The Arab Spring: Much Violence, Little Democracy

Democracy and Economic Development

ERF 21st Annual Conference

Gammarth, TunisiaMarch 20-22, 2015

The Arab Spring: Much Violence,

Little Democracy

Ibrahim Elbadawi

Dubai Economic Council and ERF



Gammarth, Tunisia, March 20-22, 2015

Motivation

Three Fundamental Questions

Is Democracy important for Development,

especially in oil-dependent MENA?

If so, why has the “Arab Spring” been such a

“late awakening”?

And, why has it been so violent?

Two cross-cutting themes

Resource-dependency

Social polarization


√ Is Democracy important for

Development?

(oil-dependent MENA)

Is Democracy Important for Development:

The Received literature

The received literature (e.g. Barro, 1996; Rodrik,

1997; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005 …etc. ) suggests

that Democracies:

Yield long-run growth rates that are more

predictable

Produce greater stability in economic performance

Handle adverse shocks much better

Pay higher wages

Generate more investment in human capital –

health and education

Produce more equitable societies


Managing Natural Resources

The received (second generation) Growth Literature

on Oil and other point-source Minerals (Collier and

Goderis, 2007) The curse is real but conditional on bad political governance

It is a long-term phenomenon

Economic factors: channels rather than true causes

More recent (third generation: Elbadawi and Soto,

2012) Account for country heterogeneity and cross-dependency

Unpack political institutions: inclusiveness & credibility

Generate country-specific rents effects and institutional mitigation

potential

Endogenously derive the country resource-management trajectory

Managing Natural Resources: Benchmark

Results (Elbadawi and Soto, 2012)

Table 1 Econometric Results: Long-Run Growth Determinants

Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Resource Rents (as % of GDP)

- -0.049* (0.030)

-0.032 (0.031)

-0.029 (0.031)

-0.033 (0.031)

Checks and Balances (polity index)

- - 0.028*** (0.008)

- 0.025*** (0.008)

Democracy (index)

- - - 0.275** (0.088)

0.181* (0.094)

Constant 0.108*** (0.041)

0.126*** (0.041)

0.129*** (0.042)

0.192*** (0.044)

0.252*** (0.046)

Note: Number of countries=90, number of observations=2745, maximum number of instruments=605, time and country fixed effects included.

Managing Natural Resources: Heterogeneity

and Sub-groups (Elbadawi & Soto)

Managing Natural Resources: Typology of

NR Management Experiences (Elbadawi & Soto)Political

Regimes

High

Inclusiveness

(political

democracy)

Low

Inclusiveness

(political

democracy)

High commitment

(checks and

balances)

Use resource rents to

diversify and grow

(Australia, New Zealand)

May avoid curse and

use rents to grow but

political transition

remains a challenge(China, SGP, HKG,

MYS)

Low commitment

(checks and

balances)

May Experience curse(Greece, Latin American

countries)

Experience curse(Populous Arab oil,

Resource-dependent

SSA)


Managing Social Fractionalization

Non-factional inclusive democracy is better in

managing social fractionalization

Programmatic authoritarian regimes are not likely to

survive in socially fractionalized societies:

The insight from “Can Africa Claim the 21st Century” Report:

Uganda vs Tanzania

The Baath Parties: Syria, Iraq

Likely to be captured by sub-national interests

Like SSA, most Arab societies are highly

fractionalized (Figures)

The Asian development model is not likely to be

transferrable to the Arab world or SSA

Social Fractionalization in the Arab world

(Elbadawi, 2004)

Figure 3: Dominant Social Fractionalization by Country

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

Ye

me

n

Tu

nis

ia

Lib

ya

Sa

ud

i

Eg

yp

t

Om

an

UA

E

Qa

tar

Alg

eri

a

Wo

rld

Ku

wa

it

Moro

cco

Ira

q

Sy

ria

Ba

hra

in

Jord

an

Mau

rita

nia

Su

da

n

Leb

ano

n

Djibo

uti

So

ma

lia

So

cia

l F

rac

tion

aliza

tion

Ethnicity Language Religion

Social Polarization in the Arab world

(Elbadawi, 2004)

