1989,andreducedthestatusoftheSSCto
thatofanordinarycabinetcommittee(Hansson1990).Thiswasdoneatatime
ofgrowingpopularandinternationalresistancetoapartheid,aswellasgrowing
schismswithintherulingparty.
72 / chAPter three
Followingthemassdestructionofrecords,apparentlydrivenbytheabove-
mentionedinterpretation,itwouldseemthatfewrecordsofNISactivitiesunder
apartheid survive. This institutional memory is unlikely to be recovered. The
apartheidrealworkingsoftheNISthusremainedasecret,despitetheoccasional
publicrelationsexercisesuchasmediainterviews.
the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon unDeR the InteRIM ConstItutIon
Despiteongoingpoliticalviolence,agreementwaseventuallyreachedonanew
interimconstitution.Itcameintoeffecton27April1994,thedayofthecountry’s
firstinclusiveelections.Itcontainedanentirely newfeatureinSouthAfricanpoli-
tics:abillofrights,whichguaranteedarangeoffundamentalrightsincludingthe
righttolife;equalitybeforethelaw;privacy;freedomofexpression,association,
andmovementaccesstothecourts;administrativejustice;and,mostsignificantly,
accesstoinformation(Mureinik1994).
Onthelast-namedright,theinterimconstitutionstatedthat:
Everypersonshallhavetherightofaccesstoallinformationheldbythestate
oranyofitsorgansatanylevelofgovernmentinsofarassuchinformationis
requiredfortheprotectionofanyofhisorherrights(ConstitutionoftheRSA,
1993,section23).
In theperiodafter theelections the intelligenceservicesstruggledtocometo
termswiththeiridentityasdefendersofthenewpoliticalorder,craftedbythe
country’sfirstfullydemocraticlegislature,andthebroadenedconceptofsecurity
contained in the interimconstitutionwasundermined inpracticebydisconti-
nuitiesinboththediscourseandpracticeofsecurity.Notably,theycontinuedto
destroyrecordsuntil1996whenthecabinetfinallydeclaredamoratoriumonthis
practice(TRC1998).
Followingthetransitiontodemocracy,intelligenceofficialsweregivenwide
discretiontoclassifyinformationgeneratedinthecourseoftheirwork.Theprac-
ticewithinthesecurityserviceswastoshieldfromthepublicvieweventhose
categoriesofinformationthatwouldcausenoharmiftheyweredisclosed.The
ANCcontinuedtokeepsecretfileson theactivitiesofkeygovernmentfigures
(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).
Withoutareasonabledegreeoftransparency,membersofthepublicwould
obviouslybeatalossastowhatinformationtheymightrequestfromtheintel-
ligence services. Within the statutory services – NIS and the TBVC services
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 73
–intelligenceinformationandmuchotherofficialdocumentationcontinuedtobe
routinelyclassifiedas‘TopSecret’,‘Secret’,‘Confidential’or‘Restricted’,depending
ontheperceiveddegreeofharmtonationalsecuritytheirdisclosurewouldcause.
The criteria for classifying information were also not subject to any scrutiny,
becausenooversightframeworkexistedfordoingso.
ByApril1994thestatutoryandnon-statutoryintelligenceinstitutionswere
alreadylockedinintensivediscussionsabouttheirintegration.Aftertheelections,
flowingfromthereportsoftheSubcouncilonIntelligence,furtherbilateraltalks
wereheldtodevelopafutureintelligencedispensation.Thesediscussionsinflu-
encedthedebatewithinthenewparliament.AWhitePaperonIntelligenceand
threeBills,namelytheIntelligenceServicesBill,NationalStrategicIntelligence
Bill,andCommitteeofMembersofParliamentonandInspectorGeneralsofIntel-
ligenceBill,werepresentedtothelegislatureforapproval(interviewwithMoe
Shaik,17October2003).
The White Paper on Intelligence, adopted by parliament in 1994, warned
againsttheintelligenceservicesadoptingamilitaristicapproachtosecurity,as
wasthecaseunderapartheid,when‘emphasiswasplacedontheabilityofthe
statetosecureitsphysicalsurvival,territorialintegrityandindependence,aswell
asitsabilitytomaintainlawandorderwithinitsboundaries’(RSA,WhitePaper
onIntelligence1994).Itfurthersignalledthat
… the main threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of
nationsacross theworlddonotprimarilycomefromaneighbouringarmy,
but fromother internalandexternalchallengessuchaseconomiccollapse,
overpopulation,massmigration,ethnicrivalry,politicaloppression,terrorism,
crimeanddisease(WhitePaperonIntelligence,1994).
TheWhitePaperdealtwithsafeguardingthecountry’sdemocraticconstitution;
upholdingtheindividualrightsenunciatedintheBillofRights;promotingthe
interrelatedelementsofsecurity,stability,co-operationanddevelopment,both
withinSouthAfricaand in relation toSouthern Africa; contributing to global
peace;promotingSouthAfrica’sabilitytofaceforeignthreatsandenhanceits
competitiveness(Africa&Mlombile2001).
Theintelligenceserviceswouldbegovernedbythefollowingprinciples,allin
sharpcontrastwiththoseunderapartheid:theprimaryauthorityofthedemo-
craticinstitutionsofsociety;subordinationoftheintelligenceservicestotherule
oflaw;complianceoftheintelligenceserviceswithdemocraticvaluessuchasthe
respectforhumanrights;politicalneutralityoftheintelligenceservices;account-
abilityandparliamentaryoversightfortheintelligenceservices;maintaininga
74 / chAPter three
fairbalancebetweensecrecyandtransparency;separationofintelligencefrom
policy-making;andanethicalcodeofconducttogoverntheperformanceand
activitiesofindividualmembersoftheintelligenceservices(RSA,WhitePaperon
Intelligence,1994).
TheIntelligenceServicesBillproposedtheamalgamationofthestatutoryand
non-statutoryintelligenceservicesintotwocivilianintelligencedepartments:the
SASS,aforeigndepartmentresponsibleforcollectinginformationaboutexter-
nalthreatstosecurity;andtheNIA,adomesticdepartmentfocusingoninternal
threats.NIAwouldalsoholdthecounterintelligencemandate,andensurethat
foreign agents did not penetrate the South African intelligence machinery
(Africa1994).
The National Strategic Intelligence Bill provided for a mechanism to co-
ordinateandintegratetheintelligenceinputsofthetwociviliandepartmentswith
thoseoftheSAPSandSANDF,inordertoadvisethegovernmentonthreatsand
potentialthreatstothesecurityofthecountryanditscitizens.
Thirdly,theCommitteeofMembersofParliamentonandInspector-Generals
of IntelligenceBillprovided foramultipartyparliamentaryoversightcommit-
tee able to receive reports, make recommendations, order investigations, and
conducthearingsonmattersrelatingtointelligenceandnationalsecurity;and
anInspector-Generaltaskedwithinvestigatingcomplaintsabouttheintelligence
services.Thecommitteewouldalsosubmitreportstoparliamentontheperform-
anceofitsdutiesandfunctions.
Onthebasisofcabinetrecommendations,theministerof justicepresented
thethreebillstoparliament.MembersofHOCSandtheirlegaladvisorsappeared
before theselectcommitteesof thenationalassemblyandsenate.Aftermuch
deliberationanddebate, theselectcommitteesrecommendedthatthebillsbe
tabledinparliament(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).
Anticipatingthenewlegislation,HOCSinstructedvarioussubcommitteesto
startworkonamalgamatingthevariousintelligenceservices.Jointspecialwork
groupswereestablishedtomaderecommendationsinrespectofthestructures,
budget,assets,andhumanresourcespoliciesofthenewservices.Basedontheir
reportsandrecommendations,HOCSformedanAmalgamationCommittee(AC)
taskedwithco-ordinatingandimplementingtheestablishmentoftheNIAand
SASS.TheACestablishedanumberofso-calledsuperworkinggroupsconsist-
ingof representativesof thestatutoryandnon-statutory intelligenceservices,
taskedwithimplementingthedecisionsandagreementsofHOCS,andfocusing
onthepracticalissuesthatwouldbeencounteredinthecourseofthetransition.
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 75
Theywerefull-timebodies,andtheirreportswereprocessedbytheACforconsid-
erationbyHOCS.
Someoftheissuesaddressedbytheworkinggroupswerethestaffrequire-
mentsoftheplannedintelligenceagencies,practicalstepstowardstheproposed
structuralchanges,budgetaryimplicationsforthe1995/6financialyear,andan
orientationprogrammeforallmembersofNIAandSASS.Theworkinggroups
also identified functions tobesharedby the twoservices,andmechanisms to
ensurethatthesefacilitieswereappropriatelydistributedandmanaged.
The interimconstitutiondidnotcontainanyprinciplesgoverningnational
security,asthesewerestillbeingdebated,andalsodidnotrefertotheestablish-
mentofthenewservices.Parliamentpassedthethreebillssettingupthenew
intelligencedispensationinthelatterhalfof1994,anditeffectivelycameinto
beingon1January1995.
Changeswithinthe intelligencestructuresof theSAPSwerealso informed
bytheoutcomeofthenegotiations(Africa&Mlombile2001).Thenewgovern-
ment’sagendaonlawenforcementwasshapedbytwoobjectives:rehabilitating
thepoliceforcetoensurethatitservedthecommunitiesofSouthAfricarather
thanpoliticalends;andmobilisingcitizenstoparticipateintheachievementof
safetyandsecurity(Africa&Mlombile2001).Amongtheoversightmechanisms
provided for in lawwerean IndependentComplaintsDirectorate, taskedwith
receivingcomplaintsfrommembersofthepublicaboutpolicemisconduct,and
parliamentaryoversightovertheSAPS.
Rauch(1991)describes thecomplexitiesof reorientingthepolice,andthe
sometimesambiguoussignalssentoutinthecourseofpolicereform.Significantly,
therankstructureoftheSAPSwasdemilitarised,andappropriatelyskilledcivil-
iansappointedtoaSecretariatforSafetyandSecurity,responsiblefordeveloping
policyforthepost-apartheidpoliceservice.
Thegovernanceandorientationofthearmedforcesalsochangedsignificantly
in the post-apartheid period. These were the product of political negotiations
abouttheintegrationofthearmedwingsoftheliberationmovementsandapart-
heidmilitarystructures,andtheroleofthearmedforcesinademocracy.Inthe
interestsofentrenchingdemocraticcivil–militaryrelations,theDefenceAmend-
mentActof1995providedforarestructuredDepartmentofDefencecomprising
theSADF(undertheoperationalcommandofthechiefofthearmedforces),and
acivilianDefenceSecretariat,responsibleforformulatingpolicy,andheadedby
theSecretaryforDefence(Africa&Mlombile2001).
Thefinalconstitutionlaterprovidedthecontextforthereformofthearmed
forces,andestablisheda framework forcivil–military relationsappropriate to
76 / chAPter three
ademocracy.Itdefinedtheprimaryroleofthedefenceforceasdefendingand
protectingtheRepublic,itsterritorialintegrityanditspeopleinaccordancewith
the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of
force’(RSAConstitution1996,section200(2)).Likeothersectorsofthesecurity
services,thedefenceforcewasrequiredtobepoliticallynon-partisan,function
withintheambitofthelaw,andsubjectitselftoparliamentaryoversight.
Defence Intelligence structures, falling under the operational command of
theSANDF,andsubjecttothepolicydeterminedbytheDepartmentofDefence,
were also subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994. The Act
distinguishedbetweendomesticandforeignmilitaryintelligence,andprescribed
theprocesstobefollowedtocollectdomesticmilitaryintelligencebythedefence
force,insupportofthepolice.Therationaleforthesestrictcontrolswastobolster
the professional status of the military and to avoid situations where it could
becomeinvolvedindomesticpoliticalconflict(Africa&Mlombile2001).
Theintroductionofastatutoryco-ordinatingmechanismfortheintelligence
agenciesmanagedbytheMinisterforIntelligencewasanothersignificantdevelop-
ment,aimedatpre-emptinginter-agencyrivalry.IntermsoftheNationalStrategic
IntelligenceAct,aco-ordinatorforintelligencewasresponsibleforcoordinating
thesupplyofintelligencebythedifferentagenciestointelligenceclients.NICOC
mainlyconsistedoftheco-ordinatorandtheheadsoftheintelligenceservices.
NICOCwasrequiredtoprovidestrategicintelligenceassessments,includingan
annualestimateofthreatstonationalsecuritywhichpolicy-makersshouldheed
inthecourseofthefollowingyear.
Afterthe1995transition,theintelligenceservicesstruggledtomanagethe
shiftinorientation.Thepoliticalclimatewasstillvolatile,andthenewgovern-
mentfacedthetaskofneutralisingdisaffectedright-wingers,someofwhomhad
accesstosecurityresources.Inaddition,violenceinthetownshipspersistedat
suchworryinglevelsthatthegovernmentwasconcernedthata‘thirdforce’–an
organisedbodyofindividualsintentondestabilisingthecountry–existedinthe
country’ssecurityforces(O’Brien1996).
Senior appointments made to the leadership of the intelligence services,
reflectedthepoliticalcompromisesinthecourseofthenegotiationprocess.The
civilian intelligence services were required to report to the president, initially
throughadeputyminister.Inpractice,thedeputyministerreportedthroughthe
ministerofjustice,whowasalsotheministerofintelligence.Thefirstdirector-gen-
eraloftheNIAwasSizakeleSigxashe,previouslyaseniorfigureinDIS,whilethe
firstdirector-generaloftheSASSwasMikeLouw,previouslydirector-generalof
NIS.TheministerofdefencewasJoeModise,aformerANCmilitarycommander,
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 77
andtheChiefofStaffIntelligencewasLieutenant-GeneralDirkVerbeek,aformer
SADFofficer.
IntheSAPS,DivisionalCommissionerAndréGrovéwhowasresponsiblefor
intelligenceandwhoservedunderNationalCommissionerGeorgeFivaz,both
apartheid-erapolicemen,reportedtoaministerforsafetyandsecurity–Sydney
Mafumadi–withanANCbackground(O’Brien1996).
Someofthepoliticalscandalsthatbesettheintelligenceservicesinthatperiod
weretheproductofpoliticaldifferencesatthetop.Thisaffectedthequalityof
intelligenceprovidedtothegovernment.Oneof these incidentswasthehand
deliveryofaclassified intelligencereport toPresidentNelsonMandelaby the
Chief of Defence Intelligence. The report had bypassed the NICOC structures
andclaimedthatseniormilitaryofficersfromanANCbackgroundwereplotting
acoup.Ajudicialteamappointedtoevaluatethereportdismisseditaslacking
credibility,andthechiefofDefenceIntelligencewasrelievedofhispost(Africa&
Mlombile2001).
AccordingtoAfricaandMlombile,theSouthAfricanexperienceofreform-
ingitsintelligenceservicesheldsomeimportantlessons.Thefirstwasthatthe
envisagedmission,orientation,andstructuresofaccountabilityoftheintelligence
servicesshouldbeclearlyreflectedinpolicyandinsubsequentlegislation.The
secondwasthatthegovernmentshouldresponddecisivelytoabuseorviolations
ofthelaw,asameansofpropagatinganewculture.Thethirdwasthatinternal
proceduresshouldbecomprehensivelyreviewedtoensurethattheywereconsist-
entwiththelegalframework.Thefourthwasthateachserviceshouldhaveclear
proceduresforauthorisingoperations,thusenablingtheresponsibleministerto
confirmthe legalityofaparticularoperation.Finally,parliamentaryoversight
bodieshadavitalroletoplayinmonitoringsuchatransformation.
IMPACt oF the ConstItutIon on the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Section 198 of the final constitution of 1996 spelt out the principles of a new
securitydispensation.Itstatedthatthesecurityserviceshadtobestructuredand
regulatedbynationallegislation,andalsostipulatedthat:
Thesecurityservicesmustact,andmustteachandrequiretheirmembersto
act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary
internationallawandinternationalagreementsbindingontheRepublic.
Nomemberofasecurityservicemayobeyamanifestlyillegalorder.
Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the
performanceoftheirfunctions:
78 / chAPter three
a. prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the
Constitution;or
b. further,inapartisanmanner,anyinterestofapoliticalparty.
Togiveeffecttotheprinciplesoftransparencyandaccountability,multiparty
parliamentarycommitteesmusthaveoversightofallsecurityservicesinaman-
nerdeterminedbynationallegislationortherulesandordersofParliament
(Constitution1996,section199).
Section210spelledoutprinciplesforthefunctioningoftheintelligenceservices:
National legislation must regulate the objects, powers and functions of the
intelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthedefenceforceor
policeservice,andmustprovidefor:
a. theco-ordinationofallintelligenceservices;and
b. civilian monitoring of the activities of those services by an Inspector
appointedbythePresident,asheadofthenationalexecutive,andapproved
byaresolutionadoptedbytheNationalAssemblywithasupportingvoteof
atleasttwo-thirdsofitsmember(Constitutionsection210).
Inchapter9,theconstitutionintroducedanumberofconstitutionalinstruments
aimedatpromoting the transparencyof thestate’s securityorgans,aswellas
theirgoodgovernance,includingaPublicProtector;aHumanRightsCommis-
sion;aCommissionforGenderEquality;anIndependentElectoralCommission;
anAuditor-General;andaCommissionforthePromotionandProtectionofthe
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (RSA Constitution,
1996;section181).
Mostimportantly,theconstitutionconfirmedtherightofaccesstoinformation
inChapter2(theBillofRights)bygivingpersonsaccesstoanyinformationheld
bythestateaswellasanyinformationheldbyanotherperson.Asinthecaseof
theinterimconstitution,rightsintheBillofRightsaresubjecttoreasonableand
justifiablelimitation.
PARLIAMentARY oVeRsIght AnD ACCess to InFoRMAtIon
Thefirstpost-apartheidparliamentfacedthegargantuantaskofreplacingapart-
heidlegislationwithlawsthatreflectedthepromisesmadetotheelectorate,thus
layingthefoundationforthetransformationofSouthAfricansociety.Inrespectof
theintelligenceservices,aswithmuchofthecivilservice,notonlywouldthis
entail formulating new policies and creating a new legal framework, but also
amalgamatingsix separatebureaucracies.By law,all theoperativesof thesix
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 79
foundingagenciesweretobeabsorbedintothethreenewintelligencestructures:
theNIA,theSASS,andtheNICOC.Asnotedearlier,theCommitteeofMembers
ofParliamentonandInspector-GeneralsofIntelligenceBill, laterrenamedthe
IntelligenceServicesControlAct,providedfortheestablishmentofacommittee
ofmembersofparliamentonintelligenceaswellasinspectors-general,andhad
theeffectofplacingtheintelligenceservicesunderconsiderableoversight.
Oneofthewaysinwhichparliamentcouldexerciseitsoversightroleinthe
post-apartheidperiodwasbyquestioningtheresponsibleminister.However,as
Hansardshows,thismethodwasnotutilisedextensively,andquestionsbymem-
bersofoppositionpartieswereoftenonveryspecific issues.Thesewereoften
administrative,andtheministercouldeasilyprovidecrypticanswers.Thiswas
doneusuallyafterconsultingtherelevantheadofdepartment,althoughinthe
endtheministerhadtodecidehowtorespond.
Theprocessofparliamentaryquestionsallowedmembersofparliamentwho
hadserved in thepreviousgovernment tobecalled toaccount.On6Septem-
ber1994InkathaFreedomPartymemberVBNdlovuaskedFWdeKlerk,then
executivedeputypresidentandchairofthecabinetcommitteeonsecurityand
intelligence,thefollowingquestion:
1. WhethertheNational IntelligenceService(NIS)wasresponsibleforthe
(a) production (b) publication and/or (c) distribution of a document
entitled ‘Political Conflict in KwaZulu/Natal – the role of traditional
leaders’;ifso,(i)whichbranchoftheNIS,(ii)whatwerethisdocument’s
circulationfigures,and(iii)whatwasitspurpose;
2. Whether the NIS was authorised to (a) produce, (b) publish and/or
(c)distributethisdocument;ifso,bywhom;ifnotwhatisthepositionin
thisregard;
3. Whetherhehastakenorintendstakinganystepsinthisregard;ifnot,why
not;ifsowhatsteps?
DeKlerk’sreplywasfrank,probablysobecauseitnolongerheldmajorpolitical
implications.HeconfirmedthattheNIShadbeenresponsibleforthedocument,
butdeniedthatithadbeendistributed.Ithadonlybeenaworkingdocumentto
beconsideredbyaprovisionalproductionunitof the intelligencecommunity.
Thedocumenthadalsonotbeendistributedtotheofficialclientsonthedistri-
butionlistforintelligenceproducts,andhadonlybeendistributedtoalimited
numberofmembersoftheintelligencecommunityforevaluationandcomment.
Headdedthatthedocumentwasnotpublishedanddistributedbecausetherewas
insufficientinformationtosubstantiatetheworkingdocument.
80 / chAPter three
Otherquestionsputtoministersresponsiblefortheintelligenceservicesover
theyearshavecoveredthestatusandprogressofdisciplinaryhearings,theuseof
consultantsinthedepartments,therelationshipoftheserviceswithcertaincom-
panies,andinformationabouttheallegedmisdemeanoursofofficialswhichmight
havebecomepublicknowledge.
Differentministershavehandledquestionsdifferentlyovertheyears.Some
havebluntlyreferredMPstotheJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence.This
hasalsohappenedincaseswhereanMPwasalsoaservingmemberoftheJSCI,
butaskedquestionsinparliament.On23April2001,Brigadier-GeneralPJvan
Schalkwyk,amemberoftheoppositionDemocraticPartyandamemberofthe
JSCI,askedtheministerforintelligence:
• Whetherapermanentinvestigativegrouphadbeenestablishedtodealwith
thebacklogofdisciplinarycaseswithintheNIA,andwhatprogresshadbeen
made;
• WhattheNICOC,theNIA,theSASShadspenteachyearonsalaries,operating
costs,andcapitalcostssince1995;and
• HowmanypeoplehadbeenemployedintheMinistryofIntelligence,NICOC,
theNIA,andSASSineachyearsince1995.
Ineachcasetheministerat thetime,LindiweSisulureplied: ‘Thehonourable
memberisreferredtotheJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceforthedetails
onthisquestion’.
Several years later, in 2004, the newly appointed minister, Ronnie Kasrils,
took the step of disclosing, during his budget vote, the total allocation to the
intelligenceservicesaswellasexpenditureonpersonnel,operations,andcapi-
tal.However,insubsequentyearshedidnotdisclosetheamounts,butratherthe
ratiosofoperational,personnelandcapitalexpenditurebytheservices.
Another mechanism through which parliament has exercised a degree of
oversight,andwhichhasthereforeaffordedthepublicadegreeoftransparency
about intelligence, has been the JSCI. The founding act gives the committee
–whosemembersarevettedbytheNIA–accesstoclassifiedinformationand
documentsinthepossessionorunderthecontrolofaservice,totheextentthat
suchaccessisnecessaryfortheperformanceofitsfunctions,andoncondition
thatsuchinformationandrecordsarehandledinaccordancewiththeexisting
securityregulations.However,theservicesarenotobligedtodisclosethenames
oridentitiesofservicemembers,sources,ormethodsofintelligencegatheringto
thecommittee.Moreover,committeemembersarerequiredtoundergoasecu-
rityclearanceprocess,managedbytheNIA.Thecommitteefunctionswithinthe
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 81
boundsofsecrecyoftheintelligenceservices,andhashadtomaintainafinebal-
ancebetweenbeingpubliclyaccountable,satisfyingparliamentthattheservices
areoperatingwithintheframeworkofthelaw,andremainingimpartial.
the RoLe oF the InsPeCtoR-geneRAL oF InteLLIgenCe
TheIntelligenceServicesControlActalsoprovided for theappointmentofan
Inspector-Generalor inspectors-general taskedwithmonitoringcomplianceof
theserviceswiththeirownpolicies,reviewingtheiractivities,andperformingall
functionsdesignatedbytheministerforintelligence.
TheInspector-Generalisnominatedbytheoversightcommittee,andhastobe
approvedbyajointsittingofbothhousesofparliamentwitha75percentmajor-
ity,followingwhichthepresidentisrequiredtoeffecttheappointment.
The inspector general is a powerful figure in the intelligence dispensation
andhasaccesstoallclassifiedrecords,providedtheyareneededforhimorher
to perform a stipulated function. Among the reports the Inspector-General is
expectedtocompilefortheministerwasonethatrecordedanyunlawfulactivi-
tiesorsignificantintelligencefailuresreportedbytheheadsoftheintelligence
services.
the RoLe oF the AuDItoR-geneRAL
Aprominent featureof the intelligencedispensation under apartheid was the
extenttowhichlawsenabledtheservicestobefundedinsecret.Asnotedear-
lier,theSecurityServicesSpecialAccountActprovidedfortheestablishmentof
aSecurityServicesSpecialAccount,tobeutilisedforservicesofaconfidential
natureandexpensesconnectedwithBOSSdeemedtobeinthepublicinterest.
Upontherequestofrelevantministers,theministeroffinancecouldtransfer
fundstoaForeignAffairsSpecialAccount;aSpecialDefenceAccount;anInfor-
mation Service Special Account, and a South African Police Special Account.
Theseweretobeusedforconfidentialprojectsapprovedbytherespectiveminis-
ters(interviewwithWallievanHeerden,21October2003).
Intermsoftheenablinglegislation,theexecutivewasprimarilyresponsiblefor
secretorspecialprojects,andparliamentknewverylittleaboutthem.
AnnualreportsoftheAuditor-Generalprovidesomeinsightintotheservices’
financialaccountability.AnofficeoftheAuditor-Generalwascreatedinthe1996
constitution, which requires this office to audit the accounts, statements, and
financial management of all national, and local government institutions, and
82 / chAPter three
reporttoanylegislaturewithadirectinterestinthefindings.Theconstitution
explicitlyrequiresthatallreportsoftheAuditor-Generalmustbemadepublic.In
1996–7theAuditor-Generalreportedthatalthoughthefinancialstatementsofthe
intelligenceserviceswerenotbeingpublishedfor‘strategicandsecurityreasons’,
theyfairlyreflectedthefinancialpositionoftheinstitutionsconcerned.Neverthe-
less,hecommentedontheneedforimprovedcontrolsoverthepaymentofhuman
sources;thefailureofthecivilianintelligenceservicestocompileassetregisters;
alackoffinancialcontrolovertheamalgamationofthesecurityagenciesofthe
TBVCstateswiththenationalpoliceserviceandintelligenceagencies;andthe
failuretoappointanInspector-General(ReportoftheAuditor-General,1996/7).
Thesameconcernswerenotedinthenexttworeports.Thereportfor1997/8
statedthatalthoughprogressinattendingtosomeoftheconcernsraisedhadbeen
slow,therelationshipbetweentheOfficeoftheAuditor-Generalandtherespec-
tivedepartmentswasdynamicandrevealedattheleastasenseofaccountability
onthepartoftheservices.
Concernsaboutfinancialmanagementwerenotconfinedtotheintelligence
services.Manydepartmentsattractednegativeaudit reports in theearlypost-
apartheidyears,anindicationofthelegacytheywereadoptingaswellasthelack
ofmanagerialexperienceofmanynewofficials.
ThePublicFinanceManagementActof1999(thePFMA)sought toensure
greaterfinancialaccountabilityandresponsibilityonthepartofheadsofdepart-
ments. It gave them more flexibility to achieve objectives, but made them
criminallyliableforanymismanagementofstateresources.Theintelligenceserv-
icesarefullyboundtocomplywiththeActs’sprovisionsthatprescribeauniform,
outcomes-drivenandtransparentapproachtofinancialmanagementinthepublic
sector.
Membersoftheintelligenceservicessometimesquestionwhetherdisclosure
oftheintelligencebudgetandtheprocessesfordeterminingitcouldcompromise
theirtaskofidentifyingthreatstonationalsecurity(interviewwithBillyMasetlha,
NIAdirector-general,4August2005).Theyalsoaskwhethertheiradherenceto
thestatutoryandregulatoryprocessesofpublicfinancialmanagementcouldhave
similarunintendedconsequences.Thesequestionsareparticularlypertinentin
thecontextofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct.
Ontheonehand,thePFMAattemptedtoensureopenandtransparentbudget-
aryprocesses,withaministergivenclearresponsibilityforfinancialmanagement.
