How good an account does Lakatos’ MRP give of the Big Bang

revolution?

Imre Lakatos’s conception of scientific methodology began as an

adaptation of Karl Popper’s ideas on falsificationism. Lakatos did not

agree that a scientific theory could be so decisi vely refuted by a single

experiment as Popper suggested and set about constructing his own

commentary on scientific methodology, a methodology that he called

‘Methodology of Research programmes’ (MRP).

In this essay I will begin by explaining the charact eristics of Lakatos’

MRP, specifically highlighting the nature of rival research programmes

and the transition between what Lakatos calls ‘progressive and

degenerative’ research programmes. Once Lakatos’ MRP has been

clearly presented I shall surrender i t to Lakatos’ own assessment

cri teria, “which histographical research programme is the superior may

be tested by seeing how successfully they explain the scientific

progress.”1

The success of Lakatos MRP has been measured against ‘The

Copernican Revolution ’2 by Lakatos himself, it has also been measured

against ‘Atomism versus thermodynamics’ 3 by Peter Clark. The most

recent measurement of Lakatos’ MRP’s success has been against the

two rival research programmes of Einstein and Lorrentz surrounding

the ‘Theory of Relativity’ at the turn of the 20 t h century. If Lakatos

MRP is an accurate account of scientific progress then it should be the

methodology of both past and present scientific communities. To test

Lakatos methodology I shall introduce the relatively modern rivalry in

physics between Fred Hoyle’s ‘Steady State Model’ and the ‘Big Bang

Model’ of the universe that began in the scientific community of the

1950’s.

I will discuss the history between the development of the two rival

research programmes and show how although both significantly

different programmes they both shared sustained periods of success and

failure. I will show how Lakatos’ MRP accurately describes the

emergence of the favoured ‘Big Bang Model’ and the scientific

isolation of the ‘Steady State Model’ due to its decreasing correlation

with observations.

Lakatos Methodology

Lakatos began, what was to become his MRP, trying to amend the

problems that Popper’s falsificationism was confronted with. Popper

1 Why Copernicus’s Programme Superseded Ptolemy’s 1976 Lakatos and Zahar page 192 2 Why Copernicus’s Programme Superseded Ptolemy’s 1976 Lakatos and Zahar 3 ‘Atomism versus Thermodynamics’ by Peter Clark Taken from ‘ Method and appraisal in the

physical sciences – the critical background to modern science 1800 – 1905’, edited by Colin Howson.

over simplified the modus tollens reconstruction of the

falsificationists’ argument by claiming that:

1. If T (theory) is true, then O (observation) will be observed

2. O is not observed

C: So T is not true

Lakatos, along with many others (like Duhem and Putnam 4), thought

that such a decis ive refutation of ‘T’ couldn’t be concluded from ‘not

O’, as all theories strongly rely on the auxiliary hypotheses and prior

theories on which current theories are based. By observing ‘ not O’ one

can only conclude that a theory combined with certain auxil iary

hypotheses is false. To avoid refutation scientists can simply adjust the

auxiliary hypotheses. This argument is widely known as the ‘Duhemian

Point’5 and it highlights that falsificationism is based on the incorrect

premise that a theory can be tested and falsified in an isolated manner.

Lakatos proposed an alternative view of science that “we view each

science dynamically as a sequence of ‘phases’ of theory, some of which

initially exhibit growth and later exhibit a decline or stagnation” 6 and

Lakatos names these sequences as ‘scientific research programmes’

(SRP.) Lakatos describes an SRP’s structure as having a ‘had core’ set

of theories at its centre, surrounded by that SRP’s heuristic and

auxiliary hypotheses (see figure 1). The ‘hard core’ of a n SRP cannot

be decisively refuted by any single crucial experiment as suggested in

Popper’s somewhat naive falsificationism. In this respect Lakatos’

methodology is a sort of sophisticated falsificationism, as surrounding

the SRP’s ‘hard core’ is the heuristics of that programme that serve to

protect the ‘hard core’ from refutation.

Figure1: A conceptual illustration to show the structure of Lakatos’

MRP.

