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14 JOURNALOFCONTEMPORARYEDUCATIONALSTUDIES5/2010 ZdenkoKodelja

Zdenko Kodelja

Theendofwhatdothenarrativesoftheendofeducationtellabout?

Abstract: ThenarrativeofeducationasoneofthefundamentalhumanisticconceptsisoneofthegrandnarrativesthatLyotardpredictedwouldendinthepostmodernera,thetimeimportantlydefinedbytheendofgrandnarratives.Butwemuststoptoaskourselvestheendofwhatthisandsomeothernarrativesoftheendofeducationactuallyare.Thearticle,therefore,attemptstoshow,atleastroughly,thatthereareatleastthreepossibleanswerstothequestion,eachbasedonadifferentunderstandingofeducationanditsspecifichistoricalandtheoreticalbackgrounds.Themainpurposeofthearticle,however,isnottogiveadefiniteanswertothequestion.Onthecon-trary,itspurposeistodefendandjustifytheveryraisingofthequestion.Foritmayseemthattheanswerisobvious,asthenarrativesappeartobeabouttheendofeducationunderstoodasBildung.Buttheproblemispreciselyinthefactthatthedifferenttheories–discussedinthearticle–oftheendofeducationpresupposeitisclearwhattheeducationdenotedbythetermBildungmeans.Ac-cordingly,theyonlycontendwiththeanalysesandinterpretationsofthereasonsforitsend.Althougheachinitsturnoffersfairlyconvincingargumentstosupportthethesisoftheendofeducation,itstillseemstheyareonlyvalidforthenotionofeducationasitisacceptedwithinthecontextofeachindividualtheory.Thatistosay,theseargumentscannotalsobesaidtoprovethegeneralthesisoftheendofeducationunderstoodasBildung.

Keywords:Education,Bildung,paideia,cultura animi,philosophyofeducation

UDC:37.01

Originalscientificpaper

Zdenko Kodelja, Ph.D., senior researcher, Educational Research Institute, Gerbičeva 62,SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia; e-mail: [email protected]

JOURNALOFCONTEMPORARYEDUCATIONALSTUDIES5/2010,14–37

Theendofwhatdothenarrativesoftheendofeducationtellabout? 15

Thenarrativeofeducationasoneofthefundamentalhumanisticconcepts1–havingbeenformed,accordingtoGadamer(2001,pp.2–29),underthedecisiveinfluencesofGoethe,Humboldt,andHerder,andreachingitspeakwithHegel–isamongthegrandnarrativesthatLyotardpredictedwouldmeettheirendinthepresent,postmodernera(Lyotard2002,p.66–69).Thiseraisimportantlydefinedbytheendofgrandnarratives,suchasthenarrativeoftheemancipa-tionoftherationalsubjectthatlegitimizedscienceastheEnlightenmentprojectibidem).Thatistosay,Lyotardisoftheopinionthattheoldprincipleofeducation,whichclaimsthat“theacquisitionofknowledgeisindissociablefromthetraining(Bild ung)ofminds,orevenofindividuals,isbecomingobsoleteandwillbecome

1ThenarrativeofeducationisnotconceivedofasastoryinthegenreoftheBildungsroman(eventhoughtheeducationnovel(theErziehungsroman)–distinguishedbysomefromthedevelopmentnovel(theEntwicklungsroman)–isoneofthenarrativesofeducation),exceptwhenunderstoodasbroadlyasbyRoyce.HeseesHegel’sPhenomenology of SpiritasasortofBildungsroman(Royce1919,p.147),althoughitisaworkofscience(Hyppolite1967,p.17).Thenarrativeofeducationismainlymeanttobeanaccountofthevarioustheoriesofeducation.TheSloveneterm“izobrazba”(education)isequivalenttotheGermanword“Bildung”,havingbeenformedfromtheGerman“(Aus)–bild–ung”,withtheverb“izobraziti”(toeducate)comingfromtheGerman“aus–bilden”(Jakopin1982,p.343).SimilarlytotheGerman“Bildung”(LexikonderPädagogik1971,pp.179–181),thebasemorphemeintheSlovenefamily“obraz”(face),“izobraziti”(toeducate)“hasitsrootsinthedescriptionofthephysicalsactsofcutting(“rezati”),hittingwithablade(“rezilo”),lateralsoformingwithablade,andeventuallydepictingandformingingeneral.”(Jakopin1982,p.343)Hencetheword“obraz”(face)hasoftenbeenrelatedtothederivativesfromthewords“lik–lice”(form–cheek/face),“obličje”(face),“oblika”(shape/form),“obraziti–oblikovati”(toform,togiveshapeto)(ibidem).Consequently,theterm“Bildung”–denotingtwothings:educationasaprocessontheonehand,andeducation/educatednessastheresultoftheprocessontheother–hasfrequentlybeentranslatedintoSlovenenotonlyas“izo-brazba”(education)butalsoas“oblikovanje”(shaping),“izoblikovanje”(givingshapeto),“formiranje”(forming),“omikanje”(cultivation),“omika”(manners),etc.Thesemanticrangeofthetermcanbeevenwiderwhentranslatedintootherlanguages.IntheItaliantranslationsofHegel,wecanthuscomeacrossthefollowingtranslationsoftheterm“Bildung”:“educazione”,“formazionespirituale”,“formazioneculturale”,“processoformativo”,“paideia”,“cultura”,“civiltà”,“educazione-formazionedell’uomo”(Löwith1976,p.84).However,recentItalian,EnglishandGermantextshaveoftenleft“Bildung”untranslatedor,whentheydotranslateit,theykeeptheoriginalinparenthesis,especiallywhentheyarekeenondrawingthedistinctionbetweentheterms“Bildung”and“Erziehung”thatthetermssuchas“educazione”,“education”and“éducation”tendtoblur.Thelatter,namely,oftenserveasthetranslationsforbothterms.


evermoreso.”(Lyotard1984,p.4)Itseemsthatthisthirty-year-oldpredictionofthehumanisticnotionofeducationasaprocessofhumanself-cultivationbecomingobsoleteandoutmodedhasalreadycometrue:Whatisrealizedinknowledge,whichourself-proclaimedknowledgesocietyisbasedon,isthevery“self-awareabsenceofeducation”(Liessmann2009,p.73).

Ifitistruethatuneducatedness(characterizedneitherbyasimplelackofknowledgenoraspecificformofuncultivation,butratherbysuchapproachtoknowledgethatis–intensiveasitcanbe–“beyondanyideaofeducation”)(ibidem,p.10)isrealizedwithintheknowledgeofthe“knowledgesociety,”thenthegrandnarrativeofeducationiscertainlyover.Itsendistoldbythreestoriesandeachtellsit inaspecificway.BesideLyotard’spreviouslymentionedtheoryofthepostmoderncondition,therearealsotwolesswell-knownformulations:Adorno’sThe Theory of Half-Education(Theorie der Halbbildung)andLiessmann’sThe Theory of Uneducation (Theorie der Unbildung).AllthreeofthesetheorizationswerewrittenafterWorldWarII.Adorno’swasfirstpublishedinthelate1950s,Lyotard’sinthelate1970s,andLiessmann’sagoodthreeyearsago.Allofthemanalyzethecausesandeffectsofthedecay(andevendisappearance)ofeducationincontemporaryhighlydevelopedsocieties,andtheyallunderstandeducationasBildung.Thefirsttwotheoriesaremostlyaboutwhatgoesunderthenameofeducation,butwhichisactuallynoeducationatall–itismerehalf-educationoruneducation.Thethirdisaboutthestateofknowledgeinthepostmoderneraand,inthiscontext,alsodifferentiatesknowledgefromeducation,whichprob-ablybroughtabouttheendofthegrandnarrativeofeducation.Butwemuststoptoaskourselvesthis:Whatisthatwhichhasdisappearedoratleastbeenmadeirrelevant?Whathasended?Wasthisonesinglegrandnarrativeknownunderdifferentnames?Ormorenarratives,articulatedinavarietyofthetheoriesofeducationunderstoodasBildung?

The first possible answer

Ontheonehand,itappearsthatonesinglenarrative–althoughforgottenincertainperiods,butalwayswiththesamecontents–isending:thehumanisticideaofeducation.ThiseducationwascalledpaideiainancientGreece,humanitas intheLatinperiod,paideia ChristiintheMiddleAges,studia humanitatis intheRenaissanceandHumanism,andBildung inGermanNeohumanismandlater(Cambi2001,p.158).ItispossibletoconcludethatallthesetermscanbeunderstoodasmerelydifferentexpressionsofoneandthesameideafromthefactthattheRomangrammarianGelliustranslatedtheGreekexpression“paideia”with“humanitas.”2Cicerodidthesame,butheusedadditionalexpressionsas

2ThereferenceistothefamoussentencefromNoctes Atticae(XIII,17)wheretheLatingrammar-ianAulusGelliustranslates“paideia”into“humanitas,”butalsointo“eruditioinstitutioqueinbonasartes.”Weshouldalsotakeintoaccount,claimsMarrou,thatthesametext(XII,16)alsomaintainsthattheexpression“humanitas”hadalreadylostthemeaningof“paideia”inthesecondcenturyandonlyhadthemeaningof“philanthropy”(Marrou1983,p.554).


well,sometimesevenmoreofthemtogether,tobeabletotranslatethatwhichneededonlyonewordinGreek:“paideia”(Marrou1983,p.560).3ItisGellius’stranslationthroughwhich“paideia”–understoodas“educationandtraininginthegoodarts”–takesonthesamemeaningas“humanitas”thatHeideggerreliesonwheninterpretingHumanismasaphenomenon“emergingfromtheencounterofRomancivilizationwithlateGreekeducation”(Heidegger1967,p. 189).Itcon-tinueswithItalianHumanismaftertheMiddleAgesandreappearswithGermanNeohumanism.Ineachcase,thereistheintentiontoreviveGreekcivilizationandtherelatedideaofpaideia.4Asimilarrevivalofthenotionintheformofenkyklios paideia5(called“studiahumanitatis”byCicero6)seemstobestudia humanitatis