Ontheotherhand,intelligencelegislationallowedtheservicestooperateinsecret
toexecutetheirmandates,andrequiredtheministertodoeverythinginhisorher
powertofacilitatetheirwork.
the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 83
ConCLuDIng ReMARks
Inordertounderstandthemanagementofintelligenceinformationinthetransi-
tion,onemustunderstandtheextentofrepressionoutofwhichthenegotiations
emerged.WhenpresidentFWdeKlerkannouncedhisdramaticreformsin1990,
thousandsofpeoplehadalreadydiedinpoliticalviolence.Thesecurityforceshad
notonlyfailedtoturnthetide,but–assubsequentinvestigationsshowed–had
sometimesfomentedtheviolence.
Theprinciplesarisingoutofthepoliticalnegotiationsasembodiedinlegis-
lationcreatingatransitionalauthority,theinterimandfinalconstitutions,and
thelawsestablishingthenewintelligencedispensationcreatedanewcultureof
accountabilityandtransparencyinrespectofintelligence.Thenewservicesfaced
manychallenges,butoversightbodiesappearedtobesatisfiedwiththeirperform-
anceduringthefirstfiveyears.
Eventhoughtheservicesoperatedundernewlawswhichentirelyrepealed
theirpredecessors,thereweresignificantcontinuitieswiththeolddispensation.
IntheHOCSphase,agreementwasreachedthattheadministrativesystemsof
theapartheid-eraNISwouldinitiallybeusedandrevisedwithinashortperiod.
Inreality,thereviewhappenedveryslowlyandmuchlaterthananticipated,and
thenewservicesinheritedandcametooperateunderthearcaneregulationsand
systemsoftheoldorder.
Moreover,theconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinformationcoexistsuneasily
withthelawsandadministrativeinstrumentsdesignedtoprotectclassifiedinfor-
mation.Theselawsandinstrumentsarevestigesoftheapartheideraandinclude
theProtectionofInformationActof1984andtheMinimumInformationSecurity
Guidelines,whichempowerspublicofficialstorestrictaccesstoinformation.
Ontheotherhand,thenewdispensationhasmanypositivefeatures.Over-
sight structures, such as the JSCI and Auditor-General are able to bring both
thestrengthsandweaknessesoftheintelligenceservicestotheattentionofthe
public.Theministerisheldtoaccountinparliament,andtheservicesare,forthe
firsttime,unitedaboutthenatureofthreatstonationalsecurity.
While the process of restructuring the intelligence services has been fairly
comprehensive,ithasnotbeenwithoutitsproblemsandweaknesses.Nowhereis
thismoreevidentthanintheJanus-likelegislativeandregulatorydispensation,
whichsimultaneouslyencouragesdisclosureandopennessontheonehand,and
allowsthewithholdingofclassifiedinformationontheother.
In democratic South Africa, severalimportantmechanismsfacilitateaccess
toinformationabouttheintelligenceservices,eitherdirectlyorindirectly.This
chapterreviewsthesemechanismsandinstitutions,andassessestheirefficacy.
A wRItten PoLICY FRAMewoRk
Chapter11oftheconstitutionoutlinestheprinciplesgoverningnationalsecurity,
includingtheestablishmentof intelligenceservicessubjecttomultipartyover-
sight.TheWhitePaperonIntelligencealsoprovidesabroadpolicyframeworkas
wellasabasisforthelegislationthatsetsupandregulatestheintelligenceserv-
ices:theIntelligenceServicesActof2002,theNationalStrategicIntelligenceAct
of1994,andtheIntelligenceServicesOversightActof1994.TheseActsspellout
themandatesoftheservices,theoversightstructures,andtherespectivedutiesof
thevariousroleplayers,includingtheminister,theheadsofthedepartments,the
JSCI,andtheInspector-General.TheintelligenceservicesarealsosubjecttoPAIA,
whichplaysapivotalnewroleinallowingandregulatingaccesstostateinforma-
tion,andwillbeexaminedingreaterdetailinthenextchapter.
The governing principles, establishment, functions and mandate of the
intelligenceservicesarecodified in law,which isessential forpublicaccess to
information.Theissueishowwidelyknownandunderstoodtheselawsare,and
whetherthegeneralpopulationrealisestheirsignificance.Inaddition,manyof
theregulationsmadeunderthese lawsareclassified,andarenotgazettedfor
publiccomment.In2002,afteranextensivereviewoftheconditionsofservice
MeChAnIsMs FACILItAtIng ACCess to InFoRMAtIon ABout the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
4
88 / chAPter four
intheintelligenceservices,theministerforintelligencegazettedasetofhuman
resourcesregulationsforpubliccomment.However,thisisnotthegeneraltrend.
Thenormisthatregulationsissuedbytheministerandpolicydirectivesissued
bythedirectors-generalarekeptconfidential,withoutanyseriousevaluationof
whethertheinformationcontainedwithinwarrantsprotection.
PARLIAMent
Parliament,throughitslaw-makingfunction,isanotherinstitutionthatprovides
awindowintothefunctioningoftheintelligenceservices.Forthoseinterestedin
theissues,Hansards–recordsofparliamentarydebatesandlegislativeprocesses
–areeasilyaccessible.Alltabledlegislationissubjecttothenormalprocesses,and
publichearingsmaybeheldwhenthereisconsiderablepublicinterestinamatter.
Parliament isalsotheforuminwhichconcernsormattersofpolicycanbe
raised with the minister responsible for the intelligence services. Although,
compared to other portfolios, the minister receives a relatively low volume of
questions,themechanismisneverthelessavailable.Insomecases,theminister
refersquestionstotheJSCI,whicheffectivelymeansthatthebroaderpublicis
deniedtheanswers.
ThroughtheJSCI,parliamentalsohastheopportunitytoconsiderthebudget
oftheintelligenceservicesbeforethevote.Likeothermultipartyparliamentary
committees,workisdonelargelyincommittee,andthepositionofthecommittee
isreflectedintheannualbudgetvoteoftheminister.TheJSCIisrequiredtopub-
lishanannualreportbutitsperformanceinthisregardhasbeenratherpoor.The
reportusuallyappearslate,andnospecialeffortseemstobemadetodistributeit
tomembersofthepublic,oreventopublicinterestbodiesthatwanttoknowmore
aboutthecommittee’soversightwork.
the exeCutIVe
One cabinet minister is explicitly responsible for the intelligence services and
isthefigurewhocanbeaskedtoaccountfortheirperformanceordeficiencies.
Theministermustreportontheworkoftheservicestocolleaguesincabinet.In
addition,theministermustensurethattheservicesprovideintelligencetodepart-
mentsand,mostimportantly,relevantandtimelynationalstrategicintelligence.
Membersofthepublicarenotprivytothisintelligence,whichisusuallyclassified
secret.However,throughthebudgetvote,theministerprovidessomeinsightinto
securityconcernsandthebroadmeasuresputinplacebytheservicestoaddress
mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 89
them.Inrespondingtotheminister,theJSCIusuallyshedssomelightoncurrent
concernsandpotentialthreats.Theministeralsoissuespublicstatements,and
respondstoqueriesfromthemediaaboutmattersconcerningtheservices.
Onecriticismoftheexecutiveisthatitdoesnotcurrentlyassesswhetherthere
is intelligencethatnolongerneedstobekeptsecret,andcanbeplacedinthe
publicdomain.Thereiscurrentlynolegalrequirementfor ittodoso,andthe
matterthereforeappearstobediscretionary.Severalintelligenceservicesaround
theworldissueunclassifiedordeclassifiedreportsrelatingtonationalsecurity,as
awayofkeepingthepublicinformedoftheintelligenceservices’preoccupations.
the InsPeCtoR-geneRAL FoR InteLLIgenCe
Thepublicismeanttohaveaccesstoanotherimportantroleplayer:theInspector-
General for Intelligence. This very senior official, whose appointment has to
beapprovedby75percentofmembersofparliament,hasunfetteredaccessto
therecordsoftheintelligenceservices,irrespectiveoftheirsecretstatus.Such
accessshouldhelp the Inspector-General toevaluateproperly,complaintsand
casesbroughtbymembersoftheservicesormembersofthepublic.Inreality,
the Inspector-General’sOfficehas limitedcapacityandhasexperiencedteeth-
ingproblems.Theofficehasmadeeffortstopubliciseitsexistence,forexample
throughbrochuresandawebsite.Intheperiodunderreview,agrowingnumber
ofcomplaintswerereceivedbothfrommembersofthepublic,andfrommembers
oftheservices,whichtheofficeunderstandablydealtwithinconfidence.How-
ever,nopublicreportshavebeenreleased;so,ironically,althoughtheofficeis
partofthetransparencymechanism,membersofthepubliccannotreadilyassess
itsperformance.
the AuDItoR-geneRAL
TheOfficeoftheAuditor-Generalisaconstitutionalbodywithfullauthorityto
auditthefinancialstatementsoftheintelligenceservicesandtoprovideapub-
licassessmentofwhethertheymeetgenerallyacceptedaccountingstandards.
RegulatedbythePublicFinanceManagementActof1999,thefinancialaccount-
ingoftheintelligenceservicesissubjecttothesamerigorousauditingstandards
asanyothergovernmentdepartment.Overtheyears,asmootherworkingrela-
tionshiphasdevelopedbetweenmembersof theservicesandmembersof the
Auditor-General’s office who are vetted and issued with security clearances.
However,theAuditor-Generalconsistentlyraisestheconcernthattheintelligence
90 / chAPter four
services’secrecyrequirementsdoeshavesomeimpactontheirwork.Forexam-
ple,whencheckingexpenditureon intelligenceoperations, theycannotverify
independentlytheexistenceofsourcestheservicesclaimtohavepaid,orsecretly
acquired assets, as these must be shielded from public knowledge to protect
operations.Inresponse,theservicesarguethatsuchisthenatureofintelligence
work,andthattherewillalwaysbelimitstowhatcanbedisclosedtotheAuditor-
General.Forexample,informantswouldbereluctanttoprovideinformationto
theservices,iftheirroleandidentitieshadtoberevealedtotheAuditor-General.
the nAtIonAL ARChIVes
Another vehicle for the public to access information is through the records of
theNationalArchives.Thisavenueshouldbeofparticularinteresttohistorians,
aswellasmembersofthepublicwantingtoaccesspersonalfiles.TheNational
ArchivesActof1996makesprovisionforthereleaseofrecordsafter20years.
As thenationalarchivisthasstreamlinedprocedures inorder tobealigned to
PAIA,membersofthepubliccanusePAIAtoaccessrecordsinthecustodyofthe
NationalArchives.
Thenationalarchivisthasalreadypublisheda listof thefiles in itsposses-
sion,andthenamesofpeopleonwhomtheapartheidsecurityserviceskeptfiles.
Affected persons were invited to view their files using the mechanisms under
PAIA,ifthesefileswereolderthan20yearsold.Thenationalarchivisthasaduty
toensurethattheexemptionsofthePAIA–particularlythoserelatingtothird-
partyinformation–aretakenintoaccountbeforereleasinginformation.Interms
oftheNationalArchivesAct’s20-yearrule,intelligenceservicerecordscreated
in1995wouldhavetobetransferredtotheNationalArchivesattheendof2014.
ThisimpliesthatallrecordsdeemedpublicrecordsintermsofPAIAwouldfall
underthecustodianshipoftheNationalArchives,includingpersonalfiles,intel-
ligenceassessments,andadministrativedocumentsthathavenotbeenidentified
for disposal. Theoretically, it should no longer be possible for an intelligence
agencytodestroysensitiverecords,asNISdidattheendoftheapartheidera.
However,whiletheservicesreportedlybelievethattheycomplywiththerecord
managementstandardsoftheNationalArchives,thereisnoindependentover-
sighttoassesswhetherrecordsareadequatelyfiled,storedandpreserved,forthe
sakeofposterityandofconservingSouthAfrica’scollectivememory.
mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 91
DePARtMentAL ReVIews
Since1995theexecutive, throughvarious intelligenceministers,has initiated
anumberofreviews,someinternalandsomeintendedforeventualpublicdis-
closure.Inmostcases,theinitiatingauthorityhastriedtoensureobjectiveand
independentproceedingsbyappointingprominentandcredibleoutsideobserv-
erstoheadorserveonthereviewteams.Fortheexecutive,thesereviewshave
beenanimportantvehicleforaddressingemergingpolicyconcernsintheintel-
ligenceservices.ThefirstknownreviewwasthePikoliCommission,namedafter
itschairperson,AdvocateVusiPikoli.InitiatedbyJoeNhlanhla,deputyminister
forintelligence,in1996,barelyayearafterthenewserviceswereestablished,the
PikoliCommissionwasinrealityaninternaldepartmentalreview.Establishing
theserviceshadbeenarockyroadforthedeputyminister.Itwasdifficultenough
toamalgamateandstreamlineabureaucracythatcontainedformerfoes,suspi-
ciousofeachotherdespitehavingworkedsohardtoovercometheirdifferencesin
theinterestofnationalunification.Butdealingsimultaneouslywiththesecurity
problemsofafragiledemocracy(aresurgenceofdomesticviolenceinKwaZulu/
NatalandontheWitwatersrand,anincreaseinorganisedcrime,aperceptionthat
foreignintelligenceagencieswerespyingonSouthAfrica)andotherinternalvul-
nerabilitiessuchasthetheftofaconvoyofvehiclesandofabatchofcomputers
containingsensitiveinformation,wastoomuch.Theselasttwoincidentswerea
hugeembarrassmenttoNhlanhla,andPresidentNelsonMandelathreatenedto
shutdowntheintelligenceservices.Nhlanhlathereforedecidedthatitwastime
totakestock.
Thereview focusedonwhether themandate and design of the services as
constituted were appropriate for the times. It also addressed how organisa-
tional effectiveness could be improved. The recommendations confirmed that
theorganisationaldesignwasappropriatebutemphasisedthatnewcapacities,
includingsignalsintelligence,neededtobebuilt.Theneedforimprovedtraining
andhumanresourcemanagementsystemswasalsoidentified.Althoughreleasing
thecommission’srecommendationswouldnothavejeopardisednationalsecurity,
Nhlanhlachosenottotablethefindingsorrecommendationsfordiscussionin
parliament,raisingtheireofoppositionpoliticalparties.Instead,therecommen-
dationsweresenttotheJSCI,whodisclosedthemintheirreporttoParliamentthe
followingyear.PerhapsNhlanhlawassimplyfollowingdueprocess;however,the
perceptioncreatedwasthattheintelligenceserviceswereonthedefensiveand
unwillingtoallowpublicdebateabouttheirorganisation.Nhlanhlaacceptedthe
commission’srecommendationsandusedthemasabasisforhisprogrammeof
workoversubsequentyears.
92 / chAPter four
ThedusthadbarelysettledaroundthePikoliCommissionwhentheservices
wereembroiledinyetmoredrama.ThistimeGeneralGeorgeMeiring,headofthe
SANDF,receivedinformationfromDefenceIntelligencethatseveralprominent
ANCleadersandaseniorSANDFofficer,GeneralSiphiweNyanda,wereplotting
amilitarycoupagainstPresidentMandela.Meiringtookthisreportdirectlyto
Mandela,by-passingNICOC.ItisconceivablethatMeiringthoughthewasdoing
therightthingbycircumnavigatinghisNICOCcolleagueswhomighthavebeen
partytotheallegedmischief.Butthepresidentdismissedtheclaimsasludicrous,
andqueriedwhyithadbeenpresentedtohiminsuchanirregularfashion.Again,
Nhlanhlawasforcedtoappointacommission.Aftersittingforseveralmonths,the
commissionpresenteditsresults,whichrecognisedthattheco-ordinatinglegisla-
tionhadtohavebeenflawedtohavebeensubvertedinsuchawaybyMeiring.
FurtherreviewswereinitiatedunderLindiweSisulu,ministerofintelligence
from2001onwards.Oneofthesehadaninternalfocusandlookedatthecon-
ditions of service of members of the intelligence community. It addressed the
broaderpolicyquestionofthestatusoftheintelligenceservicesinrelationtothe
widerpublicservice.Afterextensiveinteractionwiththepublicservice,thecabi-
netapprovedinprincipletheestablishmentofanIntelligenceServicesCouncil
tolookintothisissue,assertingthattheconditionsofserviceformembersofthe
intelligencecommunityfelloutsidethepublicservice’sjurisdiction.
Otherpolicy-relatedquestionsinvestigatedbycommissionsinitiatedbySisulu
includedtheneedforaclassificationanddeclassificationframeworkalignedto
theconstitution,andtheregulationoftheprivatesecurityindustry.Othermat-
tersrelatedtothesensitiveworkoftheintelligenceservices,includingtheformer
government’s chemical and biological warfare programme. In all cases the
commissionsmaderecommendationsthatweremeanttoinformpolicydecision-
makingorformulation.
Oneflawinthesystemofgovernmenthasbeenthelackofcontinuity,witha
successionofministersbringingtheirownideasaboutparticularpolicypriorities
anddirections.Itrevealsthedisadvantageofhavinglimitedpublicparticipation
orinterestinthereviews,asministersgenerallyarenotunderpublicpressureto
bringpolicyprocessestoahead.Whenappointedministerfortheintelligence
services,RonnieKasrilspromisedtopursuethepolicyconcernsofhispredecessor,
includingaclassificationanddeclassificationpolicy.However,thepoliticaland
securitydemandsduringKasrils’stenuremeantthatotherprioritiestookprec-
edence,withtheresultthattheclassificationanddeclassificationpolicyremained
ontheagendabutwasnottreatedwithurgency.Histermofofficeendedbefore
thelegislationrelatingtodeclassificationandclassificationhadbeenpassed.
mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 93
ThemostsignificantreviewunderKasrilswastheMinisterialReviewCom-
missiononIntelligence.Appointedin2005,itwastaskedwithassessingwhether
theoperationsoftheintelligenceserviceswerealignedtotheconstitution.The
three-personcommissionwasheadedbyaformerdeputyministerforsafetyand
security,JoeMathews.Initsfinalreport,submittedin2008,itstronglyrecom-
mendedtighterexecutivecontroloverandscrutinyofoperationsinitiatedbythe
intelligenceservices.
ThereviewfollowedthedismissalofseveralseniorNIAmanagers,including
thedirector-general,forallegedlyconductingunlawfulsurveillanceandproviding
falseinformationtothepresidentoftherepublic.TheInspector-Generalinvesti-
gatedandconfirmedtheseallegations,whichresultedincriminalchargesbeing
broughtagainstthedirector-general,BillyMasetlhaandothers.However,abitter
andprotractedseriesoflegalbattlesensued,astheformerdirector-generalfought
toclearhisname.Consequently,thecourtsemergedasacriticalspaceinwhich
mattersaffectingtheintelligenceservicesunfolded.Giventhepoliticalclimate,
themediahasbecomeasecondarychannelthroughwhichthedevelopmentsin
theintelligenceservicesarefilteredandaired.
Intheearlierdaysofthenewintelligencedispensation,problemswithinthe
intelligenceserviceswererarelyaddressedbyresortingtothecourts,andalmost
never involved such senior personnel. There was the occasional case where a
memberoftheintelligenceserviceswaschargedwithcriminalconduct,andhis
linkstotheservicesexposed,buttheseincidentsweregenerallybenignandrarely
coveredbythemedia.Therehadalsobeenincidentswhereaggrievedmembers
orformermembershadturnedtothecourtsforassistanceoverlabourdisputes
thattheyhadfailedtoresolvewithmanagement.Theresorttothecourtswas
hardlysurprisinginmanycases,astheserviceshadnoaccesstotheconciliation
andmediationmechanismsavailable,havingbeenexpresslyexcludedfromthe
provisionsoftheLabourRelationsAct.Inseveralcases,theincidentsreachedthe
courtsbecausetheemployer-employeerelationswerepoorlyhandled.Although
somesuchmatterswereheardin camera,inmostcasesthedisputesattractedlittle
mediainterestandweresettledoutofthepublicglare.
MeDIA AnD CoMMunICAtIon stRAtegIes oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Theintelligenceserviceshavealwaysbeensensitivetopublicperception.In1995
theNIAappointedaseniormanagerasheadofcommunications.Thiscontin-
uedatrendthathadbecomewellestablishedunderNIS,whichhadallowedits
94 / chAPter four
mostseniorofficialstoengagewiththemediainordertoexplainanddemystify
themselves.
However,mediacoveragehasnotalwaysbeenkindtotheintelligenceservices.
Intelligenceactivityinevitablyseemstogenerateaclimateofsuspicion.In1996,
allegationsweremadeinthemediathattheintelligenceserviceswerespyingon
thetopmanagementoftheSAPS.Overtheyears,otherallegationsweremadein
themediathattheintelligenceserviceswerebuggingthetelephonesofcitizens,
includingoppositionpoliticians.Thestoriesofmishaps,ineptitude,andscandal
carriedinthemediahavemadefortitillatingreading.Thebungledspyingonthe
GermanEmbassyinPretoria,andthetheftofminibusesandcomputersfromthe
NIA’sheadquarters,allmadeforgoodmediacopyinthefirstfewyearsoftheserv-
ices’existence.
Inresponse,theintelligenceserviceshaveestablishedcapacitiestomanage
theirpublicimageandpublicrelations.Initially,theministerdidnotplayadirect
roleinmediainteractions;theseniormanagerappointedbytheservicehandled
questionsandqueriesfromthepress.Later,inordertostandardiseandexercise
control over responses to media queries, Deputy Minister Nhlanhla appointed
aspokesperson in theministry tohandleallmediaqueries.Thisarrangement
becameembeddedquicklyenoughandtheofficeoftheMinisternowmanages
publicrelationsfortheintelligenceservices.
Nevertheless,theintelligenceservicesdoenjoysomeautonomyinrespectof
communicationstrategies.Both theNIAand SASS have informative websites.
Between2001and2004theNIAproducedthreecomprehensivepublicannual
reportsthatareavailableonitswebsiteatwww.nia.gov.za.VusiMavimbela,anew
director-generalappointedin2001,wasparticularlyenthusiasticaboutimproving
thepublicprofileoftheAgency.Mavimbelasaysinhisforewordtothe2002/3
publicannualreport:
WhenwelaunchedourPublicAnnualReportlastyear,weweredrivenbythe
simpleconvictionthattheSouthAfricansocietyistheultimatestakeholderon
issuesofnationalsecurity.Itwastheconvictionthatifthisstakeholderisto
playitsroleinensuringnationalsecurityforitself,ithastobeinformedofwhat
theplaceandroleoftheNationalIntelligenceAgency(NIA)isinsociety.
Throughthereports,theNIAreleasedsignificantandsometimesdetailedinfor-
mationaboutitselfanditswork.Forexampleonthesubjectofvetting,the2001/2
reportstatedthattheNIAhadreceivedinthepastyear3180requestsforsecurity
clearances,conductedover16000recordchecksforspecialevents,andissueda
totalof1379confidentialtotop-secretclearances.Thereportlistedthespecial
mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 95
eventsprovidedwithsecurityadvisoryservices,includingtheWorldConference
againstRacismandtheInter-CongoleseDialogue.Itstatedthatsimilarservices
wouldbeprovidedoverthecomingyearstotheconferenceoftheNon-Aligned
MovementSummit,theWorldSymposiumonSustainableDevelopment,theSum-
mitoftheAfricanUnionandtheWorldCricketCup,alleventstakingplaceon
SouthAfricansoil.
TheNIA’spublicannualreportsalsoexplainedchangesinprioritiesoverthe
years.Forexample,inits2003/4report,borderintelligence,organisedcrimeand
corruptionandterrorismarereflectedaspriorities.Thereportslistedthetypesof
‘products’(assessments)producedbytheNIA,whichincludedatthetimedaily
andweeklyintelligencereviews.Finally,thepublicreportsprovidedstatistical
informationaboutthedemographicsandcompositionoftheNIAanditscorporate
governanceframework.ThetimingoftheNIA’slastpublicannualreportcoin-
cidedwiththeresignationofMavimbelaandhisreplacementbyBillyMasetlha.
Thedisruptioncausedbythechangeinministeranddirector-generalafterthe
2004generalelectionsmaybethereasonwhynomorepublicreportswerepro-
duced.However,thefactthattheNIAisnotlegallyobligedtopublishapublic
annualreportmeansthattherewasneveranyleveragetoensurethatthispractice
continuedorwasresumed.
Incontrast,theSASShasproducedonlyonepublicreport–aglossyten-year
review.ThisfairlyrevealingdocumentcanbefoundontheSASSwebsiteatwww.
sass.gov.za.LiketheNIA’sreports,itcoversthelegalframeworkandmandate,
providesdemographicdetails(ratiosnotnumbers)andexplains thepriorities
oftheService.ThereportalsoexplainstheSASS’sintelligence-gatheringrolein
supportofAfricanpeaceinitiatives, itsco-operationwiththelawenforcement
agenciesinrespectofcrimeintelligence,itsworkineconomicintelligence,and
itsinternationalco-operationwithotherintelligenceagencies.However,sinceits
voluntarydecisiontopublishaten-yearreview,theSASShasnotcontinuedto
publiciseitsrecordinthisway,andthereisnopressureforittodoso.
Theministryitselfissubjecttotheoverallgovernmentcommunicationsstrat-
egy, led by the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS),
whichislocatedinthePresidency.TheGCISco-ordinatesgovernmentcommu-
nicationsincludingthescheduleofpressbriefings,whichcabinetministersand
their ‘cluster’colleaguesmustattend.Forcommunicationpurposes,theintelli-
genceservicesfallundertheJustice,CrimePrevention,andSecurityCluster.Thus
theministerregularlybriefsthemediaabouteventsinrelationtotheseportfolios
togetherwithhisorhercolleagues.Overandabovethis,theministerengageswith
96 / chAPter four
themediaonarangeofsecurityquestions,grantinginterviews,meetingeditors,
andwritingarticlesandletters.
ConCLusIon
Since1995,theveilappearstohavebeenliftedsignificantlyontheintelligence
services, with the public able to access information through a multiplicity of
means.However,anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatfewcitizenshavethekindof
insightrequiredforregularmonitoringanduseofallthesemeans.Publicinter-
est is not excessive, and is mainly stimulated by media reports, especially of
a sensational nature. Policy priorities change from minister to minister. More
processesareintroducedtoaddressthenewprioritiesbeforetheoldoneshave
beencompleted,addingtoconfusionaboutthestatusofpolicy,evenamongthe
enlightened.
Onreflection,theintelligenceserviceshavebeengenerallytransparentbut
have also been inconsistent. Examples include the discontinuation of public
annualreportsbytheservicesandtherelativelylowprofileoftheworkofthe
JSCI.What isperhapsneededisatransparencyreview, ledbytheminister, to
takestockofwhathasbeenachievedandtolookathowtomaintainaconsistent
cultureoftransparency.
The Bill of Rights intheSouthAfricanconstitutionstatesthateveryperson
hastherightofaccesstoanyinformationheldbythestate,aswellasany
informationheldbyanotherpersonrequiredfortheexerciseorprotectionofany
rights(s32.1).Itstatesthatnationallegislationmustbeenactedtogiveeffectto
thisright(s32.2).
ItalsostatesthattherightsintheBillofRightsmayonlybelimitedifthelimi-
tationis‘reasonableandjustifiableinanopenanddemocraticsocietybasedon
humandignity,equalityandfreedom’,and‘takingintoaccountallrelevantfactors
including:
a. thenatureoftheright;
b. theimportanceofthepurposeofthelimitation;
c. thenatureandextentofthelimitation;
d. therelationbetweenthelimitationanditspurpose;and
e. lessrestrictivemeanstoachievethepurpose’(s36.1).
Thisisanimportantprovision.InlaytermsitmeansthattherightsintheBillof
Rightsarenotabsolutebutcanberestrictedifthereasonsfordoingsocanbe
arguedwithsomelegitimacy.Infact,aswewillsee,thisisprovidedforinPAIA,
whichcontainsasetofgroundsonwhichaccesstorecordscanbewithheldfrom
requesters.
In1994ataskteamwasestablishedintheofficeofthethendeputypresident,
ThaboMbeki,todraftthelegislation.ConvenedbyAdvocateMojankuGumbi,it
alsocomprisedAdvocateVincentMaleka,ProfessorMandlaMchunu,Professor
PAIA AnD Its IMPLICAtIons FoR the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
5
98 / chAPter fIve
EtienneMureinik,andAdvocateEmpievanSchoor,astatelawadvisor.Itsbrief
wastodraftalawthatwouldcoveraccesstoinformation,accesstomeetings,and
theprotectionofwhistleblowers.
