Demand for democracy in Arab countries

Mohamad Al-Ississ

The American University in Cairo

Ishac Diwan

Paris School of Economics

AGENDA

• Review of the literature

• Defining demand for democracy

• 2 hypotheses

• Conclusion on Arab exceptionalism: the results of essentialist

or policies

ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM…

VALUES BASED DEFICIT?

• Support for Arab democratic deficit mainly supported in cross country comparisons

– Arab or a Muslim effect (Barro 1999 vs Stepan and Robertson 2003, 2004),

– oil effect (Ross 2001),

– or conflict zone effect (El Badawi and Makdissi, 2013)

– Noland – an Arab, not Muslim effect

• We ask: Is there a gap at the individual cultural values level….?

• Little work looked at Muslim and Arab individual values directly

– Fish (2002) Muslim deficit can be explained by the subordination of women

– No democratic deficit connected to being Muslim,

• whether compared to individuals of other religions in heterogeneous

societies (Hoffman 2011),

• or individuals of various levels of piety are compared in Muslim majority

countries (Tessler 2002, 2005),

• or compared to individuals in other societies (Norris and Inglhart, 2004).

We reopen the debate using

the WVS6 UNIQUE DATASET ENABLES UNPRECENTED

LOOK• The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural

and political change

• Conducted by social scientist at leading global universities

• Surveyed the basic values and beliefs of the publics of over 100

societies, on all six inhabited continents since 1981

• This study pools the results of waves 5 and 6

• 194 thousand subjects in 88 countries

• 25 thousand are Arab in 13 countries in wave 6, 4 in wave 5

• Adequate sample size per country ( 1-3 thousand)

Waves Years

1 1981-1984

2 1989-1993

3 1994-1998

4 1999-2004

5 2005-2008

6 2010-2013

• Enables us to properly evaluate democratic values of Arabs in a way that was not possible before

• Gallup data does not include a good measure of democratic aspirations,

• PEW does not have a detailed list of the respondents’ characteristics,

• the Arab Barometer, rich as it is, does not allow for comparisons with the rest of the world.

ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM ?

Democratic index – PolityIV

MRT

YEM

DJI

SDN MAREGY

JOR

DZA

IRQ

LBN

LBY

OMN

BHRSAU

ARE

KWT

QAT

MWIBDI

CAF

NERLBR

MDG

GMB

ETH

GIN

ERI

GNB

UGA

MOZ

TGO

RWA

SLE

BFA

NPL

TZA

MLI

BEN

COM

HTI

ZWEBGD

KHM

TJK

SEN

TCD

LSO

KEN

KGZPAK

CMR

IND

CIV

LAO

ZMB

NIC

GHA

UZB

VNM

SLB

PNG

MDA

HND

BTN

PHL

BOL

NGA

SWZ

LKA

IDNGTM

ARM

GEO

GUY

CPV

SLV

UKR

MNG

PRY

FJI

ALB

IRN

MKDJAM

NAM

THA

AGO

DOM

ECU

ZAFPER

CHN

BWA

BGR

BLRAZE

COL

TKM

MUS

ROM

SUR

CRI

MEX

MYS

TURPAN

BRA

GAB

HUN

HRV

KAZ

POL

VENRUS

ARGLVA

LTUCHLURYSVKTTO

EST

CZE

GNQ

TWNPRTGRCSVNCYP

KOR

ESPITAISRJPNNZLGBR

FRA

DEU

BEL

FINIRLAUTNLDCANUSA

SGP

DNKSWEAUSCHENORLUX

-10

-50

510

Polit

y

4 6 8 10 12lngdppc

Autocratic

Democratic

ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM ? Country averages

of Individiual values

Measuring PfD

• Straight questions: “do you like democracy”• Gap1. democratic gap (Norris 2010): democratic aspirations (“how

important is it for you to live in a country that is democratically governed?”), minus reality (“how democratically is your country being governed today?”).

• Gap2: (Inglehart 2005) democratic aspirations minus preference for autocracy (“as a way of governing your country, what do you think of having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”).

