- 1.Futenma Log:Base Relocation Negotiations 2009-2010
2. Attack radius diagram ofChina H-6K attack cruise missile
carrier aircraft 3. Geostrategic Position of Okinawa 4. Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma Location: Ginowan City, Okinawa
Prefecture Home of the Marine Aircraft Group 36 Occupies 480
hectares (1,186 acres) Runway: 2,800 meters long, 48 meters wide.
Third largest runwayon Okinawa island after Kadena Air Base and
Naha InternationalAirport Approximately 70 aircraft stationed there
in 2010: -- 63 helicopters of various sizes and models -- 12
fixed-wing aircraft, including KC-130s for refueling -- Starting in
2012, choppers replaced by V-22 Ospreys (24) Approximately 3,000
U.S. military personnel (no combat troops)and 200 Japanese
employees 5. MAG-36 Combat Support at Futenma 6. Anti-base protest
inOkinawa, April 25,2010Kyodo News, viaAssociated PressProtesters
packed anathletic field in the townof Yomitanson inOkinawa, Japan,
todemand that a U.S.Marine base be moved. 7. Camp Schwab and Cape
Henoko 8. V-Shaped Runways at Camp Schwab 9. Okinawa says NO to FRF
relocation Okinawans rejected the plan to construct a new U.S.base
in a referendum held in December 1997 in NagoCity. In every opinion
poll on this issue since then, 70-80percent of the respondents have
expressedopposition to the new U.S. base construction plan. In July
2008, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly alsoexpressed its opposition
to the base in a resolution. 10. Futenma cannot be relocated to
HenokoYoshio ShimojiAugust 15, 2011 Defense Minister Toshimi
Kitazawa and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta reaffirmed "that Tokyo
and Washington will move forward with the plan to relocate the
controversial Futenma base within Okinawa." Futenma was constructed
toward the end of WW II with an aim of attacking mainland Japan by
B-29s in order to end the war quickly. But the war ended before
that plan was actually carried out. Futenma should have been
returned at that point; instead, it has continued to be in the firm
grip of the U.S. military all these years to this day. Evidently,
the U.S. military seized the land in clear violation of Article 46
of the Hague Convention, which states: "Family honour and rights,
the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property
cannot be confiscated." The illegality of Futenma would not
disappear even if it were to be moved to Henoko or anywhere else in
Okinawa just like dirty money would not become clean how many times
it might undergo laundering. Both Kitazawa and Panetta must realize
this and search for an alternative solution, that is, to move it
outside of Okinawa, most preferably, to the U.S. mainland ( Yoshio
Shimoji, born in Miyako Island, Okinawa, M.S. (Georgetown
University), taught English and linguistics at the University of
the Ryukyus from 1966 until his retirement in 2003.) 11. Opinion on
Okinawa Bases Okinawa referendum (September 1996): 90% want
consolidation and reductionof U.S. bases in Okinawa (i.e., no
relocation of Futenma inside Okinawa) Asahi opinion survey (May 12,
1997) of the nation and Okinawa: 72% of allJapanese as well as
Okinawans wanted a phased reduction of U.S. bases inOkinawa, 59% of
Okinawans and 38% of all Japanese wanted Okinawa basesrelocated
elsewhere in Japan. 57% of Okinawans and 76% of all Japanesewanted
the security treaty with the U.S. maintained Yomiuri poll (June 23,
2006): 50% of all Japanese positive about U.S.-Japanagreement to
realign U.S. forces in Japan, 38% were negative. On
relocatingFutenma to another location in Okinawa and redeploying
8,000 Marines fromOkinawa to Guam, survey found 52% denying such
would alleviate Okinawasbase-hosting burden, with only 36%
positive. Results show Okinawans were notthe only Japanese with
negative views about realignment results. Okinawa Times/Asahi poll
(June 2009): 68% of Okinawans oppose relocatingFutenma within the
prefecture, against only 18% in favor. Opposed saidrelocating to
Henoko would not reduce the overall burden of the U.S. bases
inOkinawa and destroy marine environment. 12. More Opinion on
Okinawa BasesAsahi poll released May 14, 2020 70% of Okinawas
residents opposed PMHatoyamas decision to move Futenma
helicopterfunction to another site in the prefecture, withtraining
on Tokunoshima in Kagoshima Prefecture 43% of Okinawas residents
wanted all bases to be removed from the prefecture 13. Anatomy of
Dependency 14. Base economy: Sources of Income1. Host nation
support budget includes salaries for 9,000 Japanese employed at
U.S. bases (50b yen-$645m)2. Many more Japanese jobs and incomes
indirectly linked to U.S. bases such as contractors and vendors3.