Recounting the drafting process, Van Schoor confirms that the principle
of maximum disclosure was paramount during early deliberations (interview,
25.08.03). The task team studied access to information legislation of several
countries,includingAustralia,NewZealand,Ireland,theUnitedStates,Britain
(indraftformatthattime),andIndia(alsoindraftform).Theymetregularlyto
discussvariousdrafts.
Inadocumentdated19January1995,thetaskteamnotedthat‘certainclasses
ofsensitiveinformation’wouldhavetobeexemptedfromdisclosure.Theseshould
benarrow,well-justified,designedtopreventrealharm,and,wherenecessary,
subject toapublic interestoverride. In its initialdraft thetaskteamproposed
exemptionsincaseswherethereleaseofinformationcouldcauseseriousharm
tonationaldefenceorsecurity;underminelawenforcement;jeopardisepersonal
privacy,thesafetyofanindividual;endangerthegovernment’smanagementof
thenationaleconomyorthenationalfinances,oraffectthegovernment’scapacity
tocollectinformationinthenationalinterest,properpersonneladministrationin
thepublicservice,orthedeliberativeprocesswithinthegovernmentbyinhibiting
candidinternalcommunication(OpenDemocracyTaskTeam1995).
The initial proposal also required public bodies to take proactive steps to
fosteracultureoftransparency.Thetaskteamarguedthatsuchbodiesshould
routinelypublishormakeavailablethefollowingkindsofinformation:manuals
orbrochuresdetailingdescriptionsoftheclassesofinformationintheirposses-
sion; their internal structures, functions, responsibilities and decision-making
processes;themeansbywhichcitizenscouldparticipateinthedecision-making
processes;detailsofavailablecomplaint,appealandredressprocedures;detailsof
availablepublicservicesandhowtousethem;anddetailsofinternalcomplaints
procedures available to an official wishing to draw attention to lawbreaking,
corruption,ormaladministration.
Among the enforcement mechanisms proposed by the task team was the
appointmentbyeachgovernmentbodyofaninformationofficerwhowouldcon-
siderrequestsforinformation.Shouldarequestberefused,therequestercould
appeal internallytotheheadofthepublicbody.Intheeventofanunsuccess-
fulinternalappeal,arequesterwouldhaverecoursetoaninformationcourtthat
dealtexclusivelywiththeenforcementoftheOpenDemocracyAct.Thepublic
protectorandhumanrightscommissionwouldbegrantedinterventionandmedi-
ationpowers.Thetaskteamalsoproposedthatanindependentbody(theOpen
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 99
DemocracyCommission)beestablishedtomonitortheeffectivenessoftheAct
andtoreportannuallytoparliamentonitsimplementationthroughtheappropri-
ateparliamentarycommittee.
The drafting of the Open Democracy Bill proceeded with periodic delays.
Between1995and1996itwassubmittedtwicetothecabinet,butwasreferred
backeachtimeforfurtherworkandconsultation.InOctober1997thedraftbill
waspublishedintheGovernment Gazette forpubliccomment.Commentswere
considered,furtheradjustmentsweremade,andin1998cabinetapprovedthe
draft.In1998thebillwasfinallytabledinparliament.ThepurposeoftheOpen
DemocracyBillwastogivecitizensaccesstoinformationheldbypublicbodies,
andaccesstotheproceedingsofcertainpublicbodies.Otheraimsweretopro-
tectprivacy,andtoprotectofficialswhodisclosedseriousmaladministrationor
corruption.Overall,thebillwouldempowerthecitizenrytoparticipateingovern-
mentaldecision-makingthataffectedthem(Currie&Klaaren2002).
The original recommendation was for a single act to accomplish the work
doneinothercountriesbyseparatefreedomofinformationacts(alsoknownas
‘accesstoinformation’acts),privacyacts,openmeetingsacts(alsoknownas‘gov-
ernmentinthesunshine’acts),andwhistleblowerprotectionacts.However,the
cabinetdecidedtotableaseparatebillthatdealtwithwhistleblowersandopen
meetings,andovertimeabandonedtheopenmeetingscomponent.Thelegisla-
tiondealingwithwhistleblowerswastheProtectedDisclosuresActof2000.Van
Schoorexplainsthatthereasonforhavingaseparatebillwasconstitutional,as
technicallytheconstitutionrequiredtheaccesstoinformationlegislationtobe
enactedbefore4February2000(interview,25.08.03).
The Promotion of Access for Information Act (PAIA) was finally passed by
parliamentin2000.Thislawgivessubstancetotheconstitutionalrightofaccess
toinformationheldbythestate.Itsstatedaimisthefollowing:
Togiveeffecttotheconstitutionalrightofaccesstoanyinformationheldby
the state; to make available to the public, information about the functions
of governmental bodies; to provide persons with access to their personal
informationheldbyprivatebodies;toprovideforthecorrectionofpersonal
informationheldbygovernmentalorprivatebodiesandtoregulatetheuse
anddisclosureof that information; toprovidefor theprotectionofpersons
disclosingevidenceofcontraventionsofthelaw,seriousmaladministrationor
corruptioningovernmentalbodies;andtoprovideformattersconnectedthere-
with(PAIA,Aim).
100 / chAPter fIve
An outLIne oF PAIA
PAIArequiresthatallpublicandprivatebodiesreleaseinformationaboutthem-
selves,listinformationorrecordstheyhold,andstatehowmembersofthepublic
canaccessthoserecords.Italsooutlinesthegroundsonwhichpublicandprivate
bodiesmayrefuseaccesstotheirrecords,andprovidesmechanismsforappealing
againstsuchdecisions.
the scope of the ActTheActoverridesanylegislationthatmightbemateriallyinconsistentorincon-
flictwithitsprovisions.Thisimpliesthattheintelligenceservicescannotclaim
anautomaticrighttosecrecy,andmustbalancetheirobjectives(alsodefinedin
law)withtheprovisionsoftheAct.However,therearegroundsforlegitimateand
justifiablenon-disclosure,whicharecoveredlaterinthischapter.
TheActstatesthatinformationheldbythestateshouldbemadepublic ‘as
swiftly,inexpensively,andeffortlesslyasreasonablypossiblewithoutjeopardising
goodgovernance,privacyandcommercialconfidentiality’(s9b).
However,notallpublicbodiesaresubjecttoPAIA.Section12stipulatesthat
theActdoesnotapplytorecordsofthecabinetanditscommittees;thecourts
oftheconstitutionaljudicialsystem;specialtribunalsestablishedintermsofthe
SpecialInvestigatingUnitsandSpecialTribunalsActof1996;andofficersofsuch
courtsortribunals.NordoestheActapplytoindividualmembersofparliament
orprovinciallegislators.However,itdoesallowthecabinetanditscommittees,
members of parliament, or provincial legislators to request information about
privatebodies.
TheActprovidesmainlyforaccessonrequestand,inparticular,foraccessto
alreadyexistingrecords.Therefore,thebodythatreceivesarequestcannotlegiti-
matelybeexpectedtocompilearecord,ifarecorddoesnotexist.
TheActisstronglyweightedinfavourofthoserequestinginformation.The
constitutiondoesnotrequirearequestertoprovethattheinformationisnecessary
fortheexerciseoftheirconstitutionalrights.Infact,thereasonfortherequestis
irrelevant;theonusisonthepublicorprivatebodytowhomarequestisdirected
tocomplywithanylegitimaterequest,ifthereisnolegallybasedreasonforwith-
holdingarequestedrecord.
Routine disclosures required in the PAIA manualsTheAct(part2,chapter3,s14)outlinestheinformationthatallpublicbodies
mustpublishinamanualinatleasttwoofficiallanguages.(Part3listsidenti-
calrequirementsforprivatebodies.)Themanualmustcontainadescriptionof
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 101
thepublicbody’sstructures,functions,andcontactdetails;alistoftherecords
held,bysubjectandcategoriesofeachsubject;andadescriptionofeverypersonal
informationbankheldbythepublicbody.Itmustalsoclearlystatewhichcatego-
riesofrecordsareopentothepublic,andhowtoobtainaccesstothoserecords;
describeitsservicesavailabletomembersofthepublic;andhowtogainaccessto
theseservices.Itmustalsodescribearrangementsformembersofthepublicto
participateinorinfluencetheformulationofpolicy,ortheexerciseorperform-
anceofduties(Currie&Klaaren2002).
Section 14, through the requirement to produce manuals, is the window
throughwhichmembersofthepubliccangainmuchinsightintotherole,struc-
ture,andfunctionsofthepublicbodyinquestion.Itisprobablymoresignificantin
respectoftheintelligenceservicesthanotherpublicbodies,intowhichmembers
ofthepublicarelikelytohavesomeinsightthroughmediareportsandgenerally
availableinformation.Thesecrecysurroundingtheintelligenceservicestendsto
beperpetuatedbytheroutineclassificationofmostinformationandtheabsence
ofaframeworkforthenon-classificationordeclassificationofsuchinformation,
aconditionwhichcouldbesignificantlyalleviatedbytheavailabilityofmanuals.
Requests for access to informationPAIArequiresthatallrelevantpublicbodiesappointadeputyinformationofficer
(DIO)toattendtoitsobligationsundertheAct.ThustheDIOisdirectlyrespon-
sibleforprocessingrequestsforinformation,aswellastransferringrequestsif
thepublicbodydoesnothavetherequiredinformation.Agenciesarerequiredto
ensurethatrequestsarekeptuntilafinaldecisionhasbeentakenonwhetheror
nottograntaccess.Noofficialofapublicbody,otherthantheinformationofficer
ordeputyinformationofficer,hasthepowertorespondtoarequestforaccess.
grounds for refusal of access to recordsPAIArecognisesthattherearecircumstancesunderwhichpublicbodiesshould
havetherighttorefuserequestsforinformation.Inthefirstinstance,refusalis
deemedtohavetakenplacewhenthebodyinquestionrepliesthatarequested
recordcannotbefoundordoesnotexist,orwhentheresponsetoarequest is
notlodgedwithintheregulatedtime.Shouldarequestberefused,anappealcan
thereafterbemade,firsttothebodyandthentotheminister.Anothersignificant
featureoftheActisthataninformationofficermaydenytheexistenceornon-
existenceofarecord,ifthepublicbodybelievesthatacknowledgmentthereofis
goingtocauseharm(part2,chapter4).
102 / chAPter fIve
Thegroundsforlegitimatelyrefusingaccesstoarecordareclearlystipulated,
andmustbejustifiableintermsoftheconstitution.Bothmandatoryanddiscre-
tionarygroundsforrefusalareprovided.Inthecaseoftheformer,abodymust
refuseaccesstorequestedrecords.Insummary,arequestforaccesstoarecord
mayberefused if the refusal isbasedon themandatoryprotectionofprivacy
ofathirdpartywhoisanaturalperson;taxandcertainotherrecordsheldby
the South African Revenue Services (SARS); commercial information about a
thirdparty;thesafetyofindividualsandofproperty;policedockets;orresearch
information.
Therearealsoanumberofdiscretionarygroundsforrefusingaccess.Inother
words,thepublicbodyreceivingtherequestmustevaluatewhethertherequest
willcompromisecertainofitsresponsibilities.Arequestforaccesstoarecordmay
berefusediftherefusalisbasedontheprotectionofcertainconfidentialinfor-
mationaboutathirdparty;lawenforcementandlegalproceedings;ordefence,
security,andinternationalrelationsoftheRepublic.Accessmayalsoberefused
ifarequest ismanifestlyfrivolousorvexatious,orwhereaccesstoarecordor
recordswillresultinasubstantialorunreasonablediversionofresources.How-
ever,theActprovidesformandatorydisclosureiftheinformationisinthepublic
interest,orwouldrevealsubstantialenvironmentalriskorharmtopublicsafety
(Currie&Klaaren2002).
Implications for the intelligence services of the grounds for refusalGiventhattheintelligenceservicesaresubjecttoPAIA,theimplicationsofeachof
thesegroundsforrefusalneedtoexamined.Theoverallresultisalegalenviron-
mentinwhichthereisconsiderableroomfortheintelligenceservicestoprotect
theirsecrets.
Mandatory protection of the privacy of a third party who is a natural personThisprovision,insection34oftheAct,ismeanttoprotectanindividual’sprivacy,
arightalsoenshrinedintheconstitution.Theclauseimpliesthatapublicbody
cannotprovidearequesterwithpersonalinformationaboutathirdparty,which
includesadeceasedperson.Nonetheless,accessmaybegrantedincertaincases–
forexample,ifthepersonconcernedhasconsentedtodisclosure,orhasprovided
theinformationtothepublicbody,knowingthatitmightbemadeavailableat
somestage.Accessmayalsobegrantediftheinformationisalreadypubliclyavail-
able,orrelatestothephysicalormentalhealthofathirdpartyminorunderthe
careoftherequester.Finally,accessmaybegrantediftheinformationisaboutan
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 103
individualwhoisorwasanofficialofapublicbody,andrelatestotheirposition
inrelationtotheoffice.
Thisclauseimpliesthattheintelligenceservicesarenotallowedtomakeavail-
abletorequesterspersonalinformationaboutpersonsintheirranks,whoworkas
agentsorinformers,orwhoarethetargetsofintelligencecollectionwithoutthe
consentoftheindividualconcerned.Thissupportstherequirementthattheiden-
titiesofintelligenceworkersandtheirsourcesmustbeprotected,whichisalready
providedforintheIntelligenceServicesActof2002.
However, persons on whom apartheid-era security services had kept files
couldrequesttoseetheirownfilesintermsofPAIAiftherecordsweremorethan
20yearsold,asprescribedintheNationalArchivesActof1996. InNovember
2003theNationalArchivestooktheunprecedentedstepofpublishingalistof
fileswhichhadbeenmaintainedby theapartheid security forces, and invited
thepeoplelistedtoapplyforaccesstotheirfilesintermsofPAIA.However,no
memberofthepublicwasentitledtoseeanotherperson’sfileunlesstheperson
concernedhadagreedinprincipletosuchaccess.Afterevaluatingtherequest,the
filescouldthenbereleasedtotherequesterprovidedtheydidnotcontaininfor-
mationthatwasprotectedintermsofPAIA.TheNationalArchivesstressedthat
anypersonseekingaccesstotheirpersonalfilekeptbythesecurityforceswould
havetocomplywithPAIA’srequirements,completethenecessaryforms,andpay
theprescribedadministrativefeesforprocessingtherequest.
Thisgroundforrefusalisalsorelevanttothesecurityscreeningofpublicserv-
ants.Intelligenceservicesroutinelyusedetailedscreeningprocessestoacquire
informationaboutnewemployees,aswellasunsuccessfulcandidates.Theyare
alsosometimesaskedtoinvestigateandissuesecurityclearancestocivilservants
whohaveroutineorfrequentaccesstosensitiveinformation.Ingeneral,reasons
arenotsuppliedwhencandidatesfailtoobtainsecurityclearances.ThoughPAIA
hasnotbeentestedinrespectofsecurityclearances,thismayhavetochange,or
attheveryleasttheintelligenceserviceswouldhavetodocumentcarefullysuch
reasons, in case an individual requesting access to the records challenged the
decision.
ThisprovisionofPAIAimpliesthattheintelligenceservicesshouldprotectthe
privacyofsuchcandidates.Thebroadguidelineisthatitwouldbeillegaltopro-
videpersonalinformationtoathirdpartywithouttheconsentoftheindividual
concerned.WhileSouthAfricadoesnothaveprivacylegislation,thisprotection
ofpersonalinformationisinlinewiththeSouthAfricanLawCommission’sdraft
conceptsonprivacylegislation.
104 / chAPter fIve
Mandatory protection from disclosure of certain records of the South African Revenue ServiceAccordingtosection35oftheAct,SARSmustrefusearequestforaccessifthe
recordcontains informationobtainedorheld for thepurposeofenforcingtax
collection legislation. Although this reason for refusal may at first glance not
appeartohavedirectconsequencesfortheintelligenceservices,itdoes,especially
whenoneconsidersthatasubstantialpartofanyintelligenceservices’budgetis
fortheremunerationofinformers,oftenthelifebloodoftheiroperations.SARS’s
effectivenessdependsonbeingabletomatchanindividual’sbonafideidentity
withhisorher income.As intelligenceagenciesoftenmakeuseofpersonsor
entitieswithfalseidentitiesforthepurposesofoperationalsecurity,thisposesa
dilemma.Shouldsuchremunerationforservicesberegardedas‘income’,andif
not,whynot?Atthetimeofwritingthisissuehadnotyetsurfacedpublicly,andis
thereforeraisedhypothetically.Butitmaywelldosoinfuture,whenasoundand
legallydefensibleregimearoundtheremunerationorincomeofsourceswillhave
tobedeveloped.Fromapublicinterestperspective,whethersuchdisbursements
aretaxableornot,whatisatissueiswhethersuchpaymentstosourcesarereason-
able,dulyauthorised,andtheprocedureseffectingthemtransparentenoughto
preventcorruption.
Mandatory protection of commercial information of a third partyAccordingtosection36oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefusearequestforaccess
iftherequestedrecordcontainstradesecretsinvolvingathirdparty;financial,
commercial,scientificortechnicalinformationwhich,ifdisclosed,couldharmthe
commercialorfinancialinterestsofathirdparty;orinformationsuppliedincon-
fidencebyathirdpartywhich,ifdisclosedtoarequester,mightharmitsinterests
incontractualorothernegotiationsorincommercialcompetition.
However,accesstorecordsmaynotberefusediftherecordrequestedisalready
publiclyavailable,ifthethirdpartyinquestionhasconsentedtotheinformation
beingmadeavailable,or,ifdisclosinginformationrelatingtoproductorenviron-
mentaltestingwouldrevealaseriouspublicsafetyorenvironmentalrisk.This
clauseisrelevanttotheintelligenceservicesinthattheyroutinelyenterintocon-
tractualarrangementswithcommercialentities.Insomecases,especiallywhere
someoperationalmatterisatrisk,commercialentitieshavetokeeptheirrela-
tionshipwiththeintelligenceservicessecret,andareoftenrequiredtoundergo
securityclearancesandduediligenceproceduresbeforebeingconfirmed.
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 105
Mandatory protection of certain confidential information, and protection of other confidential information about a third partySection 37 stipulates that a public body must refuse a request for access to a
recordifdisclosingtherecordinquestionwouldconstituteabreachofconfidence
inrespectofathirdpartyintermsofanagreement.Itmayalsorefuseaccessto
recordsthatcontaininformationsuppliedinconfidence,whosedisclosurecould
jeopardisethefuturesupplyofsimilarinformationorinformationfromthesame
source;andifitisinthepublicinterestthatsuchanoutcomeshouldbeaverted.
Thisprovisionisclearlyrelevanttotheintelligenceservicesasmuchoftheir
informationisprocuredfromconfidentialsourcesorinformants.Inmostcases,
sourcesundertaketosupplysensitiveinformationonconditionthattheiridenti-
tieswillnotbedisclosed.Althoughnottested,thisclausemayinfactberelevant
whenconsideringwhetherinformationrelatingtopaymentsofsourcesmaybe
withheldfromSARS,apointdiscussedearlier.
Mandatory protection of the safety of individuals, and protection of propertiesIntermsofsection38oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefuseaccesstoarecordifits
disclosurecouldreasonablyendangerthelifeorphysicalsafetyofanindividual,or
ifthedisclosurecouldprejudicethesecurityofabuilding,structure,communica-
tionssystem,transportsystem,property,anindividualunderawitnessprotection
scheme,orthesafetyandsecurityofthepublic.
This exclusion correlates strongly with the provisions of the Protection of
InformationAct,whichseekstopreventandpenalisethedisclosureofinforma-
tionwithsimilareffects.Thustheintelligenceservices,whichdoprovidesecurity
advicetogovernmentdepartmentsandthereforemustbepresumedtohavesuch
informationattheirdisposal,wouldbewithintheirrightsiftheyrefusedtodis-
closeinformationthatprejudicedthesafetyofanindividualorthepublicorthe
securityofabuilding,structure,communicationssystem,transportsystem,or
property.
Mandatory protection of police dockets in bail proceedings, and a protection of law enforcement and legal proceedingsAccordingtosection39oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefusearequestforaccess
toarecordifaccessisprohibitedintermsoftheCriminalProcedureAct.Refusal
isalsoallowedundercertainotherconditions,forexample,iftherecordcontains
informationaboutinvestigativemethodsandtechniques,anditsdisclosuremay
prejudicetheeffectivenessoftheinvestigation,ormayrevealorprovideleadsto
theidentityofaconfidentialsourceofinformation.
106 / chAPter fIve
Thisclauseisrelevanttothecriminaljusticeandintelligencesectors.Informa-
tioncanbewithheldintheinterestsofasuccessfuloutcometoaninvestigative
process.However,theActissensitivetootherbasicfreedoms:inthesameclause,
itstatesthatarequestedrecordmaynotberefusedifitcontainsinformationabout
thegeneraldetentionconditionsofapersonincustody.Inthisclause,provision
ismadeforapublicbody,throughitsinformationofficer,torefusetoconfirmor
denytheexistenceornon-existenceofarecord,ifharmislikelytobecausedby
suchdisclosure.Whilstthismayappearsevere,theActcarefullystipulatestheele-
mentsofasatisfactoryresponse,andtherequesteralsohastheoptionoflodging
aninternalappeal.
Mandatory protection of records privileged from production in legal proceedingsSection41statesthatapublicbodymustrefuseaccesstoarecordiftherecordis
‘privilegedfromproductioninlegalproceedings’,unlessthepersonentitledtothe
privilegehaswaivedit.Legalprofessionalprivilegeisagenerallegalprinciplethat
protectstheintegrityoflegalproceedingsbyprotectingtheconfidentialityofcom-
municationsbetweenalawyerandhisorherclient.Intheory,recordsthatmight
be the subject of a request include correspondence or communications made
forthepurposesofgivingorseekinglegalopinionandadvice.Theintelligence
servicescaninvokethisgroundforrefusalshoulditsrecordsrequireprotection.
Discretionary protection of information related to the defence, security and international relations of the RepublicAccordingtosection41,apublicbodymayrefuseaccesstoarecordifitsdisclosure
couldprejudicethedefence,security,orinternationalrelationsoftheRepublic;if
itwouldrevealinformationsuppliedinconfidencebyoronbehalfofanotherstate
orinternationalorganisation;oriftheinformationisrequiredtobeheldinconfi-
dencebyaninternationalagreementorcustomaryinternationallaw.
This would include information about military tactics or strategy, and
militaryexercisesoroperationstoprepare,detectandpreventhostilities;infor-
mationrelatingtoweaponsprocurement,capacityanddevelopment;information
concerningforcedeploymentandcharacteristics;andinformationheldforintel-
ligencepurposes.
InthisrespecttheActagainseemsalignedwiththeProtectionofInformation
Act.Infact,theseandotherprovisionsarequitegenerousinensuringthatthe
intelligenceandsecurityservicesarenotdisabled.Theyaresufficientlybroadto
refusedisclosure,andallowthepublicbody’sinformationofficersomediscretion
overwhether todisclose informationornot.The informationofficermayalso
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 107
refusetoconfirmordenytheexistenceornon-existenceofarecord,ifitisthought
thateitherrefusalordenialwouldharmtheinterestsofthestate.
Discretionary protection of information relating to the economic interests and financial welfare of the Republic, and the commercial activities of public bodiesAccordingtosection42oftheAct,accessmayberefusedwheninformationheld
byapublicbodyislikelytojeopardisetheeconomicinterestsorfinancialwel-
fareoftheRepublic,ortheabilityofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyin
thebestinterestsoftheRepublic.Thiscouldincludeinformationaboutproposed
policychangesaffectingcurrency,coinage,legaltender,exchangeratesorforeign
investment;thegovernment’spositioninrespectofcreditorinterestrates,cus-
tomsorexciseduties,taxes,orotherrevenues;theregulationorsupervisionof
financialinstitutions;governmentborrowing;andinternationaltradeagreements.
Mandatory protection of research information of a third party, and protection of research information of a public bodyIntermsofsection43,whenathirdpartycouldbeexposedtoseriousdisadvan-
tage,arecordthatcontainsinformationaboutresearchbeingconductedbyoron
behalfofthethirdpartymaybewithheld.Thisprovisioncouldpresumablyalso
beusedbytheintelligenceservices,whoseintelligencereportsareclient-driven.
Theycouldarguethataclient,suchasthepresidentoftheRepublicorthecabinet,
couldbedisadvantagedifthestudiescommissionedaremadepublic.
Discretionary protection of the operations of public bodiesIn terms of section 44, information can be withheld from public disclosure if
therecordcontainsinformationrelatingtoanopinion,advice,reportorrecom-
mendationsobtainedorprepared,orflowingfromaconsultation,discussionor
deliberation,forthepurposeofassistingtoformulateapolicyortakeadecision
intheexerciseofapowerorperformanceofduty,andifdisclosurecouldinhibit
furthercandidcommunicationsanddeliberationswithinthepublicbody.
Inessence,thisprovisionservestoshieldthepublicbodiesfromscrutinyof
theirinnerworkings.Intelligenceagenciescouldreadilyuseittoensurethatsensi-
tiveminutesorpolicydocumentsarenotmadepubliclyavailable.
Discretionary protection from manifestly vexatious or frivolous requestsSection45statesthatarequestforaccessmayberefusedifarequestismanifestly
vexatiousor frivolous,andthework involved inprocessingtherequestwould
108 / chAPter fIve
divertsubstantialresources.Anypublicbodyrefusingaccesstoarecordonthese
groundswouldhavetoconsidercarefullywhatconstitutesafrivolousrequest,
tocountermandtherequester’sargumentthattheinformationis importantto
it.Inanyevent,PAIAdoesnotrequirearequestertojustifyreasonsforwanting
accesstoarecord.Itissimplyanincontestablerightiftheinformationorrecord
requestedisnotcoveredbythegroundsforrefusal.
Mandatory requirement of disclosure if it is in the public interestLastly,section46oftheActprovidesformandatorydisclosureiftherecordwere
torevealevidenceofseriouscontraventionorfailuretocomplywiththelaw,oran
imminentandseriouspublicsafetyorenvironmentalriskofanaturesogravethat
thepublicinterestinthedisclosureoutweighstheharmcontemplated.
AppealsPart4oftheActcoversappealsagainstdecisions.Arequestermaylaunchaninter-
nalappealwithapublicorprivatebodythatrefusesaccesstoinformation,within
stipulatedtimeframes.Ifunsuccessfulafterexhaustingtheinternalappealproce-
dure,therequestermayapplytoacourtforrelief.Thecourtsareempoweredto
hearrepresentationsincamera,andmayprohibitthepublicationofproceedings
ifappropriate.Theburdenisontherefusingbodytodemonstratetheveracityof
itsdecision.Theseconditions–confidentialpresentationofargument–workin
favouroftheintelligenceservices.
Functions of the human Rights Commission (hRC)Part5oftheActaddressesthefunctionsoftheHRCinrelationtotheAct.TheHRC
ischargedwithmakingtheActknowntothepublicandmonitoringitsimplemen-
tation.Italsohastotraintheinformationofficersofpublicbodies,andprovide
adviceonhowtoadministertheAct.TheHRCmustmakerecommendationsfor
developing,improving,modernising,reformingoramendingtheAct,orotherleg-
islationorcommonlawrelevanttoaccesstoinformationheldbyprivateorpublic
bodies.And,everyyear,theHRChastoprovidedetailedreportstotheNational
AssemblyonhowwelleachpublicbodyisimplementingtheAct.
other aspects covered by the ActPart6coverstransitionalprovisions,whichincludetheministerhavingtointro-
ducelegislationtoensurethatSchedules1and2oftheActarecompleted.Italso
providesforextendedperiodstodealwithrequestsduringthefirsttwoyears.
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 109
Part7,thelastpartoftheAct,coversgeneralprovisions.Itstipulatesthatany
personwhoattemptstodenyarightofaccessbywilfullydestroying,damaging,
altering,concealingorfalsifyingarecordisliableforuptotwoyears’imprison-
ment.ItalsostipulatesthattheministermustprovideregulationsfortheAct’s
implementation,andsubmitthemtoparliamentbeforepublication.Provisionsof
theActmaybebroughtintooperationondifferentdates.