4 Duhem and putnam 5 Duhemian Point 6 Theories of Scientific Method - Popper Lakatos and Scientific method – Robest Nola and Howard

Sankey, section 10.2, page 274.

Hard core

Protective Belt…

…of auxiliary hypotheses

Positive

Heuristics adds to

the protective belt

of Hypotheses

Negative Heuristics removes hypotheses that

should be avoided to

protect the hardcore

A heuristic is a ‘rule of thumb’ method for problem solving that

incorporates past experiences. Lakatos uses the word heurist ic to

describe the route a scientist should take when perusing a certain SRP.

To clarify Lakatos’ use of heuristics consider the well -known heuristic

of ‘Occam’s razor’, where by the simplest explanation is usually the

best . Occam’s razor is not logically sound but it is a ‘rule of thumb’

process that has a strong conviction in any argument.

In his MRP Lakatos goes further to divide heuristics into the “Positive

heuristic that defines problems, foresees anomalies and turns them

victoriously into examples” [Lakatos, 1973, 318] and the ‘Negative

heuristic’:

“The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the

modus tollens at [the SRP’s] ‘hard core.’ Instead, we must use our

ingenuity to articulate or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses,’ which

form a protective belt around this core, and we must direct the modus

tollens to these.” [Lakatos, MRP, 48]

Auxiliary hypotheses are crucial to all theories, they account for the

initial conditions and the domain in which a theory holds true.

It is the role of the positive heuristics that scientist actively engage in

that generates the explanations of how their SRP can accommodate the

empirical evidence. Thus the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses is

continuously shaped by scientists in attempt to explain away any

anomalies. Lakatos explains how ‘A research programme never solves

all its anomalies.’ [Lakatos, MRP, 49] I believe Lakatos’ statement to

be justified, as there are no current or past ‘anomaly free’ r esearch

programmes.

Lakatos chooses not to measure a programmes success against the

anomalies it cannot explain but focus more on the empirical success it

can explain. Lakatos measures the success of an SRP in respect to

whether it is what he calls ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’.

‘It is theoretically progressive if each modification leads to new

unexpected predictions and it is empirically progressive i f at least

some of these novel predictions are corroborated It is always easy for

a scientist to deal with a given anomaly by making suitable adjustments

to his programme. Such manoeuvres are ad hoc, and the programme is

degenerating, unless they not only explain the given facts they were

intended to explain but also predict some new fact as well .’’ [Lakat os,

1976, 179]

The best example of a progressive research programme is one that is

both empirically and theoretically progressive, where predictions are

backed up by empirical evidence. SRP’s that are degenerative resort to

ad hoc explanations that diverge from the heuristics of that SRP and

whilst Lakatos believes this remains scientific method, it no longer

produces novel facts or predictions. A single ad hoc adaptation of

auxiliary hypotheses by no means renders an entire SRP as degenerate

so long as its positive heuristic remains active.

Unlike Thomas Kuhn’s idea that science follows a specific paradigm

that undergoes transitional shifts over time; Lakatos MRP allows for

many rival SRP’s to co -exist in the scientific community. It is in the

debate between rival SRP’s that the progression of each programme is

most thoroughly scrutinised, “one research programme supersedes

another if it has excess truth content over its rival, in the sense that it

predicts progressively all that i ts rival truly predicts and some more

besides.” [Lakatos, 1973,179]

Lakatos requires a substantial elapse of time to assess a SRP’s

progression or degeneration and it seems to appear a measurement that

can only be made with hindsight. For how can a scientist involved in

an SRP know whether any given success is the start of a period of

sustained progression or alternative that it is just circumstantial

supporting evidence for a programme that will inevitably degenerate?

This appears to be a tricky question and it is a problem t hat is all too

evident in the ‘Big Bang’ case study that follows. I shall present this

historical example as a confirming example of Lakatos’ methodology. I

will also use this example to answer the ‘problem’ of having no

demarcation criteria or time limit to an MRP that can declare a SRP as

completely degenerated. I believe the answer can be found in the

proposed ‘problem’ as I argue that a degenerative SRP is in fact

beneficial to the scientific community and I shall aim to prove this

through the historica l account of the ‘Big Bang revolution.’

