The right of access to information and the South African intelligence services

Sandy Africa

Well-kept SecretS

Well-keptSecretS

Institute for

Global Dialogue

The right of access to information and the South African intelligence services

Sandy Africa

Well-keptSecretS

Jointly published by:

Institute for Global Dialogue IGD House, Thornhill Office Park Bekker Street, Vorna Valley Midrand, South AfricaP O Box 32571, Braamfontein 2017Tel +27 11 315-1299 Fax +27 11 315-2149 info@igd.org.za www.igd.org.za

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique Office Avenida Tomás Nduda 1313Maputo, Mozambique Tel: +258 214 912 31 Fax: +258 214 902 86 fes@tvcabo.co.mz

First impression in May 2009

© Copyright in the text vests in the author.© Copyright in this published work vests in the publisher.

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ISBN: 978-1-920216-22-1

Designed and produced by Acumen Publishing Solutions, JohannesburgPrinted by Paarl Print

Contents

Preface 9Foreword 11Introduction 15

Part OneContext and background

Chapter 1: Secrecy and transparency in the governance of intelligence 31 services

Chapter 2: The policy framework for official secrecy prior to 1994 47

Chapter 3: The transition to democracy, and its implications for intelligence 64 accountability and transparency

Part TwoThe new dispensation

Chapter 4: Mechanisms facilitating access to information about the 87 intelligence services

Chapter 5: PAIA and its implications for the intelligence services 97

Chapter 6: The intelligence services and the right of access to information: 115 three case studies

Part ThreeLessons, conclusions, and policy recommendations

Chapter 7: Comparative international experiences 135

Chapter 8: Conclusion and policy recommendations 149

Interviews and references 166

ACRonYMs AnD ABBReVIAtIons

AC AmalgamationCommittee

ADS AfricanDefenceSystems(Pty)Ltd

ANC AfricanNationalCongress

AU AfricanUnion

BOSS BureauforStateSecurity

CCII CCIISystems(Pty)Ltd

CDRC Classification/DeclassificationReviewCommittee

CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency

CODESA ConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfrica

COSATU CongressofSouthAfricanTradeUnions

COMSEC ElectronicSecurityCommunications(Pty)Ltd,2002

CSIS CanadianSecurityIntelligenceService

DOD DepartmentofDefence

DOJ DepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment

DIO DeputyInformationOfficer

DIS DepartmentofIntelligenceandSecurity

DMI DirectorateofMilitaryIntelligence

DMI DivisionofMilitaryIntelligence

EU EuropeanUnion

FOIA FreedomofInformationAct

GFC GermanFrigateConsortium

HOCS HeadsofCivilianServices

HRC HumanRightsCommission

IAAC InformationActAdvisoryCommittee

ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights

ICD IntelligenceCoordinationDivision

Acronyms AnD AbbrevIAtIons / 7

IO InformationOfficer

ISCOR IronandSteelCorporation

ISSUP InstituteforStrategicStudies,UniversityofPretoria

IRC InterdepartmentalReviewCommittee

JCIC JointCoordinatingIntelligenceCommittee

JSCI JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence

KGB Komityet Gosudarstvyennoi Biezopasnosti (Committee forState

Security)

MISS MinimumInformationSecurityStandards

NGO Non-governmentalOrganisation

NIA NationalIntelligenceAgency

NCC NationalCommunicationsCentre

NICOC NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee

NIS NationalIntelligenceService

NP NationalParty

NSA NationalSecurityAgency

NSMS NationalSecurityManagementSystem

OAU OrganisationofAfricanUnity

OB OssewaBrandwag

PAC PanAfricanistCongress

PAIA PromotionofAccesstoInformationAct,2000

PFMA PublicFinanceManagementAct,1999

PKO PeacekeepingOperation

RCMP RoyalCanadianMountedPolice

RSA RepublicofSouthAfrica

SACP SouthAfricanCommunistParty

SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

SADF SouthAfricanDefenceForce

SAHA SouthAfricanHistoryArchive

SANAI SouthAfricanNationalAcademyofIntelligence

8 / Acronyms AnD AbbrevIAtIons

SANDF SouthAfricanNationalDefenceForce

SAP SouthAfricanPolice

SAPS SouthAfricanPoliceService

SARS SouthAfricanRevenueService

SASS SouthAfricanSecretService

SIRC SecurityIntelligenceReviewCommittee

SSAC StateSecurityAdvisoryCouncil

SSC StateSecurityCouncil

TBVC Transkei,Bophuthatswana,Venda,Ciskei

TEC TransitionalExecutiveCouncil

TRC TruthandReconciliationCommission

UDF UnionDefenceForce

UDF UnitedDemocraticFront

UN UnitedNations

UNITA NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola

USA UnitedStatesofAmerica

USSR UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics

WHAM WinningHeartsandMinds

Civilian intelligence services are oftenperceivedasoccupyingarecondite

world,characterisedbysecrecy,ambiguity,andconcealment.Butnotalways

understood is that they are subject to stringent oversight and accountability

imperatives,whichareoftenlegallyenshrined.Accesstoinformationisthusan

importantnormativeaspirationforanysocietythatseekstopromotethevirtues

ofdemocracy.Oneoftheseistherightofthepublictoknowaboutthenatureof

intelligenceworkwithregardtoitspolicy,operationalandregulatorydimensions.

Thistakesonaddedmeaningandrelevanceindefiningtheparametersofhow

politicalpowerisexercisedandmanaged.

ThecaseofSouthAfricaisthusespeciallyintriguing,interestingandimportant.

Thestate’spreviouscivilianintelligenceapparatusoccupiedthedarkrecessesof

illegality,whereithelpedtoupholdandprotecttheapartheidregimeanditssecu-

ritydictates.Inthecurrentdispensation,ithasemergedintothebroaddaylightof

beingsubjecttopublicscrutiny,transparency,anddemocraticaccountability.How-

ever,astheauthortrenchantlyargues,thischangedrealityshouldnotmaskthe

persistenceofawkwarddilemmas,tensionsandambivalencesinlaw,policyand

practice.Indeed,thesewillcontinuetodefinethechallengeshighlightedinthis

enquiry,cruciallygiventhattherulingparty,theAfricanNationalCongress,hadits

ownintelligencesystemsandculturewhileconductingitsstruggleforliberation.

Rich in texture and nuance, judiciously balanced by the perspectives of a

formerpractitionerandscholar,andinformedbycomparativeexperiences,this

bookrepresentsapioneeringattempttoimposeanalyticalandnormativeorder

onhowconstitutionalprerogativeshaveshapedtheinterfacebetweenthecivilian

intelligencearchitectureandaccesstoinformationinthefirstdecadeofSouth

Africa’stransitiontodemocracy.

TheFriedrichEbertStiftungandtheInstituteforGlobalDialoguehavecome

together inacollaborativespirit tomake thispublicationpossible.This isnot

only indicative of their recognising the value of this book but also reflects an

abidingcommitmenttobringitintothepublicdomainwhereitdeservesawide

readership.

PReFACe

10 / PrefAce

Manfred Öhm

Resident Representative

FES: Mozambique

Garth le Pere

Executive Director

IGD: South Africa

Wetakethisopportunitytothanktheauthor,ProfSandyAfrica,forhercoop-

erationthroughoutaswellasherdedicationinupdatingthestudywithnewand

relevantmaterial.ThelastwordofgratitudeisreservedforRiaandeVillierswho

ablyturnedadoctoraldissertationintoahighlyengagingandreadablenarrative.

This volume is based onmydoctoraldissertation,andrepresentsanattemptto

makethestudyasaccessibleaspossibletoawideraudience.Ihopeitwillbe

readbymembersoftheSouthAfricanintelligenceservices,pastandpresent,and

thattheywillfinditafairrepresentationofthewayinwhichthepost-apartheid

civilianintelligencedispensationcameintobeing,andhowthechallengesthat

emergedinthecourseofthatprocesshavebeenaddressed.Ialsohopeitwillbe

readby,andbenefit,otherpolicyactors–theexecutive,membersofparliament,

andmembersofhumanrightsbodies–aswellasstudentsinpolicyandsecurity

studies.

Mostimportantly,Ihopethatmembersofthepublic,whomayhavebeenmys-

tifiedorintriguedbythelimitedinformationabouttheSouthAfricanintelligence

servicesinthepublicdomain,willfeelinclinedtoexplorethisstudy.Certainly,

members of the international policy community have displayed considerable

interestintheSouthAfricanmodelof‘securitysectorreform’,thecatchphrase

forinclusiveeffortstosubjectsecurityinstitutionstouniversallyagreedinstru-

mentsofcontrol,accountability,andoversight.OtherAfricancountriesemerging

fromconflicthavealsodisplayedaninterestintheSouthAfricanexperience,as

haveanalystsandothersinmorestablesocietieswitharenewedinterestinthe

accountabilityoftheirsecurityandintelligenceinstitutions.Ihopethisbookwill

enrichtheirenquiries.

Manypeoplehavecontributedtoitsevolution.ProfessorGavinCawthrawas

anunassumingyetknowledgeablesupervisorduring the lengthydoctoraldis-

sertation process. Several of my bosses in the intelligence services, including

Tim Dennis, director-general of the South African Secret Service (SASS), and

LindiweSisuluandRonnieKasrils,ministers for the intelligenceservices,suc-

cumbedtomyratherimpertinentrequestsforsabbaticalleave.Interviewsand

discussionswereaninvaluablesourceofinformation.Iinterviewedorhelddis-

cussionswithexpertsinvolvedindraftingthePromotionofAccesstoInformation

Act(PAIA);officialsoftheDepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment,

theleaddepartmentresponsibleforimplementingtheAct;theheadoftheSouth

FoRewoRD

12 / foreworD

AfricanNationalArchives;constitutionalandstatutorybodiesaimedatensuring

transparencyandaccountability,includingtheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCom-

missionandtheOfficeoftheAuditor-General;freedomofinformationadvocacy

groups,suchastheSouthAfricanHistoryArchiveTrust,ontheirexperienceof

gainingaccesstoinformationheldbythestate;andseniorofficialsoftheintel-

ligence services, on their implementation of the constitutional and legislative

requirementsforaccesstostateinformation.

Myownpositionasaseniormanagerintheintelligenceservicesprovidedme

withaccesstorelevantofficialsandpolicyactors.Atthesametime,Ioftenexperi-

encedadegreeoftensionbetweenbeingpartofthesystemandexplainingaway

itsfailures,andadoptingamorecriticalperspectivewithaviewtostimulating

debateandencouraginghigherstandardsofaccountability.

Colleagues, friends, and family members who shaped or shared my ideas,

helpedtosourceinformation,orcommentedonpartsoftheearlierdissertation

includedVerneHarris,PinglaUdit,WayneHendricks,DennisDlomo,Kerenza

Millard,RachmatRassool,LornaDaniels,JenniferBrady,HowardVarney,Taki

Netshitenzhe,WillemHanekom,andRieaz(Moe)Shaik.SiyabongaCweleand

ZolaNgcakanioftheintelligenceoversightcommunityencouragedmetopub-

lish the dissertation. The late Joe Nhlanhla personified the new intelligence

dispensation,andtheframeworkcraftedunderhisleadershipandthoseofother

visionariesacrossthepoliticaldivideinspiredmetoperseverewiththedisser-

tationandthisbook,inasmallefforttopreservethevisionandidealismofthe

earlyefforts.TheseidealshavespreadacrossAfrica,wherethereisasteadybut

growingappreciationoftheneedforintelligencereform,andwhereSouthAfrica’s

modesteffortsinthisregardarebeingemulatedandeven–withthebenefitof

hindsight–improvedupon.

Ireceivedencouragementfrommanyothers,aswellasspaceandpatientbid-

ingattheUniversityofPretoriafromProfessorMaxiSchoeman.Moralsupport

andencouragementwereprovidedingenerousamountsbymyhusband,Vejay;

mychildren;myfatherandsiblings,evenastheenddrewnearformyterminally

illmother;andrelativesandfriends.

IamgratefultotheInstituteforGlobalDialogue(IGD)foragreeingtopublish

thebook,andtotheFriedrichEbertStiftung(FES)foragreeingtofinanceit.I

alsowishtothankRiaandeVilliers,whoexpertlyguidedtheconversionofastiff

academicdissertationintoamoreconversational,morereadable,andhopefully

moreinterestingtext,andhisteamatAcumenPublishingSolutionsforproducing

anattractiveandeasilyreadablebook.Atthesametime,Iremainresponsiblefor

whateverinaccuraciesanddeficienciesmayremain.

foreworD / 13

Abookonthistopicbegsthequestionofwhatimpactintelligencehasonthe

livesofordinarycitizens,andwhetherandhowtheyshouldinfluencethedebate

ontheroleofthesekindsofinstitutions.Intheend,IamnotsurewhetherIhave

answeredthisquestion.Iarguetheneedforacomprehensivesetofpolicymeas-

uresaimedatbroadeningthepublic’sunderstandingof,andcapacitytodiscuss

andengagewiththeintelligenceservices.Aninformedpublicisthemosteffective

waytoensurethatstatestructureswithsuchpotentpowersareheldtoaccount.

Iarguethatsuchapolicyshouldprovideaclearframeworkintermsofwhich

informationshouldbeprotectedfromdisclosure,or,toputitmoredirectly,the

conditionsunderwhichsecrecyshouldbeallowed.Ontheotherhand,public

policyshouldalsoprovideclearcriteriafordecidingwheninformationnolonger

requiressuchprotection.Whilesomewouldprobablydisagree,Iarguethatintel-

ligence services have a legitimate role in South Africa’s new democracy. The

challengeistoensurethattheydonotunderminetheverydemocracythattheir

chartersrequirethemtoprotect.

Followingdecadesofsecrecy,promotingaccesstoinformationisarelatively

newexperienceforSouthAfrica.Itisparticularlychallenginginanareasuchas

intelligence,whichhastraditionallybeenclosedtopublicscrutiny.Balancingthe

roleofthestateinensuringthesecurityandwell-beingofitscitizensandthecon-

stitutionalrightofcitizenstoaccessinformationheldbythestateinvolvesdifficult

choices.However,thehistoryofunaccountableandsecretiveconductonthepart

ofSouthAfricansecurityactorssuggeststhatpolicyactors ingovernmentand

elsewhereshouldcontinuetoregardthisasanationalpriority.

Sandy Africa

April2009

32. Access to information

Everyone has the right of access to any information held by

the state …

National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this

right …

36. Limitation of rights

(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in

terms of law of general application to the extent that the

limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and

democratic society based on human dignity, equality and

freedom …

… Except as provided in subsection (1), or in any other

provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right

entrenched in the Bill of Rights …

Extracts from the Bill of Rights, Chapter 2, Constitution of the

Republic of South Africa

IN 1994 South Africa emergedfromaperiodofminorityrulecharacterisedby

excessivegovernmentsecrecyandthedenialofbasichumanrights.Onesuch

rightwastherightofaccesstoinformationgeneratedandheldbythestate.While

post-apartheidgovernmentshavebeenfarmoretransparentthantheirpredeces-

sors,policy-makersofthenewpoliticalorderhavenotreflectedadequatelyon

theimplicationsoftransparencyfortheintelligenceservices.Consequently,South

Africa does not have an explicit and coherent policy on access to information

abouttheintelligenceservices,ortheinformationtheyholdorgenerate.Among

otherthings,itisnotaltogetherclearwhatinformationorrecordscreatedorheld

bytheintelligenceservicesneedtobeprotected,fromwhom,andwhy.

Asaresultofthispolicyvacuum,thepost-apartheidintelligenceserviceshave

beenambivalentaboutandinconsistentinapplyingtheconstitutionalprinciple

oftheuniversalrightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,aswellaslegisla-

tionaimedatgivingeffecttoit.Oneconsequenceofthisisthatcitizensaswell

asorganisationsfunctioninginthepublicspheredonotalwaysunderstandtheir

rightsinthisrespect;specifically,theyoftendonotunderstandthattherecordsof

theintelligenceservicesareinfactpublicrecords.

Theconcernedcitizen,however,wouldwanttoknowthefollowing:whatare

themechanismsformanagingtherecordsoftheintelligenceservices?Arethese

filedsafelyandsecurelysothattheycanberetrievedwhenneeded–forinstance,

whenthoseservicesreceiverequestsforaccesstoinformation?Dotheservices

actuallyknowwhatrecordstheyhave,andgiventhesecrecyinvolvedinintelli-

gence,isitpossibleforthemtoknow?Aretherecordstamper-proof?Whatisthe

retentionsanddisposalspolicyoftheintelligenceservices,andunderwhatcondi-

tions,ifany,arerecordsreleasedforpublicconsumption?

Anotherlayerofquestionsrelatestosecrecy.Whichdocumentsareclassified

assecretorconfidential,andwhy?Whotakesthesedecisions,andunderwhat

authority?Forhowlongmaysuchdocumentsbeclassifiedassecret,andwhat

happensifthisstatusisnolongernecessary?Lastly,isthereanyoversightofwhat

happenstotheserecords,andhowcanthepublicbeassuredthattheircustodian-

shipisingoodhands?

IntRoDuCtIon

16 / IntroDuctIon

BACkgRounD

Priorto1994theSouthAfricanintelligenceserviceswerevirtuallyimmunefrom

publicscrutiny.TheOfficialSecretsActsof1912and1956,theSecurityIntelli-

genceandStateSecurityCouncilActof1972,theBureauforStateSecurityActof

1978,theProtectionofInformationActof1982,andvariouslawsrelatingtothe

financingofthesecurityservicesallservedtodrawaveilofsecrecyaroundthem

(Mathews1978;Africa1992).

The post-apartheid constitution – which came into force in 1996 – estab-

lishedanumberofinstitutionsaimedatsupportingarights-basedconstitutional

democracy. These include a Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission,

the Commission for Gender Equality, the Commission for the Promotion and

ProtectionoftheRightsofCultural,ReligiousandLinguisticCommunities,the

Auditor-General,andtheIndependentElectoralCommission(Constitution,1996,

chapter9).

Thestatutebookhasbeenextensivelyrevisedtoalign itwiththeconstitu-

tion.Hundredsofapartheidlawshavebeenrepealedormodified,andnewlaws

adopted.SomeprovideforinstitutionsaimedatpromotingandupholdingtheBill

ofRights.Forexample,arisingoutofaconstitutionalprovision,theIntelligence

ServicesControlActof1994providesfortheestablishmentofamultipartyparlia-

mentaryoversightcommitteeandtheappointmentofinspectors-generaltasked

withinvestigatingcomplaintsagainsttheservicesbymembersofthepublic.

The new constitution also stipulated that national legislation should be

introducedtogiveeffecttotherightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,

resultingintheadoptionofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct(PAIA)

of2000.Thislawrequiresstatesecurityorganstoactivelydiscloseinformation

aboutthemselves,andrespondtorequestsforaccesstotheirrecords.However,

someobserversarguethatthesecurityservicescontinuetoresistdisclosure,thus

underminingtheconstitutionalprincipleofaccesstoinformation(Harris2002;

Currie&Klaaren2002).

Gearingthepost-apartheidintelligenceservicestowardsdischargingtheircon-

stitutionalobligationstoimplementPAIAcarriessignificantchallengesinrespect

ofcapacity.TheActisrelativelycomplex,anditsimplementationrequires,among

otherthings,theproductionofmanuals;acapacitytorespondinatimelyfashion

torequestsforaccesstorecords;anabilitytoprocessappeals,alongsidetherole

ofthecourtswhichmustbecomeinvolvedwhenrequesterswishtoseekrecourse

tojustice;andcompliancewithasystemofannualreporting(McKinley2004).

In 1995 the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the South African Secret

Service(SASS),andtheNationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee(NICOC)

IntroDuctIon / 17

were established, constituting the civilian intelligence sector. Since 2000 the

sectorhasbeensignificantlyexpandedwiththeformationoftheSouthAfrican

National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI); Electronic Communications Secu-

rity(Pty)Limited; theOfficefor InterceptionCentres(OIC);andtheNational

Communications Centre (NCC). It is safe to assume that the secret records of

theintelligenceserviceshavegrownexponentially.Publicignoranceandintelli-

genceserviceambiguityarelikelytopersistuntilclearpolicyguidelinesforthe

managementofdifferentcategoriesofrecordsheldbytheintelligenceservices

areformulatedandmadeknown.Giventhesecrecysurroundingtheintelligence

services,andthepotentialforabusethatsuchsecrecycarries,citizensmustbe

assuredthatthereareclearparametersandpolicyguidelinesfortheexerciseof

secrecyandtransparency.

the AIM oF the stuDY

Whenoneassesseswhethertheintelligenceserviceshavecompliedwiththeircon-

stitutionalobligationsinthefirstdecadeoftheirexistence–thatis,from1995

to2004–itappearsthatboththeservicesandrelevantpolicy-makershavebeen

ambiguousabouthowappropriateandmeaningfullevelsoftransparencyshould

bepursued,andunderwhatconditionstheservicesmayinvokearighttosecrecy.

Amorepessimisticanalysiswouldbethatthewayinwhichtheintelligenceserv-

iceshaveretreatedintojustificationsofsecrecyevenwhengreateropennessand

publicdisclosurewouldnothavethreatenednationalsecurity,displaysasignifi-

cantcontinuitywiththeapartheidpast.Howarewetounderstandandexplain

thisambivalence,andpresentpolicyalternativesthatwillcompromiseneitherthe

intelligenceservices’executionoftheirmandatenorthepublicrightofaccessto

informationheldbythestate?

Thisstudyisbasedonthepremisethatthepost-apartheidintelligenceservices

areguidedbythecountry’sconstitution,includingitsinjunctiononaccesstoinfor-

mation.Oneshouldrememberthattheservicesthemselveshavebeencreatedin

termsoftheconstitution,whichindicatesthatitsarchitectsforesawtheneedfor

entitieswhosefunctionswouldincludethegatheringofintelligenceinpursuitof

nationalsecurity,presumablyintheknowledgethattheywouldcarryoverinto

thenewdispensationthosemethodsandpractices–ofintrusion,surveillance,and

restrictionsonaccesstoinformation–thatareinimicaltothedemocraticideal,

butpartoftherealitiesofgovernanceinthemodernworld.Theconductofthe

intelligenceserviceswouldthereforehavetobealignedwiththeirstatusascon-

stitutionalentities,andthedutiesimposedbythisimperative.Thisincludesbeing

18 / IntroDuctIon

subjecttotheBillofRights,whichguaranteestherightsoffreeassociationand

expression,privacy,dignity,life,andaccesstoinformationheldbythestate.This

isachallengingreality,butonewhichtheSouthAfricapolityandcitizenrycanbe

gratefulfor.

Bywayofbackground,andinordertoimproveourunderstandingofthecur-

rentlegalandpolicyenvironment,thisstudyexploresofficialsecrecyinSouth

Africaintheyearsofwhiteminorityrule.Ittracesthepoliticalimperativesthat

causedsuccessive20th centurygovernmentstointroducelegislationthatensured

theircontinueddominanceoverthecountry’sblackmajority.

Thestudyalsoassessesthestateofaccesstoinformationabouttheintelligence

servicesintheperiodduringwhichthecountry’snegotiatedsettlementgaverise

toanewintelligencedispensation.Oncetheybegantodiscussanewintelligence

dispensation, the parties to the process – principally the National Party (NP)

governmentandtheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)–rapidlyagreedonthe

strategiesappropriatetoconductingthistypeofwork.Secrecywouldbeanec-

essaryandunavoidablestrategicimperative.Eventhoughtheymighthavebeen

polesapartpoliticallyandideologically,themainpartieswereunitedonthecore

issueofhowtheintelligenceservicesshouldgoabouttheirbusiness.

Thisstudyaddressestheissueofwhetherthemethodsofsecrecyemployed

by the post-apartheid intelligence services are legitimate and sustainable in a

democracy,andwhethersufficientsafeguardshavebeenputinplacetoensure

thatabusesofpowerareavoided,orcanatleastbedetected.Asnotedearlier,the

intelligenceserviceshavebeencreatedundertheconstitution,andaresubjecttoa

numberofdemocraticprinciples.Inthisregard,thefirstquestioniswhetherthey

operateunderenablingconditions,whethertheirmandatesandfocusareclearly

andexplicitlyspeltoutintheirfoundinglegislation,andwhethertheirefficacyis

enhancedbythegovernancerequirementsimposeduponthem.Asecondques-

tionconcernstheimpactoftheseeminglycontradictorypolicy,legislative,and

regulatoryarrangementsunderwhichtheintelligenceservicesfunctioninrespect

ofpublicaccesstoinformation.Themaincontradictionisthat,whiletheconstitu-

tionconfersarightofaccesstoinformationheldbythestate,someorgansofstate

(notablytheintelligenceservices)arealsodirectedtoconducttheiraffairsinrela-

tivesecrecy(Currie&Klaaren2002).ThustheIntelligenceServicesActof2002

requirestheheadsofthoseservicestoprotecttheidentitiesofmembers,sources,

andmethodsofcollection(Qunta2004).AndtheProtectionofInformationActof

1982,whichhascoexistedsince2000withPAIA,providespenaltiesfordisclosure

oforunauthorisedaccesstoamuchwiderspectrumofinformationandrecords

thancontemplatedinthelatteract(Currie&Klaaren2002).Athirdexampleis

IntroDuctIon / 19

thatwhiletheNationalArchivesActof1996providesforthedeclassificationof

recordsafter20years,itdoesnotstatehowrecordsoriginallyclassifiedassecret

onthegroundsofnationalsecurityaretobehandledafterthe20-yearperiod

(McKinley2004).

The current situation is that information is classified in terms of a cabinet

guideline,theMinimumInformationSecurityStandards(MISS).Whatprovides

cause for concern is that while the MISS requires officials in all government

departments, without regard for their levels of authority or responsibility, to

adheretoitsprescriptionsforsecrecy,itdoesnotprovideanyoversightmecha-

nisms. Officials are required to classify ‘sensitive’ information as ‘Top Secret’,

‘Secret’,‘Confidential’,or‘Restricted’,dependingontheperceiveddegreeofharm

tonationalsecurityshouldtheinformationbedisclosed(Currie&Klaaren2002).

Thecriteria forclassifyingrecords,andtherefore forwithholding information

fromthepublic,arenotcontainedinanylegislation,creatingconcernthatthe

MISSinfactcontradictsPAIA.Thisstudyexplorestheimplicationsofthesegaps

inthelegislativeandpolicyframework,andrecommendsoptionsforaddressing

them.

A third question is whether the custodianship of intelligence records is

regulated in a way that guarantees their safety and integrity. This concern is

particularly germane to information about – and records of – the intelligence

services,becausetheyaregenerallyclosedtopublicscrutiny(Posel&Simpson

2002).Membersoftheseservicesaresworntosecrecyandmaynotdisclosetheir

activities;onlyalimitedamountofinformationabouttheactivitiesofthesestruc-

turesisreleasedtothepublic,andevenoversightbodiesareoftennotatliberty

topubliciseallaspectsoftheirinteractionswiththesestructures.Yet,asSouth

Africa’sownhistorydemonstrates,itispreciselyundersuchconditionsthatsecu-

rityforcesandintelligenceservicescancommitmajormisdeeds,allinthenameof

nationalsecurity.ThustheTruthandReconciliationCommission(TRC)–abody

establishedbythefirstpost-apartheidgovernmenttofacilitateredressforpoliti-

callyinspiredcriminalactscommittedunderapartheid–emphasisedtheneed

forthepreservationofofficialrecordsinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica.Interalia,it

exposedthefactthattheapartheidgovernmenthaddestroyedmostofitsrecords

initsfinalmonths(TRC1998).Theimpunitywithwhichthiswasdoneserves

asareminderthatwholechaptersofexecutiveactioncanbewipedofftheslate,

renderingstateactorsunaccountableandunpunishableforanymisdemeanours.

Thestudyraises theneed tobettercharacterise thesecurity threats facing

SouthAfrica,andthekindsofintelligenceinformationthatshouldbekeptsecret

asaresult. Italsoraisestheissueofwhoshouldhavetheauthoritytoclassify

20 / IntroDuctIon

information,andintermsofwhatcriteria.Itilluminatesthechallengeoffinding

aformulaforpreservingandhandlingtherecordsoftheapartheidintelligence

services, especially in the context of processes to encourage disclosure about

humanrightsabusescommittedbytheapartheidsecurityforces.Thiswillplayan

importantroleinbringingclosuretothatperiodinSouthAfricanhistory.Afinal

questionconcernsthedurationofclassificationandthecriteriafordetermining

whenamattercanbedeemedtohavelostitssensitivityandthereforeitsclassified

status.Putdifferently,thereshouldbesafeguardstoensurethattheclassifica-

tionordeclassificationofinformationisinthepublicinterest,buttheseareeither

inadequateordonotyetexist.

LoCAtIng the stuDY

Like theircounterpartsaroundtheworld, theSouthAfrican intelligenceserv-

iceskeepsecrets–usuallyinthenameofnationalsecurity.Morethananyother

departmentofstate,theyroutinelywithholdinformationfromthepublic,and

evenfromothergovernmentdepartments.Asaresult,membersofthepublicas

wellassomemembersoftheexecutiveknowrelativelylittleabouttheiractivities,

withthefurtherconsequencesthatmisconceptionsaboutthemabound.Under

thesecircumstances, the intelligenceservices tend tobecomedefensiveabout

theiroperations,andambivalentaboutissuesoftransparency.Thisisoneofthe

mostsignificantchallengeswhichpost-apartheidSouthAfricamustovercome.

Inademocracypurportingtoupholdthepublic’srightofaccesstoinformation

heldbythestate,questionsariseaboutwhenthenon-disclosureofinformation

is justified, and whether keeping these services going is an acceptable way of

spendingtaxpayers’money.Intheirdefence,theintelligenceserviceslayclaim

toaprofessionaldutyofsecrecy(toprotectvulnerableinformants,forexample,

ortopreservetheconfidentialnatureofintelligenceliaisonbetweenstates).They

alsopointoutthattheyarerequiredbylawtokeepinformationsecretundercer-

taincircumstances,atpainofcriminalsanction.Thereassurancethatmatterswill

notgetoutofhand,theyclaim,canbefoundinthecountry’sconstitution,which

unequivocallystatesthattheconductofintelligenceservicesmustconformtothe

ruleoflawaswellasinternationalhumanitarianlaw.

Policyanalystsoftenassumethatthereisacausallinkbetweengovernmental

secrecyandtheabuseofpower–and,conversely,thatgreaterpublicaccessto

information,particularlyaboutsecurityandintelligenceservices,automatically

promotesfairandjudiciousgovernment(Halperin&Hoffman1977;Richelson

1989;Steele2001;Hodess2003).InSouthAfricathereisagrowingexpectation

IntroDuctIon / 21

thatmoreandmoreinformationaboutthesecurityandintelligenceserviceswill

bemadepublic,andthatthesebodieswillbeheldaccountablefortheiractions,

both past and present (Africa 1992; Nhlanhla 1992; Harris 2000; Bell 2001;

Klaaren2002;Levy2004).

Executivesecrecyisgenerallyfrowneduponbycitizensinademocracy,andin

thissenseintelligenceservicesarenotalone.Anyformofofficialsecrecytendsto

createaclimateofdistrustbetweengovernmentandcitizens,andthatthecycleof

governmentalsecrecyandpublicalienationareafeatureofmanywesterndemoc-

racies.Thiscyclereproducesitselfinthefollowingway:peopletendtobelieve

lessandlessofwhatgovernmentsaysbecausetheyfeeltheydonothaveaccess

tocorroborating information.Aperceptionofgovernmentmisinformingthem

setsin,evenwherethisisnotthecase,whilegovernmentbecomesincreasingly

frustratedbythesimplisticanalysesofthepublicwhoseoppositionisperceived

to be motivated by misunderstandings and simplistic and extreme responses

(Mathews1978).

Evenwherecountrieshaveenactedaccesstoinformationlegislation,itdoes

notalwaysmeanthataccessisguaranteed.Inmanycountries,enforcementmech-

anismsareweak,andgovernmentsoftenresisthaving torelease information.

Alternatively,bureaucratsdelaytheprocessingofrequestsforinformation(Martin

&Feldman1998).Notsurprisinglythen,aroundtheworld,intelligenceservices

areincreasinglycloselyscrutinised.Citizensandtheirrepresentativeinstitutions

areaskingtheirgovernmentstoexplainwhattheseinstitutionsarecontributing,

especiallyintimeswhenhardpolicychoiceshavetobemade.

whY thIs DeBAte Is IMPoRtAnt FoR south AFRICA

There are a number of reasons why this study is particularly relevant today.

SouthAfricaisarelativelynewdemocracy,andeventhoughthegovernanceof

itsintelligenceservicesbeendebatedandscrutinisedbothbeforeandafterthe

firstdemocraticelections,greaterattentionneedstobepaidtodetail.Thedebate

aboutthetensionbetweensecrecyandtransparencyispartofasetofwidercon-

cernsabouttheaccountabilityofsecurityservicesindemocraticsettings.Inturn,

theseconcernsrelatetohownationalsecurityisconceptualisedandadvancedby

asocietyanditsgovernment.Thedebateaboutnationalsecurityhasbeeninflu-

encedbytheassumptionsandworldviewsof thedifferentproponents. In the

westernworld,conceptionsofnationalsecuritywereanimportantdimensionof

internationalrelationstheoryduringtheColdWar.

Themainobjectiveofthetwoleadingprotagonists–theUnitedStatesand

22 / IntroDuctIon

theSovietUnion–wastogaintheleadintheraceforstrategicglobaldominance.

Intelligenceservices–notablytheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)andCommit-

teeforStateSecurity(KGB)–playedaprominentroleintheconflict.Intelligence

servicesofothercountriesthroughouttheworldfoundthemselvesinthesphere

ofinfluenceofeitherofthesetwowell-resourcedgiantsintheworldofspying,

oftenservingassatellitesofoneortheother(Ray1979).IntheWest,thedomi-

nantobjectivewasthatofdeterrence–preventingcommunistEastbloccountries

fromextendingtheirinfluence,particularlyinthethirdworld,andensuringthat

westerncountriesremainedaheadinthenucleararmsrace.Inthe1960sthegen-

erationofintelligenceinformationproliferated,withwesternpowersspending

massivesumsondevelopingtechnologiestogivethemanadvantageinthespy

warsagainsttheSovietUnion.

Africadidnotescapethesealignments.ModernAfricanstateshadtheirorigins

inthecolonialpartitionsthattookplaceattheBerlinConferenceof1884(Smith

1983). In thecarvingupof thecontinent thatcharacterisedthis ‘scramble for

Africa’,theneedsandaspirationsofAfricanswerelargelyignored,andtheadmin-

istrativestructurescreatedbyEuropeansweremainlydesignedtofacilitateaccess

tothecontinent’sabundantnaturalresources.Nationalidentitieswereimposed

onAfricans,withhistoricallyspecificidentitiesandtheheterogeneityofAfrican

societiesbeingignoredormisunderstood.Veryoften,theonlyunifyingfactorin

agivencolonywasthefactthatitwassubjecttoasinglecolonialpower.Ironi-

cally,thecommonexperienceofcolonialoppressiongraduallycreatedasenseof

nationhoodamongthepeopleforcedtogetherinthisway,resultingintheforma-

tionofresistancemovements,anddemandsforindependencefromcolonialrulers

(Smith1983).

When independence came, however, many of the colonial administrative

structuresremainedintact,orservedasmodelsforthenewpost-colonialstates.

Post-colonial intelligence services often merely reflected core–periphery rela-

tions,evenafternominalindependencefromcolonialpowershadbeenattained.

SouthAfrica’sdemocratictransitioncoincidedwiththepost-ColdWarera,and

theintelligenceservicesthereforehadanidealopportunitytoeffectgovernance

arrangementsthatputaccountabilityandprofessionalismbeforeideology.This

studywillhopefullyshowtheextenttowhichtheintelligenceserviceswereable

toadheretotheseprinciplesinthefirsttenyearsoftheirexistence.

Thestudyalsocomesatatimewhennumerousdemocraciesthreatenedby

violenceandextremismarethinkingaboutrestrictingtheircitizens’civil liber-

tiesintheinterestsofnationalsecurity(Todd&Bloch2003).Duringthe ‘War

ofTerror’,theUnitedStates,followedbyseveralwesterncountrieswhichprided

IntroDuctIon / 23

themselvesontheircivillibertiescredentials,extendedtheirintelligenceservices’

useofsecret,intrusiveand,itwaswidelysuspected,illegalmethods.Thedebate

onhowmuchsecrecyasocietyshouldtolerateisparticularlypertinenttoSouth

Africa,giventhat,havingemergedfromapast inwhichthestatedisregarded

humanrights,anyreversalorevenqualificationofthefundamentalrightspro-

videdfornowwillbesubjecttothetestofconstitutionalism.Thisstudyrecognises

thehumanrightsunderpinningsofthepost-apartheidsecuritydispensation,and

attemptstofindpolicysolutionswithinthisparadigm.Thedebatearoundaccess

toinformationheldbythestateistakingplaceatatimewhenrapidtechnologi-

caldevelopment,andaninformationexplosionhaveexposedjusthowvulnerable

andpenetrabletheinformationsystemsofgovernmentreallyare.Communica-

tionstechnologyhasdevelopedtosuchanextent–thereisamultitudeofsatellite,

digital,andelectronicpossibilities–thatmostgovernmentsadmittheycannot

guarantee that the informationtheycollectandstore is invulnerable tounau-

thorisedaccess(Lipinski1999).Thisaffectsthedurabilityandefficacyofsecrecy

regimens,andcallsintoquestionthefundsneededtosecureinformationsystems

andpersonnelentrustedwithinformationsecurity.

Anotherfactoraffectingtheefficacyofsecrecysystemsisglobalisation,andthe

growthofmultinationalgovernmentalandprivateentities.Identitiesareincreas-

inglydefinedintransnationalterms,andindividualloyaltytoacountrymight

existalongsideorevenbesurpassedbyidentificationwithmultinationalcorpora-

tions.Theimplicationsofthisphenomenon–whichisdramaticallyfacilitatedby

newtechnology–isthatpeopleareincreasinglyidentifyingwithcausesregardless

ofgeographicalboundaries.Inatechnologicallylinkedglobalenvironment,where

accesstoinformationisoftenthekeytoprosperity,andterritorialidentitiesare

beingsubsumedbyotherformsofidentity,actorswhohavetodevelopappropri-

atepoliciesforpromotinganddefendingnationalsecurityfacemajorchallenges.

Finally,thestudyisrelevantbecauseitexplorestheinterplaybetweenvari-

ouspolicyactorsinthecourseofprovidingaccesstoinformation.Theseinclude

theexecutive,parliament,officialsoftheintelligenceservicesandotherrelated

departments,oversightbodies,andorgansofcivil society.While theybroadly

agreeonprinciples, theyoftenhavedivergent interests,which leads todiffer-

encesininterpretingandapplyingpolicy.Iconductedinterviewswithsomeof

theseactors,includingofficialsintheintelligenceservicesandothergovernment

departments,draftersofthelegislationpromotingaccesstoinformation,mem-

bers of various oversight structures, academics, and representatives of NGOs.

Understandingtheperspectivesofpolicyactors–wheretheyconverge,andwhere

theydiffer–isanimportantpartofthepolicy-makingprocess,whichmustseek

24 / IntroDuctIon

tomanagethesetensionsintheinterestsofthevariousstakeholders(Lee1991).

Theconcludingpolicyrecommendationsrepresentsomethingofabalancingact,

andrecognisethatmostoralldivergentviewsarepartlyvalid.

the sCoPe oF the stuDY

ThetermsanddefinitionsusedinrespectofSouthAfrica’sstatutorysecurityinsti-

tutionsarederivedfromtheconstitution.Chapter11oftheconstitutionrefers

to ‘securityservices’,comprisingthenationaldefenceforce,thepoliceservice,

andtheintelligenceservices.Theactualshapeandfunctionsoftheintelligence

communityweretheproductofextensivedebatebetweenthepartiesinvolvedin

negotiatingSouthAfrica’spoliticalfutureintheearly1990s.

Oneofthemajordeparturesfromtheapartheiddispensationwastoestab-

lishtwocivilianintelligenceservices,onefordomesticintelligenceandanother

forforeignintelligence.Underapartheidthepremiercivilianintelligenceservice

wastheNationalIntelligenceService(NIS),whichcollectedbothdomesticand

foreignintelligence.Inaddition,the‘Bantustans’ofTranskei,Bophuthatswana,

andVendahadtheirownintelligenceservices.ModelledontheNIS,theylargely

concentratedonflushingoutanti-apartheidactivists,andreliedheavilyonPreto-

riafordirectionandresources.Whentheintelligenceserviceswereamalgamated

in1995,themembersofthesesatelliteserviceswerealsoabsorbedintothetwo

newservices.

InlinewiththeWhitePaperonIntelligenceandNationalStrategicIntelligence

Actof1994,themissionofthedomesticintelligenceservice–theNIA–istocon-

ductsecurityintelligencewithinthebordersoftheRepublicofSouthAfricain

ordertoprotecttheconstitution.Itsaimistoensurethesecurityandstabilityof

thestate,andthesafetyandwell-beingofitscitizens.

InSouthAfricanlaw,‘domesticintelligence’meansintelligenceonanyinternal

activity,factorordevelopmentdetrimentaltothenationalstabilityoftherepublic,

orthreatsorpotentialthreatstotheconstitutionalorderoftheRepublicandthe

safetyandwell-beingofitspeople.Themissionoftheforeignintelligenceservice

–theSASS–istoconductintelligenceinrelationtoexternalthreats,opportuni-

ties,andotherissuesthatmightaffecttheRepublic,withtheaimofpromoting

nationalsecurityandtheinterestsofthecountryanditspeople.Thelawdefines

‘foreignintelligence’asintelligenceonanyexternalthreatorpotentialthreator

potentialthreattothenationalinterestsoftheRepublicanditspeople,andintel-

ligenceregardingopportunitiesrelevanttotheprotectionandpromotionofsuch

IntroDuctIon / 25

nationalinterestsirrespectiveofwhetherornotitcanbeusedtoformulateforeign

policy(RSA,NationalStrategicIntelligenceAct1994).

Thisstudydoesnotaddressindetailthemanagementofaccesstointelligence

informationheldbytheSouthAfricanPoliceService(SAPS)andtheSouthAfri-

canNationalDefenceForce(SANDF),althoughthequestionsposedaboutcivilian

intelligenceareequallyrelevanttothosesectorsofthesecurityservices.Thereis

roomforbroadeningtheanalysisinthisarea,notleastbecausetheintelligence

communitystraddlesthedefenceandpolicingenvironments(Africa&Mlombile

2001).ThisismadeclearintheNationalStrategicIntelligenceActof1994which

outlinesthestrategicintelligence-gatheringmandatesoftheNIA,SASS,Defence

Intelligence,andCrimeIntelligence.

This study focuses on policies and policy alternatives for managing intelli-

genceinformation,definedasrecordsgeneratedbytheintelligenceservicesin

thecourseof theirwork.These include theraw informationdocumentedand

compiled fromanumberofsources, including informers, technicalandsignal

collectionpoints,writtenreports,andanalysescompiledbyintelligenceofficers;

andtheassessmentsandreportsgeneratedfromthisdata,usuallyassessments

of threatsorperceivedthreats tonationalsecuritypresentedtopolicy-makers

(Richelson 1989). It also includes dossiers on people and organisations, and

recordsofthemethodsusedtogathertheinformationinquestion.

Thedefinitionofintelligencerecordsalsocoversrecordsaboutgovernanceof

theintelligenceservices,includinghumanresources,assets,andfinancialman-

agement.‘Intelligenceinformation’mayormaynotbehighlysensitive(inother

words,itspublicdisclosuremayormaynothavegraveimplicationsfornational

security),dependingonthecriteriaandconsiderationsusedtoevaluateit.

Thestudyalsoexploresissuesaroundthestatus,legitimacy,andownershipof

intelligenceinformationinthecountry’smovementfromauthoritariantodemo-

craticrule.Asabackdropitreviewsandassessesthepoliticalprocessesleadingto

theestablishmentofthenewintelligencedispensation,notablytheformationof

theNIAandSASS,whichweretofunctionunderachangedsetofpoliticalrules.

Acorefocusofthisstudyiswhether,inthecourseoftheirformationandearly

development,theyhaveadaptedtotheserulesofaccountabilityandregardforthe

constitutionandthelaw.

Itseekstoanalysehow,inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,allthreearmsofgov-

ernment–thelegislature,executive,andthejudiciary–aswellasofficialsofthe

intelligenceserviceshavedefinedtheirrelationshiptointelligenceinformation

byhighlightingthechoicestheyhavemadeinrelationtovariouschallenges.The

oversightstructurescreatedintermsoftheconstitutionandnationallegislation

26 / IntroDuctIon

–theAuditor-General,theJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence(JSCI),and

theInspector-GeneralforIntelligence–interactwiththeintelligenceservicesin

linewiththeirrespectivemandates.Theirrecordinplayingtheseoversightroles

isbrieflyreviewed.Itiswidelyknown,andevenaccepted,thattheintelligence

servicesdomuchoftheirworkinsecret,givingrisetothecentraldilemmaexer-

cisingthisstudy:howcrediblepolicycanbemadeandimplementedinacontext

wherepublicscrutinyis limited(Lustgarten&Leigh1994).Intheintelligence

environment, much information, even relatively innocuous information, finds

itselfbeyondpublicscrutiny.Thestudyattemptstoaddresstheimplicationsof

thiscondition,andtointerrogatetheimperativesthatmakeitpossible.

Finally,itexaminestheexperiencesofseveralcountriesthathavegrappled

withtheissuesofmaintainingasuccessfulbalancebetweentransparency,secrecy,

andnationalsecurityinmanagingtheirintelligenceservices.Oversightmecha-

nismshaveplayedaprominentrole,especiallyintheWest,andformanimportant

partofthedemocraticarmouryagainstbureaucraticexcess.Itwouldobviously

have been valuable to compare South Africa’s experiences in this regard with

thoseofotherAfricancountries,butfewseemtopromoteaccesstotherecordsof

theirintelligenceservicesinasimilarfashion.Giventhis,developed,largelywest-

erncountrieshadtobeexamined.Whilethechoiceofcountriesisnotexhaustive,

andtheirexperiencescannotbedirectlycomparedwithSouthAfrica’s,theydo

offerinsightsintohowcivilsocietyandsecurityestablishmentsinvarioussocieties

havedifferedontheseissues,andhowpolicy-makershaveintervenedtoresolve

disputesanddemarcatetheboundariesmoreclearly.

Ultimately,thisstudyseekstocontributetopublicpolicy.Itidentifiesaneed

for effective policy responses to the enduring problem of balancing secrecy

andtransparencyinintelligencework,andsuggestshowsuchpolicyshouldbe

evolved,implemented,evaluated,andadjusted.Intheprocessitdrawsonseveral

academicfields–law,history,philosophy,politics,andinternationalrelations–

whichisnotunusualintheareaofpolicystudies(Lee1991;Dunn1994;Parsons

1995).

Heymans(1996)hasofferedthiscommon-sensedefinitionoftheroleofpublic

policy:

Thebusinessofgovernmentistomakechoices,andtostrategicallymanage

resourcestowardsachievingthegoalsthesechoicesimply.Publicpolicyisthe

product of these choices, setting the parameters within which government

departmentsandothersoperatingwithinthesphereofparticularpolicesare

eitherintendedormadetofunction.

IntroDuctIon / 27

Settingoutthechallengesofpolicy-makinginademocracysuchasSouthAfrica,

he spells out three attributes that must be present for government to make,

analyse,implement,andevaluatepolicy:

… political leadership (to make choices and take responsibility for their

outcomes);administrativemanagement(tomakethingshappen);andana-

lyticalsupport(toidentify,exploreandpackagepolicy-relevantoptionsand

information)(Heymans1996:30).