3Therearetwosimilarexpressionsregardingtheiroriginanduse:“doctrina”and“disciplina.”Bothalsodenoteculture,but“disciplina”–unlike“doctrina”–hasneverbeenlimitedtoapurelyintellectualreality.Asitssemanticrangeincludesamoralelement,rulesforlife,etc.,itis–accordingtoMarrou–quiteagoodtranslationoftheGreekexpression“paideia”(indeed,muchbetterthan“doctrina”).Tacitus,thus,usedtheexpression“disciplina”withthesamedoublemeaningof“paideia”:theprocessofeducationandformationontheonehand,andtheresultoftheprocess,whichisculture,ontheother.“Disciplina”meanteducationorformationreceivedbyancientorators,thatis,everythingthatcontributedtotheformationandenrichmentofthespirit,i.e.,theirculture(ibidem,pp.554–556).“Doctrina”usuallyhasanarrowermeaningandrefersprimarilytothenarrowerintellectualarea,especiallythestudiesthataretaughtscientifically.Itis,nonetheless,sometimesusedinawidersenseandinsuchinstancesitmeanscultureasactivitythatdevelopsourknowledgeandenrichesourspirit.Again,bothstudiesandtheresultsofthestudiesareindicated.“Doctrina,”therefore,iswhat“effort,work,studiumaddtothenaturalqualitiesofthespirit(natura, ingenium),”butitalsodenotesthewholeofknowledgeorsciencethatwethusacquire–withsciencemeaningcultureaswell.Theexpressions“doctrina”and“disciplina”(intheplural)arealsousedassynonymsforthesci-encethatistaught(mathema).Hence,wereadof“disciplinae(doctrinae)liberales,”thatis,sciencessystematicallytaught(ibidem,pp.556–558).Usedinthegeneralsense,thefollowingexpressionscanalsodenotecultureasthecontentsoftheculturedspirit:“studium”(referringtoboththefervoranddedicationforstudyingandintellectualworkaswellasthesciencesthataretheobjectofthisenthusiasm),“litterae”(inthesenseofknowledgeordisciplines/artsthatdifferfromsciences)and“erudition”(thecultivation,formation,instructionofthemind)(ibidem,pp.558–560).

4“Theso-calledRenaissanceofthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturiesinItalyisarenascentia romanitatis.Becauseromanitasiswhatmatters,itisconcernedwithhumanitasandthereforewithGreekpaideia.ButGreekcivilizationisalwaysseeninitslaterformandthisitselfisseenfromaRomanpointofview.TheHomo romanusoftheRenaissancealsostandsinoppositiontoHomo barbarus.Butnowthein-humaneisthesupposedbarbarismofgothicScholasticismintheMiddleAges.”(Heidegger1978,p.201)

5TheexpressionreferstotheHellenisticidealofgeneraleducationorgeneralculture.Suchedu-cationis,firstly,theeducationthateveryfreeGreekmanwassupposedtohaveifhewantedtobeseenaseducated.Secondly,italsomeanstheeducationacquiredthroughtheprogramofthesevensubjectsordisciplinesthatpredominantlyconsistedofthreeliterary(grammar,rhetoric,dialectics)andfourmathematical(arithmetic,geometry,music,astronomy)disciplines.TheRomanswerethefirsttotakeoverthisprogramofgeneraleducation,understoodaspropedeutics(asbasisforallfurtherstudies),andtheycalledit“artesliberals.”Later,theMiddleAgesinheriteditunderthesamename(Marrou1964,pp.254–265).

6Cicero’sviewofstudia humanitatiscanbediscernedfromhisworkPro Archia,whichisaboutstudia humanitatisasthosedisciplines(artes)thatbelongtoman’shumanity(humanitas).“Studiahumanitatis”is,therefore,onlyanothernameforthesedisciplines,i.e.,thedisciplinesthathelpmantoachievehumanitas.CiceronamesthedisciplinesinhisworkDe oratore,wherehementionspoetry,geometry,music,anddialectics.Consequently,forhim,studia humanitatisisjustanothernamefor artes liberales (Proctor1988,pp.14–16).


intheperiodofItalianHumanism.7Ifthisistrue,thenwhenHeideggersaysthat“astudium humanitatis,whichinacertainwayreachesbacktotheancientsandthusbecomesarevivalofGreekcivilization,alwaysadherestohistoricallyunderstoodHumanism,”thismustalsobetrueoftheGermanhumanismoftheeighteenthcenturywithitsproponentsWincklemann,Goethe,andSchiller(Heidegger1978,p.201).8

Seenfromthisperspective, itdoesseemthattheexpressions“paideia,”“humanitas,”“enkykliospaideia,”“studiahumanitatis,”and“Bildung”denoteoneandthesameideaofhumanisticeducation.ThisisanindispensablepartofthephenomenonwithalongtraditionintheWest,startinginRomanantiquityandlastinguptothepresentday.Nevertheless,suchanunderstandingofhumanisticeducationandHumanismisnottrouble-free.ThesourceofthetroublesandwrongassumptionsisGellius’sabove-mentionedtranslationoftheGreekexpression“paideia”into“humanitas.”BritishhistorianBullock,discussingpaideiainhisbookonthehumanistictraditionintheWest,simplywritesthattheLatinword“humanitas”isaRomanvariantoftheolderGreekidea(Bullock1985,p.11).However,Proctormaintainsthatsuchaninterpretationismisleading(Proctor1988,p.204).ProctorcomestothisassessmentonthebasisofGiustiniani’sconclusionthat“[h]umanitas doesnothaveanycorrespondingterminGreek.Ifitisusedaspaideia,itisasynecdocheortotum pro parte”(Giustiniani1985,p.184–185).9AccordingtoGiustiniani,thereasonthatthewordsshareasemanticfield-arguablyduetothesignificantinfluencesofVarroandCicero–liesintheGreekandRomanconceptionsofahumanbeing.Theconceptionsdiffer,buttheybothrepresentthehighestlevelofperfectionahumanbeingshouldstrive

7Thefirstauthortoborrowtheexpression“studiahumanitatis”fromCicerowasSalutati,anditwasslightlylatermorespecificallydefinedbyBruni.Heuseditasadesignationforthespecificcorpusofdisciplines(grammar,rhetoric,poetry,history,andmoralphilosophy)thatnowexcludegeometry.Theveryexclusionofgeometryshows,accordingtosomeinterpreters,aradicalshiftinunderstandingofwhatthehumanityofahumanepersonis(ibidem,p.14).Yetweshouldnotoverlookthefactthatstudia humanitatiswereonlyseenasameanstowardsthecreationofaperfectperson(“humanitatisstudianuncupantur,quodhominemperficiant”)andthatartes liberaleshadtheirnamenotsomuchbecausetheybefittedfreecitizens,butmostlybecausetheyfreedthem(“idcircoestliberalis,quodliberoshominesfacit”)(Garin1975,p.10).

8Historicallyunderstood,Humanismdiffersfromthosekindsofhumanism–suchasMarx’shu-manismandSartre’sexistentialism–thatcan,despiteeverything,beunderstoodas“aconcernthatmanbecomefreeforhishumanityandfindworthinit,”sincetheydonot“needtoreturntoantiquity”fortheirsubstantiationandlegitimation(ibidem).Still,“[h]oweverdifferenttheseformsofhumanismmaybeinpurposeandinprinciple,inthemodeandmeansoftheirrespectiverealizations,andintheformoftheirteaching,theynonethelessallagreeinthis,thatthehumanitasofhomo humanusisdeterminedwithregardtoanalreadyestablishedinterpretationofnature,history,world,andthegroundoftheworld,thatis,ofbeingsasawhole.”(Ibidem)Thatiswhy“[e]veryhumanism,”saysHeidegger,“iseithergroundedinametaphysicsorisitselfmadetobethegroundofone.”(Ibidem,pp.201-202)

9ProctorreliesonSchadewaldt’sanalysisoftheoriginsoftheword“humanitas”asentirelyLatin,theexpressionbeingtheconsequenceofthespecificsofRomancharacterandhistory.ItisbasedonearlierRomanvirtues,suchasclementia,fides,andaequitas.ItissimultaneouslytheoppositeofandadditionaltooldRomanvirtues(gravitas,dignitas,severitas).Ciceroexpandeditsmeaningstillfurtherbyincludingtheareasofmoralphilosophy,culture,andeducationintoitssemanticrange(Proctor1988,pp.204–206).


for–humanitasintheRomanconceptionandpaideiaintheGreekone(ibidem,185–186).Butwhatmayexplainwhythedifferencebetweenthetwonotionswasblurreddoesnotatall justifytheblurringitself,whichbeganwiththeLatintranslationstatedabove(makingitseemasifpaideiaandhumanitaswereoneandthesamething).ForGiustiniani,theyaretwodifferentnotions:paideiapre-dominantlyreferstoculture,whereashumanitasmeanslearning,butitincludesothervaluesaswell(e.g.,character,virtues,etc.)(ibidem,p.185).

Theauthorclaimsthat “/t/hesevaluesaremuchmore importantthanHeideggerseemstoadmit”(ibidem,p.185),10whendeclaring:“Homo humanusheremeanstheRoman,whoexaltedandhonoredRomanvirtusthroughthe‘embodi-ment’ofthepaideia[education]takenoverfromtheGreeks”(Heidegger1978,p.200).ThispaideiaisthenidentifiedinthesamewayasinGellius’stranslation,thatis,as“eruditioetinstitutioinbonasartes[scholarshipandtrainingingoodconduct]”(ibidem,pp.200–201).Thiscanleadtotheconclusionthat–accordingtotheinterpretation–theRomanhomo humanusisactuallyamanwhodoesnotonlyembodyRomanvirtues,butalsopossessesthekindofeducationprovidedbybonae artes.11ThesegoodartsbeingaRomanvariantoftheGreekenkyklios paideia,itfollowsthatwhatGelliustranslatedashumanitasisnotpaideiainallitsdimensions,butratherenkyklios paideia.ThismakesGellius’stranslationmisleadingbothwhenitequatespaideiaandhumanitasandwhenittranslatespaideiaas“eruditio institutioque inbonasartes.”Giustinianibelievesthat“HeideggerismisledbytheLatintranslationofpaideiawithhumanitas,atermwhicheasilysuggestsaconnectionwithHumanism”(Giustiniani1985,p.184).Therearetwoaspectsthatrevealthis.First,HeideggeroverlookedthespecificityoftheRomanhumanitas,whichiswithoutaGreekequivalent.Hethereforethoughtthat“genuineromanitas of homo romanusconsistedinsuchhumanitas,”whichwasnothingbutGreekpaideia,seenas“educationandtraininginthegoodarts.”Second,hesawhumanitasastheoriginandessenceofhistoricalHumanismthatcannotbeanythingelsethanaresurgenceofGreekpaideia.“ThisinterpretationmaybetrueforGermanNeuhumanismus,”writesGiustiniani,but“itdoesnotfitancientRomanHumanismorItalianumanesimo.”(Ibidem,p.184)12Heidegger’sthesisthateveryhumanismismetaphysical (Heidegger1985,p.190) isalso

10Oneofthevaluesisthemanwhostandsagainstdestiny.ThisisatypicalRomanconception,“oppositetotheGreeksubmissiontothemoira(fate)andunknowntoGreekpaideia,towhichHeideggertriestorelateevery‘historical’Humanism.”(Ibidem,p.191)

11Thisisoneoftheequivalentexpressions(artes liberales,artes libero dignae,doctrina,etc.)thatCicerousedtorefertotheprogramofliberalarts,foundedundertheinfluenceoftheHellenisticprogramcalledenkyklios paideia(Marrou1983,pp.108–109).