• Our measure: “preference for democracy” (PfD), uses 3 questions that ask to rank in 3 separate menus, values connected democratic environments (“people have more say in how things are done”, “giving people more say in important government decisions”, “protecting freedom of speech, progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society”) and to rule and order (but not openly tyrannical) environments (“making sure the country has strong defense forces”, “maintaining order in the nation”, “the fight against crime”).

EXISTING INDICATORS OF DEMOCRATIC PREFERENCES….ARE PROBLEMATIC

How important is it for you to live in a

country that is democratically

governed?

How democratically is your country being

governed today

How important is it for you to live in a country that is democratically

governed?

As a way of governing your country, what do you think of having a

strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and election

GAP1 (Norris)

GAP2 (Inglehart)

Democratic Gap

Democratic Gap

Democratic Aspirations Status Quo

AutocracyDemocratic Aspirations

Unconstrained or too constrained

Noisy (relies on one question)

WHICH ONE OF THESE YOU, YOURSELF, CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT AND

WHICH WOULD BE THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT?

Democracy

Protecting freedom of speech

People have more say about how things

Progress toward a less impersonal and more

humane society

Giving People more say in important

government decisions

Strong Rule & Security

Maintaining order in the

nation

Making sure this country has

strong defense forces

The fight against crime

V.S.

•Rank-based PfD

vs Security

•Higher PfD

values indicate a

stronger

preference for

democracy

•Includes values

connected to

democratic

environments

WE CONSTRUCT NEW RANK BASED

CONSTRAINED MEASURE FOR PfD

PfD in Arab countries

Regression technique

• Demographics different -> control for individual characteristics• Countries level of development different -> control for GDP/capita

(more controls?)

• Individual characteristics controls – Age. Continuous variable 15-99– Education. Aggregate into 3 levels– Piety. Use question on whether religion is an essential quality for kids– female

• Should be using Logit: Use OLS for simplicity of interpretation• Used standardized forms for all variables: x• Do factor analysis on indexes

MODEL SPECIFICATION

PfD = A + B + C +

Describes individual

characteristics (age,

education, gender, faith,

income, self-expression)

Describes the Arab world

in various ways (a dummy

for all Arab countries,

dummies for sub-regions

of the Arab world, or

dummies for individual

Arab countries).

Set of independent

variables that describe

countries (GDPc, oil

dependency, share of

Muslims in population, and

average national levels of

support for democracy)

•Constrained rank-based

index on democratic vs

security values

•Includes values connected to

democratic environments

•Higher PfD values indicate a

stronger preference for

democracy

3 measures of democratic values

PfD Gap1

Asp-DF

Gap2

Asp-SL

Demo

aspiratn

Strong

Leader

Demo

De facto

ARB -0.09** 0.16*** 0.10** 0.04 -0.12*** -0.17***

Wave6 -0.05** -0.05* -0.12*** -0.09*** 0.09*** -0.01

W6*AB1 -0.03** 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.02

LnGDPc 0.11*** -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.09*

N 147440 128636 125740 138262 132347 129549

R2 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04

(regressions also controls for individual characteristics)

• There is Arab democratic gap around 2013

• …unlikely due entirely to the Arab Spring as per the small negative

wave 6 * ARB1 interaction (as well as the recent work of Mark Tessler)

The PfD regression globally

PfD

Arab -0.09***

Wave 6 -0.05**

Wave 6*Arab1 -0.03**

Age -0.04***

Education 0.08***

Female 0.01*

Faith -0.03*

Low Income 0

Middle Income 0.03***

High Income 0.01

GDPpc(ln) 0.11***

N 147440

R2

0.02

Standardized beta coefficients. Table 2 also controls for individual characteristics. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

• Other dynamic results consistent with

literature

• Youth, educated and middle class

are democracy’s champions

DRIVERS OF ARAB EXCEPTIONALISMPreference for

Democracy

Age -0.06***

Education 0.07***

Female 0.00

Faith -0.02

Low Income 0.00

Mid Income 0.03***

High income 0.01

GDPc 0.11***

Arab -0.04

wave6 -0.04*

w6*Arab1 -0.04*

Age*Arab 0.04**

Edu*Arab -0.06**

Fem*Arab 0.01**

Faith*Arab -0.02

Low Inc*Arab -0.01

Mid Inc*Arab -0.01

High Inc*Arab -0.00

N 142884

R2 0.04

Standardized beta coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

The globally strong youth

push for democracy is

stunted by a Self

Expression gap among

Arab youth

The globally equally

strong modernizing

impact of education on

democracy is stunted too

for Arab youth by lack of

modernization effect and

heightened religious

conservatism

After controlling for

individual effects, the

Arab democratic deficit

disappears!