Thisstudyfundamentallyinterrogatesapolicyproblem:howmuchinformation

shouldgovernmentsingeneralandtheSouthAfricangovernmentinparticular

makeavailabletothepublic,or,conversely,howmuchinformationisitentitledto

withholdfromthepublicdomain?Ifinformationaboutthesecurityofacountry

anditspeopleisapublicmatter,arepolicy-makersmakingappropriatechoices

aboutaccesstosuchinformation;andhowarethesechoicesbeinginterpretedand

implementedbythebureaucracyandtheintelligencebureaucracyinparticular?

stRuCtuRe

Thisbookisdividedintothreeparts.PartOneprovidesacontextforandback-

groundtotherestofthestudy,anddealswithconceptualissuesrelatingtosecrecy

andtransparencyinthegovernanceofintelligenceservices;officialsecrecyprior

to1994;andthetransformationoftheintelligenceservicesinthecourseofthe

transitiontodemocracy.

PartTwodealswiththenewsecuritydispensation;morespecifically,itdeals

withstatutoryinstrumentsfacilitatingaccesstoinformationabouttheintelligence

services;aswellasPAIAanditsimplicationsfortheintelligenceservices.Italso

reportsontwocourtcasesandacommissionofinquirycentringontheintelli-

genceservicesandtherightofaccesstoinformation.

PartThreeconcludes thebookwith lessons frominternationalexperience,

conclusions,andpolicyrecommendations.

PART ONE

Context and background

IN SOUTH AFRICA, as inother societiesaround theworld, secrecyarises in

varioussocialcontexts,presentingarangeofpolitical,legal,andethicaldilem-

mas.Someofthesedilemmasareuniversal,andhavebeenwithusforaverylong

time.Medicalsecrecy,asembodiedintheHippocraticOath,obligesdoctorsto

treatdisclosuresbypatientsasconfidential.Thelegalprofessiontoomustcontend

withthedilemmaofsecrecy.Straussdescribesthisasfollows:

Attorneysandadvocatesareethicallyboundinthesamewayasadoctoror

priesttomaintainconfidentialityinregardtoinformationdisclosedtothem

inconfidencebytheirclients.Failuretocomplywiththisdutycanresult in

disciplinaryactionbeingtakenagainstthelegalpractitioner…inthetechni-

calsenseoftheword,itcanbecategorisedas‘arighttounfetteredfreedom

fromthestate’scoerciveorsupervisorypowersandfromthenuisanceofits

eavesdropping’.Althoughgenerallyknownasalegalprofessionalprivilege,it

isreallyarightwhichtheclienthastowithholdfromacourtoflawcommu-

nicationsmadetohis lawyer,andtopreventthelatterfromdisclosingsuch

communicationsasevidence(1983:26).

Athirdareainwhichissuesofsecrecypresentthemselvesisjournalism.Journal-

istsaresensitivetoanexpectationoftrust,andareoftenpreparedtodefythe

authoritiesinordertoprotecttheirinformants.Matthewsattemptstodescribe

whatiscommontoallthreeoftheseareasofsocialinteraction:

seCReCY AnD tRAnsPARenCY In the goVeRnAnCe oF InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

1

32 / chAPter one

Thelawyerandhisclient, thedoctorandhispatient, the journalistandhis

informer,thecorporationmanagersandtheGovernmentmayallreasonably

claimtheprotectionofthelawforcertaincommunicationsorinformation.In

eachcasethefundamentalrationaleforsecrecyisthat inabilityoftheindi-

vidualorinstitutiontofunctioneffectivelywithoutlegalguaranteesagainst

disclosure.Butthereisanothercommonfactorofequalorgreaterimportance,

andthatisthatineachcasetheinterestinsecrecyornon-disclosureisatbest

aqualifiedinterest.Themattermaybeexpresseddifferentlybysayingthatin

everyinstancetheclaimthatsecrecyshouldbemaintainedisopposedbya

compellingclaimfavouringdisclosureoraccesstoinformation.…Thelaw’s

taskistoreconciletheopposingclaimsbydemarcatingthelegitimatebound-

arieswithinwhicheachissovereign,andbydeterminingwhenandtowhat

degreetheonemaybelimitedintheinterestsofanotherorothers(1983:36).

TheAmerican-ScandinavianphilosopherSisselaBokaddressestheethicaland

philosophicaldimensionsofsecrecyinherbookSecrets – on the Ethics of Conceal-

ment and Revelations (1982).Sheoffersa‘neutral’definitionofsecrecy,describing

itas ‘intentionalconcealment’ involvingthedeliberatewithholding,hiding,or

concealingofinformationinordertopreventsomeoneelsefromuncoveringit.

Despitethissupposedneutrality,secrecyisusuallyunderpinnedbysociallyinflu-

encedchoices.Bokdescribessomeofthesocialcontextsinwhichsecrecymight

ariseorbeapplied,includingmedicalresearchandpractice,secretsocieties,trade

negotiations,research,andmilitaryandstateactivity.

AccordingtoBok,secrecycanbeutilitarianandjustifiable.Oneexampleis

withholdingsensitiveinformationfromchildren.Anotheriswithholdinginfor-

mationfromparticipantsinresearchprojects–suchaswhichparticipantsina

medicaltrialhavebeenissuedwithaplacebo.Athirdisrestrictinginformation

toparticipantsinsensitivetradeorcommercialtalksifdisclosurecouldaffectthe

outcometothedetrimentofeitheroftheparties.

Thisraisestheissueofwhensecrecycanberegardedasacceptable,andwhen

not.AccordingtoBok,thetestshouldbewhetherthereasonscanbeconvincingly

defendedinpublic.Moreover,thecriteriaforsecrecyshouldneverrequirecon-

cealment.Inthisregard,Bokisparticularlysuspiciousofstatesecrecy,andargues

infavourofseverelylimitingtheuseofsecrecybythestatebecauseofitsasso-

ciationwithpower.Shearguesthatthesecrecysurroundingmattersofstateare

oftensimplyanexcusetowieldexcessivepower,andthattherightsofthepublic

areseverelyrestrictedwhenthisisthecase.

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 33

Bok’s book about secrecy follows an earlier analysis of a related subject,

entitledLying – Moral Choice in Public(1978).Inthiswork,sheattemptstodem-

onstratethatliesanddeceptioncouldariseorbeappliedinanumberofsocial

contexts,andthattheir impacthastobeassessedinthiscontext.Contextsfor

lyingincludewhitelies(usuallyconsideredtobeharmless);lyingtoenemies(tac-

ticallyappliedinastateofwar);deceptivemethodsofsocialscienceresearch;and

paternalisticlies(concealinganunpleasanttruthfromachild,ordeceptionofthe

terminallyillaboutthestateoftheirhealth).Shearguesthattheconsequencesof

truthfulnessordeceptionshouldbecarefullyconsidered,wheneversuchachoice

has to be made, but accepts that major dilemmas may arise in exercising this

choice.Shenotesthatanorderlysocialsystemdependsuponareasonabledegree

oftruthfulness,andsuggeststhatthetruthshouldnotbeundulysubverted.The

socialcostsoflying,shewarns,includeadisproportionateandunfairdenialof

powertogroupswhicharealreadydisempoweredduetotheirlackofaccessto

reliableinformation.Asaresult,thedisempoweredareunabletomakeappro-

priatechoicestofurthertheirownwell-being.Inaddition,thevictimsofliesare

forcedtocarryapsychologicalandemotionalburdenofuncertainty.

Bok’sworksarerelevanttoourenquirybecausetheypromptustoconfront

the complexity and consequences of secrecy and confidentiality. Intelligence

serviceskeepsecrets,andengageinprocessesthatcanbeconstruedtobedecep-

tive–bothinthenameofnationalsecurity.Wheretheyhavebeenestablished

by constitutional injunction, this makes for a fascinating subject. The South

Africanconstitution,tobesure,issilentonthemethodstobeusedbytheintel-

ligenceservices,thoughitstatescategoricallythatthesemethodsmustbelawful,

andconsistentwiththeruleof law, includinginternationalhumanitarianlaw.

Yettheintelligenceserviceswouldclaimtohaveaprofessionaldutyofsecrecy

necessitated,forexample,bytherelationshipbetweensecrethumansourcesof

informationandtheservices,andtheconfidentialnatureofintelligenceliaison

andexchangesof informationbetweenstates. Inaddition,even indemocratic

states, such secrecy is specifically provided for in law, its breach carrying the

burdenofcriminalsanction.

Robertson(1999)hasalsowrittenaboutthepolicyquestionofsecrecy,this

timeinrespectofthesecurityestablishmentintheUnitedKingdom.Infact,hehas

criticisedBok’sworkonthegroundsthatitdoesnotprovideanyconvincingcri-

teriaforjudgingwhensecrecyhasbecomeexcessive.Thisdivertsfromherstated

goalofaneutralapproachtosecrecywhenaddressingtheroleofthestate.He

accusesherofallbutcondemningthestateforhavingignobleintentionswhen-

everitconductsitsaffairsinsecret,nomatterwhatthepurposemaybe:

34 / chAPter one

ThemainthrustofBok’sanalysisisthatsecrecyisparticularlydangerouswhen

thosewhoemployitareholdersofpower,forintheabsenceofaccountability

andsafeguards,secrecymakessuchpeopleevenmorepowerful.Thebalance

ofthemoralargumenthasdramaticallyswitchedsothatwhatwasseenasa

mechanismofdefence,protecting the integrityof thepersonality, isnowa

weaponofoffence,associatedwiththeaggrandisementofpower(Robertson

1999:12).

Robertson’sobjectiontoBok’sassumptionthatsecrecyingovernmentisgenerally

badforsocietyisrelevanttoourstudy.Theintelligenceservicesindemocracies

–includingtheUnitedKingdom–aretypicallyrequiredbylawtoconducttheir

operations insecret.Wheretherearechecksandbalancesontheirpowers,as

exercisedthroughoversightmechanisms,Robertsonarguesthatitissimplisticto

concludeorassumethattheywillabusetheirpowers.Helamentsthefactthat

Bok,whohasmadethecaseforsecrecyinotherspheresoflifesocompetently,has

notbeenabletoprovideamorebalancedaccountofitsutilitywhenexercisedby

thestate.

Robertsonisconcernedabouttheimpactofsecrecyanditspotentialtoturn

democracies into ‘surveillancesocieties’ inwhichcitizensarecontinuallyscru-

tinised by the state. He is however, equally cynical about the effectiveness of

freedomofinformationlaws–or‘accesstoinformation’legislation,asitisother-

wisereferredto–asavehicleforopengovernment,andfacilitatingmeaningful

insightintopolicymatterstotheordinarycitizen.ForRobertson,freedomofinfor-

mationlegislationinmanycountrieshasbeenintroducedinresponsetocrises

precipitatedbygovernmentexcesses,andservestostreamlinethechannelsof

communicationbetweenthepublicandthestateratherthanopeningupavenues

forinfluencingdecision-making.Hearguesthatrestrictingtheprocessesthrough

which information held by the state can be accessed is, ironically, potentially

immobilising to citizens. Even though those in power must consider requests

forinformationheldbythestatefrommembersofthepublic,theyareinavery

powerfulposition,andinformationinadvertentlybecomesaleverofpower.More-

over,theytendtoreleaseinformationonlywhenrequestedratherthanbuilding

andpromotingageneralcultureandclimateofopenness.

Theoneadvantageofaccess to information,Robertsonconcedes, is that it

helpstoensurethatrecordsaremoreaccurate,whichbenefitsgovernments;and

fairer,whichbenefitscitizens.Thisisespeciallytrueofpersonalrecordsretained

bygovernments,andwhichcitizensmightbeentitledtoreviewthroughaccessto

informationlegislation.However,hewarnsthat:

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 35

Theproblemsarisewhenthismodestbutworthwhilereformisconfusedwith

opengovernment.FOIisnotanimportantpartofcreatingmoreopengovern-

ment,makingtheprocessofpoliticaldecision-makingmoretransparentand

more open to citizen participation. There are quite other mechanisms that

dothis.Thecreationofamorefederalstructure,withcompetingcentresof

decision-making,isfarmoreimportanttothisprocess(Robertson1999).

This analysis cautions us against regarding access to information as the only

measureofaccountableandopengovernment.Alongwithentrenchingtheright

ofaccesstoinformation,theSouthAfricanconstitutioninstitutionalisesarangeof

measuresandinstrumentstofacilitateopenandaccountablegovernance.These

includetheseparationofpowersbetweenthelegislature,executive,andjudiciary;

theestablishmentofparliamentaryoversightcommittees;andtheindependent

auditingofthefinancialstatementsofallgovernmentdepartments(RSAConsti-

tution,1996).Anyassessmentofaccountabilityoftheintelligenceservicesmust

thereforetakeintoaccounthowtheseinstitutionalmeasuresareappliedinrela-

tiontothem.

Some20yearsago,AnthonyMathews,aSouthAfricanconstitutionalexpert,

consideredtheimpactofsecrecyonwesterngovernmentsasabackdroptohis

seminalstudyThe Darker Reaches of Government: Access to Information about Pub-

lic Administration in Three Societies (1978). He arguesthattheoreticalwritingson

liberaldemocracyhavelongsupportedthenotionthattherighttoknowabout

theactionsanddecisionsof theexecutiveand itsadministrationareessential

elementsofthesystemofdemocracy.ForMathews,extensivesecrecyintheexec-

utivebranchanditsdepartmentsisincompatiblewithdemocracy;however,the

evidencepointstothegrowingmightofbureaucracyinwesternpoliticalsystems:

Thebureaucracies,itisnowclear,havebecomecentresofpowerinallwestern

democracies,includingthosethathavepresidentialtypeexecutives.Viewed

from the perspective of access to information, this is an alarming develop-

mentsinceofficialsecretsweretheinventionofthebureaucracy.Secrecyhas

been,andremains,oneofthemosteffectivetechniqueswhichofficialshave

employedtoenhancetheirpower(Mathews1978).

Mathewsargues thatofficial secrecycreateaclimateofdistrustbetweengov-

ernmentanditsofficialsontheonehand,andcitizensontheother.Thecycle

of governmental secrecy and public alienation are a feature of many western

democracies.Thiscyclereproducesitselfasfollows:peopletendtobelieveless

andlessofwhatgovernmentsays,becausetheyfeeltheydonothaveaccessto

36 / chAPter one

corroboratinginformation.Aperceptionofgovernmentmisinformationsetsin,

evenwherethisisnotthecase,whilegovernmentbecomesincreasinglyfrustrated

bythesimplisticanalysesofthepublicwhoseoppositionisperceivedtobemoti-

vatedbymisunderstandingandsimplisticandextremeresponses.

Mathews’sanalysis ispertinent toourstudyofaccess to intelligence infor-

mation.Perhapsmoremarkedlythananyotherdepartmentofstate,theSouth

Africanintelligenceservicesroutinelywithholdinformationfromthepublic,and

evenfromothergovernmentdepartments.Asaresult,littleisknownabouttheir

functions,bothbythepublicandtoanextent,somewithintheexecutive.Because

of thisstateofaffairs,misconceptionsabout the intelligenceservicesabound.

Hardlysurprisingly,theintelligenceserviceshavebecomeincreasinglydefensive

andambivalentaboutmeaningfultransparency.Thisalienationoftheintelligence

servicesisoneofthemostsignificantchallengesfacingthepost-apartheidSouth

Africanstate.

All threewriters–Bok,Robertson,andMathews–makevalidpoints.Bok

correctlyarguesthatsecrecyisnotalwaysasocialevil,andthattheremaybe

conditionsunderwhichitshouldbeaccepted.Thisisevidentfromtheexamples

shecites:therightofconfidentialityofpersonalmedicalrecords;client–lawyer

privilegeinlegalproceedings;andjournalists’protectionoftheirsources,torecall

afew.Evenlyinganddeceptionmaybejustifiedandsociallyacceptableincertain

contexts,includingtheelementofsurprise,stealth,andsecrecyoftenrequiredin

timesofwar;ordecliningtodisclosetheterminalnatureofanillnesstoarelative.

Insimilarvein,itcanbearguedthatatleastsomesecrecyanddeceptioninrespect

ofintelligencemaybejustified.

Bok’swarningthatstatesecrecycouldbeusedasacoverfortheabuseofpower

hasproventobeprophetictooofteninrecenthistory,andthisisthecasewith

manyofthescandalsassociatedwithintelligenceservices:theyhappenunder

coverofsecrecy,andtheinabilityofthepublictoobjecttoquestionableactivities

beforeitistoolate.YetRobertsonbelievesthatBokhasnotshownconvincingly

enoughthatsecretgovernmentisworsethanopengovernment.Atonestagehe

evenpointsoutthatshehasconcededthatgoodadministrationrequiresadegree

ofsecrecy:fordeliberations,fortiming,andtomaintaintheconfidenceofthose

whohaveexchangedinformationontheunderstandingofconfidentiality.The

factthatBokconcedesthatshedoesnothaveananswerforthequestionsofwho

shoulddeterminethatsecrecyisnecessary,andforhowlong,doesnotmakethem

goaway,soitisjustaswellthatshehasraisedthem.Thesearedifficultissues,

andtheonlywaytoresolvethemistomakepolicychoicesandevaluatethem

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 37

afteraperiodofimplementation,inordertoassesswhethertheyhavehelpedto

amelioratetheproblemstheysetouttoaddress.

Finally,Mathewshasbeenpropheticinthewayinwhichhehasforeshadowed

the dilemmas of the post-apartheid bureaucracy. The classical scenario of the

bureaucracyasageneratorofsecrets,fuellingsuspicion,andalienatingitselffrom

thepublicwhichitsetsouttoserve,istheveryprecipicethatistheconcernof

thisbook.Mathewseffectivelyjuxtaposedthesituationinrespecttosecrecyand

accesstoinformationinapartheidSouthAfricatothatinBritainandtheUnited

States.SouthAfricahasnowcaughtupwiththesecountries;itisademocracy

withaconstitutionendorsedbya representative parliament, and in which all

citizenshavetherighttopoliticalparticipation.Italsohasaconstitutionalprovi-

sioninrespectofaccesstostateinformation,andlegislationonthissubjectthat

isbindingontheintelligenceservices.Thequestionthatmustbeconsideredis

whetherthisfactormakestheintelligenceservicesmoretransparentthanin1978

whenMathewswrotehisbook.Inotherwords, it isaquestionofwhetherthe

transparency requirement has made a difference to the quality of intelligence

governance,andwhetherthisinturnhashadanimpactontheeffectivenessand

accountabilityoftheintelligenceservices.Inaddition,thequestionthatarisesis

whethertherequirementoftransparencyissufficient,orwhetherthereisneedfor

furtherinstrumentstoensureaccountability.

BALAnCIng seCReCY AnD ACCess to InFoRMAtIon In InteRnAtIonAL ReLAtIons

Access to information is recognisedasabasichumanright in several interna-

tionalcovenants.However,internationallawpermitsgovernmentstolegislatein

favouroftheprotectionofstatesecrets(D’Souza1999),andseveralinternational

covenantswhichpromote freedomof information subject this right to certain

qualifications. Evatt (1999) points to the International Covenant on Civil and

PoliticalRights(ICCPR),adoptedbytheUnitedNations(UN)in1966.Article19

oftheICCPRguaranteesfreedomofopinionandexpression,butsubjectsthese

rightstocertainrestrictions,includingtheprotectionofnationalsecurityorof

publicorder.

Evattpointsoutthatsomeguidelinesforensuringthecompatibilitybetween

individualstates’legislativeregimesandtheICCPRareavailable,butthatitisup

tothestatetoshowthelegalbasisforanyrestrictionsimposedontherighttofree-

domofexpression.InassessinganinstrumentsuchastheCovenant,onehasto

assesswhatimpactithashadongovernanceinindividualjurisdictions.Itseffects

38 / chAPter one

seemtohavebeenminimalinrealterms,atleastintheareaoffreedomofexpres-

sion.AtbesttheHumanRightsCommitteeoftheUNhasbeenabletohighlight

individualstates’deficiencies,buttheseinterventionsdonottranslateintopuni-

tivemeasuresforastatewheretherearedigressions(Evatt1999).

TheEuropeanUnion(EU) isanotherexampleofasupranationalauthority

whoseinstrumentsarebindingonallmemberstates.WhiletheEUissaidtobe

foundedonfourfreedoms(ofmovementofpersons,capital,andgoodsandserv-

ices),eachinterestmaybecurtailedintheinterestofnationalsecurity.Moreover,

Nichols(1999)informsusthat,undertheTreatyoftheEU,nomemberstateis

obligedtosupplyinformationifsuchdisclosurecanbeconsideredtobecontrary

toitssecurity.Also,anyEUmemberstatemaytakeanystepsitconsidersneces-

sarytoprotectitssecurity,particularlyinconnectionwiththeproductionofor

tradeinarms,munitions,andwarmaterial.

TheEUhasmadestridesindefiningthecategoriesofinformationthatmust

bemadepubliclyavailable,includinginformationfromprivatesectorcompanies,

andinformationheldbypublicauthoritiesabouttheenvironment.Memberstates

arenotobligedtodiscloseinformationregardinginternationalrelations,national

defence,andpublicsecurity.Moreover,theEUdirectiverequiresmemberstates

toallowapersonwhoconsidersthathisorherrequestforinformationhasbeen

unreasonablyrefusedorignoredorhasbeeninadequatelyansweredbyapublic

authoritytoseekajudicialoradministrativereviewofthedecisioninaccordance

withtherelevantnationallegalsystem(Nichols1999).

Therightofaccessto informationhasalsofeaturedinAfrican instruments

ofco-operativegovernance.TheAfricanCharteronHumanandPeople’sRights

(theAfricanCharter)wasacceptedbythemajorityofmembersoftheOrganisa-

tionofAfricanUnity(OAU),anditsAfricanCommissionofHumanandPeople’s

Rightswasmaderesponsibleforsupervisingthecharter.However,liketheICCPR,

itsimpacthasbeenlimited.Chapter9stipulatesthateveryindividualshallhave

therighttoreceiveinformation,andexpressanddisseminatehisopinionwithin

thelaw.Nevertheless,thisrequirementisnotcarriedoverinthenationallegal

frameworksofmanyAfricancountries,andwhereitis,thepracticeisoftenvery

differenttowhatisspeltoutinlaw.

Secrecyisrecognisedashavingalegitimateroleintheinternationalpolitical

system.Intelligenceisthereforeregardedbystates,andinternationalandinter-

governmentalbodiessuchastheUN,EUandAU,asbeingasrelevantasever,

ifnotmoresotodaythanpreviously. Inan increasinglyuncertainworld,even

multilateralinstitutionssuchastheUNareconsideringtheroleofsecretintel-

ligence:thisisachallengeforanorganisationsuchastheUN,giventhattheworld

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 39

bodyisdevotedtotransparency.Increasingly,initspeacekeepingrole,andforthe

securityofitsownhumanitarianoperations,theUNseemstobecomingtothe

conclusionthatitdoesafterall,requireasecretintelligencecapacity.Dorn(1999)

makesastrongargumentforUNsecrecy,particularlywherethesuccessofaUN

peacekeepingoperation(PKO)maydependonsecrecyandearlywarninggained

throughintelligence-gathering.Heargues:

SecretintelligenceisevenmoreimportantinmodernmultidimensionalPKOs

withtheirexpandedresponsibilities:electionsmonitoring,whereindividual

votesmustbekeptsecret;armscontrolverification,includingpossiblesurprise

inspectionsatunannounced locations, lawenforcementagencysupervision

(to‘watchthewatchmen’);mediationwhereconfidentialbargainingpositions

thatareconfidentiallysharedbyonepartywiththeUNshouldnotberevealed

to theother; sanctionsandbordermonitoring,whereclandestineactivities

(e.g. arms shipments) must be uncovered or intercepted without allowing

smugglerstotakeevasiveaction(ibid:3).

Dorn(1999)isconcernedthattheUNdoesnothaveanyguidelinestodealwith

sensitiveinformation,andthatthevariancesintheinformationmanagementsys-

temsofindividualPKOsunderminetheeffectivenessoftheinstitution.Heurges

thattheUNneedstoacquirethemeanstomakeeffectiveuseofbothopenand

secretinformation.Aswithanyintelligencesystem,standardsshouldbecreated

fordeterminingwhatinformationshouldbegatheredandheldopenly,andwhat

should be gathered and held in secrecy, and for what duration. He offers the

guidelinesthat informationshouldbeopenunlessdivulgingitwouldresult in

deathorinjurytoindividuals,bringaboutfailureofaUNmissionormandate,

violatetherighttoprivacyofoneormoreindividuals,orcompromiseconfidential

sourcesormethods.

Insummary,theliteraturedemonstratesthattherightofaccesstoinformation

isstronglyestablishedinvariousinternationalinstruments.Thisdoesleavethe

impressionthatthecaseforsecrecy,inthepost-apartheiddispensationmaywell

havebeenneglected.Justifiably,outofconcernforarepeatoftheexcessesofthe

past,therehasbeenmuchattentionpaidtotherightofaccesstoinformationin

academicanalysis.However,itmaywellbetimeforabodyofresponsibleanalysis

thatputsforward,againstarealisticassessmentofthreatstosecurity,acompel-

lingcaseforconfidentialityandsecrecy.Itisoutofsuchcountervailinganalyses

thatabalancedpolicyanalysisandoptionsmayemerge.

40 / chAPter one

ACCess to InFoRMAtIon AnD PoLItICAL PoweR

TheSouthAfricanintelligenceservices,liketheircounterpartsinmanyparlia-

mentarydemocracies,conductmuchoftheirwork–aimedatpromotingnational

security–underconditionsofsecrecy.Inthewesternliterature,itisoftenassumed

thatthereisacausallinkbetweengovernmentsecrecyandtheabuseofpower.

Itisalsosuggestedthatthereisanimplicittendencytowardsfairandjudicious

governmentwhengreaterpublicaccess to information,particularlyabout the

securityandintelligenceservicesofacountry,istheorderoftheday(Halperin&

Hoffman1977;Richelson1989;Steele2001;Hodess2003).InSouthAfricathere

isanincreasingpublicexpectationthatmoreinformationaboutthesecurityand

intelligenceserviceswillbemadeavailabletothepublic,andthatthesebodies

willbeheldaccountablefortheiractions,pastandpresent(Africa1992;Nhlanhla

1992;Harris2000;Bell2001;Klaaren2002;Levy2004).

Intheliteratureontherelationshipbetweensecrecyandtransparencyina

democracy,wealsoencounterseveralanalysesofthesocialandpoliticalcostsand

benefitsofthesepolicyimperatives(Franck&Weisband1974;Paraschos1975;

Turner1986;Shulsky1991;Halperin&Hoffman1977).Someofthesestudies

derivefromtheauthors’involvementinthesecuritycommunitiesoftheircoun-

tries,andtakeasagiventheroleofespionageininternationalrealpolitik.Franck

&Weisband(1974)pointoutthatthedelicatebalancebetweenthegovernment’s

needforsecrecyandthepeople’srighttoknowhasbeenthesubjectofintense

academicandpublicconcerninmanywesterndemocracies.

The contradiction in managing the conflict between the secrecy required

by intelligence activities and the normal openness of democratic societies is

addressedbyTurner(1986),whopointsoutthatthereasontheUnitedStates

governmentintroducedmeasurestocounterbalancesecrecywithtransparency

measuresinthe1970sand1980swasitsexperiencesofunacceptableconduct

withinthesecurityservices,especiallytheintelligencecommunity.

Somewritershavearguedthatalackofopennesshasfuelledsuspicionanda

publicbeliefthatthesecretserviceshavehiddenandsubversiveagendas(Aubrey

1981;Cohen1982;Mates1989).Thedilemmafortheintelligenceservicesofa

democraticstateisthatsuchananalysis,carriedtoanextreme,maydemonise

them unfairly, and fail to recognise the role that they could play in providing

earlywarningaboutthreatstothesecurityofacountryanditspeople(Todd&

Bloch2003).Inaddition,thereisdebateindemocraticsocietiesabouttheextent

towhichstatesshouldinstitutesecrecymeasures.Steele(2001)hasarguedthat

muchintelligenceandearlywarningaboutsecuritythreatscanbegleanedfrom

openlyavailablesourcesofinformation.

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 41

Thewayinwhichcountrieswhosesecurityandintelligenceservicesaresubject

toaccesstoinformationlegislationmanageinpracticetheirresponsestorequests

fordisclosureabouttheactivitiesorconductoftheirintelligenceserviceisoften

fraughtwithcontradictions(Rankin1986;Hazell1989;Leigh1997;Coliveretal

1999;D’Souza1999).Banisar(2002)cautionsthatthemereexistenceofaccess

to information legislation does not always mean that access is guaranteed. In

manycountries,enforcementmechanismsareweakandgovernmentsoftenresist

releasinginformation.Alternatively,bureaucratsdelaytheprocessingofinforma-

tionrequests(Martin&Feldman1998).

Intelligenceserviceshaveundergonesignificantchangesinthepost-ColdWar

period,particularlyintheirrelationswiththeircountries’owncitizens,andone

wouldassumethatthiswouldmeangreateraccesstoinformationabouttheintel-

ligenceservices,ifonlyabouttheirpast.Yetthepicturehasbeenamixedone.

Manystudieshavesoughttouncovertheinnerworkingsoftheformereastern

Europeanintelligenceservices,usingrecordsdisclosedintheperiodfollowingthe

ColdWar(Childs&Popplewell1996;Williams&Deletant2001).Thedeclassifica-

tionofrecordsincountrieswherethishasoccurredhasplayedasignificantrole

inrevelationsabouttheroleofintelligenceservices.Nevertheless,fulldisclosure

remainsaproblem,evenforbodiesconstitutedattheinstanceofthestate.Hayner

(2001)writesaboutthedifficultiesthattruthcommissionsoftenencounter in

accessingofficialrecordsofformerrepressiveregimes.Somestatesundergoing

transitionshavebeenabletofill the informationgapbyaccessingdeclassified

recordsofotherstates,wheretherehavebeengapsintheirownrecords.Inthe

caseofboththeSalvadoranandGuatemalantruthcommissions,extensiveuse

was made of records declassified in terms of the US Freedom of Information

Act.Thesecommissionsmadeuseofnon-governmentorganisationssuchasthe

National Security Archive that had experience in declassification procedures

(Hayner2001).TheSalvadorancommission,forexample,reliedonthefilesof

alreadydeclassifieddocuments,butalsoappliedforthedeclassificationofaddi-

tionaldocuments.Althoughitinitiallymetresistancefromsomedepartmentsof

theUnitedStatesgovernment,co-operationimprovedwiththeinaugurationof

PresidentBillClintoninJanuary1993.TheGuatemalancommissionmademuch

moreextensiveuseofUnitedStatesdocumentation,andthroughtheNational

SecurityArchivessubmittedfreedomofinformationrequestsonoverthreedozen

casestheywereinvestigating.Thereleaseoftheinformationandtheuseofdeclas-

sifiedrecordsplayedaninvaluableroleinexplainingtheAmericangovernment’s

relationswiththesestates,andprovidinginsightintotheroleoftheAmerican

intelligenceservicesinthe1960sand1970s.

42 / chAPter one

Thisfactorandthesestrategies–accesstothedeclassifiedrecordsofformer

authoritarianregimes–maybeparticularlyrelevanttoSouthAfrica,inviewofthe

apartheidexperienceofthedestructionofintelligencerecords.Asrevealedduring

thehearingsoftheTRC–initiatedthroughalawofparliamenttouncovergross

humanrightsviolationsthathadbeencommittedduringtheapartheidperiod–

thepreservationofofficialrecordsisattheheartofpreservingnationalmemory,

yethugevolumesofrecordsweresystematicallydestroyedastheapartheidyears

drewtoaclose.

Measuresofredressthatmaybechosenbystatesintheaftermathofperiods

ofatrocityareoftendependentonaccesstoreliablerecords.Thisisthecontext

inwhichtheneedtopreservethemforposterityaspublicrecords,andnothave

themregardedastheexclusivepropertyofanyoneagency,mustbeseen.The

SouthAfricanexperienceofmanagingofficialfilesfromtheapartheideracon-

trastssharplywiththecaseofseveralformereasternEuropeancountrieswhere

filesoftheformersecurityserviceswerethrownopentothepublicforscrutiny,

followingthecollapseofcommunistregimes.Theargument inthecaseofthe

easternEuropeanpost-communistauthoritieswasthatdisclosurewasanecessary,

ifpainful,exerciseincomingtotermswiththepast.Thesecontrastingexperiences

leadustoconsidertheroleofthearchive,andtheprocessofrecordinganddocu-

mentinghistory,asafundamentalpreludetoaccessinginformation.

the ARChIVes AnD InteLLIgenCe ReCoRDs

Hamilton(2002)andPetersen(2002)havequestionedthetraditionalconception

androleofstatearchives.Statearchives,theyargue,reinforcetheisolationand

secrecyofinformation:onceburiedinthearchives,recordsinawaynolonger

exist,exceptforthosewhoareitsimmediatecustodians,andotherswhodevelop

somearcaneinterestinit.Theywarnthatstatearchivescanfalselyconstructthe

pastthroughthecontrolofselection,description,andaccesstoinformation.Asa

result,historianshavebeencautiousaboutrelyingexclusivelyonpublicandmore

specificallygovernmentrecords.ThisisespeciallythecaseinSouthAfrica,where

archivesareperceivedtoreinforcecolonialandlaterapartheidbiases.

Thereconstitutionofthearchivesinpost-apartheidSouthAfricacreatesan

opportunitytoredressthislegacy.Themostimportantchallengeistoincorporate

theexperiencesofdiversestakeholders.Archivesshouldthereforenotonlyreflect

howstateswanthistorytoberecorded;theyshouldalsoexpressthedocumented

strugglesandexperiencesofallthepeopleswithinacommonpoliticalspace,irre-

spectiveofwhetherrecordshavebeencapturedbythestateornot.

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 43

This brings us to the question of the duty of the state to preserve public

records,andfacilitatethepreservationofnon-governmentalrecords.InSouth

Africa, the records of the intelligence services have been particularly vulner-

abletodisposalonpoliticalwhim,ashappenedintheclosingdaysofapartheid

whenstaterecordsweredestroyedunderthedirectionofthestate’sintelligence

services.Thisdestructionofrecordscontinuedwellintothefirstyearsofthenew

democracy,aclearsignthattheparadigmhadnotchanged,despitethefactthat

thoserecordswereaclearlinktothepastthatstillneededtobeunderstoodand

assimilated.Moreover,Pigou(2002)recountsthedifficultiesingainingaccessto

officialinformationencounteredbytheinvestigationunitoftheTRC,andclaims

thattheSAPS,SANDFandNIA,tovaryingdegrees,blockedaccesstotherecords

oftheirpredecessors.

Theseperspectivesonthestatearchive,andaccessingofficialrecordsduring

thetransition,arerelevanttothedebateonsecrecyandaccesstoinformation

generatedinthecontextofnationalsecurityimperatives.Alessonfromthisdebate

isthatweshouldbecarefulnottomistakethestate’srecordorversionofreality

asthefinalreflectionofthetruth.Arangeofnon-stateactorsmaywellviewthe

samephenomenathroughentirelydifferentlenses,andthisdoesnotmaketheir

reflectionslessimportantorvalid.It isthereforeimportantthattheprocessof

documentingthesedifferentrealitiesaretakenintoaccountwhenappraisingany

pastreality,andthatthestate’sofficialpolicyonnationalsecuritybeappropriately

formulated,ratherthancontinuingtomarginaliselesspowerfulgroupsinsociety.

Thesecondlessonarisingoutof thisdebate is theneedtoseriouslyrecon-

siderhowtoimproveaccesstostaterecordsandarchives,andavoidtheperilsof

underminingpublicownershipofacountry’shistory.Apartfrommarginalising

significantvoices intheSouthAfricanarena,theStateArchivesServiceunder

apartheiddidnotintervenewhenstatestructureswentaboutdestroyingofficial

history.Theneedtopreservehistory,unalteredandrepresentative,istherefore

anotherlessonfromourpast.Howtheselessonsaretobeappliedinthecontext

ofstatestructureswhichexistintheshadowsisahugechallenge.Thisstudywill

deconstructtheimplicationsofaccesstoinformationaboutorfromtheintelli-

genceservices.Presumably,anyinformationthatfallsoutsidethescopeofoneof

PAIA’sgroundsforrefusalofaccesstoinformationmayberequestedandpoten-

tiallyanswered.

Practicalchoiceshavetobemadebythepublicandbytheintelligenceservices

andotherpublicbodiesregardingtheirrelationshiptoinformation.Important

intermediariesaretobefoundinthepolicy-makingandgovernancecommunities,

andinnon-stateactors.Asinmydiscussiononthephilosophicaldimensionsof

44 / chAPter one

secrecy,andthepracticeofsecuritization,itseemsthatonceagaintheunderlying

powerrelationsunderscorethechoicesthataremade.

ACCess to InFoRMAtIon AnD the LAw In ConteMPoRARY south AFRICA

ThereissignificantlegalprecedenceinSouthAfricaaroundaccesstoinformation

andthedisclosureofinformationinvariouscontextsotherthantheintelligence

services,someofitpredatingthenewconstitution.Someanalysescentreonthe

rightofaccesstopolicedocketsorrecordsbyadefendantinacriminalmatter:

theyincludethoseofBursey(1990),Cassim(1996),Jazbhay(1997,1998,and

2002),Meintjies-vanderWalt(1995),andDeVilliers(2003).Thefollowingwrit-

ershaveexploredthequestionofaccesstoinformationconcerningenvironmental

rights:Glazewski(1994),DuPlessis(1998,1999),Kidd(1999),andGrinlinton

(1999).Concerningaccesstomedicalrecords,studiesincludethoseundertaken

byVanWyk(1996),Driver-Jowet(1998),VanderPoel(1998),Strauss(1998),

VanOosten(2000),Gaum(2001)andBlackbeard(2002)whilstDeale(1994),

Landman(1996),Grogan(1997)andLeRoux(2001)coverthesubjectofaccess

toinformationinlabourrelations.Finally,thefollowingwritershavecommented

onaccesstocorporateinformation:Malan(1989),Solomon(1995),Carnelley

(1999),Pimstone(1999),Matlala(2003)andSchulze(2004).Alltheseanalyses

attempttoapplyortoestablishlegalprincipleinresolvingcontradictionsbetween

societyontheonehand(eitherasacollectiveortheindividualstherein),andthe

stateoritsinstitutionsontheother.

TheintroductionofaBillofRights,bothintheinterimconstitutionof1993

andthefinalconstitutionof1996,wasthebasisforseveralmoregeneralanalyses

oftherightofaccesstoinformationinSouthAfrica.Somewritersonthesubject

included Mureinik (1994), De Villiers (1995), De Vos (1995), Burns (1997),

Currie(1999,2000)andWessels(2002).TheintroductionoftheOpenDemoc-

racyBillin1998andthepassingofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationActin

2000werethebasisforthecommentariesofGovender(1995),Roos(1998),and

Visser(2002).Allthesewritershaveconsideredtheimplicationsforthepolicy

andjudicial landscapeoftheintroductionofaconstitutionalrightofaccessto

information.

AcentralthemeinmodernanalysesofgovernmentalsecrecyinSouthAfricais

thattheyarelocatedinatimeandframeworkofdeepconcernabouttheexcesses

of the apartheid era, during which secrecy was used to cover governmental

excesses(Mathews1978;Currie&Klaaren2002;Levy2004;Qunta2004;Steytler

2004).Post-1994analystsareconcernedthatsocietyshouldnotreverttothat

secrecy AnD trAnsPArency In the GovernAnce of IntellIGence servIces / 45

darkpast.Anunintendedconsequenceofthisconcernmaywellbethat,whilethe

casefortransparencyiscompellinglymade,thecaseforlegitimatesecrecymaybe

neglected.

ConCLusIon

Managingthetensionsbetweensecrecyandtransparencyinademocracyisoften

acomplextask.Theentrenchmentofaconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinforma-

tionhasbeenadefiningfeatureof thepost-apartheidpolitical landscape,and

chimes with international trends in democratic political systems. However, in

internationallaw,thedutyofstatestoprotecttheirsecretshasalsobeenalong-

recognisedprinciple(Evatt1999;Nichols1999).Whilethisisalsothecaseinthe

SouthAfricancontext,whereaccesstoinformationlegislationco-existswithleg-

islationprotectingotherinformation,theacademicliteraturehastendedtofocus

ontheconstitutionalrighttoknow,ratherthantherightofthestatetoprotect

informationfromdisclosurewherenationalsecurityconsiderationsjustifythis

(Mathews1978;Currie&Klaaren2002).Thispolarisationofthepolicydebate

suggeststhatthereisnoconsensusbetweentheintelligenceservicesandimpor-

tantstakeholdersinthepublicdomainonwhatconstitutesathreattosecurity,

andwhatinformationthereforewarrantsprotection.

Most writers on the subject agree that transparency can be leveraged to

givecitizensaccesstoinformationtheyneedtodefendtheirrights,andtogive

marginalisedgroupsmeaningfulinsighttotheworkingsofstate(Mathews1978).

However,asRobertson(1999)pointsout,accesstoinformationlegislationaround

theworldhasnotresultedinsignificantshiftsinpowerrelations,andmustlead

ustoconsiderwhetherthisaloneisasufficientrequirementforaccountableand

transparent government. It appears not to be, and therefore any remedies for

governanceofthesecuritysectorshouldincludearangeofoversightandaccount-

abilitymechanisms.

ManywouldarguethatbecauseSouthAfricaisnotinastateofinternalor

externalconflict,itdoesnotneedtoresorttoextremesecrecy,suchasthatwhich

characterisedtheapartheidperiodortheColdWar.However,itisincreasingly

acceptedthattheworld,apartfrombeinginterconnected,isfairlyunpredictable,

andthatthereisstillavarietyofthreatsforwhichtheearlywarningcapabilities

ofintelligenceservicesarerequired.

Importantworkhasbeendonearoundthesignificanceofaccesstotherecords

offallenauthoritarianregimes,whenthisbecomespossibleunderachangeof

government. Such access has enormous social and political value, and allows

46 / chAPter one

asocietytocometotermswithitspast,particularlythepastroleofitssecurity

forces.This ispertinent toSouthAfrica,where theTRCrevealedasystematic

destructionofstaterecords.Becausethearchivalrecordisnotaneutralentity,it

shouldbeviewedasonlyonerepresentationofreality,whichisalsocontinuously

shapedbynon-stateactorsthroughotherformsofrecordingmemory.Particu-

larlyrelevantisthecaseofintelligencerecordsthatcontinue,afterapartheid,to

besubjecttoconsiderablecontrolandsecrecy.Opacityaroundstateinformation

holdingswhicharenotreadilyaccessibletothepublicraisesthespectreofthe

vulnerabilityofthesedocumentstodistortionandevendisposal,allpossibilities

whengovernancemechanismsarenoteffective.Inpracticalterms,andfortrans-

parencytobegivenmeaningfuleffect,thefullweightofcountervailingsystems,

includingoversightofintelligence,shouldbebroughttobear.

THIS CHAPTER examines the policy framework for official secrecy under

whiteminorityrule.Theperiodunderreviewbeginsattheturnofthe20th

century,andendsinFebruary1990whentheANC,SouthAfricanCommunist

Party(SACP),Pan-AfricanistCongress(PAC),andotheranti-apartheidorgani-

sations were unbanned. In this period, successive white regimes attempted to

maintaintheirpoliticalandeconomicdominance,andentrencharacialnotionof

SouthAfricancitizenship.

Fivephasesseemtodefineshiftsinthestate’sapproachtosecurity.Priorto

Unionin1910bothBoersandBritonsestablishedinstitutionsaimedatwarning

themtimeouslyofthreatstotheirinterests.Thenextphasestartsin1910when

SouthAfrica’sfourwhite-controlledcolonieswereunifiedunderacentralgov-

ernmentthatoweditsallegiancetotheBritishcrown,andcontinuestotheend

ofWorldWarTwo.Thenextphase,followingWorldWarTwo,coverstheperiod

whentheAfrikaner-basedNProsetopower,andbegantoconsolidateracially

exclusiveandsegregationistpolicies.Thenextphasestartswiththebanningofthe

liberationmovementsin1960andtheirsubsequentresorttoanarmedstruggle,

andendswiththeSowetouprisingin1976.Excessivestatesecrecy,alongwiththe

suppressionofcivillibertiessuchasfreedomofexpression,associationandmove-

ment,werefundamentalpillarsofwhiteminoritycontrol.Thelastphasecovers

theperiodofmasspoliticalresistance,heightenedstaterepression,anddeepening

politicalcrisisinwhichtheapartheidgovernmentbegantorealisethatitneeded

tonegotiateapoliticalsettlementwiththeliberationmovements(Gerhardt1978;

Davidsonetal1976;Magubane2004).

the PoLICY FRAMewoRk FoR oFFICIAL seCReCY PRIoR to 1994

2

48 / chAPter two

Thisstudyofofficialsecrecypolicyunderminorityruleexamines, foreach

period, thepolicy imperativesof thegovernmentsat that time, the legislative

framework,theadministrationofthesystemofsecrecy,theshapeoftheintel-

ligence and security forces, and the ensuing resistance against secrecy and

repression.Itismeanttoprovideabackgroundtothepost-apartheidsecrecysys-

tem,sketchingtheoriginsofcontemporarypolicyaswellasitsflawedpolitical

foundation,whichhelpedtocreateitslegislativeandadministrativeshortcom-

ings.Althoughitstartsatthebeginningofthe20thcentury,theapartheiderais

emphasised,sinceitwasthelegacyofsuccessiveapartheidgovernmentsthathad

tobeundonewhendemocracywasformallyattainedin1994.

the PeRIoD PRIoR to 1910

The white regimes in the territories that later constituted the Union of South

Africabelievedtheyfacedsufficienthostilitiestojustifytheuseofsecretagents.

BlackburnandCaddell(1911)capturedthemoodinwhichsecretservicefirsttook

rootincolonialtimes:

In the early days of political stress in the Cape Colony, a system of secret

intelligence was developed automatically, particularly at the period of the

Britishoccupation,whentheBoerswerebecomingrestless,andthegrowing

discontentmanifesteditselfinmoreorlessopenmeetingsatremotefarms,

andsecretmutteringsinthemarketplace,oratthegreatquarterlyreligious

gathering,Nachtmaal…It is justifiabletosaythatthemenandwomenof

theSouthAfricanColonieswhohaveactedassecretconveyersofinformation

togovernmentsortheirrepresentativeshave, inthevastmajorityofcases,

beenactuatedbysomethingsufficientlyfarremovedfromsordidmotives,to

warrantitsbeingaccountedtothemforrighteousness,ifnotforthepurest

patriotism.Thisisprobablytrueofthemen–andwomen–whoassistedboth

sidesduringthelastBoerWar(1911:3).

Accordingtotheseauthors,secrecyandespionageinthisperioddealtwithissues

thatwenttotheheartofcontroloverresourcesandthesubjugationofindigenous

people:theillicitliquortrade,gunrunning,andthesmugglingofpreciousmin-

erals.RegardingtheformationofaBoersecretservice,theydescribetheroleof

DrWilliamLeyds,SecretaryofStateoftheTransvaalRepublic,ascentral.After

completinghis legalstudiesintheNetherlands,Leyds,abrilliantstudent,was

recruitedbyascoutwhorecommendedhimtoPresidentPaulKruger.TheDutch

wereverysympathetictowardstheBoersduringtheirwarsagainsttheBritish,

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 49

asentimentsharedbyLeyds,whodidnothesitatetotakeupKruger’sofferto

assumethepostofprosecutorintheTransvaal(VanNiekerk1985).

LeydssoonrosetothepositionofSecretaryofState–apivotalposition in

Kruger’sexecutive.UnderLeyds’sguidance,ahighlyorganisedsecretservicewas

established:

When the Kruger Executive began to realise that European opinion was a

thingthatmattered,andthattheSouthAfricanRepublicreallyhadaforeign

policyandforeignrelationslikeotherrespectableandold-establishedcoun-

tries…aseparateaccount[was]votedandkeptfor ‘informatie’.Withinten

yearsthesecretserviceoftheTransvaaldevelopedfromaprimitiveaffairof

privateinquiries...intooneofthemostexpensiveandextensiveintheworld

(Blackburn&Cadell1911:237).