Cabinet recordsThisanalysisofthegroundsforrefusalshowsthatPAIA,notwithstandingitsinten-
tionoffacilitatingaccesstoinformation,providesamplespaceforinformationto
bewithheldfromrequesters.ThisseemstosupportconcernsthattheActcouldin
factbeusedtofrustrateattemptstoaccessinformation.Moreover,cabinetrecords
areexcludedfromaccess.Theimplicationsofthisaredebatable.Ontheonehand,
theexecutiveinademocracymustbeassumedtohavelegitimacyandamandate
togovern.Ontheotherhand,whereittakesdecisionswithfar-reachingimplica-
tionsforthestateasawhole,thereislikelytobeabacklashagainstunpopular
policymoves.Itwasunderthecoverofcabinetprerogativethatmanyharmful
decisionsweretakenunderapartheid:thismuchemergedduringthehearings
oftheTRC.Itisthereforeinthebroaderpublicinterestforaccesstoexecutive
decision-makingtobeasmeaningfulaspossible.
PAIA’s IMPACt on the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Thissectiondealswiththeattemptsoftheintelligenceservicestobalancethe
competing requirements of secrecy and transparency, while taking PAIA into
account.Italsoassesseswhethertheseactionshavecontributedtoeffectiveand
accountablegovernanceoftheservices,andanalysesthepolicychoicesresult-
ingfromtheAct,asexpressedininstitutionalarrangementsandstatementsby
policy-makers.
PresidentThaboMbekiassentedtothePAIAon2February2000.Originally
scheduledtocomeintoeffecton15September2000,theActwasdelayeduntil
March2001toenablethedraftingandapprovalofregulations.Thefirstdraft
interimregulationswerepublishedon10August2001,andcertainsectionsofthe
Actcameintoforceon15February2002.
ImplementationHowever, implementation proceeded slowly. For example, public and private
bodiesweregenerallyslowinrespondingtotherequirementtosubmitmanuals.
110 / chAPter fIve
(Asnotedearlier,theActrequirespublicbodiestoproducemanualscontaining
detailedinformationabouttheirstructureandfunctions,theinformationthey
hold,andhowthesemaybeaccessedbymembersofthepublic.)
When the government noted that both public and private bodies were not
adheringtotherequirementtoproducemanuals,theduedateforgivingeffectto
thisprovisionwasextendedto28February2003,bywayofablanketexemption
forallpublicandprivatebodies.Evenbythisdate,veryfewgovernmentdepart-
mentshadmetthedeadline.In2003theministerof justiceandconstitutional
developmentgrantedafurtherreprieve,exemptingpublicbodiesandprivatebod-
iesfromsubmittingmanualsfortheperiod1March2003to31August2003.The
ministryforintelligenceservicesco-ordinatedapplicationsbytheSASSandNIA
foranexemptionfromthemanualsrequirement.Bothdepartmentsstatedthat
complyingwiththisrequirementwouldcompromisetheirmandates,andjeop-
ardisenationalsecurity.Theministerforjusticeandconstitutionaldevelopment
grantedtheexemptions.BothSASSandtheNIAwereexemptedfromcompiling
manualsfortheperiod2003to2008(interviewwithMarlynRasswisi,4.08.05).
AdvocateEmpieVanSchoor,formermemberoftheopendemocracytaskteam
thatdraftedtheaccesstoinformationlegislation,iscriticalofthefactthatthe
regulationswerenotfinaliseduntilseveralyearsaftertheActhadbeenpassed,
andarguesthatoneofthelessonsoftheprocesswasthatlegislationandregula-
tionshouldbedraftedsimultaneously(interview,25.08.03).
However, David Porogo, DIO in the Department of Justice and Constitu-
tionalDevelopment(DOJ),blamesthedelayinimplementationonotherfactors.
Accordingtohim,implementationwasnotlinkedtothedepartment’sbudgeting
process,despitethedepartmenthavingoverallresponsibilityforimplementation,
whichaffectedpracticalmeasures,suchasdevelopinganddistributingeduca-
tionalmaterial.Furthermore,manyheadsofdepartmentwereunawareofthe
Act’sprovisions,suchastheirownrolesasinformationofficers,therequirement
toappointDIOs,ortherequirementtoproducemanuals.Inthatsense,theintel-
ligenceserviceswerenomoreguiltyofnon-compliancewiththeActthanmany
otherdepartments(interview,27.08.03).
ByAugust2005,theNIAandSASSdisplayeddifferentdegreesofreadiness
for implementing the PAIA. By that stage the NIA had produced a document
entitled ‘PolicyontheProceduresontheDisclosureof Information’ thatregu-
latedits implementationoftheAct.NIAdidinfactappointaDIO,responsible
forensuringproperadministrativecompliancewiththeAct,compilingresponses
(torequests)forconsiderationandapprovalbytheInformationOfficer(IO),and
anyotherdutiesrelatingtoPAIAcompliancedelegatedbythedirector-general.
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 111
However,thepolicyasawholewasclassified‘confidential’andwasthereforenot
publiclyavailabletothoseseekingtounderstandtheNIA’srequestprocedure.
SASS,ontheotherhand,onlyhadadraftpolicy,whichwasalsoclassified
‘confidential’.Atthetimeitsdirector-generalstillhadtoapprovethepolicy,and
hadnotappointedaDIO.Accordingtothedirector-general,HiltonDennis,the
draftpolicyoninformationmanagementwasmoreconcernedwithidentifying
whichinformationrequiredprotectionthanwiththeprocedurescoveringrequests
forinformation(interview,25.07.05).Assuch,itwasintendedtobealigned,but
notconcernedexclusively,withtheimplementationofPAIA.
Bycontrast,theDepartmentofDefence(DOD)hadapolicythatoutlinedroles,
responsibilities,andmechanismsforimplementingPAIA.Ithadbeenapproved
bythehighestpolicy-makingbodyintheDOD,theplenarydefencecouncil.The
DOD’sstructurehadtwocomponents: thesecretariat, fallingunder thesecre-
taryfordefence,whoisalsotheaccountingofficerforthedepartment;andthe
SANDF,headedbyitschief.Thesecretariatanddefenceforceeachhavetheirown
managementandaccountabilitystructures,both leadingupto theministerof
defence.Onamonthlybasis,theplenarydefencecouncilbringstogetherthemost
seniormanagementofthetwocomponentsandischairedinalternatemonths
bythesecretaryfordefenceandthechiefoftheSANDF(interviewwithWayne
Hendricks,28July2005).
According to Hendricks, a former DOD official, the policy regulating PAIA
implementation in the DOD was approved in 2000 (interview, 28.07.05). The
policywasclassifiedas‘restricted’,anditshandlinginstructionsstatedthat‘this
documentisthepropertyoftheDepartmentofDefenceandshallbeissuedonly
tothosemembersrequiringit intheexecutionoftheirduties’(Departmentof
Defence2000).
Thepolicywasanupdateofanearlierpolicydocument,promulgatedbythe
DODin1999,inresponsetothetablinginparliamentoftheOpenDemocracy
Bill. As accounting officer, the secretary for defence was designated as an IO,
whileDIOsweretobetheheadsoftheSANDFandthesecretariat.Inlinewith
thePAIAprovisions,thepolicydescribedtheIO’srole:toappoint,directandcon-
troltheDIOs;torender,ormakeavailable,suchreasonableassistancerequired
byarequestertocomplywiththeprescriptionsregardingrequestsforinforma-
tion;tograntorrefuseaccesstoinformationinthepossessionoforunderthe
controloftheDOD;toreceiveinternalappealsagainstdecisionsoftheDOD;to
forwardsuchappealsandreasonsfordecisionstotheministerofdefence;toassist
theministerofdefenceinfurtherdealingwithappeals;andtoensurecompliance
withtheActintheDOD.
112 / chAPter fIve
The policy also described the DIOs’ responsibilities, which included the
following:todevelopinternalprocedurestoimplementtheActintheirareasof
responsibility;toensurethatpersonswithdelegatedresponsibilitiesweretrained
intheAct’sproceduresandstipulations;andtomakerecommendationsregard-
ingthereleaseofinformationundertheircontrol.TheDIOwasalsorequiredto
referdisputedorcontentiousrecommendationstotheInformationActAdvisory
Committee(IAAC)forconsideration,toliaisewithrequestersonallmattersper-
tainingtorequests,andtoassisttheIOandtheministerofdefenceindealingwith
appeals.
TheIAACconsistedofrepresentativesoftheIO(whowouldchairthecommit-
tee),theSANDFchief,thelegalsupportdirectorate,defenceintelligence,andthe
headoftheinformationcentre.ItsrolewastoadvisetheIOonrecommendations
fromtheDIOsregardingrequestsforinformation.
AccordingtoHendricks,theJusticeCollege,undertheJusticeDepartment,
hadtrainedDODrepresentativesfromdifferentdivisions.Availabletoallgov-
ernment departments, the week-long training emphasised the constitutional
basis of PAIA, and the presumption in favour of disclosing all public records,
exceptinthosecaseswhereexemptionswereprovidedforintheAct(interview,
28.07.2005).
The challenge for the NIA, SASS, and the DOD was to provide adequate
resourcestoimplementPAIA.InNIA,althoughtheDIOsweremembersofsenior
managementwithothervitalresponsibilities,theydidnothavesufficientdedi-
catedstafftofollowuponPAIArequests.AccordingtotheNIA’sprimaryDIO,
JackieMcKay,developedcountriessuchastheUnitedStatesandCanadahave
well-resourcedandstaffedunitsresponsibleforensuringeffectiveimplementa-
tionofaccesstoinformationlegislation.Itwasthislackofresourcesthatresulted
intheNIAsometimesfailingtorespondwithinthestipulateddeadlines(inter-
view,15.07.05).
ComplianceThedegreeofcompliancewithPAIAbytheintelligenceserviceswasexamined
duringinterviewswiththedirector-generaloftheNIA,BillyMasetlha,(4August
2005),andthedirector-generalofSASS,HiltonDennis(25July2005).
BothwereawareofthemainrequirementsofthePAIAbutadmittedthattheir
departmentsdidnotcomplywithallof them,whichsupports the theory that
the intelligenceservicesareambivalentabout implementing the transparency
requiredbytheAct.However,theywereopenabouttheirservices’shortcomings,
whichperhapsreflectsthegrowingawarenessoftheAct.
PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 113
Appointment of deputy information officersAtthetimeoftheinterviews,theNIAhadappointedandpublishedthenameand
contactdetailsofitsprimaryDIO,incompliancewithPAIA.However,SASShad
notyetappointedaDIO.Dennissaiditwasconsideringappointingthegeneral
managerforinformationtechnologyasDIOasheorshewouldbemostawareof
thenatureofrecordsheldbytheservice,theirclassification,andtheirlocationin
thedepartment’svariousdatabases.
Voluntary disclosureTheNIAandtheSASScomplytoacertaindegreewithanotherrequirementof
PAIA,thatofvoluntarydisclosure.Bothhavewebsites,althoughthesearenot
updatedveryregularly.InJune2005theministryforintelligenceservicesalso
launchedawebsite,whichitupdatedfairlyregularlywiththeservingminister’s
speechesandresponsestoparliamentaryquestions.
TheNIAandSASShavealsoreleasedvoluntaryannualpublicreports.TheNIA
didsoeveryyearfrom2001to2004(afterwhichthepracticestopped),while
theSASSpublishedaten-yearreviewin2004.Muchoftheinformationreleased
relates to their mandates, functions, and corporate profiles. The NIA website
containsthefollowingcategoriesofinformation:theNIA’svisionandmission;
ahistoricaloverview;abriefoutlineofthestructuresofthecivilianintelligence
community;oversightmechanisms;thelegislativemandate;NIAannualreports;
humanresourcesinformation;corporateevents;NIA’sfocusareas;thecodeof
conduct for intelligenceworkers;andcontactdetails.TheSASSwebsitehada
similarstructure,andincludestheSASSten-yearreview.
Everyyeartheseintelligenceservicesalsosupplyoversightbodieswithinfor-
mation,evidenceofwhichcanbefoundintheannualreportsoftheJSCIandthe
Auditor-General.Theyhavealsoinitiatedregularmediabriefingsinanattemptto
improvepublicunderstandingoftheirroles.
Reports to the HRC on requests receivedDennisadmittedthathisdepartmenthadnotcompliedwithpart5oftheAct,
whichrequiredthatbodiessubjecttotheActsubmitreportstotheHRConthe
numberofrequestsandappeals,andhowtheyhavebeendealtwith.However,
MasetlhaindicatedthattheNIAhadmetallsuchobligations.DrLeonWessels,an
HRCcommissioner,admittedthattheHRChadnotpaidspecificattentiontothe
complianceoftheintelligenceservices.TheHRCfacedamoregeneralproblem:
thatgovernmentdepartmentsatalltierswereunawareoftheAct’sprovisions,and
114 / chAPter fIve
didnothavetheresourcestofocusontheminutiaeandspecialcircumstancesof
theintelligenceservices(interview,2.08.05).
Since the passage of the PAIA, the SASS had received no more than six
requests, most of them from members of the former anti-apartheid activists
requestingaccesstotheirfiles.Inreply,SASSreferredapplicantstotheNIA.Den-
nisexplainedthatallsurvivingfilesfromtheapartheiderahadbeenplacedinthe
custodyoftheNIAin1995,whentheserviceswereamalgamated.Therefore,if
thoserecordsdidexist,theywouldbeintheNIAfiles.
Bycontrast,theNIAhadreceived43requestsforaccesstoinformationsince
1991:fourin2001,whichwereall‘positivelyrespondedto’;sixin2002,which
wereall‘respondedto’(exceptforrequestsforTRCrecordsthatwerereferredto
theDOJ);12in2003,whichwererespondedtoeither‘indicatingthatnoinforma-
tionwasavailableonthesubjectmatterrequested’,ormakingtheinformation
available (there were no refusals); nine in 2004, of which the majority were
submittedbytheSouthAfricanHistoryArchivesTrustonbehalfofindividuals,
andtherewerenorefusals.UntilJuly2005,theNIAhadreceived12requests,
themajorityofwhichhadbeensubmittedbytheSouthAfricanHistoryArchive
(SAHA),mainlyactingonbehalfofprominentfiguresinthepre-1994anti-apart-
heidstruggle.Again,therewerenorefusals.
MostoftherequestsreceivedbytheNIAwereforpersonalinformation,from
anti-apartheid activists wanting access to their own files. SAHA intentionally
playedanimportantrole,helpingpeoplelodgetheirrequestswithvariousgov-
ernmentdepartments,soastodeterminethestate’scapability,knowledgeand
attitude towards the PAIA. According to Masetlha, during 2002 and 2003 the
‘initialrequests’(withSAHAoftenactingonbehalfoftherequesters)werefor
sensitiverecordsoftheTRC;formerBOSSfiles,whichrequiredsubmittingavery
specificNationalArchivesindextosubstantiatetherequest;andinformationon
prominentanti-apartheidactivistspriorto1990.TheNIAalsoreceivedrequests,
which were transferred to other public bodies holding the records, including
theNationalArchives,theOfficeoftheAuditor-General,andtheDepartmentof
JusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment.
The three case studies presentedinthischapterillustratethedilemmasand
choicesfacingtheintelligenceserviceswhenbalancingsecrecy(intheinter-
estsofnationalsecurity)andtransparency.OnecomprisesaPAIAapplicationby
anon-governmentorganisation,theSouthAfricanHistoryArchives(SAHA),for
accesstorecordsthathadearlierbeenpresentedtotheTRC.Thesecondcomprises
aPAIArequestforrecordsrelatingtothedecisionsoftheMinistryofDefencein
respectofaprocurementtender.Thethirddealswithpoliticallyexplosiveclaims
thataservingnationaldirectorofPublicProsecutionshadbeenanagentofthe
apartheidsecurityapparatus.Boththeseissuesservedbeforeinstitutionsofthe
post-apartheidstate.Eachcasepresentstheoutlineofeventsandchoicesmade
bytheintelligenceservicesinprocessingrequestsforrecords,andtheresponses
oftherequesterstotheirrefusalofaccess.Thesecasestudieshighlighttheimpor-
tanceofvalid,convincinggroundsforanyrefusal,andemphasisethefundamental
natureoftherightofaccesstoinformation.
APPLICAtIon BY sAhA FoR ACCess to tRC ReCoRDs
After the TRC process, SAHA, a non-government organisation committed to
greaterpublicaccesstorecords,lodgedaformalrequestintermsofPAIAwith
theNIAandtheDepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment(DOJ)
foraccesstotherecordsreceivedandconsideredbytheTRC.Therequestwas
declined in ways outlined below. As a result, on 26 November 2002 SAHA’s
lawyersservednoticeofitsintentiontoapplyforaHighCourtordersettingaside
the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes AnD the RIght oF ACCess to InFoRMAtIon: thRee CAse stuDIes
6
116 / chAPter sIx
thedecisionof theministerof justice to refuse three internalappeals submit-
tedearlierthatyear.Notonlyhadtheministerfailedtorespondtotheinternal
appealswithinthe30daysstipulatedintheAct;butSAHAalsobelievedtheminis-
ter’srefusalwasprocedurallyflawed.Firstly,noreasonsfordismissingtheappeals
weregiventoSAHA’sdeputydirector,SelloHatang,whohadfiledtheapplication
onSAHA’sbehalf.Secondly,SAHAarguedthatthedelayinprovidingtheappli-
cantwithdecisionswasneitherfairnorreasonable.Thirdly,theyarguedthatthe
wayinwhichtheapplicanthadeffectivelybeendeniedaccesstotherequested
recordswasinconsistentwiththeconstitutionaswellasPAIA.
Thebackgroundisasfollows:on20May2002,SAHA’sdeputydirector,Sello
Hatang,submittedtworequestsforaccesstoTRCrecordstotheDOJ.Therequests
weremadeintermsoftheprovisionsofPAIA.Onerequestwasforcopiesofall
recordsheldbytheDOJwhichdocumentedthechainofcustodyofcertainTRC
recordssincetheirtransferfromtheTRCin1999,includinginformationabout
theirlocation,physicaltransfer,control,responsibility,processing,andclassifica-
tion.ThesecondwasforcopiesofthetransferlistsusedtomoveTRCrecordsfrom
CapeTowntotheNationalArchivesinPretoria.Hatanghadpreviouslysentalet-
tertoDavidPorogo,DIOattheDOJ,informinghimofSAHA’sintentiontolaunch
aTRCarchiveproject.
On21May2002SAHAsentathirdandsimilarrequesttotheNIA.TheNIA
repliedinwriting,statingthattheTRCdocumentswerenotintheircustodyand
weretheDOJ’sresponsibility.ItundertooktorefertherequesttotheDOJ.
On12August2002HatangreceivedaletterfromPorogoadvisinghimthatthe
requesteddocumentscouldnotbefound.Accordingtosection23(3)ofthePAIA,
anoticethatrecordscannotbefoundordonotexistisregardedasarefusalof
access.Consequently,SAHAlodgedanappealagainsttherefusalswiththeminis-
terofjusticeandconstitutionaldevelopment,onthegroundsthatPorogodidnot
seemtohaveappliedhismindtotherequests.SAHAalsocontendedthatPorogo
hadfailedtoadheretotheproceduresinrespectofthe‘deemedrefusals’.TheAct
stipulatesthatiftherequestedrecordscannotbefound,theinformationofficer
hastoprovideanaffidavitoraffirmationthatspellsoutinfullthestepstakento
findtherecordsortodeterminewhethertherecordsexisted.
AccordingtoHatang,thewithholdingwasallthemoreintolerablebecausehe
wasalsoinpossessionofaletterfromtheNIAwhichstatedthatithadnosecurity
orotherconcernsaboutgrantingtherequestforaccesstoTRCchain-of-custody
records,andprovidingsuchrecordstoSAHA.Acopyoftheletterhadbeensentto
theheadofministerialservicesintheDOJon24October2002.
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 117
ThecaseoftheTRCrecordswasaprotractedone.Morethanayearlater,on
22December2003,PorogolodgedhisreplyingaffidavittoHatang’sapplication
withtheHighCourt,inwhichheclaimedthathehadbeenunawareofthewhere-
aboutsoftherecordsinquestionwhentheywereinitiallyrequested.Hestated
that:
Allmyinquiries,aswellasallthesearchesIhadconductedorcausedtobe
conductedtofindthesedocumentsortoestablishtheirwhereabouts,cameto
nought.Itwasonlyafterajournalist,acertainMrTerryBell,hadgivenme
informationconcerningtheirwhereabouts,thatIlearnedthattheaforesaid
documentshadbeenhandedovertoMrDullahOmar–theformerMinisterof
Justice,whoatthattime,alsoheldtheportfolioofMinisterfortheIntelligence
Services–andthatthedocumentswerebeingkeptinDrOmar’sofficeinthe
MinistryfortheNationalIntelligenceAgency(Porogo,TPD22/12/2003).
AccordingtoPorogo,officialsintheMinistryforIntelligenceServicesrebuffedhis
effortstoretrievethedocuments,statingthattheministerintendedtoreviewthe
documentsaspartofaclassificationanddeclassificationprocess,whichthemin-
istrywouldinitiateshortly.SAHAalsorejectedthisargument,questioningwhy
theministrywouldbedrivingsuchaprocesswhentheDOJwastheresponsible
department.
Porogo’sdelayedresponsedidnotmeantherewasnoactivityaroundthecon-
testedrecords.InFebruary2003theministerforintelligenceservices,Lindiwe
Sisulu,establishedaClassification/DeclassificationReviewCommittee(CDRC)
taskedwithadvisingheronthebestwaytodealwiththerequest.Afterconsider-
ingthematter,theCDRCrecommendedthatthereviewandreleaseofallsensitive
documentsshouldberegardedasspecialprojects,andapprovedbytheminister.
Inthisinstance,theobjectivewouldbetoreviewthesensitivedocuments(con-
tainedin34boxes)inaccordancewithPAIA’sexemptionclauses.Anydocument
that did not require protection in terms of these clauses would be voluntarily
releasedintothepublicdomain.TheCDRCalsorecommendedtheformationofan
InterdepartmentalReviewCommittee(IRC)toreviewthestatusoftherequested
recordsandconsidertheirrelease.MarlynRaswiswi,amemberofthePAIAUnit
intheDOJ,wasappointedastheIRC’schair.ThePAIAcomplianceprocesswould
beoverseenbytheCDRC(interviewwithRaswisi,4.08.05).
In effect, the IRC would have to scrutinise each document and, based on
standardcriteria,recommendwhetherornotitcouldbereleasedtoSAHA.Inhis
affidavittotheHighCourt,Porogosaidthisprocessonlybeganon9September
2003aftercertainpreparatorymeasureshadbeencompleted.These included
118 / chAPter sIx
gaining the approval of the special project by the ministers for Intelligence
Services,JusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment,andArtsandCulture(thelast-
namedresponsiblefortheNationalArchives);relocatingthesensitivedocuments
totheSouthAfricanNationalArchives;establishingtheIRC;trainingitsmembers;
andprovidingitwiththenecessaryresources.Thereviewprocessconsistedof
threephases:verificationofthedocuments;theiractualreview;andoversightof
theprocess.
Thepurposeoftheverificationprocesswastoensurethatalltherecordswhich
SAHAclaimedexistedcouldbeaccountedfor.TheprocesswasguidedbyDrBiki
Minyuku,formerchiefexecutiveofficeroftheTRC,assistedbypersonnelfrom
theNationalArchivesandformerpersonnelfromtheTRC’srecordsoffice.In1999
MinyukuhadbeenresponsibleforselectingandhandingovertoDrDullahOmar
the34boxesofrecordswhichhebelievedtobesensitive.
Two inventories were used for the verification: one compiled by the TRC,
whichaccompaniedthesensitivedocumentsin1999,andamoredetailedone
compiledwhilethedocumentswereinthepossessionoftheministryforintel-
ligenceservices.AccordingtoPorogo:
All therecords thatwere indexedcouldbeaccounted for, save foronefile,
ie‘W47’,whichwastitled‘ListofInformers’.AccordingtoMinyuku,thisfile
onlycontainedcorrespondenceaboutalistofinformers,butthat(sic)such
a listneveractuallyexisted.(Replyingaffidavit to theHighCourtbyDavid
Porogo,22December2003.)
Apartfromthecontestedlistofinformers,someoftherecordsfellinthecategory
ofChemicalandBiologicalWarfare.Manyof thesewerealready in thepublic
domainasaresultofthetrialofDrWouterBasson,asurgeonintheSANDF,who
hadstoodtrialforhisroleinrunningsecretprojectsusingstatefunds,allegedly
aimedatmanufacturingchemicalagentsforuseagainstanti-apartheidactivists.
OthercategoriesofinformationrelatedtofilesontheSteynCommission;aninves-
tigationentitled‘ProJack’;theinvestigationintothemurderoftheParis-based
ANCactivistDulcieSeptember,wheremostoftheinformationwasoriginallyin
French;variousTRCamnestyhearings; taxiviolenceandgun-running,where
someofthedocumentswereinSwedish,GermanandPortuguese;andtheinves-
tigationintotheassassinationoftheformerSwedishprimeministerOlafPalme,
wheremost,ifnotall,thedocumentswereinSwedish.
Porogo insistedthat theIRChadreviewedthedocumentscontained inthe
34boxesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthePAIA.Theywerethenreclas-
sifiedintosixcategories,basedonthesensitivityoftheinformationandPAIA’s
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 119
provisions.Theseincludedfulldisclosure(stamped‘declassified’),whichmeant
allinformationcontainedinthedocumentcouldbedisclosed;partiallydisclosed
(stamped ‘declassified’), which meant that any information relating to PAIA
exemption clauses was masked out, in accordance with section 28 of the Act,
whichdealtwithseverability;andnodisclosure,whichmeantthatthedocuments
containedinformationwhichwasexemptedintermsofchapterfouroftheActon
groundsforrefusalofaccesstorecords.
Insomecases,recordscouldbedisclosedsubjecttothirdpartynotification.
Informationwouldremaincloseduntilthirdpartyconsenthadbeenobtained.
Finally,therewasacategoryofrecordswhosestatusstillhadtobedetermined.
Thesedocumentswouldremaincloseduntilclarityovertheirclassificationorveri-
ficationhadbeenobtained.
Porogostatedthatthemostcommonreasonsforcategorisingdocumentsas
‘nodisclosure’weretoprotectpersonalandthirdparty information;methods,
technicalandmanufacturingdetailspertainingtochemicalbiologicalwarfare
documents;andSouthAfrica’srelationswithotherstates.Exceptforthosedocu-
mentsrequiringtranslation(whichwasinprogress),themajorityofrecordshad
been reviewed. His affidavit contained the following table, which showed the
resultsofthecategorisationprocessasat5December2003:
suMMARY oF CLAssIFICAtIon oF tRC ReCoRDs As At 5 DeCeMBeR 2003
ReVIeweD stAtus ACtuAL nuMBeRs PeRCentAge
full DIsclosure 658 39,07
PArtIAl DIsclosure 198 11,76
no DIsclosure 296 17,58
DIsclosure, subject to thIrD PArty notIfIcAtIon
20 1,19
stAtus to be DetermIneD PenDInG further clArIfIcAtIon
512 30,40
totAl 1 684 100,00
Inaninterview,RaswiswielaboratedfurtheronhowtheIRCworked.TheIRC
includedrepresentativesoftheSANDF,NIA,theSAPS,andSASS,andhadlogisti-
calsupportfromtheNationalArchivesonwhosepremisestheactualreviewtook
place.MostoftheinformationwithheldhadbeenprovidedtotheTRCongrounds
ofconfidentiality.Aschairperson,shetriedtoachieveconsensusontheclassifica-
tionofeachdocument.Onceconsensushadbeenachieved,shesoughttoensure
thatthereviewedstatuswasconsistentwithPAIA.TheIRCcompleteditswork
120 / chAPter sIx
inJanuary2004,andhanded its report to theCDRC(interviewwithRaswisi,
4.08.05).
Porogo’sattorneysinformedHatangthatcopiesofthedocumentscouldbe
inspectedatthepremisesoftheNationalArchives.Theyreferredtoa411-page
documententitled‘WorksheetforthereviewoftheTRCdocuments’,whichsum-
marisedallthedocumentsdescribedas‘sensitive’containedinthe34boxes.The
worksheetwasclassifiedas‘confidential’,asitdescribednotonlythedeclassified
documentsbutalsohighlysensitivedocumentsclassifiedas‘nodisclosure’.Asthe
worksheetwasdevelopedduringthereviewprocessfortheIRCandCDRC,Porogo
arguedthatSAHAwasnotentitledtoacopy.However,heofferedSAHAacopyof
theworksheetundertheconditionofconfidentiality,sothatitcouldunderstand
ingreaterdepththebasisonwhichtheDOJdecisionshadbeenmade.
