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Hydropolitics in the MENA Region
Ana Elisa CascãoKing’s College of LondonPresentation to TWM 2008 MENA2nd-3rd November 2008
3rd
No
vem
ber
2 - International Water Law
• International Water Law - watercourses and groundwater
• Main legal frameworks• IWL in the MENA region• Successes and failures• Nexus water, law & politics• Law as a tool for conflict resolution/
prevention?
EXERCISE 2: Nile Basin case – How to apply IWL?
Main international legal frameworks
1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (ILA)
1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (ILC)
2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources (ILA)
2008 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (ILC)
UN CONVENTION – MENA’ POSITIONS
VOTING (1997)
In favour:Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, Yemen
Against: Turkey
Abstained: Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel
Absent: Lebanon
STATUS (2008)
Ratification:Syria (1998)
Jordan (1999)
Accession:Lebanon (1999)
Libya (1999)Qatar (2002)Iraq (2005)
Signature only:Tunisia (2000)Yemen (2000)
Campaigns forthe ratification of
UN Convention GOALS:
RatificationEntry into forceImplementation
Policy guidelines Level playing field
PREVENT: Unilateral Action
Legal weaknesses Water misgovernance
Conflicts
World Development Movement
World Wildlife Fund
IWL ON THE GROUNDMENA Shared Basins and Aquifers
No agreementAgreement;
although partial or not all-inclusive
Agreement informed by IWL principles
•Nile Basin•Jordan Basin
•Tigris-Euphrates Basin•Asi-Orontes Basin
•Niger Basin•Lake Chad
•Nubian Aquifer•Disi Aquifer
•Majority of the transboundary aquifers
•Al-Kabir Al-Janoubi Basin
“Mission unaccomplished”
EXAMPLES OF AGREEMENTS RELATED PROBLEMS1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters (Egypt/Sudan)
•Bilateral agreement•Volumetric water allocations•Unequal allocations•Colonial background•“Prior use” argument
2007 Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement (all Nile riparians)
•Complex negotiations•No volumetric water allocations•Treaty secession or not?•Deliberate ambiguity•No ratification or political commitment
1994 Israeli-Jordanian Water Agreement (Israel/Jordan)
•Bilateral Agreement•Deliberate (constructive) ambiguity•Difficulties on implementation•Destructive Ambiguity
1995 Oslo Water Regime (Israel/Palestine) •Unequal allocations•“Fake” joint management•Constraints on Palestinian development of water resources (eg do not include Jordan River waters)•“Prior use” argument
Niger River / Lake Chad Agreements •Not all-inclusive•No volumetric water allocations•No provisions on information exchange
Agreement; although partial
or not all-inclusive
No agreementTransboundary Aquifers -
“Long way to go”STATUS:• No Agreement in majority of transboundary MENA aquifers • Only draft of Law of Transboundary Aquifers• Limited achievements regarding regional cooperation
PROBLEMS:• “Invisible” resource • “Pumping race” – over-abstraction• Strong environmental impacts• Process of political “silentisation”
COOPERATION:• Ongoing negotiations: Northwest Sahara Aquifer System, Nubian
Sandstone Aquifer System, Basalt Aquifer (Jordan-Syria), Shallow Aquifer (Oman-UAE), Wajid Sandstone (Saudi Arabia-Yemen), Wasia-Biyadh/Mukallah Deep Aquifer (Oman-Yemen)
2002 Agreement on Al-Kabir Al-Janoubi River (Lebanon-Syria)Agreement informed
by IWL principles
Agreement is derived from relevant provisions of
international law and, in particular, the United
Nations Convention
EXERCISE 2: Nile Basin case – how to apply IWL?
• Participants will play the role of the diverse negotiatiors and external parties involved in the negotiations for a new Nile Treaty
• Discuss and reflect on the application of the UN Convention articles:
UN Convention Potential Nile Treaty Articles 5 and 6: Equitable andreasonable utilization and participation and related factors
•How to translate equitable and reasonable on the ground?•Weight of each factor?•How to define the water allocation of each of the 10 riparians?•What occurs if new infrastructures are built?
Article 7: Obligation not to cause serious Harm •How to measure harm?•Which are the obligations of upstream countries?•What happens to “prior” uses?
Articles 8 and 9: General obligation to cooperate, regular exchange of data and information
•How to share data?•What about prior notification?•Which mechanisms to notify and inform?•Which institution will supervise the process?
Articles 20, 21 and 23: Protection of ecosystems and the marine environment, prevention of pollution
•How to include, guarantee and protect ecosystems?•Which mechanisms can be used?•How this relates to old and new hydraulic infrastructures?
Articles 24, 25 and 26: Management and regulation
•Mechanisms?•How this relates to old and new hydraulic infrastructures?
Article 33: Settlement of disputes •Which body will be responsible?•Arbitration?
• Discuss and reflect on how to operationalise the Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation in the Nile River Basin:
FACTORS (Art. 6 UN Convention) Potential Nile Treaty
1 - Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
SOME RELEVANT QUESTIONS:
Weight of each factor?
Future needs vs. Present uses?
Existing vs. Potential uses?
Impacts of water utilisation upstream – how to measure?
Alternative water resources – within or outside the Basin?
2 - The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
3 - The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
4 - The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;
5 - Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
6 - Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
7 - The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.
EXERCISE 2: Nile Basin case – how to apply IWL?