Acharismaticfigure,Leydsplacedgreatstoreineffectivecommunications,and

developedanextensivenetworkofcontactsintheEuropeanmedia,thusseeking

toinfluenceopinioninfavouroftheTransvaalRepublic.Heandothermembersof

theTransvaalgovernmentprobablyhadasimilaroutlooktothatwhichheldsway

intheBritishEmpire–thenthemostpowerfulintheworld–whichmaintained

anextensivenetworkofinformantstoensurethattheCrownwaswellinformed

aboutalldevelopmentsinitsfar-flungrealm.

OfficialsecrecyinmodernSouthAfricacanthereforebetracedbacktothe

periodprecedingtheformationoftheUnionofSouthAfricain1910underthe

SouthAfricaActof1909,whichwaspassedbytheBritishparliament(Bindman

1988). The unification of the two former Boer Republics (the Transvaal and

OrangeFreeState)withtheBritishcoloniesoftheCapeandNatalwaspreceded

byanationalconventionatwhichdelegatessoughttoagreeonhowwhitesfrom

various language groups could coexist while excluding blacks from the rights

ofcitizenship.TheexclusionofblacksfromtheUnion’spoliticalandeconomic

mainstreamformedthecoreofthedomesticsecuritypolicyofsuccessivewhite

governments. They sought to manage the demands of white workers, while

continuing to exclude the black majority from economic benefits, often using

organisedforcetoupholdthisstrategy.

FRoM 1910 to 1948

Inthisperiod,theUnionwassubjecttoBritishlegislationonofficialsecrecy.An

OfficialSecretsActwasfirstpassedinBritainin1889,andsupersededin1911

byanamendedAct.AccordingtoMathews(1978), theActmighthavebeena

50 / chAPter two

responsetoleaksofofficialdocumentsaboutforeignaffairs,includingasecret

treaty between the United Kingdom and Russia in 1878. The law prohibited

Britishcitizensfromdisclosingstatesecrets;thusthebasiccrimeitcreatedwas

thecommunicationofofficialinformationandnotespionage.

The English law, in the form of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 was applied

in South Africa. This law was generally applied in British dominions, such as

Australia, New Zealand and India in the early 20th century (Mathews 1978;

Geldenhuys 1984). After 1911, subsequent amendments passed in the British

versionoftheActwerenotincorporatedintheSouthAfricanlaw,withtheresult

thatthelatterremainedunchangeduntilitwasrepealedandreplacedin1956

(Mathews,1978).TheOfficialSecretsActcreatedthecrimeofspying,committed

byanyonewhoendangeredthesafetyorinterestsofthestatebyengaginginany

oneofthreeactivities:approaching,inspecting,passingover,entering,orbeing

intheneighbourhoodofaprohibitedplace;makingasketch,plan,modelornote

whichmightbeorwasintendedtobeusefultoanenemy;orobtaining,collect-

ing,recording,publishingorcommunicatingtoanyotherpersondocumentaryor

otherinformationthatmightbeusefultoanenemy.Italsoprohibitedtheuseof

officialinformation,includinginformationaboutmunitionsofwar,forthebenefit

ofaforeignpower,aswellastheuseofofficialdocumentsforanypurposepreju-

dicialtothesafetyorinterestsofthestate(Mathews1978).

UnderaUniongovernment,moresignificant thanrelationsbetweenwhite

South Africans and the British government, was the exclusion of blacks from

politicallife.Governmentwasnotaccountabletothismajority,whichincludeda

peasantrythatwasbeingforcedofftheland,agrowingunskilledworkingclass,

and a politicised but small black elite (Gerhardt 1978). Each of these groups

respondedtotheirmarginalisationthroughvaryingformsofprotest.Collectively,

thepeasantswhoresistedtheirdispossession;theblackworkerswhoclashedwith

whiteminersintheurbanareas,andtheblackelitewhichpetitionedtheoverseas

centresofpowerinprotestagainsttheirpoliticalexclusion,shapedtheearlyUnion

government’sdomesticpolicy.Whiteworkersweregivenpreferentialtreatment

includingaccesstomoreskilledpositionsintheeconomy,alongwiththeprivi-

legeofpoliticalinclusion;thiswasthegovernment’sdominantresponsetothe

majorsecurityissueofthetime,commonlyreferredtoasthe ‘Nativequestion’

(DeKiewiet1941).

DuringtheearlyUnionperiod,foreignpolicyissueswererarelydebatedin

parliament,anddecisionswereoftentakenattheexecutivelevel.Nonetheless,

internationalrelationsconstitutedanimportantpartoftheUniongovernment’s

survivalstrategy.TheInformationService,whichfellundertheDepartmentof

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 51

ExternalAffairs,wasthechannelofforeignrepresentation.InitiallySouthAfrica

did not have an independent international status, as the British government

handledtheforeignrelationsofitsdominionsdirectly.The1926BalfourDeclara-

tiondefinedtherelationshipbetweenBritainanditsdominionsasonebetween

autonomouscommunitieswithintheBritishEmpirewhichwereequalinstatus

except in the spheres of foreign affairs and defence, which would remain the

responsibilityoftheBritishgovernment(Geldenhuys1984).

Theconsolidationofwhitepoliticalpowerwasaccompaniedbytheestablish-

mentofsecurityinstitutionsthatunifiedtheformercomponentsofthevarious

coloniesandBoerRepublics.TheUnionDefenceForce(UDF)andSouthAfrican

Police(SAP),bothformedshortlyafterUnion,facedthetaskofintegratingdis-

paratesecuritycultures.Seegers(1996)notesthatthroughtheseinstitutionsthe

systemofsecrecydevelopedatanearlystage.BoththeBothaandSmutsgovern-

mentsfocusedtheattentionoftheSAPonBolshevikelementsinthetradeunions.

Correspondingly,between1910and1920theBritishpolicefocusedtheiratten-

tionontheactivitiesof theBritishCommunistPartyand leftists in the labour

movement.LondonandPretoriasharedinformationsuppliedbytheirrespective

informers.Seegersalsonotesanearlyrelianceon‘blackdetectives,informers,and

trackersinstocktheftcases,whowerepraisedfortheirzeal’(1996:51).

Theperiodbetweenthetwoworldwarssawthedevelopmentofvariousinfor-

malinstitutionsaimedatconsolidatingthepositionofAfrikanersinSouthAfrican

society.Theformationin1918oftheBroederbond,asecretorganisationaimed

at advancing Afrikaner interests and Nationalism, was one such initiative. In

the1940s,NazisupportersinSouthAfricaformedtheOssewaBrandwag(OB).

Several right-wing nationalists were later recruited into the first formal civil-

ianintelligenceorganisation,theBureauforStateSecurity(BOSS),established

underPrimeMinisterBJVorster,whohimselfhadbeeninternedduringthewar

(Grundy1986).Seegers(1996)observesthattheSAPwasthefirstsecurityagency

torespondtotheinformation-gatheringneedsofthewarwhenitwasorderedto

respondtoasignificantshowofpro-NazismintheterritoryofSouthWestAfrica,

atthetimeaSouthAfricanmandate.

EncroachingonpersonallibertieswasanintegralwayoftheUnion’smachin-

eryofsecrecyandstatesecurity.Mathews(1971)notesthattheIndemnityand

SpecialTribunalActof1915provided fordetentionand imprisonmentduring

WorldWarOne,andthattheWarMeasuresActcontainedsimilarsanctionsduring

WorldWarTwo.Boththesemeasureswerewithdrawnafterthesewarsended;

however,Mathewsrecords,

52 / chAPter two

AsectionoftheNatalBantuCodewhichempowersthedetentionofAfrican

(Bantu) persons without trial has been a long-standing exception to the

temporarynatureofsuchprovisions.TheprovisionauthorizestheSupreme

Chief(StatePresident)toorderthedetentionofanyAfricanifheissatisfied

thatheisadangertothepublicpeace(1971:131).

MathewscitestwojudgmentsconcerningtheOfficialSecretsActduringWorld

WarTwo,whichisthecontextinwhichthelawwasmostextensivelyapplied.In

onecase(R v Wentzel),theaccused(Wentzel)waschargedwithhavingprepared

forpostage,informationthatmighthaveassistedaforeignpowerthatwashos-

tiletoSouthAfrica.Atthattime,SouthAfricawasatwarwiththeNazialliance.

Wentzeldefendedhimselfbysayinghehadnotintendedtoposttheinformation,

buthadhelditinreserveshouldtheneedarisetoexplainhimselfasaGerman

national to a future Nazi government, which seemed probable at the time.

Significantly,hewasacquittedonthegroundsthatthestatehadfailedtoprove

hisintentiontocommunicatethecontentsofthelettertotheenemy,whichwasa

requirementoftheOfficialSecretsAct(Mathews1978).

Inanothercase,(R v Vorster) the accused (Vorster)wasconvictedofcollecting

informationaboutthemunitionsandpersonnelatthenavalbaseinSimonstown.

Inthiscase,theappealcourtacceptedthat,becausetheinformationhadbeen

obtainedfromapersonnotauthorisedtocommunicateit,theaccusedcouldbe

assumedtohaveobtainedtheinformationforreasonsthatwereharmfultothe

interestsofthestate(Mathews1978).

Theclassificationofrecordsorinformationwasofnoconsequenceindecisions

relatingtowhetheracrimehadbeencommittedundertheOfficialSecretsAct.

Classificationwasmerelyanadministrativeprocedureappliedbygovernment

departments.ApersoncouldbeprosecutedundertheActeveniftheinformation

disclosedwasunclassified.ThiswasthesubjectofreviewintheUnitedKingdom

in1957.Acommitteelookingintoadministrativeproceduresandtribunals–the

FranksCommittee–raisedconcernsabouttheclassificationsysteminplaceatthe

time.Thissystemessentiallyrateddocumentsaccordingtotheharmthatcould

resultfromtheirunauthoriseddisclosure,asfollows:TopSecret(exceptionally

gravedamagetothenation);Secret(seriousinjurytotheinterestsofthenation);

Confidential(prejudicialtotheinterestsofthenation);andRestricted(undesir-

ableintheinterestsofthenation(Mathews1978:117).

TheFranksCommitteequestionedwhetherthesecriteriawerebeingappliedin

areasonableandconsistentmanner,andraisedconcernaboutthefactthatclas-

sificationdecisionswerenotsubjecttoreview.Moreover,theonuswasplacedon

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 53

arecipientofclassifiedinformationtodestroyit,ratherthantoseekareviewofits

classificationstatus.Thisledtoconcernsbyhistoriansthatdocumentswerebeing

tamperedwithbeforebeingmadeavailablewhenthetimecameforpublicrelease

afterthe30yearperiodstipulatedinthePublicRecordsAct(ibid).

Asearlyas1957,theFranksCommitteemadethecaseforarevisionofthe

classificationsystemintheUnitedKingdom.Oneoftherecommendationswas

tolinkthesystemofclassificationwiththecriminallaw.SouthAfricaatthetime

wassinkingfurtherandfurtherintoracialexclusionandpoliticalsuppression.By

1957,theNPgovernmenthadallbutinstitutionalisedsecrecy.

Extensivesecrecymeasureshadbeenputinplaceintheperiod1910–1945,

withtheOfficialSecretsActof1911asthemainvehicle.Theirusebythestatewas

drivenbythreekeydomesticandinternationalimperatives:addressingthe‘Native

question’,controllingthegrowthofthelabourmovement,andassistingtheAllies

inthewar.Theinstitutionsthatdevelopedoutofthisefforthadsomeofthehall-

marksofmodernsecurityorganisations,but thesewereovershadowedby the

factorofracialexclusivity,whichbecamemorepronouncedaftertheNP’sascent

topower(Grundy1986;Cawthra1986).TheBritishapproach–particularlythe

promulgationanduseoftheOfficialSecretsAct–wasparticularlyinfluentialin

shapingsecurityandintelligencepolicy.ItwasaprimarytoolintheUniongovern-

ment’sresponsestovariousthreatstoitsperceivedinterests.Onemajorperceived

threatwasblackresistance,afactorthatshapeddomesticsecuritypolicyaswell

astheroleandorientation ofthesecurityforces.

FRoM 1945 to 1960

TheperiodafterWorldWarTwowasmarkedbyaheightenedstandoffbetween

EastandWest,intheformoftheColdWar.Inlinewithglobaltrends,intelligence

servicesbecameamoredominantfeatureofSouthAfricanpolitics.TheSecurity

BranchoftheSAPwasestablishedin1947.DrawnfromtheSAP’sdetectiveserv-

ice,itactedasanelitepoliticalpolice.Domestically,itwasprimarilyengagedin

tacticalintelligence;itgatheredinformationaboutopponentsofapartheid,and

pursuedshort-andmedium-termobjectivessuchasdetentions,prosecutions,and

imprisonment.

SouthAfrica’sforeignrelationsinthisperiodwerearesponsetoitsgrowing

isolation,andhadtobeconductedinanincreasinglystealthymanner.Gonewas

theinternationalstatureandprominencethatGeneralJCSmutshadachieved

duringhistenureasprimeminister,apositionthatsawhimserveasamember

oftheBritishWarCouncil.Informationofficerspostedabroadweretaskedwith

54 / chAPter two

countering‘hostilepropaganda’(Geldenhuys1984).Thenumberofinformation

officesmultiplied,andanexpandedSouthAfricanInformationServicewasestab-

lishedin1957,taskedwithwinningforeignsupportforSouthAfrica’sdomestic

andforeignpolicies.TheUnitedStates,Britain,andWesternEuropeweresingled

outaspriorityareas.Africawasnot,andtheNPgovernmentmaintainedonlyone

officeinthe‘north’–inSalisburyinSouthernRhodesia(Geldenhuys1984).

Followingitsascenttopower,theNPgovernmentintroducedpoliciesaimedat

enforcingracialseparationandwhiteprivilegeinallwalksoflife(Grundy1986;

Bindman1988;VanDiepen1988).Strongmeasureswererequiredtosecurethe

continuedcomplianceofanincreasinglydefiantblackpopulation,andtheperiod

after1948sawtheestablishmentofstrengthenedsecurityservicesandtheintro-

duction of a plethora of laws designed to enforce apartheid (Bindman 1988).

Besideslegislationexplicitlyaimedatcounteringpoliticalresistance–commonly

labelledas‘communism’–manyotherareasofpubliclifeweresubjectedtogrow-

ingsecrecy.Amongothers,theWageActof1957,theIndustrialConciliationActof

1956,theBantuLabourRelationsActof1953,andtheReserveBankActof1944

containedsevererestrictionsonthepublicdisclosureofcertaintypesofinforma-

tion(Mathews1971).

Lawsaimedat suppressing freedomofexpressionandpoliticalassociation

includedtheSuppressionofCommunismActof1950;theInternalSecurityAct

of1950;thePublicSafetyActof1953;theRiotousAssembliesActof1956;the

DefenceActof1957);andthePoliceActof1958.Theywereintroducedinacon-

textofincreasedblackoppositiontowhiterule(Gerhardt1978;Davidsonetal

1976).Thisoppositionwaslargelypeaceful,thoughmass-based,andwascharac-

terisedbyincreasingcollaborationbetweendifferentracialandethnicgroups.In

theColdWarcontext,theNPregimelabelledalmostallresistancetowhiterule

as‘communist’,andthebarrageoflegislationpassedintheearly1950swasbased

onthisassumption.

Mathews(1971)hascomparedSouthAfricawithothercountriesthatplaced

restrictionsonpoliticalassociationandaccesstoinformationintheearlypartof

the20thcentury. In1917theUnitedStates introduceditsEspionageStatutes,

aimedatdefiningthecrimeofespionageasthecommunicationofdocumentary

orother informationrelatingtonationaldefencetoa foreignnationoragent.

TheUnitedStateswasalsooneoffewwesterndemocracieswithextensiveanti-

communist laws, which encroached upon basic freedoms of expression and

informationaswellaspersonalprivacyandliberty.

There, the Smith Act of 1940 was introduced to counter the activities of

NaziandFascistgroups;however,itwasusedextensivelyagainstcommunists.

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 55

OtherlegislationincludedtheSubversiveActivitiesControlActandInternalSecu-

rityActof1950,andtheCommunistControlActof1954.Mathews(1971)notes

that,unlikeitsSouthAfricanvariants,theAmericanlegislationdidnotenjoyfree

passage,andhadtoberefashionedtoaccordwiththeruleoflawandrequire-

mentsofdueprocess.InSouthAfrica,however,semi-authoritarianruleallowed

thefreepassageoflawsthatroutinelyrestrictedinformation,andundermined

personalliberties.

Among other things, South African legislation in this period continued to

emphasisethesuppressionofinformation,ratherthanpublicaccess.Even‘white’

institutions–includingparliamentandthemedia–weresubjectedtogrowing

restrictions.TheDefenceActof1957prohibitedthepublicationofthreeclasses

ofinformationwithoutministerialauthority,thuseffectivelydeprivingthepublic

oftherighttovirtuallyall informationconnectedwithdefence,andmakingit

acrimeforanygovernmentemployeeorcontractor,oranypersontowhomthe

informationhadbeengiveninconfidence,todiscloseitwithoutauthority.The

threeclassesofinformationwere:

• informationaboutthecomposition,movements,ordispositionoftheSouth

Africanorforeignarmedforcesortheirarmaments;

• statements,commentsorrumoursaboutamemberoractivityoftheSouth

African or foreign armed forces calculated to prejudice or embarrass the

governmentortoalarmordepressmembersofthepublic;and

• secretorconfidentialinformationrelatingtothedefenceoftheRepublic.

Thislastcategoryhadfar-reachingimplications;allinformationrelatingtothe

defenceoftheRepublicwaspresumedsecretorconfidentialunlessthecontrary

was proved, and any information relating to military equipment was deemed

secretunlesspublicationhadbeenauthorised(Mathews1971).

TheInternalSecurityActof1950authorisedthestatepresidenttobanapubli-

cationcontaininginformationcalculatedtoachievetheobjectivesofcommunism,

orendangerthesecurityofthestateorthemaintenanceofpublicorder.

ThePrisonsActof1959madeitacrimetosketchorphotographaprisonor

anyportionofaprison,or topublishthesewithouttheauthorityof theCom-

missionerofPrisons.Similarly,photographsofprisonersordetaineescouldnot

betakenwiththeintentionofpublishingthemunlessusedforofficialpurposes.

Effectively, this Act placed restrictions on making known the poor conditions

underwhichprisonersmightbekept.Significantly,itwasintroducedafterthe

‘Treason Trial’ of 1956 involving Nelson Mandela and other anti-apartheid

56 / chAPter two

activists.Theirphotographs–andtheircause–werewidelypublicised,whichno

doubtspurredthislatestformofcensorship.

FRoM 1960 to 1976

Growingresistancetoapartheidledtointensifiedrepression.In1961theANC

wasbanned,anditsremainingleaderswentintoexile(Davidsonetal1976).In

responsetotheradicalisationofliberationpolitics,thegovernmentexperimented

withdifferentmodelsofintelligencecoordination.In1963itestablishedaState

Security Committee and a Working Committee (National Intelligence Service

1994).Bothhowever,werepart-timestructures,andtherefore largely ineffec-

tive.OnereasonwasthattheStateSecurityCommitteedidnotmeetregularly.In

1966intelligenceco-ordinationwasagainreviewedandthethenprimeminister,

DrHFVerwoerd,decidedthattheStateSecurityCommitteeshouldbesubsti-

tutedbyaStateSecurityAdvisoryCouncil(SSAC).Thelatterhadasecretariat,

knownastheIntelligenceCo-ordinationDivision(ICD).Exceptforitsdirector,the

ICDconsistedofnon-permanentmemberswhodependedonfull-timeofficialsfor

basicintelligence.

Inthelate1960sthecabinetfeltitneededtobebetterinformedonsecurity

issues,andtheprimeminister,BJVorster,taskedahigh-rankingpoliceofficerand

closeconfidante,GeneralHJvandenBergh,withestablishinganewintelligence

organisation. Initially, itwasenvisagedthatVanDenBerghwouldcontrol the

SecurityPoliceandDefenceForceIntelligence.However,headvisedagainstthis

conflationandaninquiryintothematterwasheld.Thedepartmentalintelligence

serviceswerenotenthusiasticaboutacentralintelligenceorganisationasthey

feareditwouldencroachontheirmandates(NationalIntelligenceService1994).

In September 1969 the government appointed Appeal Court Judge

HJPotgietertoexplorethefuturepositioningoftheintelligencedepartments.

CompletedinAugust1970,hisreportadvocatedthecreationofaBureauforState

Securitytoinvestigateandevaluateallmatters–whetherwithinthecountryor

abroad–thatthreatenedorhadabearingonthesecurityorsafetyofthecoun-

try,andtoadvisetheprimeministeraboutthem.Thegovernmentacceptedthis

recommendation,andformedtheBureauforStateSecurity,orBOSS(National

IntelligenceService1994;Grundy1986).

The functions of BOSS were to collect, evaluate, correlate, and interpret

national security intelligence for the purpose of defining and identifying any

threatorpotentialthreattothesecurityoftheRepublic;prepareandinterpretfor

theStateSecurityCouncilanationalintelligenceestimateconcerningthesecurity

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 57

oftheRepublic;formulate,forapprovalbytheCouncil,policyrelatingtonational

securityintelligence;co-ordinatetheflowofintelligenceamongdifferentgovern-

mentdepartments;andmakerecommendationstotheStateSecurityCouncilon

intelligencematters(Africa1992;SecurityIntelligenceandStateSecurityCouncil

Act,1972).

Inordertofacilitatetheworkofthecountry’sfirsteverspecialisedintelligence

service,thegovernmentintroducedtheSecurityServicesSpecialAccountActof

1969,whichenabledittocreateanaccounttocontrolandutilisefundsforcon-

fidentialservicesandexpensesconnectedwiththeBureau.BOSSsoonbecame

knownforitsheavy-handedandintimidatoryactivities.Eventhoughitdidnot

havepowersofarrest,itscrudeandheavy-handedtactics–harassmentofjournal-

istsandeditors,blatantsurveillanceofpoliticalmeetings,tappingoftelephones,

and opening of mail of opponents of apartheid – quickly made it notorious

(Magubane2004).

BOSSoperateddomesticallyaswellasabroad.Geldenhuys(1984)observes

that intelligenceservicesoperatingsecretlyareoftenvery influential,andthis

soonhappenedinthecaseoftheBureau,whichcametoplayasignificantrolein

foreignrelations.GeneralVanDenBergh,asheadoftheBureauwasparticularly

activeinsouthernAfricaasanemissaryofVorsterinthedétenteeraofthe1970s;

forexample,hehelped toorganise thehistoricVictoriaFalls summitbetween

VorsterandPresidentKennethKaundaofZambiainAugust1975.FormerBOSS

officialshavestatedthatmuchoftheiroperationaleffortwasaimedatending

SouthAfrica’sinternationalisolation.NISoperativesweredeployedtothisend

bothinsidethecountryandabroad(NIS1994).

BesidestheBureau,theothermembersofthestatutoryintelligencecommu-

nityandthestate’ssecrecysysteminthisperiodweretheSecurityBranchofthe

SAP,andtheDivisionofMilitaryIntelligence(DMI)oftheSouthAfricanDefence

Force(SADF).Bothwereinvolvedinpoliticalconflict.Inthe1970sworkerand

communityresistancetoapartheidintensified,resultinginintensifiedrepression

bythesecurityforces.TheSecurityBranchwastaskedwithmonitoringpolitical

resistance,anddidsobyco-ordinatinganextensivenetworkofinformersaswell

asutilisingdraconianmeasuressuchasdetentionwithouttrial,andtheharass-

mentandsurveillanceofopponentsofthestate.TheBranchkeptfilesonmany

anti-apartheidfigures(Brogden&Shearing1993).

ThemoststrikingfeatureoftheDMIwastheextenttowhichitengagedin

attacksonanti-apartheidactivists,manyofwhomwereinexile,inbannedpoliti-

calorganisationssuchastheANCandPAC,UmkhontoweSizweandPoqo(the

armedwingsofthesetwomovements),andtheSACP.Thisclearlydeviatedfrom

58 / chAPter two

theconventionalroleofadefenceforce,namelytodefendacountryagainstfor-

eignaggressors. InSouthAfrica’scase the ‘enemy’was theso-called frontline

states,orindependentsouthernAfricanstatesborderingonSouthAfrica,which

hadtobearathreefoldburden:economicdominationbySouthAfrica;thespon-

sorship of counterrevolutionary movements by Pretoria, notably Renamo in

MozambiqueandUnitainAngola;andregularstrikesonANCbasesontheirown

soil,oftenatthecostofcivilianlives(Davidsonetal1976;Cawthra1986).

Besides the Defence Act, other security legislation also restricted access to

information.Muchinformationaboutthedefenceforcewasblackedout, thus

evenpreventingthemediafromreportingoneventsofpublicinterest.Thusthe

SouthAfricanmediawereunabletoreportonSADFincursionsintoneighbouring

territoriessuchasAngola(Mathews1978).

TheAtomicEnergyActof1967criminalisedthedisclosureorunauthorised

publicationofinformationrelatingtosourceornuclearmaterials,orresearch,

inventions,ordiscoveriesrelatedtonuclearoratomicenergy.Thereceiptofsuch

informationwasalsoacrime.TheNuclearInstallationActof1963andregulations

undertheUraniumEnrichmentActof1970containedsimilarprovisions.Again,

theseprovisionswereasbroad,ifnotbroader,thanthoseintheOfficialSecrets

Act,withtheresultthatthereachofthelawextended

…outsidetheappropriategovernmentdepartmentsorgovernment-created

boardsorcorporationstoinformationinthehandsofprivatebodiesorciti-

zens.Itcoversresearchersinthefieldofnuclearscienceandeventeacherswho

couldbreachtheprovisionsoftheactbydiscussionintheclassroomorwith

colleagues(Mathews1978:148).

Accesstostaterecordsbymembersofthepublic,includingresearchersandthe

media,wasstrictlyregulated.TheArchivesActof1962gavethedirectorofthe

StateArchivessignificantpowerstomanageofficialrecords.Amongotherthings,

thedirectorhadtoprescribeconditionsforthephysicalcareofallrecords,their

classificationaccordingtoanapprovedsystem,conditions foraccessingthem,

theirinspection,andtheirultimatedisposal(interviewwithDrGrahamDominy,

2September2003).

IntermsoftheAct,staterecordscouldonlybemadeavailabletothepublic

after 50 years. Moreover, their legal disposal involved either a transfer to the

Archivesordestructionintermsofadisposalauthority.Until1979astatutory

body,theArchivesCommission,wasresponsibleforauthorisingthedestruction

ofrecords.In1979theActwaschanged,givingthedirectorofarchivesthispower.

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 59

However,severaldepartmentsmadeuseofambiguousformulationsinthelawto

avoiditsdisposalrequirements(TRC1998).

Censorshipofthemediaalsoplayedasignificantroleinrestrictingaccessto

information.ThePublicationsActof1974prohibitedthedistribution,publication,

orexhibitionof‘undesirable’publications,filmsandentertainment,andenabled

acommittee toexercise its judgmentaboutwhichmedia fellwithinthescope

ofacceptablenorms.Thecommittee’sdecisionswerebindingincriminalcases.

AccordingtotheAct,materialwasdeemedundesirableifitwas‘prejudicialtothe

safetyoftheState,thegeneralwelfareorthepeaceandgoodorder’(Mathews

1978:151).In1976theActwasinvokedtobanaChristianInstitutepublication

entitledSouth Africa –APolice State? becauseitlistedpeopledetainedundervari-

oussecuritylaws,describedmajorpoliticaltrialsduringthepreviousthreeyears,

andoutlinedtypesoftortureusedbythepolice.

Apartheidlegislationalsoinfringedonpersonallibertiesandprivacy.Section

118A,insertedinthePostOfficeActin1972,allowedmailandtelephonecalls

tobeinterceptedifdeemedtobeintheinterestsofthesecurityoftheRepublic

(Mathews1971).

FRoM 1976 to 1990

In1976,followingtheSowetouprisingagainsttheintroductionofAfrikaansas

amediumof instruction inblackschools,hundredsofyouths left thecountry

totakeuparmsagainsttheapartheidgovernment.Theunprecedentedpolitical

resistance,andSouthAfrica’sconsequentincreasinginternationalisolation,led

itsrulerstoreviewtheirsecuritystrategy.Accordingtothe1977WhitePaperon

Defence,theroleofthedefenceestablishmentwastoupholdtherightofself-

determinationofthe‘whitenation’(Cawthra1986;Grundy1986).

Co-optionwasasignificantfeatureoftheapartheidgovernment’sstrategyfor

maintainingwhitedomination.TheTBVCstates–the ‘independent’Republics

ofTranskei,Venda,BophuthatswanaandCiskei–hadpowerstolegislateoncer-

tainareasofservicedelivery,thusgivingrisetoamythofpoliticalindependence

(Bindman1988).InrealitytheywereeconomicallyentirelydependentonSouth

Africa;andtheinternationalcommunity,includingmultilateralbodiessuchas

theUNandtheOAU,regardedthemasextensionsoftheapartheidorder.Besides

these,Pretoriacreatedseveralotherself-governingnationalterritories,or‘home-

lands’, which were rejected by the majority, and internationally unrecognised

(Bindman 1988). In terms of the Self-Governing Territories Act of 1971, their

60 / chAPter two

governingauthoritiescouldmakelawsaboutpolicing,butnotaboutintelligence.

Allsixterritorieschosetoestablishtheirownpoliceforces.

TheTranskeiIntelligenceService,theBophuthatswanaNationalIntelligence

Service,andtheVendaNationalIntelligenceServiceweremodelled–inlawat

least–ontheapartheidgovernment’sNationalIntelligenceService,butstaffed

bytheirown‘citizens’.Likethemainstreamservices,theTBVCservicesfocused

on frustrating their political opponents. They received training and resources

fromtheSouthAfricangovernment,andservedthesameends,namelytoprevent

thecountryfromfallingintothehandsofthedisenfranchisedmajority.Inaddi-

tion,thepoliceforcesofallthesehomelandswereextensionsoftherepressive

machineryoftheapartheidstate.Forexample,whileKwaZuluneverdevelopeda

statutoryintelligenceservice,itspolicecolludedwithwarlords,certainchiefs,and

vigilantegroupstoquellpoliticaloppositiontoitschiefminister,DrMangosuthu

Buthelezi.

TheDefenceWhitePaperof1977introducedthenotionofa‘totalstrategy’to

countera‘totalonslaught’ontheSouthAfricansocialorder.Allaspectsofnational

life–military,economic,political,sociological,technological,ideological,psycho-

logicalandcultural–weretobeco-ordinatedtothisend(Hansson1990).Inthe

1970sand1980sSouthAfricansocietybecameincreasinglymilitarised.Among

themorenotorioussecurityinstitutionswastheCivilCooperationBureau(CCB),

anoffshootoftheSpecialForces,whichengagedinanextensivepoliticalassas-

sination campaign (Cawthra 1986). At the height of apartheid in this period,

security policy and strategy were co-ordinated by the State Security Council

(SSC),acabinetcommitteechairedbythestatepresidentandlargelycomprising

ministersresponsibleforthecountry’ssecurityservices.

Significantly, theheadsof the intelligenceservicesalsoservedontheSSC,

givingthemgreatinfluenceinnationaldecision-making.TheSCCwasestablished

undertheSecurityIntelligenceandStateSecurityCouncilActof1972.Influential

innationalpoliticstotheextentthatthecabinetmerelyservedtorubber-stampits

decisions,theSSCintroducedtheNationalSecurityManagementSystem(NSMS)

in1979,whichsought to integrate thesecurityandwelfareaspectsofa ‘total

strategy’,aimedatmaintainingwhitepoliticalcontrol(Cawthra1986;Grundy

1986).Therationaleofthisstrategyof‘winningheartsandminds’(WHAM)was

thatagoverningpowercoulddefeatanyrevolutionarymovementifitadopted

arevolutionarystrategyandprinciplesandappliedtheminreverse.TheNSMS

continuedtoevolvenewformsofcontroltocountergrowingnationalresistance

andthefailureofgovernmentreforms.Bythemiddleofthe1980sstatestrate-

gistsbegantodescribeSouthAfricaasbeinginvolvedina‘waroflowintensity’,

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 61

requiringthemobilisationoftheentirepopulation,includingblackpeopleatthe

grassroots(Hansson1990;Haysom1992).

Seegers(1996:25)describesthecontestforinfluenceandcontrolbyelements

ofthesecurityforcesinthemid-1980sasfollows:

Securityintelligencewasimpededbyrivalryamongthestatesecuritybodies

andbyalackofup-to-dateinformationaboutactivitiesatthelocallevel.The

coreproblemseemedtobeagapbetweenplanningandexecution.Thiscon-

textwasripefortheexecutionofamilitarysolutionthatstressedcoordination

andefficiency....TheofficeofExecutiveStatePresident,institutedinthenew

constitutionof1983,wasareadybasisforamoreexecutivestyleofgovern-

ment.Itwashardlysurprisingthen,thatpowerrelationswithinthestatewere

restructuredtowardsanexecutivedominatedbythemilitary.

More legislationaimedatconsolidatingsecrecyandstatesecuritywaspassed

duringthistime.TheSecretServicesAccountActof1978providedfortheestab-

lishmentofanaccountforsecretservices.Theministeroffinancecouldtransfer

funds to the following accounts, at the request of the ministers concerned: a

ForeignAffairsSpecialAccountestablishedbytheForeignAffairsSpecialAccount

Actof1967;theSecurityServicesSpecialAccount;theSpecialDefenceAccount,

establishedbytheDefenceSpecialAccountActof1974;theInformationService

ofSouthAfricaSpecialAccount,establishedbytheInformationServiceofSouth

AfricaSpecialAccountActof1979;andtheSouthAfricanPoliceSpecialAccount,

establishedbytheSouthAfricanPoliceSpecialAccountActof1985.

The effect of this legislation was to tighten control over information, and

furtherrestrictoppositiontogovernmentpolicies.Moreover,thelegislationwas

generallyintrusive,givingthestateaninordinatedegreeofcontroloverpeople’s

lives.

TheProtectionofInformationActof1982supersededtheOfficialSecretsAct

of1956,theOfficialSecretsAmendmentActof1956,section27CofthePoliceAct

of1958,sections10,11and12oftheGeneralLawAmendmentAct,1969,and

section10oftheGeneralLawAmendmentAct,1972.Itstronglyresembledits

primaryprecursor,theOfficialSecretsAct,1956andprohibitedthedisclosureof

certaininformation.Morespecifically,itproscribedobtainingsecretstaterecords

information and disclosing such information to any foreign state or its agent.

Secretinformationwasdefinedasinformationrelatingtoanyprohibitedplaceor

anythinginanyprohibitedplace,oranyarmament;thedefenceoftheRepublic,

anymilitarymatter,anysecuritymatter,orthepreventionorcombatingofter-

rorism;andanyothermatterorarticlewhichmightbeofusetoaforeignstateor

62 / chAPter two

hostileorganisation(ProtectionofInformationAct1982).Itplacedaheavyonus

onindividualstoidentifymattersthatmightprejudicetheinterestsofthestate.

TheActwasclearlydesignedtodenyaccessto informationbothtoforeign

statesand toopponentsofapartheid.Theemphasiswasondenyingaccess to

information,andthiscreatedbarrierstothepublic’srighttoinformationinorder

toplayameaningfulroleinpublicpolicyformulation.TheProtectionofInforma-

tionActisstillinforcetoday,andsitsuneasilyalongsidethePromotionofAccess

toInformationActof2000aswellastheNationalArchivesActof1996.

Like the Official Secrets Act, the Protection of Information had no formal

relationshipwithprevailingsystemsofclassification.In1978thecabinetintro-

ducedasetofguidelinesaimedatensuringuniformstandardsforthehandling

ofclassifiedinformationbypublicservants.CommissionerTertiusGeldenhuys,

headofLegalServicesintheSAPS,describedthebackgroundtotheintroduction

oftheseguidelines.PriortothistheOfficialSecretsActwasinplace,butthere

werenogovernmentregulationstostandardisethehandlingofsensitivegovern-

mentinformation.Theresponsibilityforsecuringinformationthereforelaywith

individualministersandheadsofdepartment.Theguidelinesfollowedinterna-

tionalnormsandprovidedforinformationtobeclassifiedunderdifferentlevelsof

secrecy,aswellasproceduresfortheirhandlingandsafekeeping(interviewwith

DrTertiusGeldenhuys,7October2003).

Insummary,itcanbearguedthatallthecomponentsofthestatutoryintel-

ligencecommunity–NISanditspredecessor,BOSS;theSecurityBranch;Military

Intelligence;andthe intelligenceservicesof theTBVCstates–collaboratedto

ensurethemaintenanceofapartheid.Thisisnottodenythattherewerecontra-

dictionsbetweentheseroleplayersfromtimetotime.Attimes,therivalryamong

MilitaryIntelligence,theSecurityBranch,andNISwasquitemarked.Butcollec-

tivelytheseagencieswieldedconsiderablepower.

ConCLusIon

Before1990SouthAfricangovernmentwasclosedandsecretive.Officialsecrecy

andpoliticalexclusioncombinedtomarginalisethecountry’sblackmajorityas

wellasopponentsoftherulinggovernments.From1912onwardsthecountry

wassubjecttotheBritishOfficialSecretsAct,whichcontainedseverepenaltiesfor

thedisclosureofstatesecrets.Domesticforeignpolicywasdrivenbytheimpera-

tivetoresolvethe‘Nativequestion’,whichcametoaheadfollowingtheascent

topoweroftheAfrikaner-dominatedNP.Insubsequentyears,muchoftheleg-

islationaimedatconsolidatingwhiterulehadtheeffectofsilencingopposition

the PolIcy frAmework for offIcIAl secrecy PrIor to 1994 / 63

andsuppressingbasichumanrightssuchasfreedomofspeech,movement,and

expression.Asshownintheearlierdiscussionofinternationalconventions,the

denialofthesefreedomsistantamounttothedenialofaccesstoinformationin

thebroadersense.

TheProtectionofInformationAct–whichsupersededtheOfficialSecretsAct

–reinforcedacultureofpenalisingthedisclosureofsecrets.Importantissuesof

accountability,ofwhodefineswhatcanbewithheldassecretorconfidential,and

whichchecksandbalancesexistoverhowofficialsmanageinformation,contin-

uedtobeignored.Thisisnotsurprising,giventhatapartheidSouthAfricawas

facinganunprecedentedcrisisatthattime.

TheroleoftheStateArchivesServiceinmanagingsecurityrecordsappears

tohavebeenambiguous,creatingasituationseeminglyexploitedbythesecurity

services.Manydocumentsweredestroyedintheearly1990s,eradicatingalarge

partofSouthAfrica’sofficialmemory.

In the period reviewed in this chapter, the security policies and secrecy

measuresofsuccessivewhiteminoritygovernmentswereaimedatconsolidat-

ingwhiterule,whileinfluencinginternationalopinioninfavourofSouthAfrica’s

domesticpolicies.Intheapartheidera,SouthAfricahadneitheraspecificsystem

fordeclassifyingsecurity-sensitiveinformation,noraregimeofaccesstoinforma-

tion.Inreportingonandassessingtheimplicationsofthedestructionofrecords,

theTruthandReconciliationCommissionpointsoutthatthemainguidelineto

publicaccesstostaterecordsunderapartheidwastheArchivesActof1962,which

establishedthataccesswasaprivilegetobegrantedbybureaucrats.

Theapartheidinheritanceincludedaclassificationsystemcontainedinthe

cabinetguidelinesfortheprotectionofclassifiedinformation.Theclassifications

mostcommonlyusedbyofficialswere ‘TopSecret’, ‘Secret’, ‘Confidential’,and

‘Restricted’.ThesewerecapturedinacabinetdocumententitledMinimumInfor-

mationSecurityStandards(MISS),andallstatedepartmentswereexpectedto

complywithitsstipulations.Theguidelinesdonotcovertheissueofwhichoffi-

cialshavetheauthoritytoclassifyinformation,howthatauthorityisderived,and

underwhichconditionsinformationmaybereclassified.

Secrecyinpre-1990SouthAfricawaspervasive;itformedanintegralpartof

thecolonialandapartheidorder,andcausedmuchsufferingformanypeople.

Thetransitiontoanewpoliticaldispensationwasmarkedbythetransformation

ofmanyinstitutions,includingtheintelligenceservices.Thisisthesubjectofthe

nextchapter,whichinterrogateshowfundamentalthistransformationhasbeen,

andwhether,andtowhatextent,theoldpatternsofsecrecyhavepersisted.

The mid-1980s to the early1990swasanexceptionallyviolentperiodinSouth

African history. The UDF, a broad front of extra-parliamentary organisa-

tions,waslaunchedin1983toopposeattemptedgovernmentreforms,including

araciallybasedtricameralparliament.TheSouthAfricanstate,particularlythe

securityforces,respondedwithagrowingshowofforceandincreasingrepression:

detentionswithouttrial,prosecutionsandimprisonmentunderanti-terrorismand

internalsecuritylegislation,politicalassassinationsbyapartheidhitsquads,and

theinstigationof‘black-on-blackviolence’(Collinge1992).

Throughmostofthe1980sthePWBothagovernmentchallengedtheANC

torenounceviolence,whiletheANC,retortingthatitwasthegovernmentthat

shoulddoso,encourageditsfollowerstocontinuetopursueanarmedstruggle,

massaction,andSouthAfrica’sinternationalisolation.Thegovernment’sposture

changeddramaticallyafterFWdeKlerksucceededBothaasstatepresidentin

1989,although,evenunderthelatter,secrettalkswereinitiatedwiththeANCto

explorethepossibilityofanegotiatedpoliticalsettlement.

De Klerk’s unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other restricted organi-

sationstookobserversaswellastheliberationmovementsbysurprise.Nelson

Mandela and other high-profile political prisoners were released, and exiled

leadersreturnedtopavethewayfornegotiations(Haysom1992).InMay1990the

governmentandANCsignedthehistoricGrooteSchuurMinutewhichexpressed

a‘commoncommitmenttowardstheresolutionoftheexistingclimateofviolence

and intimidation from whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to stability

the tRAnsItIon to DeMoCRACY, AnD Its IMPLICAtIons FoR InteLLIgenCe ACCountABILItY AnD tRAnsPARenCY

3

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 65

andtoapeacefulprocessofnegotiations’(ISSUP1992:17).Theyreaffirmedthis

commitmentinthePretoriaMinutelaterthatyear.

Intheearly1990sthegovernmentdiscoursearoundsecuritybegantochange.

ShortlybeforetheunbanningoftheANC,DeKlerkaddressedameetingofthe

country’stop500policeofficersatwhichheimpresseduponthemthattheyhad

newresponsibilities,andurgedthemtoleavepoliticstothepoliticians(Nathan&

Phillips1992).

From February 1990 onwards, political parties and organisations across

the political spectrum began to give urgent attention to formulating alterna-

tivepolicies.TheANCheldamajorpolicyconferenceinJune1991.Meanwhile,

implementation of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, particularly the

return of exiles and the accompanying amnesty process, the release of politi-

calprisoners,andmeasurestocontainpoliticalviolencestillragingacrossthe

country, proceeded with difficulty. The main parties made accusations and

counter-accusationsabouttherealintentionsoftheircounterparts.Bythisstage

some10000peoplehadlosttheirlivesinpoliticalviolencesince1986,andmore

than30000hadbeendisplaced(Haysom1992).Levelsofpublicconfidencein

theabilityofthesecurityforcestocontaintheviolencewereverylow,andinApril

1991theANCthreatenedtosuspendnegotiations.Thestop-startprocesscontin-

uedforseveralmonths,butthegovernmentandotherpartiesfinallyagreedon

multipartytalkstodiscussaninclusivepoliticaldispensation.Thisresultedinthe

ConferenceforaDemocraticSouthAfrica,orCODESA(Friedman1993).

CODESA’sfirstmeeting,heldinDecember1991,providedaplatformforthe

variouspartiestoexpresstheirintentiontonegotiateapoliticalsettlement.But

mostof theworkwasdone infiveworkinggroups,dealingwithaclimate for

freepoliticalactivity;constitutionalprinciplestobeincludedinanewconstitu-

tion,andaconstitution-makingforum;transitionalarrangements;thefutureof

theTBVCstates;andtimeframesandmodesofimplementation(Haysom1992).

Whileinitiallyunhappyaboutthisproposal,thegovernmenteventuallyagreed

thatdecisionstakenatCODESAwouldbebinding.Thepartiesalsoagreedthat

decisionswouldbetakenonthebasisof‘sufficientconsensus’amongparticipants.

ThiseffectivelymeantthatthegovernmentandtheANCwouldhavetoagreeif

theprocesswastomoveforward.

Discussions in the working groups continued over the next year, and

CODESA2convenedinMay1992toconsidertheresults.However,theCODESA

processbrokedownbecauseimportantissuesrelatingtotheconstitution-making

processhadnotbeenresolved.ThegovernmentandANCbegantalksaimedat

gettingthenegotiationsbackontrack.

66 / chAPter three

Thevolatilepoliticalclimatedidnotlenditselftotheresolutionofdifferences,

butbythisstageboththegovernmentandtheANCrealisedthattheywereso

deeplyembroiledintheprocessthattheydarednotletitfail(Friedman1993).

InSeptember1992theysignedaRecordofUnderstandingwhichdealtwitha

numberofoutstandingissues.

Whilenegotiationscontinued,withabroadrangeofoppositionorganisations

rallyingbehindtheANC,citizensmadelimitedinputs.TheANCtriedtobroaden

participationbyholdingconsultativemeetingswithotherorganisations,includ-

ingitsalliancepartners,theSACPandCongressofSouthAfricanTradeUnions

(COSATU), and holding public meetings, but policy and strategy were largely

determinedbyitsleaders.Similarly,inFebruary1992thegovernmentcalleda

referendum to seek endorsement for the adoption of an interim constitution

(Friedman1993).

the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon DuRIng the negotIAtIons

Thetransitiontoanewintelligencedispensationformedpartofabroaderprocess

ofpoliticalaccommodationthatstemmedfromtheworkofWorkingGroupOneat

CODESA.WorkingGroupOnedealtwiththecreationofaclimateforfreeandfair

politicalactivity,anditsplitupfurtherintothreesub-workinggroupsdealingwith

thereturnofexilesandthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners,therepealofsecurity

legislationandotherrepressivelaws,andthefutureofthesecurityforces(Fried-

man1993).Initsfinalreportitrecommendedthatthesecurityforcesbesubject

totheconstitution;politicallynon-partisan;respecthumanrights,non-racialism

anddemocracy;andstrivetoberepresentativeofthesocietyasawhole.Working

GroupThreeagreedthatthesecurityforcesshouldbecontrolledbytheinterim

government.

Atthistime,the1983tricameralconstitutionwasstillinforce.Whileitdidnot

createarightofaccesstoinformation,politicswerebeingliberalised,enabling

themediatoreportmorefreelyonsignificantnationalevents.However,security

legislationsuchastheInternalSecurityAct,theRiotousAssembliesActandthe

TerrorismActremainedinplace.Intelligenceservicesweremanagedasseparate

entities,andtheintelligenceinformationofthestatewasfirmlyunderlockand

keyinstatehands,unauthorisedaccesstoitbeingacriminaloffence.

Intelligenceservicesplayedasignificantroleinthenegotiations,andrepre-

sentativesofservicesonbothsidesweredrawnintotheprocesstomapoutanew

intelligencedispensation(O’Brien1996).TheANC’sDepartmentofIntelligence

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 67

andSecurity(DIS)hadbeenformedin1969,tocounterattemptsbytheSouth

AfricanstatetocrushUmkhontoweSizwe.