12WehavealreadystatedGiustiniani’sreasonsagainstequatingGreekpaideiawithRomanhuma nitas.TheauthorwritesthatItalianumanisti“madeeveryefforttosetupatheoryofedu-cationcomparabletopaideiaortoGreekeducationingeneral. (…)TheyalsoeagerlytranslatedIsocrates’sandPlutarch’spaedagogicalwritingsandsharedPlotinus’sassumptionthatmanhastomodelhimselfinthewayasculptorsmoothsandshapeshiswork.”(Ibidem,p.186)OnlyfromthispointofviewcanItalianumanesimobecomparedwithNeohumanism.ButunlikeNeohumanism,whereGreekpaideiawastheclimaxofallpedagogicalaspiration,thepedagogicaltheoryofItalianhumanistswastheresultoftheirownworkanditwasveryoftendifferentformthetheoryoftheirpredecessors(ibidem,p.186).


problematical.Ifeveryhumanismismetaphysical,thenthismustalsoapplytohistoricalHumanism,includingItalianRenaissanceHumanism.However,refer-ringtothisasmetaphysicalphilosophyisquestionable,sinceopinionsonwhetherItalianRenaissanceHumanismreallyisphilosophyaredivided.13

Thevariousinterpretationsofhumanism(andofhumanisticeducation)donotsettlethequestionaboutwhetherwearereadingonlyone,albeitdiscontinued,narrative;morevarietiesofthenarrative;ordifferentnarratives.Inspiteofthat,theverynarrativeofhumanisticeducationiscertainlyoneofthepossibleanswerstothequestionaskedatthebeginningofthisarticleaboutwhatgrandnarrativeoftheendofeducationactuallyendedinthepostmodernera.

The second possible answer

AnothernarrativethatmaybeassumedtohaveendedinthepostmodernerawasbegunatthetimeoftheattemptsattheHellenizationofearlyChristianityandthesimultaneousChristianizationofGreekculture.ThiswaswhenGreekpaideia,understoodastheprocessofhumanformation,becamethemodelforwhatJaegercallsChristianpaideia(Jaeger1961,pp.25,117).14GregoryofNyssarepeatedlyemphasizesthatmorphosisistheveryessenceofChristianpaideia,thatis,theformationoftheperfectChristian.Nevertheless,henoticesacrucialdifferencebetweenthem.Thedifferenceispreciselythatwhich–throughtheprocessofformation–makesanindividualaGreek(asopposedtoabarbarianandignoramus)oraChristian.Intheformercase,itisfirstandforemostGreekliterature,aswellasallotherdisciplines,thatisincludedinenkyklios paideia;inthelattercaseitistheBible.“TheformationoftheChristianman,hismorphosis,istheeffectofhisunceasingstudyoftheBible.TheformisChrist.ThepaideiaoftheChristianisimitation Christi:Christmusttakeshapeinhim.”(Ibidem,pp.92–93)

SuchaviewoftheformationoftheChristianmanasaChristianhaspersisteduptothepresentday,butthishasnotbeentheonlyperspective.Justasimpor-tantistheviewbasedontheideaofmanasabeingmadeintheimageofGod.Ahumanbeingisthusimago Dei;undertheinfluenceofPlatonism,theChristiansoulwasunderstoodaswax,receivingGod’sstampatthetimeofcreation.Inthissense,AugustinespokeofpeopleasGod’scoins.15Later,intheMiddleAges,

13Tosimplifythematter,therearetwoopposinginterpretations.ThefirstseesItalianHuman-ismasthephilosophyoftheRenaissancethatwentupagainstScholasticism.Theotherassertsthatumanesimo–althoughsomeItalianhumaniststriedhardtoestablishtheirownphilosophyofman–wassomethingdifferentfromanewphilosophyfromtheverybeginning.GiustinianidulyquotesKristellerandGarin,twoprominentexpertsinthefield,ashavingopposinganswerstothequestionofwhetherItalianHumanismwasphilosophyornot(Giustiniani1985,p.187).

14Oneofitsvariantsisalsopaideia tou kyriouorthepaideia of God,whichdenotesGod’seduca-tionalworkingsinrelationtopeople,suchasisdescribedintheBible(e.g.,Ephesians6,4).ClementofAlexandriatakesGreekpaideiaasabasisforhisinterpretationofChristastheembodimentofLogos,astheteacher(didaskalos)ofallhumanity(ibidem,pp.25,60–64,133).

15“SicettunummusDeies”(inAssmann2002,p.22).


theChristianmysticBernardofClairvauxalsoputforwardtheviewofmanasimago DeiinthecenteroftheChristiannotionofthespiritualformationoftheChristian,i.e.,hiseducation,whichisavariationonthethemeofGod’simage(forma).16Thiseducation,ortakingshape,hasthreephases:deformare(man’sdeformationofGod’sfaceduetotheoriginalsin),conformare(gettingclosertoman’sGod’simagethroughfaithandlove),andreformare(thereformationofmanthroughGod’sgraceandlove).ThefirsttointroducethisscholasticterminologyintoGermanwasMeisterEckhartinthefourteenthcentury;hedevelopedhisownversionoftheteachingongrowingintothelikenessofGod.Thisinterpretationclaimsthatmanispredestinedtobecomegotformelich,thatis,toassumeGod’simage.ButhecannotachievethatinanyotherwaybutthroughGod’sgrace.ThesoullookingforGodmustrenounceeverything,notonlysensuality,butalsohisorherimage(bildunge),asitmusttakeanimageinGod(EckhartinAssmann2002,pp.22–23).17OnlyinhissearchforGodcanman–whoseseedofthedivinenaturehasneverbeentakenaway,buthasonlybeenconcealed–reallyformhimself.Hisformationisonly–andnowhereelsebut–inhisbeingtheimageofGod.ThisiswhyBildungisshownintheBild(Gennari1995,p.25).

ThemysticalbeliefinmancarryinginhissoultheimageofGodistheoriginoftheGermanword“Bildung”(Gadamer2004,p.10).18“Bilden”meanstoformGod’simageinthehumansoul,and“Bild”istheimageofGodthathumanbe-ingscarrywithintheirsouls,astheyaremadeafteritbutstillhavetoformitinthemselves.Inthiscontext,then,educationhasthesamemeaningasthespiritualformationofman,whichshouldbeunderstoodasaradicalreformationofmanaccordingtoGod’simageinhissoul.ThisisthepointwheretheChristianconceptofeducationasspiritualformationdiffersfromtheancientone,whichhastheprinciplesofformationandgrowthatitscenter.Assmannexplainsthisdifferenceusingthemetaphorsoftheseedandtheseal.Theseedisapossibility,adispositionthat–ifcultivated–canbloomandripen.Thesealisamark,astampthatgivesidentitytosomeobjectorpersonregardlessoftime.Assmannmaintainsthatthedifferencemeltedawayintheeighteenthcentury,whenthenotionofeducationbecamesecularized,whichshowsinthefactthattheideaoftotaleducationwasdroppedandtheideaofgradualgrowthwasadopted.Atthattime,thenotionofeducationgotitssemanticframe,whichisactuallytheheritageofbothancientRomanandGreekandChristiantraditions.Itinheritedtheprincipleofgrowth

16“Lovethestampandtheimagethatyoubearwithinyou.Fortheimage(forma)ofyourMakertoshineeverymorebrightlywithinyou,comeclosertoHimthatislovewithyourloveandwork(conforma).…AlthoughourbodydraggedthesoulwithitwhenseparatedfromGodandalthoughourearthlyneedscloudourthoughtsthatstrivetoomuchforearthlythings,thenewcommandmentofGod’slovefortheimageofGodstillreforms(reformat)uswhomsinhasdeformed(tamen peccato deformatos).”(Bernard,De charitate21.68,inAssmann2002,pp.22–23)

17TheGermanmysticsofthefourteenthcenturyusedthewords‘education’(Bildung)and‘image’(Bild)assynonyms(ibidem,p.23,fn.19).

18“TheLatinequivalentforBildungis‘formation’”;inEnglish(e.g.,inShaftesbury),theequiva-lentsare“form”and“formation.”InGerman,“Formierung”and“Formation”havelongviedwiththewordBildung,buttheydonothavethesamerichnessofmeaning,,since“theideaof‘form’lacksthemysteriousambiguityofBild,whichcomprehendsbothNachbild(image,copy)andVorbild(model).”(Ibidem)


fromantiquity,andtheemphasisonthehumaninteriorityandindividualityfromChristianity(Assmann1993,p.24).