Rents: Most base land privately owned but leased to the Japanese
government (totaling $1 billion in 2009)4. Complex system of
subsidies from the central government to communities hosting U.S.
basesSince 1997, Nago City (hosts Camp Schwab) has received $145
million for ACCEPTING FRF to Henoko 15. As of March 2011 16.
Okinawa Consolidation, Reduction, Realignment All bases south of
Camp Foster and certain areas of CampFoster to be returned to Japan
USMC forces consolidate to remaining bases 8,000 Marines leave
Okinawa (plus dependents) Relocated to Guam by 2014 (GOJ pays $6.09
b; U.S.$4.189 b) 10,000 MAGTF capability remains in Okinawa
Tangible progress with FRF is precondition for relocation 17.
Futenma Relocation Plan Relocation of Marine Aerial Refueler
Transport Squadron152 (VMGR-152) KC-130J fixed-wing aircraft to
MCASIwakuni MAG-36 (helicopter unit) relocates to
FutenmaReplacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko Saki FRF are V-shaped
dual runways, 1,600m in length with100m overruns Long runway
operations provided by access to Japaneseairfields 18. The SACO
Final Reporton Futenma Air Station At the Security Consultative
Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda,Minister
Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their
commitmentto the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim
Report of April 15, 1996 andthe Status Report of September 19,
1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, bothGovernments have been
working to determine a suitable option for the return of FutenmaAir
Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and
areas in Okinawa, whilemaintaining the airfields critical military
functions and capabilities. The Status Reportcalled for the Special
Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives:
1)incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a
heliport at Camp Schwab;and 3) develop and construct a sea-based
facility (SBF). On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO
recommendation to pursue the SBFoption. Compared to the other two
options, the SBF is judged to be the best option interms of
enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while
maintainingoperational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition,
the SBF can function as a fixed facilityduring its use as a
military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years,
after adequatereplacement facilities are completed and operational.
19. State of Progress in SACO ReportReturned: Aha Training Area
(total) Sobe Communication Site (total) Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
(total) Senaha Communication Station (most)In Process: Northern
Training Area (more than half) Gimbaru Training Area (total) Naha
Port Camp KuwaeNo Progress: MCAS Futenma 20. Main actors in
negotiations, 1996-7Japanese side American side Prime Minister
Hashimoto President Clinton Chief Cabinet Secretary Ambassador to
Japan MondaleKajiyama Pentagon JDA Director General Usui, then Dep.
Assist. Sect. CampbellKyuma FIG (Futenma Implementation Vice
Defense Minister Moriya Group) U.S.-Japan working gp. LDP Policy
Res. Council Chair USFJYamasaki Hashimoto advisor Yukio Dep.