SAHArejectedthisofferonthegroundsthatitcouldnotacceptan‘inconfi-
dence’responsetoarequest.Inresponse,Porogoproposedthatamemberofhis
staffbepresentwhentheapplicantandtheirattorneysinspectedthedocuments
attheNationalArchives,inordertoexplainwhycertaindocumentscouldnotbe
disclosed.
InreplyingaffidavitstotheHighCourton22January2004and25February
2004,HatangtookissuewithseveralaspectsofPorogo’sresponse.Inbrief,he
arguedthatthestatusoftheCDRCandIRCwasnotclearinrelationtotherequest
madeandthedecisionstakenbyPorogoconcerningthedocuments.SAHAfelt
thatPorogohadnotexercisedhismindindependently.Moreover,itwasunaccept-
abletomakeavailablephotocopiesofthedocumentswhenSAHA’sapplication
wasto inspecttherecordsthemselves.Nothavingaccesstotheoriginaldocu-
mentsmadeitimpossibletoverifytheirintegrity.
HatangalsoarguedthattherewereseveraladministrativeerrorsinPorogo’s
response.Forexample,Porogohadstatedthattheapplicantwasentitledtoaccess
certaindocumentswhichwereinfactnotprovided.Hatangalsorefusedtoaccept
thatcertainrecords,suchasthe‘ProgressreportontheworkoftheTRCInvestiga-
tionUnit’,werelikelytocontainconfidentialthirdpartyinformation,asPorogo
hadcontended.Healsorejectedthecontentionthatcertainfileswerebeingwith-
heldonthebasisthat ‘familymembers’ofpersonsnamedinthosedocuments
hadtobeconsulted,asthiswasnotprovidedforintheAct.SimilarlytheActdid
notallowinformationtobewithheldonthegroundsofpreventingtheembar-
rassmentofaforeigner,whichwasthereasongivenformaskingsectionsofan
Afrikaansdocumententitled‘Finalreport:USADollarsadvancepayment’.Lastly,
alargenumberofdocumentshadbeenwithheldonthegroundsthattheycon-
tained third party information, whereas the Act required that, before making
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 121
afinaldecision,thirdpartieshadtobeinformed, notconsulted,whichwasthe
DOJ’sinterpretation.
Lessons FRoM the CAse stuDY
Thecaseofthe34boxesofTRCrecords,asthemattercametoberegardedand
reportedinthemedia,isacompellingonewhichdeservestobethoroughlyana-
lysed.ItgoestotheheartofinterpretationofthePAIA,andhowpolarisedsuch
interpretationscanbe.Italsoraisesthequestionofhowcommittedtheintelli-
genceservicesreallyaretotransparency.Eventhoughthehighcourtapplications
andcounter-applicationswerebetweentheDOJandSAHA,theMinistryforIntel-
ligenceServiceswasalooming,ifnothighlyinstrumental,presenceinthecourse
ofevents,largelybecausetherecordsinquestionhademanated,atleastinpart,
fromtheapartheidsecurityapparatus.
One issue was whether the ministry had acted lawfully and in the public
interestinwithholdingtherecordsfromSAHA,andwhetheritactuallyhadthe
prerogativetodecidewhattodowiththerecords.NIA’sresponsetoSAHA’sinitial
request–thattherecordswerenotinthecustodyoftheNIAandwerewiththe
DOJ–suggestsoneoftwothings:eitherpoorcommunicationbetweentheminis-
tryandtheNIA,oradeliberateattempttomisleadSAHA.
Thetimingofitsestablishment,andtheinclusioninitsbriefofhowtohandle
thesensitiveTRCrecords,createstheimpressionthattheCDRCinitiatedbythe
intelligenceministerintrudedonthemandateandtoacertainextentusurpedthe
roleoftheDOJ.
Another issue that requires scrutiny is the IRC’scomposition,method,and
recommendations. Although ‘trained’ for its task, the committee consisted of
middle-rankingofficialswhoweregivenconsiderablepowertorecommendthe
‘reclassification’ofdocuments,someofwhichhadpreviouslynotbeenclassified
atall.Moreover,theIRCmadeitsrecommendationtotheCDRC,whichconsisted
ofacademicsandgovernmentofficials.
Alsoquestionable iswhether the IRChadadequateexpertise,especially in
viewoftheadministrativeerrorsandhighincidenceoflegallyunsoundreasons
givenforwithholding,maskingorrefusingtodisclosedocuments.Itappearsthat
theProtectionofInformationActmayhaveundulyinfluencedthereasonsgiven
forrefusingaccesstosomerecords.
Although,inaninterview,PorogoinsistedthattheDOJexercisedindepend-
entjudgmentindecidinghowtorespondtotheSAHArequest,thedeliberations
andrecommendationsoftheIRCcertainlyhadatrickle-downeffect,andaffected
122 / chAPter sIx
theDOJ’sresponsetotheSAHArequestratherthanbeingguidedsolelybythe
PAIAprovisions.Inaninterview,Raswiswidefendedherdepartment,arguingthat
theDOJ’sdirector-generalhadstudiedtherequestandtakendifferentdecisions
tothoserecommendedbytheIRC.However,therewasclearlyconsiderablerole
confusion,asSAHAarguedafterreceivingacopyofaconfidentialworksheetfrom
theIRC,whichneededfurtherclarificationoverwhycertaindocumentswerenot
disclosedoronlypartiallydisclosed.
Anotherproblemwasthattheministerof justicedecidedtoacceptrecords
regardedbyDrMinyukuas‘sensitive’,andholdthemforsafekeepingatthemin-
istryforintelligenceservices.Minyukuprobablythoughthewasactingcorrectly,
andeveninthenationalinterest.However,theeffectivenessoftheseactionsis
questionable,asmanyofthedocumentswereinthepublicdomain,whilecopies
ofotherswereprobablyinthehandsofindividualresearchersandinvestigators.
Theminister’sdecisiontoholdthedocumentsfor‘safekeeping’,ratherthandeal
withthemexpeditiously(forexample,bypassingthosethatneededfurtherinves-
tigationontothelawenforcementauthorities),raisedissuesabouttheirintegrity,
andsuspicionsabouttheintelligenceservices’motives.
Thematterofthe‘sensitiveTRCrecords’wasonlyresolvedaftermanymonths
andmuchwranglingbetweentheapplicantandrespondents’lawyers.Itwasset-
tledoutofcourt.Thesagasuggeststhatthepost-apartheidintelligenceservices
areambivalentaboutdisclosuresof thepast.According toDennis,during the
TRChearingsSASShadbeeninfavourofdisclosingpastsecrets,especiallythose
relatingtoSouthAfrica’schemicalandbiologicalwarfareprogramme,butsenior
formerNISofficialshadresistedtheidea(interview,25.07.05).
ThroughoutthedisputeaboutthewhereaboutsoftheTRCdocuments,the
cabinetremainedsilent,whichsuggestedthatitsupported–atleasttacitly–the
wayinwhichthenministersconcernedhadhandledtheaffair.
SomeoftherecordsrelatedtomembersoftherulingANC,andtherewasspec-
ulationthatthewithholdingoftherecordsandtheclaimthatthelistofinformers
hadneverexistedwasanattempttohideinformationabouttherulingpartyand
itsmembersfromthepublic.PAIAregulatesaccesstoinformationheldbypublic
orprivatebodiesirrespectiveoftheoriginsofthoserecords.Whendecidingto
grantaccess,theonlyrelevantfactoriswhetheroneofthegroundsforrefusal
applies.While theminister for intelligenceservicesmayhavebeenconcerned
aboutcertaininformationbeingreleasedintothepublicdomain,amoreappro-
priateresponsewouldhavebeentodevelopclearerpolicyguidelinesonhowto
handlerequestsforinformationthatoriginatefrompoliticalorganisations.
According to Raswiswi, the department later received other requests for
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 123
TRC-relateddocumentation.Oneoftheseinvolveddocumentsaboutthedeathsof
fouranti-apartheidactivistsintheEasternCapeknownasthe‘CradockFour’who
werekilledbyapartheidsecuritypolicemeninthemid-1980s.Becauseofthis,the
director-generaloftheDOJhadtakentheinitiativetosetupanotherInterdepart-
mentalReviewCommittee,whichwouldfunctionalongsimilarlines(interview,
4.08.05).
SAHA’srequestforaccesstoinformationabouttheTRCmustbeseeninthe
contextoftheTRC’sexperienceoftryingtouncovertheapartheid-erarecords
ofthesecurityestablishment.Duringitsinvestigationofapartheid-erarecords,
theTRCfoundthattherehadbeenamassivedestructionofrecordsbythestate’s
intelligenceagencies(primarilytheNIS).Alarmingly,thedestructionofrecords
continuedevenafterademocraticgovernmenthadtakenoffice,untilthecabinet
imposedamoratoriumonthispracticein1996.
Itiscauseforconcernthat,whenSAHAlodgeditsrequests,noclearguidelines
existedforhandlingrequestsforaccesstoTRCdocuments.WhiletheDOJstated
thatitdealtwithrequestsforaccesswithinthePAIAframework,SAHAimplied
thattheprovisionsoftheProtectionofInformationActhadinfluencedtheDOJ’s
decisions–whichtheservicesdenied.
APPLICAtIon FoR ReCoRDs ReLAtIng to the stRAtegIC ARMs PRoCuReMent PACkAge
ThesecondcasestudyisthatofCCII Systems (Pty) Ltd vs M P G Lekota,heardin
theHighCourt(TransvaalProvincialDivision)byJusticeSouthwoodin2002.
CCIIsoughtanordertodirecttherespondent,MosiuoaLekota,thenMinisterof
Defence,tofurnishcertainrecordspertainingtothesubsystemstobeinstalledon
corvettesorderedbytheDODforusebytheSouthAfricanNavy.CCII,acompany
whosebusinesswasthedesignandmanufactureofcomputerandsoftwaresys-
temsforthedefenceindustry,contendedthatithadbeenwronglyexcludedasa
tendererforthesupplyofthesubsystemsthroughsignificantdeviationsfromthe
lawfultenderprocess.Ithadthereforeinstitutedalawsuitfordamagesagainstthe
ministerofdefence,theArmamentsCorporationofSouthAfricaLimited(Arms-
cor),andAfricanDefenceSystems(Pty)Ltd(ADS).
SomebackgroundtotheStrategicArmsProcurementsPackageor‘armsdeal’,
as itwascommonlyreferredto,helpscontextualisethedecisionsmadebythe
variousroleplayers.InSeptember1997thegovernmentdecidedtopurchasevari-
ousnewweaponssystemsfortheSANDF.Theseincludedfourpatrolcorvettesfor
theSouthAfricanNavy.Eachcorvetteconsistedofahull,propulsionsystem,and
124 / chAPter sIx
combatsuite.TheDODandArmscorsetuptwobodiestoassistinthepurchasing
ofthecorvettes.OnewastheJointProjectTeam,consistingoftechnicalexperts,
whosetaskwastoassessthevarioustenders.TheotherwastheProjectControl
Board,towhichtheJointProjectTeammaderecommendations,sothatitcould
makefinaldecisionsrelatingtotheawardofthetenders.
CCII did not accept the outcome of the tender process, which was that a
consortiumofGermancompanies,theGermanFrigateConsortium(GFC),was
declaredthepreferredbidderforthesupplyofthecorvettes.CCIIbelievedthat
the tender process had been unprocedural, and it therefore sought access to
therecordsarisingoutofthetenderprocess(interviewwithWayneHendricks,
28July2005).
On15January2002theapplicanthadmadeaPAIArequesttotheDODfor
recordscategorizedunder54headings.Overaperiodofalmostayear,theDOD,
throughits InformationCommittee,madesomeofthedocumentsavailableto
CCII.(Inhiseventualjudgment,JudgeSouthwoodnotedthattheapplicantdid
notquestionthelegalityofhisrequestsbeingconsideredbytheInformationCom-
mittee,andthereforedidnottakeissuewiththisfactor.)
Intheremainingcases,theDODclaimedthatthedocumentseitherdidnot
exist,orrefusedtogiveaccesstothem,citinggroundsprovidedforinPAIA.Inhis
judgment,SouthwoodobservedthattheDOD,inmostcases,hadnotfurnished
factsinsupportofitsdecisions,buthadmerelyquotedfromtherelevantsectionof
theActwhenarguingforitsnon-disclosureofarecord,apparentlyinanattempt
tocomplywithsection25(c)ofPAIAwhichrequiresthatwhenarequestforaccess
isrefused,therequestermustbefurnishedwithadequatereasonsfortherefusal.
Theapplicantwasnot satisfiedwith thereason fornon-disclosure,andon
22January2003initiatedaninternalappealintermsofsection75ofPAIA.Inhis
appealhepointedouttherequirementthatapublicbodyshouldconsiderwhether
therewerepartsoftherecordsrequestedthatcouldbesevered,inordertorender
therecordsdisclosable.
Inhisjudgment,JudgeSouthwoodemphasisedthedutyofapublicbodywith
whicharequesthadbeenlodgedtoconsidertheseverabilityoftherecord.He
arguedthatsection28ofPAIArequiredthepublicbodytogiveaccesstothepart
oftherecordthatwasnotcoveredbyastatutorygroundofobjection,statingthat:
Thisisofparticularsignificancewheretherespondent’soppositionischaracter-
isedbygeneralisedandsweepingobjectionsonthestrengthofwhichheseeks
towithholdwholedocumentsandgroupsofdocument.Theapplicant’scoun-
selarguedthatthecourtshouldnotpermitthismodeofopposition.Iagree.
Thepublicbodymustdemonstrate to thecourt that ithasconsideredeach
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 125
documentwithseveranceinmind.Itmustidentifythepartofthedocument
thatcontainstheprotectedmaterial,giveaproperindicationofitscontents
andwhyitsdisclosureisprotected,andpermitaccesstotherestofthedocu-
ment.Unlesstherespondentdischargestheonusofshowingthatthewhole
document(orgroupofdocuments)isprotected,hehasfailedtoestablishwhat
partheisentitledtowithhold.Havingfailedtodischargethatonushewould
havetogiveaccesstothewholedocument(Southwood2002).
JudgeSouthwoodwentontoconsiderthemeritsofthelegalargumentspresented
bytheapplicantandtherespondent.Thoseargumentsandaspectsofthejudg-
mentrelevanttotheintelligencecommunityaresummarisedbelow.
Request for ‘access to the umbrella agreement for the Corvette’When the request had first been launched, the Information Committee had
refusedaccessintermsofsection36(1)ofPAIA,whichprotectscommercialinfor-
mationofathirdparty,andsection37(1),whichprotectsconfidentialinformation
ofathirdparty.InSouthwood’sview,neithertheInformationCommitteenorthe
appeal authority had given adequate reasons for the refusal, and neither had
consideredwhethertherewereanypartsoftherequestedrecordthatcouldbe
severed(deleted)becauseoftheirsensitivecontents,soastomaketherestofthe
documentavailabletotheapplicant.
Inpapersbefore thecourt, therespondent introduceda furtherreason for
seekingtoprotect therecordfromdisclosure,namelysection41,whichstates
that recordsmaybewithheld in the interestor defence of the Republic, or to
protectinternationalrelations.Thejudgeagainpointedoutthattherespondent
hadnotproducedfactsinsupportofusingthisreason.Eventhoughtherespond-
enthadnotarguedfornon-disclosureonthegroundsofsection42(2),neither
hadanyfactsbeenintroducedthatwouldjustifyanargumentthatdisclosureof
theagreementwouldbelikelytomateriallyjeopardisetheeconomicinterestsor
financialwelfareoftheRepublicorofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyof
theRepublicorofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyeffectivelyinthebest
interestsoftheRepublic.
Request for ‘access to the supply agreement for the Corvette Platforms (Part A) and the Corvette Combat Suite (Parts B and C)’TheInformationCommitteeandtheappealauthorityhadrefusedinformationin
termsofsections36(1)and37(1)ofPAIA,andhadreliedonclause26of the
SupplyAgreement,anaddendumtotheUmbrellaAgreement,whichprohibited
126 / chAPter sIx
thedisclosureofany informationcontained therein, without motivating their
reasons.
Inhisaffidavit,therespondentstatedthatthesupplyagreementcontained
commercially and financially sensitive pricing information relating to the
Republic,thecontractorsandsuppliers.Inaddition,section26.10oftheSupply
Agreementstatedthat:
Armscor, the End-User and the Seller will keep confidential all informa-
tion includingspecifications,plans,drawings, listsandotherdata,whether
furnished to it in writing or by electronic means prior to the date of this
scheduleAorafter,andwhichisclearlyandconspicuouslymarkedasconfi-
dentialorproprietary.Thesameshallapplywithrespecttosuchinformation
thatisnotsomarkedbutwhereArmscorandtheEndUserhadclearreasonto
knowthatsuchinformationwastobekeptconfidential.Suchinformationshall
onlybeusedforpurposesunderthisScheduleAorasmaybeotherwiseagreed
inwritingbytheParties(quotedinSouthwood2002)
Thejudgepointedoutthattherequestwasforthesupplyagreementitself,and
notfortheprotectedinformationdescribedinsection26.10.Hethereforerejected
theclaimthattheActcouldbeinvokedforrefusaloftherequestedinformation.
Request for access to ‘all records, agendas and minutes of meetings and deliberations of the Joint Project Team relating to relevant decisions regarding nomination, selection and awarding of sub-contracts regarding the Corvette Combat suite’ and ‘all quotations and offers regarding the SMS submitted to the Joint Project Team by the German Frigate Consortium as received from ADS’Hereagain, the InformationCommitteeand theappealauthorityhadrefused
accessintermsofsection36(1)andsection37(1)ofPAIA,buthadfailedtosetout
anyfactsinsupportofthesesections.Intheiraffidavit,therespondentstatedthat
therecordsrequestedcontainedinformationsuppliedbytheapplicant’scompeti-
tor,andthatitcouldnotthereforeprovidethisthirdpartyinformation.However,
thejudgeheldthattheinformationhadaged,sincefouryearshadelapsedsince
thecontracthadbeenawarded,andtheinformationwasthereforemerelyofhis-
toricalinterest.Inanyevent,therespondenthadfailedtoprovideinformation
whichshowedthat,iftheinformationweresuppliedinconfidence,itsdisclosure
wouldputADSoranyotherthirdpartyatadisadvantageinnegotiationsorcom-
petition.Moreover, the judgeheld thatsince thequotationshadprecededthe
conclusionoftheUmbrellaAgreement,theywouldnotfallwithintheambitof
theagreement’sconfidentialityclause.Andasfarastheconfidentialityclausewas
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 127
concerned,therespondenthadnotclaimedthatADSoranyotherpartyfellwithin
themeaningof‘seller’inthatprovision.
Other requests for access to informationThe judgealso rejected theMinister’sargument forwithholdingseveralother
records. The Minister had argued refusal on grounds of confidentiality. But
Southwoodruledthatthisdidnotconstituteanadequatereasoninlinewiththe
stipulationsoftheAct.SomeoftherecordsthattheMinisterhadrefusedaccess
towere:allquotationsandoffersregardingtheStrategicProcurementPackage
submittedtotheJointProjectTeamasreceivedfromADS;themainequipmentlist
fortheCorvettePlatform;themainequipmentlistfortheCorvetteCombatSuite;
allinternalcorrespondenceandmemorandaconcerningthesematterswithinthe
DOD;andallcorrespondenceconcerningthesemattersbetweentheDODandthe
GermanFrigateConsortium(Southwood2002).
The judge supported the applicant’s argument that its managing director,
RichardYoung,hadsince1992heldthehighestsecurityclearancepossible,and
thatallstaffofCCIIheldatleastsecurityclearancestothelevelof‘Confidential’.
TherespondenthadarguedthatYoung’ssecurityclearancedidnotentitlehim
toanyinformation,andthatsuchinformationwouldonlybemadeavailableto
himasrequiredforspecificdutiesassignedtohim.Thejudgeheldthattherewas
neither a suggestion in the respondent’s affidavits that Young or his staff was
untrustworthy,northattheinformationmadeavailabletohimwouldbeatrisk.
Healsorejectedtwootherreasonsprovidedbytherespondent.Thefirstwas
that that therequestwasvagueandunspecified(section45(b)ofPAIA).This
reasonwasprovided inrelation to therequest forall internalcorrespondence
andmemorandaconcerning‘thesematters’withtheDOD.Thejudgefeltthatthe
concept‘thesematters’hadbeenusedconsistentlythroughouttheprocess,and
inCCII’sapplicationsforaccess,andthatitshouldbepossibletodeducewhat
recordswerebeingsoughtthroughthisphrasing.Secondly,herejectedtheargu-
mentthattheworkinvolvedinprocessingtherequestwouldsubstantiallyand
unreasonablydiverttheresourcesofthepublicbody(section45(b)ofPAIA).The
judgeheldthatitwasinconceivablethatawell-resourcedpublicbodysuchasthe
DODhadneitheranaccessiblefilingsystem,northestafftoprocesstherequest.
Further, he supported the applicant’s claim that the respondent’s claim that
processingtherequestwouldsubstantiallyandunreasonablydiverttheDOD’s
resourcesshouldbeweighedagainstthesignificantpublicinterestinthematter.
128 / chAPter sIx
Lessons FRoM the CAse stuDY
Thiscasestudyholdsimportantlessonsfortheintelligenceservices,becauseit
toorelatestoinformationregardedasprotectedintermsofPAIA,yetfoundtobe
releasableintheSouthwoodjudgment.Thejudgmentthereforesetsprecedents
thatwillhavetobetakenintoaccountbyallpublicbodies.
Ithighlightstheneedforbodiesconsideringrequeststogiveadequatereasons
iftheywishtowithholdrecordsfromarequester.Sincethereisapresumptionin
favourofdisclosure,thepublicbodyshouldnotmerelycitetherelevantground
forexclusiononwhich itbases itdecisions,but shouldsubstantiate itsclaims
aboutthelikelihoodofharmthroughaconvincingpresentationoffactsinsupport
ofitsargument.
Thepublicbodyshouldconsiderwhetherthereisanyinformationcontainedin
therecordrequestedthatcouldbesevered,soastomaketherecordavailablefor
disclosure.Again,thereisapresumptioninfavourofdisclosure,andinthecaseof
CCII vs Lekota,thejudgeheldthattherewasadutyonthepartofthepublicbody
toconsiderthesegregabilityoftherecord,asprovidedforinsection25ofPAIA.
Thefactthatadocumentismarkedorclassifiedasconfidentialbyapublic
bodyisinitselfnotsufficienttoinvokesections36and37,whichrespectivelypro-
videforrefusalonthebasisofcontainingconfidentialcommercialinformation,or
confidentialthirdpartyinformation.Again,Southwoodspecifiedthatthisclaim
wouldhavetobecontextualisedandproperlymotivated,andcontendedthata
recordcouldloseitsriskratingthathadoriginallyrequiredittobeheldconfiden-
tially,withthepassageoftime.Therefore,ifwantingtoinvokeeithersection36or
37asgroundsforrefusal,thelikelihoodofharm,alongthelinesspecifiedinthe
Act,wouldhavetobecarefullyarguedbythepublicbodytowhomarequesthad
beenput.
Similarly,itisnotsufficienttoarguethatthesecurityordefenceoftheRepublic
couldbeprejudiced,evenifitisthecorebusinessofthepublicbodytomaintain
thesecurityordefenceofthecountryandtheinformationinitspossessionrelate
tothisreality.Southwoodnotedthatnotonlyisthegroundforrefusaladiscre-
tionaryone,butthatthecasefornon-disclosurewouldhavetobemotivated.
He also suggested that arguing refusal on the grounds that a request is
frivolousorvexatious,orwouldinvolveadiversionorresources,shouldbeused
circumspectly;inthecaseofCCII vs Lekota,hearguedthattheDODinalllike-
lihoodhadtheresourcestoprocesstherequestof theapplicant,andthatthe
matterwasofsufficientpublicinteresttowarranttheresourcethatsucharequest
mightneed.
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 129
Lastly,thejudgmentsuggeststhatapublicbody,inconsideringrefusalofa
record,shouldapplyallresourcesnecessarytodeveloplegallysoundarguments
atallstagesoftheprocess:whenarequestisfirstpresented,duringtheinternal
appealprocess,andifthematteristakentocourt.Raisingadditionalgroundsfor
refusal,particularlythegroundsthatdisclosurecouldprejudicethedefenceand
securityoftheRepublic,provokedacynicalresponsefromthejudge,whowenton
toorderdisclosure.
TheSouthwoodjudgmentcanberegardedasaverystrictinterpretationof
PAIA’sgroundsforrefusal,butitwasandisarealfactorinthefieldoflegalinter-
pretation.TheDODwasobligedtoacceptandimplementthejudge’sfindings,
despitetheself-imposedstricturesofsecrecyandconfidentialityitassumedwere
sufficienttoshieldrecordsthatitheldfromdisclosuretoarequester.
the heFeR CoMMIssIon
In 2003 President Thabo Mbeki appointed a judicial commission, the Hefer
Commission, toassess theclaimmadebya formeranti-apartheidactivistand
intelligenceoperative,MoeShaik,supportedbytheANCveteranMacMaharaj,
thattheservingnationaldirectorofpublicprosecutions(NDPP),BulelaniNgcuka,
hasbeenanapartheid-eraspy.Theallegationswerepoliticallyexplosive,particu-
larlybecauseShaikandMaharajwereseenaspoliticallysupportiveofthedeputy
president,JacobZuma.TensionbetweenMbekiandZumawasstartingtoshow.
ZumahaddrawntheattentionofNgcukabecauseofhisrelationshipwiththe
businessmanSchabirShaik,MoeShaik’sbrother,whowasalsobeinginvestigated
bythepublicprosecutor.TheclaimsagainstNgcukacreatedapoliticaluproar,and
generatedintensemediainterest.
Thehearingsofthecommissionwereheldpublicly.JudgeHeferdulysum-
monedtheintelligenceservicestoconfirmwhethertheallegationsweretrue.The
intelligenceservices–boththeNIAandtheSAPS–decidedtorefusetorevealthe
contentsoftheirrecordstothejudge,onthegroundsthatthesewereclassified
secret.Theyarguedthatthelaw,inanycase,preventedthemfromdisclosingthe
identitiesofintelligence‘sources’,andpointedoutthatMbekicouldhavedirect
accesstotheintelligencethatmightassisttoanswerthequestionthejudgewas
meanttoinvestigate,ifhesowished.
ShaikandMaharajwerelefttoproduceandpresenttotheCommissioncopies
oftherecordtheysaidwerethebasisoftheirclaims–whichtheMinisterofIntel-
ligenceServiceslaterdemandedbehandedovertotheintelligenceserviceseven
iftheywereonlycopies.Intheend,allthatJudgeHefercouldreportwasthat
130 / chAPter sIx
Ngcukahad‘probablynot’beenanapartheid-eraspy,furthermakingthepoint
thathecouldnotbeconclusivebecausehedidnothaveaccesstotheintelligence
recordsthatmighthaveassistedhimtomakeadeterminationofthismatter.
TheMinisterforIntelligenceServices,LindiweSisulu,commissionedareview
ofthesagafollowingthesedevelopments.ItwaschairedbyProfessorNorman
Levy,aseasonedacademic.Servingwithhimwerealawyer,ChristineQunta;a
legalacademic,ProfessorNicoSteytler;asociologist,ProfessorPaulusZulu;and
amediaexpert,ProfessorGuyBerger.Theywereassistedbyseveralseniorman-
agers fromthe intelligenceservices,andtheprojectwasconductedunder the
auspicesofSANAI,thetrainingfacilityfortheintelligenceservices.Thereview
committeedidnotpronounceonthemeritsofthejudgmentorevendeliberate
verydirectlyonhowtheproceedingshadbeenconducted.Instead,anumberof
broad,policy-relatedproblemswereextrapolatedand formed thebasisof the
reportsubmittedtotheMinister.
Firstly, thereportaddressed inphilosophical terms thechallengesofman-
agingthetensionsbetweenthepublic’srightofaccess to informationandthe
intelligenceservices’righttowithholdinformation.Levy(2004)arguedthatthe
existenceoftheserviceswasaconstitutionalrequirement,andthattheyhada
dutytopreservesecrecy,andtoprotect fromdisclosure,sensitive information
intheirpossession.Steytler(2004)alsorecognisedthattheSouthAfricanintel-
ligenceservicesarefacedwiththechallengeofbalancingtherequirementsof
theconstitutionwith their legallydefinedroleandmethodspermitted in law.