2. Big Bang revolution

Rival Programmes

In 1909 Albert Einstein published his long awaited final work on

‘General Relativity.’ General Relativity found success where

Newtonian mechanics failed; that is applying the gravitational force on

a large scale. The implications of General relativity when it was

applied to the even larger -scale universe were not so successful . The

mathematics of General relativity stated that the gravitational force of

galaxies would be so strong that it would pull all matter towards it.

Consequently, if the assumed eternal and static nature of the universe

was correct , then General relativity predicted that gravity should have

caused the universe to collapse long ago.

Einstein managed to adjust the mathematics of general relativity by

introducing the ‘cosmological constant’ that could be applied to

equations so they would not equate to the universe collapsing. The

‘cosmological constant’ could not be tested or observed, i t simple had

to be, if the universe was static and eternal. Einstein’s defence of the

eternal universe is the primitive shell of the research programme that

would become known as the ‘Steady State Model’ (SSM).

Thousands of miles away from Einstein’s research the Russian scientist

and mathematician Alexander Friedmann began to construct his own

research programme that was a progeny of Einstein’s work. Friedmann

was a strong believer in General relativity, however he did not agree

with Einstien’s introduction of the cosmol ogical constant. Friedmann

placed complete faith in General Relativity as his ‘ hard core’ principle

and applied the mathematics of General relativity without the

cosmological constant and without any a prior assumptions of the

nature of the universe. Friedmann calculated that General relativity,

without the cosmological constant, predicted a dynamic expanding

universe and not the static universe that Einstein and many others had

assumed. Friedmann’s SRP was the primitive shell of what would

become known as the ‘Big Bang Model.’ (BBM)

Friedmann’s work hard sparked the great cosmological debate of the

20 t h century as he had presented the following ult imatum: either the

theory of General Relativity is correct and our universe is a dynamic

system or Einstein’s cosmological constant is correct and our universe

is eternal and static.

Hubble’s Empirical evidence

The debate between Einstein and Friedmann symbolised the divide that

was growing in the scientific community between those that believed in

an eternal universe and those that believed in a dynamic universe.

Lakatos’ MRP predicts that it is the progressive SRP, the programme

that shows both empirical and theoretical progression, which will

ultimately triumph in the scientific community.

In the initial debates between Friedmann and Einstein there was a

severe lack of empirical evidence that either side could draw upon

because the telescopic power of astronomers in the 1920’s was limited.

That was until in 1929 the astronomer Edwin Hubble began to look

beyond our own Milky Way into the farther reaches of space. Hubble

observed that the wavelength of the radiation emitted by distant

galaxies is shifted towards the longer wavelength end of the

electromagnetic spectrum. According to the scientific principle know n

as the ‘Doppler effect’ a shift in wavelengths towards the longer

wavelength end of the spectrum means that the source relative to the

observe has a velocity away from the observer. The same scientific

principle explains the shift in pitch of an ambulanc e’s siren as it passes

past your ears. From this observation Hubble inferred that distant

galaxies are travelling at great velocities away from our own galaxy

with speeds that are proportional to their distance from the Milky Way

(See figure 2).

Figure 2: Shows Hubble’s original 1931 measurements of galaxies and their

recession speeds. The graph shows the farther the galaxy is away from the

Milky Way the faster i t is travell ing. Where velocity is in kilometres per

second and distance is in Mpc (where 1Mpc = 3.26 mill ion l ight years away)

Hubble’s measurement of the Doppler Shift of galaxies sparked a race

between the two rival SRP’s to answer the question why are galaxies

observed to be travelling away from our galaxy? 7

BBM interpretation

Hubble had finally presented empirical evidence that both the

heuristics of BBM and SSM would have to explain. The BBM was now

fronted by the Belgian physicist Georges Lemaítre who had writ ten in

his 1927 paper8 the prediction that if the BBM was corre ct then

galaxies should be racing away at speeds proportional to their distance.