Figure 4: Dominant Social Polarization by Country

0

0.1

0.20.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.70.8

0.9

1

Ye

me

n

Tun

isia

Lib

ya

Sa

ud

i

Ara

bia

Eg

yp

t

Om

an

UA

E

Leb

ano

n

So

ma

lia

Qa

tar

Syri

a

Worl

d

Alg

eri

a

Su

da

n

Djib

outi

Ba

hra

in

Jo

rdan

Iraq

Ma

urita

nia

Mo

rocco

Ku

wait

So

cia

l P

ola

riza

tio

n

Ethnicity Language Religion


Lessons for the Arab Spring

Lesson 1: “…For every Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, there are

many like Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo” (Dani Rodrik, 2010)

Lesson 2: Arab spring should not only bring democracy, as

badly needed as it is in this region, but should also lay the

foundations for strong systems of political checks and balances

Lesson 3: Programmatic benevolent authoritarianism has been,

and will likely be, an exception to the rule in the socially

fractionalized Arab world; hence democracy is central to the

survival of the nation state in this region, but factional, winner

take all, democracy is not the answer


√ Why has the “Arab Spring”

been such a “late awakening”?

Why has the “Arab Spring” been such a “late

awakening”?

The Arab Spring is a late “awakening”

High persistence of autocracy in the Arab

world (Figure)

Accumulated effect of lack of “sustainable

democratic transitions” (Figure)

Modelling “sustainable democratic transitions”

Deconstructing democratic transition in the

Arab world (Elbadawi, Makdisi and others)

Key factors: oil rents and conflicts, but also

idiosyncretic country-specific determinants

Table 1: Democracy across the Developing World {-10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (full-fledged democracy)}

(Elbadawi& Makdisi, 2013)

1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-80 1981-84 1985-90 1991-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09

Arab -7 -7 -8.35 -8.4 -8.2 -8 -7.4 -7 -6.7 -4

Sub-Saharan Africa -6 -6.6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -5.4 -1.5 0 2.5

Latin America -1.7 -2.6 -6 -6 -4 3 6 7 8 8

Southern Central Asia -9.4 -8 -8 -7.4 -6 -5.7 -3 -3.8 -5.2 -2.25

East Asia -6 -6.4 -4.8 -7 -7 -2 2.5 1.4 4.125 2.25

Figure 2: Frequency of Democratic

Transitions in Developing Regions:1960-09(Elbadawi& Makdisi, 2013)

79

52

41

13

7

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia Southern Central Asia Arab

Modeling Democratic Transitions (an extended

Przeworski- Ross Model): cannot reject the

following selected set of hypotheses

H1: Controlling for initial income, growth and democratic legacy,

natural resource rents hinders democratic transition

H2: However, the resource rents impact on democratic

transition is subject to threshold effects (i.e. below a certain

threshold, resource rents have no impact)

H3: Wars impede democratic transitions (Table)

H4: high unemployment, beyond a certain threshold (U>10),

promotes democratic transitions

H5: However, employment does not fully account for the

authoritarian bargain in highly resource endowed societies:

Unlike lower levels, high resource rents remain negative and highly

significant, despite controlling unemployment

The authoritarian bargain still holds, possibly through other means

of social transfers

Table 2: Average Number of Wars Arab world second only to SSA

1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 Average

Arab

Homewar 4.5 5.5 5.5 5 5.1

Neighbor war 6.5 10 9 10.5 9.0

Sub-Saharan Africa

Homewar 2 6.5 8 9 6.4

Neighbor war 10.5 18 22.5 22 18.3

Latin America

Homewar 2.5 3 5.5 4 3.8

Neighbor war 5 7 14 12 9.5

Southern Central Asia

Homewar 1.5 2 3 3 2.4

Neighbor war 2.5 2.5 3 4 3.0

East Asia

Homewar 2 3 5 3.5 3.4

Neighbor war 2 5.5 6.5 6.5 5.1

Hypotheses (cond :).