Heexploredthestrengthsandweaknessesofparticularvehiclesforinvestigat-
ingmattersconcerningtheintelligenceservices,listingthesevehiclesasinternal
investigations,andinvestigationsundertakenbytheInspector-GeneralforIntel-
ligence,theJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence,thePublicProtector,and
CommissionsofInquiry.Heendedhisanalysisontheoptimisticnotethatleverag-
ingtherightvehicles,possiblyincombinationwitheachother,canyieldaresult
thatupholdstheprincipleofaccesstoinformation.
Qunta(2004)pointedtolegalprecedence,bothlocallyandinternationally,
whichhelduptheprincipleofprotectingtheidentitiesofsources,atleastinpolice
investigations.However,Zulu(2004)remindedtheMinisterandotherreadersof
thereportoftheconsequencesoftheexecutivenotbeinginapositiontoreview
thecredibilityandreliabilityofinformation,pointingtothepoliticallycostlydeci-
sionoftheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomtogotowaragainstIraq.
Thestudyconcludesonanoptimisticifambivalentnote,arguingstronglyin
favour of transparency by the intelligence services, yet sympathising with the
notionofabsolutenon-disclosureof the identityofsources.Onreflection, the
the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 131
studyauthorisedbytheMinisterforIntelligenceServicesdidnotreallyanswer
thequestionofhowtodealwithapartheid-eraintelligencerecords,oreveninter-
rogatewhethertherewasanadequatepolicyandlegalframeworkforthismatter.
ThetermsofreferenceoftheHeferCommissionwerechangedatleastonce,yet
thereviewersdidnotaddresstheissueofwhythiswasdone.Moreover,itremains
unclearwhyMbekiestablishedajudicialcommissionwhenhecouldaseasilyhave
requestedabriefingorevenaninvestigationbytheintelligenceservicesintothe
questionofwhetherNgcukahadbeenanapartheid-eraspy.Theplausibleanswer
tothatquestionisthatsuchaprocesswouldnothavesatisfiedpublicinterest,
sinceitwouldhavetakenplacebehindcloseddoors.Butdetractorsaccusedthe
Presidentofplayingpoliticalgames inestablishingaprocesswhichwasham-
strungbytheveryconditionsunderwhichitwouldhavetodoitswork.Judge
Heferexpressedfrustrationthathedidnothaveaccesstotherecordsthatmight
haveassistedhiminansweringtheveryquestionthathewassupposedtoanswer.
AndoncetheCommission’sfindingswereannounced,Mbekiissuedathinlyveiled
warningtothosewhowoulddareaccuseothersofbeingapartheid-eraspiesnever
torepeatthemisdemeanour.
Thequestionthatarisesiswhethertheprincipleofsecrecyoftheidentityof
sourcesisanimmutableprinciple,evenunderthosecircumstanceswherethere
isoverwhelmingpublicinterestinthematter.Thereadyanswertothisquestion
is thattheconsequencesofconfirmingsuchanallegation,were it true,would
havebeentoviolatetheprincipleofhonouringtheconfidentialitywhichinform-
antsexpectwhenprovidinginformationtoauthorities.Thattheallegationswere
madeatallbyShaikandMaharaj,andpromptedtheestablishmentofahigh-level
enquiry,suggeststhattherewereunresolvedquestionsaboutthetransitionand
therecordsofthepast.
ConCLuDIng ReMARks
TheMinistryforIntelligenceServiceshasplayedanambivalentleadershiprolein
respectofthePAIA,appearingatfirsttosupport,andevenco-ordinate,applica-
tionsbytheNIAandSASSforexemptionfromtherequirementsthatpublicbodies
produceamanual.Thegroundsonwhichtheexemptionwasrequestedwerevery
vague,andsuggestedlittlein-depthpolicydebatebeforemakingtheapplication.
Oneofthemosttellingindicationsoftheintelligenceservices’approachto
PAIAcameintheirresponsetoSAHA’sapplicationforaccesstosensitiverecords
transferred fromtheTRCto theMinisterofJustice,whowasalsoresponsible
fortheintelligenceservices.TheNIAtransferredtherequesttotheDOJ,which
132 / chAPter sIx
hadreceivedasimilar requestdirectly fromtheSAHA.TheDOJ thenbecame
embroiledinalong,behind-the-scenesbattletowrestcontrolofthedocuments
fromtheministryforintelligenceservices,inordertoprocesstherequest.
Hadthematternotbeensettledoutofcourt,itislikelythatconsiderations
thatwereraisedintheSouthwoodjudgmentwouldhavesurfaced.Oneisthatthe
classificationofarecordassecretisnotasufficientgroundforrefusal.Thelabel-
lingofadocumentasbeingsecretortopsecrethasnolegalweight;itisamere
administrativemeasure,atleastitwasthen.Theonusremainsonrequestersto
provethatwhenrecordsarewithheld,thereasonscomplywiththegroundsfor
refusalcontainedinthePAIA.ItisalsoclearthattheProtectionofInformationAct
cannotbeusedasabasisforrefusingaccess.ThatActhasitsownpurpose,namely
criminalisingtheunauthoriseddisclosureofinformation,andcanonlybeapplied
inaccordancewithitsownprovisions.InthecaseoftheHeferCommission,when
theintelligenceserviceswerecalledupontorevealwhetherNgcukahadbeenan
agentofanapartheidsecurityservice,thereappearstohavebeenalacunawhich
thepresidingjudgewasunabletofill.Eitherthelegislativeframeworkwasinad-
equate,orthewayinwhichavailableinstrumentsareutilisedisnotgivendue
thoughtandappropriateapplicationbytheexecutive.
Theissueofapartheid-erarecordsisverymuchalive,andinthepubliccon-
sciousness.Mostoftherequestsbyindividuals,throughSAHA,totheNIAwere
forrecordsaboutthemheldbythestate.Policyneedstobeformulated,anda
legalframeworkestablished,fordealingwiththisissue.Ideally,theintelligence
servicesshouldundertakeaproactivedeclassificationprocessandprovideinfor-
mation about the records available to the public, in order to avoid becoming
involvedintime-consumingsearchesforrecords,andpossiblyexpensivelitiga-
tionoveraccessdisputes.Therealsoneedstobeareviewofthelegalbasisofthe
proceduresandcriteriaforclassification.Thefollowingfactors,whicharenotpart
oftheinterdepartmentalreviewprocess,shouldbeaddressedintheregulatory
framework:thecriteriaforclassificationalignedwithPAIA;possiblerestrictions
onwhohastheauthoritytoclassifyrecords;andstricteroversightofclassification
procedures.
In the decade after the Cold War, many countries introduced access to
information legislation, also commonly referred to as freedom of informa-
tionlegislation.TheyincludedJapan(1999),SouthAfrica(2000),SouthKorea
(1996),Iceland(1996),Thailand(1997),theUnitedKingdom,andanumberof
EastandCentralEuropeancountries.Theyjoinedanumberofcountriesthathad
alreadyenactedsuchlaws,includingSweden(1949),theUnitedStates(1966),
theNetherlands(1980),Canada(1982)andAustralia(1982).Thistrendhasusu-
allyreflectedademandforgreateraccountabilityonthepartofgovernmentand
otherpublicbodies,especiallyfollowingcrisesofconfidencerelatedtosecurity
issuesorforeignrelations.
Assecurityandintelligenceorganisationsworklargelyinsecret,studyinghow
accesstoinformationlegislationimpactsontheiroperationsindemocraciesmay
beusefulforSouthAfrica.Althoughdifferentparliamentarydemocraciesadopt
accesstoinformationlegislationinresponsetodifferenthistoricalcircumstances
andconcerns,reflectingontheirexperiencescancastgreaterlightontheten-
sionsbetweennationalsecurityinterestsontheonehandandthepublic’srightof
accesstoinformationontheother.
the unIteD stAtes
The United States has a long-established tradition of freedom of information,
andisoftenseenashavingmanyoftheanswersmanagingthebalancebetween
secrecy and transparency. Yet it is important to remember that freedom of
CoMPARAtIVe InteRnAtIonAL exPeRIenCes
7
136 / chAPter seven
informationintheUnitedStatesaroseoutofparticularhistoricalconditions,and
thatmanygainsaretheresultsofstrugglesinandoutsideofthecourts.
origins of the Freedom of Information ActIn1966,CongressenactedtheFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA),whichintro-
ducedageneralrightofaccesstopublicrecords.Thiswasinresponsetostate
departments,whichwereincreasinglyresortingtosecrecy,oftencitingColdWar
imperativesasjustification.Priorto1966,therewasnogeneralrighttoinspect
federalrecords,althoughsomestateshad,indifferingdegrees,introducedvari-
ousformsofopengovernment.UnderaprovisionoftheAdministrativeProcedure
Act,federalrecordswereavailableto‘personsproperlyanddirectlyconcerned’,
subjecttovagueexceptionsthatwereintendedtoprotectthepublicinterestbut
hadnosupportingjudicialremedy.Thisprovisionwasultimatelyrepealedand
replacedbytheFOIA,asithadineffectbecomeachartertowithholdratherthan
aninstrumentofdisclosure(Adler,1991).
The FOIA is better understood in the context of other laws that impact on
accesstoinformationandbalancetheinterestsoftheindividual.Onesuchlawis
theGovernmentintheSunshineAct(‘SunshineAct’)of1976,whichwasbasedon
theviewthatthegovernmentshouldconductthepublic’sbusinessinpublic.This
ActappliestoallagenciesthataresubjecttotheFOIA,andopenstheirmeetings
tothepublic;itcontainsexemptionsthatmirrorcloselythosefoundintheFOIA.
AnotherlawisthePrivacyActof1974,whichreinforcestheconstitutionallypro-
tectedrightofprivacyofAmericancitizens,andincludesasystemforindividuals
toaccessrecordsaboutthemselves(withexceptions).ThroughthisAct,Congress
hasacknowledgedandsoughttoregulatethepracticesaffectingtherighttopri-
vacy,suchasthecollection,useanddisseminationofpersonalinformationbythe
federalagencies,madeeasierbytheuseofcomputersandtechnology.
Main features of the Freedom of Information ActTheFOIA’spremiseisthat,unlessexemptfromthisrequirement,allfederalgov-
ernmentrecordsmustbeaccessibletothepublic.Anymemberofthepublic(‘any
person’)mayrequestarecord:theActdoesnotstipulateacitizenshiprequire-
ment,andthecourtshaveinterpretedthedefinitiontoincludeforeigncitizens,
corporationsandgovernments.Arequesterdoesnothavetogiveareasonforthe
request.TheActalsolimitstheresponsetimesforrequeststobeattendedto,the
costsofmakingrequestsandanappealsmechanism.Inthebeginning,somefed-
eralagenciesresistedtheActandemployedavarietyofwaystodiscourageitsuse,
suchashighfees,longdelaysandclaimsthattheycouldnotfindtherequested
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 137
materials(Adler,1991).ThisledtoareviewoftheActandvariousamendments
in1974.In1976,minoramendmentswereintroducedthatdealtwithstandards
fordeterminingmorepreciselywhich‘otherstatutes’couldbeusedasgroundsfor
withholdinginformation.
Furtheramendmentswereenactedin1986,whentheUnitedStatesgovern-
mentwasconcernedthattheAct’sexemptionsdidnotadequatelyprotectfrom
disclosureconfidentialsources,ongoinginvestigations,certainmanualsandother
sensitive,non-investigative, lawenforcementmaterials.Thustheamendments
included the following exclusions: records whose disclosure would interfere
withcriminalproceedingsofwhichthesubjectisnotaware;informantrecords
requestedbyathirdpartyaccordingtothenameorpersonalidentification;and
classifiedrecordsoftheFBIpertainingtoforeignintelligence,counterintelligence
orinternationalterrorism(Adler,1991).
grounds for refusal (exemptions)TheFOIA, in itscurrentform,providesforthefollowingexemptions:national
security information; internal agency rules; information exempted by other
statutes;businessinformation;litigationtoreverseFOIA;personalprivacy;law
enforcementrecords;financialinstitutions’records,andoilwelldata.Ofpartic-
ularrelevancetointelligenceisthefirstexemption,whichstatesthattheFOIA
doesnotapplytomattersspecificallyauthorisedtobekeptsecret,intheinterest
ofnationaldefenceorforeignpolicy,undercriteriaestablishedbyanexecutive
order.However,theAmericansecurityandintelligenceservicesarenotexcluded
fromtheAct’sprovisions;indeedtheyhavebeenthetargetsofcivilrightsgroups
andamassivebodyofcaselawhasdevelopedaroundthecourts’applicationof
theAct.
TheUnitedStatesmakesstatutoryprovisionfortheprotectionofclassified
information.Executiveorderno.12356clarifies which information should be
classified.Thecategoriesare:militaryplans,weaponsoroperations;thevulner-
abilitiesorcapabilitiesofsystems,installations,projectsorplansrelatingtothe
nationalsecurity;foreigngovernmentinformation;intelligenceactivities(includ-
ing special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; foreign relations or
foreignactivitiesoftheUnitedStates;scientific,technologicaloreconomicmat-
tersrelatingtothenationalsecurity;governmentprogrammesforsafeguarding
nuclearmaterialsorfacilities;cryptology;aconfidentialsource;orothercatego-
riesofinformationrelatedtothenationalsecuritythatrequireprotectionagainst
unauthoriseddisclosure,asdeterminedbythepresident,agencyheadsorother
138 / chAPter seven
officialswhohavebeengrantedoriginalclassificationauthoritybythepresident
(Adler,1991).
status of CIA filesTheAmericansecurityandintelligenceagenciesarenot,asaclass,exemptfrom
theprovisionsoftheFOIA.However,in1984,CongressamendedtheNational
SecurityActof1947toallowcertain‘operationalfiles’oftheCIAtobeexempt
fromthesearchandreviewrequirementsoftheFOIA(Adler,1991).Significantly,
this amendment was passed with the support of the American Civil Liberties
Union,avocalfreedomofinformationadvocacyorganisation.Throughthisstat-
ute,Congresshopedtorelievetheagencyofthefrustratingadministrativeburden
ofhavingtosearchandreviewcertainfilesthat‘almostinvariablyprovenotto
bereleasableundertheFOIA’.Andinthisway,thestatuteaimsatreducingthe
processingbackloganddelaysinrespondingtoFOIArequests,‘whilepreserving
undiminishedtheamountofmeaningfulinformationreleasabletothepublic’and,
inaddition,keepingCIAsourcesconfidential(Adler,1991).
‘Operational files’ included files of the operations, science and technology,
andsecuritydirectorates.Theoperationsdirectorate’sfilesdocumenttheconduct
of foreignintelligenceorcounterintelligenceoperations, intelligence,security,
liaisonarrangements,informationexchangeswithforeigngovernmentsortheir
intelligenceorsecurityservices.Thescienceandtechnologydirectorate’sfiles
documentforeignintelligenceorcounterintelligencecollectionthroughscientific
andtechnicalsystems.Thesecurityoffice’sfilesdocumentinvestigationsintothe
suitabilityofpotential foreign intelligenceorcounterintelligencesources.Sig-
nificantly,filesthatarethesolerepositoryofdisseminatedintelligencearenot
regardedasoperationalfiles(Adler,1991).
Impact of freedom of information legislationFreedomofinformationhasbeenusedextensivelyintheUnitedStatestodefend
andupholdconstitutionalrights.Inapoliticalenvironmentthathassimultane-
ously addressed the challenges of classification and declassification for which
thereisalsoanExecutiveOrder,theintelligenceagenciescouldnotaffordtobe
complacent about the issue of access to information. As a consequence, there
existsacultureofpublicinformationabouttheworkingsoftheintelligencecom-
munity,whichtranslatesintothemanycoursesofferedbyuniversities,academic
research,aswellasacriticalmedia.
TheCommissiononProtectingandReducingGovernmentSecrecy(Moynihan
Commission 1997) was established in the mid-1990s, in response to public
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 139
concernsabouttheextentofgovernmentalsecrecy.Its1997reportfoundthatthe
subjectivityofofficialsledtoinconsistentinterpretationandapplicationofthe
classificationanddeclassificationcriteria.Asthissecrecysystemhadnostatutory
basis, each time the administration changed, a new classification and declas-
sificationexecutiveorderwasissued.Thecommissionfoundthattheseregular
amendmentsdisruptedtheefficientadministrationoftheclassificationsystem.
Dissentingpublicofficialsquiteoftensimplydraggedtheirfeetonimplementing
policychanges,knowingfullwellthattheappointmentofthenextadministra-
tionwouldbringyetanotherchange.Thecommissionalsoexpressedconcernover
therelianceontheFreedomofInformationActasaninstrumentfordeclassifica-
tion.TheFOIAislimited,asitonlyappliedtoindividualsmakingrequests.This
naturallymakesitdifficultforinterestedpartiestomakerequestsaboutsecrets
toagencies.Theagenciesareatanadvantage,astheycanchoosetocutoutsub-
stantialchunksof information,whichmighthaveprovidedtherequesterwith
significantcontextualinformation.Concernedthatacultureofopennesswould
neverdevelopunlessacultureofsecrecyisrestrained,thecommissionrecom-
mendedmechanismsfortheproactivedeclassificationofintelligencerecordsand
oversightstructurestoensurecompliancewiththisprocess(MoynihanCommis-
sion,1997).
The United States’ intelligence services are subject to extensive and public
scrutiny,whichensuresasignificantdegreeoftransparencyaboutthem.Overthe
years,congressionalcommittees,severalgovernment-initiatedreviews,aculture
oflitigation,thepresenceofcivillibertiesorganisations,haveallcontributedtoa
significantamountofinformationandrecordsabouttheservicesbeingplacedin
thepublicdomain.
CAnADA
In Canada, two pieces of complementary and mutually balancing legislation
dealwithfreedomofinformation:theAccesstoInformationActof1982andthe
PrivacyAct,1982.
origins of the Access to Information ActTheTrudeaugovernmentintroducedthislegislationatatimewhenCanadawas
undergoingsubstantialconstitutionalreform.TheMcDonaldCommissionhad
beensetuptoinvestigateabusesintheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice(RCMP),
amidgrowingcontroversyovertheroleofthesecurityforces.Theresultwasthe
140 / chAPter seven
establishmentofacivilianintelligenceagency,theCanadianSecurityIntelligence
Service(CSIS),in1984.
TheCanadianlegislationcoversall132federalagenciesincludingthesecu-
rityservices.Inadditionseveralregionalauthorities,includingOntario,Quebec,
BritishColumbiaandQuebec,haveintroducedaccesstoinformationlegislation,
coveringthousandsofinstitutions.
Main features of the ActThe Access to Information Act of 1982 promotes the following principles:
governmentinformationbeingmadeavailabletothepublic;limitedandspecific
exceptionstotherightofaccess;andindependent(ofgovernment)reviewsof
disclosuredecisions.InCanada,theAct’suseisrestrictedtocitizensandperma-
nentresidentsorpersonspresentinCanada,therebyexcludingforeigners.Asin
theUSA,thesecurityandintelligenceagenciesarenotexcludedfromtheambit
oftheAct.
Incompliancewiththerequirementtopublishcategoriesofinformationheld,
theCSISliststhefollowing:communicationssecurity;planningandco-ordination
ofactivities;counter-intelligenceandcounter-terrorism;accessanddisclosure
procedures and requests; personnel records; internal security of the Service;
scientific,operationalandtechnicalsupport;supplyofsecurityassessmentsto
othergovernmentdepartments;andpolicy,administrationandmanagementof
operationsinvolvinghumansources(Hazell,1989).
UndertheAct,apublicbodymustdisclosearecordifthereissucharequest.
However, the general principles are that a government body is not obliged to
createarecordthatdoesnotexist.CSISreceivesrequestsfromawiderangeof
sourcesincludinghistorians,manyofwhomadmittosubmittingsimilarrequests
toseveralagenciesinthehopeofgettingascomprehensiveanansweraspossible.
Partofthereasonforthis isthattheCSISfrequentlyusestheprovisioninthe
Actthatallowsthemtoneitherconfirmnordenytheexistenceofinformationon
currentoperations;themainconcernseemstobetoabletoprovidelifelongpro-
tectionforthosewhohaveactedashumansources.
IntheCanadianAct,thefollowingkindsof informationareprotectedfrom
disclosure:informationrelatingtonationalsecurityanddefence;international
relations;lawenforcement;cabinetdiscussions;civilserviceadvice;legaladvice;
damage to the economy; commercial information; personal information; and
informationprotectedbyotherstatutes.
Canada’sdiversesystemofcontrolsoverthesecurityandintelligencecommu-
nityprovidesafairmeasureofpublicaccountabilityinthisareaofgovernance.
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 141
FollowingrecommendationsbytheMcDonaldCommission,anindependentbody
wasestablishedtoreviewthefunctioningoftheCSIS:theSecurityIntelligence
ReviewCommittee(SIRC),whosemembersareallprivycouncillorsappointed
bythegovernor-in-council,afterconsultationbytheprimeministerwithlead-
ersofthemajoroppositionparties.TheSIRC’sfourmainfunctionsareto:review
CSIS’sperformanceofitsduties;investigatecomplaintsofanypersonsagainstthe
CSIS;investigatecomplaintsaboutsecurityclearances;andreviewcasesconcern-
ingnationalsecuritymatters.SIRCreleasesanannualreporttothepublicabout
itswork,andgenerallyhastheconfidenceofthepublic(Rankin,1986).Another
mechanismofcontrol is the Inspector-General,appointedby thecabinet.Like
theSIRC,theInspector-GeneralhaswideaccesstoCSISdocumentation,except
forcabinetrecords.InCanada,ministerialresponsibilitylieswiththesolicitor-
general,towhomtheCSIS,theInspector-GeneralandtheSIRCallreport(Rankin,
1986).
Canada,likemanyothercountries,learnedthelessonofallowingthesecurity
servicestofunctionunderconditionsofunaccountability.Thelegislativemeas-
uresputinplaceareimpressivebutnotwithoutproblems.However,Canadais
ausefulcomparisonforSouthAfrica,whichhasadoptedmanyfeaturesofthe
legislationdealingwithaccessandthefunctioningofitsdomesticsecurityservice,
whichinmanyrespectscanbeequatedtoSouthAfrica’sNIA.
InDIA
LikeSouthAfrica,Indiaisanestablisheddemocracythatisbesetwithproblems:
acolonial legacy, includingaWestminstersystemofgovernment,andtheves-
tigesofmanyBritishdominionlaws;aneconomicallystratifiedsociety,ofdeep
social,religiousandcastedivisions;andavolatilepoliticalclimate.Evenwith
theseproblems,Indiaremainsoneoftheworld’slargestparliamentarydemoc-
racies.BorderedbyPakistan,China,BangladeshandNepal,itsconflictswithits
neighbours,particularlyPakistan,arewelldocumented.Internally,Indianpoli-
ticsisfraughtwithconflict,whichhassometimesclaimedscoresofcivilianlives.
Despitetheseconditions,therighttoinformationhasbeenaconcernthroughout
thedecadesoffreedom.
origins of the Right to Information ActForseveralyears,theIndiangovernmenthadbeenunderpressuretointroduce
accesstoinformationlegislation,andeventuallyintroducedabillatfederallevel
in1999.Thegenesisoftherighttoinformationdatesbackto1975when,inthe
142 / chAPter seven
caseofState of Uttar Pradesh v Raj Narayan,theSupremeCourtofIndiaacknowl-
edgedthat,althoughnotspecifiedintheconstitution,therighttoinformationwas
impliedintherighttofreedomofspeechandconscience.TheSupremeCourtlater
ruled(in1982),inthecaseofSP Gupta v President of India,thataccesstogovern-
mentinformationwasanessentialpartofthefundamentalrighttofreedomof
speechandexpression,stating:
Theconceptofanopengovernmentisthedirectemanationfromtherightto
knowwhichseemsimplicitintherightoffreespeechandexpressionguaran-
teedunderArticle19(1)(a).Therefore,disclosuresof informationinregard
tothefunctioningofGovernmentmustbetherule,andsecrecyanexception
justifiedonlywherethestrictestrequirementsofpublicinterestsodemands.
TheapproachoftheCourtmustbetoattenuatetheareaofsecrecyasmuchas
possibleconsistentlywiththerequirementofpublicinterest,bearinginmind
allthetimethatdisclosurealsoservesanimportantaspectofpublicinterest.
(Martin&Feldman,1998)
In1997,theIndiangovernmentestablishedaworkinggrouptodraftabillthat
would provide a general right of access to information, and create a National
CouncilforFreedomofInformationandStateCouncils.InFebruary1999,Presi-
dentKRNarayanannouncedthegovernment’sintentiontointroducetheFreedom
ofInformationBill.
Thebillwasstronglyresisted,particularlybypublicofficials(IndiaTogether,
2006),andtheversionpassedin2000wasdiscreditedasahalf-heartedcommit-
menttofreedomofinformation.Thebillwaswithdrawnshortlyafterwardsand
replacedbyaversionthatsatisfiedatleastsomeofthecritics’concerns.
Legislative framework for the intelligence servicesIndia’sstrainedrelationswithitsneighbourshaveresultedinthecountryadopting
adefensivesecuritystance.Nationalsecurityisseentorequirestrongintelligence
and defence capabilities to protect territorial integrity; and strong police and
domesticsecuritycapacities,tocounterperceiveddomesticsecuritythreats.There
is,inasense,continuityintheaimsofthesecurityinstitutions:underBritishrule,
theyprotectedBritishinterests;onattainingindependence,theywereconverted
toservetheinterestsoftherulingeliteandfoundthemselvesincreasinglyatodds
withmarginalisedpoliticalgroups(Subrahmanyam2000).
InIndia,theorganisationandresponsibilitiestheintelligenceservicesarenot
establishedorregulatedbylegislativeparliamentaryacts.Anditisagainstthis
backgroundthattheapplicationoffreedomofinformationlegislationmustbe
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 143
seen.Nonetheless,publicaccessisaffectedbythemanylawsregulatingpublic
safetyandnationalsecurity:theOfficialSecretsAct;CriminalProcedureCode;
Indian Telegraph Act; Armed Forces Special Powers Act; Disturbed Areas Act;
PublicSafetyAct;NationalSecurityAct;andtheTerroristandDisruptiveActivi-
tiesAct(FASIntelligenceResourceProgramme,2001).
Main provisions of the Freedom of Information ActOneofthelegaciesofBritishrulewastheOfficialSecretsActof1923,whichmade
thedisclosureofclassifiedinformationinIndiaacriminaloffence.TheActwas
basedontheUKOfficialSecretsAct.InthemotivationfortheFreedomofInfor-
mationBill,itwassaidthat,oncepassedbyparliament,itwouldtakeprecedence
overtheOfficialSecretsActandbeonlyfortheuseofIndiancitizens.Thebill
wouldbeapplicabletoallfederalpublicauthoritiesandrequirethemtomaintain
records,whichwouldbesubjecttodisclosureonrequest.Thebillrequiredpublic
authoritiestoappointpublicinformationofficers,andassistpersonswishingto
accessinformation,Recognisingtheunequallevelsofliteracy,thisassistancewas
toincludetranslatingverbalrequestsintowrittenform.Thebillalsoprovidedfor
aninternalappealtoadesignatedindividualorofficewithinthepublicbodyto
whichtheoriginalrequestwasmade,intheeventofarefusal.Thefederalbill
wasfinallypassedastheRighttoInformationAct,andbecameoperationalon
12October2005(IndiaTogether,2006).
exclusions and exemptionsArticle16ofthebillprovidedforablanketexclusionofallintelligenceandsecurity
organisationslistedintheschedule,whichthecentralgovernmentmayamend
bynotification.Notsurprisingly,thelegislationadoptedbystatesincludedexclu-
sionsthatwerealignedtothenationalAct.Rajasthanwasoneofthefirststates
tointroducefreedomofinformationlegislation.InsectionfiveoftheRajasthan
RighttoInformationAct,thegroundsforrefusalapplytoinformationwhosedis-
closurewouldprejudiciallyaffectthe:sovereigntyandintegrityofIndia;security
ofthestate;conductofinternationalrelations,includinginformationreceivedin
confidencefromforeigngovernments,theiragenciesorinternationalorganisa-
tions;theconductofcentre-staterelations,includinginformationexchangedin
confidencebetweenthecentralandstategovernmentoranyoftheirauthorities/
agencies; thefranknessandcandourof internaldiscussions, includingcabinet
papers,interdepartmental/intradepartmentalnotes,correspondenceandpapers
containingadviceandopinionsrelatingtointernalpolicyanalysis.