This was the first sign of the BBM being a progressive programme. The

BBM had made a prediction in 1927 that was then verified in 1929 by

Hubbles undisputed measurements. Lema itre interpreted Hubble’s

results in the following way: “If the galaxies are receding then:

Tomorrow they will be further away from us

But yesterday they were closer to us

And last year they were closer still

7 Th e ap p a r en t u n iq u e s i gn i f i c an ce o f ou r u n ive rs e ap p ea r i n g t o b e a t t h e c en t r e o f t h e u n iver s e

wa s q u i ck ly a t t r i b u t ed t o b e n on e r e la t i v i s t i c . Th a t i s t o s a y t h e exp an s ion o f t h e u n iv er s e wou ld

l ook t h e sam e n o ma t t er wh e re you wer e i n t h e u n iv e rs e . In c omp ar i s on t h in k of sp ot s p a in t ed on to a b a l l o on ; a s t h e b a l l oon i s i n f la t ed an d exp an d s , r e la t i v e t o each sp ot t h e o th e r sp ot s wou ld a l l b e

t rav e l l i n g a wa y f r om you . 8 ‘A homogeneous Universe of constant mass and growing radius accounting for the radial velocity of

extragalactic nebulae’, G. Lemaître published in Annals of the Scientific Society of Brussels, Vol. 47, p.

49, April 1927

At some point in the past all galaxies must ha ve been right on

top of us.”9

Hubble’s evidence appeared to fit the BBM very well as it reinforced

the ‘hard core’ principle of the BBM, explicitly that the universe

expanded from a singularity in space and time. Yet despite the apparent

perfect match between the story of the BBM and Hubble’s data there

remained a fundamental problem when considering the consequences of

this data.

Hubble’s data is presented in figure 2 as a velocity against distance

graph and from this data one can relatively simply deduc e the time

taken for galaxies to travel this distance apart. Using the elementary

equation that time taken is equal to the distance travelled divided by

the velocity of motion one can see that Hubble’s data implies that the

universe is 1.9 billion years old10. The problem with this result is that

geologists had already used radioactive material from the earth’s

surface to date the creation of the Earth at around 3 billion years old 11.

Therefore Hubble’s data when applied to the BBM results in a universe

that is younger than the planets the comprise it, a complete

contradiction.

It is here that I find Lakatos’ MRP favourable over alternative

scientific methodology as such damning contradictory evidence could

well come within the falsifiable bracket of Popper’ s methodology but

here MRP allows the BBM this anomaly. In Lakatos cri tique of

Popper’s falsificationism, he quotes Popper as saying “A self-

contradictory system must be rejected” [Lakatos, 1973,317] and there

are few more self-contradictory examples than that which the BBM

presented in the 1930’s. Contrary to Popper’s falsification, Lakatos’

MRP states:

“For in large research programmes there are always known anomalies:

normally the researcher puts them aside and follows the posit ive

heuristic of the programme. In general he rivets his attention on the

positive heuristic rather than on the distracting anomalies, and hopes

that the ‘recalcitrant instances’ will be turned into confirming

instances as the programme progresses.” [Lakatos, 1973,317] crucial

exp

Lakatos’ idea of sett ing aside anomalies until the programme progress

is confirmed by the action of the BBM as this is exactly what they did.

The BBM rendered the universes age as an anomaly to be solved later

and focused on applying their positive heuri st ics to produce novel

facts. (see figure 3)

9 ‘Big Bang’ The Great debate, Simon Singh, page 263, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005, ISBN:

0007152523 10 Using data from figure2 and the line of best fit. Take v = 500km/s and d = 3.26 million light years. 11 Big Bang’ Paradigm shift, Simon Singh, page 372, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005, ISBN:

0007152523

Positive Heuristics:

Infinitely hot &

dense beginning

Universe is

constantly expanding

Predicts observable

signs of the initial

explosion to still exist

Negative Heuristics

Age of the Universe

How galaxies

formed from the

explosion

How complex matter

formed from the

explosion

Figure 3: a basic construction of the BBM. Note there are far more

detailed positive and negative heuristics than I have incorporated.