In1992,JoeNhlanhla,theANC’sheadofintelligence,wrotethattheapart-

heidsecurityserviceswerepervadedbyamilitaristicandracistethos,servedthe

interestsoftheNPregimeratherthanthoseofthepeople,andweresteepedina

cultureofsecrecyandlackoftransparencyandaccountability.Becauseofthis,

theywereabletoresorttodetentionandtorture,assassinations,andkidnappings.

Thiswasaninward-focusedapproachwherethegreatestthreattonationalsecu-

ritywasseentocomefromfellowSouthAfricans.However,hesaidintelligence

servicesdidhavearoletoplayintheaffairsofstate,andaddedthat

the world over, intelligence activity is, by its very nature, characterised by

secrecyandstealth…anunderstandableandoftennecessaryfeature,asthe

defenceofnationalsecurityoftenrequiresthewithholdingofinformationthat

mightbeusedagainstacountrybywould-beaggressors(1992:70).

NIS claimed it had played a constructive role during its existence, which was

roughlyaslongasthatofDIS.DanielBarnard,aformerheadofNIS,saiddur-

inghistermofofficeithadnotonlysuppliedintelligence,buthadalsofacilitated

negotiationsbetweentheapartheidgovernmentanditsopponents.HesaidNIS

hadbeenabletoplaythisrolebecauseitwas‘schooledintheage-olduniversal

fundamentalsoftheintelligenceprofession:itseeksthetruth,andundauntedly

conveysittothegovernment’(NationalIntelligenceService1994).

In1992thenewdirector-generalofNIS,MikeLouw,spokeof theneedfor

greateropenness in intelligencematters,andpromisedthat theagencywould

becomemoretransparent(SundayTimes,23February1992).UnderPresident

DeKlerk,controlovertheintelligenceserviceswasshiftedfromtheStatePresi-

dent’sofficetotheministerofjustice.

TheANC’sframeworkforsecuritypolicywasverysimilartothoseofliberal

democraciesinthepost-ColdWarera.Itadoptedthefollowingresolutionatits

June1991policyconference,whichbecamethebasisforitsinputintothenegotia-

tionprocess:

Thenationalintelligenceagencywillberesponsibleforgathering,collatingand

evaluatingstrategicinformationthatpertainstothesecurityofthestateand

thecitizenry;

The national intelligence agency shall respect the rights of all South

Africanstoengageinlawfulpoliticalactivity;

68 / chAPter three

Intelligenceactivitiesshallberegulatedbyrelevantlegislation,theBillof

Rights,theConstitutionandanappropriateCodeofConduct;

Allintelligenceinstitutionswillbeaccountabletoparliamentandsubjectto

parliamentaryoversight;

Thepublicshallhavetherighttoinformationgatheredbyanyintelligence

agencysubjecttothelimitationsofclassificationconsistentwithanopenand

democraticSouthAfrica;

Thenationalintelligenceagencyshallbepoliticallynon-partisan;and

The national intelligence agency shall guard the ideals of democracy,

non-racialism,non-sexism,nationalunityandreconciliation,andactinanon-

discriminatoryway(ANC1991).

AccordingtoseniorANCmembers,theNPgovernmentinitiallyresistedtheidea

ofnegotiatinganewintelligencedispensation,onthegroundsthatintelligence

issuescouldnotbediscussedinopenpoliticalforums.Itofferedtosimplyabsorb

membersoftheintelligenceservicesoftheliberationmovementsandTBVCstates

into NIS. The ANC rejected this proposal, and the political players, including

representativesofthevariousintelligenceservices,wentontonegotiateanew

intelligencedispensation(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).

DISandNISweredeterminednottoallowsetbacksinthepoliticalnegotia-

tionstoderailtheireffortstofindcommonground.Theyheldaseriesofbilateral

meetings,resultinginagreementsonasetofbasicprinciplesforintelligencework

inthenewdispensation,theneedfortheestablishmentofasubcouncilonintel-

ligenceundertheauthorityoftheimpendingTransitionalExecutiveCouncil,and

thetermsofreferenceofsuchasubcouncil.

Itwasduringthisearlyperiodofthetransitionthathugequantitiesofapart-

heidsecurityrecordswereapparentlydestroyed.Thepreviouschapterhasalready

examinedtheimplicationsofthestate’sviewthat‘sensitiverecords’felloutside

theambitoftheArchivesAct.In1992theANCCommissiononMuseums,Monu-

mentsandHeraldryproposedamoratoriumonthedestructionofstaterecords,

butwaspowerlesstoseethisthrough(interviewwithVerneHarris,1Septem-

ber2003).Instead,thecabinetauthorisedvariousgovernmentdepartmentsto

destroysensitiverecords.

Thedevastatingconsequencesofthisdecisionwasrecordedbythecountry’s

TruthandReconciliationCommission,establishedbya1995actofparliament.In

asixtoeightmonthperiodin1993,NISalonedestroyedabout44tonsofdocu-

mentsandmicrofilm–allofficialrecords.Allstatedepartmentswereinstructed

totransferdocumentsthathadoriginatedasStateSecurityCouncilSecretariat

records to NIS, which at the time provided secretariat services to the State

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 69

SecurityCouncil.Amongotherdestructionfacilities,thefurnacesoftheIronand

SteelCorporation(ISCOR)plantinPretoriawereusedforthismassiveincinera-

tionexercise.AccordingtotheTRC,muchofthedestructiontookplaceoutside

theparametersoftheguidelinesforthedisposalofrecords,andwasintended

toobliterateall informationaboutoperations,sources,orothercompromising

informationthatthesecurityestablishmentmighthavetoexplaininthefuture.

ThiscreatedamassivevacuuminthecorporatememoryofNISaswellasother

securityinstitutions(TRC1998).

TheANCandotherliberationmovementswereprobablyunawareoftheextent

ofthedestructionofrecordsinthisearlyperiod,andpowerlesstopreventitinany

case.Thegovernmenthadonlyjustlifteditsrestrictionsonthemovement,which,

togetherwithextraparliamentaryorganisations,hadbeenintenselyscrutinised

bystatesecurityforcesandintelligenceservices.Thefactthatthetwosideswere

engagedintalksdidnotmeanthateitherwaspreparedtosharesecrets,since

theirmostpotentsecretswereabouteachother.

the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon unDeR the teC

Thestatus,legitimacy,andownershipofintelligenceinformationinthecourse

ofthetransitiontodemocracyiscentraltoourenquiry.Thiswasundoubtedlyan

areaofcontestation.Ananalysisofpolicy,legislativeandadministrativeinstru-

mentsestablishedorenforcedinthatperiodsuggestsanambiguousimpacton

accesstoandcontroloverinformationgeneratedbytheapartheid-erasecurity

institutions.

TheTransitionalExecutiveCouncilActof1993gaveexpressiontothearrange-

mentsagreedtointhenegotiationprocess.Whiledemocraticelectionswerebeing

prepared,thecountrywouldbejointlygovernedbytheNPandmajorentities.

Sevensubcouncils–ondefence,lawandorder,intelligence,finance,thestatusof

women,foreignaffairs,andregionalandlocalgovernment–weresetuptofacili-

tatethisprocess.Theirroleamountedtoaformofmultipartyscrutinyoverthese

areas of governance. The role of the subcouncil on intelligence, as prescribed

bytheact,wastodevisebasicprinciplesforintelligenceworkwhichcouldalso

anchoranewdemocraticdispensation.Itwasalsotaskedwithformulatingacode

ofconductthatwouldbindallservicesduringthetransitionalperiod,andfore-

shadowacodeinademocraticSouthAfrica(TECAct1993).

UndertheTEC,theintelligenceservicesoftheNPgovernment,theTBVCstates

andtheliberationmovementswouldremainintact.Theywouldcontinuetopro-

videtheirprincipalswithinformationduringthisvitalperiod,butwereexpected

70 / chAPter three

to start crafting a unified intelligence framework. Unavoidably, the leaders of

theseintelligenceinstitutionsweredrawnintonegotiatingtheircommonfuture.

The TEC Act also provided for the establishment of a Joint Coordinating

IntelligenceCommittee(JCIC),taskedwithprovidingtheTECwithestimatesof

thesecuritysituationintherun-uptotheelections.TheANCinitiallywantedall

intelligencestructurestoreporttotheJCIC,butbackeddownwhenNISinsisted

thatalltheservicesshouldretaincontroloftheirday-to-dayactivities.TheJCIC

comprisedtheheadsofallthecivilian,police,andmilitaryintelligenceservices,

andeffectivelymanagedthemduringthisperiodoftransition.Besidesproviding

theTECwithintelligence,theJCICplayedavitalroleintherun-uptotheelection

byensuringthatallfactorsthatcouldderailtheprocessweremonitored(inter-

viewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).

After completing its task, the JCIC – following a recommendation of the

subcouncil–establishedaforumcalledtheHeadsofCivilianServices(HOCS),

comprisingtheheadsofthevariouscivilianintelligenceagencies,andaprovi-

sionalnationalintelligenceco-ordinatingcommittee.ThetaskofHOCSwasto

continuedevelopingproposalsforafutureintelligencedispensation,begununder

the auspices of the subcouncil. The task of the coordinating structure was to

ensurethatthejointintelligenceprocesscontinuedbeyondthelegalmandateof

theTEC.

WhileNISandDISco-operatedtosomedegree,theywerestillonopposite

sidesofthepoliticaldivideinthiscriticalperiod.Despitetheformalco-operation

introducedbytheestablishmentoftheTEC,secretinformationwasacontested

area.BoththeNPgovernmentanditspoliticaladversaries,particularlytheANC,

wereawareofthehugeinfluenceofintelligenceagenciesinthissensitiveperiod,

andkeptuptheir intelligenceoffensives inorder to learnasmuchaspossible

abouttheotherside.Theexistenceofalegislativeregimethatcriminalisedthe

disclosureofinformation,internalregulationsthatboundmembersofthesecurity

servicestosecrecy,andtheabsenceofrecordsmakeitalmostimpossibletoassess

objectivelytheroleofNISatthattime.

Thewide-rangingProtectionofInformationAct,1982andotherdraconian

security laws such as the Internal Security Act remained in force, even as the

opposing political forces engaged each other. A double-edged sword, security

legislation was probably as much directed at the liberation movement, with

whichthegovernmentwasbusynegotiatinganewpoliticaldispensation,asthe

whiterightwing,whichwasengagedinviolentattemptstoderailthetalks.The

volatilityofthesituationshouldnotbeunderestimated.Thereweremajordivi-

sionsintheapartheidsecurityforces,withanumberofmembersalignedwith

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 71

theextra-parliamentarywhiterightwing.Thegovernmentandothersfearedthat

securityinformationmightbeleakedtotherightwing,andaclimateofmutual

fearanddistrustpervadedtheranksofthesecurityforces(Haysom1992).

Akeyissuewasthestatusofintelligencerecordsvis-à-visthestatearchives.

AccordingtotheTRC(1998),the1978cabinetguidelinesontheprotectionof

informationempoweredtheheadsofgovernmentdepartmentstoauthorisethe

destructionofstaterecords.Intheprocess,theguidelinesignoredtheprovisions

oftheArchivesAct,whichgavefinalcustodianshipofallstaterecordstotheState

Archives.Theguidelinesdidnotexplicitlystatethatthepowersgiventothedirec-

toroftheStateArchiveswerebeingreplacedorretracted.Buttheweightofa

cabinetdecisionwassufficienttoallowgovernmentdepartmentstoactwithout

hindranceindestroyingstaterecords.Thispowerwasexercisedroutinelywithin

thesecurityestablishment.TheStateArchivesServiceclaimeditonlybecame

awareoftheguidelinesduring1991.

From 1983 the routine destruction of records was commonplace in NIS,

whichassumedthatitsrecordsfelloutsidetheambitoftheArchivesAct.Marius

Ackerman,formerstatelawadvisorintheStatePresident’sOffice,indescribing

thestatusofofficialdocumentsinthecustodyofNIS,pointedoutthat:

There was a difference of opinion between the State Archives and security

departmentsonthemeaningandeffectoftheArchivesAct.Theformerwereof

theviewthatallstatedocumentationeventuallyhadtobeundertheircontrol,

while the latter held the view that ‘sensitive documentation’ could never

besubmitted inthatwaybecausestatesecurityandespeciallythesafetyof

individualscouldbecompromised(interviewwithAdvocateMariusAckerman,

3August2003).

In testimony before the TRC, former NIS officials admitted that the organisa-

tionhaddestroyedabout44 tonsof records in themonthspreceding thefirst

democraticelections.Thousandsofofficials in thesecurity servicesandother

government departments shredded and burnt all records that could give the

ANC-led government insight into the methods, informants, and operations of

theapartheidintelligenceagencies.TheTRCnotes,however,thatrecordswhich

couldnotbetracedincludedthoseoftheNationalSecurityManagementSystem

(NSMS), a substructure of the State Security Council (TRC 1998). President

FWdeKlerkdisbandedtheNSMSin1989,andreducedthestatusoftheSSCto

thatofanordinarycabinetcommittee(Hansson1990).Thiswasdoneatatime

ofgrowingpopularandinternationalresistancetoapartheid,aswellasgrowing

schismswithintherulingparty.

72 / chAPter three

Followingthemassdestructionofrecords,apparentlydrivenbytheabove-

mentionedinterpretation,itwouldseemthatfewrecordsofNISactivitiesunder

apartheid survive. This institutional memory is unlikely to be recovered. The

apartheidrealworkingsoftheNISthusremainedasecret,despitetheoccasional

publicrelationsexercisesuchasmediainterviews.

the MAnAgeMent oF InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon unDeR the InteRIM ConstItutIon

Despiteongoingpoliticalviolence,agreementwaseventuallyreachedonanew

interimconstitution.Itcameintoeffecton27April1994,thedayofthecountry’s

firstinclusiveelections.Itcontainedanentirely newfeatureinSouthAfricanpoli-

tics:abillofrights,whichguaranteedarangeoffundamentalrightsincludingthe

righttolife;equalitybeforethelaw;privacy;freedomofexpression,association,

andmovementaccesstothecourts;administrativejustice;and,mostsignificantly,

accesstoinformation(Mureinik1994).

Onthelast-namedright,theinterimconstitutionstatedthat:

Everypersonshallhavetherightofaccesstoallinformationheldbythestate

oranyofitsorgansatanylevelofgovernmentinsofarassuchinformationis

requiredfortheprotectionofanyofhisorherrights(ConstitutionoftheRSA,

1993,section23).

In theperiodafter theelections the intelligenceservicesstruggledtocometo

termswiththeiridentityasdefendersofthenewpoliticalorder,craftedbythe

country’sfirstfullydemocraticlegislature,andthebroadenedconceptofsecurity

contained in the interimconstitutionwasundermined inpracticebydisconti-

nuitiesinboththediscourseandpracticeofsecurity.Notably,theycontinuedto

destroyrecordsuntil1996whenthecabinetfinallydeclaredamoratoriumonthis

practice(TRC1998).

Followingthetransitiontodemocracy,intelligenceofficialsweregivenwide

discretiontoclassifyinformationgeneratedinthecourseoftheirwork.Theprac-

ticewithinthesecurityserviceswastoshieldfromthepublicvieweventhose

categoriesofinformationthatwouldcausenoharmiftheyweredisclosed.The

ANCcontinuedtokeepsecretfileson theactivitiesofkeygovernmentfigures

(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).

Withoutareasonabledegreeoftransparency,membersofthepublicwould

obviouslybeatalossastowhatinformationtheymightrequestfromtheintel-

ligence services. Within the statutory services – NIS and the TBVC services

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 73

–intelligenceinformationandmuchotherofficialdocumentationcontinuedtobe

routinelyclassifiedas‘TopSecret’,‘Secret’,‘Confidential’or‘Restricted’,depending

ontheperceiveddegreeofharmtonationalsecuritytheirdisclosurewouldcause.

The criteria for classifying information were also not subject to any scrutiny,

becausenooversightframeworkexistedfordoingso.

ByApril1994thestatutoryandnon-statutoryintelligenceinstitutionswere

alreadylockedinintensivediscussionsabouttheirintegration.Aftertheelections,

flowingfromthereportsoftheSubcouncilonIntelligence,furtherbilateraltalks

wereheldtodevelopafutureintelligencedispensation.Thesediscussionsinflu-

encedthedebatewithinthenewparliament.AWhitePaperonIntelligenceand

threeBills,namelytheIntelligenceServicesBill,NationalStrategicIntelligence

Bill,andCommitteeofMembersofParliamentonandInspectorGeneralsofIntel-

ligenceBill,werepresentedtothelegislatureforapproval(interviewwithMoe

Shaik,17October2003).

The White Paper on Intelligence, adopted by parliament in 1994, warned

againsttheintelligenceservicesadoptingamilitaristicapproachtosecurity,as

wasthecaseunderapartheid,when‘emphasiswasplacedontheabilityofthe

statetosecureitsphysicalsurvival,territorialintegrityandindependence,aswell

asitsabilitytomaintainlawandorderwithinitsboundaries’(RSA,WhitePaper

onIntelligence1994).Itfurthersignalledthat

… the main threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of

nationsacross theworlddonotprimarilycomefromaneighbouringarmy,

but fromother internalandexternalchallengessuchaseconomiccollapse,

overpopulation,massmigration,ethnicrivalry,politicaloppression,terrorism,

crimeanddisease(WhitePaperonIntelligence,1994).

TheWhitePaperdealtwithsafeguardingthecountry’sdemocraticconstitution;

upholdingtheindividualrightsenunciatedintheBillofRights;promotingthe

interrelatedelementsofsecurity,stability,co-operationanddevelopment,both

withinSouthAfricaand in relation toSouthern Africa; contributing to global

peace;promotingSouthAfrica’sabilitytofaceforeignthreatsandenhanceits

competitiveness(Africa&Mlombile2001).

Theintelligenceserviceswouldbegovernedbythefollowingprinciples,allin

sharpcontrastwiththoseunderapartheid:theprimaryauthorityofthedemo-

craticinstitutionsofsociety;subordinationoftheintelligenceservicestotherule

oflaw;complianceoftheintelligenceserviceswithdemocraticvaluessuchasthe

respectforhumanrights;politicalneutralityoftheintelligenceservices;account-

abilityandparliamentaryoversightfortheintelligenceservices;maintaininga

74 / chAPter three

fairbalancebetweensecrecyandtransparency;separationofintelligencefrom

policy-making;andanethicalcodeofconducttogoverntheperformanceand

activitiesofindividualmembersoftheintelligenceservices(RSA,WhitePaperon

Intelligence,1994).

TheIntelligenceServicesBillproposedtheamalgamationofthestatutoryand

non-statutoryintelligenceservicesintotwocivilianintelligencedepartments:the

SASS,aforeigndepartmentresponsibleforcollectinginformationaboutexter-

nalthreatstosecurity;andtheNIA,adomesticdepartmentfocusingoninternal

threats.NIAwouldalsoholdthecounterintelligencemandate,andensurethat

foreign agents did not penetrate the South African intelligence machinery

(Africa1994).

The National Strategic Intelligence Bill provided for a mechanism to co-

ordinateandintegratetheintelligenceinputsofthetwociviliandepartmentswith

thoseoftheSAPSandSANDF,inordertoadvisethegovernmentonthreatsand

potentialthreatstothesecurityofthecountryanditscitizens.

Thirdly,theCommitteeofMembersofParliamentonandInspector-Generals

of IntelligenceBillprovided foramultipartyparliamentaryoversightcommit-

tee able to receive reports, make recommendations, order investigations, and

conducthearingsonmattersrelatingtointelligenceandnationalsecurity;and

anInspector-Generaltaskedwithinvestigatingcomplaintsabouttheintelligence

services.Thecommitteewouldalsosubmitreportstoparliamentontheperform-

anceofitsdutiesandfunctions.

Onthebasisofcabinetrecommendations,theministerof justicepresented

thethreebillstoparliament.MembersofHOCSandtheirlegaladvisorsappeared

before theselectcommitteesof thenationalassemblyandsenate.Aftermuch

deliberationanddebate, theselectcommitteesrecommendedthatthebillsbe

tabledinparliament(interviewwithMoeShaik,17October2003).

Anticipatingthenewlegislation,HOCSinstructedvarioussubcommitteesto

startworkonamalgamatingthevariousintelligenceservices.Jointspecialwork

groupswereestablishedtomaderecommendationsinrespectofthestructures,

budget,assets,andhumanresourcespoliciesofthenewservices.Basedontheir

reportsandrecommendations,HOCSformedanAmalgamationCommittee(AC)

taskedwithco-ordinatingandimplementingtheestablishmentoftheNIAand

SASS.TheACestablishedanumberofso-calledsuperworkinggroupsconsist-

ingof representativesof thestatutoryandnon-statutory intelligenceservices,

taskedwithimplementingthedecisionsandagreementsofHOCS,andfocusing

onthepracticalissuesthatwouldbeencounteredinthecourseofthetransition.

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 75

Theywerefull-timebodies,andtheirreportswereprocessedbytheACforconsid-

erationbyHOCS.

Someoftheissuesaddressedbytheworkinggroupswerethestaffrequire-

mentsoftheplannedintelligenceagencies,practicalstepstowardstheproposed

structuralchanges,budgetaryimplicationsforthe1995/6financialyear,andan

orientationprogrammeforallmembersofNIAandSASS.Theworkinggroups

also identified functions tobesharedby the twoservices,andmechanisms to

ensurethatthesefacilitieswereappropriatelydistributedandmanaged.

The interimconstitutiondidnotcontainanyprinciplesgoverningnational

security,asthesewerestillbeingdebated,andalsodidnotrefertotheestablish-

mentofthenewservices.Parliamentpassedthethreebillssettingupthenew

intelligencedispensationinthelatterhalfof1994,anditeffectivelycameinto

beingon1January1995.

Changeswithinthe intelligencestructuresof theSAPSwerealso informed

bytheoutcomeofthenegotiations(Africa&Mlombile2001).Thenewgovern-

ment’sagendaonlawenforcementwasshapedbytwoobjectives:rehabilitating

thepoliceforcetoensurethatitservedthecommunitiesofSouthAfricarather

thanpoliticalends;andmobilisingcitizenstoparticipateintheachievementof

safetyandsecurity(Africa&Mlombile2001).Amongtheoversightmechanisms

provided for in lawwerean IndependentComplaintsDirectorate, taskedwith

receivingcomplaintsfrommembersofthepublicaboutpolicemisconduct,and

parliamentaryoversightovertheSAPS.

Rauch(1991)describes thecomplexitiesof reorientingthepolice,andthe

sometimesambiguoussignalssentoutinthecourseofpolicereform.Significantly,

therankstructureoftheSAPSwasdemilitarised,andappropriatelyskilledcivil-

iansappointedtoaSecretariatforSafetyandSecurity,responsiblefordeveloping

policyforthepost-apartheidpoliceservice.

Thegovernanceandorientationofthearmedforcesalsochangedsignificantly

in the post-apartheid period. These were the product of political negotiations

abouttheintegrationofthearmedwingsoftheliberationmovementsandapart-

heidmilitarystructures,andtheroleofthearmedforcesinademocracy.Inthe

interestsofentrenchingdemocraticcivil–militaryrelations,theDefenceAmend-

mentActof1995providedforarestructuredDepartmentofDefencecomprising

theSADF(undertheoperationalcommandofthechiefofthearmedforces),and

acivilianDefenceSecretariat,responsibleforformulatingpolicy,andheadedby

theSecretaryforDefence(Africa&Mlombile2001).

Thefinalconstitutionlaterprovidedthecontextforthereformofthearmed

forces,andestablisheda framework forcivil–military relationsappropriate to

76 / chAPter three

ademocracy.Itdefinedtheprimaryroleofthedefenceforceasdefendingand

protectingtheRepublic,itsterritorialintegrityanditspeopleinaccordancewith

the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of

force’(RSAConstitution1996,section200(2)).Likeothersectorsofthesecurity

services,thedefenceforcewasrequiredtobepoliticallynon-partisan,function

withintheambitofthelaw,andsubjectitselftoparliamentaryoversight.

Defence Intelligence structures, falling under the operational command of

theSANDF,andsubjecttothepolicydeterminedbytheDepartmentofDefence,

were also subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994. The Act

distinguishedbetweendomesticandforeignmilitaryintelligence,andprescribed

theprocesstobefollowedtocollectdomesticmilitaryintelligencebythedefence

force,insupportofthepolice.Therationaleforthesestrictcontrolswastobolster

the professional status of the military and to avoid situations where it could

becomeinvolvedindomesticpoliticalconflict(Africa&Mlombile2001).

Theintroductionofastatutoryco-ordinatingmechanismfortheintelligence

agenciesmanagedbytheMinisterforIntelligencewasanothersignificantdevelop-

ment,aimedatpre-emptinginter-agencyrivalry.IntermsoftheNationalStrategic

IntelligenceAct,aco-ordinatorforintelligencewasresponsibleforcoordinating

thesupplyofintelligencebythedifferentagenciestointelligenceclients.NICOC

mainlyconsistedoftheco-ordinatorandtheheadsoftheintelligenceservices.

NICOCwasrequiredtoprovidestrategicintelligenceassessments,includingan

annualestimateofthreatstonationalsecuritywhichpolicy-makersshouldheed

inthecourseofthefollowingyear.

Afterthe1995transition,theintelligenceservicesstruggledtomanagethe

shiftinorientation.Thepoliticalclimatewasstillvolatile,andthenewgovern-

mentfacedthetaskofneutralisingdisaffectedright-wingers,someofwhomhad

accesstosecurityresources.Inaddition,violenceinthetownshipspersistedat

suchworryinglevelsthatthegovernmentwasconcernedthata‘thirdforce’–an

organisedbodyofindividualsintentondestabilisingthecountry–existedinthe

country’ssecurityforces(O’Brien1996).

Senior appointments made to the leadership of the intelligence services,

reflectedthepoliticalcompromisesinthecourseofthenegotiationprocess.The

civilian intelligence services were required to report to the president, initially

throughadeputyminister.Inpractice,thedeputyministerreportedthroughthe

ministerofjustice,whowasalsotheministerofintelligence.Thefirstdirector-gen-

eraloftheNIAwasSizakeleSigxashe,previouslyaseniorfigureinDIS,whilethe

firstdirector-generaloftheSASSwasMikeLouw,previouslydirector-generalof

NIS.TheministerofdefencewasJoeModise,aformerANCmilitarycommander,

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 77

andtheChiefofStaffIntelligencewasLieutenant-GeneralDirkVerbeek,aformer

SADFofficer.

IntheSAPS,DivisionalCommissionerAndréGrovéwhowasresponsiblefor

intelligenceandwhoservedunderNationalCommissionerGeorgeFivaz,both

apartheid-erapolicemen,reportedtoaministerforsafetyandsecurity–Sydney

Mafumadi–withanANCbackground(O’Brien1996).

Someofthepoliticalscandalsthatbesettheintelligenceservicesinthatperiod

weretheproductofpoliticaldifferencesatthetop.Thisaffectedthequalityof

intelligenceprovidedtothegovernment.Oneof these incidentswasthehand

deliveryofaclassified intelligencereport toPresidentNelsonMandelaby the

Chief of Defence Intelligence. The report had bypassed the NICOC structures

andclaimedthatseniormilitaryofficersfromanANCbackgroundwereplotting

acoup.Ajudicialteamappointedtoevaluatethereportdismisseditaslacking

credibility,andthechiefofDefenceIntelligencewasrelievedofhispost(Africa&

Mlombile2001).

AccordingtoAfricaandMlombile,theSouthAfricanexperienceofreform-

ingitsintelligenceservicesheldsomeimportantlessons.Thefirstwasthatthe

envisagedmission,orientation,andstructuresofaccountabilityoftheintelligence

servicesshouldbeclearlyreflectedinpolicyandinsubsequentlegislation.The

secondwasthatthegovernmentshouldresponddecisivelytoabuseorviolations

ofthelaw,asameansofpropagatinganewculture.Thethirdwasthatinternal

proceduresshouldbecomprehensivelyreviewedtoensurethattheywereconsist-

entwiththelegalframework.Thefourthwasthateachserviceshouldhaveclear

proceduresforauthorisingoperations,thusenablingtheresponsibleministerto

confirmthe legalityofaparticularoperation.Finally,parliamentaryoversight

bodieshadavitalroletoplayinmonitoringsuchatransformation.

IMPACt oF the ConstItutIon on the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Section 198 of the final constitution of 1996 spelt out the principles of a new

securitydispensation.Itstatedthatthesecurityserviceshadtobestructuredand

regulatedbynationallegislation,andalsostipulatedthat:

Thesecurityservicesmustact,andmustteachandrequiretheirmembersto

act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary

internationallawandinternationalagreementsbindingontheRepublic.

Nomemberofasecurityservicemayobeyamanifestlyillegalorder.

Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the

performanceoftheirfunctions:

78 / chAPter three

a. prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the

Constitution;or

b. further,inapartisanmanner,anyinterestofapoliticalparty.

Togiveeffecttotheprinciplesoftransparencyandaccountability,multiparty

parliamentarycommitteesmusthaveoversightofallsecurityservicesinaman-

nerdeterminedbynationallegislationortherulesandordersofParliament

(Constitution1996,section199).

Section210spelledoutprinciplesforthefunctioningoftheintelligenceservices:

National legislation must regulate the objects, powers and functions of the

intelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthedefenceforceor

policeservice,andmustprovidefor:

a. theco-ordinationofallintelligenceservices;and

b. civilian monitoring of the activities of those services by an Inspector

appointedbythePresident,asheadofthenationalexecutive,andapproved

byaresolutionadoptedbytheNationalAssemblywithasupportingvoteof

atleasttwo-thirdsofitsmember(Constitutionsection210).

Inchapter9,theconstitutionintroducedanumberofconstitutionalinstruments

aimedatpromoting the transparencyof thestate’s securityorgans,aswellas

theirgoodgovernance,includingaPublicProtector;aHumanRightsCommis-

sion;aCommissionforGenderEquality;anIndependentElectoralCommission;

anAuditor-General;andaCommissionforthePromotionandProtectionofthe

Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (RSA Constitution,

1996;section181).

Mostimportantly,theconstitutionconfirmedtherightofaccesstoinformation

inChapter2(theBillofRights)bygivingpersonsaccesstoanyinformationheld

bythestateaswellasanyinformationheldbyanotherperson.Asinthecaseof

theinterimconstitution,rightsintheBillofRightsaresubjecttoreasonableand

justifiablelimitation.

PARLIAMentARY oVeRsIght AnD ACCess to InFoRMAtIon

Thefirstpost-apartheidparliamentfacedthegargantuantaskofreplacingapart-

heidlegislationwithlawsthatreflectedthepromisesmadetotheelectorate,thus

layingthefoundationforthetransformationofSouthAfricansociety.Inrespectof

theintelligenceservices,aswithmuchofthecivilservice,notonlywouldthis

entail formulating new policies and creating a new legal framework, but also

amalgamatingsix separatebureaucracies.By law,all theoperativesof thesix

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 79

foundingagenciesweretobeabsorbedintothethreenewintelligencestructures:

theNIA,theSASS,andtheNICOC.Asnotedearlier,theCommitteeofMembers

ofParliamentonandInspector-GeneralsofIntelligenceBill, laterrenamedthe

IntelligenceServicesControlAct,providedfortheestablishmentofacommittee

ofmembersofparliamentonintelligenceaswellasinspectors-general,andhad

theeffectofplacingtheintelligenceservicesunderconsiderableoversight.

Oneofthewaysinwhichparliamentcouldexerciseitsoversightroleinthe

post-apartheidperiodwasbyquestioningtheresponsibleminister.However,as

Hansardshows,thismethodwasnotutilisedextensively,andquestionsbymem-

bersofoppositionpartieswereoftenonveryspecific issues.Thesewereoften

administrative,andtheministercouldeasilyprovidecrypticanswers.Thiswas

doneusuallyafterconsultingtherelevantheadofdepartment,althoughinthe

endtheministerhadtodecidehowtorespond.

Theprocessofparliamentaryquestionsallowedmembersofparliamentwho

hadserved in thepreviousgovernment tobecalled toaccount.On6Septem-

ber1994InkathaFreedomPartymemberVBNdlovuaskedFWdeKlerk,then

executivedeputypresidentandchairofthecabinetcommitteeonsecurityand

intelligence,thefollowingquestion:

1. WhethertheNational IntelligenceService(NIS)wasresponsibleforthe

(a) production (b) publication and/or (c) distribution of a document

entitled ‘Political Conflict in KwaZulu/Natal – the role of traditional

leaders’;ifso,(i)whichbranchoftheNIS,(ii)whatwerethisdocument’s

circulationfigures,and(iii)whatwasitspurpose;

2. Whether the NIS was authorised to (a) produce, (b) publish and/or

(c)distributethisdocument;ifso,bywhom;ifnotwhatisthepositionin

thisregard;

3. Whetherhehastakenorintendstakinganystepsinthisregard;ifnot,why

not;ifsowhatsteps?

DeKlerk’sreplywasfrank,probablysobecauseitnolongerheldmajorpolitical

implications.HeconfirmedthattheNIShadbeenresponsibleforthedocument,

butdeniedthatithadbeendistributed.Ithadonlybeenaworkingdocumentto

beconsideredbyaprovisionalproductionunitof the intelligencecommunity.

Thedocumenthadalsonotbeendistributedtotheofficialclientsonthedistri-

butionlistforintelligenceproducts,andhadonlybeendistributedtoalimited

numberofmembersoftheintelligencecommunityforevaluationandcomment.

Headdedthatthedocumentwasnotpublishedanddistributedbecausetherewas

insufficientinformationtosubstantiatetheworkingdocument.

80 / chAPter three

Otherquestionsputtoministersresponsiblefortheintelligenceservicesover

theyearshavecoveredthestatusandprogressofdisciplinaryhearings,theuseof

consultantsinthedepartments,therelationshipoftheserviceswithcertaincom-

panies,andinformationabouttheallegedmisdemeanoursofofficialswhichmight

havebecomepublicknowledge.

Differentministershavehandledquestionsdifferentlyovertheyears.Some

havebluntlyreferredMPstotheJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence.This

hasalsohappenedincaseswhereanMPwasalsoaservingmemberoftheJSCI,

butaskedquestionsinparliament.On23April2001,Brigadier-GeneralPJvan

Schalkwyk,amemberoftheoppositionDemocraticPartyandamemberofthe

JSCI,askedtheministerforintelligence:

• Whetherapermanentinvestigativegrouphadbeenestablishedtodealwith

thebacklogofdisciplinarycaseswithintheNIA,andwhatprogresshadbeen

made;

• WhattheNICOC,theNIA,theSASShadspenteachyearonsalaries,operating

costs,andcapitalcostssince1995;and

• HowmanypeoplehadbeenemployedintheMinistryofIntelligence,NICOC,

theNIA,andSASSineachyearsince1995.

Ineachcasetheministerat thetime,LindiweSisulureplied: ‘Thehonourable

memberisreferredtotheJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceforthedetails

onthisquestion’.

Several years later, in 2004, the newly appointed minister, Ronnie Kasrils,

took the step of disclosing, during his budget vote, the total allocation to the

intelligenceservicesaswellasexpenditureonpersonnel,operations,andcapi-

tal.However,insubsequentyearshedidnotdisclosetheamounts,butratherthe

ratiosofoperational,personnelandcapitalexpenditurebytheservices.

Another mechanism through which parliament has exercised a degree of

oversight,andwhichhasthereforeaffordedthepublicadegreeoftransparency

about intelligence, has been the JSCI. The founding act gives the committee

–whosemembersarevettedbytheNIA–accesstoclassifiedinformationand

documentsinthepossessionorunderthecontrolofaservice,totheextentthat

suchaccessisnecessaryfortheperformanceofitsfunctions,andoncondition

thatsuchinformationandrecordsarehandledinaccordancewiththeexisting

securityregulations.However,theservicesarenotobligedtodisclosethenames

oridentitiesofservicemembers,sources,ormethodsofintelligencegatheringto

thecommittee.Moreover,committeemembersarerequiredtoundergoasecu-

rityclearanceprocess,managedbytheNIA.Thecommitteefunctionswithinthe

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 81

boundsofsecrecyoftheintelligenceservices,andhashadtomaintainafinebal-

ancebetweenbeingpubliclyaccountable,satisfyingparliamentthattheservices

areoperatingwithintheframeworkofthelaw,andremainingimpartial.

the RoLe oF the InsPeCtoR-geneRAL oF InteLLIgenCe

TheIntelligenceServicesControlActalsoprovided for theappointmentofan

Inspector-Generalor inspectors-general taskedwithmonitoringcomplianceof

theserviceswiththeirownpolicies,reviewingtheiractivities,andperformingall

functionsdesignatedbytheministerforintelligence.

TheInspector-Generalisnominatedbytheoversightcommittee,andhastobe

approvedbyajointsittingofbothhousesofparliamentwitha75percentmajor-

ity,followingwhichthepresidentisrequiredtoeffecttheappointment.

The inspector general is a powerful figure in the intelligence dispensation

andhasaccesstoallclassifiedrecords,providedtheyareneededforhimorher

to perform a stipulated function. Among the reports the Inspector-General is

expectedtocompilefortheministerwasonethatrecordedanyunlawfulactivi-

tiesorsignificantintelligencefailuresreportedbytheheadsoftheintelligence

services.

the RoLe oF the AuDItoR-geneRAL

Aprominent featureof the intelligencedispensation under apartheid was the

extenttowhichlawsenabledtheservicestobefundedinsecret.Asnotedear-

lier,theSecurityServicesSpecialAccountActprovidedfortheestablishmentof

aSecurityServicesSpecialAccount,tobeutilisedforservicesofaconfidential

natureandexpensesconnectedwithBOSSdeemedtobeinthepublicinterest.

Upontherequestofrelevantministers,theministeroffinancecouldtransfer

fundstoaForeignAffairsSpecialAccount;aSpecialDefenceAccount;anInfor-

mation Service Special Account, and a South African Police Special Account.

Theseweretobeusedforconfidentialprojectsapprovedbytherespectiveminis-

ters(interviewwithWallievanHeerden,21October2003).

Intermsoftheenablinglegislation,theexecutivewasprimarilyresponsiblefor

secretorspecialprojects,andparliamentknewverylittleaboutthem.

AnnualreportsoftheAuditor-Generalprovidesomeinsightintotheservices’

financialaccountability.AnofficeoftheAuditor-Generalwascreatedinthe1996

constitution, which requires this office to audit the accounts, statements, and

financial management of all national, and local government institutions, and

82 / chAPter three

reporttoanylegislaturewithadirectinterestinthefindings.Theconstitution

explicitlyrequiresthatallreportsoftheAuditor-Generalmustbemadepublic.In

1996–7theAuditor-Generalreportedthatalthoughthefinancialstatementsofthe

intelligenceserviceswerenotbeingpublishedfor‘strategicandsecurityreasons’,

theyfairlyreflectedthefinancialpositionoftheinstitutionsconcerned.Neverthe-

less,hecommentedontheneedforimprovedcontrolsoverthepaymentofhuman

sources;thefailureofthecivilianintelligenceservicestocompileassetregisters;

alackoffinancialcontrolovertheamalgamationofthesecurityagenciesofthe

TBVCstateswiththenationalpoliceserviceandintelligenceagencies;andthe

failuretoappointanInspector-General(ReportoftheAuditor-General,1996/7).

Thesameconcernswerenotedinthenexttworeports.Thereportfor1997/8

statedthatalthoughprogressinattendingtosomeoftheconcernsraisedhadbeen

slow,therelationshipbetweentheOfficeoftheAuditor-Generalandtherespec-

tivedepartmentswasdynamicandrevealedattheleastasenseofaccountability

onthepartoftheservices.

Concernsaboutfinancialmanagementwerenotconfinedtotheintelligence

services.Manydepartmentsattractednegativeaudit reports in theearlypost-

apartheidyears,anindicationofthelegacytheywereadoptingaswellasthelack

ofmanagerialexperienceofmanynewofficials.

ThePublicFinanceManagementActof1999(thePFMA)sought toensure

greaterfinancialaccountabilityandresponsibilityonthepartofheadsofdepart-

ments. It gave them more flexibility to achieve objectives, but made them

criminallyliableforanymismanagementofstateresources.Theintelligenceserv-

icesarefullyboundtocomplywiththeActs’sprovisionsthatprescribeauniform,

outcomes-drivenandtransparentapproachtofinancialmanagementinthepublic

sector.

Membersoftheintelligenceservicessometimesquestionwhetherdisclosure

oftheintelligencebudgetandtheprocessesfordeterminingitcouldcompromise

theirtaskofidentifyingthreatstonationalsecurity(interviewwithBillyMasetlha,

NIAdirector-general,4August2005).Theyalsoaskwhethertheiradherenceto

thestatutoryandregulatoryprocessesofpublicfinancialmanagementcouldhave

similarunintendedconsequences.Thesequestionsareparticularlypertinentin

thecontextofthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct.

Ontheonehand,thePFMAattemptedtoensureopenandtransparentbudget-

aryprocesses,withaministergivenclearresponsibilityforfinancialmanagement.

Ontheotherhand,intelligencelegislationallowedtheservicestooperateinsecret

toexecutetheirmandates,andrequiredtheministertodoeverythinginhisorher

powertofacilitatetheirwork.

the trAnsItIon to DemocrAcy / 83

ConCLuDIng ReMARks

Inordertounderstandthemanagementofintelligenceinformationinthetransi-

tion,onemustunderstandtheextentofrepressionoutofwhichthenegotiations

emerged.WhenpresidentFWdeKlerkannouncedhisdramaticreformsin1990,

thousandsofpeoplehadalreadydiedinpoliticalviolence.Thesecurityforceshad

notonlyfailedtoturnthetide,but–assubsequentinvestigationsshowed–had

sometimesfomentedtheviolence.

Theprinciplesarisingoutofthepoliticalnegotiationsasembodiedinlegis-

lationcreatingatransitionalauthority,theinterimandfinalconstitutions,and

thelawsestablishingthenewintelligencedispensationcreatedanewcultureof

accountabilityandtransparencyinrespectofintelligence.Thenewservicesfaced

manychallenges,butoversightbodiesappearedtobesatisfiedwiththeirperform-

anceduringthefirstfiveyears.

Eventhoughtheservicesoperatedundernewlawswhichentirelyrepealed

theirpredecessors,thereweresignificantcontinuitieswiththeolddispensation.

IntheHOCSphase,agreementwasreachedthattheadministrativesystemsof

theapartheid-eraNISwouldinitiallybeusedandrevisedwithinashortperiod.

Inreality,thereviewhappenedveryslowlyandmuchlaterthananticipated,and

thenewservicesinheritedandcametooperateunderthearcaneregulationsand

systemsoftheoldorder.

Moreover,theconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinformationcoexistsuneasily

withthelawsandadministrativeinstrumentsdesignedtoprotectclassifiedinfor-

mation.Theselawsandinstrumentsarevestigesoftheapartheideraandinclude

theProtectionofInformationActof1984andtheMinimumInformationSecurity

Guidelines,whichempowerspublicofficialstorestrictaccesstoinformation.

Ontheotherhand,thenewdispensationhasmanypositivefeatures.Over-

sight structures, such as the JSCI and Auditor-General are able to bring both

thestrengthsandweaknessesoftheintelligenceservicestotheattentionofthe

public.Theministerisheldtoaccountinparliament,andtheservicesare,forthe

firsttime,unitedaboutthenatureofthreatstonationalsecurity.

While the process of restructuring the intelligence services has been fairly

comprehensive,ithasnotbeenwithoutitsproblemsandweaknesses.Nowhereis

thismoreevidentthanintheJanus-likelegislativeandregulatorydispensation,

whichsimultaneouslyencouragesdisclosureandopennessontheonehand,and

allowsthewithholdingofclassifiedinformationontheother.

84 / chAPter three

PART TWO

the new dispensation

In democratic South Africa, severalimportantmechanismsfacilitateaccess

toinformationabouttheintelligenceservices,eitherdirectlyorindirectly.This

chapterreviewsthesemechanismsandinstitutions,andassessestheirefficacy.

A wRItten PoLICY FRAMewoRk

Chapter11oftheconstitutionoutlinestheprinciplesgoverningnationalsecurity,

includingtheestablishmentof intelligenceservicessubjecttomultipartyover-

sight.TheWhitePaperonIntelligencealsoprovidesabroadpolicyframeworkas

wellasabasisforthelegislationthatsetsupandregulatestheintelligenceserv-

ices:theIntelligenceServicesActof2002,theNationalStrategicIntelligenceAct

of1994,andtheIntelligenceServicesOversightActof1994.TheseActsspellout

themandatesoftheservices,theoversightstructures,andtherespectivedutiesof

thevariousroleplayers,includingtheminister,theheadsofthedepartments,the

JSCI,andtheInspector-General.TheintelligenceservicesarealsosubjecttoPAIA,

whichplaysapivotalnewroleinallowingandregulatingaccesstostateinforma-

tion,andwillbeexaminedingreaterdetailinthenextchapter.

The governing principles, establishment, functions and mandate of the

intelligenceservicesarecodified in law,which isessential forpublicaccess to

information.Theissueishowwidelyknownandunderstoodtheselawsare,and

whetherthegeneralpopulationrealisestheirsignificance.Inaddition,manyof

theregulationsmadeunderthese lawsareclassified,andarenotgazettedfor

publiccomment.In2002,afteranextensivereviewoftheconditionsofservice

MeChAnIsMs FACILItAtIng ACCess to InFoRMAtIon ABout the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

4

88 / chAPter four

intheintelligenceservices,theministerforintelligencegazettedasetofhuman

resourcesregulationsforpubliccomment.However,thisisnotthegeneraltrend.

Thenormisthatregulationsissuedbytheministerandpolicydirectivesissued

bythedirectors-generalarekeptconfidential,withoutanyseriousevaluationof

whethertheinformationcontainedwithinwarrantsprotection.

PARLIAMent

Parliament,throughitslaw-makingfunction,isanotherinstitutionthatprovides

awindowintothefunctioningoftheintelligenceservices.Forthoseinterestedin

theissues,Hansards–recordsofparliamentarydebatesandlegislativeprocesses

–areeasilyaccessible.Alltabledlegislationissubjecttothenormalprocesses,and

publichearingsmaybeheldwhenthereisconsiderablepublicinterestinamatter.

Parliament isalsotheforuminwhichconcernsormattersofpolicycanbe

raised with the minister responsible for the intelligence services. Although,

compared to other portfolios, the minister receives a relatively low volume of

questions,themechanismisneverthelessavailable.Insomecases,theminister

refersquestionstotheJSCI,whicheffectivelymeansthatthebroaderpublicis

deniedtheanswers.

ThroughtheJSCI,parliamentalsohastheopportunitytoconsiderthebudget

oftheintelligenceservicesbeforethevote.Likeothermultipartyparliamentary

committees,workisdonelargelyincommittee,andthepositionofthecommittee

isreflectedintheannualbudgetvoteoftheminister.TheJSCIisrequiredtopub-

lishanannualreportbutitsperformanceinthisregardhasbeenratherpoor.The

reportusuallyappearslate,andnospecialeffortseemstobemadetodistributeit

tomembersofthepublic,oreventopublicinterestbodiesthatwanttoknowmore

aboutthecommittee’soversightwork.

the exeCutIVe

One cabinet minister is explicitly responsible for the intelligence services and

isthefigurewhocanbeaskedtoaccountfortheirperformanceordeficiencies.

Theministermustreportontheworkoftheservicestocolleaguesincabinet.In

addition,theministermustensurethattheservicesprovideintelligencetodepart-

mentsand,mostimportantly,relevantandtimelynationalstrategicintelligence.

Membersofthepublicarenotprivytothisintelligence,whichisusuallyclassified

secret.However,throughthebudgetvote,theministerprovidessomeinsightinto

securityconcernsandthebroadmeasuresputinplacebytheservicestoaddress

mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 89

them.Inrespondingtotheminister,theJSCIusuallyshedssomelightoncurrent

concernsandpotentialthreats.Theministeralsoissuespublicstatements,and

respondstoqueriesfromthemediaaboutmattersconcerningtheservices.