Thenew,seculardimensionoftheconceptofeducationispresentinsomeofHerderandHumboldt’swritings,whicharecrucialfortheNeohumanisticno-tionofeducation.Herder’scentraldefinitionofthenotionofBildungwasthatof“risinguptohumanitythroughculture”(Gadamer2004,p.9).19Inthecontextofhisculture,Herderwritesof“thetransitionfromtheeruditionbasedonancientlanguagesandencyclopedicknowledgetotheeducationrelatedtothenationallanguage.Educationisseparatedfromtheprogramofhumanisticstudiesandtheelitistlimitsoftheoldphilology,andisfascinatingasanunfinishedprocessofaspecificgrowthandtheformationofourownculturalcharacter.”20(Assmann2002,p.25)Thus,Herdermakesadistinctionbetweenlearning(Gelehrsamkeit)andeducation(Bildung).Heseeseducationtobethe“nationalizationofculture,anaspectofculturethatisanallyofhistory.Thisiswhatmakeseducationdif-ferentfromthelearningofHumanismorfromthelearningoftheEnlightenment.”(Ibidem,pp.25–26)

Besidenationalizationandhistorizationastwocharacteristicsofeduca-tion,Assmannintroducesathird,whichsignifiesthetransferofcultureintothehumanbeing.Humboldtdistinguishesamongcultivation(Bildung),culture,andcivilization.Forhim,civilizationisthehumanizationofpeoplesintheiroutwardinstitutionsandcustoms,andcultureisscienceandart,butheseescultivationtobe“somethingatthesametimehigherandmoreinward,namelythedisposi-tionthat,fromtheknowledgeandfeelingoftheentirementalandmoralen-deavour,poursoutharmoniouslyupontemperamentandcharacter.”(Humboldt1999,pp.34–35;seealsoIzzo1993,p.21)Eventhougheducation(cultivation)isnotdefinedveryprecisely,someothertextsbytheauthorrevealthatinfacthemeanstheprocessofhumanself-cultivation(thedevelopmentandperfectionofallhumanstrengthsinthedirectionofawell-balancedwhole),whichtakesplaceintheindividual’sinteractionwiththeoutsideworldandculture(Lüth1998,pp.43–60).Thisprocess,however,isnotpossiblewithouttwoconditionsbeingfulfilled:theindividual’sfreedomandthevarietyofexternalcircumstances(Humboldt1969–1981,p.64).Onlyiftheindividualisfreeishis/herformationthroughrelationshipswithotherspossible,sinceonlyfreedomcanguaranteeindependencewhenacceptingorrejectingexternalinfluences.Thevarietyofex-ternalcircumstances,presentingthestimulifortheindividual’sdevelopment,isnecessaryfortheindividualtodevelopallofhis/herstrengths(physical,mental,andmoral).Thisiswhy,Humboldtbelieves,schoolcurriculumsshouldalsobedesignedsothatschoolsubjectsandstudydisciplineswouldformallpupils’andstudents’strengths(ibidem,188).Theattemptsattherealizationofthisidea

19TheEnglishtranslationrenders“Bildung”with“culture”and“EmporbildungzurHumanität”with“risinguptohumanitythroughculture”(Gadamer2004,p.9).

20“ThankGod,wearealreadyhalfwaytoLatinnolongerbeingtheLanguageofApollo,andthatoutbarbaricmothertongueisbecomingpopular,thatintellectuals…nolongerwriteasiftheywereinschooloracademy.Letwritinginthenationallanguageprevailinallwritingsthatarebasedoneducation[Bildung]thatIheredistinguishfromlearning[Gelehrsamkeit]”(Herder1786inAssmann2002,p.25)


weretheHumboldthighschoolanduniversity.Weshouldalsoemphasizethatstudyingantiquity(especiallytheancientGreeklanguageandculture21)isavitalpartofhumanisticeducationasconceivedbyHumboldt.Nonetheless,hedoesnotconsiderancientGreeksanidealtobecopied(thoughhedoesadmirethem);rather,duetotheiruniqueness,heviewsthemasapossiblesourceofinspirationforthecreationofanewindividuality(Lüth1998,p.54).

SuchaNeohumanisticconceptofeducationthatclosely linkseducationwithcultureandisseenas“theonlypossibilitytobringmanfrombarbaritytocivilization,fromhisbeingunderagetoautonomy”(Liessmann2009,p.54)pointstoanotherimportantchangeinthedevelopmentofBildung.Atthattime,thepreviouslywidelyspreadideaofa“naturalform”–whichrefersto“externalappearance(theshapeofthelimbs,thewell-formedfigure)andingeneraltotheshapescreatedbynature(e.g.amountainformation–Gebirgsbildung)”–was“detachedalmostentirelyfromthenewidea”(Gadamer2004,p.9).Ontheotherhand,Neohumanismbroughtwithitachangeintheconceptionofthedifferencebetweeneducationandculture.Educationnolongermeantcultureinthesenseofcultivatingone’snaturalcapacitiesandtalents,asmaintainedbyKantwhenmentioningthedutyofnotlettingone’stalentsrustamongdutiestooneself(Kant1977,p.19).WhenHegeltakesupKant’sideaofdutiestooneself,henolongerspeaksofcultivationbutofself-cultivation(Sichbilden)andeducation(Bildung)(Gadamer2004,p.9).22Hedevelopsthesenotions,keytotheunderstandingofeducation,invarioustexts,butheexplainstheminthemostconciseandsimplewayinhisposthumouslypublishedThe Philosophical Propedeutic.23Init,hefirststressesthathumanbeingshaveadutynotonlytosustainthemselvesphysically,butalsotoraisethemselvestotheiruniversalnature,thatis,toeducatethemselves.Here,educationdenotesapathtosomethinguniversal,awayforpeopletomakeuniversalspiritualbeingsofthemselves.Humanbeingsasspiritualandrationalbeings–asopposedtoanimals,whicharebynatureonlywhattheyareandwhattheycanbe–arenotbynaturewhattheyoughttobe(Hegel1968,§41).Theycanonlybecomethisiftheyareeducated.Withouteducation,theycannotreachuniversality.Thisiswhatmakeseducationahumanduty,adutytooneself.

21Greekculturehasaspecialeducationalvalueforhim,sinceitcanbeunderstoodas“paradigmaticforthewholehumanity”(Liessmann2009,p.50).

22Gadamerclaimsthatthischange,notonlyterminological,butalsoconceptualinnature,isalsoimportantbecauseHegelistheauthorwhobestexplainswhatBildungis.

23ThefivegymnasiumspeechesthatHegelgaveasthedirectoroftheNürnbergGymnasiumbe-tween1809and1815arealsoveryimportantifwearetounderstandhisconceptofeducation.Thefirstspeechputsaspecialemphasisonthestudyofantiquityandtheeffectsoflearningclassicallanguagesandgrammaroneducation.Thesecondfocusesonthenotionofdisciplineandontherelationshipbetweenmoralandscientificeducation.Thethirdisaboutschoolasaninstitutionplacedbetweenthechild’sfamilylifeandthepubliclifeoftheadult.Thefourthoncemorestressestheimportanceofstudyingantiquityinlightofthecompleteformationoftheindividual.Inthefifth,thecrisisofcontemporaryeducationisexplainedwiththeoppositionbetweenthetraditionalandmodernviewsrelatedtoeducation(Hegel1978,pp.75–130).


Hegelmakesadistinctionbetweentwotypesofeducation:theoreticalandpractical(ibidem,§42–43).24Bothpresupposealienationasanecessarycondition.25Theoreticaleducationisactuallyalienationinitself,asitisabouttheindirect,thealien,thethingsbelongingtomemory,memorizingandthinking(Hegel1978,p.84).Assuch,itallowsmantoelevatehimself“abovetheparticularknowledgeofinsignificantthingsthatsurroundhimtoauniversalknowledge”(Hegel1968,§42).Learningforeignlanguagesisalsoalienation.Wecannotlearnthemdirectly.Acquiringsomethingforeign,namely,requiresalienationfromwhatisone’sown.Thisiswhyweneedtoalienateourselvesfromourselvesinordertobeabletogetclosertotheforeignanddifferent(Löwith2006,p.308).Thisisespeciallyobviouswhenlearningclassicallanguages,sincetheworldofantiquityweenterinthiswayissofarandalienthatitpresentsuswithanobstacleseparatingusfromourselves.Atthesametime,itcontains“alltheexitpointsandthreadsofthereturntooneself,forbecomingacquaintedwithitandforfindingoneselfagain,butoneselfaccordingtothetrulyuniversalessenceofspirit”(Hegel1978,p.85).Gadamerseesthesewordstobe“theclassicist’sprejudicethatitisparticularlyintheworldofclassicalantiquitythattheuniversalnatureofthespiritcanmosteasilybefound,”buthealsoadmitsthat“thebasicideaiscorrect.Torecognizeone’sowninthealien,tobecomeathomeinit,isthebasicmovementofthespirit,whosebeingconsistsonlyinreturningtoitselffromwhatisother”(Gadamer2004,p.13).Alltheoreticaleducationisonlythecontinuationofaprocessofeducationthatbeginsmuchearlier,aseachindividual“whoraiseshimselfoutofhisnaturalbeingtothespiritualfindsinthelanguage,customs,andinstitutionsofhispeopleapre-givenbodyofmaterialwhich,asinlearningtospeak,hehastomakehisown.ThuseveryindividualisalwaysengagedintheprocessofBildungandingettingbeyondhisnaturalness,inasmuchastheworldintowhichheisgrowingisonethatishumanlyconstitutedthroughlanguageandcustom.…ThuswhatconstitutestheessenceofBildungisclearlynotalienationassuch,butthereturntooneself–whichpresupposesalienation,tobesure”(ibidem,p.13).

Practicaleducationbeginswithalienation,too,onlyhereitisthealienationfromhumans’naturalwantsandimpulses.Suchalienationisnotaflightawayfromone’snature;rather,itisrisingtouniversality,toreflectionandwisdomthatmakeitpossibleforhumanstocontrolthemselves,andconsequentlytodirectthegratificationoftheirwantsandimpulses,tobeablenotonlytoconfinetheirgratificationofnaturalwantstowithinthelimitsofnecessity,butalsotosacrificethemforhigherduties(Hegel1968,p.43).Educationcanbeexplainedthroughthedialecticsoflabor,asdevelopedinHegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit.Laborissuppresseddesire;suppresseddesireisthebasisofeducationasBildung.Intheprocessoflabor,humanbeingsformthemselvesthroughtheveryformationoftheobject(Hyppolite1967,p.372).Thecultivationoftheoutsideworldisat

24Inadditiontotheoreticalandpracticaleducation,Hegelalsomentionsintellectualandmoraleducation,whichgivesmanthecapacitytofulfillduties towards othersratherthanhimself.Hecallsthesedutiesrealduties,whilethedutiesthatrelatetoman’sowneducationareofamoreformalnature(Hegel1968,§46).