The SSM’s interpretation

The SSM camp, now predominantly fronted by three Cambridge

University colleagues Hoyle, Gold and Bondi, found Hubble’s evidence

disturbing. Disturbing but not damning. Hoyle was to become the key

protagonist of the SSM and he set about redefining the SSM in light of

Hubble’s evidence. Hoyle adjusted the auxiliary hypotheses of the

SSM, so that it no longer required the universe to be static but the SSM

universe was now also dynamic. Hoyle argued that whilst the space

between galaxies was proven to be expanding, the idea of an e ternal

universe could incorporate this expansion.

Hoyle and Gold proposed that new matter was created when the space

between galaxies expanded. They could not account for how or when

the matter would be created; they could only infer that this had to be

the case if the SSM was true. This is a clear example of the negative

heuristics of an SRP at work. Hoyle and Gold believed so strongly in

the ‘hard core’ principle of an eternal universe they had to adjust their

SRP’s hypotheses to account for matter bein g created out of nothing. In

order to explain the spontaneous creation of matter Hoyle hypothesised

‘the creation field’ or ‘C-f ield’ that existed undetected in our universe.

Arguably there is no supporting evidence whatsoever of the

spontaneous creation of matter however Hoyle explained that the

amount of matter required to be created to explain an expanding

universe would be on a scale so small it would be experimentally

unobservable. Hoyle made the analogy that “the universe’s expansion

required a rate of creation of only ‘one atom every century in a volume

equal to the Empire state building’” 12 The interesting product of the

12 ‘Big Bang’ Mavericks of the cosmos, Simon Singh, page 347, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005,

ISBN: 0007152523

Universe exploded into

existence from a single point

in space & time.

Positive Heuristics:

Predicts ‘baby

galaxies’

Can account for the

formation of galaxies

Negative Heuristics

Hoyle’s “Creation

field”

How complex matter

formed

Hoyle’s C -field was that it made the novel prediction of the formation

of new matter al l over the universe as time continued. Hoyl e claimed

that this new matter would cluster to form new ‘baby galaxies’ 13 that

should be observable beyond our own Milky Way.

Hoyle’s C-field is analogues to Einstein’s ‘cosmological constant’ as

both explanations appear to be introduced ‘ad hoc’. It app eared that the

SSM had shrugged off the need for Einstein’s questionable

‘cosmological constant’ by allowing for a dynamic universe, however

in doing so the SSM had found itself having to introduce another

questionable hypotheses of the ‘C-field.’ The SSM seemed to rely on

improvised ‘ad hoc’ theoretical hypotheses to explain the empirical

evidence supplied by the modern telescopes’ observations. The SSM

was beginning to show characteristics of a ‘degenerative programme’ .

That being said, the positive heuri stics of the SSM were alive and

active and made the testable ‘novel prediction’ of ‘baby galaxies’ (see

figure 4.)

Unfortunately despite the vast improvements of astronomer’s

telescopes in previous years, the telescopes were not yet powerful

enough to distinguish the predicted baby galaxies from any other

galaxy. The cosmological community was at face off.

SRP Face off

At this stage in the debate, around the 1940’s, there was stalemate

between the SSM and the BBM. The BBM, specifically Lemaitre , had

correctly predicted that galaxies should be receding and at rate

proportional to their distance from the Milky Way. In terms of

Lakatos’ MRP, the BBM was both theoretically and empirically

progressive. However the BBM stil l had to ac count for the hugely

contradictory anomaly that the Earth was supposedly older than the

universe.

13 ibid pg 348

Universe eternal, it has no

finite beginning.

On the other hand, the SSM replaced an already ad hoc hypothesis of

Einstein’s ‘cosmological constant’ with the reinvented dynamic SSM

and the introduction of a new ad hoc hypothesis in Hoyle’s ‘C-f ield.’

Lakatos’ MRP would regard the SSM as degenerative was i t not for the

active nature of its positive heurist ic that made the novel prediction of

‘baby galaxies.’ Considering the active nature of the heuristics of the

SSM I believe the Lakatos’ would brand the SSM ‘stagnant’ as

opposed to degenerative or progressive , allowing its future label to be

determined as and when its novel prediction was confirmed or rejected.