Onecriticismoftheexecutiveisthatitdoesnotcurrentlyassesswhetherthere

is intelligencethatnolongerneedstobekeptsecret,andcanbeplacedinthe

publicdomain.Thereiscurrentlynolegalrequirementfor ittodoso,andthe

matterthereforeappearstobediscretionary.Severalintelligenceservicesaround

theworldissueunclassifiedordeclassifiedreportsrelatingtonationalsecurity,as

awayofkeepingthepublicinformedoftheintelligenceservices’preoccupations.

the InsPeCtoR-geneRAL FoR InteLLIgenCe

Thepublicismeanttohaveaccesstoanotherimportantroleplayer:theInspector-

General for Intelligence. This very senior official, whose appointment has to

beapprovedby75percentofmembersofparliament,hasunfetteredaccessto

therecordsoftheintelligenceservices,irrespectiveoftheirsecretstatus.Such

accessshouldhelp the Inspector-General toevaluateproperly,complaintsand

casesbroughtbymembersoftheservicesormembersofthepublic.Inreality,

the Inspector-General’sOfficehas limitedcapacityandhasexperiencedteeth-

ingproblems.Theofficehasmadeeffortstopubliciseitsexistence,forexample

throughbrochuresandawebsite.Intheperiodunderreview,agrowingnumber

ofcomplaintswerereceivedbothfrommembersofthepublic,andfrommembers

oftheservices,whichtheofficeunderstandablydealtwithinconfidence.How-

ever,nopublicreportshavebeenreleased;so,ironically,althoughtheofficeis

partofthetransparencymechanism,membersofthepubliccannotreadilyassess

itsperformance.

the AuDItoR-geneRAL

TheOfficeoftheAuditor-Generalisaconstitutionalbodywithfullauthorityto

auditthefinancialstatementsoftheintelligenceservicesandtoprovideapub-

licassessmentofwhethertheymeetgenerallyacceptedaccountingstandards.

RegulatedbythePublicFinanceManagementActof1999,thefinancialaccount-

ingoftheintelligenceservicesissubjecttothesamerigorousauditingstandards

asanyothergovernmentdepartment.Overtheyears,asmootherworkingrela-

tionshiphasdevelopedbetweenmembersof theservicesandmembersof the

Auditor-General’s office who are vetted and issued with security clearances.

However,theAuditor-Generalconsistentlyraisestheconcernthattheintelligence

90 / chAPter four

services’secrecyrequirementsdoeshavesomeimpactontheirwork.Forexam-

ple,whencheckingexpenditureon intelligenceoperations, theycannotverify

independentlytheexistenceofsourcestheservicesclaimtohavepaid,orsecretly

acquired assets, as these must be shielded from public knowledge to protect

operations.Inresponse,theservicesarguethatsuchisthenatureofintelligence

work,andthattherewillalwaysbelimitstowhatcanbedisclosedtotheAuditor-

General.Forexample,informantswouldbereluctanttoprovideinformationto

theservices,iftheirroleandidentitieshadtoberevealedtotheAuditor-General.

the nAtIonAL ARChIVes

Another vehicle for the public to access information is through the records of

theNationalArchives.Thisavenueshouldbeofparticularinteresttohistorians,

aswellasmembersofthepublicwantingtoaccesspersonalfiles.TheNational

ArchivesActof1996makesprovisionforthereleaseofrecordsafter20years.

As thenationalarchivisthasstreamlinedprocedures inorder tobealigned to

PAIA,membersofthepubliccanusePAIAtoaccessrecordsinthecustodyofthe

NationalArchives.

Thenationalarchivisthasalreadypublisheda listof thefiles in itsposses-

sion,andthenamesofpeopleonwhomtheapartheidsecurityserviceskeptfiles.

Affected persons were invited to view their files using the mechanisms under

PAIA,ifthesefileswereolderthan20yearsold.Thenationalarchivisthasaduty

toensurethattheexemptionsofthePAIA–particularlythoserelatingtothird-

partyinformation–aretakenintoaccountbeforereleasinginformation.Interms

oftheNationalArchivesAct’s20-yearrule,intelligenceservicerecordscreated

in1995wouldhavetobetransferredtotheNationalArchivesattheendof2014.

ThisimpliesthatallrecordsdeemedpublicrecordsintermsofPAIAwouldfall

underthecustodianshipoftheNationalArchives,includingpersonalfiles,intel-

ligenceassessments,andadministrativedocumentsthathavenotbeenidentified

for disposal. Theoretically, it should no longer be possible for an intelligence

agencytodestroysensitiverecords,asNISdidattheendoftheapartheidera.

However,whiletheservicesreportedlybelievethattheycomplywiththerecord

managementstandardsoftheNationalArchives,thereisnoindependentover-

sighttoassesswhetherrecordsareadequatelyfiled,storedandpreserved,forthe

sakeofposterityandofconservingSouthAfrica’scollectivememory.

mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 91

DePARtMentAL ReVIews

Since1995theexecutive, throughvarious intelligenceministers,has initiated

anumberofreviews,someinternalandsomeintendedforeventualpublicdis-

closure.Inmostcases,theinitiatingauthorityhastriedtoensureobjectiveand

independentproceedingsbyappointingprominentandcredibleoutsideobserv-

erstoheadorserveonthereviewteams.Fortheexecutive,thesereviewshave

beenanimportantvehicleforaddressingemergingpolicyconcernsintheintel-

ligenceservices.ThefirstknownreviewwasthePikoliCommission,namedafter

itschairperson,AdvocateVusiPikoli.InitiatedbyJoeNhlanhla,deputyminister

forintelligence,in1996,barelyayearafterthenewserviceswereestablished,the

PikoliCommissionwasinrealityaninternaldepartmentalreview.Establishing

theserviceshadbeenarockyroadforthedeputyminister.Itwasdifficultenough

toamalgamateandstreamlineabureaucracythatcontainedformerfoes,suspi-

ciousofeachotherdespitehavingworkedsohardtoovercometheirdifferencesin

theinterestofnationalunification.Butdealingsimultaneouslywiththesecurity

problemsofafragiledemocracy(aresurgenceofdomesticviolenceinKwaZulu/

NatalandontheWitwatersrand,anincreaseinorganisedcrime,aperceptionthat

foreignintelligenceagencieswerespyingonSouthAfrica)andotherinternalvul-

nerabilitiessuchasthetheftofaconvoyofvehiclesandofabatchofcomputers

containingsensitiveinformation,wastoomuch.Theselasttwoincidentswerea

hugeembarrassmenttoNhlanhla,andPresidentNelsonMandelathreatenedto

shutdowntheintelligenceservices.Nhlanhlathereforedecidedthatitwastime

totakestock.

Thereview focusedonwhether themandate and design of the services as

constituted were appropriate for the times. It also addressed how organisa-

tional effectiveness could be improved. The recommendations confirmed that

theorganisationaldesignwasappropriatebutemphasisedthatnewcapacities,

includingsignalsintelligence,neededtobebuilt.Theneedforimprovedtraining

andhumanresourcemanagementsystemswasalsoidentified.Althoughreleasing

thecommission’srecommendationswouldnothavejeopardisednationalsecurity,

Nhlanhlachosenottotablethefindingsorrecommendationsfordiscussionin

parliament,raisingtheireofoppositionpoliticalparties.Instead,therecommen-

dationsweresenttotheJSCI,whodisclosedthemintheirreporttoParliamentthe

followingyear.PerhapsNhlanhlawassimplyfollowingdueprocess;however,the

perceptioncreatedwasthattheintelligenceserviceswereonthedefensiveand

unwillingtoallowpublicdebateabouttheirorganisation.Nhlanhlaacceptedthe

commission’srecommendationsandusedthemasabasisforhisprogrammeof

workoversubsequentyears.

92 / chAPter four

ThedusthadbarelysettledaroundthePikoliCommissionwhentheservices

wereembroiledinyetmoredrama.ThistimeGeneralGeorgeMeiring,headofthe

SANDF,receivedinformationfromDefenceIntelligencethatseveralprominent

ANCleadersandaseniorSANDFofficer,GeneralSiphiweNyanda,wereplotting

amilitarycoupagainstPresidentMandela.Meiringtookthisreportdirectlyto

Mandela,by-passingNICOC.ItisconceivablethatMeiringthoughthewasdoing

therightthingbycircumnavigatinghisNICOCcolleagueswhomighthavebeen

partytotheallegedmischief.Butthepresidentdismissedtheclaimsasludicrous,

andqueriedwhyithadbeenpresentedtohiminsuchanirregularfashion.Again,

Nhlanhlawasforcedtoappointacommission.Aftersittingforseveralmonths,the

commissionpresenteditsresults,whichrecognisedthattheco-ordinatinglegisla-

tionhadtohavebeenflawedtohavebeensubvertedinsuchawaybyMeiring.

FurtherreviewswereinitiatedunderLindiweSisulu,ministerofintelligence

from2001onwards.Oneofthesehadaninternalfocusandlookedatthecon-

ditions of service of members of the intelligence community. It addressed the

broaderpolicyquestionofthestatusoftheintelligenceservicesinrelationtothe

widerpublicservice.Afterextensiveinteractionwiththepublicservice,thecabi-

netapprovedinprincipletheestablishmentofanIntelligenceServicesCouncil

tolookintothisissue,assertingthattheconditionsofserviceformembersofthe

intelligencecommunityfelloutsidethepublicservice’sjurisdiction.

Otherpolicy-relatedquestionsinvestigatedbycommissionsinitiatedbySisulu

includedtheneedforaclassificationanddeclassificationframeworkalignedto

theconstitution,andtheregulationoftheprivatesecurityindustry.Othermat-

tersrelatedtothesensitiveworkoftheintelligenceservices,includingtheformer

government’s chemical and biological warfare programme. In all cases the

commissionsmaderecommendationsthatweremeanttoinformpolicydecision-

makingorformulation.

Oneflawinthesystemofgovernmenthasbeenthelackofcontinuity,witha

successionofministersbringingtheirownideasaboutparticularpolicypriorities

anddirections.Itrevealsthedisadvantageofhavinglimitedpublicparticipation

orinterestinthereviews,asministersgenerallyarenotunderpublicpressureto

bringpolicyprocessestoahead.Whenappointedministerfortheintelligence

services,RonnieKasrilspromisedtopursuethepolicyconcernsofhispredecessor,

includingaclassificationanddeclassificationpolicy.However,thepoliticaland

securitydemandsduringKasrils’stenuremeantthatotherprioritiestookprec-

edence,withtheresultthattheclassificationanddeclassificationpolicyremained

ontheagendabutwasnottreatedwithurgency.Histermofofficeendedbefore

thelegislationrelatingtodeclassificationandclassificationhadbeenpassed.

mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 93

ThemostsignificantreviewunderKasrilswastheMinisterialReviewCom-

missiononIntelligence.Appointedin2005,itwastaskedwithassessingwhether

theoperationsoftheintelligenceserviceswerealignedtotheconstitution.The

three-personcommissionwasheadedbyaformerdeputyministerforsafetyand

security,JoeMathews.Initsfinalreport,submittedin2008,itstronglyrecom-

mendedtighterexecutivecontroloverandscrutinyofoperationsinitiatedbythe

intelligenceservices.

ThereviewfollowedthedismissalofseveralseniorNIAmanagers,including

thedirector-general,forallegedlyconductingunlawfulsurveillanceandproviding

falseinformationtothepresidentoftherepublic.TheInspector-Generalinvesti-

gatedandconfirmedtheseallegations,whichresultedincriminalchargesbeing

broughtagainstthedirector-general,BillyMasetlhaandothers.However,abitter

andprotractedseriesoflegalbattlesensued,astheformerdirector-generalfought

toclearhisname.Consequently,thecourtsemergedasacriticalspaceinwhich

mattersaffectingtheintelligenceservicesunfolded.Giventhepoliticalclimate,

themediahasbecomeasecondarychannelthroughwhichthedevelopmentsin

theintelligenceservicesarefilteredandaired.

Intheearlierdaysofthenewintelligencedispensation,problemswithinthe

intelligenceserviceswererarelyaddressedbyresortingtothecourts,andalmost

never involved such senior personnel. There was the occasional case where a

memberoftheintelligenceserviceswaschargedwithcriminalconduct,andhis

linkstotheservicesexposed,buttheseincidentsweregenerallybenignandrarely

coveredbythemedia.Therehadalsobeenincidentswhereaggrievedmembers

orformermembershadturnedtothecourtsforassistanceoverlabourdisputes

thattheyhadfailedtoresolvewithmanagement.Theresorttothecourtswas

hardlysurprisinginmanycases,astheserviceshadnoaccesstotheconciliation

andmediationmechanismsavailable,havingbeenexpresslyexcludedfromthe

provisionsoftheLabourRelationsAct.Inseveralcases,theincidentsreachedthe

courtsbecausetheemployer-employeerelationswerepoorlyhandled.Although

somesuchmatterswereheardin camera,inmostcasesthedisputesattractedlittle

mediainterestandweresettledoutofthepublicglare.

MeDIA AnD CoMMunICAtIon stRAtegIes oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Theintelligenceserviceshavealwaysbeensensitivetopublicperception.In1995

theNIAappointedaseniormanagerasheadofcommunications.Thiscontin-

uedatrendthathadbecomewellestablishedunderNIS,whichhadallowedits

94 / chAPter four

mostseniorofficialstoengagewiththemediainordertoexplainanddemystify

themselves.

However,mediacoveragehasnotalwaysbeenkindtotheintelligenceservices.

Intelligenceactivityinevitablyseemstogenerateaclimateofsuspicion.In1996,

allegationsweremadeinthemediathattheintelligenceserviceswerespyingon

thetopmanagementoftheSAPS.Overtheyears,otherallegationsweremadein

themediathattheintelligenceserviceswerebuggingthetelephonesofcitizens,

includingoppositionpoliticians.Thestoriesofmishaps,ineptitude,andscandal

carriedinthemediahavemadefortitillatingreading.Thebungledspyingonthe

GermanEmbassyinPretoria,andthetheftofminibusesandcomputersfromthe

NIA’sheadquarters,allmadeforgoodmediacopyinthefirstfewyearsoftheserv-

ices’existence.

Inresponse,theintelligenceserviceshaveestablishedcapacitiestomanage

theirpublicimageandpublicrelations.Initially,theministerdidnotplayadirect

roleinmediainteractions;theseniormanagerappointedbytheservicehandled

questionsandqueriesfromthepress.Later,inordertostandardiseandexercise

control over responses to media queries, Deputy Minister Nhlanhla appointed

aspokesperson in theministry tohandleallmediaqueries.Thisarrangement

becameembeddedquicklyenoughandtheofficeoftheMinisternowmanages

publicrelationsfortheintelligenceservices.

Nevertheless,theintelligenceservicesdoenjoysomeautonomyinrespectof

communicationstrategies.Both theNIAand SASS have informative websites.

Between2001and2004theNIAproducedthreecomprehensivepublicannual

reportsthatareavailableonitswebsiteatwww.nia.gov.za.VusiMavimbela,anew

director-generalappointedin2001,wasparticularlyenthusiasticaboutimproving

thepublicprofileoftheAgency.Mavimbelasaysinhisforewordtothe2002/3

publicannualreport:

WhenwelaunchedourPublicAnnualReportlastyear,weweredrivenbythe

simpleconvictionthattheSouthAfricansocietyistheultimatestakeholderon

issuesofnationalsecurity.Itwastheconvictionthatifthisstakeholderisto

playitsroleinensuringnationalsecurityforitself,ithastobeinformedofwhat

theplaceandroleoftheNationalIntelligenceAgency(NIA)isinsociety.

Throughthereports,theNIAreleasedsignificantandsometimesdetailedinfor-

mationaboutitselfanditswork.Forexampleonthesubjectofvetting,the2001/2

reportstatedthattheNIAhadreceivedinthepastyear3180requestsforsecurity

clearances,conductedover16000recordchecksforspecialevents,andissueda

totalof1379confidentialtotop-secretclearances.Thereportlistedthespecial

mechAnIsms fAcIlItAtInG Access to InformAtIon / 95

eventsprovidedwithsecurityadvisoryservices,includingtheWorldConference

againstRacismandtheInter-CongoleseDialogue.Itstatedthatsimilarservices

wouldbeprovidedoverthecomingyearstotheconferenceoftheNon-Aligned

MovementSummit,theWorldSymposiumonSustainableDevelopment,theSum-

mitoftheAfricanUnionandtheWorldCricketCup,alleventstakingplaceon

SouthAfricansoil.

TheNIA’spublicannualreportsalsoexplainedchangesinprioritiesoverthe

years.Forexample,inits2003/4report,borderintelligence,organisedcrimeand

corruptionandterrorismarereflectedaspriorities.Thereportslistedthetypesof

‘products’(assessments)producedbytheNIA,whichincludedatthetimedaily

andweeklyintelligencereviews.Finally,thepublicreportsprovidedstatistical

informationaboutthedemographicsandcompositionoftheNIAanditscorporate

governanceframework.ThetimingoftheNIA’slastpublicannualreportcoin-

cidedwiththeresignationofMavimbelaandhisreplacementbyBillyMasetlha.

Thedisruptioncausedbythechangeinministeranddirector-generalafterthe

2004generalelectionsmaybethereasonwhynomorepublicreportswerepro-

duced.However,thefactthattheNIAisnotlegallyobligedtopublishapublic

annualreportmeansthattherewasneveranyleveragetoensurethatthispractice

continuedorwasresumed.

Incontrast,theSASShasproducedonlyonepublicreport–aglossyten-year

review.ThisfairlyrevealingdocumentcanbefoundontheSASSwebsiteatwww.

sass.gov.za.LiketheNIA’sreports,itcoversthelegalframeworkandmandate,

providesdemographicdetails(ratiosnotnumbers)andexplains thepriorities

oftheService.ThereportalsoexplainstheSASS’sintelligence-gatheringrolein

supportofAfricanpeaceinitiatives, itsco-operationwiththelawenforcement

agenciesinrespectofcrimeintelligence,itsworkineconomicintelligence,and

itsinternationalco-operationwithotherintelligenceagencies.However,sinceits

voluntarydecisiontopublishaten-yearreview,theSASShasnotcontinuedto

publiciseitsrecordinthisway,andthereisnopressureforittodoso.

Theministryitselfissubjecttotheoverallgovernmentcommunicationsstrat-

egy, led by the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS),

whichislocatedinthePresidency.TheGCISco-ordinatesgovernmentcommu-

nicationsincludingthescheduleofpressbriefings,whichcabinetministersand

their ‘cluster’colleaguesmustattend.Forcommunicationpurposes,theintelli-

genceservicesfallundertheJustice,CrimePrevention,andSecurityCluster.Thus

theministerregularlybriefsthemediaabouteventsinrelationtotheseportfolios

togetherwithhisorhercolleagues.Overandabovethis,theministerengageswith

96 / chAPter four

themediaonarangeofsecurityquestions,grantinginterviews,meetingeditors,

andwritingarticlesandletters.

ConCLusIon

Since1995,theveilappearstohavebeenliftedsignificantlyontheintelligence

services, with the public able to access information through a multiplicity of

means.However,anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatfewcitizenshavethekindof

insightrequiredforregularmonitoringanduseofallthesemeans.Publicinter-

est is not excessive, and is mainly stimulated by media reports, especially of

a sensational nature. Policy priorities change from minister to minister. More

processesareintroducedtoaddressthenewprioritiesbeforetheoldoneshave

beencompleted,addingtoconfusionaboutthestatusofpolicy,evenamongthe

enlightened.

Onreflection,theintelligenceserviceshavebeengenerallytransparentbut

have also been inconsistent. Examples include the discontinuation of public

annualreportsbytheservicesandtherelativelylowprofileoftheworkofthe

JSCI.What isperhapsneededisatransparencyreview, ledbytheminister, to

takestockofwhathasbeenachievedandtolookathowtomaintainaconsistent

cultureoftransparency.

The Bill of Rights intheSouthAfricanconstitutionstatesthateveryperson

hastherightofaccesstoanyinformationheldbythestate,aswellasany

informationheldbyanotherpersonrequiredfortheexerciseorprotectionofany

rights(s32.1).Itstatesthatnationallegislationmustbeenactedtogiveeffectto

thisright(s32.2).

ItalsostatesthattherightsintheBillofRightsmayonlybelimitedifthelimi-

tationis‘reasonableandjustifiableinanopenanddemocraticsocietybasedon

humandignity,equalityandfreedom’,and‘takingintoaccountallrelevantfactors

including:

a. thenatureoftheright;

b. theimportanceofthepurposeofthelimitation;

c. thenatureandextentofthelimitation;

d. therelationbetweenthelimitationanditspurpose;and

e. lessrestrictivemeanstoachievethepurpose’(s36.1).

Thisisanimportantprovision.InlaytermsitmeansthattherightsintheBillof

Rightsarenotabsolutebutcanberestrictedifthereasonsfordoingsocanbe

arguedwithsomelegitimacy.Infact,aswewillsee,thisisprovidedforinPAIA,

whichcontainsasetofgroundsonwhichaccesstorecordscanbewithheldfrom

requesters.

In1994ataskteamwasestablishedintheofficeofthethendeputypresident,

ThaboMbeki,todraftthelegislation.ConvenedbyAdvocateMojankuGumbi,it

alsocomprisedAdvocateVincentMaleka,ProfessorMandlaMchunu,Professor

PAIA AnD Its IMPLICAtIons FoR the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

5

98 / chAPter fIve

EtienneMureinik,andAdvocateEmpievanSchoor,astatelawadvisor.Itsbrief

wastodraftalawthatwouldcoveraccesstoinformation,accesstomeetings,and

theprotectionofwhistleblowers.

Recounting the drafting process, Van Schoor confirms that the principle

of maximum disclosure was paramount during early deliberations (interview,

25.08.03). The task team studied access to information legislation of several

countries,includingAustralia,NewZealand,Ireland,theUnitedStates,Britain

(indraftformatthattime),andIndia(alsoindraftform).Theymetregularlyto

discussvariousdrafts.

Inadocumentdated19January1995,thetaskteamnotedthat‘certainclasses

ofsensitiveinformation’wouldhavetobeexemptedfromdisclosure.Theseshould

benarrow,well-justified,designedtopreventrealharm,and,wherenecessary,

subject toapublic interestoverride. In its initialdraft thetaskteamproposed

exemptionsincaseswherethereleaseofinformationcouldcauseseriousharm

tonationaldefenceorsecurity;underminelawenforcement;jeopardisepersonal

privacy,thesafetyofanindividual;endangerthegovernment’smanagementof

thenationaleconomyorthenationalfinances,oraffectthegovernment’scapacity

tocollectinformationinthenationalinterest,properpersonneladministrationin

thepublicservice,orthedeliberativeprocesswithinthegovernmentbyinhibiting

candidinternalcommunication(OpenDemocracyTaskTeam1995).

The initial proposal also required public bodies to take proactive steps to

fosteracultureoftransparency.Thetaskteamarguedthatsuchbodiesshould

routinelypublishormakeavailablethefollowingkindsofinformation:manuals

orbrochuresdetailingdescriptionsoftheclassesofinformationintheirposses-

sion; their internal structures, functions, responsibilities and decision-making

processes;themeansbywhichcitizenscouldparticipateinthedecision-making

processes;detailsofavailablecomplaint,appealandredressprocedures;detailsof

availablepublicservicesandhowtousethem;anddetailsofinternalcomplaints

procedures available to an official wishing to draw attention to lawbreaking,

corruption,ormaladministration.

Among the enforcement mechanisms proposed by the task team was the

appointmentbyeachgovernmentbodyofaninformationofficerwhowouldcon-

siderrequestsforinformation.Shouldarequestberefused,therequestercould

appeal internallytotheheadofthepublicbody.Intheeventofanunsuccess-

fulinternalappeal,arequesterwouldhaverecoursetoaninformationcourtthat

dealtexclusivelywiththeenforcementoftheOpenDemocracyAct.Thepublic

protectorandhumanrightscommissionwouldbegrantedinterventionandmedi-

ationpowers.Thetaskteamalsoproposedthatanindependentbody(theOpen

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 99

DemocracyCommission)beestablishedtomonitortheeffectivenessoftheAct

andtoreportannuallytoparliamentonitsimplementationthroughtheappropri-

ateparliamentarycommittee.

The drafting of the Open Democracy Bill proceeded with periodic delays.

Between1995and1996itwassubmittedtwicetothecabinet,butwasreferred

backeachtimeforfurtherworkandconsultation.InOctober1997thedraftbill

waspublishedintheGovernment Gazette forpubliccomment.Commentswere

considered,furtheradjustmentsweremade,andin1998cabinetapprovedthe

draft.In1998thebillwasfinallytabledinparliament.ThepurposeoftheOpen

DemocracyBillwastogivecitizensaccesstoinformationheldbypublicbodies,

andaccesstotheproceedingsofcertainpublicbodies.Otheraimsweretopro-

tectprivacy,andtoprotectofficialswhodisclosedseriousmaladministrationor

corruption.Overall,thebillwouldempowerthecitizenrytoparticipateingovern-

mentaldecision-makingthataffectedthem(Currie&Klaaren2002).

The original recommendation was for a single act to accomplish the work

doneinothercountriesbyseparatefreedomofinformationacts(alsoknownas

‘accesstoinformation’acts),privacyacts,openmeetingsacts(alsoknownas‘gov-

ernmentinthesunshine’acts),andwhistleblowerprotectionacts.However,the

cabinetdecidedtotableaseparatebillthatdealtwithwhistleblowersandopen

meetings,andovertimeabandonedtheopenmeetingscomponent.Thelegisla-

tiondealingwithwhistleblowerswastheProtectedDisclosuresActof2000.Van

Schoorexplainsthatthereasonforhavingaseparatebillwasconstitutional,as

technicallytheconstitutionrequiredtheaccesstoinformationlegislationtobe

enactedbefore4February2000(interview,25.08.03).

The Promotion of Access for Information Act (PAIA) was finally passed by

parliamentin2000.Thislawgivessubstancetotheconstitutionalrightofaccess

toinformationheldbythestate.Itsstatedaimisthefollowing:

Togiveeffecttotheconstitutionalrightofaccesstoanyinformationheldby

the state; to make available to the public, information about the functions

of governmental bodies; to provide persons with access to their personal

informationheldbyprivatebodies;toprovideforthecorrectionofpersonal

informationheldbygovernmentalorprivatebodiesandtoregulatetheuse

anddisclosureof that information; toprovidefor theprotectionofpersons

disclosingevidenceofcontraventionsofthelaw,seriousmaladministrationor

corruptioningovernmentalbodies;andtoprovideformattersconnectedthere-

with(PAIA,Aim).

100 / chAPter fIve

An outLIne oF PAIA

PAIArequiresthatallpublicandprivatebodiesreleaseinformationaboutthem-

selves,listinformationorrecordstheyhold,andstatehowmembersofthepublic

canaccessthoserecords.Italsooutlinesthegroundsonwhichpublicandprivate

bodiesmayrefuseaccesstotheirrecords,andprovidesmechanismsforappealing

againstsuchdecisions.

the scope of the ActTheActoverridesanylegislationthatmightbemateriallyinconsistentorincon-

flictwithitsprovisions.Thisimpliesthattheintelligenceservicescannotclaim

anautomaticrighttosecrecy,andmustbalancetheirobjectives(alsodefinedin

law)withtheprovisionsoftheAct.However,therearegroundsforlegitimateand

justifiablenon-disclosure,whicharecoveredlaterinthischapter.

TheActstatesthatinformationheldbythestateshouldbemadepublic ‘as

swiftly,inexpensively,andeffortlesslyasreasonablypossiblewithoutjeopardising

goodgovernance,privacyandcommercialconfidentiality’(s9b).

However,notallpublicbodiesaresubjecttoPAIA.Section12stipulatesthat

theActdoesnotapplytorecordsofthecabinetanditscommittees;thecourts

oftheconstitutionaljudicialsystem;specialtribunalsestablishedintermsofthe

SpecialInvestigatingUnitsandSpecialTribunalsActof1996;andofficersofsuch

courtsortribunals.NordoestheActapplytoindividualmembersofparliament

orprovinciallegislators.However,itdoesallowthecabinetanditscommittees,

members of parliament, or provincial legislators to request information about

privatebodies.

TheActprovidesmainlyforaccessonrequestand,inparticular,foraccessto

alreadyexistingrecords.Therefore,thebodythatreceivesarequestcannotlegiti-

matelybeexpectedtocompilearecord,ifarecorddoesnotexist.

TheActisstronglyweightedinfavourofthoserequestinginformation.The

constitutiondoesnotrequirearequestertoprovethattheinformationisnecessary

fortheexerciseoftheirconstitutionalrights.Infact,thereasonfortherequestis

irrelevant;theonusisonthepublicorprivatebodytowhomarequestisdirected

tocomplywithanylegitimaterequest,ifthereisnolegallybasedreasonforwith-

holdingarequestedrecord.

Routine disclosures required in the PAIA manualsTheAct(part2,chapter3,s14)outlinestheinformationthatallpublicbodies

mustpublishinamanualinatleasttwoofficiallanguages.(Part3listsidenti-

calrequirementsforprivatebodies.)Themanualmustcontainadescriptionof

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 101

thepublicbody’sstructures,functions,andcontactdetails;alistoftherecords

held,bysubjectandcategoriesofeachsubject;andadescriptionofeverypersonal

informationbankheldbythepublicbody.Itmustalsoclearlystatewhichcatego-

riesofrecordsareopentothepublic,andhowtoobtainaccesstothoserecords;

describeitsservicesavailabletomembersofthepublic;andhowtogainaccessto

theseservices.Itmustalsodescribearrangementsformembersofthepublicto

participateinorinfluencetheformulationofpolicy,ortheexerciseorperform-

anceofduties(Currie&Klaaren2002).

Section 14, through the requirement to produce manuals, is the window

throughwhichmembersofthepubliccangainmuchinsightintotherole,struc-

ture,andfunctionsofthepublicbodyinquestion.Itisprobablymoresignificantin

respectoftheintelligenceservicesthanotherpublicbodies,intowhichmembers

ofthepublicarelikelytohavesomeinsightthroughmediareportsandgenerally

availableinformation.Thesecrecysurroundingtheintelligenceservicestendsto

beperpetuatedbytheroutineclassificationofmostinformationandtheabsence

ofaframeworkforthenon-classificationordeclassificationofsuchinformation,

aconditionwhichcouldbesignificantlyalleviatedbytheavailabilityofmanuals.

Requests for access to informationPAIArequiresthatallrelevantpublicbodiesappointadeputyinformationofficer

(DIO)toattendtoitsobligationsundertheAct.ThustheDIOisdirectlyrespon-

sibleforprocessingrequestsforinformation,aswellastransferringrequestsif

thepublicbodydoesnothavetherequiredinformation.Agenciesarerequiredto

ensurethatrequestsarekeptuntilafinaldecisionhasbeentakenonwhetheror

nottograntaccess.Noofficialofapublicbody,otherthantheinformationofficer

ordeputyinformationofficer,hasthepowertorespondtoarequestforaccess.

grounds for refusal of access to recordsPAIArecognisesthattherearecircumstancesunderwhichpublicbodiesshould

havetherighttorefuserequestsforinformation.Inthefirstinstance,refusalis

deemedtohavetakenplacewhenthebodyinquestionrepliesthatarequested

recordcannotbefoundordoesnotexist,orwhentheresponsetoarequest is

notlodgedwithintheregulatedtime.Shouldarequestberefused,anappealcan

thereafterbemade,firsttothebodyandthentotheminister.Anothersignificant

featureoftheActisthataninformationofficermaydenytheexistenceornon-

existenceofarecord,ifthepublicbodybelievesthatacknowledgmentthereofis

goingtocauseharm(part2,chapter4).

102 / chAPter fIve

Thegroundsforlegitimatelyrefusingaccesstoarecordareclearlystipulated,

andmustbejustifiableintermsoftheconstitution.Bothmandatoryanddiscre-

tionarygroundsforrefusalareprovided.Inthecaseoftheformer,abodymust

refuseaccesstorequestedrecords.Insummary,arequestforaccesstoarecord

mayberefused if the refusal isbasedon themandatoryprotectionofprivacy

ofathirdpartywhoisanaturalperson;taxandcertainotherrecordsheldby

the South African Revenue Services (SARS); commercial information about a

thirdparty;thesafetyofindividualsandofproperty;policedockets;orresearch

information.

Therearealsoanumberofdiscretionarygroundsforrefusingaccess.Inother

words,thepublicbodyreceivingtherequestmustevaluatewhethertherequest

willcompromisecertainofitsresponsibilities.Arequestforaccesstoarecordmay

berefusediftherefusalisbasedontheprotectionofcertainconfidentialinfor-

mationaboutathirdparty;lawenforcementandlegalproceedings;ordefence,

security,andinternationalrelationsoftheRepublic.Accessmayalsoberefused

ifarequest ismanifestlyfrivolousorvexatious,orwhereaccesstoarecordor

recordswillresultinasubstantialorunreasonablediversionofresources.How-

ever,theActprovidesformandatorydisclosureiftheinformationisinthepublic

interest,orwouldrevealsubstantialenvironmentalriskorharmtopublicsafety

(Currie&Klaaren2002).

Implications for the intelligence services of the grounds for refusalGiventhattheintelligenceservicesaresubjecttoPAIA,theimplicationsofeachof

thesegroundsforrefusalneedtoexamined.Theoverallresultisalegalenviron-

mentinwhichthereisconsiderableroomfortheintelligenceservicestoprotect

theirsecrets.

Mandatory protection of the privacy of a third party who is a natural personThisprovision,insection34oftheAct,ismeanttoprotectanindividual’sprivacy,

arightalsoenshrinedintheconstitution.Theclauseimpliesthatapublicbody

cannotprovidearequesterwithpersonalinformationaboutathirdparty,which

includesadeceasedperson.Nonetheless,accessmaybegrantedincertaincases–

forexample,ifthepersonconcernedhasconsentedtodisclosure,orhasprovided

theinformationtothepublicbody,knowingthatitmightbemadeavailableat

somestage.Accessmayalsobegrantediftheinformationisalreadypubliclyavail-

able,orrelatestothephysicalormentalhealthofathirdpartyminorunderthe

careoftherequester.Finally,accessmaybegrantediftheinformationisaboutan

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 103

individualwhoisorwasanofficialofapublicbody,andrelatestotheirposition

inrelationtotheoffice.

Thisclauseimpliesthattheintelligenceservicesarenotallowedtomakeavail-

abletorequesterspersonalinformationaboutpersonsintheirranks,whoworkas

agentsorinformers,orwhoarethetargetsofintelligencecollectionwithoutthe

consentoftheindividualconcerned.Thissupportstherequirementthattheiden-

titiesofintelligenceworkersandtheirsourcesmustbeprotected,whichisalready

providedforintheIntelligenceServicesActof2002.

However, persons on whom apartheid-era security services had kept files

couldrequesttoseetheirownfilesintermsofPAIAiftherecordsweremorethan

20yearsold,asprescribedintheNationalArchivesActof1996. InNovember

2003theNationalArchivestooktheunprecedentedstepofpublishingalistof

fileswhichhadbeenmaintainedby theapartheid security forces, and invited

thepeoplelistedtoapplyforaccesstotheirfilesintermsofPAIA.However,no

memberofthepublicwasentitledtoseeanotherperson’sfileunlesstheperson

concernedhadagreedinprincipletosuchaccess.Afterevaluatingtherequest,the

filescouldthenbereleasedtotherequesterprovidedtheydidnotcontaininfor-

mationthatwasprotectedintermsofPAIA.TheNationalArchivesstressedthat

anypersonseekingaccesstotheirpersonalfilekeptbythesecurityforceswould

havetocomplywithPAIA’srequirements,completethenecessaryforms,andpay

theprescribedadministrativefeesforprocessingtherequest.

Thisgroundforrefusalisalsorelevanttothesecurityscreeningofpublicserv-

ants.Intelligenceservicesroutinelyusedetailedscreeningprocessestoacquire

informationaboutnewemployees,aswellasunsuccessfulcandidates.Theyare

alsosometimesaskedtoinvestigateandissuesecurityclearancestocivilservants

whohaveroutineorfrequentaccesstosensitiveinformation.Ingeneral,reasons

arenotsuppliedwhencandidatesfailtoobtainsecurityclearances.ThoughPAIA

hasnotbeentestedinrespectofsecurityclearances,thismayhavetochange,or

attheveryleasttheintelligenceserviceswouldhavetodocumentcarefullysuch

reasons, in case an individual requesting access to the records challenged the

decision.

ThisprovisionofPAIAimpliesthattheintelligenceservicesshouldprotectthe

privacyofsuchcandidates.Thebroadguidelineisthatitwouldbeillegaltopro-

videpersonalinformationtoathirdpartywithouttheconsentoftheindividual

concerned.WhileSouthAfricadoesnothaveprivacylegislation,thisprotection

ofpersonalinformationisinlinewiththeSouthAfricanLawCommission’sdraft

conceptsonprivacylegislation.

104 / chAPter fIve

Mandatory protection from disclosure of certain records of the South African Revenue ServiceAccordingtosection35oftheAct,SARSmustrefusearequestforaccessifthe

recordcontains informationobtainedorheld for thepurposeofenforcingtax

collection legislation. Although this reason for refusal may at first glance not

appeartohavedirectconsequencesfortheintelligenceservices,itdoes,especially

whenoneconsidersthatasubstantialpartofanyintelligenceservices’budgetis

fortheremunerationofinformers,oftenthelifebloodoftheiroperations.SARS’s

effectivenessdependsonbeingabletomatchanindividual’sbonafideidentity

withhisorher income.As intelligenceagenciesoftenmakeuseofpersonsor

entitieswithfalseidentitiesforthepurposesofoperationalsecurity,thisposesa

dilemma.Shouldsuchremunerationforservicesberegardedas‘income’,andif

not,whynot?Atthetimeofwritingthisissuehadnotyetsurfacedpublicly,andis

thereforeraisedhypothetically.Butitmaywelldosoinfuture,whenasoundand

legallydefensibleregimearoundtheremunerationorincomeofsourceswillhave

tobedeveloped.Fromapublicinterestperspective,whethersuchdisbursements

aretaxableornot,whatisatissueiswhethersuchpaymentstosourcesarereason-

able,dulyauthorised,andtheprocedureseffectingthemtransparentenoughto

preventcorruption.

Mandatory protection of commercial information of a third partyAccordingtosection36oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefusearequestforaccess

iftherequestedrecordcontainstradesecretsinvolvingathirdparty;financial,

commercial,scientificortechnicalinformationwhich,ifdisclosed,couldharmthe

commercialorfinancialinterestsofathirdparty;orinformationsuppliedincon-

fidencebyathirdpartywhich,ifdisclosedtoarequester,mightharmitsinterests

incontractualorothernegotiationsorincommercialcompetition.

However,accesstorecordsmaynotberefusediftherecordrequestedisalready

publiclyavailable,ifthethirdpartyinquestionhasconsentedtotheinformation

beingmadeavailable,or,ifdisclosinginformationrelatingtoproductorenviron-

mentaltestingwouldrevealaseriouspublicsafetyorenvironmentalrisk.This

clauseisrelevanttotheintelligenceservicesinthattheyroutinelyenterintocon-

tractualarrangementswithcommercialentities.Insomecases,especiallywhere

someoperationalmatterisatrisk,commercialentitieshavetokeeptheirrela-

tionshipwiththeintelligenceservicessecret,andareoftenrequiredtoundergo

securityclearancesandduediligenceproceduresbeforebeingconfirmed.

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 105

Mandatory protection of certain confidential information, and protection of other confidential information about a third partySection 37 stipulates that a public body must refuse a request for access to a

recordifdisclosingtherecordinquestionwouldconstituteabreachofconfidence

inrespectofathirdpartyintermsofanagreement.Itmayalsorefuseaccessto

recordsthatcontaininformationsuppliedinconfidence,whosedisclosurecould

jeopardisethefuturesupplyofsimilarinformationorinformationfromthesame

source;andifitisinthepublicinterestthatsuchanoutcomeshouldbeaverted.

Thisprovisionisclearlyrelevanttotheintelligenceservicesasmuchoftheir

informationisprocuredfromconfidentialsourcesorinformants.Inmostcases,

sourcesundertaketosupplysensitiveinformationonconditionthattheiridenti-

tieswillnotbedisclosed.Althoughnottested,thisclausemayinfactberelevant

whenconsideringwhetherinformationrelatingtopaymentsofsourcesmaybe

withheldfromSARS,apointdiscussedearlier.

Mandatory protection of the safety of individuals, and protection of propertiesIntermsofsection38oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefuseaccesstoarecordifits

disclosurecouldreasonablyendangerthelifeorphysicalsafetyofanindividual,or

ifthedisclosurecouldprejudicethesecurityofabuilding,structure,communica-

tionssystem,transportsystem,property,anindividualunderawitnessprotection

scheme,orthesafetyandsecurityofthepublic.

This exclusion correlates strongly with the provisions of the Protection of

InformationAct,whichseekstopreventandpenalisethedisclosureofinforma-

tionwithsimilareffects.Thustheintelligenceservices,whichdoprovidesecurity

advicetogovernmentdepartmentsandthereforemustbepresumedtohavesuch

informationattheirdisposal,wouldbewithintheirrightsiftheyrefusedtodis-

closeinformationthatprejudicedthesafetyofanindividualorthepublicorthe

securityofabuilding,structure,communicationssystem,transportsystem,or

property.

Mandatory protection of police dockets in bail proceedings, and a protection of law enforcement and legal proceedingsAccordingtosection39oftheAct,apublicbodymustrefusearequestforaccess

toarecordifaccessisprohibitedintermsoftheCriminalProcedureAct.Refusal

isalsoallowedundercertainotherconditions,forexample,iftherecordcontains

informationaboutinvestigativemethodsandtechniques,anditsdisclosuremay

prejudicetheeffectivenessoftheinvestigation,ormayrevealorprovideleadsto

theidentityofaconfidentialsourceofinformation.

106 / chAPter fIve

Thisclauseisrelevanttothecriminaljusticeandintelligencesectors.Informa-

tioncanbewithheldintheinterestsofasuccessfuloutcometoaninvestigative

process.However,theActissensitivetootherbasicfreedoms:inthesameclause,

itstatesthatarequestedrecordmaynotberefusedifitcontainsinformationabout

thegeneraldetentionconditionsofapersonincustody.Inthisclause,provision

ismadeforapublicbody,throughitsinformationofficer,torefusetoconfirmor

denytheexistenceornon-existenceofarecord,ifharmislikelytobecausedby

suchdisclosure.Whilstthismayappearsevere,theActcarefullystipulatestheele-

mentsofasatisfactoryresponse,andtherequesteralsohastheoptionoflodging

aninternalappeal.

Mandatory protection of records privileged from production in legal proceedingsSection41statesthatapublicbodymustrefuseaccesstoarecordiftherecordis

‘privilegedfromproductioninlegalproceedings’,unlessthepersonentitledtothe

privilegehaswaivedit.Legalprofessionalprivilegeisagenerallegalprinciplethat

protectstheintegrityoflegalproceedingsbyprotectingtheconfidentialityofcom-

municationsbetweenalawyerandhisorherclient.Intheory,recordsthatmight

be the subject of a request include correspondence or communications made

forthepurposesofgivingorseekinglegalopinionandadvice.Theintelligence

servicescaninvokethisgroundforrefusalshoulditsrecordsrequireprotection.

Discretionary protection of information related to the defence, security and international relations of the RepublicAccordingtosection41,apublicbodymayrefuseaccesstoarecordifitsdisclosure

couldprejudicethedefence,security,orinternationalrelationsoftheRepublic;if

itwouldrevealinformationsuppliedinconfidencebyoronbehalfofanotherstate

orinternationalorganisation;oriftheinformationisrequiredtobeheldinconfi-

dencebyaninternationalagreementorcustomaryinternationallaw.

This would include information about military tactics or strategy, and

militaryexercisesoroperationstoprepare,detectandpreventhostilities;infor-

mationrelatingtoweaponsprocurement,capacityanddevelopment;information

concerningforcedeploymentandcharacteristics;andinformationheldforintel-

ligencepurposes.

InthisrespecttheActagainseemsalignedwiththeProtectionofInformation

Act.Infact,theseandotherprovisionsarequitegenerousinensuringthatthe

intelligenceandsecurityservicesarenotdisabled.Theyaresufficientlybroadto

refusedisclosure,andallowthepublicbody’sinformationofficersomediscretion

overwhether todisclose informationornot.The informationofficermayalso

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 107

refusetoconfirmordenytheexistenceornon-existenceofarecord,ifitisthought

thateitherrefusalordenialwouldharmtheinterestsofthestate.

Discretionary protection of information relating to the economic interests and financial welfare of the Republic, and the commercial activities of public bodiesAccordingtosection42oftheAct,accessmayberefusedwheninformationheld

byapublicbodyislikelytojeopardisetheeconomicinterestsorfinancialwel-

fareoftheRepublic,ortheabilityofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyin

thebestinterestsoftheRepublic.Thiscouldincludeinformationaboutproposed

policychangesaffectingcurrency,coinage,legaltender,exchangeratesorforeign

investment;thegovernment’spositioninrespectofcreditorinterestrates,cus-

tomsorexciseduties,taxes,orotherrevenues;theregulationorsupervisionof

financialinstitutions;governmentborrowing;andinternationaltradeagreements.

Mandatory protection of research information of a third party, and protection of research information of a public bodyIntermsofsection43,whenathirdpartycouldbeexposedtoseriousdisadvan-

tage,arecordthatcontainsinformationaboutresearchbeingconductedbyoron

behalfofthethirdpartymaybewithheld.Thisprovisioncouldpresumablyalso

beusedbytheintelligenceservices,whoseintelligencereportsareclient-driven.

Theycouldarguethataclient,suchasthepresidentoftheRepublicorthecabinet,

couldbedisadvantagedifthestudiescommissionedaremadepublic.

Discretionary protection of the operations of public bodiesIn terms of section 44, information can be withheld from public disclosure if

therecordcontainsinformationrelatingtoanopinion,advice,reportorrecom-

mendationsobtainedorprepared,orflowingfromaconsultation,discussionor

deliberation,forthepurposeofassistingtoformulateapolicyortakeadecision

intheexerciseofapowerorperformanceofduty,andifdisclosurecouldinhibit

furthercandidcommunicationsanddeliberationswithinthepublicbody.

Inessence,thisprovisionservestoshieldthepublicbodiesfromscrutinyof

theirinnerworkings.Intelligenceagenciescouldreadilyuseittoensurethatsensi-

tiveminutesorpolicydocumentsarenotmadepubliclyavailable.

Discretionary protection from manifestly vexatious or frivolous requestsSection45statesthatarequestforaccessmayberefusedifarequestismanifestly

vexatiousor frivolous,andthework involved inprocessingtherequestwould

108 / chAPter fIve

divertsubstantialresources.Anypublicbodyrefusingaccesstoarecordonthese

groundswouldhavetoconsidercarefullywhatconstitutesafrivolousrequest,

tocountermandtherequester’sargumentthattheinformationis importantto

it.Inanyevent,PAIAdoesnotrequirearequestertojustifyreasonsforwanting

accesstoarecord.Itissimplyanincontestablerightiftheinformationorrecord

requestedisnotcoveredbythegroundsforrefusal.

Mandatory requirement of disclosure if it is in the public interestLastly,section46oftheActprovidesformandatorydisclosureiftherecordwere

torevealevidenceofseriouscontraventionorfailuretocomplywiththelaw,oran

imminentandseriouspublicsafetyorenvironmentalriskofanaturesogravethat

thepublicinterestinthedisclosureoutweighstheharmcontemplated.