25InHegel’stheory,“thereisnoeducationwithoutalienation”(Bourgeois1978,p.53).


thesametimealsothecultivationofthehumanself.Thecultivationoftheselfassuppresseddesireisinfactthenegationofinnernature,therenunciationofthenaturalself.Ontheotherhand,theprocessoflaborisalsotheinternaliza-tionoftheestrangedexternality,whichisahumanproductandassuchawayofappropriatingtheestrangedobjectasone’sown.Inthiscontext,theprocessofhumaneducationshowsitselftobetheprocessofself-formationthroughtheprocessoflabor,thatis,throughtheprocessesofobjectification,externalizationintheoutsideworld,therecognitionofoneselfintheestrangedexternalobjectivity,andthentheappropriationoftheobjectasone’sown.

Hegel’snotionofeducation,roughlysketchedhere,makesitclearthathisisnotmerelythecontinuationofthenarrativeofhumanisticeducation,eventhoughHegelascribesaveryimportanteducationalroletostudyingantiquityandclassicallanguages.AsopposedtoHumanism,whichassumeseducationtobe“aspontaneousandharmonicdevelopmentofallone’snaturalpowers,”Hegel’sviewstressesthealienationoftheselffromthenaturalbeingandspontaneity.Withoutalienation,withoutaradicalbreakwithdirectness,withoutthenegationofinnernature,educationisnotpossibleatall(ibidem,pp.372–373).

The third possible answer

Thethirdnarrativethatmayhaveendedinthepostmoderntimeisrelatedtotheprevioustwo.Itisthetheorysuggestingthattheonlytrueeducationisthecultura animi.Thephrase“culturaanimi”isfirstfoundinCicero,whenhewritesthat“asallthefieldswhicharecultivatedarenotfruitful…itisnoteverymindwhichhasbeenproperlycultivatedthatproducesfruit;and,togoonwiththecomparison,asafield,althoughitmybenaturallyfruitful,cannotproduceacropwithoutdressing,soneithercanthemindwithouteducation;suchistheweaknessofeitherwithouttheother.Whereasphilosophyisthecultureofthemind[culturaanimi]:thisitiswhichplucksupvicesbytheroots;preparesthemindforthereceivingofseed;commitsthemtoit,or,asImaysay,sowsthem,inthehopethat,whencometomaturity,theymayproduceaplentifulharvest”(Cicero2007,II,5).26

Thisclearlyrevealstwothings.First,theclassicalLatinwords“cultura”and“colere”originallymeantthecultivationoffields,growingplants,andrearinganimals,buttheywerealsousedintheirmetaphoricalsensetoexplainsomething

26“Namutagrinonomnesfrugiferisuntquicoluntur…sicaniminonomnescultifructumferunt.Atque,utineodemsimiliverser,utagerquamvisfertilissineculturafructuosusessenonpotest,sicsinedoctrinaanimus;itaestutraqueressinealteradebilis.Culturaautemanimiphilosophiaest;haecextrahitvitiaradicitusetpraeparatanimosadsatusaccipiendoseaquemandatiset,utitadicam,serit,quaeadultafructusuberrimosferant.”(CiceroII,13)However,thecomparisonbetweencultivatingthefieldandthehumanmindisolder.ItisascribedtoPlutarch,whousesitasanillu-strationforthethreeelementsofthesophisticnotionofeducation(nature,instruction,practice).Justassuccessfulfarmingrequiresfertilesoil,askillfulfarmer,andgoodseeds,successfuleducationrequiresthechild’snaturaltalents,theteacher,instruction,andadvice(Plutarco1996,pp.65–66;seealsoJaeger1986,p.312).


thatispartofthemind.Thiswasthebeginningof“culturaanimi”and“ingenii”(Marrou1983,pp.550–551).27Second,thequotationshowsthatcultura animiasdefinedbyCiceroisphilosophy.Philosophy,therefore,isthesciencethatenablesthecultivationofthemind.Cicero,writesMarrou,didnottranslate“paideia”with“culturaanimi,”althoughtheformermeantthecultureofthemind.Instead,heusedtheneologism“humanitas” (ibidem,p.554),and“enkykliospaideia”wastranslatedwith“studiahumanitatis.”Thispointstotheconclusionthathistranslationwasduetothefactthateducationasprovidedbystudia humanitatisisnotyettruecultura animi.Itis,nonetheless,itsprecondition,beingthebasisforallhigherstudies,includingphilosophy,whichiscultura animi(ibidem,pp.222–223).

Later,atthebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury,Baconusedtheexpressions“culturaanimi”and“georgicaanimi”inhisdiscussionsonethics,withthetermsretainingtheoriginalmeaningofcultureasfarmingandcultivatingfields.28Thestyleofwritingonthecultureofthemindintermsoftheeducationandspiritualformationofhumanbeings(withobvioushorticulturalmetaphors)continuedinComenius’sfamousworkDidactica Magna.29

Kantalsospeaksaboutthecultureofthemindinhislecturesonpedagogy(Kant1803).30Forhim,thecultureofthemind(Cultur der Seele)isasubspeciesofculture,andcultureitselfis“whatmakesmandifferentfromanimals”(ibidem,p.481).Assuch,cultureisoneofthebasicelementsofeducation;31withoutit,

27MarrouanalyzesCicero’sandothertextsfromantiquitytoshowthattheterm“cultus”(referringtobothcultureandreligiousworship),whenusedinisolation,sometimesalsomeanteducation.Theancientsthusspokeof“colereamicitiam,fidem,virtutes”or“coleredicendiartem,studiumphilosophiae,”justaswetodayspeakofcultivatingrhetoricalskills,philosophy,andsuchlike(ibidem,p.551).

28“PartiemurigiturEthicamindoctrinasprincipalesduas;alteramdeExemplarisiveImagineBoni;alteramdeRegimineetCulturaAnimi,quametiampartemGeorgica Animiappelareconsuevimus.IllaNaturamBonidescribit,haecRegulasdeanimoadillamconformandopraescribit[WhereforeIwilldividemoralknowledgeintotwoprincipalparts;theone‘theExemplarPlatformofGood’,theother‘theRegimentorCultureoftheMind’,whichIalsocalltheGeorgics of the Mind;theonedescribingthenatureofgood,theotherprescribingruleshowtoaccommodatethewillofmanthereunto].”(Bacon1623VII,1;Englishtranslationqtd.fromBacon1869).Theexpression“thegeorgicsofthemind”verylikelyhasthesamemeaningasthe“cultivationofthemind,”referringasitistothecollectionofpoetryentitledGeorgicabytheRomanpoetVergil,wheretheidylliclifeoffarmingisdescribed.

29Comenius,whowasgreatlyinspiredbyBacon’sphilosophy(thetitleofhisworkwasalsoprobablyinfluencedbyBacon’sInstauratio Magna),writes:“Thedutyoftheteachersoftheyoung,therefore,isnoneotherthantoskillfullyscattertheseedsofinstructionintheirminds,andtocarefullywaterGod’splants, increaseandgrowthwillcomefromabove,”i.e., fromGod,whocreateseverything.(Didactica Magna,XVI,2;Englishtranslationqtd.fromKeatinge1991,p.111)

30WhenreadingandquotingthisworkbyKant,wemusttakeintoaccountthatthetexts(orparts)ofuniversitylectureswerecollectedandeditedbyhisstudentFriedrichTheodorRink.ItisalsonotknownwhetherhepublishedKant’stextsasawholeandinthesameorderastheywerewrittenintheirmanuscript.Thestructureofthetextsseemsnottobeeditedcarefullyenough;therearere-petitionsandtheconceptsdonotdevelopproportionally.Rinkalmostcertainlyalsoaddedthetitles(Development,On physical education,On practical education)(Philonenko1987).

31Kantdefinesupbringing(Erziehung)asnursing/care(Wartung),discipline(Zucht)andinstruc-tion(Unterweisung)togetherwitheducation(Bildung) ( ibidem,p.457),buthealsodefinesitasnursing/careandeducation(Bildung),witheducationbeingeithernegative(discipline,whichmerelypreventsfaults)orpositive(instructionanddirection).Positiveeducationbelongstoculture(ibidem,p.467).Education,therefore,consistsofdisciplineandculture.Yetthisdivisionisunclear,asKant


humanbeingscannotbecomehumanatall(ibidem,p.459).Tobecomehuman,theymust firstbedisciplined,thencultured,civilized,andmoralizedintheprocessofeducation(ibidem,p.465).32Inthiscontext,cultureisseenasaprocessofcultivation,notasitsproduct,whichisthecombinationofculturedorcivilizedwaysoflivingandthinking.33Culturethusunderstoodisactuallynothingbutthestrengtheningofone’smentalpowers(ibidem,p.481).Kantdistinguishesbetweentwotypesofcultureofthefacultiesofthemind:generalandparticular.Theparticularcultureofthefacultiesofthemindisdividedintolower(intellect,memory,attention,senses,imagination)andhigher(understanding,judgment,reason)mentalfaculties(ibidem,p.491).Thegeneralcultureofthefacultiesofthemindstrengthensallmentalpowers.Itcanbeeitherphysicalormoral.Physicalculturedependsonpracticeanddiscipline,34whereasmoralculturedependsonmaxims(ibidem,p.490).35

writeselsewherethatphysicalculture(distinctfrommoralculture)isbasedonpracticeanddiscipline(ibidem,p.490).Consequently,thiscallsintoquestionthedivisionofeducationandupbringingintonegative(discipline)andpositive(culturewithitsteachingandinstruction)parts.ThisconclusionissupportedbyKant,whenhedefinesdisciplineas“aculturebywayoftraining”inhisCritique of Judgement.(“Itconsistsintheliberationofthewillfromthedespotismofdesireswhereby,inourat-tachmenttocertainnaturalthings,wearerenderedincapableofexercisingachoiceofourown.Thishappenswhenweallowourselvestobeenchainedbyimpulseswithwhichnatureonlyprovidedusthattheymightserveasguidancetopreventourneglecting,orevenimpairing,theanimalelementinournature,whileyetweareleftfreeenoughtotightenorslackenthem,tolengthenorshortenthem,astheendsofourreasondemand.”(Kant2007,p.260)).