The Arab middle class, like

the rest of the world, is the

champion for democracy

…BUT WHAT’S explains THIS DEFICIT?

2 possible theories

Modernist Aspirations

Religious Conservatism

Inglehart and Welzel

(2005) show how

individual preferences

evolve, from survivalist

to self-expressive values.

Measured as an index based on three WVS questions: two related to parents preferences regarding imagination and self-expression, and one relating to the extent respondents think of themselves as being creative and critical.

Religious conservatism

may affect individual

values on DfD.

Measured using WVS

question on support for

the statement that

“Religious authorities

should ultimately

interpret the laws.”

PFD

Individual,

MICs

Individual,

Arab

Countries,

global

Religious

Conservatism.01* -.06* -.42*

Self

Expression.10* .12* .43*

Correlation Coefficients with PfD

Other Arab specificities

PI S-E

GDPc -0.17*** 0.01

ARB 0.18*** -0.11**

wave6 0.01 -0.08**

w6*ARB1 -0.01 0.04**

Self expression

JOR -0.02

MAR 0.02

EGY -0.03

LBN -0.01**

QAT -0.01

TUN -0.01

LBY 0.01

YEM -0.02***

IRQ -0.09**

DZA -0.00

SAU -0.05**

Religious conservatism (PI)

DRIVERS OF ARAB EXCEPTIONALISMPreference for

Democracy

Religious

Conservatism

Self

Expression

Age -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.10***

Education 0.07*** -0.11*** 0.08***

Female 0.00 0.02*** -0.03***

Faith -0.02 0.14*** -0.07***

Low Income 0.00 -0.01 -0.06***

Mid Income 0.03*** -0.02* -0.06***

High income 0.01 -0.01 -0.02**

GDPc 0.11*** -0.16*** 0.03

Arab -0.04 -0.02 -0.07

wave6 -0.04* -0.01 -0.09**

w6*Arab1 -0.04* -0.01 0.03

Age*Arab 0.04** 0.09*** 0.07**

Edu*Arab -0.06** 0.10** 0.01

Fem*Arab 0.01** -0.00 0.00

Faith*Arab -0.02 0.00 -0.08**

Low Inc*Arab -0.01 0.03 -0.01

Mid Inc*Arab -0.01 0.03* -0.01

High Inc*Arab -0.00 0.01 -0.02

N 142884 131229 146601

R2 0.04 0.14 0.05

Standardized beta coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

The globally strong youth

push for democracy is

stunted by a Self

Expression gap among

Arab youth

The globally equally

strong modernizing

impact of education on

democracy is stunted too

for Arab youth by lack of

modernization effect and

heightened religious

conservatism

After controlling for

individual effects, the

Arab democratic deficit

disappears!

The Arab middle class, like

the rest of the world, is the

champion for democracy

PfD PI S-E

JOR -0.03** 0.10*** -0.00

MAR 0.00 0.03*** 0.02

EGY -0.03** 0.17*** -0.03*

LBN -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00

PLN -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00

QAT -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.01

TUN -0.05*** -0.01 -0.00

LBY -0.08*** 0.06*** -0.02***

YEM -0.03*** 0.01** -0.02***

IRQ 0.02 0.09*** -0.13***

DZA -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01

KWT 0.00 0.06*** 0.01**

BHR -0.03** 0.04*** -0.01**

N 133108 123010 136266

R2 0.04 0.14 0.06

ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM: REOPENING

THIS CAN OF WORMS…

We document support for Arab democratic deficit

… that can however be entirely explained by individual effects

The Self Expression among youth which contributes to democracy through direct and indirect effects is neutralized in the Arab World

The positive education effect on democracy is constrained due to Arab educational policies and religious conservatism

ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL NOT ESSENTIALIST