AppealsPart4oftheActcoversappealsagainstdecisions.Arequestermaylaunchaninter-

nalappealwithapublicorprivatebodythatrefusesaccesstoinformation,within

stipulatedtimeframes.Ifunsuccessfulafterexhaustingtheinternalappealproce-

dure,therequestermayapplytoacourtforrelief.Thecourtsareempoweredto

hearrepresentationsincamera,andmayprohibitthepublicationofproceedings

ifappropriate.Theburdenisontherefusingbodytodemonstratetheveracityof

itsdecision.Theseconditions–confidentialpresentationofargument–workin

favouroftheintelligenceservices.

Functions of the human Rights Commission (hRC)Part5oftheActaddressesthefunctionsoftheHRCinrelationtotheAct.TheHRC

ischargedwithmakingtheActknowntothepublicandmonitoringitsimplemen-

tation.Italsohastotraintheinformationofficersofpublicbodies,andprovide

adviceonhowtoadministertheAct.TheHRCmustmakerecommendationsfor

developing,improving,modernising,reformingoramendingtheAct,orotherleg-

islationorcommonlawrelevanttoaccesstoinformationheldbyprivateorpublic

bodies.And,everyyear,theHRChastoprovidedetailedreportstotheNational

AssemblyonhowwelleachpublicbodyisimplementingtheAct.

other aspects covered by the ActPart6coverstransitionalprovisions,whichincludetheministerhavingtointro-

ducelegislationtoensurethatSchedules1and2oftheActarecompleted.Italso

providesforextendedperiodstodealwithrequestsduringthefirsttwoyears.

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 109

Part7,thelastpartoftheAct,coversgeneralprovisions.Itstipulatesthatany

personwhoattemptstodenyarightofaccessbywilfullydestroying,damaging,

altering,concealingorfalsifyingarecordisliableforuptotwoyears’imprison-

ment.ItalsostipulatesthattheministermustprovideregulationsfortheAct’s

implementation,andsubmitthemtoparliamentbeforepublication.Provisionsof

theActmaybebroughtintooperationondifferentdates.

Cabinet recordsThisanalysisofthegroundsforrefusalshowsthatPAIA,notwithstandingitsinten-

tionoffacilitatingaccesstoinformation,providesamplespaceforinformationto

bewithheldfromrequesters.ThisseemstosupportconcernsthattheActcouldin

factbeusedtofrustrateattemptstoaccessinformation.Moreover,cabinetrecords

areexcludedfromaccess.Theimplicationsofthisaredebatable.Ontheonehand,

theexecutiveinademocracymustbeassumedtohavelegitimacyandamandate

togovern.Ontheotherhand,whereittakesdecisionswithfar-reachingimplica-

tionsforthestateasawhole,thereislikelytobeabacklashagainstunpopular

policymoves.Itwasunderthecoverofcabinetprerogativethatmanyharmful

decisionsweretakenunderapartheid:thismuchemergedduringthehearings

oftheTRC.Itisthereforeinthebroaderpublicinterestforaccesstoexecutive

decision-makingtobeasmeaningfulaspossible.

PAIA’s IMPACt on the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Thissectiondealswiththeattemptsoftheintelligenceservicestobalancethe

competing requirements of secrecy and transparency, while taking PAIA into

account.Italsoassesseswhethertheseactionshavecontributedtoeffectiveand

accountablegovernanceoftheservices,andanalysesthepolicychoicesresult-

ingfromtheAct,asexpressedininstitutionalarrangementsandstatementsby

policy-makers.

PresidentThaboMbekiassentedtothePAIAon2February2000.Originally

scheduledtocomeintoeffecton15September2000,theActwasdelayeduntil

March2001toenablethedraftingandapprovalofregulations.Thefirstdraft

interimregulationswerepublishedon10August2001,andcertainsectionsofthe

Actcameintoforceon15February2002.

ImplementationHowever, implementation proceeded slowly. For example, public and private

bodiesweregenerallyslowinrespondingtotherequirementtosubmitmanuals.

110 / chAPter fIve

(Asnotedearlier,theActrequirespublicbodiestoproducemanualscontaining

detailedinformationabouttheirstructureandfunctions,theinformationthey

hold,andhowthesemaybeaccessedbymembersofthepublic.)

When the government noted that both public and private bodies were not

adheringtotherequirementtoproducemanuals,theduedateforgivingeffectto

thisprovisionwasextendedto28February2003,bywayofablanketexemption

forallpublicandprivatebodies.Evenbythisdate,veryfewgovernmentdepart-

mentshadmetthedeadline.In2003theministerof justiceandconstitutional

developmentgrantedafurtherreprieve,exemptingpublicbodiesandprivatebod-

iesfromsubmittingmanualsfortheperiod1March2003to31August2003.The

ministryforintelligenceservicesco-ordinatedapplicationsbytheSASSandNIA

foranexemptionfromthemanualsrequirement.Bothdepartmentsstatedthat

complyingwiththisrequirementwouldcompromisetheirmandates,andjeop-

ardisenationalsecurity.Theministerforjusticeandconstitutionaldevelopment

grantedtheexemptions.BothSASSandtheNIAwereexemptedfromcompiling

manualsfortheperiod2003to2008(interviewwithMarlynRasswisi,4.08.05).

AdvocateEmpieVanSchoor,formermemberoftheopendemocracytaskteam

thatdraftedtheaccesstoinformationlegislation,iscriticalofthefactthatthe

regulationswerenotfinaliseduntilseveralyearsaftertheActhadbeenpassed,

andarguesthatoneofthelessonsoftheprocesswasthatlegislationandregula-

tionshouldbedraftedsimultaneously(interview,25.08.03).

However, David Porogo, DIO in the Department of Justice and Constitu-

tionalDevelopment(DOJ),blamesthedelayinimplementationonotherfactors.

Accordingtohim,implementationwasnotlinkedtothedepartment’sbudgeting

process,despitethedepartmenthavingoverallresponsibilityforimplementation,

whichaffectedpracticalmeasures,suchasdevelopinganddistributingeduca-

tionalmaterial.Furthermore,manyheadsofdepartmentwereunawareofthe

Act’sprovisions,suchastheirownrolesasinformationofficers,therequirement

toappointDIOs,ortherequirementtoproducemanuals.Inthatsense,theintel-

ligenceserviceswerenomoreguiltyofnon-compliancewiththeActthanmany

otherdepartments(interview,27.08.03).

ByAugust2005,theNIAandSASSdisplayeddifferentdegreesofreadiness

for implementing the PAIA. By that stage the NIA had produced a document

entitled ‘PolicyontheProceduresontheDisclosureof Information’ thatregu-

latedits implementationoftheAct.NIAdidinfactappointaDIO,responsible

forensuringproperadministrativecompliancewiththeAct,compilingresponses

(torequests)forconsiderationandapprovalbytheInformationOfficer(IO),and

anyotherdutiesrelatingtoPAIAcompliancedelegatedbythedirector-general.

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 111

However,thepolicyasawholewasclassified‘confidential’andwasthereforenot

publiclyavailabletothoseseekingtounderstandtheNIA’srequestprocedure.

SASS,ontheotherhand,onlyhadadraftpolicy,whichwasalsoclassified

‘confidential’.Atthetimeitsdirector-generalstillhadtoapprovethepolicy,and

hadnotappointedaDIO.Accordingtothedirector-general,HiltonDennis,the

draftpolicyoninformationmanagementwasmoreconcernedwithidentifying

whichinformationrequiredprotectionthanwiththeprocedurescoveringrequests

forinformation(interview,25.07.05).Assuch,itwasintendedtobealigned,but

notconcernedexclusively,withtheimplementationofPAIA.

Bycontrast,theDepartmentofDefence(DOD)hadapolicythatoutlinedroles,

responsibilities,andmechanismsforimplementingPAIA.Ithadbeenapproved

bythehighestpolicy-makingbodyintheDOD,theplenarydefencecouncil.The

DOD’sstructurehadtwocomponents: thesecretariat, fallingunder thesecre-

taryfordefence,whoisalsotheaccountingofficerforthedepartment;andthe

SANDF,headedbyitschief.Thesecretariatanddefenceforceeachhavetheirown

managementandaccountabilitystructures,both leadingupto theministerof

defence.Onamonthlybasis,theplenarydefencecouncilbringstogetherthemost

seniormanagementofthetwocomponentsandischairedinalternatemonths

bythesecretaryfordefenceandthechiefoftheSANDF(interviewwithWayne

Hendricks,28July2005).

According to Hendricks, a former DOD official, the policy regulating PAIA

implementation in the DOD was approved in 2000 (interview, 28.07.05). The

policywasclassifiedas‘restricted’,anditshandlinginstructionsstatedthat‘this

documentisthepropertyoftheDepartmentofDefenceandshallbeissuedonly

tothosemembersrequiringit intheexecutionoftheirduties’(Departmentof

Defence2000).

Thepolicywasanupdateofanearlierpolicydocument,promulgatedbythe

DODin1999,inresponsetothetablinginparliamentoftheOpenDemocracy

Bill. As accounting officer, the secretary for defence was designated as an IO,

whileDIOsweretobetheheadsoftheSANDFandthesecretariat.Inlinewith

thePAIAprovisions,thepolicydescribedtheIO’srole:toappoint,directandcon-

troltheDIOs;torender,ormakeavailable,suchreasonableassistancerequired

byarequestertocomplywiththeprescriptionsregardingrequestsforinforma-

tion;tograntorrefuseaccesstoinformationinthepossessionoforunderthe

controloftheDOD;toreceiveinternalappealsagainstdecisionsoftheDOD;to

forwardsuchappealsandreasonsfordecisionstotheministerofdefence;toassist

theministerofdefenceinfurtherdealingwithappeals;andtoensurecompliance

withtheActintheDOD.

112 / chAPter fIve

The policy also described the DIOs’ responsibilities, which included the

following:todevelopinternalprocedurestoimplementtheActintheirareasof

responsibility;toensurethatpersonswithdelegatedresponsibilitiesweretrained

intheAct’sproceduresandstipulations;andtomakerecommendationsregard-

ingthereleaseofinformationundertheircontrol.TheDIOwasalsorequiredto

referdisputedorcontentiousrecommendationstotheInformationActAdvisory

Committee(IAAC)forconsideration,toliaisewithrequestersonallmattersper-

tainingtorequests,andtoassisttheIOandtheministerofdefenceindealingwith

appeals.

TheIAACconsistedofrepresentativesoftheIO(whowouldchairthecommit-

tee),theSANDFchief,thelegalsupportdirectorate,defenceintelligence,andthe

headoftheinformationcentre.ItsrolewastoadvisetheIOonrecommendations

fromtheDIOsregardingrequestsforinformation.

AccordingtoHendricks,theJusticeCollege,undertheJusticeDepartment,

hadtrainedDODrepresentativesfromdifferentdivisions.Availabletoallgov-

ernment departments, the week-long training emphasised the constitutional

basis of PAIA, and the presumption in favour of disclosing all public records,

exceptinthosecaseswhereexemptionswereprovidedforintheAct(interview,

28.07.2005).

The challenge for the NIA, SASS, and the DOD was to provide adequate

resourcestoimplementPAIA.InNIA,althoughtheDIOsweremembersofsenior

managementwithothervitalresponsibilities,theydidnothavesufficientdedi-

catedstafftofollowuponPAIArequests.AccordingtotheNIA’sprimaryDIO,

JackieMcKay,developedcountriessuchastheUnitedStatesandCanadahave

well-resourcedandstaffedunitsresponsibleforensuringeffectiveimplementa-

tionofaccesstoinformationlegislation.Itwasthislackofresourcesthatresulted

intheNIAsometimesfailingtorespondwithinthestipulateddeadlines(inter-

view,15.07.05).

ComplianceThedegreeofcompliancewithPAIAbytheintelligenceserviceswasexamined

duringinterviewswiththedirector-generaloftheNIA,BillyMasetlha,(4August

2005),andthedirector-generalofSASS,HiltonDennis(25July2005).

BothwereawareofthemainrequirementsofthePAIAbutadmittedthattheir

departmentsdidnotcomplywithallof them,whichsupports the theory that

the intelligenceservicesareambivalentabout implementing the transparency

requiredbytheAct.However,theywereopenabouttheirservices’shortcomings,

whichperhapsreflectsthegrowingawarenessoftheAct.

PAIA AnD Its ImPlIcAtIons for the securIty servIces / 113

Appointment of deputy information officersAtthetimeoftheinterviews,theNIAhadappointedandpublishedthenameand

contactdetailsofitsprimaryDIO,incompliancewithPAIA.However,SASShad

notyetappointedaDIO.Dennissaiditwasconsideringappointingthegeneral

managerforinformationtechnologyasDIOasheorshewouldbemostawareof

thenatureofrecordsheldbytheservice,theirclassification,andtheirlocationin

thedepartment’svariousdatabases.

Voluntary disclosureTheNIAandtheSASScomplytoacertaindegreewithanotherrequirementof

PAIA,thatofvoluntarydisclosure.Bothhavewebsites,althoughthesearenot

updatedveryregularly.InJune2005theministryforintelligenceservicesalso

launchedawebsite,whichitupdatedfairlyregularlywiththeservingminister’s

speechesandresponsestoparliamentaryquestions.

TheNIAandSASShavealsoreleasedvoluntaryannualpublicreports.TheNIA

didsoeveryyearfrom2001to2004(afterwhichthepracticestopped),while

theSASSpublishedaten-yearreviewin2004.Muchoftheinformationreleased

relates to their mandates, functions, and corporate profiles. The NIA website

containsthefollowingcategoriesofinformation:theNIA’svisionandmission;

ahistoricaloverview;abriefoutlineofthestructuresofthecivilianintelligence

community;oversightmechanisms;thelegislativemandate;NIAannualreports;

humanresourcesinformation;corporateevents;NIA’sfocusareas;thecodeof

conduct for intelligenceworkers;andcontactdetails.TheSASSwebsitehada

similarstructure,andincludestheSASSten-yearreview.

Everyyeartheseintelligenceservicesalsosupplyoversightbodieswithinfor-

mation,evidenceofwhichcanbefoundintheannualreportsoftheJSCIandthe

Auditor-General.Theyhavealsoinitiatedregularmediabriefingsinanattemptto

improvepublicunderstandingoftheirroles.

Reports to the HRC on requests receivedDennisadmittedthathisdepartmenthadnotcompliedwithpart5oftheAct,

whichrequiredthatbodiessubjecttotheActsubmitreportstotheHRConthe

numberofrequestsandappeals,andhowtheyhavebeendealtwith.However,

MasetlhaindicatedthattheNIAhadmetallsuchobligations.DrLeonWessels,an

HRCcommissioner,admittedthattheHRChadnotpaidspecificattentiontothe

complianceoftheintelligenceservices.TheHRCfacedamoregeneralproblem:

thatgovernmentdepartmentsatalltierswereunawareoftheAct’sprovisions,and

114 / chAPter fIve

didnothavetheresourcestofocusontheminutiaeandspecialcircumstancesof

theintelligenceservices(interview,2.08.05).

Since the passage of the PAIA, the SASS had received no more than six

requests, most of them from members of the former anti-apartheid activists

requestingaccesstotheirfiles.Inreply,SASSreferredapplicantstotheNIA.Den-

nisexplainedthatallsurvivingfilesfromtheapartheiderahadbeenplacedinthe

custodyoftheNIAin1995,whentheserviceswereamalgamated.Therefore,if

thoserecordsdidexist,theywouldbeintheNIAfiles.

Bycontrast,theNIAhadreceived43requestsforaccesstoinformationsince

1991:fourin2001,whichwereall‘positivelyrespondedto’;sixin2002,which

wereall‘respondedto’(exceptforrequestsforTRCrecordsthatwerereferredto

theDOJ);12in2003,whichwererespondedtoeither‘indicatingthatnoinforma-

tionwasavailableonthesubjectmatterrequested’,ormakingtheinformation

available (there were no refusals); nine in 2004, of which the majority were

submittedbytheSouthAfricanHistoryArchivesTrustonbehalfofindividuals,

andtherewerenorefusals.UntilJuly2005,theNIAhadreceived12requests,

themajorityofwhichhadbeensubmittedbytheSouthAfricanHistoryArchive

(SAHA),mainlyactingonbehalfofprominentfiguresinthepre-1994anti-apart-

heidstruggle.Again,therewerenorefusals.

MostoftherequestsreceivedbytheNIAwereforpersonalinformation,from

anti-apartheid activists wanting access to their own files. SAHA intentionally

playedanimportantrole,helpingpeoplelodgetheirrequestswithvariousgov-

ernmentdepartments,soastodeterminethestate’scapability,knowledgeand

attitude towards the PAIA. According to Masetlha, during 2002 and 2003 the

‘initialrequests’(withSAHAoftenactingonbehalfoftherequesters)werefor

sensitiverecordsoftheTRC;formerBOSSfiles,whichrequiredsubmittingavery

specificNationalArchivesindextosubstantiatetherequest;andinformationon

prominentanti-apartheidactivistspriorto1990.TheNIAalsoreceivedrequests,

which were transferred to other public bodies holding the records, including

theNationalArchives,theOfficeoftheAuditor-General,andtheDepartmentof

JusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment.

The three case studies presentedinthischapterillustratethedilemmasand

choicesfacingtheintelligenceserviceswhenbalancingsecrecy(intheinter-

estsofnationalsecurity)andtransparency.OnecomprisesaPAIAapplicationby

anon-governmentorganisation,theSouthAfricanHistoryArchives(SAHA),for

accesstorecordsthathadearlierbeenpresentedtotheTRC.Thesecondcomprises

aPAIArequestforrecordsrelatingtothedecisionsoftheMinistryofDefencein

respectofaprocurementtender.Thethirddealswithpoliticallyexplosiveclaims

thataservingnationaldirectorofPublicProsecutionshadbeenanagentofthe

apartheidsecurityapparatus.Boththeseissuesservedbeforeinstitutionsofthe

post-apartheidstate.Eachcasepresentstheoutlineofeventsandchoicesmade

bytheintelligenceservicesinprocessingrequestsforrecords,andtheresponses

oftherequesterstotheirrefusalofaccess.Thesecasestudieshighlighttheimpor-

tanceofvalid,convincinggroundsforanyrefusal,andemphasisethefundamental

natureoftherightofaccesstoinformation.

APPLICAtIon BY sAhA FoR ACCess to tRC ReCoRDs

After the TRC process, SAHA, a non-government organisation committed to

greaterpublicaccesstorecords,lodgedaformalrequestintermsofPAIAwith

theNIAandtheDepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment(DOJ)

foraccesstotherecordsreceivedandconsideredbytheTRC.Therequestwas

declined in ways outlined below. As a result, on 26 November 2002 SAHA’s

lawyersservednoticeofitsintentiontoapplyforaHighCourtordersettingaside

the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes AnD the RIght oF ACCess to InFoRMAtIon: thRee CAse stuDIes

6

116 / chAPter sIx

thedecisionof theministerof justice to refuse three internalappeals submit-

tedearlierthatyear.Notonlyhadtheministerfailedtorespondtotheinternal

appealswithinthe30daysstipulatedintheAct;butSAHAalsobelievedtheminis-

ter’srefusalwasprocedurallyflawed.Firstly,noreasonsfordismissingtheappeals

weregiventoSAHA’sdeputydirector,SelloHatang,whohadfiledtheapplication

onSAHA’sbehalf.Secondly,SAHAarguedthatthedelayinprovidingtheappli-

cantwithdecisionswasneitherfairnorreasonable.Thirdly,theyarguedthatthe

wayinwhichtheapplicanthadeffectivelybeendeniedaccesstotherequested

recordswasinconsistentwiththeconstitutionaswellasPAIA.

Thebackgroundisasfollows:on20May2002,SAHA’sdeputydirector,Sello

Hatang,submittedtworequestsforaccesstoTRCrecordstotheDOJ.Therequests

weremadeintermsoftheprovisionsofPAIA.Onerequestwasforcopiesofall

recordsheldbytheDOJwhichdocumentedthechainofcustodyofcertainTRC

recordssincetheirtransferfromtheTRCin1999,includinginformationabout

theirlocation,physicaltransfer,control,responsibility,processing,andclassifica-

tion.ThesecondwasforcopiesofthetransferlistsusedtomoveTRCrecordsfrom

CapeTowntotheNationalArchivesinPretoria.Hatanghadpreviouslysentalet-

tertoDavidPorogo,DIOattheDOJ,informinghimofSAHA’sintentiontolaunch

aTRCarchiveproject.

On21May2002SAHAsentathirdandsimilarrequesttotheNIA.TheNIA

repliedinwriting,statingthattheTRCdocumentswerenotintheircustodyand

weretheDOJ’sresponsibility.ItundertooktorefertherequesttotheDOJ.

On12August2002HatangreceivedaletterfromPorogoadvisinghimthatthe

requesteddocumentscouldnotbefound.Accordingtosection23(3)ofthePAIA,

anoticethatrecordscannotbefoundordonotexistisregardedasarefusalof

access.Consequently,SAHAlodgedanappealagainsttherefusalswiththeminis-

terofjusticeandconstitutionaldevelopment,onthegroundsthatPorogodidnot

seemtohaveappliedhismindtotherequests.SAHAalsocontendedthatPorogo

hadfailedtoadheretotheproceduresinrespectofthe‘deemedrefusals’.TheAct

stipulatesthatiftherequestedrecordscannotbefound,theinformationofficer

hastoprovideanaffidavitoraffirmationthatspellsoutinfullthestepstakento

findtherecordsortodeterminewhethertherecordsexisted.

AccordingtoHatang,thewithholdingwasallthemoreintolerablebecausehe

wasalsoinpossessionofaletterfromtheNIAwhichstatedthatithadnosecurity

orotherconcernsaboutgrantingtherequestforaccesstoTRCchain-of-custody

records,andprovidingsuchrecordstoSAHA.Acopyoftheletterhadbeensentto

theheadofministerialservicesintheDOJon24October2002.

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 117

ThecaseoftheTRCrecordswasaprotractedone.Morethanayearlater,on

22December2003,PorogolodgedhisreplyingaffidavittoHatang’sapplication

withtheHighCourt,inwhichheclaimedthathehadbeenunawareofthewhere-

aboutsoftherecordsinquestionwhentheywereinitiallyrequested.Hestated

that:

Allmyinquiries,aswellasallthesearchesIhadconductedorcausedtobe

conductedtofindthesedocumentsortoestablishtheirwhereabouts,cameto

nought.Itwasonlyafterajournalist,acertainMrTerryBell,hadgivenme

informationconcerningtheirwhereabouts,thatIlearnedthattheaforesaid

documentshadbeenhandedovertoMrDullahOmar–theformerMinisterof

Justice,whoatthattime,alsoheldtheportfolioofMinisterfortheIntelligence

Services–andthatthedocumentswerebeingkeptinDrOmar’sofficeinthe

MinistryfortheNationalIntelligenceAgency(Porogo,TPD22/12/2003).

AccordingtoPorogo,officialsintheMinistryforIntelligenceServicesrebuffedhis

effortstoretrievethedocuments,statingthattheministerintendedtoreviewthe

documentsaspartofaclassificationanddeclassificationprocess,whichthemin-

istrywouldinitiateshortly.SAHAalsorejectedthisargument,questioningwhy

theministrywouldbedrivingsuchaprocesswhentheDOJwastheresponsible

department.

Porogo’sdelayedresponsedidnotmeantherewasnoactivityaroundthecon-

testedrecords.InFebruary2003theministerforintelligenceservices,Lindiwe

Sisulu,establishedaClassification/DeclassificationReviewCommittee(CDRC)

taskedwithadvisingheronthebestwaytodealwiththerequest.Afterconsider-

ingthematter,theCDRCrecommendedthatthereviewandreleaseofallsensitive

documentsshouldberegardedasspecialprojects,andapprovedbytheminister.

Inthisinstance,theobjectivewouldbetoreviewthesensitivedocuments(con-

tainedin34boxes)inaccordancewithPAIA’sexemptionclauses.Anydocument

that did not require protection in terms of these clauses would be voluntarily

releasedintothepublicdomain.TheCDRCalsorecommendedtheformationofan

InterdepartmentalReviewCommittee(IRC)toreviewthestatusoftherequested

recordsandconsidertheirrelease.MarlynRaswiswi,amemberofthePAIAUnit

intheDOJ,wasappointedastheIRC’schair.ThePAIAcomplianceprocesswould

beoverseenbytheCDRC(interviewwithRaswisi,4.08.05).

In effect, the IRC would have to scrutinise each document and, based on

standardcriteria,recommendwhetherornotitcouldbereleasedtoSAHA.Inhis

affidavittotheHighCourt,Porogosaidthisprocessonlybeganon9September

2003aftercertainpreparatorymeasureshadbeencompleted.These included

118 / chAPter sIx

gaining the approval of the special project by the ministers for Intelligence

Services,JusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment,andArtsandCulture(thelast-

namedresponsiblefortheNationalArchives);relocatingthesensitivedocuments

totheSouthAfricanNationalArchives;establishingtheIRC;trainingitsmembers;

andprovidingitwiththenecessaryresources.Thereviewprocessconsistedof

threephases:verificationofthedocuments;theiractualreview;andoversightof

theprocess.

Thepurposeoftheverificationprocesswastoensurethatalltherecordswhich

SAHAclaimedexistedcouldbeaccountedfor.TheprocesswasguidedbyDrBiki

Minyuku,formerchiefexecutiveofficeroftheTRC,assistedbypersonnelfrom

theNationalArchivesandformerpersonnelfromtheTRC’srecordsoffice.In1999

MinyukuhadbeenresponsibleforselectingandhandingovertoDrDullahOmar

the34boxesofrecordswhichhebelievedtobesensitive.

Two inventories were used for the verification: one compiled by the TRC,

whichaccompaniedthesensitivedocumentsin1999,andamoredetailedone

compiledwhilethedocumentswereinthepossessionoftheministryforintel-

ligenceservices.AccordingtoPorogo:

All therecords thatwere indexedcouldbeaccounted for, save foronefile,

ie‘W47’,whichwastitled‘ListofInformers’.AccordingtoMinyuku,thisfile

onlycontainedcorrespondenceaboutalistofinformers,butthat(sic)such

a listneveractuallyexisted.(Replyingaffidavit to theHighCourtbyDavid

Porogo,22December2003.)

Apartfromthecontestedlistofinformers,someoftherecordsfellinthecategory

ofChemicalandBiologicalWarfare.Manyof thesewerealready in thepublic

domainasaresultofthetrialofDrWouterBasson,asurgeonintheSANDF,who

hadstoodtrialforhisroleinrunningsecretprojectsusingstatefunds,allegedly

aimedatmanufacturingchemicalagentsforuseagainstanti-apartheidactivists.

OthercategoriesofinformationrelatedtofilesontheSteynCommission;aninves-

tigationentitled‘ProJack’;theinvestigationintothemurderoftheParis-based

ANCactivistDulcieSeptember,wheremostoftheinformationwasoriginallyin

French;variousTRCamnestyhearings; taxiviolenceandgun-running,where

someofthedocumentswereinSwedish,GermanandPortuguese;andtheinves-

tigationintotheassassinationoftheformerSwedishprimeministerOlafPalme,

wheremost,ifnotall,thedocumentswereinSwedish.

Porogo insistedthat theIRChadreviewedthedocumentscontained inthe

34boxesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthePAIA.Theywerethenreclas-

sifiedintosixcategories,basedonthesensitivityoftheinformationandPAIA’s

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 119

provisions.Theseincludedfulldisclosure(stamped‘declassified’),whichmeant

allinformationcontainedinthedocumentcouldbedisclosed;partiallydisclosed

(stamped ‘declassified’), which meant that any information relating to PAIA

exemption clauses was masked out, in accordance with section 28 of the Act,

whichdealtwithseverability;andnodisclosure,whichmeantthatthedocuments

containedinformationwhichwasexemptedintermsofchapterfouroftheActon

groundsforrefusalofaccesstorecords.

Insomecases,recordscouldbedisclosedsubjecttothirdpartynotification.

Informationwouldremaincloseduntilthirdpartyconsenthadbeenobtained.

Finally,therewasacategoryofrecordswhosestatusstillhadtobedetermined.

Thesedocumentswouldremaincloseduntilclarityovertheirclassificationorveri-

ficationhadbeenobtained.

Porogostatedthatthemostcommonreasonsforcategorisingdocumentsas

‘nodisclosure’weretoprotectpersonalandthirdparty information;methods,

technicalandmanufacturingdetailspertainingtochemicalbiologicalwarfare

documents;andSouthAfrica’srelationswithotherstates.Exceptforthosedocu-

mentsrequiringtranslation(whichwasinprogress),themajorityofrecordshad

been reviewed. His affidavit contained the following table, which showed the

resultsofthecategorisationprocessasat5December2003:

suMMARY oF CLAssIFICAtIon oF tRC ReCoRDs As At 5 DeCeMBeR 2003

ReVIeweD stAtus ACtuAL nuMBeRs PeRCentAge

full DIsclosure 658 39,07

PArtIAl DIsclosure 198 11,76

no DIsclosure 296 17,58

DIsclosure, subject to thIrD PArty notIfIcAtIon

20 1,19

stAtus to be DetermIneD PenDInG further clArIfIcAtIon

512 30,40

totAl 1 684 100,00

Inaninterview,RaswiswielaboratedfurtheronhowtheIRCworked.TheIRC

includedrepresentativesoftheSANDF,NIA,theSAPS,andSASS,andhadlogisti-

calsupportfromtheNationalArchivesonwhosepremisestheactualreviewtook

place.MostoftheinformationwithheldhadbeenprovidedtotheTRCongrounds

ofconfidentiality.Aschairperson,shetriedtoachieveconsensusontheclassifica-

tionofeachdocument.Onceconsensushadbeenachieved,shesoughttoensure

thatthereviewedstatuswasconsistentwithPAIA.TheIRCcompleteditswork

120 / chAPter sIx

inJanuary2004,andhanded its report to theCDRC(interviewwithRaswisi,

4.08.05).

Porogo’sattorneysinformedHatangthatcopiesofthedocumentscouldbe

inspectedatthepremisesoftheNationalArchives.Theyreferredtoa411-page

documententitled‘WorksheetforthereviewoftheTRCdocuments’,whichsum-

marisedallthedocumentsdescribedas‘sensitive’containedinthe34boxes.The

worksheetwasclassifiedas‘confidential’,asitdescribednotonlythedeclassified

documentsbutalsohighlysensitivedocumentsclassifiedas‘nodisclosure’.Asthe

worksheetwasdevelopedduringthereviewprocessfortheIRCandCDRC,Porogo

arguedthatSAHAwasnotentitledtoacopy.However,heofferedSAHAacopyof

theworksheetundertheconditionofconfidentiality,sothatitcouldunderstand

ingreaterdepththebasisonwhichtheDOJdecisionshadbeenmade.

SAHArejectedthisofferonthegroundsthatitcouldnotacceptan‘inconfi-

dence’responsetoarequest.Inresponse,Porogoproposedthatamemberofhis

staffbepresentwhentheapplicantandtheirattorneysinspectedthedocuments

attheNationalArchives,inordertoexplainwhycertaindocumentscouldnotbe

disclosed.

InreplyingaffidavitstotheHighCourton22January2004and25February

2004,HatangtookissuewithseveralaspectsofPorogo’sresponse.Inbrief,he

arguedthatthestatusoftheCDRCandIRCwasnotclearinrelationtotherequest

madeandthedecisionstakenbyPorogoconcerningthedocuments.SAHAfelt

thatPorogohadnotexercisedhismindindependently.Moreover,itwasunaccept-

abletomakeavailablephotocopiesofthedocumentswhenSAHA’sapplication

wasto inspecttherecordsthemselves.Nothavingaccesstotheoriginaldocu-

mentsmadeitimpossibletoverifytheirintegrity.

HatangalsoarguedthattherewereseveraladministrativeerrorsinPorogo’s

response.Forexample,Porogohadstatedthattheapplicantwasentitledtoaccess

certaindocumentswhichwereinfactnotprovided.Hatangalsorefusedtoaccept

thatcertainrecords,suchasthe‘ProgressreportontheworkoftheTRCInvestiga-

tionUnit’,werelikelytocontainconfidentialthirdpartyinformation,asPorogo

hadcontended.Healsorejectedthecontentionthatcertainfileswerebeingwith-

heldonthebasisthat ‘familymembers’ofpersonsnamedinthosedocuments

hadtobeconsulted,asthiswasnotprovidedforintheAct.SimilarlytheActdid

notallowinformationtobewithheldonthegroundsofpreventingtheembar-

rassmentofaforeigner,whichwasthereasongivenformaskingsectionsofan

Afrikaansdocumententitled‘Finalreport:USADollarsadvancepayment’.Lastly,

alargenumberofdocumentshadbeenwithheldonthegroundsthattheycon-

tained third party information, whereas the Act required that, before making

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 121

afinaldecision,thirdpartieshadtobeinformed, notconsulted,whichwasthe

DOJ’sinterpretation.

Lessons FRoM the CAse stuDY

Thecaseofthe34boxesofTRCrecords,asthemattercametoberegardedand

reportedinthemedia,isacompellingonewhichdeservestobethoroughlyana-

lysed.ItgoestotheheartofinterpretationofthePAIA,andhowpolarisedsuch

interpretationscanbe.Italsoraisesthequestionofhowcommittedtheintelli-

genceservicesreallyaretotransparency.Eventhoughthehighcourtapplications

andcounter-applicationswerebetweentheDOJandSAHA,theMinistryforIntel-

ligenceServiceswasalooming,ifnothighlyinstrumental,presenceinthecourse

ofevents,largelybecausetherecordsinquestionhademanated,atleastinpart,

fromtheapartheidsecurityapparatus.

One issue was whether the ministry had acted lawfully and in the public

interestinwithholdingtherecordsfromSAHA,andwhetheritactuallyhadthe

prerogativetodecidewhattodowiththerecords.NIA’sresponsetoSAHA’sinitial

request–thattherecordswerenotinthecustodyoftheNIAandwerewiththe

DOJ–suggestsoneoftwothings:eitherpoorcommunicationbetweentheminis-

tryandtheNIA,oradeliberateattempttomisleadSAHA.

Thetimingofitsestablishment,andtheinclusioninitsbriefofhowtohandle

thesensitiveTRCrecords,createstheimpressionthattheCDRCinitiatedbythe

intelligenceministerintrudedonthemandateandtoacertainextentusurpedthe

roleoftheDOJ.

Another issue that requires scrutiny is the IRC’scomposition,method,and

recommendations. Although ‘trained’ for its task, the committee consisted of

middle-rankingofficialswhoweregivenconsiderablepowertorecommendthe

‘reclassification’ofdocuments,someofwhichhadpreviouslynotbeenclassified

atall.Moreover,theIRCmadeitsrecommendationtotheCDRC,whichconsisted

ofacademicsandgovernmentofficials.

Alsoquestionable iswhether the IRChadadequateexpertise,especially in

viewoftheadministrativeerrorsandhighincidenceoflegallyunsoundreasons

givenforwithholding,maskingorrefusingtodisclosedocuments.Itappearsthat

theProtectionofInformationActmayhaveundulyinfluencedthereasonsgiven

forrefusingaccesstosomerecords.

Although,inaninterview,PorogoinsistedthattheDOJexercisedindepend-

entjudgmentindecidinghowtorespondtotheSAHArequest,thedeliberations

andrecommendationsoftheIRCcertainlyhadatrickle-downeffect,andaffected

122 / chAPter sIx

theDOJ’sresponsetotheSAHArequestratherthanbeingguidedsolelybythe

PAIAprovisions.Inaninterview,Raswiswidefendedherdepartment,arguingthat

theDOJ’sdirector-generalhadstudiedtherequestandtakendifferentdecisions

tothoserecommendedbytheIRC.However,therewasclearlyconsiderablerole

confusion,asSAHAarguedafterreceivingacopyofaconfidentialworksheetfrom

theIRC,whichneededfurtherclarificationoverwhycertaindocumentswerenot

disclosedoronlypartiallydisclosed.

Anotherproblemwasthattheministerof justicedecidedtoacceptrecords

regardedbyDrMinyukuas‘sensitive’,andholdthemforsafekeepingatthemin-

istryforintelligenceservices.Minyukuprobablythoughthewasactingcorrectly,

andeveninthenationalinterest.However,theeffectivenessoftheseactionsis

questionable,asmanyofthedocumentswereinthepublicdomain,whilecopies

ofotherswereprobablyinthehandsofindividualresearchersandinvestigators.

Theminister’sdecisiontoholdthedocumentsfor‘safekeeping’,ratherthandeal

withthemexpeditiously(forexample,bypassingthosethatneededfurtherinves-

tigationontothelawenforcementauthorities),raisedissuesabouttheirintegrity,

andsuspicionsabouttheintelligenceservices’motives.

Thematterofthe‘sensitiveTRCrecords’wasonlyresolvedaftermanymonths

andmuchwranglingbetweentheapplicantandrespondents’lawyers.Itwasset-

tledoutofcourt.Thesagasuggeststhatthepost-apartheidintelligenceservices

areambivalentaboutdisclosuresof thepast.According toDennis,during the

TRChearingsSASShadbeeninfavourofdisclosingpastsecrets,especiallythose

relatingtoSouthAfrica’schemicalandbiologicalwarfareprogramme,butsenior

formerNISofficialshadresistedtheidea(interview,25.07.05).

ThroughoutthedisputeaboutthewhereaboutsoftheTRCdocuments,the

cabinetremainedsilent,whichsuggestedthatitsupported–atleasttacitly–the

wayinwhichthenministersconcernedhadhandledtheaffair.

SomeoftherecordsrelatedtomembersoftherulingANC,andtherewasspec-

ulationthatthewithholdingoftherecordsandtheclaimthatthelistofinformers

hadneverexistedwasanattempttohideinformationabouttherulingpartyand

itsmembersfromthepublic.PAIAregulatesaccesstoinformationheldbypublic

orprivatebodiesirrespectiveoftheoriginsofthoserecords.Whendecidingto

grantaccess,theonlyrelevantfactoriswhetheroneofthegroundsforrefusal

applies.While theminister for intelligenceservicesmayhavebeenconcerned

aboutcertaininformationbeingreleasedintothepublicdomain,amoreappro-

priateresponsewouldhavebeentodevelopclearerpolicyguidelinesonhowto

handlerequestsforinformationthatoriginatefrompoliticalorganisations.

According to Raswiswi, the department later received other requests for

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 123

TRC-relateddocumentation.Oneoftheseinvolveddocumentsaboutthedeathsof

fouranti-apartheidactivistsintheEasternCapeknownasthe‘CradockFour’who

werekilledbyapartheidsecuritypolicemeninthemid-1980s.Becauseofthis,the

director-generaloftheDOJhadtakentheinitiativetosetupanotherInterdepart-

mentalReviewCommittee,whichwouldfunctionalongsimilarlines(interview,

4.08.05).

SAHA’srequestforaccesstoinformationabouttheTRCmustbeseeninthe

contextoftheTRC’sexperienceoftryingtouncovertheapartheid-erarecords

ofthesecurityestablishment.Duringitsinvestigationofapartheid-erarecords,

theTRCfoundthattherehadbeenamassivedestructionofrecordsbythestate’s

intelligenceagencies(primarilytheNIS).Alarmingly,thedestructionofrecords

continuedevenafterademocraticgovernmenthadtakenoffice,untilthecabinet

imposedamoratoriumonthispracticein1996.

Itiscauseforconcernthat,whenSAHAlodgeditsrequests,noclearguidelines

existedforhandlingrequestsforaccesstoTRCdocuments.WhiletheDOJstated

thatitdealtwithrequestsforaccesswithinthePAIAframework,SAHAimplied

thattheprovisionsoftheProtectionofInformationActhadinfluencedtheDOJ’s

decisions–whichtheservicesdenied.

APPLICAtIon FoR ReCoRDs ReLAtIng to the stRAtegIC ARMs PRoCuReMent PACkAge

ThesecondcasestudyisthatofCCII Systems (Pty) Ltd vs M P G Lekota,heardin

theHighCourt(TransvaalProvincialDivision)byJusticeSouthwoodin2002.

CCIIsoughtanordertodirecttherespondent,MosiuoaLekota,thenMinisterof

Defence,tofurnishcertainrecordspertainingtothesubsystemstobeinstalledon

corvettesorderedbytheDODforusebytheSouthAfricanNavy.CCII,acompany

whosebusinesswasthedesignandmanufactureofcomputerandsoftwaresys-

temsforthedefenceindustry,contendedthatithadbeenwronglyexcludedasa

tendererforthesupplyofthesubsystemsthroughsignificantdeviationsfromthe

lawfultenderprocess.Ithadthereforeinstitutedalawsuitfordamagesagainstthe

ministerofdefence,theArmamentsCorporationofSouthAfricaLimited(Arms-

cor),andAfricanDefenceSystems(Pty)Ltd(ADS).

SomebackgroundtotheStrategicArmsProcurementsPackageor‘armsdeal’,

as itwascommonlyreferredto,helpscontextualisethedecisionsmadebythe

variousroleplayers.InSeptember1997thegovernmentdecidedtopurchasevari-

ousnewweaponssystemsfortheSANDF.Theseincludedfourpatrolcorvettesfor

theSouthAfricanNavy.Eachcorvetteconsistedofahull,propulsionsystem,and

124 / chAPter sIx

combatsuite.TheDODandArmscorsetuptwobodiestoassistinthepurchasing

ofthecorvettes.OnewastheJointProjectTeam,consistingoftechnicalexperts,

whosetaskwastoassessthevarioustenders.TheotherwastheProjectControl

Board,towhichtheJointProjectTeammaderecommendations,sothatitcould

makefinaldecisionsrelatingtotheawardofthetenders.

CCII did not accept the outcome of the tender process, which was that a

consortiumofGermancompanies,theGermanFrigateConsortium(GFC),was

declaredthepreferredbidderforthesupplyofthecorvettes.CCIIbelievedthat

the tender process had been unprocedural, and it therefore sought access to

therecordsarisingoutofthetenderprocess(interviewwithWayneHendricks,

28July2005).

On15January2002theapplicanthadmadeaPAIArequesttotheDODfor

recordscategorizedunder54headings.Overaperiodofalmostayear,theDOD,

throughits InformationCommittee,madesomeofthedocumentsavailableto

CCII.(Inhiseventualjudgment,JudgeSouthwoodnotedthattheapplicantdid

notquestionthelegalityofhisrequestsbeingconsideredbytheInformationCom-

mittee,andthereforedidnottakeissuewiththisfactor.)

Intheremainingcases,theDODclaimedthatthedocumentseitherdidnot

exist,orrefusedtogiveaccesstothem,citinggroundsprovidedforinPAIA.Inhis

judgment,SouthwoodobservedthattheDOD,inmostcases,hadnotfurnished

factsinsupportofitsdecisions,buthadmerelyquotedfromtherelevantsectionof

theActwhenarguingforitsnon-disclosureofarecord,apparentlyinanattempt

tocomplywithsection25(c)ofPAIAwhichrequiresthatwhenarequestforaccess

isrefused,therequestermustbefurnishedwithadequatereasonsfortherefusal.

Theapplicantwasnot satisfiedwith thereason fornon-disclosure,andon

22January2003initiatedaninternalappealintermsofsection75ofPAIA.Inhis

appealhepointedouttherequirementthatapublicbodyshouldconsiderwhether

therewerepartsoftherecordsrequestedthatcouldbesevered,inordertorender

therecordsdisclosable.

Inhisjudgment,JudgeSouthwoodemphasisedthedutyofapublicbodywith

whicharequesthadbeenlodgedtoconsidertheseverabilityoftherecord.He

arguedthatsection28ofPAIArequiredthepublicbodytogiveaccesstothepart

oftherecordthatwasnotcoveredbyastatutorygroundofobjection,statingthat:

Thisisofparticularsignificancewheretherespondent’soppositionischaracter-

isedbygeneralisedandsweepingobjectionsonthestrengthofwhichheseeks

towithholdwholedocumentsandgroupsofdocument.Theapplicant’scoun-

selarguedthatthecourtshouldnotpermitthismodeofopposition.Iagree.

Thepublicbodymustdemonstrate to thecourt that ithasconsideredeach

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 125

documentwithseveranceinmind.Itmustidentifythepartofthedocument

thatcontainstheprotectedmaterial,giveaproperindicationofitscontents

andwhyitsdisclosureisprotected,andpermitaccesstotherestofthedocu-

ment.Unlesstherespondentdischargestheonusofshowingthatthewhole

document(orgroupofdocuments)isprotected,hehasfailedtoestablishwhat

partheisentitledtowithhold.Havingfailedtodischargethatonushewould

havetogiveaccesstothewholedocument(Southwood2002).

JudgeSouthwoodwentontoconsiderthemeritsofthelegalargumentspresented

bytheapplicantandtherespondent.Thoseargumentsandaspectsofthejudg-

mentrelevanttotheintelligencecommunityaresummarisedbelow.

Request for ‘access to the umbrella agreement for the Corvette’When the request had first been launched, the Information Committee had

refusedaccessintermsofsection36(1)ofPAIA,whichprotectscommercialinfor-

mationofathirdparty,andsection37(1),whichprotectsconfidentialinformation

ofathirdparty.InSouthwood’sview,neithertheInformationCommitteenorthe

appeal authority had given adequate reasons for the refusal, and neither had

consideredwhethertherewereanypartsoftherequestedrecordthatcouldbe

severed(deleted)becauseoftheirsensitivecontents,soastomaketherestofthe

documentavailabletotheapplicant.

Inpapersbefore thecourt, therespondent introduceda furtherreason for

seekingtoprotect therecordfromdisclosure,namelysection41,whichstates

that recordsmaybewithheld in the interestor defence of the Republic, or to

protectinternationalrelations.Thejudgeagainpointedoutthattherespondent

hadnotproducedfactsinsupportofusingthisreason.Eventhoughtherespond-

enthadnotarguedfornon-disclosureonthegroundsofsection42(2),neither

hadanyfactsbeenintroducedthatwouldjustifyanargumentthatdisclosureof

theagreementwouldbelikelytomateriallyjeopardisetheeconomicinterestsor

financialwelfareoftheRepublicorofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyof

theRepublicorofthegovernmenttomanagetheeconomyeffectivelyinthebest

interestsoftheRepublic.

Request for ‘access to the supply agreement for the Corvette Platforms (Part A) and the Corvette Combat Suite (Parts B and C)’TheInformationCommitteeandtheappealauthorityhadrefusedinformationin

termsofsections36(1)and37(1)ofPAIA,andhadreliedonclause26of the

SupplyAgreement,anaddendumtotheUmbrellaAgreement,whichprohibited

126 / chAPter sIx

thedisclosureofany informationcontained therein, without motivating their

reasons.

Inhisaffidavit,therespondentstatedthatthesupplyagreementcontained

commercially and financially sensitive pricing information relating to the

Republic,thecontractorsandsuppliers.Inaddition,section26.10oftheSupply

Agreementstatedthat:

Armscor, the End-User and the Seller will keep confidential all informa-

tion includingspecifications,plans,drawings, listsandotherdata,whether

furnished to it in writing or by electronic means prior to the date of this

scheduleAorafter,andwhichisclearlyandconspicuouslymarkedasconfi-

dentialorproprietary.Thesameshallapplywithrespecttosuchinformation

thatisnotsomarkedbutwhereArmscorandtheEndUserhadclearreasonto

knowthatsuchinformationwastobekeptconfidential.Suchinformationshall

onlybeusedforpurposesunderthisScheduleAorasmaybeotherwiseagreed

inwritingbytheParties(quotedinSouthwood2002)

Thejudgepointedoutthattherequestwasforthesupplyagreementitself,and

notfortheprotectedinformationdescribedinsection26.10.Hethereforerejected

theclaimthattheActcouldbeinvokedforrefusaloftherequestedinformation.