Democratic Neighborhood

H6: Neighborhood democracy promotes democratic

transitions

H7: Moreover, resource rent is not a constraint to

democratic transition in democratic neighborhood

H8: Neighborhood wars impede democratic

transitions

Implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Other inter-state conflicts- Gulf wars

Potential ramifications of the Arab Spring

H9: Moreover, resource rents remain impediment to

democratic transition in war-affected neighborhoods

Figure 6: Neighborhood Democracy (Average level of Democracy in the immediate Neighbors)

-7 -7

2.95

-8.1

-3.5

0.33

2

8

-6.5

3.08

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

Arab Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Southern CentralAsia

East Asia

1960-64

2005-09


√ Why has the “Arab Spring”

been so violent?

Why has the “Arab Spring” been so violent: Peoples

Power and Autocracy (Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica

Frantz, April 9, 2014: The Washington Post)_

Since the turn of the 2000 decade autocrats are now ousted more by popular

uprisings than by coups

However, they are learning and mounting counter-revolutions through “induced

violence (El-Affendi, 2013)

Why has the “Arab Spring” been so violent:

assessing the magnitude

Political violence has been specially intensive

during and after the onset of the Arab Spring

300,000 casualties in Syria alone

More than 10 million refugees and internally

displaced Syrians

Economy: $202 b lost to the war

(http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/alienation_a

nd_violence_impact_of_the_syria_crisis_in_2014_e

ng.pdf)

Much Violence, Little Democracy

-9

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Med

ian

Po

lity

Batt

le-R

ela

ted

Death

s (

per

millio

n p

op

ula

tio

n)

Arab Casualties Non-Arab Casualties Median Arab Polity

Gulf War

Sudan and Iraq

Civil War

Invasion

of Iraq

Arab

Spring

Source: WDI (World Bank) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala University Version 5.0)

Civilian Victims by Country (Monthly data)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1/1

1

3/1

1

5/1

1

7/1

1

9/1

1

11

/11

1/1

2

3/1

2

5/1

2

7/1

2

9/1

2

11

/12

1/1

3

3/1

3

5/1

3

7/1

3

9/1

3

11

/13

1/1

4

3/1

4

5/1

4

7/1

4

9/1

4

11

/14

1/1

5

Inte

rnal

Co

nfl

ict

Civ

ilia

n D

eath

s Libya

Sudan

Egypt

Tunisia

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

1/1

1

3/1

1

5/1

1

7/1

1

9/1

1

11

/11

1/1

2

3/1

2

5/1

2

7/1

2

9/1

2

11

/12

1/1

3

3/1

3

5/1

3

7/1

3

9/1

3

11

/13

1/1

4

3/1

4

5/1

4

7/1

4

9/1

4

11

/14

1/1

5

Inte

rnal

Co

nfl

ict

Civ

ilia

n D

eath

s Syria

Source: Armed Conflict Project and Event Data Project (ACLED)

Source: The Syrian Revolution Martyr Database


The Received Literature

No role for natural resources or social structures in mainstream

political transition literature:

Modernization strand (Lipset, 1959, Barro, 2012)

Intuitional school (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006)

Extension: Incumbent strategy for pre-empting a revolt largely

driven by the size of rents pc (Ali and Elbadawi, 2012; Diwan, 2014):

High rents, beyond a certain rents pc threshold: investment in

public goods, expanding public sector employment and social

transfers

Low and moderate rents pc: political repression and violence as the

dominant strategy

However, while accounting for natural resource effect, this

literature does not consider social structures in resource

endowed societies

Resource Rents pc: GCC vs Populous Oil

Arab Economies (2005 fixed dollars)

-

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Med

ian

Oil R

en

ts p

er

Cap

ita

(co

nsta

nt

2005 U

SD

)

GCC - Nationals only

-

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Med

ian

Oil R

en

ts p

er

Cap

ita

(co

nsta

nt

2005 U

SD

)

Populous Arab-Oil

Source: WDI (World Bank)

Source: WDI (World Bank)


The Received Literature (contd.)

