Mugabe Cometh: A Public Choice Analysis of Land Reform in Zimbabwe

Kabeed Mansur

Introduction

In the run up to parliamentary elections in February 2000, Mugabe and his ruling Zanu PF party were dealt

a massive blow when the public voted against a referendum that would allow Mugabe to make sweeping changes to

the constitution, by concentrating greater power in the executive, and instituting a policy of land reform – whereby,

white owned lands would be seized and redistributed to poor black rural farmers. The opposition to the referendum

was mobilized primarily in the urban areas by the then recently formed MDC (Movement for Democratic Change)

party, which were also emerging as the main challengers to Zanu PF in upcoming parliamentary elections. Fearing a

popular backlash against years of ill governance which left the Zimbabwean economy in shambles, Mugabe quickly

suspended parliamentary elections from taking place in March 2000 and postponed them to June 2000. Mugabe used

this gap to rally support for his Zanu PF party, by implementing the land reform policies that were initially rejected

under the February referendum.

It will be the goal of this analysis to use Ronald Wintrobe’s Model of Autocracy to examine the Zimbabwean

Land Reform Policy of 2000 from a public choice perspective. We will break our analysis into two sections; the first

section will develop and present Wintrobe’s model, while the second section will apply the model to an analysis of

the Zimbabwean Land Reform Policy of 2000.

(II). Wintrobe’s Model of Autocracy[i]

·

Wintrobe first develops his model of autocracy by defining the dictator’s utility function U as dependent on

three independent variables: Consumption (C), Power (P), and Security (S):

U = f (C,P,S)

Wintrobe then shows that in order to maximize this utility function the dictator must find an equilibrium point where

he balances the right proportions of loyalty and repression. In other words - Whatever their preferences, dictators must

divide their resources between repressing opponents and rewarding loyal followers (Source: The Independent

Institute, Caplan).

______________

Selecting Survival Strategies:

1. As mentioned earlier, the dictator’s success, or utility, is maximized by equilibrating the right proportions

of loyalty creation with that of repression.

2. It seems plausible that a dictator will makes his investments in fostering loyalty and repression selectively

3. This leads to the question: How does a dictator choose which groups to court and which to repress?

4. We can model the process of survival strategy selection mathematically by:

Let:

S = security of dictatorship

TRi = tax revenue devoted to repressing group (i)

Ui = Ui (Yi + si) = utility functions for individual groups in society where utility (Ui) is a function of income earned

(Yi) and subsidy/transfers received (si)n

ni = number of individuals belonging to the repressed group

αi = group specific parameter, measures specific group contributions to the regimes success.

βi = group specific parameter, measures regimes success from repression

Then:

S = n1(α1 U1 (Y1 + s1) + β1 R(TR1)) + n2(α2 U2 (Y2 + s2) + β2 R(TR2))+ … + ni(αi Ui (Yi + si) + βi R(TRi))

Note:

= > Rent seeking will take place and different groups will compete for these rents. To achieve his goals, the dictator

must determine who his true supporters and enemies are, who to reward and whom to punish, the α’s and β’s in the

equation above

= > For groups with very low β’s the gains from repression are so low that no funds are devoted to this activity

= > For groups with very low α’s have all of their incomes taxed away

= > The optimal set of policies of a dictator are likely to involve the selective use of rewards and punishments

= > Recall that the dictators utility function is defined as : U(C,P,S). Thus, by maximizing S and holding (C) and (P)

constant we can maximize utility of the dictator.

(III). Analysis of Zimbabwean Land Reform Policy of 2000

As we briefly discussed in the introduction, in the run up to the March 2000 parliamentary elections, Mugabe

along with his Zanu PF party witnessed the success of the opposition MDC party in rallying strong support within

urban areas, evidenced by their successful opposition to the February 2000 referendum proposed by Mugabe.

In the February referendum on the draft constitution, to the ruling party's surprise, the electorate -

albeit with a turn-out rate of only 25 percent - was not swayed by the populist attempt to appeal to

historical land grievances. People voted against the draft constitution because it did not address

excessive presidential powers. White farmers mobilized their farm workers against the land clause

but they were also concerned about governance issues and the escalating economic crisis. Mugabe

accepted his first electoral defeat since 1980 with seeming equanimity. However, faced with an

upcoming election against the newly formed popular opposition party, the Movement for

Democratic Change, and bereft of state resources to use for patronage, ZANU PF had to do

something dramatic to demonstrate to ordinary people that it had something to offer them. (Source:

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v027/27.2kriger.html)

In light of this situation Mugabe returned to his policy of land reform which had been previously defeated in

the February referendum– “Banking on the assumption that for millions of poor people eking out an existence

on overcrowded communal land, the prospect of resettlement on white owned commercial farms would be

an extremely strong incentive to vote for the ruling party”. (Source:

http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2000election1.htm)

Then in May 2000, Mugabe gave authorization for rural black farmers to raid white owned farms and resettle

them. With the help of the War Veterans – a militant wing of the Zanu PF party – along with scores of

unemployed rural youth a campaign of land grabs began in earnest. However, the strategy employed by

Mugabe here was not simply to seize white owned lands and redistribute them to rural black farmers, but rather

give the mere illusion that land transfers were underway. This way Mugabe could mobilize support among the

rural population and then leverage this support into high voter turnout for Zanu PF in parliamentary elections.

A further examination suggests that Mugabe employed a Rent Extraction strategy here. As Fred McChesney

explains: “The model of rent extraction is developed to show how politicians reap returns already in

existence….where, the credibility and political attraction of rent extraction depends on the strength of

constitutional rules that protect private property and contract rights against government taking. (Source:

www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=363)

If we recall that in the Wintrobe model when formulating the success function (S) for a dictator, the success

function is subject the following constraint:

⇨ ni(∑(si) = ∑(TRi))

Where the net subsidies allocated to loyalty networks and the net tax revenue allocated to repressive tactics

must be equal to total tax revenue raised.