Request for access to ‘all records, agendas and minutes of meetings and deliberations of the Joint Project Team relating to relevant decisions regarding nomination, selection and awarding of sub-contracts regarding the Corvette Combat suite’ and ‘all quotations and offers regarding the SMS submitted to the Joint Project Team by the German Frigate Consortium as received from ADS’Hereagain, the InformationCommitteeand theappealauthorityhadrefused

accessintermsofsection36(1)andsection37(1)ofPAIA,buthadfailedtosetout

anyfactsinsupportofthesesections.Intheiraffidavit,therespondentstatedthat

therecordsrequestedcontainedinformationsuppliedbytheapplicant’scompeti-

tor,andthatitcouldnotthereforeprovidethisthirdpartyinformation.However,

thejudgeheldthattheinformationhadaged,sincefouryearshadelapsedsince

thecontracthadbeenawarded,andtheinformationwasthereforemerelyofhis-

toricalinterest.Inanyevent,therespondenthadfailedtoprovideinformation

whichshowedthat,iftheinformationweresuppliedinconfidence,itsdisclosure

wouldputADSoranyotherthirdpartyatadisadvantageinnegotiationsorcom-

petition.Moreover, the judgeheld thatsince thequotationshadprecededthe

conclusionoftheUmbrellaAgreement,theywouldnotfallwithintheambitof

theagreement’sconfidentialityclause.Andasfarastheconfidentialityclausewas

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 127

concerned,therespondenthadnotclaimedthatADSoranyotherpartyfellwithin

themeaningof‘seller’inthatprovision.

Other requests for access to informationThe judgealso rejected theMinister’sargument forwithholdingseveralother

records. The Minister had argued refusal on grounds of confidentiality. But

Southwoodruledthatthisdidnotconstituteanadequatereasoninlinewiththe

stipulationsoftheAct.SomeoftherecordsthattheMinisterhadrefusedaccess

towere:allquotationsandoffersregardingtheStrategicProcurementPackage

submittedtotheJointProjectTeamasreceivedfromADS;themainequipmentlist

fortheCorvettePlatform;themainequipmentlistfortheCorvetteCombatSuite;

allinternalcorrespondenceandmemorandaconcerningthesematterswithinthe

DOD;andallcorrespondenceconcerningthesemattersbetweentheDODandthe

GermanFrigateConsortium(Southwood2002).

The judge supported the applicant’s argument that its managing director,

RichardYoung,hadsince1992heldthehighestsecurityclearancepossible,and

thatallstaffofCCIIheldatleastsecurityclearancestothelevelof‘Confidential’.

TherespondenthadarguedthatYoung’ssecurityclearancedidnotentitlehim

toanyinformation,andthatsuchinformationwouldonlybemadeavailableto

himasrequiredforspecificdutiesassignedtohim.Thejudgeheldthattherewas

neither a suggestion in the respondent’s affidavits that Young or his staff was

untrustworthy,northattheinformationmadeavailabletohimwouldbeatrisk.

Healsorejectedtwootherreasonsprovidedbytherespondent.Thefirstwas

that that therequestwasvagueandunspecified(section45(b)ofPAIA).This

reasonwasprovided inrelation to therequest forall internalcorrespondence

andmemorandaconcerning‘thesematters’withtheDOD.Thejudgefeltthatthe

concept‘thesematters’hadbeenusedconsistentlythroughouttheprocess,and

inCCII’sapplicationsforaccess,andthatitshouldbepossibletodeducewhat

recordswerebeingsoughtthroughthisphrasing.Secondly,herejectedtheargu-

mentthattheworkinvolvedinprocessingtherequestwouldsubstantiallyand

unreasonablydiverttheresourcesofthepublicbody(section45(b)ofPAIA).The

judgeheldthatitwasinconceivablethatawell-resourcedpublicbodysuchasthe

DODhadneitheranaccessiblefilingsystem,northestafftoprocesstherequest.

Further, he supported the applicant’s claim that the respondent’s claim that

processingtherequestwouldsubstantiallyandunreasonablydiverttheDOD’s

resourcesshouldbeweighedagainstthesignificantpublicinterestinthematter.

128 / chAPter sIx

Lessons FRoM the CAse stuDY

Thiscasestudyholdsimportantlessonsfortheintelligenceservices,becauseit

toorelatestoinformationregardedasprotectedintermsofPAIA,yetfoundtobe

releasableintheSouthwoodjudgment.Thejudgmentthereforesetsprecedents

thatwillhavetobetakenintoaccountbyallpublicbodies.

Ithighlightstheneedforbodiesconsideringrequeststogiveadequatereasons

iftheywishtowithholdrecordsfromarequester.Sincethereisapresumptionin

favourofdisclosure,thepublicbodyshouldnotmerelycitetherelevantground

forexclusiononwhich itbases itdecisions,but shouldsubstantiate itsclaims

aboutthelikelihoodofharmthroughaconvincingpresentationoffactsinsupport

ofitsargument.

Thepublicbodyshouldconsiderwhetherthereisanyinformationcontainedin

therecordrequestedthatcouldbesevered,soastomaketherecordavailablefor

disclosure.Again,thereisapresumptioninfavourofdisclosure,andinthecaseof

CCII vs Lekota,thejudgeheldthattherewasadutyonthepartofthepublicbody

toconsiderthesegregabilityoftherecord,asprovidedforinsection25ofPAIA.

Thefactthatadocumentismarkedorclassifiedasconfidentialbyapublic

bodyisinitselfnotsufficienttoinvokesections36and37,whichrespectivelypro-

videforrefusalonthebasisofcontainingconfidentialcommercialinformation,or

confidentialthirdpartyinformation.Again,Southwoodspecifiedthatthisclaim

wouldhavetobecontextualisedandproperlymotivated,andcontendedthata

recordcouldloseitsriskratingthathadoriginallyrequiredittobeheldconfiden-

tially,withthepassageoftime.Therefore,ifwantingtoinvokeeithersection36or

37asgroundsforrefusal,thelikelihoodofharm,alongthelinesspecifiedinthe

Act,wouldhavetobecarefullyarguedbythepublicbodytowhomarequesthad

beenput.

Similarly,itisnotsufficienttoarguethatthesecurityordefenceoftheRepublic

couldbeprejudiced,evenifitisthecorebusinessofthepublicbodytomaintain

thesecurityordefenceofthecountryandtheinformationinitspossessionrelate

tothisreality.Southwoodnotedthatnotonlyisthegroundforrefusaladiscre-

tionaryone,butthatthecasefornon-disclosurewouldhavetobemotivated.

He also suggested that arguing refusal on the grounds that a request is

frivolousorvexatious,orwouldinvolveadiversionorresources,shouldbeused

circumspectly;inthecaseofCCII vs Lekota,hearguedthattheDODinalllike-

lihoodhadtheresourcestoprocesstherequestof theapplicant,andthatthe

matterwasofsufficientpublicinteresttowarranttheresourcethatsucharequest

mightneed.

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 129

Lastly,thejudgmentsuggeststhatapublicbody,inconsideringrefusalofa

record,shouldapplyallresourcesnecessarytodeveloplegallysoundarguments

atallstagesoftheprocess:whenarequestisfirstpresented,duringtheinternal

appealprocess,andifthematteristakentocourt.Raisingadditionalgroundsfor

refusal,particularlythegroundsthatdisclosurecouldprejudicethedefenceand

securityoftheRepublic,provokedacynicalresponsefromthejudge,whowenton

toorderdisclosure.

TheSouthwoodjudgmentcanberegardedasaverystrictinterpretationof

PAIA’sgroundsforrefusal,butitwasandisarealfactorinthefieldoflegalinter-

pretation.TheDODwasobligedtoacceptandimplementthejudge’sfindings,

despitetheself-imposedstricturesofsecrecyandconfidentialityitassumedwere

sufficienttoshieldrecordsthatitheldfromdisclosuretoarequester.

the heFeR CoMMIssIon

In 2003 President Thabo Mbeki appointed a judicial commission, the Hefer

Commission, toassess theclaimmadebya formeranti-apartheidactivistand

intelligenceoperative,MoeShaik,supportedbytheANCveteranMacMaharaj,

thattheservingnationaldirectorofpublicprosecutions(NDPP),BulelaniNgcuka,

hasbeenanapartheid-eraspy.Theallegationswerepoliticallyexplosive,particu-

larlybecauseShaikandMaharajwereseenaspoliticallysupportiveofthedeputy

president,JacobZuma.TensionbetweenMbekiandZumawasstartingtoshow.

ZumahaddrawntheattentionofNgcukabecauseofhisrelationshipwiththe

businessmanSchabirShaik,MoeShaik’sbrother,whowasalsobeinginvestigated

bythepublicprosecutor.TheclaimsagainstNgcukacreatedapoliticaluproar,and

generatedintensemediainterest.

Thehearingsofthecommissionwereheldpublicly.JudgeHeferdulysum-

monedtheintelligenceservicestoconfirmwhethertheallegationsweretrue.The

intelligenceservices–boththeNIAandtheSAPS–decidedtorefusetorevealthe

contentsoftheirrecordstothejudge,onthegroundsthatthesewereclassified

secret.Theyarguedthatthelaw,inanycase,preventedthemfromdisclosingthe

identitiesofintelligence‘sources’,andpointedoutthatMbekicouldhavedirect

accesstotheintelligencethatmightassisttoanswerthequestionthejudgewas

meanttoinvestigate,ifhesowished.

ShaikandMaharajwerelefttoproduceandpresenttotheCommissioncopies

oftherecordtheysaidwerethebasisoftheirclaims–whichtheMinisterofIntel-

ligenceServiceslaterdemandedbehandedovertotheintelligenceserviceseven

iftheywereonlycopies.Intheend,allthatJudgeHefercouldreportwasthat

130 / chAPter sIx

Ngcukahad‘probablynot’beenanapartheid-eraspy,furthermakingthepoint

thathecouldnotbeconclusivebecausehedidnothaveaccesstotheintelligence

recordsthatmighthaveassistedhimtomakeadeterminationofthismatter.

TheMinisterforIntelligenceServices,LindiweSisulu,commissionedareview

ofthesagafollowingthesedevelopments.ItwaschairedbyProfessorNorman

Levy,aseasonedacademic.Servingwithhimwerealawyer,ChristineQunta;a

legalacademic,ProfessorNicoSteytler;asociologist,ProfessorPaulusZulu;and

amediaexpert,ProfessorGuyBerger.Theywereassistedbyseveralseniorman-

agers fromthe intelligenceservices,andtheprojectwasconductedunder the

auspicesofSANAI,thetrainingfacilityfortheintelligenceservices.Thereview

committeedidnotpronounceonthemeritsofthejudgmentorevendeliberate

verydirectlyonhowtheproceedingshadbeenconducted.Instead,anumberof

broad,policy-relatedproblemswereextrapolatedand formed thebasisof the

reportsubmittedtotheMinister.

Firstly, thereportaddressed inphilosophical terms thechallengesofman-

agingthetensionsbetweenthepublic’srightofaccess to informationandthe

intelligenceservices’righttowithholdinformation.Levy(2004)arguedthatthe

existenceoftheserviceswasaconstitutionalrequirement,andthattheyhada

dutytopreservesecrecy,andtoprotect fromdisclosure,sensitive information

intheirpossession.Steytler(2004)alsorecognisedthattheSouthAfricanintel-

ligenceservicesarefacedwiththechallengeofbalancingtherequirementsof

theconstitutionwith their legallydefinedroleandmethodspermitted in law.

Heexploredthestrengthsandweaknessesofparticularvehiclesforinvestigat-

ingmattersconcerningtheintelligenceservices,listingthesevehiclesasinternal

investigations,andinvestigationsundertakenbytheInspector-GeneralforIntel-

ligence,theJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence,thePublicProtector,and

CommissionsofInquiry.Heendedhisanalysisontheoptimisticnotethatleverag-

ingtherightvehicles,possiblyincombinationwitheachother,canyieldaresult

thatupholdstheprincipleofaccesstoinformation.

Qunta(2004)pointedtolegalprecedence,bothlocallyandinternationally,

whichhelduptheprincipleofprotectingtheidentitiesofsources,atleastinpolice

investigations.However,Zulu(2004)remindedtheMinisterandotherreadersof

thereportoftheconsequencesoftheexecutivenotbeinginapositiontoreview

thecredibilityandreliabilityofinformation,pointingtothepoliticallycostlydeci-

sionoftheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomtogotowaragainstIraq.

Thestudyconcludesonanoptimisticifambivalentnote,arguingstronglyin

favour of transparency by the intelligence services, yet sympathising with the

notionofabsolutenon-disclosureof the identityofsources.Onreflection, the

the IntellIGence servIces: three cAse stuDIes / 131

studyauthorisedbytheMinisterforIntelligenceServicesdidnotreallyanswer

thequestionofhowtodealwithapartheid-eraintelligencerecords,oreveninter-

rogatewhethertherewasanadequatepolicyandlegalframeworkforthismatter.

ThetermsofreferenceoftheHeferCommissionwerechangedatleastonce,yet

thereviewersdidnotaddresstheissueofwhythiswasdone.Moreover,itremains

unclearwhyMbekiestablishedajudicialcommissionwhenhecouldaseasilyhave

requestedabriefingorevenaninvestigationbytheintelligenceservicesintothe

questionofwhetherNgcukahadbeenanapartheid-eraspy.Theplausibleanswer

tothatquestionisthatsuchaprocesswouldnothavesatisfiedpublicinterest,

sinceitwouldhavetakenplacebehindcloseddoors.Butdetractorsaccusedthe

Presidentofplayingpoliticalgames inestablishingaprocesswhichwasham-

strungbytheveryconditionsunderwhichitwouldhavetodoitswork.Judge

Heferexpressedfrustrationthathedidnothaveaccesstotherecordsthatmight

haveassistedhiminansweringtheveryquestionthathewassupposedtoanswer.

AndoncetheCommission’sfindingswereannounced,Mbekiissuedathinlyveiled

warningtothosewhowoulddareaccuseothersofbeingapartheid-eraspiesnever

torepeatthemisdemeanour.

Thequestionthatarisesiswhethertheprincipleofsecrecyoftheidentityof

sourcesisanimmutableprinciple,evenunderthosecircumstanceswherethere

isoverwhelmingpublicinterestinthematter.Thereadyanswertothisquestion

is thattheconsequencesofconfirmingsuchanallegation,were it true,would

havebeentoviolatetheprincipleofhonouringtheconfidentialitywhichinform-

antsexpectwhenprovidinginformationtoauthorities.Thattheallegationswere

madeatallbyShaikandMaharaj,andpromptedtheestablishmentofahigh-level

enquiry,suggeststhattherewereunresolvedquestionsaboutthetransitionand

therecordsofthepast.

ConCLuDIng ReMARks

TheMinistryforIntelligenceServiceshasplayedanambivalentleadershiprolein

respectofthePAIA,appearingatfirsttosupport,andevenco-ordinate,applica-

tionsbytheNIAandSASSforexemptionfromtherequirementsthatpublicbodies

produceamanual.Thegroundsonwhichtheexemptionwasrequestedwerevery

vague,andsuggestedlittlein-depthpolicydebatebeforemakingtheapplication.

Oneofthemosttellingindicationsoftheintelligenceservices’approachto

PAIAcameintheirresponsetoSAHA’sapplicationforaccesstosensitiverecords

transferred fromtheTRCto theMinisterofJustice,whowasalsoresponsible

fortheintelligenceservices.TheNIAtransferredtherequesttotheDOJ,which

132 / chAPter sIx

hadreceivedasimilar requestdirectly fromtheSAHA.TheDOJ thenbecame

embroiledinalong,behind-the-scenesbattletowrestcontrolofthedocuments

fromtheministryforintelligenceservices,inordertoprocesstherequest.

Hadthematternotbeensettledoutofcourt,itislikelythatconsiderations

thatwereraisedintheSouthwoodjudgmentwouldhavesurfaced.Oneisthatthe

classificationofarecordassecretisnotasufficientgroundforrefusal.Thelabel-

lingofadocumentasbeingsecretortopsecrethasnolegalweight;itisamere

administrativemeasure,atleastitwasthen.Theonusremainsonrequestersto

provethatwhenrecordsarewithheld,thereasonscomplywiththegroundsfor

refusalcontainedinthePAIA.ItisalsoclearthattheProtectionofInformationAct

cannotbeusedasabasisforrefusingaccess.ThatActhasitsownpurpose,namely

criminalisingtheunauthoriseddisclosureofinformation,andcanonlybeapplied

inaccordancewithitsownprovisions.InthecaseoftheHeferCommission,when

theintelligenceserviceswerecalledupontorevealwhetherNgcukahadbeenan

agentofanapartheidsecurityservice,thereappearstohavebeenalacunawhich

thepresidingjudgewasunabletofill.Eitherthelegislativeframeworkwasinad-

equate,orthewayinwhichavailableinstrumentsareutilisedisnotgivendue

thoughtandappropriateapplicationbytheexecutive.

Theissueofapartheid-erarecordsisverymuchalive,andinthepubliccon-

sciousness.Mostoftherequestsbyindividuals,throughSAHA,totheNIAwere

forrecordsaboutthemheldbythestate.Policyneedstobeformulated,anda

legalframeworkestablished,fordealingwiththisissue.Ideally,theintelligence

servicesshouldundertakeaproactivedeclassificationprocessandprovideinfor-

mation about the records available to the public, in order to avoid becoming

involvedintime-consumingsearchesforrecords,andpossiblyexpensivelitiga-

tionoveraccessdisputes.Therealsoneedstobeareviewofthelegalbasisofthe

proceduresandcriteriaforclassification.Thefollowingfactors,whicharenotpart

oftheinterdepartmentalreviewprocess,shouldbeaddressedintheregulatory

framework:thecriteriaforclassificationalignedwithPAIA;possiblerestrictions

onwhohastheauthoritytoclassifyrecords;andstricteroversightofclassification

procedures.

PART THREE

Lessons, conclusions, and policy recommendations

In the decade after the Cold War, many countries introduced access to

information legislation, also commonly referred to as freedom of informa-

tionlegislation.TheyincludedJapan(1999),SouthAfrica(2000),SouthKorea

(1996),Iceland(1996),Thailand(1997),theUnitedKingdom,andanumberof

EastandCentralEuropeancountries.Theyjoinedanumberofcountriesthathad

alreadyenactedsuchlaws,includingSweden(1949),theUnitedStates(1966),

theNetherlands(1980),Canada(1982)andAustralia(1982).Thistrendhasusu-

allyreflectedademandforgreateraccountabilityonthepartofgovernmentand

otherpublicbodies,especiallyfollowingcrisesofconfidencerelatedtosecurity

issuesorforeignrelations.

Assecurityandintelligenceorganisationsworklargelyinsecret,studyinghow

accesstoinformationlegislationimpactsontheiroperationsindemocraciesmay

beusefulforSouthAfrica.Althoughdifferentparliamentarydemocraciesadopt

accesstoinformationlegislationinresponsetodifferenthistoricalcircumstances

andconcerns,reflectingontheirexperiencescancastgreaterlightontheten-

sionsbetweennationalsecurityinterestsontheonehandandthepublic’srightof

accesstoinformationontheother.

the unIteD stAtes

The United States has a long-established tradition of freedom of information,

andisoftenseenashavingmanyoftheanswersmanagingthebalancebetween

secrecy and transparency. Yet it is important to remember that freedom of

CoMPARAtIVe InteRnAtIonAL exPeRIenCes

7

136 / chAPter seven

informationintheUnitedStatesaroseoutofparticularhistoricalconditions,and

thatmanygainsaretheresultsofstrugglesinandoutsideofthecourts.

origins of the Freedom of Information ActIn1966,CongressenactedtheFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA),whichintro-

ducedageneralrightofaccesstopublicrecords.Thiswasinresponsetostate

departments,whichwereincreasinglyresortingtosecrecy,oftencitingColdWar

imperativesasjustification.Priorto1966,therewasnogeneralrighttoinspect

federalrecords,althoughsomestateshad,indifferingdegrees,introducedvari-

ousformsofopengovernment.UnderaprovisionoftheAdministrativeProcedure

Act,federalrecordswereavailableto‘personsproperlyanddirectlyconcerned’,

subjecttovagueexceptionsthatwereintendedtoprotectthepublicinterestbut

hadnosupportingjudicialremedy.Thisprovisionwasultimatelyrepealedand

replacedbytheFOIA,asithadineffectbecomeachartertowithholdratherthan

aninstrumentofdisclosure(Adler,1991).

The FOIA is better understood in the context of other laws that impact on

accesstoinformationandbalancetheinterestsoftheindividual.Onesuchlawis

theGovernmentintheSunshineAct(‘SunshineAct’)of1976,whichwasbasedon

theviewthatthegovernmentshouldconductthepublic’sbusinessinpublic.This

ActappliestoallagenciesthataresubjecttotheFOIA,andopenstheirmeetings

tothepublic;itcontainsexemptionsthatmirrorcloselythosefoundintheFOIA.

AnotherlawisthePrivacyActof1974,whichreinforcestheconstitutionallypro-

tectedrightofprivacyofAmericancitizens,andincludesasystemforindividuals

toaccessrecordsaboutthemselves(withexceptions).ThroughthisAct,Congress

hasacknowledgedandsoughttoregulatethepracticesaffectingtherighttopri-

vacy,suchasthecollection,useanddisseminationofpersonalinformationbythe

federalagencies,madeeasierbytheuseofcomputersandtechnology.

Main features of the Freedom of Information ActTheFOIA’spremiseisthat,unlessexemptfromthisrequirement,allfederalgov-

ernmentrecordsmustbeaccessibletothepublic.Anymemberofthepublic(‘any

person’)mayrequestarecord:theActdoesnotstipulateacitizenshiprequire-

ment,andthecourtshaveinterpretedthedefinitiontoincludeforeigncitizens,

corporationsandgovernments.Arequesterdoesnothavetogiveareasonforthe

request.TheActalsolimitstheresponsetimesforrequeststobeattendedto,the

costsofmakingrequestsandanappealsmechanism.Inthebeginning,somefed-

eralagenciesresistedtheActandemployedavarietyofwaystodiscourageitsuse,

suchashighfees,longdelaysandclaimsthattheycouldnotfindtherequested

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 137

materials(Adler,1991).ThisledtoareviewoftheActandvariousamendments

in1974.In1976,minoramendmentswereintroducedthatdealtwithstandards

fordeterminingmorepreciselywhich‘otherstatutes’couldbeusedasgroundsfor

withholdinginformation.

Furtheramendmentswereenactedin1986,whentheUnitedStatesgovern-

mentwasconcernedthattheAct’sexemptionsdidnotadequatelyprotectfrom

disclosureconfidentialsources,ongoinginvestigations,certainmanualsandother

sensitive,non-investigative, lawenforcementmaterials.Thustheamendments

included the following exclusions: records whose disclosure would interfere

withcriminalproceedingsofwhichthesubjectisnotaware;informantrecords

requestedbyathirdpartyaccordingtothenameorpersonalidentification;and

classifiedrecordsoftheFBIpertainingtoforeignintelligence,counterintelligence

orinternationalterrorism(Adler,1991).

grounds for refusal (exemptions)TheFOIA, in itscurrentform,providesforthefollowingexemptions:national

security information; internal agency rules; information exempted by other

statutes;businessinformation;litigationtoreverseFOIA;personalprivacy;law

enforcementrecords;financialinstitutions’records,andoilwelldata.Ofpartic-

ularrelevancetointelligenceisthefirstexemption,whichstatesthattheFOIA

doesnotapplytomattersspecificallyauthorisedtobekeptsecret,intheinterest

ofnationaldefenceorforeignpolicy,undercriteriaestablishedbyanexecutive

order.However,theAmericansecurityandintelligenceservicesarenotexcluded

fromtheAct’sprovisions;indeedtheyhavebeenthetargetsofcivilrightsgroups

andamassivebodyofcaselawhasdevelopedaroundthecourts’applicationof

theAct.

TheUnitedStatesmakesstatutoryprovisionfortheprotectionofclassified

information.Executiveorderno.12356clarifies which information should be

classified.Thecategoriesare:militaryplans,weaponsoroperations;thevulner-

abilitiesorcapabilitiesofsystems,installations,projectsorplansrelatingtothe

nationalsecurity;foreigngovernmentinformation;intelligenceactivities(includ-

ing special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; foreign relations or

foreignactivitiesoftheUnitedStates;scientific,technologicaloreconomicmat-

tersrelatingtothenationalsecurity;governmentprogrammesforsafeguarding

nuclearmaterialsorfacilities;cryptology;aconfidentialsource;orothercatego-

riesofinformationrelatedtothenationalsecuritythatrequireprotectionagainst

unauthoriseddisclosure,asdeterminedbythepresident,agencyheadsorother

138 / chAPter seven

officialswhohavebeengrantedoriginalclassificationauthoritybythepresident

(Adler,1991).

status of CIA filesTheAmericansecurityandintelligenceagenciesarenot,asaclass,exemptfrom

theprovisionsoftheFOIA.However,in1984,CongressamendedtheNational

SecurityActof1947toallowcertain‘operationalfiles’oftheCIAtobeexempt

fromthesearchandreviewrequirementsoftheFOIA(Adler,1991).Significantly,

this amendment was passed with the support of the American Civil Liberties

Union,avocalfreedomofinformationadvocacyorganisation.Throughthisstat-

ute,Congresshopedtorelievetheagencyofthefrustratingadministrativeburden

ofhavingtosearchandreviewcertainfilesthat‘almostinvariablyprovenotto

bereleasableundertheFOIA’.Andinthisway,thestatuteaimsatreducingthe

processingbackloganddelaysinrespondingtoFOIArequests,‘whilepreserving

undiminishedtheamountofmeaningfulinformationreleasabletothepublic’and,

inaddition,keepingCIAsourcesconfidential(Adler,1991).

‘Operational files’ included files of the operations, science and technology,

andsecuritydirectorates.Theoperationsdirectorate’sfilesdocumenttheconduct

of foreignintelligenceorcounterintelligenceoperations, intelligence,security,

liaisonarrangements,informationexchangeswithforeigngovernmentsortheir

intelligenceorsecurityservices.Thescienceandtechnologydirectorate’sfiles

documentforeignintelligenceorcounterintelligencecollectionthroughscientific

andtechnicalsystems.Thesecurityoffice’sfilesdocumentinvestigationsintothe

suitabilityofpotential foreign intelligenceorcounterintelligencesources.Sig-

nificantly,filesthatarethesolerepositoryofdisseminatedintelligencearenot

regardedasoperationalfiles(Adler,1991).

Impact of freedom of information legislationFreedomofinformationhasbeenusedextensivelyintheUnitedStatestodefend

andupholdconstitutionalrights.Inapoliticalenvironmentthathassimultane-

ously addressed the challenges of classification and declassification for which

thereisalsoanExecutiveOrder,theintelligenceagenciescouldnotaffordtobe

complacent about the issue of access to information. As a consequence, there

existsacultureofpublicinformationabouttheworkingsoftheintelligencecom-

munity,whichtranslatesintothemanycoursesofferedbyuniversities,academic

research,aswellasacriticalmedia.

TheCommissiononProtectingandReducingGovernmentSecrecy(Moynihan

Commission 1997) was established in the mid-1990s, in response to public

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 139

concernsabouttheextentofgovernmentalsecrecy.Its1997reportfoundthatthe

subjectivityofofficialsledtoinconsistentinterpretationandapplicationofthe

classificationanddeclassificationcriteria.Asthissecrecysystemhadnostatutory

basis, each time the administration changed, a new classification and declas-

sificationexecutiveorderwasissued.Thecommissionfoundthattheseregular

amendmentsdisruptedtheefficientadministrationoftheclassificationsystem.

Dissentingpublicofficialsquiteoftensimplydraggedtheirfeetonimplementing

policychanges,knowingfullwellthattheappointmentofthenextadministra-

tionwouldbringyetanotherchange.Thecommissionalsoexpressedconcernover

therelianceontheFreedomofInformationActasaninstrumentfordeclassifica-

tion.TheFOIAislimited,asitonlyappliedtoindividualsmakingrequests.This

naturallymakesitdifficultforinterestedpartiestomakerequestsaboutsecrets

toagencies.Theagenciesareatanadvantage,astheycanchoosetocutoutsub-

stantialchunksof information,whichmighthaveprovidedtherequesterwith

significantcontextualinformation.Concernedthatacultureofopennesswould

neverdevelopunlessacultureofsecrecyisrestrained,thecommissionrecom-

mendedmechanismsfortheproactivedeclassificationofintelligencerecordsand

oversightstructurestoensurecompliancewiththisprocess(MoynihanCommis-

sion,1997).

The United States’ intelligence services are subject to extensive and public

scrutiny,whichensuresasignificantdegreeoftransparencyaboutthem.Overthe

years,congressionalcommittees,severalgovernment-initiatedreviews,aculture

oflitigation,thepresenceofcivillibertiesorganisations,haveallcontributedtoa

significantamountofinformationandrecordsabouttheservicesbeingplacedin

thepublicdomain.

CAnADA

In Canada, two pieces of complementary and mutually balancing legislation

dealwithfreedomofinformation:theAccesstoInformationActof1982andthe

PrivacyAct,1982.

origins of the Access to Information ActTheTrudeaugovernmentintroducedthislegislationatatimewhenCanadawas

undergoingsubstantialconstitutionalreform.TheMcDonaldCommissionhad

beensetuptoinvestigateabusesintheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice(RCMP),

amidgrowingcontroversyovertheroleofthesecurityforces.Theresultwasthe

140 / chAPter seven

establishmentofacivilianintelligenceagency,theCanadianSecurityIntelligence

Service(CSIS),in1984.

TheCanadianlegislationcoversall132federalagenciesincludingthesecu-

rityservices.Inadditionseveralregionalauthorities,includingOntario,Quebec,

BritishColumbiaandQuebec,haveintroducedaccesstoinformationlegislation,

coveringthousandsofinstitutions.

Main features of the ActThe Access to Information Act of 1982 promotes the following principles:

governmentinformationbeingmadeavailabletothepublic;limitedandspecific

exceptionstotherightofaccess;andindependent(ofgovernment)reviewsof

disclosuredecisions.InCanada,theAct’suseisrestrictedtocitizensandperma-

nentresidentsorpersonspresentinCanada,therebyexcludingforeigners.Asin

theUSA,thesecurityandintelligenceagenciesarenotexcludedfromtheambit

oftheAct.

Incompliancewiththerequirementtopublishcategoriesofinformationheld,

theCSISliststhefollowing:communicationssecurity;planningandco-ordination

ofactivities;counter-intelligenceandcounter-terrorism;accessanddisclosure

procedures and requests; personnel records; internal security of the Service;

scientific,operationalandtechnicalsupport;supplyofsecurityassessmentsto

othergovernmentdepartments;andpolicy,administrationandmanagementof

operationsinvolvinghumansources(Hazell,1989).

UndertheAct,apublicbodymustdisclosearecordifthereissucharequest.

However, the general principles are that a government body is not obliged to

createarecordthatdoesnotexist.CSISreceivesrequestsfromawiderangeof

sourcesincludinghistorians,manyofwhomadmittosubmittingsimilarrequests

toseveralagenciesinthehopeofgettingascomprehensiveanansweraspossible.

Partofthereasonforthis isthattheCSISfrequentlyusestheprovisioninthe

Actthatallowsthemtoneitherconfirmnordenytheexistenceofinformationon

currentoperations;themainconcernseemstobetoabletoprovidelifelongpro-

tectionforthosewhohaveactedashumansources.

IntheCanadianAct,thefollowingkindsof informationareprotectedfrom

disclosure:informationrelatingtonationalsecurityanddefence;international

relations;lawenforcement;cabinetdiscussions;civilserviceadvice;legaladvice;

damage to the economy; commercial information; personal information; and

informationprotectedbyotherstatutes.

Canada’sdiversesystemofcontrolsoverthesecurityandintelligencecommu-

nityprovidesafairmeasureofpublicaccountabilityinthisareaofgovernance.

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 141

FollowingrecommendationsbytheMcDonaldCommission,anindependentbody

wasestablishedtoreviewthefunctioningoftheCSIS:theSecurityIntelligence

ReviewCommittee(SIRC),whosemembersareallprivycouncillorsappointed

bythegovernor-in-council,afterconsultationbytheprimeministerwithlead-

ersofthemajoroppositionparties.TheSIRC’sfourmainfunctionsareto:review

CSIS’sperformanceofitsduties;investigatecomplaintsofanypersonsagainstthe

CSIS;investigatecomplaintsaboutsecurityclearances;andreviewcasesconcern-

ingnationalsecuritymatters.SIRCreleasesanannualreporttothepublicabout

itswork,andgenerallyhastheconfidenceofthepublic(Rankin,1986).Another

mechanismofcontrol is the Inspector-General,appointedby thecabinet.Like

theSIRC,theInspector-GeneralhaswideaccesstoCSISdocumentation,except

forcabinetrecords.InCanada,ministerialresponsibilitylieswiththesolicitor-

general,towhomtheCSIS,theInspector-GeneralandtheSIRCallreport(Rankin,

1986).

Canada,likemanyothercountries,learnedthelessonofallowingthesecurity

servicestofunctionunderconditionsofunaccountability.Thelegislativemeas-

uresputinplaceareimpressivebutnotwithoutproblems.However,Canadais

ausefulcomparisonforSouthAfrica,whichhasadoptedmanyfeaturesofthe

legislationdealingwithaccessandthefunctioningofitsdomesticsecurityservice,

whichinmanyrespectscanbeequatedtoSouthAfrica’sNIA.

InDIA

LikeSouthAfrica,Indiaisanestablisheddemocracythatisbesetwithproblems:

acolonial legacy, includingaWestminstersystemofgovernment,andtheves-

tigesofmanyBritishdominionlaws;aneconomicallystratifiedsociety,ofdeep

social,religiousandcastedivisions;andavolatilepoliticalclimate.Evenwith

theseproblems,Indiaremainsoneoftheworld’slargestparliamentarydemoc-

racies.BorderedbyPakistan,China,BangladeshandNepal,itsconflictswithits

neighbours,particularlyPakistan,arewelldocumented.Internally,Indianpoli-

ticsisfraughtwithconflict,whichhassometimesclaimedscoresofcivilianlives.

Despitetheseconditions,therighttoinformationhasbeenaconcernthroughout

thedecadesoffreedom.

origins of the Right to Information ActForseveralyears,theIndiangovernmenthadbeenunderpressuretointroduce

accesstoinformationlegislation,andeventuallyintroducedabillatfederallevel

in1999.Thegenesisoftherighttoinformationdatesbackto1975when,inthe

142 / chAPter seven

caseofState of Uttar Pradesh v Raj Narayan,theSupremeCourtofIndiaacknowl-

edgedthat,althoughnotspecifiedintheconstitution,therighttoinformationwas

impliedintherighttofreedomofspeechandconscience.TheSupremeCourtlater

ruled(in1982),inthecaseofSP Gupta v President of India,thataccesstogovern-

mentinformationwasanessentialpartofthefundamentalrighttofreedomof

speechandexpression,stating:

Theconceptofanopengovernmentisthedirectemanationfromtherightto

knowwhichseemsimplicitintherightoffreespeechandexpressionguaran-

teedunderArticle19(1)(a).Therefore,disclosuresof informationinregard

tothefunctioningofGovernmentmustbetherule,andsecrecyanexception

justifiedonlywherethestrictestrequirementsofpublicinterestsodemands.

TheapproachoftheCourtmustbetoattenuatetheareaofsecrecyasmuchas

possibleconsistentlywiththerequirementofpublicinterest,bearinginmind

allthetimethatdisclosurealsoservesanimportantaspectofpublicinterest.

(Martin&Feldman,1998)

In1997,theIndiangovernmentestablishedaworkinggrouptodraftabillthat

would provide a general right of access to information, and create a National

CouncilforFreedomofInformationandStateCouncils.InFebruary1999,Presi-

dentKRNarayanannouncedthegovernment’sintentiontointroducetheFreedom

ofInformationBill.

Thebillwasstronglyresisted,particularlybypublicofficials(IndiaTogether,

2006),andtheversionpassedin2000wasdiscreditedasahalf-heartedcommit-

menttofreedomofinformation.Thebillwaswithdrawnshortlyafterwardsand

replacedbyaversionthatsatisfiedatleastsomeofthecritics’concerns.

Legislative framework for the intelligence servicesIndia’sstrainedrelationswithitsneighbourshaveresultedinthecountryadopting

adefensivesecuritystance.Nationalsecurityisseentorequirestrongintelligence

and defence capabilities to protect territorial integrity; and strong police and

domesticsecuritycapacities,tocounterperceiveddomesticsecuritythreats.There

is,inasense,continuityintheaimsofthesecurityinstitutions:underBritishrule,

theyprotectedBritishinterests;onattainingindependence,theywereconverted

toservetheinterestsoftherulingeliteandfoundthemselvesincreasinglyatodds

withmarginalisedpoliticalgroups(Subrahmanyam2000).

InIndia,theorganisationandresponsibilitiestheintelligenceservicesarenot

establishedorregulatedbylegislativeparliamentaryacts.Anditisagainstthis

backgroundthattheapplicationoffreedomofinformationlegislationmustbe

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 143

seen.Nonetheless,publicaccessisaffectedbythemanylawsregulatingpublic

safetyandnationalsecurity:theOfficialSecretsAct;CriminalProcedureCode;

Indian Telegraph Act; Armed Forces Special Powers Act; Disturbed Areas Act;

PublicSafetyAct;NationalSecurityAct;andtheTerroristandDisruptiveActivi-

tiesAct(FASIntelligenceResourceProgramme,2001).

Main provisions of the Freedom of Information ActOneofthelegaciesofBritishrulewastheOfficialSecretsActof1923,whichmade

thedisclosureofclassifiedinformationinIndiaacriminaloffence.TheActwas

basedontheUKOfficialSecretsAct.InthemotivationfortheFreedomofInfor-

mationBill,itwassaidthat,oncepassedbyparliament,itwouldtakeprecedence

overtheOfficialSecretsActandbeonlyfortheuseofIndiancitizens.Thebill

wouldbeapplicabletoallfederalpublicauthoritiesandrequirethemtomaintain

records,whichwouldbesubjecttodisclosureonrequest.Thebillrequiredpublic

authoritiestoappointpublicinformationofficers,andassistpersonswishingto

accessinformation,Recognisingtheunequallevelsofliteracy,thisassistancewas

toincludetranslatingverbalrequestsintowrittenform.Thebillalsoprovidedfor

aninternalappealtoadesignatedindividualorofficewithinthepublicbodyto

whichtheoriginalrequestwasmade,intheeventofarefusal.Thefederalbill

wasfinallypassedastheRighttoInformationAct,andbecameoperationalon

12October2005(IndiaTogether,2006).

exclusions and exemptionsArticle16ofthebillprovidedforablanketexclusionofallintelligenceandsecurity

organisationslistedintheschedule,whichthecentralgovernmentmayamend

bynotification.Notsurprisingly,thelegislationadoptedbystatesincludedexclu-

sionsthatwerealignedtothenationalAct.Rajasthanwasoneofthefirststates

tointroducefreedomofinformationlegislation.InsectionfiveoftheRajasthan

RighttoInformationAct,thegroundsforrefusalapplytoinformationwhosedis-

closurewouldprejudiciallyaffectthe:sovereigntyandintegrityofIndia;security

ofthestate;conductofinternationalrelations,includinginformationreceivedin

confidencefromforeigngovernments,theiragenciesorinternationalorganisa-

tions;theconductofcentre-staterelations,includinginformationexchangedin

confidencebetweenthecentralandstategovernmentoranyoftheirauthorities/

agencies; thefranknessandcandourof internaldiscussions, includingcabinet

papers,interdepartmental/intradepartmentalnotes,correspondenceandpapers

containingadviceandopinionsrelatingtointernalpolicyanalysis.

144 / chAPter seven

Insummary,theintroductionoffreedomofinformationlegislationwasaposi-

tivestepforIndia,althoughthecategoricalexclusionoftheintelligenceservices

fromthebillsuggeststhatthepublicwillcontinuetobeaffordedlittleofficial

informationabouttheirfunctioning.

Lessons FoR south AFRICA

SouthAfricacanderivemanylessonsfromstudyingtheaccessto information

legislationinothercountriesanditsrelevancetotheintelligenceservices.

Insomecountries(forexampleIndia),thesecurityandintelligenceagencies

arespecificallyexcludedfromtheaccesstoinformationlegislation.However,in

othercountries,suchastheUnitedStatesandCanada,theintelligenceagencies

aresubjecttofreedomofinformationlegislation.

The one common area is the range of exceptions. Generally, the following

categoriesofinformationareexemptfromdisclosure:privateinformationabout

individuals;informationrelatingtodefence,security,andinternationalrelations;

informationaboutongoinginvestigationsinthelawenforcementsector;commer-

cialandeconomicinformation;andoperationalproceduresofpublicbodies.In

relationtointelligence,thescopecoverstheidentitiesofsourcesandintelligence

officers.Thus,provisionismadetoprotectinformationheldbytheintelligence

services,evenwhentheyaresubjecttotheaccesstoinformationlegislation.

Officialsecretslegislationorregulationsgenerallyco-existwithfreedomof

informationlegislation.Theintroductionofthelatterhascertainlynotsounded

thedeathknellforofficialsecrecy.Indeedthestate’srightofrefusaltodisclose

securityanddefenceinformationseemstobeaninalienablegiven,whichmakes

theneedformanagingclassificationanddeclassificationofinformationespecially

relevant.

Somecountrieshave introducedseparate legislation toprotect theprivacy

oftheindividual,toensurethatpersonshaveaccesstoinformationaboutthem-

selves,andthatsuchinformationmaynotbedisclosedtounauthorisedpersons.

However,suchlegislationusuallyexcludes‘nationalsecurity’information.

In other aspects there is little uniformity. Certain countries have a well-

establishedbodyof judicialprecedence,as in thecasewith theUnitedStates,

whileothersdonot,whichisthecasewithCanada.Nevertheless,inmanycases,

thetrendistolinkaccesstoinformationlegislationwithotheroversightmecha-

nisms,suchasparliamentaryoversightbodies(inCanada’scase,aprivycouncil)

andinspectors-generalreportingtoaministerorthelegislature.

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 145

Despite theabovesimilarities, it isnecessary tobecircumspect inderiving

lessons from the example of other countries. While belonging to the body of

countriesthathasadoptedfreedomofinformationlegislation,SouthAfricahas

donesounderspecificcircumstances,inresponsetoparticularpressures,andata

certainlevelofmaturityandstageofevolution.

Managing records from the pastApart from access to information legislation and how countries’ intelligence

servicesmaybesubjecttoit,theremaybevalueinreflectingonhowsocietiesin

transitionmanagetheirrecords.InSouthAfrica,theissueofwhetheraseparate

regulatoryregimeisrequiredforthehandlingofsuchrecordappearedtohave

beenunresolvedwhentheHeferCommissionsat.

Theexampleofformercommunistcountriesinhandlingrecordsofthestate

securityapparatusesissometimesreferredto.AfterthecollapseoftheBerlinWall

andtheEastGermanstate,thenewintegratedGermanstateactedquicklytotake

controloftherecordsofformercommuniststate,andwentasfaraspublishing

legislationthatregulatedaccesstoandtheutilisationofsecurityservicerecords.

The Act Regarding the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German

Democratic Republic (Stasi Records Act)waspassedinDecember1991.Itaimedto

facilitateindividualaccesstopersonaldatawhichtheStateSecurityServicehad

storedonindividuals,toprotecttheprivacyofindividuals,topromotethe‘histori-

cal,politicalandjuridicalreappraisaloftheactivitiesoftheStateSecurityService’

andtoprovidepublicandprivatebodieswithaccesstotheinformationrequired

toachievethepurposesoftheact(section1,StasiRecordsAct1991).

Theactisdetailedandprescriptiveabouttheuseoftherecords,anddirects

theconditionsunderwhichparticularcategoriesofrecordsshouldbedirected

toparticularagencies,whentheymaybeusedforcriminalproceedings,andthe

conditionsunderwhichaccesstopersonalrecordsmaybegiven.Italsocarefully

detailswhichrecordsaresubjecttotheAct,andwhicharenot.

Theactisalsoveryparticularaboutprocedure.Allrequestsforaccesstothe

relevantrecordsof the formerStasimustbemade inwriting,andarequester

mustproperlyidentifyhimselforherself.Particularcareisexercisedindetermin-

ingwhataccessisgiven.InPart3oftheAct(UseoftheStateSecurityService

Records),itisspecifiedthatwhereapersonhasrequestedinformationpertain-

ingtorecordsabouthimselfforherself,ifinformationaboutthirdpartiesmight

bedisclosedthroughtheinspectionofsuchaccesstoarecord,thesethirdpar-

tiesmustgivetheirconsent.Accesscanbegrantedif‘separationofpersonaldata

regardingotherdatasubjectsorthirdpartiesisnotpossibleorispossibleonly

146 / chAPter seven

withunreasonableeffort,andthereisnoreasontoassumethattheotherdata

subjectsorthirdpartieshaveanoverridinglegitimateinterestinkeepingthem

secret’(section12,4.2.).

ThepersonresponsiblefortheexecutionoftheActisaFederalCommission,

responsibletotheInteriorMinister.ThepowersoftheCommissionerarespeltout

inlaw,asarethemeasuresthatmustbetakenbytheincumbenttoensurethe

safety,integrityandsecurityoftherecords.TheFederalMinisterisassistedbya

statutoryAdvisoryCommission.

TheStasiRecordsActhasawholesectiondealingwithdatasubjectsandthird

parties(section13),‘datasubjects’beingpersonsaboutwhomtheStateSecurity

Servicecollectedpersonaldatabydeliberate,includingsecret,information-gath-

eringorspying.Asarule,datasubjectenjoytherightofaccesstoinformationto

recordsaboutthem.Intheirrequests,theywouldbeexpectedtosupplyparticu-

larswhichmakeitpossibletolocatetherecords,but‘thepurposeforwhichthe

informationisrequestedneednotbegiven’(s.13.1).Theactisstronglyweighted

infavourofdatasubjects’,totheextentofexposingthosewhohavecollectedor

providedtheinformationthatmadeitswaytothepolice.Section13.5states:

If code names of employees of the State Security Service who gathered or

evaluatedpersonaldataregardingthedatasubject,ornamesof theiroffic-

ers, together with particulars which make it possible to positively identify

theseemployees,canbefoundintheexistingpreparedrecordswhichthedata

subjecthasinspectedorforwhichheobtainsduplicates,thenamesofsuch

employeesshallbeprovidedtothesubjectathisrequest.Section1shallalso

applytootherpersonswhoinformedonthedatasubjectinwriting,ifthecon-

tentsoftheirreportswerewritteninsuchawayastobedetrimentaltothedata

subject.Theinterestsofemployeesandinformersinkeepingtheirnamessecret

shallnotruleoutdisclosureoftheirnames.

Ofinterestistheprovisionthattheaboveclausewouldnotapplyto‘employeesof

theStateSecurityServiceiftheywerenotatleast18yearsoldatthetimeofthe

activitiesinquestion’(s.13.6).Thisraisesthedisturbingprospectthatsomeofthe

employeesoftheStateSecurityServicewereinfactmerechildren.

SimilarprovisionstothosefoundintheStasiActaretobefoundinHungar-

ianlaw,whichalsohasaspeciallegislativedispensationforrecordsoftheformer

SecurityServices.Thelawhasbeenreviewedseveraltimesoverthepastdecade

andtodayispartofabodyoflawrelatingtotheorganisationoftheintelligence

services, the protection of individual privacy, and the management of public

records.TheactdealingwithsecurityrecordsofthepastisActNo.111of2003

comPArAtIve InternAtIonAl exPerIences / 147

On theDisclosure of the Secret Service Activities of the Communist Regime andon

the Establishment of the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security.Records

coveredbytheactcovertheperiod21December1944to14February1990.In

similarveintotheStasiAct,thecategoriesofboththosewhoinformedandthose

whowerethetargetsofintelligencecollectionaredefined.TheActthenstipulates

theproceduresforthehandlingofsuchrecords,andtheconditionsunderwhich

theymaybeaccessed.

TheHungarianlawappearstodiffersubstantivelyinitshandlingofthesecrecy

ofidentitiesofinformers,fromtheStasiAct.Thisisdonethroughtheclassifica-

tionstatusaccordedsuchrecords.Article2.1oftheactreadsthus:

Theprevioussecuritystatusofthedatatobefoundinthedocumentsfalling

undertheeffectoftheActshallceasetoexistbyvirtueofthisAct,exceptifthe

classificationofthedataismaintainedbythepersonentitledthereto.