Hodler (2012) fills this lacuna: an incumbent autocrat had two

options to prevent democratization in a socially polarized

society, depending on:

The extent of resource endowment

Whether he belongs to an ethnic minority or majority group

Major predictions:

In highly resource endowed societies, equilibrium behavior of an

autocrat form the majority group would be to ‘bribe’ all citizens in

order to remain in power

Instead, if the dictator controls only intermediate or low level of

appropriable resources, he will have no option but to relatively

peacefully extend the franchise (Egypt, Tunisia)

On the other hand, the violent option will be preferred by a dictator hailing

from the minority group, because it is cheaper to bribe his group to fight to

keep him in power than to bribe both groups (Libya, Syria)


Toward a Research Agenda

Extend Hodler’s type model so that it is even more relevant to

explaining the violence associated with the Arab Spring:

First, relax the implicit assumption of the ‘winners take all’

democratization

Second, the effect of conflictive and polarized neighborhood (such

as the rising sectarian divide in the region) and the consequent

external interventions spawned by it

Third, group cohesion as an alternative approach to understanding

why ethnic minority-led regimes were capable of mounting extreme

violence in response to popular democratic demands

Test predictions of the theoretical literature:

New panel data on popular uprisings and violence

However, not yet extended to more recent years

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New

York: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “A Theory of Political Transitions.” American Economic

Review, 91 (4): 938-963.

Ali, Omer and Ibrahim Elbadawi (2012),” The Political Economy of Public Sector Employment in Resource

Dependent Countries,” ERF Working Paper # 673, the Economic Research Forum, Cairo, Egypt.

Barro, Robert, (2012), “Convergence and Modernization Revisited”, Working Paper 18295, National Bureau

of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Barro, Robert (1996), “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study,” NBER

Working Paper no. 5698, August.

Collier, P. and B. Goderis. (2007), “Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse:

Reconciling a Conundrum,” CSAE Working Paper WPD/2007-15, Department of Economics, University of

Oxford.

Diwan, Ishac (2014),”The Effects of Oil on Development and the Uncertain Rise of the GCC,” unpublished

mimeo, ERF, Cairo.

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (2015),” Overcoming Induced Insecurities: Stabilizing Arab Democracies after the

Spring,” unpublished mimeo, Project on Deconstructing Arab Democratic Transitions, American University

of Beirut.

References (cond.)

Elbadawi, Ibrahim (2015),”Deconstructing Democratic Transitions in the Arab World,” unpublished mimeo,

Project on Deconstructing Arab Democratic Transitions, American University of Beirut.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Raimundo Soto (2012),” Economic Growth During the Oil Cycle,” ERF Working

Paper # 678, the Economic Research Forum, Cairo, Egypt.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim (2004),” The politics of Sustaining Growth in the Arab World: Getting Democracy Right,”

Lecture and Working Papers Series No. 2, Institute of Financial Economics, AUB, Beirut, Lebanon.

Geddes, Barbara et al (2015), “New Data Set: Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions,” unpublished

mimeo, Department of Political Science UCLA Los Angeles, CA, USA.

Hodler, Ronald (2012),”The Political Economics of the Arab Spring,” OxCarre Research Paper 101,

Department of Economics, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, Oxford University,

UK.

Lipset, S., (1959), “Some Social Pre-requisites of Democracy: and Economic Development and Political

Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review 53.

Rodrik, Dani (2010), “The Myth of Authoritarian Growth,” Project Syndicate, The World Opinion Page,

August.

Rodrik, Dani (1997), “Democracy and Economic Performance,” presented at the conference on

democratization and economic reform in South Africa, Cape Town, January, 16-19.

Rodrik, Dani and Romain Wacziarg (2005), “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes,”

CDDRL Working Paper, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute of

International Studies, Stanford University, CA, USA.



Gammarth, TunisiaMarch 20-22, 2015

Government & Nonprofit

The Arab Spring: Much Violence, Little Democracy