However, simply transferring land over from white farmers to rural black farmers does not create a flow of

new tax revenue, but rather, halts exisisting tax revenue from coming in. Since white farmers have the exsisting

human and physical capital required to make the farms productive, by resettling rural black farmers on these

lands they will not be able to make the farms as productive as they could be. Once Mugabe realizes this, we

begin to see a rent extraction strategy surface.

By implementing the land reform policy in which white owned farms would be seized and redistributed to rural

blacks, Mugabe attempted to first force Britain’s hand into paying compensation to displaced white farmers,

which he could then heavily tax to finance repression expenditures, while using the repossessed land itself as

subsidies in bolstering loyalty networks.

The president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, stepped up pressure on the British government yesterday

by formally announcing a change in law that will allow him to confiscate white-owned farms. The

land grab, which effects up to 841 white farms worth £108m, could come as early as next week unless

Britain offers an improved compensation package. (Source:

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/may/25/zimbabwe.ewenmacaskill).

Unable to force Britain into paying compensations to white farmers displaced from their lands, Mugabe went

ahead with the land grabs. Then using the head of the War Veterans as a proxy negotiated with white farmers

through the CFU (commercial farmers union) to allow them to return to their lands under the condition that

they continue to allow those who had seized their lands to remain on the land and in exchange all violence

against white farmers would cease and all normal farm production would be allowed to restart.

Prior to the June 2000 polls, it seemed that ZANU PF had taken a political stranglehold on the rural

areas, with the acquiescence of the CFU which had agreed to a deal with Chenjerai Hunzvi's

National Liberation War Veterans' Association, a front for the military-backed ZANU PF farm

invasions ....CFU members had to agree, under extreme duress, that squatters could remain on their

land in exchange for no further violence and a return to farm activities. In practice, this meant that

ZANU PF had established bases on most farms .... Indeed, highly placed ZANU PF sources referred

to a two-pronged election campaign strategy centered on the land issue. Mugabe was using the issue

of land, first, to ensure that the ruling party won the polls at any cost; and, second, to build a solid

platform and sell himself as the only candidate who can win a presidential election for the party in

2002, against mounting local and foreign opposition.(Source:

http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2000election1.htm).

This agreement to allow land grabbers to remain on white owned farms even after the original owners were

able to return and continue operating their farms was part of Mugabe and Zanu PF’s election strategy. With

no real tax revenue to expend on repressing the opposition; by maintaining a presence of War Veterans on a

bulk of white owned farms in rural communities Zanu PF essentially created political support bases, as well

and political no go areas. Since MDC had cultivated much of their early support in the urban areas, Zanu PF

and Mugabe were able to successfully use land grabs as both a means of cultivating loyalty networks in rural

communities, as well preventing any MDC incursion into these Moreover, these bases also used intimidation

and violence to pressure rural communities/supporters who had aligned themselves with MDC to realign

themselves with Zanu PF.

In the June parliamentary election, the ruling party won a narrow majority of the 120 contested seats in

the general election (30 out of 150 seats were uncontested and guaranteed to ZANU PF), suggesting

that the land invasions had produced at least some pay-off for the party...Two outstanding attributes of

the ZANU PF regime since independence have been a low regard for the constitution and the

predominance of a political logic in economic decision-making. The synergy between these two factors

in 2000 led the party to embark on its land grab. Faced with a serious challenge from the MDC in the

parliamentary elections, the ruling party needed to win the votes of the disenchanted electorate. After

the regime's economic mismanagement in the 1990s, the state coffers were almost empty. A land grab

gave it new patronage resources to distribute and raised its ideological status as a revolutionary

nationalist party. (Source: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v027/27.2kriger.html)

(IV). Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen how the land reform policy of 2000 in Zimbabwe undertaken by Robert

Mugabe and his ruling Zanu PF party fit in line with the Wentrobe model of autocracy. The central idea on

which the Wentrobe model rests is that: Dictators must find an equilibrium state in which they maximize

their utility, security – hold on power – by balancing reward (loyalty) and punishment (repression). In the

case of Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy of 2000, what we see is an attempt to do just this.

After the voting public rejected the government referendum ahead of parliamentary elections, the

Zanu PF party headed by Robert Mugabe saw that the MDC, an opposition party, was gaining impressive

ground in urban areas and was able to successfully mobilize political support and voter turnout in these areas.

In order for Zanu PF to maintain a majority in parliament, Mugabe realized that he needed to allocate

resources toward cultivating loyalty networks in rural areas, where the MDC had not yet gained any

impressive ground. Thus, if Mugabe and the Zanu PF were to enjoy their monopoly on power by controlling

both the executive and legislative branches of government, they needed to incentivize rural voters to cast

their ballots in favor of Zanu PF and also prevent/repress the opposition from gaining more ground especially

in rural areas. Mugabe was able to accomplish this by instituting a policy of land reform in May 2000,

whereby, the militant wing of Zanu PF – the War Veterans – were given authorization to seize and settle

white owned farms. This issue mobilized poor rural communities for whom the issue of land reform continued

to loom large. After striking a deal with white farmers, the War Veterans and the CFU agreed to allow the

land grabbers to remain on the farms while the original owners would gain back control of farm production.

This allowed for Mugabe and Zanu PF to rally support in rural communities, while also preventing the

opposition from making any significant inroads into these communities.

[i] Model taken from Public Choice III by: Mueller Ch. 18