WATER LAW & POLITICS
Nexus – Water, Law and Politics
NEGOTIATIONS OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER LEGAL AGREEMENTSARE HIGHLY POLITICISED PROCESSES –
•Asymmetric Power Politics are determinant •Contextual power is key for conclusion/delaying of agreements•Equitable and reasonable utilisation is difficult to operationalise
•Negotiations on volumetric water allocations are highly problematic
ConclusionInternational Water Law
• Set of useful guidelines for transboundary water management
• ILW: A mean, not an end by itself
• Power Politics International Water Law
• Power Politics Negotiations & Political Commitment
• Law as a tool for conflict resolution/ prevention?
3 HYDROPOLITICAL COOPERATION1 NEXUS WATER AND POLITICS
3 - CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND COOPERATION
• Transboundary river basins: Conflict or/and Cooperation?
• Conflicts, diplomacy and deadlocks
• Transboundary cooperation – overcoming deadlocks?
• Main cooperative attempts in the MENA region
• Cooperation is as political as water
EXERCISE 3: If I was a donor…
Transboundary river basins:Conflict or Cooperation?
C
ON
FL
ICT
COOPERATION
CONFLICT ? COOPERATION ?
Reality is not BlackBlack & White White !
ConflictConflict and CooperationCooperationCo-exist
Mirumachi 2007
HOW?
Diplomatic conflict, not war!
Wolf et al 2003
Diplomatic, strong or mild verbal official hostility
Conflict resolution:Political and diplomatic
Typical conflictive situation
Typical conflictive situation
Riparian A Riparian B
Deadlock
DON’T•Agree in positions
and arguments•No data-sharing•No negotiations
•No political commitment•No common projects
•No cooperation
DO•Securitise
•Use egoistic arguments•Confidentiality of information
•Refuse concessions•Play with time
•Threats
Cooperation – Overcoming the deadlocksDeadlock
COOPERATION
How?
Capacity-Building
InformationSharing
AppliedTraining
StakeholderInvolvement
Shared Vision
Joint Projects
Benefit-Sharing
Legal and Institutional Frameworks
Socio-econ.development River Basin
Organisation(RBO)
Main cooperative attempts in the MENA regionBasin Initiative Main achievements Donors
Nile Nile Basin Initiative
(all 10 riparians)
•NBI – provisional cooperative mechanism (since 1999)•Ambitious goals/ involves all 10 riparians / strong involvement of donors•Shared Vision and Subsidiary Action programs•Capacity-building and trust achieved •Not yet a legal framework or projects on-the-ground•Nevertheless, seen as a good model of cooperation
World Bank, UNDP, African Development Bank, FAO, GEF, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, US
Niger Niger Basin Authority
(9 riparians)
(Algeria is not member)
•One of the oldest intergovernmental in Africa (Convention signed in 1987)•Goal: integrated water management and economic developemnt•Shared Vision and several inestment projects•Joint basin-wide hydrological monitoring system •Active nvolvement of donors, but also civil society and environmentalists
World Bank, UNDP, African Devel. Bank, Canada, European Commission, France, US
Lake Chad Lake Chad Basin Commission
(5 riparians)
(Algeria, Sudan and Libya not members)
•Old organisation – since 1964 [Failed to prevent environmental catastrophe]•Goal: regulation and planning of the uses of water and natural resources•Still focusing primarily in surface water, and not groundwater•Ambitious project of water diversion from Congo River to Lake Chad
World Bank, UNDP, Denmark, European Commission, France,
Nubian Aquifer
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System Project
(all 4 riparians)
•Goal: rational and equitable management of the NSAS•In the first stages of cooperation (setting)•Not yet legal and insitutional framework neither projects
International Atomic Energy Agency, UNDP, GEF, UNESCO
Jordan Basin
EXACT
(3 riparians)
•Database project•Forum whereby infrastructure, research and negotiations are launched•Small-scale projects (eg wastewater treatment)
United States, France, EU, the Netherland, Canada
Israeli–Palestinian Joint Water Committee
(just aquifers, not Jordan River)
•Goal: rational water resource management and IWRM•JWC: decisions on water projects in te West Bank by consensus•Presented as model of cooperation •Criticism: domination dressed up as cooperation (Israel: Veto & licensing)
Currently no donors support projects not licensed through the JWC
Israeli–Jordanian Joint Water Committee
(just Israel and Jordan)
•JWC goal: the implementation of the water clauses of the Peace Treaty•Continued in functions despite of conflicts between countries•Several problems to disentangle ambguities embedded in the treaty•Limited effectiveness
...
Tigris-Euphrates
Basin
Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation
(not governmental, just civil society of 4 riparians)
•No cooperation at interstate level•Civil society engagement•Aims facilitating cooperation•Goals: Capacity-building and institutional strengthening
UNESCO, Private Sector, Universities
EXERCISE 3: If I was a donor…
Capacity-Building
InformationSharing
AppliedTraining
StakeholderInvolvement
Shared Vision
Joint Projects
Benefit-Sharing
Legal and Institutional Frameworks
• In which Basin/Aquifer would I invest? In those already cooperating, those starting cooperative initiatives, or those displaying no cooperation? And Why?
• In which of these fields of activity (or others) would I engage giving financial support? And Why?
Cooperation is as political as water
BASIN/AQUIFER
Multiple stakeholders, positions, decision-making layers, strategies, external actors, ...
Multilateral Donor
BilateralDonor
CivilSociety
RiparianC
RiparianB
Riparian A