32“To disciplinemeanstoattempttopreventtheanimalnaturefrombecominginjurioustohu-mannatureintheindividualaswellasinthememberofsociety.Disciplineis,hence,onlythetamingofwildness.”Cultureisaboutacquiringskillfulnesswiththehelpofinstructionandteaching,andskillfulnessmeans“thepossessionofafacultysufficientfortheexecutionofanydesiredpurpose,”butdeterminesnogoalinitself.To be civilized,acertainformofcultureisnecessary,“/e/ssentialtheretoaremanners,politeness,andacertainjudiciousnessbyvirtueofwhichallmenmaybeusedtoone’sownultimateaims,”andthis“adjustsitselftothechangeabletasteofeachage.”Throughmoralization,man“shouldacquirethattypeofmindwhichchoosesgoodaimsonly.Thesearesuchasarenecessarilyapprovedbyeveryone,andwhichatthesametimecanbethepurposeofeveryone.”(Kant1904,pp.122–123)

33Abbagnano,however,seesthetransitionbetweenthetwomeaningsofcultureinKant’sthoughtaswell:“Theproductioninarationalbeingofanaptitudeforanyendswhateverofhisownchoosing,consequentlyoftheaptitudeofabeinginhisfreedom,isculture.Henceitisonlyculturethatcanbetheultimateendwhichwehavecausetoattributetonatureinrespectofthehumanrace.”(Kant2007,p.260)Ultimatelycultureisnottheprocessofcultivation;rather,itistheproductoftheprocess,i.e.,thetotalityoftheculturedandcivilizedwaysoflivingandthinking(Abbagnano1993,p.203).

34Sayingthatcultureisbasedondisciplineisambiguous,asitcanbeunderstoodthatdisciplineiseitherapreconditionforcultureorameansofcultivation.

35“Themaximsmustspringfrommanhimself.Inmoraleducation,theattempttointroduceintothechild’smindtheideaofwhatisgoodorevilmustbemadeveryearly.…Thefirstendeavorinmoraleducationistoestablishacharacter.Characterconsistsinthereadinesstoactaccordingtomaxims.Atfirstthesearethemaximsoftheschoolandlatertheyarethoseofhumanity.…Weshouldseetoitthatthepupilbehaveswellfromhisownmaximsandnotfromhabit,andthathenotonlydothegood,butdoitforthereasonthatitisgood:forthemoralworthofactionsconsistsinthemaximsofgood.…Hemustalwaysperceivetheprinciplesofactionandthebondwhichattachesittotheideaofduty”(Kant1904,pp.186–187,180).


ForKant,thecultureofthemindisstillsomehowphysical(ibidemp.485),36butheemphasizesthatitisnecessarytodistinguishbetween“natureandfreedom,”asgivinglawstofreedomissomethingcompletelydifferentfromcultivatingna-ture(ibidem).Thus,thereisabigdifferencebetweenthephysicalandthemoralcultivationofthemind.Theformeraimssolelyatnature,andthelattersolelyatfreedom(ibidem).37Thephysicalcultureofthemindisdividedintothefreeandthescholastic.Thefreecultureismostlyaboutthecultivationofthehighermentalpowers.Thelowerpowersarecultivatedsimultaneously,butonlywithreferencetothehigher,asthelowersoneshavenoworthforeducationinKant’sview.Thus,apersonwithagoodmemorybutnodevelopedjudgmentisonlyalivinglexicon(ibidem,p.487).38Kantthusbelievesthattheprincipleruleshouldbethatnosinglementalpowershouldbecultivatedinisolation;andthattheloweronesshouldonlybecultivatedforthebenefitofthehigherones,e.g.,thepowerofimaginationormemoryonlyforthebenefitofunderstanding(ibidem).39

Understandingcannotbecultivatedthroughplay,whichisameansofthefreecultivationofmentalpowers,butonlythroughwork(Philonenko1987,p.53).Kant,therefore,emphasizesthatitisveryimportantforthechildtolearntowork(Kant1803,p.486).Work,asinterpretedinaHegelianwaybyPhilonenko,isamediatorbetweennatureandculture.Inwork,disciplineappearstobeameansforculture.Firstofall,however,workisobedience,sincethetransformationofthingsrequiresthesubmissiontothelawsoftherealworld.Freedomisrealizedtogetherwithobedience,becausetheworldistherealizationoftheprojectthatispureideal.Humanbeings,thus,whilechangingtheworld,changethemselves;whencultivatingnature,wecultivateourselves.Inotherwords,manishisownproduct(Philonenko1987,pp.37–39).Thebestplaceforchildrentolearntoworkandcultivatethemselvesisschool,whichisaforcedculture.Inschool,disciplineandfreedomareinterrelated.Thisiswhyscholasticculture,acquiredinschool,differsfromfreecultureinthatitisaforcedculture.Itiscultureacquiredthroughcompulsion(Kant1803,pp.485,487).Thisveryexternalcompulsionanddiscipline,onthebasesofwhichthechildissubjectedtoabsoluteobedience,preparethechildformoraleducationandthusforthe(self)productionofthemoralsubject.Moraleducationnolongerdependsondiscipline,butonmaxims,i.e.onfreedom.Itisnotaboutdoingonlythatwhichisgood,butaboutdoingsomethingbecauseitisgood(Philonenko1987,p.57).Toactaccordingtomaximsmeansactinginaccordancewiththerules,thelawsthatwesetupourselves.Disciplinethus

36Suchlabelsareunusual,butstillseemjustifiedfortworeasons:first,becauseintellectualeducation(wherethecultureofthemindbelongs)isnotonlyaboutfreedom,andsecond,becauseitislargelybased–similarlytophysicaleducation–ondiscipline(Philonenko1987,p.44).

37“Amancanbehighlycultivatedphysically;hemayhaveahighlyperfectedmind,butatthesametimebewantinginmoralculture,andhencebeanevilbeing.”(Kant1904,p.164)

38“Butsuchpack-mulesofParnassusarenecessary;for,althoughtheythemselvesareunabletoproduceanythingrational,theycandragalongthematerialoutofwhichotherscanbringsomethinggood.”(Kant1904,p.170)

39“Understandingistheknowledgeoftheuniversal.Judgmentistheapplicationoftheuniversaltotheparticular.Reasonisthefacultyofperceivingtheunionoftheuniversalwiththeparticular.”(Kant1904,p.171)


becomesinternalizedandthechildhis/herownmaster.Obedienceinternalizesitselfandbecomesvoluntary.Itisnolongerfoundedonexternalauthority,butontheobediencetoreason,theobediencetooneself;inthatsense,itisautonomy/freedom(ibidem,p.59).AccordingtoPhilonenko,thisisapotentialanswertotheparadoxofthefollowingquestionposedbyKant:Howisitpossibletocultivatefreedomwithforce?

Kant’squestionleadstothefollowinginquiry:Is itpossibletocultivatefreedomatall?Kanthimselfwritesthatmoralculture,characteristicallyreferringtofreedom,“ismoralizationandnotcultivation”(Kant1904,p.164).40What,then,isthedifferencebetweencultivationandmoralization?Cultivation,aswehaveseen,isthedevelopmentofman’scapabilitiesforthegood,41whichProvidencehasnotplaced“inhimalreadyperfectandcomplete;theyareonlybarepotentialities,andwithoutthedistinctionofmorality.Manistoseektomakehimbetter,tocultivatehimself,and,ifheisevil,todevelopmoralitywithinhimself.”(Ibidem,p.113)Butmanbeingfree,hecanandmustonlydoithimself.Iftherewassomeotherreasonleadinghim,hewouldnotbefree(Philonenko1987,p.28).42However,ifcultivationnotonlymeansthedevelopmentofman’scapabilitiesforthegoodinorderforhimtobecomeskilful(havingtheabilitytoattainallhisends)andsensible(adaptedtohumansociety),butalsomoral(capableofchoosingonlygoodends)(Kant1803,p.465;Philonenko1987,p.34),thenitseemsthatcultivationandmoralizationarenottwoentirelyseparateprocesses.Rather,moralizationappearstobeonlyaparticularsortofcultivation.Here,however,cultivationcannotbebasedondiscipline–asitiswithphysicalculture.Thereasonforthisliesinthefactthatitiscrucialformoralculturenottobefoundedondiscipline,butonmaxims.Furthermore,cultivationisaboutthedevelopmentofthecapabili-tiesforthegoodandsurpassingbasenessandignorance.43Disciplinemeansthetamingofwildnessandthuschanginganimalnatureintohumannature(Kant1803,p.457).

Wildness,accordingtoKant,is“independenceoflaws”originatinginman’sanimalnature.Discipline,which“subjectsmantothelawsofhumanity,”preventshim“frombeingturnedasidebyhisanimalimpulsesfromhisdestiny,whichishumanity”(Kant1904,pp.103–104).Ontheotherhand,itisjustaslikelythatwildnessoriginatesinmans’freedom,notinhisanimalnature.Inthesamesection,Kantnamelywritesthatdisciplineshould“bebroughtintouseveryearly,”since

40AccordingtoKant,physicalculturemustbedistinguishedfrom“practicalculture,whichispragmaticormoral.Inthelattercaseitismoralizationandnotcultivation.”(Ibidem,p.164)

41Since“theelementsofevilarenotfoundinman’snaturalcapacities,”as“thereareonlygermsofgood”inhim,itis“necessaryonlytodevelopfurtherthegermswhichmanpossesses”(Ibidem,p. 118).

42SinceGodcreatedmaninhisownimage,Hemadehimfree,andmade“thefinalendthatthewholenatureisteleologicallysubjectto”outofmanasamoralsubject(ibidem,pp.27–28;Kant1999,p.275).Thefinalend“isnotanendwhichnaturealoneisabletobringaboutandrealizeinaccordancewiththeideaofthesameend,becausetheendisunconditioned.Forthereisnothinginnature(asasensiblebeing),ofwhichthedetermininggroundthatisfoundinnatureitselfisnotinturnconditioned.”(Kant2007,p.263)

43Kantwritesthatcultivationcanbecalledteaching(Kant1803,p.459).Moreover,elsewherehedefinescultureasteachingandinstruction.


man“hassuchagreatnaturalinstinctforfreedomthathesacrificeseverythingforitwhenoncehehasbeenaccustomedtoitforanylengthoftime.…If,inhisyouth,heisgrantedhisownwill,andopposedinnothing,hewillretainacertainwildnessthroughouthiswholelife.”(Ibidem,pp.104–105)Thismeansthatwild-nessisnotidenticalwithanimalnatureinman,butwithman’sfreedom.Butifwildnessishumanundisciplinedfreedom,howarewetounderstandKant’sexpli-cationthatbecauseofthegreathumaninstinctforfreedom–notanobleinstinct,asitwasforRousseau,but“acertainrawness,”typicaloftheanimalwhichhas“notyetdevelopedthehumanitywithinit”–thisrawnessmustbepolishedbyaccustomingman“tosubjecthimselftothecommandsofreason?”(Ibidem,p.105)Ifwildnessandrawnessarenotunderstoodtobedifferent,asneitherissubjecttothecommandsofreason,thenwearefacedwithacontradictionconcerningKant’sdistinguishingbetweentherawandtheunculturedman.Forhim,“[h]ewhoisnotcultivatedisraw;hewhoisnotdisciplinediswild.”(Ibidem,p.108)Inviewofthis,anotherstatementofhiscouldturnouttobejustasnonsensical:“Theomissionofdisciplineisagreaterevilthantheneglectofculture;forthelattercanberecoveredinlateryears,butwildnesscannotberemovedandablunderindisciplinecannotberetrieved.”(Ibidem,p.108–109)Yetifman’swildnessdiffersfromhisrawness,thenrawnesscannotbepolishedthroughdiscipline;rather,thiscanonlybeachievedthroughcultivation.