144 / chAPter seven
Insummary,theintroductionoffreedomofinformationlegislationwasaposi-
tivestepforIndia,althoughthecategoricalexclusionoftheintelligenceservices
fromthebillsuggeststhatthepublicwillcontinuetobeaffordedlittleofficial
informationabouttheirfunctioning.
Lessons FoR south AFRICA
SouthAfricacanderivemanylessonsfromstudyingtheaccessto information
legislationinothercountriesanditsrelevancetotheintelligenceservices.
Insomecountries(forexampleIndia),thesecurityandintelligenceagencies
arespecificallyexcludedfromtheaccesstoinformationlegislation.However,in
othercountries,suchastheUnitedStatesandCanada,theintelligenceagencies
aresubjecttofreedomofinformationlegislation.
The one common area is the range of exceptions. Generally, the following
categoriesofinformationareexemptfromdisclosure:privateinformationabout
individuals;informationrelatingtodefence,security,andinternationalrelations;
informationaboutongoinginvestigationsinthelawenforcementsector;commer-
cialandeconomicinformation;andoperationalproceduresofpublicbodies.In
relationtointelligence,thescopecoverstheidentitiesofsourcesandintelligence
officers.Thus,provisionismadetoprotectinformationheldbytheintelligence
services,evenwhentheyaresubjecttotheaccesstoinformationlegislation.
Officialsecretslegislationorregulationsgenerallyco-existwithfreedomof
informationlegislation.Theintroductionofthelatterhascertainlynotsounded
thedeathknellforofficialsecrecy.Indeedthestate’srightofrefusaltodisclose
securityanddefenceinformationseemstobeaninalienablegiven,whichmakes
theneedformanagingclassificationanddeclassificationofinformationespecially
relevant.
Somecountrieshave introducedseparate legislation toprotect theprivacy
oftheindividual,toensurethatpersonshaveaccesstoinformationaboutthem-
selves,andthatsuchinformationmaynotbedisclosedtounauthorisedpersons.
However,suchlegislationusuallyexcludes‘nationalsecurity’information.
In other aspects there is little uniformity. Certain countries have a well-
establishedbodyof judicialprecedence,as in thecasewith theUnitedStates,
whileothersdonot,whichisthecasewithCanada.Nevertheless,inmanycases,
thetrendistolinkaccesstoinformationlegislationwithotheroversightmecha-
nisms,suchasparliamentaryoversightbodies(inCanada’scase,aprivycouncil)
andinspectors-generalreportingtoaministerorthelegislature.
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 145
Despite theabovesimilarities, it isnecessary tobecircumspect inderiving
lessons from the example of other countries. While belonging to the body of
countriesthathasadoptedfreedomofinformationlegislation,SouthAfricahas
donesounderspecificcircumstances,inresponsetoparticularpressures,andata
certainlevelofmaturityandstageofevolution.
Managing records from the pastApart from access to information legislation and how countries’ intelligence
servicesmaybesubjecttoit,theremaybevalueinreflectingonhowsocietiesin
transitionmanagetheirrecords.InSouthAfrica,theissueofwhetheraseparate
regulatoryregimeisrequiredforthehandlingofsuchrecordappearedtohave
beenunresolvedwhentheHeferCommissionsat.
Theexampleofformercommunistcountriesinhandlingrecordsofthestate
securityapparatusesissometimesreferredto.AfterthecollapseoftheBerlinWall
andtheEastGermanstate,thenewintegratedGermanstateactedquicklytotake
controloftherecordsofformercommuniststate,andwentasfaraspublishing
legislationthatregulatedaccesstoandtheutilisationofsecurityservicerecords.
The Act Regarding the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German
Democratic Republic (Stasi Records Act)waspassedinDecember1991.Itaimedto
facilitateindividualaccesstopersonaldatawhichtheStateSecurityServicehad
storedonindividuals,toprotecttheprivacyofindividuals,topromotethe‘histori-
cal,politicalandjuridicalreappraisaloftheactivitiesoftheStateSecurityService’
andtoprovidepublicandprivatebodieswithaccesstotheinformationrequired
toachievethepurposesoftheact(section1,StasiRecordsAct1991).
Theactisdetailedandprescriptiveabouttheuseoftherecords,anddirects
theconditionsunderwhichparticularcategoriesofrecordsshouldbedirected
toparticularagencies,whentheymaybeusedforcriminalproceedings,andthe
conditionsunderwhichaccesstopersonalrecordsmaybegiven.Italsocarefully
detailswhichrecordsaresubjecttotheAct,andwhicharenot.
Theactisalsoveryparticularaboutprocedure.Allrequestsforaccesstothe
relevantrecordsof the formerStasimustbemade inwriting,andarequester
mustproperlyidentifyhimselforherself.Particularcareisexercisedindetermin-
ingwhataccessisgiven.InPart3oftheAct(UseoftheStateSecurityService
Records),itisspecifiedthatwhereapersonhasrequestedinformationpertain-
ingtorecordsabouthimselfforherself,ifinformationaboutthirdpartiesmight
bedisclosedthroughtheinspectionofsuchaccesstoarecord,thesethirdpar-
tiesmustgivetheirconsent.Accesscanbegrantedif‘separationofpersonaldata
regardingotherdatasubjectsorthirdpartiesisnotpossibleorispossibleonly
146 / chAPter seven
withunreasonableeffort,andthereisnoreasontoassumethattheotherdata
subjectsorthirdpartieshaveanoverridinglegitimateinterestinkeepingthem
secret’(section12,4.2.).
ThepersonresponsiblefortheexecutionoftheActisaFederalCommission,
responsibletotheInteriorMinister.ThepowersoftheCommissionerarespeltout
inlaw,asarethemeasuresthatmustbetakenbytheincumbenttoensurethe
safety,integrityandsecurityoftherecords.TheFederalMinisterisassistedbya
statutoryAdvisoryCommission.
TheStasiRecordsActhasawholesectiondealingwithdatasubjectsandthird
parties(section13),‘datasubjects’beingpersonsaboutwhomtheStateSecurity
Servicecollectedpersonaldatabydeliberate,includingsecret,information-gath-
eringorspying.Asarule,datasubjectenjoytherightofaccesstoinformationto
recordsaboutthem.Intheirrequests,theywouldbeexpectedtosupplyparticu-
larswhichmakeitpossibletolocatetherecords,but‘thepurposeforwhichthe
informationisrequestedneednotbegiven’(s.13.1).Theactisstronglyweighted
infavourofdatasubjects’,totheextentofexposingthosewhohavecollectedor
providedtheinformationthatmadeitswaytothepolice.Section13.5states:
If code names of employees of the State Security Service who gathered or
evaluatedpersonaldataregardingthedatasubject,ornamesof theiroffic-
ers, together with particulars which make it possible to positively identify
theseemployees,canbefoundintheexistingpreparedrecordswhichthedata
subjecthasinspectedorforwhichheobtainsduplicates,thenamesofsuch
employeesshallbeprovidedtothesubjectathisrequest.Section1shallalso
applytootherpersonswhoinformedonthedatasubjectinwriting,ifthecon-
tentsoftheirreportswerewritteninsuchawayastobedetrimentaltothedata
subject.Theinterestsofemployeesandinformersinkeepingtheirnamessecret
shallnotruleoutdisclosureoftheirnames.
Ofinterestistheprovisionthattheaboveclausewouldnotapplyto‘employeesof
theStateSecurityServiceiftheywerenotatleast18yearsoldatthetimeofthe
activitiesinquestion’(s.13.6).Thisraisesthedisturbingprospectthatsomeofthe
employeesoftheStateSecurityServicewereinfactmerechildren.
SimilarprovisionstothosefoundintheStasiActaretobefoundinHungar-
ianlaw,whichalsohasaspeciallegislativedispensationforrecordsoftheformer
SecurityServices.Thelawhasbeenreviewedseveraltimesoverthepastdecade
andtodayispartofabodyoflawrelatingtotheorganisationoftheintelligence
services, the protection of individual privacy, and the management of public
records.TheactdealingwithsecurityrecordsofthepastisActNo.111of2003
comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 147
On theDisclosure of the Secret Service Activities of the Communist Regime andon
the Establishment of the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security.Records
coveredbytheactcovertheperiod21December1944to14February1990.In
similarveintotheStasiAct,thecategoriesofboththosewhoinformedandthose
whowerethetargetsofintelligencecollectionaredefined.TheActthenstipulates
theproceduresforthehandlingofsuchrecords,andtheconditionsunderwhich
theymaybeaccessed.
TheHungarianlawappearstodiffersubstantivelyinitshandlingofthesecrecy
ofidentitiesofinformers,fromtheStasiAct.Thisisdonethroughtheclassifica-
tionstatusaccordedsuchrecords.Article2.1oftheactreadsthus:
Theprevioussecuritystatusofthedatatobefoundinthedocumentsfalling
undertheeffectoftheActshallceasetoexistbyvirtueofthisAct,exceptifthe
classificationofthedataismaintainedbythepersonentitledthereto.
ThisapparentlyundertheSecrecyActof1995.Moreover,thesecuritystatusofthe
datawhichissubjecttotheact,andwhichisclassifiedassecretundertheSecrecy
Act,maybemaintainedifitappliestoapersonwhowasattachedtothestaffof
thenationalsecurityservicesintheperiod15February1990and26May2002,
ortosomeonewhosecretlycooperatedwiththeservices.Thesecretstatuscan
alsobemaintainedifitappliestoapersonwhoseactivitiesoridentity,ifexposed,
mightbecomethevictimofacrimeseriouslyviolatingorendangeringhisorher
life,healthorpersonalfreedom,orthatofhisorherrelatives(Article2.2).In
generalthereisamorecautiousapproachtodisclosureevenoftheformersecu-
rityservicerecords,anddueregardisalsogiventowhatisconsideredtobein
Hungary’snationalinterest.
the handling of records of the former security servicesBoththeStasiandHungarianexperiencesdemonstrateimportantaspectsthat
shouldbeconsideredwhendealingwithrecordsofformersecurityservicesof
authoritariansocieties.Insuchcases,aswasthecaseinSouthAfrica,thereisa
desiretogettothebottomofthestatesecrets,particularlytheroleofthesecu-
rityservicesinupholdingtheregime.IntheSouthAfricancase,theTRCwasone
ofthemainvehiclesthataddressedthisneed.However,theActestablishingthe
TRC,thePromotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, didnotmake
specificprovisionforthehandlingofrecordsoftheformersecurityservices,inthe
waythattheabovementionedActsdid.TheTRCdidhavethepowertodemand
recordsandtoissuesubpoenas,andinthecourseofitsinvestigations,ithadpow-
ersofsearchandseizure,buttherewasnotandtothisdateisnotaspecificSouth
148 / chAPter seven
Africanlawdealingwiththemanagementoftherecordsoftheformersecurity
andintelligenceservices.
Theconsequencehasbeenachaoticstateofaffairs.Itshouldbeofconcern
thatapartheiderasecurityestablishmentrecordsremaindispersedthroughout
thestructuresofthepresentsecurityestablishment,withdifferingstandardsof
care and custodianship. A good example of such records being well managed
isthoseunderthecontroloftheSANDF.Inothercases,forexample,surviving
Security Police files which were located, secured and listed under TRC direc-
tionin1997/8,wereseveralyearslaterinchaos(interviewwithVerneHarris,
1September2003).
Afurtherproblemhasbeentheillegalremovalofrecordsbyformermembers
ofthesecurityestablishment.Otherrecordsthatfoundthemselvesinthehands
oftheTRCwerenotproperlyretrievedandhandledwhentheTRCconcludedits
work.TherecordsoftheBantustansecurityserviceshavealsobeencompromised,
havingbeentakenupinahaphazardwaybythedifferentpublicserviceandsecu-
ritysectorinstitutions.Thesystematicdestructionofrecords,whichapparently
continuedevenafterademocraticgovernmenthadbeeninstalled,wasthedirect
resultofnothavingaspecificpolicypositiononwhattodowithsuchrecords.
Anecdotalrecollectionsbymembersofthesecurityservicessuggestthatthe
former regime and the liberation movements felt as they were negotiating a
commonfuture,thatthepastwasbestlefttorest,andthatthereshouldbeno
exposureoftheother’sspies,becausethismighthavecausedembarrassmentor
evenputthelivesofcollaboratorsatrisk.Thesituationthatcametoobtainthen
wasthatpersons,whohadbeenspieduponbytheapartheidsecurityforces,were
nevertoknowwhohadbetrayedthem.Andpersonswhodefiedthelawingiving
statesecretstotheenemy(manyofthemintheranksofthesecuritypoliceand
militaryintelligence),weregiventheuneasyassurancethattheriskstheytook
wouldnotbeexposed.Inthiscontext,thoughandwithouttheprotectionofan
adequatepolicyandlegalframeworkthatdeliberatelybalancestherighttoknow,
withtherighttoprotect,andtakesintoaccountotherimperativessuchasthe
righttojustice,theaccusationsoftreacherylinger,causingthekindofnational
crisisthattheclaimsagainstNgcukathattheHeferCommissionwasrequiredto
resolve.ItmaybethatSouthAfricastillneedstoexploresuchapolicyandlegisla-
tiveframework,toforeverputtheapartheidghoststorest.
The primary aim of thisbookhasbeentoexploreapossiblepolicyframework
fordeterminingwhatinformationabouttheintelligenceservices,orinfor-
mationheldbythem,shouldbemadeavailabletothepublic.Theroutehasbeen
circuitous,coveringthehistoryofofficialsecrecy,thetransitiontodemocracy,
andsomeinternationalcomparisons.Althoughthefocushasbeenonthepolicy
forimplementingPAIA,theresearchhasraisedbroaderissuesofpublicaccount-
ability,governance,anddemocraticcontroloftheintelligenceservices.Whathas
becomeevidentarethemultiplemeansofaccessinginformationaboutthepost-
apartheidintelligenceservices.Therefore,someofthestrengths,weaknesses,and
efficacyofdifferentwaysofaccessingthisinformationhavealsobeenassessed.
The secrecy under which intelligence services conduct their business is a
worldwide phenomenon, and a feature of both authoritarian and democratic
politicalsystems.SincetheendoftheColdWar,globalconflictandinternalinsta-
bilityhavepersisteddespitetheintroductionoftheconceptof‘humansecurity’.
Debatesaboutnationalsecurityandthegovernanceofthesecuritysectorhave
raisedimportantissues,bothinternationallyandinthedevelopingworld.
Statescontinuetojustifyusingextraordinaryregulatorymeasuresnotonly
whentherearerealandgravethreatsto lifeandlimb,butundermanyguises
labelledasthe‘nationalinterest’.Resortingtosecrecyisanexampleofsuchan
extraordinarymeasure.Byandlarge,placingissuesinthesecurityrealmsignalsa
failuretoaddressthemthroughthenormalrulesofpoliticalengagement.Aresort
tosecrecybythestate(particularlyifthisisexcessive)indicatesthatthenormal
ConCLusIon AnD PoLICY ReCoMMenDAtIons
8
150 / chAPter eIGht
courseofpoliticshasfailed,andthatsocietyisbeingdrivenbackintotheabyssof
unaccountableandauthoritarianstateconduct.
Decidingwhenofficialsecrecyhasbecomeexcessiveisaproblemconfront-
ingalldemocraticsocieties.Before1994,secrecyinSouthAfricawasanintegral
partofanundemocratic,raciallyexclusiveconstitutionalorderthatundermined
humanrights. Inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica the intelligenceservicesarestill
claimingarighttosecrecy,becauseofcontinuedthreatstonationalsecurityand
becausetheyhaveaconstitutionaldutytoprotectstatesecrets,alongsidetheir
dutytocontributetostatetransparency.Strikingabalancebetweensecrecyand
transparencyisacontinuingchallengewhich,duringthefirsttenyearsofdemoc-
racy,wasnothelpedbytheexecutive’sinabilitytoformulateacomprehensiveand
viablepolicyframeworkreconcilingtheconstitutional imperativesofaccessto
informationwiththeintelligenceservices’legitimateconstitutionalrole.Thefact
thatthelegalframeworkremainsincompleteandcontradictoryisevidenceofthis
failure.
MAnAgIng InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon In the tRAnsItIon
Thelegalframeworkthathashistoricallycoveredstateinformationhasbeenprob-
lematicanddoesnotfitinthepost-1994context.From1912onwardsSouthAfrica
wassubjecttotheOfficialSecretsAct,whichwasmodelledonBritishlegislation
andprovidedforseverepenaltiesfordisclosingstatesecrets.Thiswasfollowedby
theProtectionofInformationActof1982,whichreinforcedthecultureofpenal-
tiesforthedisclosureofsecrets.Adebateaboutgovernmentalaccountabilityis
neededifabalancedapproachtoclassificationofofficialinformationistoemerge.
Issuestobeaddressedincludewhodefineswhatislegitimatelywithheldassecret
orconfidential;whatchecksandbalancesexisttoensurethatofficialsexercise
diligenceintheirmanagementofinformation;andhowmembersofthepublic
canbesufficientlyinformedandreassuredthatgovernmentisactingintheirbest
interests.
InSouthAfrica,theentrenchmentofdemocraticprinciplesinthenewpolitical
dispensationcreatedthebasisofanewcultureofaccountabilityandtransparency
intheintelligenceservices.Whilealltheoldlegislationestablishingtheapart-
heidintelligenceorganshasbeenrepealed,andnewlawsmadetoestablishand
regulatethenewintelligenceservices,thereisstillasignificantcontinuitywith
theoldorder.Intermsofthetransitionalagreements,theadministrativesystems
andregulationsoftheNISweretohavebeenusedforashortperiodoftimeand
thenrevised.Inreality,thereviewhasbeenveryslow,withtheresultthatthenew
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 151
servicesarestilloperatingunderthearcaneregulationsandsystemsinherited
fromtheoldorder.
Vestiges of the old political order, the law and administrative instruments
designed to protect classified information rest uneasily with the new consti-
tutional right of access to information. These relics include the Protection of
InformationActof1982andtheMISS,acabinetdirectivethatgivesofficialsthe
authoritytoclassifydocumentsonthegroundsofprotectingnationalsecurity,
andthusrestrictpublicaccesstotheinformationcontainedinthedocuments.The
MISSisapost-1994initiative,butisbasedonanadministrativeinstrumentinher-
itedfromtheapartheidera.
the MeRIts AnD DeMeRIts oF seCReCY
InSouthAfrica,theimplicationsoftheconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinforma-
tionhavebeenstudiedinareassuchasemployer-employeerelations,health,trade
practices,criminalinvestigations,andtradematters.Emergingfromanumberof
conceptualanalyses(Bok1978,1982;Mathews1978;Robertson1999),several
issueshelptoputthepolicyoptionsinperspective.Acentralquestioniswhether
avaluejudgmentcanbeattachedtosecrecyortransparency,andwhethereither
can be regarded as good or bad for governance, especially of the intelligence
services.Whilethisisacomplexissue,theseauthorsmakeanoverwhelmingcase
formore,ratherthanless,transparency,especiallyonthepartofpublicagencies.
Acynicalviewisthataccesstoinformationlegislationdoesnotnecessarily
facilitateopengovernment,becausetheonusisonthepublictoaskforinforma-
tionratherthanonthegovernmentdisclosingit.Suchlegislationcouldbeseen
aslittlemorethanarevisedsystemofinformationmanagement,whichcontinues
tofavourtheelites,especiallyassuchlegislationrarelyoffersaccesstovitalinfor-
mationaboutpolicy-making,andisweightedinfavouroffacilitatingaccessto
personalfiles.
Thesemisgivingsneedtobeplacedincontext.Insocietieswithnoaccessto
publicrecords,andwherethatspaceisfilledwithrepression,winningtheright
ofaccesstoinformationisamomentousvictory.OneexampleisSouthAfrica,
whereaccesstoinformationisentrenchedintheconstitutionasafundamental
right.Moreover,thelegislationdetailingtheexerciseofthisright–thePAIA–
promotesacultureoftransparencybyprovidingforthevoluntarydisclosureof
stateinformation.Theissueiswhetherpublicbodiesaredoingenoughtopro-
moteknowledgeabouttheirmandatesandfunctioning.Dotheyrelyexclusively
onadministeringtheaccesstoinformationlegislationtosatisfypubliccuriosityor
152 / chAPter eIGht
demandsforinformation?Isthereenoughpressureonpublicbodiestoproduce
anddisseminatethemanualsthatplaysuchanimportantrole?Orshouldthey
spreadknowledgeandinformationinother,perhapsmoreappropriate,forms?
Whatistrueisthataccesstoinformationlegislationalonewillnotdeliveropen,
transparent,andaccountablegovernment,andsoothergovernancemechanisms
topromoteaccountabilityshouldnotbeabandoned.
Anotherconcernishowofficialrecordsarehandledintimesoftransition,and
underconditionsofpoliticalnormality.Duringperiodsoftransition,thearchival
recordishighlycontested:onegroupseeksaccessinordertoconfirmitsfears
oftheworstexcesses,whiletheotherseekstodestroyanderadicateevidenceof
itsshamefulpast.Yet thearchivalrecordrepresentsonlyofficialdom’sversion
ofreality.Theintelligenceserviceswillonlyrecordwhatthestateperceivesasa
threattosecurity,tothelikelyexclusionofthepeople’sownperceptionsofthreats
totheirwell-beingandsecurity.Ofequalconcernisthatrecordsareoftenonly
accessibletothepublicofficialorresearcherswhoknowoftheirexistence,andare
inaccessibletothepublic.Thisispreciselywhypublicdeclarationsoftheinforma-
tionheldbythestate,andconditionsforeasyretrievalandaccesstosuchrecords,
becomesoimportant.Theargumentiscompellingforintelligencerecordstobe
availableforscrutinysothattheycanneveragainbeerasedfrommemory,asthey
wereunderapartheid,ortamperedwithinordertodistorttheaccountofhistory.
IMPLeMentAtIon oF the PAIA
AlackofstatecapacityhasseriouslyhamperedPAIA’simplementation.Infact,
itsusehaslargelybeenconfinedtoorganisedNGOs,atsomecosttothemselves.
ThepublicseemstoknowlittleabouttheAct,andthelowlevelsofliteracyinthe
countrysuggestthatitwillbesometimebeforemembersofthepublicmakefull
useofit.
Theattitudeof the intelligenceservices towards thedisclosureof informa-
tionisgenerallypositive,asshownbytheirvoluntarypublicationofinformation
throughpromotionalmaterial,websites,andresponsestopublicqueriesviathe
mediaandinparliament.However,theheadsoftheservicesarguethattheyhave
adutytoprotecttheidentitiesoftheirmembersandsourcesofinformation,and
theoperationalmethodstheyemploy,citingtheIntelligenceServicesActof2002
asjustification.AreviewoftheHeferCommissionhasshownthatthelawdoes
indeedplacesucharesponsibilityontheshouldersoftheintelligenceservices
heads,which,accordingtointernationalexperience,isnotunusual.Ithasalso
shownthat,infuture,strategiesconsistentwithallconstitutionalaspectsofthe
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 153
lawwillhavetobeevolvedtodealwithsuchscenarios.Mandateswouldhaveto
beexercisedcreativelytopreventanyunderminingoftheintelligenceservices’
mandatesoraccountabilitytothepublic.
Cabinetandministerial leadershipof the intelligenceservices,particularly
inrespectoftheir implementationofPAIA,hasbeenweakandinconsistent.A
greatercauseforconcernisthefactthatoversightbodies–theJSCI,theInspector-
General,andtheHumanRightsCommission–havealsonotplacedpressureon
theservicestoimprovetheircompliancewiththeAct.By2005SASShadnoteven
appointedaDIO,asrequiredbylaw,andboththeNIAandSASAhad,withminis-
terialconsent,appliedforexemptionfromthesection14requirementtoapprove
amanual.Theexemptionexpiredin2008,yettheseservicesdonotappeartohave
madeanyattempttoconsiderwhatinformationshouldbecontainedinamanual,
ortomakeacaseforextendingtheirexclusion.
NIAhasbeenundergreaterpressure thanSASS to respond to requests for
information.Mostoftherequestshavebeenforaccesstopersonalinformation
files,andhavebeengranted.However, the lackofadequateresources,mainly
properlytrainedpersonnel,hasresultedindelaysinrespondingtosomerequests.
ThecaseoftheTRCrecordsgoestotheheartofhowcommittedtheintelli-
genceservicesaretotransparency,andwhethertheyarepreparedtoupholdthe
ruleoflawinimplementingsecrecymeasures.Thisincidentalsodemonstrates
thattheissueofapartheiderarecordsisstillverymuchaliveandinthepublic
consciousness.Theministry’srefusaltoadmitopenlytoknowingthewhereabouts
oftherequestedrecordssoundsdisturbinglylikedissemblance.Ayearafterthe
SAHAlodgedanaccesstoinformationrequest,itappearedthattherecordshad
beenintheministryallalong.SAHAwasunhappywiththegroundsforrefusal
giveninsomecases,arguingthattheywerenotcoveredbyprovisionsinPAIA,but
weremoreinlinewiththeProtectionofInformationActof1982.Moreover,SAHA
claimedthattheministryforintelligencehadinfluencedtheDOJ’sresponsetothe
request.
TheSouthAfricanintelligenceservicescannotescapetheirconstitutionalobli-
gations,whichistoprovidethepublicwithaccesstoinformationabouttheirrole
andsomeaspectsoftheirfunctioning.Thecompellinghistoricalbasisforthisis
theroleplayedbytheintelligenceservicesattheheightoftheapartheiderain
upholdingthatsystem.Thecloakofsecrecyunderwhichthesecurityestablish-
ment functioned contributed to the assassination, harassment, and detention
withouttrialofscoresofSouthAfricans. Itwouldbe inthepublic interest for
theintelligenceservicestoengageinmaximumdisclosure.Anumberofoptions
154 / chAPter eIGht
notpreviouslyconsideredbytheservicesshouldbeconsidered.Onewouldbeto
institutionalisetheproductionoftheirpublicannualreports.
PAIAshouldbereviewedinordertoascertainwhatstaterecordsreallyneed
tobeprotectedagainstunauthorisedaccessanddisclosure.Inthisrespect,atten-
tionshouldbepaidtothevolumesofinformationalreadyinthepublicdomain,
throughresearch,theprintandelectronicanddigitalmedia;itmakesnosense
for intelligence services to attempt to classify readily available information.
Clarifyingpreciselywhat interestsareunder threatwouldhelp toaddress the
uncertaintysurroundingwhatinformationshouldbedisclosedandwhatinfor-
mationprotected.
otheR CountRIes’ exPeRIenCes
Therecordsoftheformersecurityservicesareanaspectofwhatmustbemanaged
insocietiesundergoingtransitionstodemocraticformsofgovernment.InSouth
AfricathiswasexemplifiedbytheTRC,whichuncoveredthemassdestruction
oftonsofdocumentsbytheauthoritiesinthelastyearsofapartheid.Thissug-
geststhattheapartheidsecurityforceswereactingunderexecutiveinstructionto
eradicatetracesoftheirroleintherepressionofanti-apartheidopponents.Truth
commissionprocessesinothercountriessuchasChileandGuatemalahavealso
revealedevidenceofrecordsbeingdestroyed.Insomeinstances,informationwas
obtainedthroughaccesstoathirdcountry’srecords,whichtruthcommissions
couldusetounderstandthesecurityforces’role.InGuatemala,forexample,the
truthcommissionsuccessfullypetitioned theAmericangovernment foraccess
torecordsthatwouldshedlightonitsrelationshipwiththeregimeresponsible
for the deaths and disappearances of many Guatemalans. Truth commissions
havegenerallyreinforcedtheneedforpost-transitionalauthoritiestoestablish
transparentsystemsofmanagingofficialrecords,sothattheintegrityof‘official
memory’ispreservedandmadeavailabletothepublic.
Comparing and contrasting the experiences of other countries with access
toinformationlegislationisalsouseful.Theprinciplesofaccesstoinformation
arefoundmoreorlessuniversallyindemocracies,andarebasedontheunder-
standing that citizens in particular have a right to information held by their
governments.Theprinciplesinclude:
• the need for maximum disclosure to the public of information held by the
state;
• theneedforpublicbodiestodiscloseinformationvoluntarily,ratherthanrely
onrequestsforaccess;
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 155
• alimitationongroundsforrefusingrequestsforinformation;and
• aninexpensiveandaccessiblesystemforprocessingrequests.