ThisapparentlyundertheSecrecyActof1995.Moreover,thesecuritystatusofthe

datawhichissubjecttotheact,andwhichisclassifiedassecretundertheSecrecy

Act,maybemaintainedifitappliestoapersonwhowasattachedtothestaffof

thenationalsecurityservicesintheperiod15February1990and26May2002,

ortosomeonewhosecretlycooperatedwiththeservices.Thesecretstatuscan

alsobemaintainedifitappliestoapersonwhoseactivitiesoridentity,ifexposed,

mightbecomethevictimofacrimeseriouslyviolatingorendangeringhisorher

life,healthorpersonalfreedom,orthatofhisorherrelatives(Article2.2).In

generalthereisamorecautiousapproachtodisclosureevenoftheformersecu-

rityservicerecords,anddueregardisalsogiventowhatisconsideredtobein

Hungary’snationalinterest.

the handling of records of the former security servicesBoththeStasiandHungarianexperiencesdemonstrateimportantaspectsthat

shouldbeconsideredwhendealingwithrecordsofformersecurityservicesof

authoritariansocieties.Insuchcases,aswasthecaseinSouthAfrica,thereisa

desiretogettothebottomofthestatesecrets,particularlytheroleofthesecu-

rityservicesinupholdingtheregime.IntheSouthAfricancase,theTRCwasone

ofthemainvehiclesthataddressedthisneed.However,theActestablishingthe

TRC,thePromotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, didnotmake

specificprovisionforthehandlingofrecordsoftheformersecurityservices,inthe

waythattheabovementionedActsdid.TheTRCdidhavethepowertodemand

recordsandtoissuesubpoenas,andinthecourseofitsinvestigations,ithadpow-

ersofsearchandseizure,buttherewasnotandtothisdateisnotaspecificSouth

148 / chAPter seven

Africanlawdealingwiththemanagementoftherecordsoftheformersecurity

andintelligenceservices.

Theconsequencehasbeenachaoticstateofaffairs.Itshouldbeofconcern

thatapartheiderasecurityestablishmentrecordsremaindispersedthroughout

thestructuresofthepresentsecurityestablishment,withdifferingstandardsof

care and custodianship. A good example of such records being well managed

isthoseunderthecontroloftheSANDF.Inothercases,forexample,surviving

Security Police files which were located, secured and listed under TRC direc-

tionin1997/8,wereseveralyearslaterinchaos(interviewwithVerneHarris,

1September2003).

Afurtherproblemhasbeentheillegalremovalofrecordsbyformermembers

ofthesecurityestablishment.Otherrecordsthatfoundthemselvesinthehands

oftheTRCwerenotproperlyretrievedandhandledwhentheTRCconcludedits

work.TherecordsoftheBantustansecurityserviceshavealsobeencompromised,

havingbeentakenupinahaphazardwaybythedifferentpublicserviceandsecu-

ritysectorinstitutions.Thesystematicdestructionofrecords,whichapparently

continuedevenafterademocraticgovernmenthadbeeninstalled,wasthedirect

resultofnothavingaspecificpolicypositiononwhattodowithsuchrecords.

Anecdotalrecollectionsbymembersofthesecurityservicessuggestthatthe

former regime and the liberation movements felt as they were negotiating a

commonfuture,thatthepastwasbestlefttorest,andthatthereshouldbeno

exposureoftheother’sspies,becausethismighthavecausedembarrassmentor

evenputthelivesofcollaboratorsatrisk.Thesituationthatcametoobtainthen

wasthatpersons,whohadbeenspieduponbytheapartheidsecurityforces,were

nevertoknowwhohadbetrayedthem.Andpersonswhodefiedthelawingiving

statesecretstotheenemy(manyofthemintheranksofthesecuritypoliceand

militaryintelligence),weregiventheuneasyassurancethattheriskstheytook

wouldnotbeexposed.Inthiscontext,thoughandwithouttheprotectionofan

adequatepolicyandlegalframeworkthatdeliberatelybalancestherighttoknow,

withtherighttoprotect,andtakesintoaccountotherimperativessuchasthe

righttojustice,theaccusationsoftreacherylinger,causingthekindofnational

crisisthattheclaimsagainstNgcukathattheHeferCommissionwasrequiredto

resolve.ItmaybethatSouthAfricastillneedstoexploresuchapolicyandlegisla-

tiveframework,toforeverputtheapartheidghoststorest.

The primary aim of thisbookhasbeentoexploreapossiblepolicyframework

fordeterminingwhatinformationabouttheintelligenceservices,orinfor-

mationheldbythem,shouldbemadeavailabletothepublic.Theroutehasbeen

circuitous,coveringthehistoryofofficialsecrecy,thetransitiontodemocracy,

andsomeinternationalcomparisons.Althoughthefocushasbeenonthepolicy

forimplementingPAIA,theresearchhasraisedbroaderissuesofpublicaccount-

ability,governance,anddemocraticcontroloftheintelligenceservices.Whathas

becomeevidentarethemultiplemeansofaccessinginformationaboutthepost-

apartheidintelligenceservices.Therefore,someofthestrengths,weaknesses,and

efficacyofdifferentwaysofaccessingthisinformationhavealsobeenassessed.

The secrecy under which intelligence services conduct their business is a

worldwide phenomenon, and a feature of both authoritarian and democratic

politicalsystems.SincetheendoftheColdWar,globalconflictandinternalinsta-

bilityhavepersisteddespitetheintroductionoftheconceptof‘humansecurity’.

Debatesaboutnationalsecurityandthegovernanceofthesecuritysectorhave

raisedimportantissues,bothinternationallyandinthedevelopingworld.

Statescontinuetojustifyusingextraordinaryregulatorymeasuresnotonly

whentherearerealandgravethreatsto lifeandlimb,butundermanyguises

labelledasthe‘nationalinterest’.Resortingtosecrecyisanexampleofsuchan

extraordinarymeasure.Byandlarge,placingissuesinthesecurityrealmsignalsa

failuretoaddressthemthroughthenormalrulesofpoliticalengagement.Aresort

tosecrecybythestate(particularlyifthisisexcessive)indicatesthatthenormal

ConCLusIon AnD PoLICY ReCoMMenDAtIons

8

150 / chAPter eIGht

courseofpoliticshasfailed,andthatsocietyisbeingdrivenbackintotheabyssof

unaccountableandauthoritarianstateconduct.

Decidingwhenofficialsecrecyhasbecomeexcessiveisaproblemconfront-

ingalldemocraticsocieties.Before1994,secrecyinSouthAfricawasanintegral

partofanundemocratic,raciallyexclusiveconstitutionalorderthatundermined

humanrights. Inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica the intelligenceservicesarestill

claimingarighttosecrecy,becauseofcontinuedthreatstonationalsecurityand

becausetheyhaveaconstitutionaldutytoprotectstatesecrets,alongsidetheir

dutytocontributetostatetransparency.Strikingabalancebetweensecrecyand

transparencyisacontinuingchallengewhich,duringthefirsttenyearsofdemoc-

racy,wasnothelpedbytheexecutive’sinabilitytoformulateacomprehensiveand

viablepolicyframeworkreconcilingtheconstitutional imperativesofaccessto

informationwiththeintelligenceservices’legitimateconstitutionalrole.Thefact

thatthelegalframeworkremainsincompleteandcontradictoryisevidenceofthis

failure.

MAnAgIng InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon In the tRAnsItIon

Thelegalframeworkthathashistoricallycoveredstateinformationhasbeenprob-

lematicanddoesnotfitinthepost-1994context.From1912onwardsSouthAfrica

wassubjecttotheOfficialSecretsAct,whichwasmodelledonBritishlegislation

andprovidedforseverepenaltiesfordisclosingstatesecrets.Thiswasfollowedby

theProtectionofInformationActof1982,whichreinforcedthecultureofpenal-

tiesforthedisclosureofsecrets.Adebateaboutgovernmentalaccountabilityis

neededifabalancedapproachtoclassificationofofficialinformationistoemerge.

Issuestobeaddressedincludewhodefineswhatislegitimatelywithheldassecret

orconfidential;whatchecksandbalancesexisttoensurethatofficialsexercise

diligenceintheirmanagementofinformation;andhowmembersofthepublic

canbesufficientlyinformedandreassuredthatgovernmentisactingintheirbest

interests.

InSouthAfrica,theentrenchmentofdemocraticprinciplesinthenewpolitical

dispensationcreatedthebasisofanewcultureofaccountabilityandtransparency

intheintelligenceservices.Whilealltheoldlegislationestablishingtheapart-

heidintelligenceorganshasbeenrepealed,andnewlawsmadetoestablishand

regulatethenewintelligenceservices,thereisstillasignificantcontinuitywith

theoldorder.Intermsofthetransitionalagreements,theadministrativesystems

andregulationsoftheNISweretohavebeenusedforashortperiodoftimeand

thenrevised.Inreality,thereviewhasbeenveryslow,withtheresultthatthenew

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 151

servicesarestilloperatingunderthearcaneregulationsandsystemsinherited

fromtheoldorder.

Vestiges of the old political order, the law and administrative instruments

designed to protect classified information rest uneasily with the new consti-

tutional right of access to information. These relics include the Protection of

InformationActof1982andtheMISS,acabinetdirectivethatgivesofficialsthe

authoritytoclassifydocumentsonthegroundsofprotectingnationalsecurity,

andthusrestrictpublicaccesstotheinformationcontainedinthedocuments.The

MISSisapost-1994initiative,butisbasedonanadministrativeinstrumentinher-

itedfromtheapartheidera.

the MeRIts AnD DeMeRIts oF seCReCY

InSouthAfrica,theimplicationsoftheconstitutionalrightofaccesstoinforma-

tionhavebeenstudiedinareassuchasemployer-employeerelations,health,trade

practices,criminalinvestigations,andtradematters.Emergingfromanumberof

conceptualanalyses(Bok1978,1982;Mathews1978;Robertson1999),several

issueshelptoputthepolicyoptionsinperspective.Acentralquestioniswhether

avaluejudgmentcanbeattachedtosecrecyortransparency,andwhethereither

can be regarded as good or bad for governance, especially of the intelligence

services.Whilethisisacomplexissue,theseauthorsmakeanoverwhelmingcase

formore,ratherthanless,transparency,especiallyonthepartofpublicagencies.

Acynicalviewisthataccesstoinformationlegislationdoesnotnecessarily

facilitateopengovernment,becausetheonusisonthepublictoaskforinforma-

tionratherthanonthegovernmentdisclosingit.Suchlegislationcouldbeseen

aslittlemorethanarevisedsystemofinformationmanagement,whichcontinues

tofavourtheelites,especiallyassuchlegislationrarelyoffersaccesstovitalinfor-

mationaboutpolicy-making,andisweightedinfavouroffacilitatingaccessto

personalfiles.

Thesemisgivingsneedtobeplacedincontext.Insocietieswithnoaccessto

publicrecords,andwherethatspaceisfilledwithrepression,winningtheright

ofaccesstoinformationisamomentousvictory.OneexampleisSouthAfrica,

whereaccesstoinformationisentrenchedintheconstitutionasafundamental

right.Moreover,thelegislationdetailingtheexerciseofthisright–thePAIA–

promotesacultureoftransparencybyprovidingforthevoluntarydisclosureof

stateinformation.Theissueiswhetherpublicbodiesaredoingenoughtopro-

moteknowledgeabouttheirmandatesandfunctioning.Dotheyrelyexclusively

onadministeringtheaccesstoinformationlegislationtosatisfypubliccuriosityor

152 / chAPter eIGht

demandsforinformation?Isthereenoughpressureonpublicbodiestoproduce

anddisseminatethemanualsthatplaysuchanimportantrole?Orshouldthey

spreadknowledgeandinformationinother,perhapsmoreappropriate,forms?

Whatistrueisthataccesstoinformationlegislationalonewillnotdeliveropen,

transparent,andaccountablegovernment,andsoothergovernancemechanisms

topromoteaccountabilityshouldnotbeabandoned.

Anotherconcernishowofficialrecordsarehandledintimesoftransition,and

underconditionsofpoliticalnormality.Duringperiodsoftransition,thearchival

recordishighlycontested:onegroupseeksaccessinordertoconfirmitsfears

oftheworstexcesses,whiletheotherseekstodestroyanderadicateevidenceof

itsshamefulpast.Yet thearchivalrecordrepresentsonlyofficialdom’sversion

ofreality.Theintelligenceserviceswillonlyrecordwhatthestateperceivesasa

threattosecurity,tothelikelyexclusionofthepeople’sownperceptionsofthreats

totheirwell-beingandsecurity.Ofequalconcernisthatrecordsareoftenonly

accessibletothepublicofficialorresearcherswhoknowoftheirexistence,andare

inaccessibletothepublic.Thisispreciselywhypublicdeclarationsoftheinforma-

tionheldbythestate,andconditionsforeasyretrievalandaccesstosuchrecords,

becomesoimportant.Theargumentiscompellingforintelligencerecordstobe

availableforscrutinysothattheycanneveragainbeerasedfrommemory,asthey

wereunderapartheid,ortamperedwithinordertodistorttheaccountofhistory.

IMPLeMentAtIon oF the PAIA

AlackofstatecapacityhasseriouslyhamperedPAIA’simplementation.Infact,

itsusehaslargelybeenconfinedtoorganisedNGOs,atsomecosttothemselves.

ThepublicseemstoknowlittleabouttheAct,andthelowlevelsofliteracyinthe

countrysuggestthatitwillbesometimebeforemembersofthepublicmakefull

useofit.

Theattitudeof the intelligenceservices towards thedisclosureof informa-

tionisgenerallypositive,asshownbytheirvoluntarypublicationofinformation

throughpromotionalmaterial,websites,andresponsestopublicqueriesviathe

mediaandinparliament.However,theheadsoftheservicesarguethattheyhave

adutytoprotecttheidentitiesoftheirmembersandsourcesofinformation,and

theoperationalmethodstheyemploy,citingtheIntelligenceServicesActof2002

asjustification.AreviewoftheHeferCommissionhasshownthatthelawdoes

indeedplacesucharesponsibilityontheshouldersoftheintelligenceservices

heads,which,accordingtointernationalexperience,isnotunusual.Ithasalso

shownthat,infuture,strategiesconsistentwithallconstitutionalaspectsofthe

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 153

lawwillhavetobeevolvedtodealwithsuchscenarios.Mandateswouldhaveto

beexercisedcreativelytopreventanyunderminingoftheintelligenceservices’

mandatesoraccountabilitytothepublic.

Cabinetandministerial leadershipof the intelligenceservices,particularly

inrespectoftheir implementationofPAIA,hasbeenweakandinconsistent.A

greatercauseforconcernisthefactthatoversightbodies–theJSCI,theInspector-

General,andtheHumanRightsCommission–havealsonotplacedpressureon

theservicestoimprovetheircompliancewiththeAct.By2005SASShadnoteven

appointedaDIO,asrequiredbylaw,andboththeNIAandSASAhad,withminis-

terialconsent,appliedforexemptionfromthesection14requirementtoapprove

amanual.Theexemptionexpiredin2008,yettheseservicesdonotappeartohave

madeanyattempttoconsiderwhatinformationshouldbecontainedinamanual,

ortomakeacaseforextendingtheirexclusion.

NIAhasbeenundergreaterpressure thanSASS to respond to requests for

information.Mostoftherequestshavebeenforaccesstopersonalinformation

files,andhavebeengranted.However, the lackofadequateresources,mainly

properlytrainedpersonnel,hasresultedindelaysinrespondingtosomerequests.

ThecaseoftheTRCrecordsgoestotheheartofhowcommittedtheintelli-

genceservicesaretotransparency,andwhethertheyarepreparedtoupholdthe

ruleoflawinimplementingsecrecymeasures.Thisincidentalsodemonstrates

thattheissueofapartheiderarecordsisstillverymuchaliveandinthepublic

consciousness.Theministry’srefusaltoadmitopenlytoknowingthewhereabouts

oftherequestedrecordssoundsdisturbinglylikedissemblance.Ayearafterthe

SAHAlodgedanaccesstoinformationrequest,itappearedthattherecordshad

beenintheministryallalong.SAHAwasunhappywiththegroundsforrefusal

giveninsomecases,arguingthattheywerenotcoveredbyprovisionsinPAIA,but

weremoreinlinewiththeProtectionofInformationActof1982.Moreover,SAHA

claimedthattheministryforintelligencehadinfluencedtheDOJ’sresponsetothe

request.

TheSouthAfricanintelligenceservicescannotescapetheirconstitutionalobli-

gations,whichistoprovidethepublicwithaccesstoinformationabouttheirrole

andsomeaspectsoftheirfunctioning.Thecompellinghistoricalbasisforthisis

theroleplayedbytheintelligenceservicesattheheightoftheapartheiderain

upholdingthatsystem.Thecloakofsecrecyunderwhichthesecurityestablish-

ment functioned contributed to the assassination, harassment, and detention

withouttrialofscoresofSouthAfricans. Itwouldbe inthepublic interest for

theintelligenceservicestoengageinmaximumdisclosure.Anumberofoptions

154 / chAPter eIGht

notpreviouslyconsideredbytheservicesshouldbeconsidered.Onewouldbeto

institutionalisetheproductionoftheirpublicannualreports.

PAIAshouldbereviewedinordertoascertainwhatstaterecordsreallyneed

tobeprotectedagainstunauthorisedaccessanddisclosure.Inthisrespect,atten-

tionshouldbepaidtothevolumesofinformationalreadyinthepublicdomain,

throughresearch,theprintandelectronicanddigitalmedia;itmakesnosense

for intelligence services to attempt to classify readily available information.

Clarifyingpreciselywhat interestsareunder threatwouldhelp toaddress the

uncertaintysurroundingwhatinformationshouldbedisclosedandwhatinfor-

mationprotected.

otheR CountRIes’ exPeRIenCes

Therecordsoftheformersecurityservicesareanaspectofwhatmustbemanaged

insocietiesundergoingtransitionstodemocraticformsofgovernment.InSouth

AfricathiswasexemplifiedbytheTRC,whichuncoveredthemassdestruction

oftonsofdocumentsbytheauthoritiesinthelastyearsofapartheid.Thissug-

geststhattheapartheidsecurityforceswereactingunderexecutiveinstructionto

eradicatetracesoftheirroleintherepressionofanti-apartheidopponents.Truth

commissionprocessesinothercountriessuchasChileandGuatemalahavealso

revealedevidenceofrecordsbeingdestroyed.Insomeinstances,informationwas

obtainedthroughaccesstoathirdcountry’srecords,whichtruthcommissions

couldusetounderstandthesecurityforces’role.InGuatemala,forexample,the

truthcommissionsuccessfullypetitioned theAmericangovernment foraccess

torecordsthatwouldshedlightonitsrelationshipwiththeregimeresponsible

for the deaths and disappearances of many Guatemalans. Truth commissions

havegenerallyreinforcedtheneedforpost-transitionalauthoritiestoestablish

transparentsystemsofmanagingofficialrecords,sothattheintegrityof‘official

memory’ispreservedandmadeavailabletothepublic.

Comparing and contrasting the experiences of other countries with access

toinformationlegislationisalsouseful.Theprinciplesofaccesstoinformation

arefoundmoreorlessuniversallyindemocracies,andarebasedontheunder-

standing that citizens in particular have a right to information held by their

governments.Theprinciplesinclude:

• the need for maximum disclosure to the public of information held by the

state;

• theneedforpublicbodiestodiscloseinformationvoluntarily,ratherthanrely

onrequestsforaccess;

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 155

• alimitationongroundsforrefusingrequestsforinformation;and

• aninexpensiveandaccessiblesystemforprocessingrequests.

Groundsforrefusingaccesstoinformationwerealsoverysimilar,andincluded

thepreservationofnationalsecurity,theprotectionofprivacy,theprotectionof

tradesecretsorcommercialinformationorinformationrelatingtotheeconomic

interestsofacountry,theprotectionofinformationrelatingtocriminalinvesti-

gations,andinformationrelatingtopolicyinthemaking.Allthesegroundsfor

refusal,whichareapplicableinSouthAfrica,arecontainedintheaccesstoinfor-

mationlegislationoftheUnitedStates,CanadaandIndia,thecountriesusedfor

comparison.

Nosingle formulaforbalancingsecrecyandtransparencywasfoundwhen

contrasting the experience of transparency and access to information in post-

apartheidSouthAfricawiththatofothercountries.Notallintelligenceservices

aresubjecttoaccesstoinformationlegislation:inIndia,theintelligenceservices

areexpresslyexemptfromtheircountry’saccesstoinformationlaws.Thiscom-

pleteexemption,incidentally,alsoappliestoAustralia,despiteitsstronglyrooted

cultureofaccesstoinformation.AmericanandCanadianintelligenceservicesare

subject to freedom-of-information legislation. In South Africa the intelligence

serviceshavebeentemporarilyexemptedfromhavingtoproducemanuals,partof

theprovisionsofthePAIA.Yetothercountries,suchasCanada,producedetailed

andextensivemanuals.

The remit of access to information legislation is often extended by legal

challengesbymembersofthepublic.However,probablymoreimportantinthis

regardisthepoliticalcultureinagivensociety,andtheextenttowhichother

mechanismsofoversightareavailable.

PoLICY ReCoMMenDAtIons

Anintelligenceinformationmanagementpolicymustrelatetorealchallenges,and

attempttoreconciletheinterestsofvariousconcernedparties.Ifthemandateof

theintelligenceservicesistoidentifyandreportonpotentialthreatstothesecu-

rityoftheRepublic,thestartingpointistoassesswhichinstitutions,individuals,

andpracticesfacesecurityrisks.

Theconstitutionisthebasisfordeterminingwhatshouldbeprotected.Thebill

ofrightsisunequivocalaboutthefundamentalrightsofallthosesubjecttothe

constitution.Theseincludetherighttolife,therighttoprivacy,therighttofree-

domofexpression,therighttowork,andtherightofaccesstostateinformation.

156 / chAPter eIGht

Theseprinciplesweretakenintoaccountwhendraftingthelegislationunderthe

newconstitutionalframework.

Currently,mostoftheinformationcreatedandheldbytheintelligenceservices

isroutinelyclassifiedas‘confidential’,‘secret’or‘topsecret’.Moreover,underthe

MISS,officialsoutsidetheintelligenceservicesareallowedtoclassifyinformation

intheirpossession,andlimititsdisclosureanddistribution.Asthereisverylittle

oversightofthisprocess,informationthatmaynotrequireprotectionisbeyond

ordinarypublicscrutiny.Whatisneededisaclearandunambiguouspolicyframe-

workforsecurityclassificationbyallpublicbodies,effectivelycodifiedinthelaw.

Informulatingsuchaframework,policy-makersneedtodeterminewhetherinfor-

mationiscurrentlybeingclassifiedasamatterofhabitandconvention,orbecause

itreallyplacesthestateatriskinanyway.Thisareaneedsfurtherresearch,which

needstobecommissionedandmanaged.

Securityclassificationamountstolittlemorethanplacingastamponadocu-

ment.Itismeanttodeterofficialsfromdisclosingtheinformationinquestion.

Protection should be readily afforded to information whose disclosure could

presentseriousriskstothelivesofagentsandinformants,inpursuitofalegiti-

mate function derived from the mandate of the intelligence services. And the

necessary penalties should also be readily imposed on those who violate the

requirementsofconfidentiality.

Technologicaldevelopmentsneedtobe taken intoaccountwhenassessing

thevalueoftheintelligenceservices’classificationofrecordsatdifferentlevelsof

secrecy.Technologyhasdevelopedtosuchapointthatmostgovernmentsadmit

thatallinformationisvulnerabletounauthorisedaccessanddisclosure.Conse-

quently,governmentsarespendingverylargesumsofmoneyonsecuringtheir

informationsystems.Themyriadofsatellite,digital,andelectronictransgressions

thatarenowpossiblemeansthatgovernmentsmaynotevenrealisethattheyare

losinghighlysensitiveinformationtootherparties.Therefore,anycomprehensive

strategyforclassifyinganddeclassifyinginformationneedstotaketechnological

advancesintoaccount.

AnotherkeyissueiswhetherSouthAfricareallyneedstheProtectionofInfor-

mationAct.TheaimoftheActis‘toprovidefortheprotectionfromdisclosureof

certaininformation’.Apartfromlistingthemanypartiesunauthorisedfordisclo-

sure,theActspellsoutthescopeofsuchinformation.Bydefinition,thisincludes

‘prohibitedplaces’,suchasdefenceinstallationsusedoroccupiedbyoronbehalf

ofthegovernment;informationconcerninganymatterbeingdealtwithbythe

intelligenceservices,andanysecretofficialcodeorpasswordoranydocument,

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 157

model, article or information used, kept, made or obtained in any prohibited

place.

Someanalystsregardtheactassomethingofananomaly,giventhat itco-

existswithlegislationthatguaranteespublicaccesstoinformationheldbythe

state.TheyclaimitnotonlyconflictswiththespiritofPAIA,butisallthemore

odiousbecauseitoriginatesfromtheapartheiddays.Itsrationalewastoprevent

accesstoinformationby‘hostileorganisations’,definedasorganisationsdeclared

byorunderanyactofparliamenttobeunlawful,oranyassociation,movementof

persons,orinstitutiondeclaredasahostileorganisationthroughapromulgation

ofthepresident.

Despite thesesentiments, there isperhapsamorerealisticapproach.Most

wouldagreethateverystateneedsalegalframeworkprovidingforandregulat-

ingadegreeofnecessarysecrecy.Lawsregulatingofficialsecrecyexistinmany

democracies.PAIAdoesnotprotectinformation,orimposepenaltiesonthosewho

failtoprotectit,andtheMISShasbeencriticisedfornothavinganystatutory

force.Therefore,withoutanticipatingtheoutcomeofapublicdebateonwhat

stateinformationneedstobeprotected,anumberofprinciplescanbeconsid-

eredtoresolvethequestionofwhetherlegislationshouldexisttoprotectcertain

information.

First, thedebateshouldnotbeconfinedtothesecurityservicesbutshould

bewide-ranginginscopeandsponsorship,andtakeintoaccounttheconcerns

andfullrangeofpolicyactorsonwhomthedebatewillimpact,includingnon-

governmentorganisations,oversightbodies,andtheexecutive.

Next, in keeping with the spirit of the constitution, the framework for the

debateshouldbetheconstitutionalprinciplesofaccesstoinformation,andthe

reasonablelimitationofthisright.And,givenSouthAfrica’shistory,theprotection

ofstatutoryinformationshouldprohibitthestatefromabusing,manipulating,

and destroying information for its own ends. In other words, in terms of this

newparadigm,notonlyindividualsandorganisationsbutalsothestatecouldbe

deemedguiltyofviolatingtheirdutytoprotecttheinformationforwhichtheyare

responsible.

Lastly,espionageshouldbeclearlydefinedasaseparateoffence,onecommit-

tedbystateswithintentionshostiletoSouthAfrica’sinterests.However,theactual

contentofthecrimeofespionageshouldbereconsideredwithintheparadigmof

sharinginformation.

158 / chAPter eIGht

PRInCIPLes FoR MAnAgIng InteLLIgenCe InFoRMAtIon

Thesecurity forces,particularly the intelligencecommunity,currentlyclassify

virtuallyallinformationtheyproduceaseitherTopSecret,Secret,Confidential,

orRestricted.Ifthesecurityservicesweretoadoptamoreproactiveapproachto

declassifyinginformation,therewouldbelessantagonismbetweenapublicseek-

ingaccesstoinformationandthosewhoconsidertheinformationtoosecretto

share,believingthattheyareactingintheinterestsofnationalsecurity.

A well-regulated classification and declassification system would have two

purposes.Thefirstwouldbetohaveauniformsystemforevaluating,categoris-

ing,andsafeguardingofficialinformationwhoseunauthoriseddisclosurecould

threaten the country’s security. The second would be to routinely review the

originalcriteriaforwithholdinginformationfromthepublicwiththeintention

ofmakingsuchinformationpubliclyavailableonceitsdisclosureposesnofurther

threattothecountry’ssecurity.

PAIA’sexemptionsinfactprovideforgovernmentsecrecy.However,thereare

coststothissecrecy,includingthatofphysicallyprotectingsecrets,thedanger

of losing public confidence through non-disclosure, and the input and debate

limitations.Furthermore,secretsarevulnerabletoleakswhichcanhaveuntold

consequences. So the implementation and usage of these sorts of provisions

shouldnotbetakenlightly.

Severalconceptscanprobablybeincorporatedintoaclassificationanddeclas-

sificationpolicyframework.Thegovernmentshouldprovideastatutorybasisfor

thesecrecysystem,withclearstandardsofwhatistobeclassified,bywhom,and

in termsofwhichprocedures.Anynew legal framework forclassificationand

declassificationshouldbealigned toPAIA. As PAIA is concerned with disclos-

ingratherthanprotectinginformation,groundsexistforadditionallegislation

toprotectandclassifyinformation.Theauthoritytoclassifyinformationshould

belinkedtothedegreeofclassificationrequired.Forexample,onlydesignated

office-bearerssuchasthepresident,ministers,andheadsofdepartmentshouldbe

entitledtoclassifyinformationas‘topsecret’;lowerlevelofficialsshouldonlyhave

suchauthorityifitisspecificallydelegatedtothem.

Legislationfortheclassificationanddeclassificationofrecordsshouldincor-

poratetheconceptofalife-cycleofsecrets,becauseovertimethesensitivityof

information and the resources needed for its physical protection may dimin-

ish.Moreover,classificationshouldnotbeusedtoconcealviolationsofthelaw,

inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent the embarrassment of a person,

organisationoragency;withholdbasicscientificresearchinformationnotclearly

related to national security; or conceal previously declassified information.

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 159

Lastly,uniformnationalstandardsfordeclassificationshouldbeformulated,and

theirimplementationmonitoredbyanappropriateoversightbody.

towARDs A PoLICY FRAMewoRk FoR MAnAgIng the ReCoRDs oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Whathasemergedfromthisstudyisthatapolicyframeworkisneededforthe

protectionofcertainkindsofformation,whileensuringthatinformationabout

the security services is routinely provided to ensure greater transparency and

accountability,andpromoteinformeddebateabouttheirperformanceandrole.

Itshouldcontainappropriatestandardsforclassifyinganddeclassifyingintelli-

gencerecords.Themaincategories,andtheargumentsthatshouldbeconsidered

informulatingthem,arediscussedbelow.

ReCoRDs ConCeRnIng the DAY-to-DAY oPeRAtIons AnD MAnDAtes oF the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Therecordsoftheintelligenceservicesarepublicrecords,andassucharesubject

toPAIA.AsPAIAexpressesaconstitutionalprescription,theexclusionoftheintel-

ligenceservicesfromtheActoranyofitsprovisionsshouldnotbeencouraged.

Instead,theservicesshouldbeginbyconsideringwhytheirrecordsneedto

beprotected,startingwithrecordsabouttheirday-to-dayfunctioning.Theintel-

ligenceservicesauthorandgathersignificantrecordsinthecourseofgathering

domesticandforeignintelligence,andfulfillingtheircounter-intelligencerespon-

sibilities. The director-general of SASS, Hilton Dennis, suggests that a useful

distinctioncanbemadebetweencorporateinformationandintelligenceinforma-

tion(interview,25.07.2005).

Corporateinformationwouldincludeinformationabouttheadministration

of the services, including their legal mandate and mission, human resources

management, policies and procedures, finance, assets, and transactions with

corporateandservicesstructures.Regulationsissuedbytheministeranddirec-

tivesissuedbythedirector-generalcouldalsobeincluded.Theserviceswould

havetomotivatewhyanyofthis informationrequiresprotection,anddemon-

stratehowreleasingitwouldharmthecountry.Asfaraspossible,thegroundsfor

keepingrecordssecretshouldbealignedtothosecontainedinPAIA.

In order to avoid inconsistencies when dealing with requests for informa-

tion, the intelligence services should consider institutionalising public annual

reports,whichwouldincludeminimumcorporateinformation.Atthesametime,

160 / chAPter eIGht

theintelligenceservicesshouldseeklegalopiniononwhethertheinformation

theywish toprotectcanbeaccommodatedwithin theprovisionsof thePAIA.

PAIA also requires voluntary disclosure, and the services would comply with

thisbyreleasinginformationintheirpublicannualreports.Suchreportswould

contributetoabroaderunderstandingofhowtheintelligenceservicesfunction,

andhelptodemystifyasubjectlittleunderstoodbymostpeople.Thechallengein

acountrysuchasSouthAfricaistoreachthemassofpeople,which,givenhigh

povertyandilliteracylevels,wouldrequirecreativegrass-rootsstrategiessuchas

usingtheradioandvisitinglocalcommunities.

Thesecondcategoryofinformationisintelligenceinformation,whichcanbe

brokendownfurtherintooperationalinformationandintelligencereports.The

IntelligenceServicesActrequiresthedirectors-generaloftheintelligenceserv-

icesandtheheadofSANAItotakeallnecessarystepstoprotecttheidentitiesof

membersoftheservices,themethodsofintelligencegathering,andintelligence

sources. Therefore, releasing all known or available categories of information

couldobviouslyberisky.

Iftheintelligenceservicesfeelstronglythatcertaincategoriesofinformation

needtobeprotected,oneoptionwouldbetolobbyforamendmentstoPAIAso

that categories contained in the Intelligence Services Act, such as methods of

intelligencecollection,theidentitiesofinformers,andotheroperationaldetails

couldbeincorporatedasgroundsforrefusal.However,theintelligenceservices

wouldhavetoaccepttherightofotherinterestedparties,includingfreedomof

informationadvocacygroups,toarguefororagainstanylegislativechanges.

IthasbeensuggestedthatSouthAfricashouldhavealawthatexplicitlycrimi-

nalisesespionage(interviewwithHiltonDennis,25.07.05).Whilethiswaspartly

theintentionoftheProtectionofInformationAct, itsprovisionsareextremely

broad, place onerous restrictions on members of the civil service and society,

andcriminalisethereleaseofvastcategoriesofrecords,evenwhennoharmwas

intendedorhasresulted.Manygovernmentstheworldoveraremovingtowards

greater sharing of information. A South African espionage law would have to

considercarefullywhatstate informationwouldbeconsideredharmful to the

country’sinterestsifdisclosedtooraccessedbyaforeigngovernment,andhow

suchactivitywouldbeframedincriminallaw.Itwouldhavetotakeintoaccount

thelawsthatarethebasisofco-operationbetweenmanycountriesandalready

dealwithspecificcrimessuchasforeignmilitaryassistance,moneylaundering,

andcorruption.

Themoreopenandaccountablegovernmentsaretotheirownpeople,theless

theyhavetohidefromothergovernments.Asthereisnocitizenshiprestrictionon

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 161

whocanaccessinformationviaPAIA,determinedgovernmentswantingtoaccess

certain information can easily do so. However, PAIA already exempts certain

categoriesofinformation,includingcabinetrecords,andrecordsofmembersof

parliamentandprovinciallegislatures.Therefore,ifagentsofaforeigngovern-

mentaccessthoserecords,thiswouldwellconstituteacrimeofespionage.

CLAssIFIeD ReCoRDs ConCeRnIng the ReLAtIonshIP Between the seRVICes AnD theIR MeMBeRs

OneofPAIA’saimsistogiveindividualstheopportunitytoaccessstaterecords

aboutthemselves,inordertocorrectthoserecords.Likeallemployers,security

servicesarerequiredtokeeppersonalrecordsaboutindividuals,andnormally

shouldnothaveanyreasontowithholdsuchinformationfromanindividual.

Problemsarisewhenanemployeewho is indisputewith theserviceseeks

informationtouseinaninternalprocedureorinlitigation.Albeitinadifferent

context,theSouthwoodjudgment(TPO161)underlinedtheneedforpublicbod-

iestofollowfairandproperadministrativeprocedures,andfoundthatclassifying

arecordasconfidentialdoesnotconstitutegroundsforwithholdingit.Theservice

concernedwouldhavetodemonstratethatthedocumenthasbeenconsidered

withseveranceinmind,evenifitcontainsthirdpartyinformationsuchasacol-

league’stestimonyaboutthemember.Thepresumptionisinfavourofdisclosure,

andeverythingshouldbedonetomakeitpossibletoreleasethedocument in

question.

Themostchallengingsubcategory inthisscenariorelates tosecurityclear-

anceinvestigations.TheNationalStrategicIntelligenceActof1994requiresthe

directors-generalofthesecurityservicestoprovidesecurityscreeningprocedures

forindividualswhohandleclassifiedinformation.Recordsgeneratedinthecourse

ofasecurityscreeningcouldberegardedasoperational,astheirdisclosurecould

harmtheprocedure.However,thecourtwouldprobablyconsiderthetimingof

therequest,theadministrativefairnessofthescreeningprocedure,andwhether

severingpartsoftherecordhadbeenconsidered.Insuchasituation,withSouth

Africa’sstrongrights-basedculture,thecourtsarelikelytoconsiderotherrights,

includingtherighttoworkandtherighttodignity.

Atthesametime,therighttoprivacycontainedintheconstitution,andthe

impendingintroductionofprivacylegislation,islikelytohaveanimpactonhow

theintelligenceservicesrespondtorequestsforaccesstotheirfilesbythesubjects

ofsecurityclearances.Thisshouldencouragegreaterprofessionalism,care,and

objectivityinhandlingthevettingprocess.

162 / chAPter eIGht

CLAssIFIeD APARtheID-eRA ReCoRDs

Anotherscenariorequiringpolicyisrequestsforaccesstoapartheid-erarecords,

suchas theTRCfiles.Apartheid-erastaterecordsare likely toremainanarea

of interest and contestation. Several submissions to the CDRC established by

Minister Sisulu suggested that these records should be urgently audited and

placedinthecustodyoftheNationalArchivist.Themainconcernispreserving

theintegrityoftherecords,especiallyinlightofthemassivedestructionofrecords

duringthefinalyearsofapartheid.Theproposedauditwouldconsiderreasonsfor

keepingtherecordsoutofthepubliceye.Theprocesswouldrequireconsiderable

resourcesandshouldincludenotonlymembersofthesecurityandintelligence

services,butalsoothersocialstakeholderssuchasparliament,non-government

organisations,andthejudiciary.TheIRCprocess,whichwasconfinedtomem-

bersofthesecurityestablishment,wasdeficientintworespects:quality,probably

becauseoftheteam’slimitedexperience;andthecredibilityofitsfindings,which

werenotmadepublic.

Thereismeritinputtingtheghostsofapartheidtorest.Considerablepublic

uneaseiscreatedbyclaimsofallegedapartheidgovernmentspiesthatsurface

fromtimetotime.Anagreedframeworkfordealingwiththesecretsoftheapart-

heideraisfarpreferabletocontinualandslowleaksaboutthepast.Moreover,

disclosureaboutthemethods,andeventheobjectives,successesandfailuresof

intelligenceoperationsduringtheapartheideracouldcomfortthosewhobelieve

that the truthhasbeensuppressed.This is not to suggest that the TRC be re-

opened,butthataresponsiblewayisfoundtoreleasetheinformationintothe

publicdomain.Theexamplesof theformerEastEuropeanstates inmanaging

accesstotherecordsofformersecurityservicesprovideusefulandvariedlessons

inhowtoapproachthissensitiveissue.

Atpresent,PAIAisusedbyapplicantswantingtoperuseapartheidfiles,most

commonlyaboutthemselves.Thestateofficial(inthiscasetheNationalArchivist)

whoconsiderssuchrequestsisinapowerfulposition,andmustdecidewhether

ornotthefileinquestioncontainsinformationthatmustbesevered.Yetthese

recordsrelateonlytoindividualsandnottothepolicydecisionsanddirections

frompoliticalleaders,whowerethearchitectsofthesystem.Governmentshould

look at a mass declassification of all such remaining records, and provide the

resourcestoensureacredibleprocess.

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 163

CLAssIFIeD ReCoRDs ABout the tRAnsItIon

ThetransitiontodemocracymarkedasignificantpointinSouthAfrica’spoliti-

calhistory.Therecanbelittlejustificationforwithholdinginformationaboutthis

periodfromthepublic,includingrecordsofthesubcouncilonintelligenceand

itssubcommitteesestablishedundertheTEC.Thesestructureswereinvolvedin

definingtheprinciplesandgroundrulesforintelligenceservicesoperationsand,

atthesametime,tryingtosteertheexistingservicestowardsamalgamationunder

afuture,democraticallyelectedgovernment.TheSouthAfricantransitionisheld

upasamodelforthetransformationofintelligenceservices.Itisnotclearwhere

theserecordsarebeingkeptandwhethertheirintegrityhasbeenretained,despite

theirenduringarchivalandhistoricalvalue.Thebulkdeclassificationandrelease

ofdocumentsfromthatperiodwoulddefinitelyresultinadeeperunderstanding

ofthatprocess.Determiningwhetheranydocumentationshouldnotbereleased

wouldbedonebyapplying thePAIAcriteria;but,byand large, thoserecords

shouldbedeclassified.Theintelligenceservicesshoulduseandencouragehisto-

rianstowritethehistoryoftheirestablishment,usingthisrepositoryofrecords.

ReCoRDs oF oVeRsIght AuthoRItIes InVestIgAtIng the InteLLIgenCe seRVICes

Anumberofoversightinstitutionscanatanyonetimeberequiredtoinvestigate

amatterconcerningtheintelligenceservices,andconsequentlyaccessclassified

information.TheseincludetheInspector-Generalforintelligence,theJSCI,the

HumanRightsCommission,andthePublicProtector.

Whendecidingonthemostappropriateandeffectiveinvestigatingstructure,a

dualapproachshouldbeconsideredwhichwouldlinkaninstrumentwithaccess

tointelligenceinformationtoapublicinvestigativeprocess.Thisrecommenda-

tionemergedfromtheworkoftheHeferCommissioncommissionedbySisulu

(Levy2004).Forexample,acommissionofinquiryortheHumanRightsCom-

missioncouldinvolvetheInspector-Generalforintelligence,whohasfullaccess

totheintelligenceservices(whichtheydonot).Thiswouldalsoinspirepublic

confidenceintheoutcomeoftheinquiry.

the stoRAge oF InteLLIgenCe ReCoRDs

Therecordsoftheintelligenceservicesarepublicrecords,andthereforehaveto

bemanagedintermsoftheNationalArchivesAct.In1999theNIAenteredinto

anagreementwiththeNationalArchivesrelatingtotheimplementationofthe

164 / chAPter eIGht

Act.Amongotherthings,thepartiesagreedonpreviouslyunclearaspectsofthe

requirementthatrecordsbetransferredtothecustodyoftheNationalArchives

forpreservationandcustodianship.GiventhattheNIA’srecordsrequiredspecial

management, the parties agreed that the NIA could retain the records on its

premises,butinstrictaccordancewitharchivalstandardsofsafekeepingandclas-

sification.TheNationalArchiveswouldtrainNIAstaff.Asaresult,theNIAisin

compliancewiththeNationalArchivesAct,anditsfilingofrecordshasimproved

overtheyears(interviewwithPeterRicher,09.09.2008).

Twofactorshaveacceleratedthedrivetowardsbetterandmoreefficientman-

agementofrecords.ThefirstistheneedtocomplywithPAIA;theNIAnowneeds

anorderlyhouseifitistorespondtorequestsforinformationinatimelymanner.

Theotherhasbeentheneedtoprotectitsinformation.Aseriesofdetrimental

leakshaspointedtothevulnerabilityoftheorganisation,andpromptedmanage-

menttointroducemeasuresandsystemsthatstreamlinedtheflowofinformation

andmadeiteasiertomonitorwhohadaccesstorecords.Theuseofaneffective

documentmanagementsystemhasalsomadeiteasiertomonitorwhoauthor-

isesdecisions.Thesesystemsarebothofarchivalvalue,andimproveinformation

security. Inaddition,over thepastdecade theNIAandSASShave introduced

disasterrecoveryplanstoavertthepermanentlossofdata.Thesedevelopments

areverypositive,andanypolicyheadshouldensurethatsuchstandardsofinfor-

mationmanagementareadheredtobytheentireintelligencecommunity.Without

properrecordsmanagement,therecanbenomeaningfulaccesstoinformation.

ConCLuDIng ReMARks

Whatshouldbesecret,andwhy?Whatshouldthepublicknow,andwhy?Under

whatconditionsshoulditbeacrimetohide,destroy,ordistortinformation,and

whatshouldbethepenalties?Whatshouldthepenaltybeforreleasinginforma-

tionwithoutauthority?Whoshouldclassifyanddeclassifyinformation?Whatis

‘TopSecret’intoday’sworld?Andwhendoesasecretexpire?Thesearesomeof

thequestionsthathavepromptedthisstudyandwhichhopefullyhavebeenat

leastpartiallyanswered.

Butwhowillguardtheguardians?Thepost-apartheidintelligenceservices

have not uniformly resisted the promotion of access to information. In some

instances,withouthavingtobepushed,theyhavetakenlaudableinitiativesto

makethemselvesknowntothepublic.

Together with the HRC, parliament has a special duty to ensure that the

intelligenceservicesareastransparentandaccountableaspossible.Infact,itis

conclusIon AnD PolIcy recommenDAtIons / 165

ultimatelythedutyofparliamenttoconsiderthelegalframeworkfortransparency.

Overandabovethis,theinstitutionswhoaremeanttooverseeandinvestigatethe

intelligenceserviceswhererequired–theInspector-GeneralandAuditor-General

–mustdosovigorously.Butthereisaworryingfactorthatmaylimitparliamentin

playingthisroleinarobustway.ExceptfortheHRC,thestructureswithoversight

oftheintelligencecommunityalloperatewithintheintelligenceservices’circle

ofsecrecy,andacceptwhatevertheintelligenceservicesconsidersasclassified.

Theseoversightauthoritiesneedtostartquestioningwhycertaininformationhas

beendesignatedsecret,atleastintheformativestagesofdefining(orredefining)

atransparencyandsecrecypolicy.

Strongleadershipandpolicydirectionwillbeneeded.Somemembersofthe

intelligenceservicesmayfeelthreatenedbyaparadigmthatdoesnotregardthem

asbeingthedeterminingforcebehindapolicyreview,butratherasservantsofits

outcome.Suchareactionwouldbeunderstandable;theintelligenceserviceshave

longbeeninthepaternalisticpositionofdecidingwhoshouldknowwhat.How-

ever,parliamentshouldensurethattheservicesclearlyunderstandthebroader

issues involved, including thehistoricalandconstitutional imperatives;create

appropriatepolicyframeworksfortheservices;andreviewtheirmandates.

ParliamentmusttakestockofthefailingsofPAIAaswellasotherrelevant

legislation.Lastly,theministerofintelligenceservicesmustensurethatadequate

resourcesareavailable tomakevoluntarydisclosurea reality,andparliament

mustkeepwatchoverhowthisdutyisperformed.

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Dominy,Graham(Dr),NationalArchivist,DepartmentofArts,Culture,Scienceand

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Harris,Verne(Mr),Director,SouthAfricanHistoryArchive,1September2003.

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Well-kept SecretS

South Africa’s democratic constitution entrenches citizens’ right of access to information held by the state. In this volume, the author – who previously held a senior position in the intelligence community – assesses whether the post-apartheid intelligence services have complied with this obligation during the first decade following South Africa’s transition to democracy.

She raises key normative questions such as whether relevant policy-makers and the intelligence services have pursued appropriate and meaningful levels of transparency; and whether there has been a decisive break with the culture of secrecy that characterised the apartheid intelligence apparatus. Drawing on international theory and comparative experience, she spells out a path towards clearer policy and practice on these vital issues.

It is hoped this book will help role players in the intelligence dispensation to gain greater clarity about the boundaries between transparency and secrecy – and, equally crucially, equip citizens to better defend their hard-won constitutional freedoms.

9 7 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 6 2 2 1

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