Thekeyquestion,however, isas follows:Is itpossibletoacquiremoralculturethroughcultivation?Ifitis,whydoesKantclaimthatmoralcultureisnotcultivation,butmoralization?If,ontheotherhand,moralizationisdifferentfromcultivation,ifmancannotbemorallycultivatedandcanonlybemoralized,whydoesKanthimselfspeakofthepossibilityofmanbeingbadlymorallyculti-vated?(Kant1803,p.485)Butevenifmoralizationdiffersfromcultivation,itisnotindependentofit–cultivationpresupposesmoralization,justascultivationpresupposesdiscipline.Therearenomoralactswithoutthecultureofreason,thepowerofjudgmentandthemindontheonehandand,ontheother,instructionandteachingonthereasonsforspecifichumanduties,thedutiestooneselfandothers,whichmaximsarejust,etc.However,cultivationisonlyanecessarypreconditionformorality.Inotherwords,apersoncanbehighlycultivatedinthisrespect,butifhe/sheisbadlymorallycultivated,he/sheisstill,asKantputsit,anevilbeing(ibidem,p.485).Thefollowingquestionremains,however:Ishe/sheevilbecausehe/shehasnotcultivatedhim/herselfanddevelopedthenaturalinclinationsforthegoodorbecausehe/sheisevilbynature?44Intheformercase,thesolutionlies

44Kantexplicitlyanswersthequestionofwhethermanisbynaturemorallygoodorbadwiththefollowingwords:“Heisneither;forheisbynaturenotamoralbeingatall;hebecomesamoralbeingonlywhenhisreasonraisesitselftotheconceptofdutyandoflaw.”(Kant1904,p.210)ButPhilonenkoshowsthatKantgivesaverysimplifiedviewoftheproblem,whichhedealswithinmoredetailinlaterworks.ComparingKant’stextsrevealsthathisanswertothequestionofwhethermanisbynaturegoodorbadismuchmoreambiguous(Philonenko1987,p.33–34).InhisReligion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,forinstance,Kantwritesthatmanismorallybadbynature.Thismeansthatman–awareofthemoralLaw–hasnonethelessacceptedthedeviationfromitashismaxim.Thereasonformoralevilisthusinman’sfreewill,inhisfreeadoptionofthesubjectivemaximasageneralruleonwhichheacts.Ifheadoptsthegoodmaxim(thatis,theoneinaccordancewiththe


inthebettercultivationofoneself,whileinthelatteritdoesnot,“fortheelementsofevilarenotfoundinman’snaturalcapacities.”Thesearesubjecttocultivation,sinceinman’snaturalcapacities“thereareonlygermsofgood”(Kant1904,p.118).Theissueis,nonetheless,notasclearasitmayseem.Kantwritesthatman“hasoriginallyimpulsesforallvices,forhehasinclinationsandinstinctswhichincitehim,althoughreasonimpelshimintheoppositedirectionatthesametime.Hecan,therefore,becomemorallygoodonlybymeansofvirtues–thatis,byself-restraint.”(Ibidem,p.210)Ifmanbecomesamoralbeingbysubjectinganimalnaturetotherulesofthemindthroughdisciplineandcultivation,thenitseemsthatthepathtothemoralmanleadsthroughthegoodcultivationofman’sownanimalnature.Inthiscase,moralizationasaprocessseparatefromcultivationseemsredundant.Butthequestioniswhetheritisalsoredundantifman’sinclinationstowardevilarenotduetohisanimalnature,butrathertohisfreewill.45Thisisprobablynotthecase,ifmoralizationisunderstoodasaprocessofthecultivationofman’sgoodcharacter,whichisnothingbuttheabilityandreadinesstoactinlinewithgoodmaxims,thatis,themaximsfollowingthemoralLaw(Philonenko1987,p.124).46

Kant’sdefinitionsofcultureandcultivationmaysometimesbeambiguous,butthereisprobablylittledoubtthathistheoryrelatesbothtotheafore-mentionedideasofeducationascultura animi(althoughhisdefinitionofthecultureoftheminddiffersconsiderablyfromCicero’s)andalsotothelatertheoriesofeducationasBildung(eventhoughKanthardlyeverusesthetermitself).ThetermBildung,however,islateronusedbySchelerwhendevelopinghistheoryofeducationthatfocusesoneducationasBildungorcultura animi (Scheler2006,p.183).47FormoralLaw),heisgoodbynature.IfheadoptsthemaximwhichisinoppositiontothemoralLaw,heisbadbynature.Therefore,itisnotnature’sfaultifmanisbad,norshoulditbepraisedifheisgood.Onlymanhimselfistoblameortopraiseforthat.ButsincehecannotbeindifferenttothemoralLaw–hemusteitheradoptorrejectitashismaxim–itisnotpossibletosaythatmanisbynatureneithergoodnorbad,justasitisimpossibletosaythatheisbothatthesametime:goodinsomeacts,badinothers.Ifheisgoodinanact,itmeanshehasadoptedthemoralLawashismaxim.Ifhewerebadinanotheractatthesametime,themaximrelatingtothemorallawaboutthefulfillmentofduties–ofwhichthereisonlyoneanditisuniversal–wouldbesimultaneouslyuniversalandparticular,whichisacontradiction(cf.Kant1985,pp.3–62).

45Evil“istobesoughtnotintheinclinationsbutinthepervertedmaximandthereforeinfreedomitself.Theinclinationsonlymakeitmoredifficulttocarry outtheoppositegoodmaxim;theproperevil,however,consistsinone’snotwillingtoresistthoseinclinationswhentheyincitetransgression.”(Kant2009,p.63)Anypropensityiseitherphysical(belongingtothepowerofchoiceofthehumanbeingasanaturalbeing)oritismoral(belongingtothepowerofchoiceofmanasamoralbeing).“Inthefirstcase,thereisnopropensitytomoralevil;forthisevilmustarisefromfreedom,andaphysicalpropensity(whichisbasedonsensibleimpulses)toanyuseoffreedom,whetherforgoodorforevil,isacontradiction.Thereforeapropensitytoevilcanadhereonlytothemoralabilityofthepowerofchoice.However,nothingismorally(i.e.,imputably)evilbutthatwhichisourowndeed.”(Ibidem,p. 34)Sincepropensitytoevilisnotyetanact,butonlyasubjectivebasisforthedeterminationofthefreewill,whichprecedeseveryact,itcannotbemoralevilinitself.

46InAnthropology,Kantdefinescharacterasthatcharacteristicofthewillthroughwhichthesub-jectrelatesitselftospecificpracticalprinciplesthatone’sownreasonformulates(ibidem,p.124–125).

47TheessenceofeducationasthecultureofthemindisdefinedintwowaysbyScheler:first,asman’stendencytobecomeamicrocosm(tocontainthetotalityoftheworld),andsecond,asasimul-taneousprocessofhumanizationandself-identification,i.e.,asaprocessoftheindividual’sclimbingoverhis/heranimalnatureandhis/herdeification(Ibidem,pp.184–185,190–191).


him,thecultureofthemindissomethingquitedifferentfromtheconceptfoundinKant;he,likeCicero,understandsitincloseassociationwithphilosophy.48ForScheler,education–ifseenasanideal(i.e.,assomethingperfected,notmerelyastheprocessofeducation)–isfirstaformthatallowsanddefinesboththedevelop-mentoftheindividual’sspiritual,mental,andphysicalactivityandexpression,andhis/herentirefunctioning.Schelerthereforestressesthateducationisacat-egoryofbeing,notofknowledgeorexperience(ibidem).Needlesstosay,hedoesnotmaintainthateducationhasnothingtodowithknowledge.Onthecontrary,educationisonlypossibleonthebasisofknowledge.Whathecallsourattentiontoissomethingelse:theobjectiveendofknowledge(thatwhichisthereasonfortheexistenceofknowledgeandforourattemptstoacquireit)“cannotbesomeparticularknowledge”(ibidem,p.209).Hence,herejectstheideasof“scienceforthesakeofscience”thatoriginatedinAristotle’sthesisassertingthatthetheo-reticalscienceswherediscoveriesareanendinitself(knowledgeforthesakeofknowledge)andwhichbringnopracticaluse(knowledgeforactingorproduction)areofthehighestvalue.AccordingtoScheler(andEpicurus,towhomherefers),gainingknowledgeforthesakeofknowledgeitselfisabsurdandfutile.Forhim,scienceforscience’ssakeisjustasabsurdasartforart’ssake.Heseestheonlyworthofthatinitsbeinganexpressionoftheoppositiontophilosophicalpragma-tism,whichvaluesknowledgeonlyasfarasitisuseful(ibidem).InSheler’sview,then,neitherknowledgeitselfnotitsusefulnesscanbeasufficientreasonforourdesiretoacquireknowledge.Theauthorassertsthatthemainreasonforourdesireforknowledgeisthatinitweseeameansfortherealizationofthethreehighesthumanpurposes:dominationovernature,education,andredemption(ibidem).49

48Inasimilarway,educationwasinterpretedbytheSloveneauthorKarelOzvaldbeforeWorldWarII.OzvaldwasinfluencedbyScheler’stheoryofeducation,andeducationascultura animiisthecultivationofthehumanmindorspirit.Sucheducationcannotbebasedonpositivistknowledge,typicalofmodernscience,whichunderstandsknowledgeaspower(Bacon):Theendofsuchknow-ledgeisnotthementalformationofpeople,butrathercontrolovertheworldandpeople.Itcanonlybebasedonwisdom(philosophy),whoseaimistoeducate,form,cultivatethehumanmind.ThisiswhyOzvaldcallswisdomeducationalknowledgeandwhyhedevelopshisnotionofeducation(whichheidentifieswiththecultureofthemind)inoppositiontotechnicalandvocationaleducation.Inthiscontext,educationascultura animimeansthesameasgeneraleducation,whichOzvalddoesnotunderstandasmerelyatypeofeducation,butratheridentifiesastheonlytrueeducation.Formoreonthis,seemyarticle“Educationascultura animi”(Kodelja2002).