Groundsforrefusingaccesstoinformationwerealsoverysimilar,andincluded
thepreservationofnationalsecurity,theprotectionofprivacy,theprotectionof
tradesecretsorcommercialinformationorinformationrelatingtotheeconomic
interestsofacountry,theprotectionofinformationrelatingtocriminalinvesti-
gations,andinformationrelatingtopolicyinthemaking.Allthesegroundsfor
refusal,whichareapplicableinSouthAfrica,arecontainedintheaccesstoinfor-
mationlegislationoftheUnitedStates,CanadaandIndia,thecountriesusedfor
comparison.
Nosingle formulaforbalancingsecrecyandtransparencywasfoundwhen
contrasting the experience of transparency and access to information in post-
apartheidSouthAfricawiththatofothercountries.Notallintelligenceservices
aresubjecttoaccesstoinformationlegislation:inIndia,theintelligenceservices
areexpresslyexemptfromtheircountry’saccesstoinformationlaws.Thiscom-
pleteexemption,incidentally,alsoappliestoAustralia,despiteitsstronglyrooted
cultureofaccesstoinformation.AmericanandCanadianintelligenceservicesare
subject to freedom-of-information legislation. In South Africa the intelligence
serviceshavebeentemporarilyexemptedfromhavingtoproducemanuals,partof
theprovisionsofthePAIA.Yetothercountries,suchasCanada,producedetailed
andextensivemanuals.
The remit of access to information legislation is often extended by legal
challengesbymembersofthepublic.However,probablymoreimportantinthis
regardisthepoliticalcultureinagivensociety,andtheextenttowhichother
mechanismsofoversightareavailable.
PoLICY ReCoMMenDAtIons
Anintelligenceinformationmanagementpolicymustrelatetorealchallenges,and
attempttoreconciletheinterestsofvariousconcernedparties.Ifthemandateof
theintelligenceservicesistoidentifyandreportonpotentialthreatstothesecu-
rityoftheRepublic,thestartingpointistoassesswhichinstitutions,individuals,
andpracticesfacesecurityrisks.
Theconstitutionisthebasisfordeterminingwhatshouldbeprotected.Thebill
ofrightsisunequivocalaboutthefundamentalrightsofallthosesubjecttothe
constitution.Theseincludetherighttolife,therighttoprivacy,therighttofree-
domofexpression,therighttowork,andtherightofaccesstostateinformation.
156 / chAPter eIGht
Theseprinciplesweretakenintoaccountwhendraftingthelegislationunderthe
newconstitutionalframework.
Currently,mostoftheinformationcreatedandheldbytheintelligenceservices
isroutinelyclassifiedas‘confidential’,‘secret’or‘topsecret’.Moreover,underthe
MISS,officialsoutsidetheintelligenceservicesareallowedtoclassifyinformation
intheirpossession,andlimititsdisclosureanddistribution.Asthereisverylittle
oversightofthisprocess,informationthatmaynotrequireprotectionisbeyond
ordinarypublicscrutiny.Whatisneededisaclearandunambiguouspolicyframe-
workforsecurityclassificationbyallpublicbodies,effectivelycodifiedinthelaw.
Informulatingsuchaframework,policy-makersneedtodeterminewhetherinfor-
mationiscurrentlybeingclassifiedasamatterofhabitandconvention,orbecause
itreallyplacesthestateatriskinanyway.Thisareaneedsfurtherresearch,which
needstobecommissionedandmanaged.
Securityclassificationamountstolittlemorethanplacingastamponadocu-
ment.Itismeanttodeterofficialsfromdisclosingtheinformationinquestion.
Protection should be readily afforded to information whose disclosure could
presentseriousriskstothelivesofagentsandinformants,inpursuitofalegiti-
mate function derived from the mandate of the intelligence services. And the
necessary penalties should also be readily imposed on those who violate the
requirementsofconfidentiality.
Technologicaldevelopmentsneedtobe taken intoaccountwhenassessing
thevalueoftheintelligenceservices’classificationofrecordsatdifferentlevelsof
secrecy.Technologyhasdevelopedtosuchapointthatmostgovernmentsadmit
thatallinformationisvulnerabletounauthorisedaccessanddisclosure.Conse-
quently,governmentsarespendingverylargesumsofmoneyonsecuringtheir
informationsystems.Themyriadofsatellite,digital,andelectronictransgressions
thatarenowpossiblemeansthatgovernmentsmaynotevenrealisethattheyare
losinghighlysensitiveinformationtootherparties.Therefore,anycomprehensive
strategyforclassifyinganddeclassifyinginformationneedstotaketechnological
advancesintoaccount.
AnotherkeyissueiswhetherSouthAfricareallyneedstheProtectionofInfor-
mationAct.TheaimoftheActis‘toprovidefortheprotectionfromdisclosureof
certaininformation’.Apartfromlistingthemanypartiesunauthorisedfordisclo-
sure,theActspellsoutthescopeofsuchinformation.Bydefinition,thisincludes
‘prohibitedplaces’,suchasdefenceinstallationsusedoroccupiedbyoronbehalf
ofthegovernment;informationconcerninganymatterbeingdealtwithbythe
intelligenceservices,andanysecretofficialcodeorpasswordoranydocument,
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 157
model, article or information used, kept, made or obtained in any prohibited
place.
Someanalystsregardtheactassomethingofananomaly,giventhat itco-
existswithlegislationthatguaranteespublicaccesstoinformationheldbythe
state.TheyclaimitnotonlyconflictswiththespiritofPAIA,butisallthemore
odiousbecauseitoriginatesfromtheapartheiddays.Itsrationalewastoprevent
accesstoinformationby‘hostileorganisations’,definedasorganisationsdeclared
byorunderanyactofparliamenttobeunlawful,oranyassociation,movementof
persons,orinstitutiondeclaredasahostileorganisationthroughapromulgation
ofthepresident.
Despite thesesentiments, there isperhapsamorerealisticapproach.Most
wouldagreethateverystateneedsalegalframeworkprovidingforandregulat-
ingadegreeofnecessarysecrecy.Lawsregulatingofficialsecrecyexistinmany
democracies.PAIAdoesnotprotectinformation,orimposepenaltiesonthosewho
failtoprotectit,andtheMISShasbeencriticisedfornothavinganystatutory
force.Therefore,withoutanticipatingtheoutcomeofapublicdebateonwhat
stateinformationneedstobeprotected,anumberofprinciplescanbeconsid-
eredtoresolvethequestionofwhetherlegislationshouldexisttoprotectcertain
information.
First, thedebateshouldnotbeconfinedtothesecurityservicesbutshould
bewide-ranginginscopeandsponsorship,andtakeintoaccounttheconcerns
andfullrangeofpolicyactorsonwhomthedebatewillimpact,includingnon-
governmentorganisations,oversightbodies,andtheexecutive.
Next, in keeping with the spirit of the constitution, the framework for the
debateshouldbetheconstitutionalprinciplesofaccesstoinformation,andthe
reasonablelimitationofthisright.And,givenSouthAfrica’shistory,theprotection
ofstatutoryinformationshouldprohibitthestatefromabusing,manipulating,
and destroying information for its own ends. In other words, in terms of this
newparadigm,notonlyindividualsandorganisationsbutalsothestatecouldbe
deemedguiltyofviolatingtheirdutytoprotecttheinformationforwhichtheyare
responsible.
Lastly,espionageshouldbeclearlydefinedasaseparateoffence,onecommit-
tedbystateswithintentionshostiletoSouthAfrica’sinterests.However,theactual
contentofthecrimeofespionageshouldbereconsideredwithintheparadigmof
sharinginformation.
158 / chAPter eIGht
PRInCIPLes FoR MAnAgIng InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon
Thesecurity forces,particularly the intelligencecommunity,currentlyclassify
virtuallyallinformationtheyproduceaseitherTopSecret,Secret,Confidential,
orRestricted.Ifthesecurityservicesweretoadoptamoreproactiveapproachto
declassifyinginformation,therewouldbelessantagonismbetweenapublicseek-
ingaccesstoinformationandthosewhoconsidertheinformationtoosecretto
share,believingthattheyareactingintheinterestsofnationalsecurity.
A well-regulated classification and declassification system would have two
purposes.Thefirstwouldbetohaveauniformsystemforevaluating,categoris-
ing,andsafeguardingofficialinformationwhoseunauthoriseddisclosurecould
threaten the country’s security. The second would be to routinely review the
originalcriteriaforwithholdinginformationfromthepublicwiththeintention
ofmakingsuchinformationpubliclyavailableonceitsdisclosureposesnofurther
threattothecountry’ssecurity.
PAIA’sexemptionsinfactprovideforgovernmentsecrecy.However,thereare
coststothissecrecy,includingthatofphysicallyprotectingsecrets,thedanger
of losing public confidence through non-disclosure, and the input and debate
limitations.Furthermore,secretsarevulnerabletoleakswhichcanhaveuntold
consequences. So the implementation and usage of these sorts of provisions
shouldnotbetakenlightly.
Severalconceptscanprobablybeincorporatedintoaclassificationanddeclas-
sificationpolicyframework.Thegovernmentshouldprovideastatutorybasisfor
thesecrecysystem,withclearstandardsofwhatistobeclassified,bywhom,and
in termsofwhichprocedures.Anynew legal framework forclassificationand
declassificationshouldbealigned toPAIA. As PAIA is concerned with disclos-
ingratherthanprotectinginformation,groundsexistforadditionallegislation
toprotectandclassifyinformation.Theauthoritytoclassifyinformationshould
belinkedtothedegreeofclassificationrequired.Forexample,onlydesignated
office-bearerssuchasthepresident,ministers,andheadsofdepartmentshouldbe
entitledtoclassifyinformationas‘topsecret’;lowerlevelofficialsshouldonlyhave
suchauthorityifitisspecificallydelegatedtothem.
Legislationfortheclassificationanddeclassificationofrecordsshouldincor-
poratetheconceptofalife-cycleofsecrets,becauseovertimethesensitivityof
information and the resources needed for its physical protection may dimin-
ish.Moreover,classificationshouldnotbeusedtoconcealviolationsofthelaw,
inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent the embarrassment of a person,
organisationoragency;withholdbasicscientificresearchinformationnotclearly
related to national security; or conceal previously declassified information.
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 159
Lastly,uniformnationalstandardsfordeclassificationshouldbeformulated,and
theirimplementationmonitoredbyanappropriateoversightbody.
towARDs A PoLICY FRAMewoRk FoR MAnAgIng the ReCoRDs oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Whathasemergedfromthisstudyisthatapolicyframeworkisneededforthe
protectionofcertainkindsofformation,whileensuringthatinformationabout
the security services is routinely provided to ensure greater transparency and
accountability,andpromoteinformeddebateabouttheirperformanceandrole.
Itshouldcontainappropriatestandardsforclassifyinganddeclassifyingintelli-
gencerecords.Themaincategories,andtheargumentsthatshouldbeconsidered
informulatingthem,arediscussedbelow.
ReCoRDs ConCeRnIng the DAY-to-DAY oPeRAtIons AnD MAnDAtes oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Therecordsoftheintelligenceservicesarepublicrecords,andassucharesubject
toPAIA.AsPAIAexpressesaconstitutionalprescription,theexclusionoftheintel-
ligenceservicesfromtheActoranyofitsprovisionsshouldnotbeencouraged.
Instead,theservicesshouldbeginbyconsideringwhytheirrecordsneedto
beprotected,startingwithrecordsabouttheirday-to-dayfunctioning.Theintel-
ligenceservicesauthorandgathersignificantrecordsinthecourseofgathering
domesticandforeignintelligence,andfulfillingtheircounter-intelligencerespon-
sibilities. The director-general of SASS, Hilton Dennis, suggests that a useful
distinctioncanbemadebetweencorporateinformationandintelligenceinforma-
tion(interview,25.07.2005).
Corporateinformationwouldincludeinformationabouttheadministration
of the services, including their legal mandate and mission, human resources
management, policies and procedures, finance, assets, and transactions with
corporateandservicesstructures.Regulationsissuedbytheministeranddirec-
tivesissuedbythedirector-generalcouldalsobeincluded.Theserviceswould
havetomotivatewhyanyofthis informationrequiresprotection,anddemon-
stratehowreleasingitwouldharmthecountry.Asfaraspossible,thegroundsfor
keepingrecordssecretshouldbealignedtothosecontainedinPAIA.
In order to avoid inconsistencies when dealing with requests for informa-
tion, the intelligence services should consider institutionalising public annual
reports,whichwouldincludeminimumcorporateinformation.Atthesametime,
160 / chAPter eIGht
theintelligenceservicesshouldseeklegalopiniononwhethertheinformation
theywish toprotectcanbeaccommodatedwithin theprovisionsof thePAIA.
PAIA also requires voluntary disclosure, and the services would comply with
thisbyreleasinginformationintheirpublicannualreports.Suchreportswould
contributetoabroaderunderstandingofhowtheintelligenceservicesfunction,
andhelptodemystifyasubjectlittleunderstoodbymostpeople.Thechallengein
acountrysuchasSouthAfricaistoreachthemassofpeople,which,givenhigh
povertyandilliteracylevels,wouldrequirecreativegrass-rootsstrategiessuchas
usingtheradioandvisitinglocalcommunities.
Thesecondcategoryofinformationisintelligenceinformation,whichcanbe
brokendownfurtherintooperationalinformationandintelligencereports.The
IntelligenceServicesActrequiresthedirectors-generaloftheintelligenceserv-
icesandtheheadofSANAItotakeallnecessarystepstoprotecttheidentitiesof
membersoftheservices,themethodsofintelligencegathering,andintelligence
sources. Therefore, releasing all known or available categories of information
couldobviouslyberisky.
Iftheintelligenceservicesfeelstronglythatcertaincategoriesofinformation
needtobeprotected,oneoptionwouldbetolobbyforamendmentstoPAIAso
that categories contained in the Intelligence Services Act, such as methods of
intelligencecollection,theidentitiesofinformers,andotheroperationaldetails
couldbeincorporatedasgroundsforrefusal.However,theintelligenceservices
wouldhavetoaccepttherightofotherinterestedparties,includingfreedomof
informationadvocacygroups,toarguefororagainstanylegislativechanges.
IthasbeensuggestedthatSouthAfricashouldhavealawthatexplicitlycrimi-
nalisesespionage(interviewwithHiltonDennis,25.07.05).Whilethiswaspartly
theintentionoftheProtectionofInformationAct, itsprovisionsareextremely
broad, place onerous restrictions on members of the civil service and society,
andcriminalisethereleaseofvastcategoriesofrecords,evenwhennoharmwas
intendedorhasresulted.Manygovernmentstheworldoveraremovingtowards
greater sharing of information. A South African espionage law would have to
considercarefullywhatstate informationwouldbeconsideredharmful to the
country’sinterestsifdisclosedtooraccessedbyaforeigngovernment,andhow
suchactivitywouldbeframedincriminallaw.Itwouldhavetotakeintoaccount
thelawsthatarethebasisofco-operationbetweenmanycountriesandalready
dealwithspecificcrimessuchasforeignmilitaryassistance,moneylaundering,
andcorruption.
Themoreopenandaccountablegovernmentsaretotheirownpeople,theless
theyhavetohidefromothergovernments.Asthereisnocitizenshiprestrictionon
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 161
whocanaccessinformationviaPAIA,determinedgovernmentswantingtoaccess
certain information can easily do so. However, PAIA already exempts certain
categoriesofinformation,includingcabinetrecords,andrecordsofmembersof
parliamentandprovinciallegislatures.Therefore,ifagentsofaforeigngovern-
mentaccessthoserecords,thiswouldwellconstituteacrimeofespionage.
CLAssIFIeD ReCoRDs ConCeRnIng the ReLAtIonshIP Between the seRVICes AnD theIR MeMBeRs
OneofPAIA’saimsistogiveindividualstheopportunitytoaccessstaterecords
aboutthemselves,inordertocorrectthoserecords.Likeallemployers,security
servicesarerequiredtokeeppersonalrecordsaboutindividuals,andnormally
shouldnothaveanyreasontowithholdsuchinformationfromanindividual.
Problemsarisewhenanemployeewho is indisputewith theserviceseeks
informationtouseinaninternalprocedureorinlitigation.Albeitinadifferent
context,theSouthwoodjudgment(TPO161)underlinedtheneedforpublicbod-
iestofollowfairandproperadministrativeprocedures,andfoundthatclassifying
arecordasconfidentialdoesnotconstitutegroundsforwithholdingit.Theservice
concernedwouldhavetodemonstratethatthedocumenthasbeenconsidered
withseveranceinmind,evenifitcontainsthirdpartyinformationsuchasacol-
league’stestimonyaboutthemember.Thepresumptionisinfavourofdisclosure,
andeverythingshouldbedonetomakeitpossibletoreleasethedocument in
question.
Themostchallengingsubcategory inthisscenariorelates tosecurityclear-
anceinvestigations.TheNationalStrategicIntelligenceActof1994requiresthe
directors-generalofthesecurityservicestoprovidesecurityscreeningprocedures
forindividualswhohandleclassifiedinformation.Recordsgeneratedinthecourse
ofasecurityscreeningcouldberegardedasoperational,astheirdisclosurecould
harmtheprocedure.However,thecourtwouldprobablyconsiderthetimingof
therequest,theadministrativefairnessofthescreeningprocedure,andwhether
severingpartsoftherecordhadbeenconsidered.Insuchasituation,withSouth
Africa’sstrongrights-basedculture,thecourtsarelikelytoconsiderotherrights,
includingtherighttoworkandtherighttodignity.
Atthesametime,therighttoprivacycontainedintheconstitution,andthe
impendingintroductionofprivacylegislation,islikelytohaveanimpactonhow
theintelligenceservicesrespondtorequestsforaccesstotheirfilesbythesubjects
ofsecurityclearances.Thisshouldencouragegreaterprofessionalism,care,and
objectivityinhandlingthevettingprocess.
162 / chAPter eIGht
CLAssIFIeD APARtheID-eRA ReCoRDs
Anotherscenariorequiringpolicyisrequestsforaccesstoapartheid-erarecords,
suchas theTRCfiles.Apartheid-erastaterecordsare likely toremainanarea
of interest and contestation. Several submissions to the CDRC established by
Minister Sisulu suggested that these records should be urgently audited and
placedinthecustodyoftheNationalArchivist.Themainconcernispreserving
theintegrityoftherecords,especiallyinlightofthemassivedestructionofrecords
duringthefinalyearsofapartheid.Theproposedauditwouldconsiderreasonsfor
keepingtherecordsoutofthepubliceye.Theprocesswouldrequireconsiderable
resourcesandshouldincludenotonlymembersofthesecurityandintelligence
services,butalsoothersocialstakeholderssuchasparliament,non-government
organisations,andthejudiciary.TheIRCprocess,whichwasconfinedtomem-
bersofthesecurityestablishment,wasdeficientintworespects:quality,probably
becauseoftheteam’slimitedexperience;andthecredibilityofitsfindings,which
werenotmadepublic.
Thereismeritinputtingtheghostsofapartheidtorest.Considerablepublic
uneaseiscreatedbyclaimsofallegedapartheidgovernmentspiesthatsurface
fromtimetotime.Anagreedframeworkfordealingwiththesecretsoftheapart-
heideraisfarpreferabletocontinualandslowleaksaboutthepast.Moreover,
disclosureaboutthemethods,andeventheobjectives,successesandfailuresof
intelligenceoperationsduringtheapartheideracouldcomfortthosewhobelieve
that the truthhasbeensuppressed.This is not to suggest that the TRC be re-
opened,butthataresponsiblewayisfoundtoreleasetheinformationintothe
publicdomain.Theexamplesof theformerEastEuropeanstates inmanaging
accesstotherecordsofformersecurityservicesprovideusefulandvariedlessons
inhowtoapproachthissensitiveissue.
Atpresent,PAIAisusedbyapplicantswantingtoperuseapartheidfiles,most
commonlyaboutthemselves.Thestateofficial(inthiscasetheNationalArchivist)
whoconsiderssuchrequestsisinapowerfulposition,andmustdecidewhether
ornotthefileinquestioncontainsinformationthatmustbesevered.Yetthese
recordsrelateonlytoindividualsandnottothepolicydecisionsanddirections
frompoliticalleaders,whowerethearchitectsofthesystem.Governmentshould
look at a mass declassification of all such remaining records, and provide the
resourcestoensureacredibleprocess.
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 163
CLAssIFIeD ReCoRDs ABout the tRAnsItIon
ThetransitiontodemocracymarkedasignificantpointinSouthAfrica’spoliti-
calhistory.Therecanbelittlejustificationforwithholdinginformationaboutthis
periodfromthepublic,includingrecordsofthesubcouncilonintelligenceand
itssubcommitteesestablishedundertheTEC.Thesestructureswereinvolvedin
definingtheprinciplesandgroundrulesforintelligenceservicesoperationsand,
atthesametime,tryingtosteertheexistingservicestowardsamalgamationunder
afuture,democraticallyelectedgovernment.TheSouthAfricantransitionisheld
upasamodelforthetransformationofintelligenceservices.Itisnotclearwhere
theserecordsarebeingkeptandwhethertheirintegrityhasbeenretained,despite
theirenduringarchivalandhistoricalvalue.Thebulkdeclassificationandrelease
ofdocumentsfromthatperiodwoulddefinitelyresultinadeeperunderstanding
ofthatprocess.Determiningwhetheranydocumentationshouldnotbereleased
wouldbedonebyapplying thePAIAcriteria;but,byand large, thoserecords
shouldbedeclassified.Theintelligenceservicesshoulduseandencouragehisto-
rianstowritethehistoryoftheirestablishment,usingthisrepositoryofrecords.
ReCoRDs oF oVeRsIght AuthoRItIes InVestIgAtIng the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes
Anumberofoversightinstitutionscanatanyonetimeberequiredtoinvestigate
amatterconcerningtheintelligenceservices,andconsequentlyaccessclassified
information.TheseincludetheInspector-Generalforintelligence,theJSCI,the
HumanRightsCommission,andthePublicProtector.
Whendecidingonthemostappropriateandeffectiveinvestigatingstructure,a
dualapproachshouldbeconsideredwhichwouldlinkaninstrumentwithaccess
tointelligenceinformationtoapublicinvestigativeprocess.Thisrecommenda-
tionemergedfromtheworkoftheHeferCommissioncommissionedbySisulu
(Levy2004).Forexample,acommissionofinquiryortheHumanRightsCom-
missioncouldinvolvetheInspector-Generalforintelligence,whohasfullaccess
totheintelligenceservices(whichtheydonot).Thiswouldalsoinspirepublic
confidenceintheoutcomeoftheinquiry.
the stoRAge oF InteLLIgenCe ReCoRDs
Therecordsoftheintelligenceservicesarepublicrecords,andthereforehaveto
bemanagedintermsoftheNationalArchivesAct.In1999theNIAenteredinto
anagreementwiththeNationalArchivesrelatingtotheimplementationofthe
164 / chAPter eIGht
Act.Amongotherthings,thepartiesagreedonpreviouslyunclearaspectsofthe
requirementthatrecordsbetransferredtothecustodyoftheNationalArchives
forpreservationandcustodianship.GiventhattheNIA’srecordsrequiredspecial
management, the parties agreed that the NIA could retain the records on its
premises,butinstrictaccordancewitharchivalstandardsofsafekeepingandclas-
sification.TheNationalArchiveswouldtrainNIAstaff.Asaresult,theNIAisin
compliancewiththeNationalArchivesAct,anditsfilingofrecordshasimproved
overtheyears(interviewwithPeterRicher,09.09.2008).
Twofactorshaveacceleratedthedrivetowardsbetterandmoreefficientman-
agementofrecords.ThefirstistheneedtocomplywithPAIA;theNIAnowneeds
anorderlyhouseifitistorespondtorequestsforinformationinatimelymanner.
Theotherhasbeentheneedtoprotectitsinformation.Aseriesofdetrimental
leakshaspointedtothevulnerabilityoftheorganisation,andpromptedmanage-
menttointroducemeasuresandsystemsthatstreamlinedtheflowofinformation
andmadeiteasiertomonitorwhohadaccesstorecords.Theuseofaneffective
documentmanagementsystemhasalsomadeiteasiertomonitorwhoauthor-
isesdecisions.Thesesystemsarebothofarchivalvalue,andimproveinformation
security. Inaddition,over thepastdecade theNIAandSASShave introduced
disasterrecoveryplanstoavertthepermanentlossofdata.Thesedevelopments
areverypositive,andanypolicyheadshouldensurethatsuchstandardsofinfor-
mationmanagementareadheredtobytheentireintelligencecommunity.Without
properrecordsmanagement,therecanbenomeaningfulaccesstoinformation.
ConCLuDIng ReMARks
Whatshouldbesecret,andwhy?Whatshouldthepublicknow,andwhy?Under
whatconditionsshoulditbeacrimetohide,destroy,ordistortinformation,and
whatshouldbethepenalties?Whatshouldthepenaltybeforreleasinginforma-
tionwithoutauthority?Whoshouldclassifyanddeclassifyinformation?Whatis
‘TopSecret’intoday’sworld?Andwhendoesasecretexpire?Thesearesomeof
thequestionsthathavepromptedthisstudyandwhichhopefullyhavebeenat
leastpartiallyanswered.
Butwhowillguardtheguardians?Thepost-apartheidintelligenceservices
have not uniformly resisted the promotion of access to information. In some
instances,withouthavingtobepushed,theyhavetakenlaudableinitiativesto
makethemselvesknowntothepublic.
Together with the HRC, parliament has a special duty to ensure that the
intelligenceservicesareastransparentandaccountableaspossible.Infact,itis
conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 165
ultimatelythedutyofparliamenttoconsiderthelegalframeworkfortransparency.
Overandabovethis,theinstitutionswhoaremeanttooverseeandinvestigatethe
intelligenceserviceswhererequired–theInspector-GeneralandAuditor-General
–mustdosovigorously.Butthereisaworryingfactorthatmaylimitparliamentin
playingthisroleinarobustway.ExceptfortheHRC,thestructureswithoversight
oftheintelligencecommunityalloperatewithintheintelligenceservices’circle
ofsecrecy,andacceptwhatevertheintelligenceservicesconsidersasclassified.
Theseoversightauthoritiesneedtostartquestioningwhycertaininformationhas
beendesignatedsecret,atleastintheformativestagesofdefining(orredefining)
atransparencyandsecrecypolicy.
Strongleadershipandpolicydirectionwillbeneeded.Somemembersofthe
intelligenceservicesmayfeelthreatenedbyaparadigmthatdoesnotregardthem
asbeingthedeterminingforcebehindapolicyreview,butratherasservantsofits
outcome.Suchareactionwouldbeunderstandable;theintelligenceserviceshave
longbeeninthepaternalisticpositionofdecidingwhoshouldknowwhat.How-
ever,parliamentshouldensurethattheservicesclearlyunderstandthebroader
issues involved, including thehistoricalandconstitutional imperatives;create
appropriatepolicyframeworksfortheservices;andreviewtheirmandates.
ParliamentmusttakestockofthefailingsofPAIAaswellasotherrelevant
legislation.Lastly,theministerofintelligenceservicesmustensurethatadequate
resourcesareavailable tomakevoluntarydisclosurea reality,andparliament
mustkeepwatchoverhowthisdutyisperformed.
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Dennis,Hilton(Mr),Director-General,SouthAfricanSecretService,25July2005.
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Dominy,Graham(Dr),NationalArchivist,DepartmentofArts,Culture,Scienceand
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Geldenhuys,Tertius(Dr),HeadLegalServices,SouthAfricanPoliceService,7October2003.
Harris,Verne(Mr),Director,SouthAfricanHistoryArchive,1September2003.
Hendricks,Wayne(Dr),SeniorAnalystintheNationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee
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Masetlha,Billy(Mr),Director-General,NationalIntelligenceAgency,4August2005.
McKay,Jackie(Mr),DeputyInformationOfficer,NationalIntelligenceAgency,15July2005.
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Well-kept SecretS
South Africa’s democratic constitution entrenches citizens’ right of access to information held by the state. In this volume, the author – who previously held a senior position in the intelligence community – assesses whether the post-apartheid intelligence services have complied with this obligation during the first decade following South Africa’s transition to democracy.
She raises key normative questions such as whether relevant policy-makers and the intelligence services have pursued appropriate and meaningful levels of transparency; and whether there has been a decisive break with the culture of secrecy that characterised the apartheid intelligence apparatus. Drawing on international theory and comparative experience, she spells out a path towards clearer policy and practice on these vital issues.
It is hoped this book will help role players in the intelligence dispensation to gain greater clarity about the boundaries between transparency and secrecy – and, equally crucially, equip citizens to better defend their hard-won constitutional freedoms.
9 7 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 6 2 2 1
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