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Nevena Trajkov Wayne State University 25 April 2009

2009 Trajkov Social Capital

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Page 1: 2009 Trajkov Social Capital

Nevena Trajkov

Wayne State University

25 April 2009

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Questions

Hypothesis

Overview of Theories• Path Dependence, Social Capital, Civil

Society

Theories Applied to Croatia

Concluding Thoughts 2

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What are they?

What is their relationship?

Problem: “Fuzzy Logic”• Lack of explicit distinctions between them

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How can Croatia aid in the understanding of path dependence, social capital and civil society?

Bonus Question

• What will this reveal about Croatia itself?

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H1: Path dependence, social capital and civil society can exhibit circular and confusing properties with one another

H2: Path dependence and social capital, according to their accepted definitions, have the potential to be detrimental to Croatia

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Increasing Return – The “Groove” (Pierson)• Positive reinforcement• Negative Externalities

Technology: QWERTY board (Page)

Institutions “Lock-In” (North)• High start up costs, difficult to learn new

techniques, risk in changing methods of coordination

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Obligations, expectations, trustworthiness (norm) (reciprocity) (trust)

A does something for B (obligation/norm) and expects B to reciprocate.

Each repetition (reciprocation) builds TRUST. - Jewish Diamond Merchants of Brooklyn, New York

Deviation = social and financial costs

Question: Are these not Pierson’s increasing returns and negative externalities?

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“Helps Explain WHY people act the way they do AND how that translates into the bigger” structural picture by exposing limitations.

PEOPLE ARE RATIONAL ACTORS

Trust is key: “without trust, institutions could not exist” as they will experience a loss in membership

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Attempt to fuse social capital and institutions

Making Democracy Work (1993)

Social capital: networks, norms and trust

Civil society: citizen involvement in political and non-political groups

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Social capital + civil society less corrupt, more efficient government

• Social capital increases as more people work together

• Civil society necessary to build up social capital

• Again, similarities to Pierson’s increasing returns

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Social capital is path dependent because of history

Society’s history leaves a lasting impression Does not mention “investment”; duration

Constant battle between tradition (increasing returns) and modernization (negative externalities, technology)

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Economic security : high priority for free choice and motivates political action (civil society)

Economic development: reflects changes in people’s beliefs andmotivations modernization break in the

“groove”

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Definition: London School of Economics“arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state and civil society, family and market are often complex blurred and negotiated”

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BUT again, the idea is of increasing returns.

Collective action – pursuit of goals by more than one person

Shared interests

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Increasing Return- Trust, Norms, Obligations, Expectations

- Tradition

Negative Externalities- Cost of change, technological advances

- Modernization

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Putnam, Inglehart

Putnam: social capital is networks, norms and trust (increasing returns, tradition) and helps build democracies and institutions

Inglehart: tradition does not promote democratization, but rather modernization

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Problems of conceptual stretching?

Extension v/ Intension• Possibility of path dependence, social

capital and civil society to exist in the same family?

• Need clear distinctions, more explicit definitions

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What can Croatia tell us?

Is Croatia in its own “groove”?

Is this “groove” good or bad for the state?

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World Bank: Governance Improving

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Since government effectiveness is improving, according to the theories, so should score on civil society to indicate modernization/democratization

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Results do not support Putnam nor Inglehart/Welzel: civil society remained virtually unchanged while government effectiveness improved

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Social Capital and thus civil society is down in Croatia

Three testing variables:• General trust, civic participation, trust in

institutions

• First tests on civic participation and trust in institutions

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Major decrease in trust of institutionsŠtulhofter: trust indicates perceived corruption

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Trust (norms, increasing returns) indicates corruption, NOT government effectiveness

Challenges all presented authors, especially Putnam: who hold that social capital and civil society more effective government• Reality, it makes little difference

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Religiosity• 90% of Croats trust the Roman Catholic

Church more than anything (Bezovan)

• Only consistent indicator of civil society (5.03***)

• Tradition, non-modernization, increasing returns does not equal democratization, new things, negative externalities.

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Croatia showed problems with the logic of path dependence, social capital and civil society• - more explicit definitions are needed

•Social capital and path dependence is not always good! Can be too traditional and delay modernization/democratization “groove”, lock- in; e.g. Uzelac and judicial reform

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Civil Society does not indicate an effective government as Putnam would have it. • Instead, it indicates corruption, therefore

•Civil society cannot change government until it exposes it and through democratic processes, it can legitimize governments.

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