49Educationissomethingspecialamongthepurposes,asitbelongstothespecificaimsthatcanonlybeachievedifwearenottryingtoachievethemintentionally(ibidem,p.198).EducationdefinedinthiswayisatypicalexampleofthoseparadoxicalmentalandsocialstatesthatElstercalls“statesthatareessentiallyby-products,”andthat“canonlycomeaboutastheby-productofactionsundertakenforotherends.Theycannever,thatis,bebroughtaboutintelligentlyorintentionally,becausetheveryattempttodosoprecludesthestateoneistryingtobringabout”(Elster1985,p.43).Thequestionarisinghereisthis:Isitpossibletoreceiveeducationinanyindirectway,ifitisimpossibletoreceiveitbymakingitourintentionalandconsciousend?Isitpossibletoproduceitasaby-productofanactionthatwasnotintendedtobringaboutthereceptionofeducation,buthadsomeotherpurpose?ItseemsthatSchelerallowsforsuchapossibilitywhenwriting:“Intheprocessofyourlifeintheworldandwiththeworld,inovercomingitsandyourpassionsandoppositions,inloveanddeed,devotedtoathing,tobrothersortoacountry,inhardwork,which(bybringingincome)makesyourpowersandyourselfstrongerandmoreextensive,hereeducationhappens–behindthebackofintentionsandpurposes.Onlythemanwillingtolose(tosacrifice)himselfinfavorofsomethingnobleorofthe


Therelationshipamongthepurposesishierarchical,reflectingthehierarchyofvalueswhichbeginswiththevaluesrelatedtoeverydaylife,continueswiththoseconcerningthemind,andendswithreligiousones(ibidem).

Themeansfortheaccomplishmentofthepurposesarethreeformsofknow-ledge:theknowledgeofproductivity,theknowledgeofeducation,andtheknowledgeofredemption.50Theknowledgeofproductivityistheresultofpositivistsciencesandallowshumanstodominateexternalandinternalnature.Theknowledgeofeducationisphilosophicalknowledgethataimsatthecultivationofmanasaspiritualbeing(ibidem,p.180).51Theknowledgeofredemptionisatypeofmeta-physicalknowledge(theknowledgeoftheexistence,quintessence,andvalueoftheAbsolute)thatallowshumanbeingstorecognizetheirownfoundationsinthehighestformofbeing,whilealsoparticipatingintheformationoftheDivine(ibidem,p.214).52Scheleremphasizesthat“noneofthethreeformsofknowledgecanreplaceanyoftheothertwo.”(Ibidem)53Ifoneformofknowledgedominatestheothertwo,orjustoneofthem,bywhichthedominationofoneformofknowledgeisestablished,mansuffersgreatdamage.AccordingtoScheler,thisisexactlywhathasrepeatedlyhappenedinourhistory,becausethethreeformsofknowledgehavebeendevelopedhighlyunevenlyindifferentcultures.Indiaemphasizedtheknowledgeofredemptionandthetechniquesofself-control;GreeceandChinaputemphasisontheknowledgeofeducation;andtheWesthasbeendevelopingtheknowledgeofproductivity,basedonthefindingsofpositivistscience,sincethelateMiddleAges.BeforeWorldWarII,suchknowledgeofproductivitybecamethedominantformofknowledgeglobally(ibidem,pp.210–211,214–215).

Fromthediscussionabove,then,Schelerbelieveditwasnecessarymorethaneverbeforetodeveloptheknowledgeofeducation,whichisphilosophicalknow-ledge,thatis,theknowledgeoftheessences,theknowledgethatisnotmerelytheformandruleofunderstanding,butalsotheformofdesiring,judging,enjoying,etc.(ibidem,p.204).Suchknowledgeisthepathtotrueeducationand,throughthat,totheeducatedindividual.ForScheler,aneducatedhumanbeingisnotsomebodywithalotofknowledgeaboutalotofthings,norisitsomeonewhocanforeseeandcontrolprocessesonthebasisofthelawshe/sheknows.Theformerhumancommunity,withoutfearingwhatmayhappentohim,onlythatmanwillfindhimself,thatis,thetruebeing(Elster2000,p.198–199;Scheler2006,p.15–16).

50ThetermsSchelerusesare:“Herrschaftswissen”and“Leistungswissen,”fortheknowledgeofproductivity,“Bildungswissen”fortheknowledgeofeducation/culture,and“Erlösungswissen”or“Heilswissen”fortheknowledgeofredemption(ibidem,p.209).

51ItisquestionablewhetherinScheler’svieweachphilosophyisalwayseducationalknowledgeaswell.Itseemsthatthisisnotso,asheassociatesphilosophicalmovementssuchaspositivismandpragmatismmorewithpositivistknowledge,whichservesthedominationofman,thanwiththeknowledgeofeducation.

52AccordingtoScheler,thecreationsofGodandthatofmanareinterdependent:GodemergingfromtheGroundofBeingcanonlycomprehenditselfthroughman’srealizationofhisownfoundationintheDivinity,i.e.,thehighestformofbeing(ibidem,pp.209–210).

53Theconclusiontobedrawnfromtheaboveisthis:Amongthethreeformsofknowledge,onlytheknowledgeofeducationhasman’seducationasitsaim.Neithertheknowledgeofredemptionnottheknowledgeofproductivitystrivesforthespiritualeducation/cultivationofman.Theknowledgeofredemption,namely,hasman’sredemptioninGodforitsaim,andpositivistknowledgestrugglesforman’sdominationofnatureandman.


isascholar,andthelatterisaresearcher.Atrulyeducatedperson,ontheotherhand,issomeonewhohascreatedforhim/herselfapersonalitystructurethattypicallyconsistsofamaximumoftheflexibleandidealschemesofknowledge,thinking,understanding,judging,andactingwhichareinterrelatedasfarastheunityofstyle(ibidem,p.214).Aswehaveseen,however,suchastructurenotonlycomprisesreasonandthinking,butalsothewill,thecharacter,andtheheart(ibidem,p.205).

Aneducatedpersonisfurtherdistinguishedbyvariouscharacteristicssuchasmodesty,humility,andsensitivity.Thereisonethatisparticularlyimportantbecauseit isthespecificdifferencebetweenaneducatedandanuneducatedperson:Thedifferencebetweenthemisthataneducatedperson(asunderstoodbyScheler)isalwaysawareofhis/herlimits.Theauthenticknowledgeofeducationalwaysincludestheknowledgeofwhatonedoesnotknow.ThisistheknowledgethatNicholasofCusatermsdocta ignorantiaandcanalreadybefoundinSocrateswhenhesaysthatheknowshedoesnotknow.Justastheknowledgeofone’sownlimitsisasignofeducatedness,boastingone’seducationisthebestevidenceofuneducatedness(ibidem,p.203–204).Hence,ifaneducatedpersonknowsthathe/shedoesnotknow,thenthisishis/herverydistinctionfromapersonwhoisnoteducated.Suchapersoncanbehalf-educatedoruneducated.Half-educatedpeopleimaginetheyknow,andforthatveryreasontheyarepersuadedthattheylackneitherknowledgenoreducation.They,therefore,havenorealreasonfortryingtogaineither.Uneducatedpeople,however,whoknowthattheydonotknow,canusetheknowledgeoftheirownignoranceasagoodreasontostarteducation.Yet,ifAdornoandLiessmann’sanalysesoftheradicallychangedrelationshipbetweenknowledgeandeducationincontemporarysocietyaretrue,54thenknowledgecanbeacquired,buttheveryacquisitionofknowledgeisnolongerindissociablefromthetrainingofminds.Asaconsequence,today’ssociety,whichunderstandsitselfastheknowledgesociety,isincreasinglybecomingasocietyofhalf-educationanduneducation,asocietywheretheideaofeducation–understoodasBildung–isdead.

In place of a conclusion

Themainpurposeofmyarticleisnottogiveananswertothequestionfromthetitle,namely,theendofwhatarethethreediscussednarrativesoftheendofeducationabout.Ifthatwerethepurpose,athoroughanalysisofthethreenar-ratives/theorieswouldfirstbenecessary.However,thepurposehereisjusttheopposite:Itistodefendandjustifytheveryraisingofthequestion,foritmayseemthattheanswerisalreadyhere.Allthreetheoriesabouttheendofeducation–Adorno’s,Lyotard’s,andLiessmann’s–obviouslydiscusstheendofeducation.Itseems,then,thatquestionsaboutwhatmayhaveendedinthepostmodernperiodareredundantandpointless.Surelyitmustbecleartoeveryonethat

54Foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheissue,seeKodelja(2009).


thenarrativesabouttheendofeducation–understoodasBildung–simplytellabouttheendofeducationunderstoodinthisway.Buttheproblemispreciselyinthefactthattherearedifferentviewsofwhatsuchanunderstandingactuallymeans.Thisarticle,therefore,hastriedtosketchthedifferentnotionsandviewsthatarealldefinedbytheirspecifichistoricalandtheoreticalbackgrounds.Thetheories,itseems,canbecombinedintothreeinterrelatednarrativesofeducation,whichmightalsobereadasthreepossibleanswerstotheopeningquestion.Thequestionitselfisnotdealtwithbythethreetheoriesabouttheendofeducation.Instead,eachinitsturnpresupposesthatitisclearwhateducationdenotedbythetermBildungmeans.Consequently,theyonlycontendwiththeanalysesandinterpretationsofthereasonsforitsend.Althougheachoffersfairlyconvincingargumentstosupportthethesisoftheendofeducation,itstillseemsthattheargumentsareonlyvalidforthenotionofeducationasitisacceptedwithinthecontextofeachindividualtheory.Thatistosay,theseargumentscannotbesaidtoprovethegeneralthesisoftheendofeducationunderstoodasBildung.

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