Assist. Sec. State HubbardOkamoto American Embassy, Tokyo Okinawa
Governor Ota 21. Main proposals 1996Japanese side American side
Kadena Air Base integration SACO final report-basedoption,
orfloating heliport or sea-based Kadena Ammunition Depot facility
offshore(dropped due to resistance from Debate was over method
ofUSFJ and local communities) construction and location Sea-based
facility offshore 22. Proposals floated 2005Japanese side American
side Camp Schwab land-based plan Kadena integration
(Lawless,(Moriya)dropped when USAF opposed) DFAA holds out for
original Pentagon pushing for secondoffshore plan (local support)
runway Kadena integration plan (JDA) Shoals plan using
landreclamation method (localorganizations concept) 23. Competing
proposals in 2005On the table at this time for both governments to
considerwere four proposals for the Futenma replacement facility:
The original Henoko-offing plan, based on the 1996 SACOagreement,
which was scheduled for joint military-civilian use(Runway 2,500
meters long, 730 meters long); A scaled-down Henoko plan, also
known as the shoals plan orthe reef plan, that would only be a
military heliport (Length1,500 meters, width 500 meters); Camp
Schwab land-based plan (Runway within the base 1,300 1,500 meters
long); Kadena integration plan, under which a heliport for
theMarines would be built inside that Air Force base. 24. SCC
agreement October 29, 2005 Both sides will locate the FRF in an
"L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp
Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of
the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into
the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower
section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest
direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length
of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. 25. United States-Japan
Roadmap for Realignment ImplementationMay 1, 2006Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF): The United States and Japan will locate
the FRF in a configurationthat combines the Henoko-saki and
adjacent water areas of Ouraand Henoko Bays, including two runways
aligned in a "V"-shape,each runway having a length of 1,600 meters
plus two 100-meteroverruns. The length of each runway portion of
the facility is 1,800meters, exclusive of seawalls. This facility
ensures agreedoperational capabilities while addressing issues of
safety, noise,and environmental impacts. In order to locate the
FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, inthe Camp Schwab
area, necessary adjustments will be made, suchas reconfiguration of
Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent watersurface areas.
Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014. 26.
U.S.-Japanese Roadmap forForce Realignment Issued on May 1, 2006,
the Roadmap is a comprehensive, interconnectedpackage of force
posture changes on Okinawa and the Japanese main islands.The major
provisions for Okinawa are: --Redeployment of U.S. Marine Corps air
units from Futenma Air Station to areplacement facility to be
constructed in the less populated area adjacent toCamp Schwab;
--Reduction of U.S. force levels on Okinawa by relocating 8,000
Marines and9,000 dependents to Guam; --Japans provision of $6
billion of the estimated $10 billion cost to relocate toGuam; --
Consolidation of remaining U.S. Marine units in less heavily
populated areasin northern Okinawa; and --Return of several U.S.
bases south of Kadena Air Base to Okinawa control. The Okinawa
realignment initiatives are interconnected. The relocation of8,000
Marines to Guam, consolidation of Marine forces, and land returns
southof Kadena depend on "tangible progress toward completion of
the FutenmaReplacement Facility (FRF) and Japans financial
contributions to funddevelopment of required facilities and
infrastructure on Guam." 27. Realignment in OkinawaJOINT USE
BETWEEN USFJ AND SDF-- Camp Hansen, with GSDF-- Kadena Air Base,
with ASDFREVERSIONS OF SIX FACILITIES SOUTH OF KADENA-- Tank farm
used by U.S. Army (16 ha)-- Makinomoto Oil Storage Facility (274
ha)-- Naha Port facility (56 ha)-- Camp Lester (Kuwae) (68 ha)--
Camp Foster (Zukeran) (692 ha partial return)-- MCAS Futenma (481
ha) 28. Marines under 2006 RoadmapFutenma Air Station: Helicopter
unit to be relocated to new facility to be builton a spot on the
southern part of Camp Schwab andjutting out into Oura Bay Air
refueling aircraft to Iwakuni on Kyushu withemergency airfields
also designatedMarines to Guam:8,000 personnel from the III MEF and
approx. 9,000dependants transferred to Guam (from Camp
Courtney,Hansen, Foster, Futenma Air Station, and Makinomoto) 29.
Official draft plan for relocating the Futenma Air Station. The
Hatoyama government: Proposes modifying the existing Japan-U.S.
plan to relocate the Futenma Air Station to reclaimed land on the
coast in Nago, Okinawa, to transfer it instead to a pile-supported
facility to be built some 500 meters southwest from the coastline
with only one 1,800-meter runway.Proposes transferring some of the
training of Futenmas helicopter unit to Tokunoshima Island,
Kagoshima Prefecture.Promotes transferring some of the training
held by U.S. forces in Okinawa to Self-Defense Forces bases
elsewhere in Japan.Calls for the return of part of Area Hotel
Hotel, a water area east of Okinawa Island used for drills, and of
the bombing and shooting ranges on Kumejima and Tori islands,
located west of the main Okinawa island (5/9/2010). 30. Excerpt of
Japan-U.S. joint statement on Futenma relocation accord (5/27/10)
The Ministers confirmed their commitment to implement steadily the
realignmentinitiatives described in the May 1, 2006, SCC Document,
United States-JapanRoadmap for Realignment Implementation," as
supplemented by this SCC Statement. The Ministers reaffirmed that,
as provided for in the Guam Agreement of February 17,2009, the
relocation of approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF)personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from
Okinawa to Guam isdependent on tangible progress toward the
completion of the replacement facility. Therelocation to Guam will
realize the consolidation and return of most of the facilitiessouth
of Kadena. Bearing this in mind, the two sides intend to verify and
validate that this Futenmarelocation plan appropriately considers
factors such as safety, operationalrequirements, noise impact,
environmental concerns, and effects on the localcommunity. Both
sides confirmed the intention to locate the replacement facility at
the CampSchwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, with the
runway portion(s) of thefacility to be 1,800 meters long, inclusive
of overruns, exclusive of seawalls. In order to achieve the
earliest possible return of MCAS Futenma, the Ministersdecided that
a study by experts regarding the replacement facilitys
location,configuration and construction method would be completed
promptly (in any event nolater than the end of August and that the
verification and validation would becompleted by the time of the
next SCC. 31. Futenma negotiations 2009-10Japanese sideAmerican
side PM Hatoyama (President Obama) (Secretary Clinton) Foreign
Minister Okada Assistant Secretary of State Defense Minister
KitazawaCampbell Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano (Defense Secretary
Gates) (MOFA and MOD officials) Assistant Secretary of Defense
Gregson Advisor: Yukio Okamoto Ambassador to Japan Roos Japan Desk
U.S. Embassy Staff Naha Consul General 32. Hatoyama: Marines No
Deterrence In a May 4, 2010 meeting with Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima of
OkinawaPrefecture, then Prime Minister Hatoyama said that he had no
alternativebut to give up the idea of moving the Futenma air
station out of OkinawaPrefecture. Asked why the facility had to
remain in Okinawa, he said that ashe "studied the issue more and
more," he came to realize that various U.S.armed forces units,
including marines, combine to maintain a deterrent. In a 2011
interview, Hatoyama said that when it became clear that he hadto
accept the Henoko plan, he had to find a "post factum
justification."Although he did not believe that U.S. Marines in
Okinawa per se directlydeter war, he thought the word deterrent in
a wide sense could be used assuch a justification. Using the
Buddhist concept of "hoben" a way inwhich Buddha leads people to
understand his teachings depending on thedegree of their ability to
understand he said that if someone insists thathis justification
was hoben, he had to admit that it was hoben. In everydaylanguage,
hoben is usually taken to mean an expedient excuse. 33. Okamoto
rebuts Hatoyama Commentator Yukio Okamoto, who served as a foreign
policy advisor in theHatoyama administration, criticized previous
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama inpresenting his views as a speaker
recommended by the Liberal Democratic Party ata public hearing of
the House of Representatives Budget Committee yesterday. Allthe
more because Okamoto grappled with the issue of relocating the U.S.
MarineCorps Futenma Air Station for many years, he seems to have
been unable to hidehis chagrin over the setback to the settlement
of the issue on account ofHatoyamas irresponsible statements. In
the hearing, Okamoto said: "I explained to then Prime Minister
Hatoyama theconcept of deterrence and made efforts to have him
understand it." He then madethis candid remark: "The plan to
relocate (the Futenma Air Station) to the Henokodistrict (in Nago
City, Okinawa Prefecture) was viable at that time, but
since(Hatoyama) insisted on moving the base out of the prefecture,
it becameimpossible to implement the plan. The responsibility [for
the ongoing stagnation]rests largely with the previous prime
minister." 34. Negotiations, 1995-96, 2006-7: Main conclusions
Leadership essential in both cases, particularly at final stage
tobreak impasse Intense efforts by negotiators, matched by
persuasive effortsof intermediaries sent to Okinawa Difficult
negotiations: at times extremely contentious, divisiveand sometimes
on verge of collapse For sake of alliance, pulled back from brink
before talkscompletely collapsed Agreements were Pyrrhic victories
for implementation of eachremained elusive Decision-making process
in first and second agreements:marked similarities but some
dissimilarities : i.e., role of LDPwas negative factor in first,
positive factor in second case 35. Main conclusions (continued)
Agreements ambiguous about exact location andmodality of FRF, led
to lengthy conflict over both duringimplementation stage Opinion in
Okinawa basically a constant and not avariable Okinawa governors
proved to be a main obstacle toagreement and then to implementation
36. Futenma negotiations, 2009-10 Conclusions reached Alliance was
damaged by the Hatoyama administrationsmishandling of the Futenma
issue U.S. never wavered from its basic demand to honor 2006Roadmap
Agreement; Faulted for lacking flexibility Japan misread the U.S.,
which abides by fundamental principlethat government-to-government
agreement must be honored Washington-Tokyo trust relationship never
established Hatoyama government did not understand and thus
ignoredOkinawan sensitivities; Proposals never vetted with locals
Okinawa lost all confidence in Tokyo; felt betrayed byHatoyama
(5/2010); remains opposed in principle tocompromise solution,
proactive efforts of Kan governmentnotwithstanding 37. Conclusions
continued: Hatoyama government treated Futenma issue as a search
forparking lots for Futenma aircraft Issue of Japans national
security never seems to have comeup Ignored issue of maintaining
military capabilities of U.S. forceson OkinawaPolitics given
priority over alliance or national security Decision-making process
was politically motivated andincoherent Kan government reconfirmed
bilateral agreement, but hasdelayed final conclusions on modality
for political reasons U.S. remained disengaged from Dec. 2009 to
May 2010,although maintained a veto power over silly proposals 38.
Implementation Barrier Implementation always needed a consensus to
holdamong the three parties: USG, GOJ, and Okinawa Now as in the
past agreements, local opposition hasmade plans impossible to
implement. An impasse exists. Consensus on the U.S. side to support
plan is unraveling,starting with the Senate and views in Pentagon.
GOJ not carrying out intense nemawashi or informalspadework to
convince locals to accept compromise Roadmap agreement is a package
in which Futenma isinseparable part of an intricate realignment
scheme 39. Consensus Unraveling 40. Senators Levin, McCain andWebb
Propose: Placing the realignment of the basing of U.S. military
forces in SouthKorea on hold pending further review, and reevaluate
any proposalto increase the number of family members accompanying
militarypersonnel. Revising the Marine Corps force realignment
implementation planfor Guam to consist of a presence with a
permanently-assignedheadquarters element bolstered by deployed,
rotating combat units,and consideration of off-island training
sites Examining the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets at
MCASFutenma, Okinawa, to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, rather
thanbuilding an expensive replacement facility at Camp Schwab
whiledispersing a part of Air Force assets now at Kadena to
Andersen AirBase in Guam and/or other locations in Japan. 41.
Okinawa governor:Senate proposal astarting pointHe
conditionedconsideration of such onguarantees that noisepollution
around Kadenawould be clearly lowerthan present levels. Herejected
Ospreys asdangerous, however. 42. Senators Proposal Rejected Kadena
option rejected as not feasible due to localopposition Kadena Mayor
Hiroshi Toyama: "Both the town and theresidents are dead set
against the plan. There is no otherway than to relocate (Futenma)
outside Japan." More than 20,000 residents who live near the
Kadenabase had just filed a lawsuit demanding suspension offlights
early in the morning and at night andcompensation for damage.
Kadena vetted and rejected by USG/GOJ several times inpast 43.
Alliance Critics Some reject conventional view that U.S.-Japan
alliance iskey to peace and stability in East Asia Deny that the
concept of deterrence has anything to dowith the presence of a
forward-deployed Marine wing Deny that the Marine forces along with
other U.S. forcesin Japan satisfy U.S. national strategy by
visiblydemonstrating the U.S. commitment to regional security Deny
these forces deter aggression, provide a crisis-response capability
should deterrence fail, and avoid therisk of interpreting some
withdrawals as a sign of alessening of the U.S. commitment. 44.
Proposed Removal of Marines to U.S. Critics say Guam and Henoko
relocations are tooexpensive, so bring Marine combat capabilityback
to California; they could always fly back incase of a contingency,
keeping places and shipsready in Japan to receive them But
opponents of that idea argue that virtualpresence (similar to DPJ
proposal in 1996) isactual absence; they could not readily
respond.How can rotary wing components return?