The scientific community of 1950 still remai ned divided in its attempts

to answer the nature of the universe because both of the SRP’s had

areas of success and failure. (See figure 3)

Figure 3; is a table showing the successes and failures of the BBM and

the SSM.

In addition to those arguments presented in figure3 both models failed

to account for several other phenomena of the universe 14, the most

important of these was the unobserved background radiation predict by

the BBM.

Novel predictions

The SSM had made the novel prediction of the existence of ‘baby

galaxies’ that unfortunately required cosmological technology beyond

its years. The SSM had to wait for empirical evidence.

On the other hand, the BBM had made a novel prediction that was

testable with the equipment available to them. The BBM stated the

universe began with an explosion of ext remely hot and extremely dense

14 for ins tance: the format ion of the var ious e lements, the distr ibut ion of galaxies

wi thin the universe

Cri ter ion Big Bang Model (BBM) Success Stead y S ta te Model (SSM) Success

Redshi f t and the Expanding universe

To be expec ted f rom a un i ve rse that i s c reated i n

a dense s ta te and then expands

Yes

To be expec ted f rom an e terna l un i ve rse that expands , wi t h new mat ter be ing c reated i n

the gaps

Yes

Format ion of Galaxies

The B ig Bang expans ion would perhaps have pu l led apar t baby ga laxies before

they cou ld evo lve, but nobody cou ld exp la in how.

?

Mat te r i s c reated by the c - f ie ld and an e te rn i t y o f t ime a l lows

ga lax ies to deve lop and d ie . No v io l ent exp los ion to contes t

w i th .

Yes

Age of the Universe

The un iverse is apparent l y younger than the p lanets

that compr ise i t . Cont rad ic tory

No The un iverse is e t erna l . Yes

plasma comprised of the fundamental particles, Leptons (photons) and

Hadrons (quarks). As the universe expanded the hot plasma cooled and

the Hadrons clumped together to form atoms separating from the ‘fog’

of Leptons. The BBM predicts that as the universe expanded further the

once dense fog of photons would be affected by the ‘Doppler shift’ as

mentioned early, this shift of wavelength should be measurable today

as microwave radiation. The BBM predicted this in 1948 15 however no

such radiation was detected until 1964.

It is easy to access the progress of the BBM with hindsight. Knowing

that the novel prediction of microwaves was going to be confirmed in

1964, we can therefore label the 16 years from its prediction in 1948 16

as a period of ‘ theoretical progression’ but not ‘empirical

progression. ’ That being said the ‘theoretical progression was far from

clear for scientists working during this period.

Take for example the year 1955, at this point in the cosmological

debate both SSM and BBM had made novel predictions and both were

yet to be observed. It seems unfair to attribute the same impediment to

the SSM, who’s prediction was unobserved due to lack of technological

expertise, as to the BBM who’s prediction remained unobserv ed despite

several attempts 17 to detect it . Lakatos appears to suggest that such

unobserved predictions are treated in the same manner as anomalies,

just put to the side until the positive heuristics of an SRP finds an

answer. I find a sl ight problem with MRP here, as if the positive

heuristics of an SRP have made a novel prediction that is not

confirmed it would be very hard to continue to be progressive without

such confirmation on its work so far. Consider a man attempting to

walk from London to Edinburgh . He would know the general direction

he wanted to go was north, however if he could not stop to ask for

directions and verify his location he would be reluctant to say at any

given time on his journey whether he was progressing in the correct

direction or not.

I believe that as negative as this example may sound this is exactly

what Lakatos’ MRP is describing. It is important to remember here that

a methodological description, such as Lakatos’ MRP, is not an

explanation of an ideal scientist working in an ideal efficient world but

rather an explanation of what real world scientists have done

throughout history. With this in mind I believe Lakatos is correct in

allowing SRP’s to continue without empirical confirmation as although

without empirical confirmation progress may be slower and harder (as

they can not rely too heavily on what has not yet been confirmed),

ultimately the positive heuristics will ensure they are heading

relatively in the correct direction. Analogously the man walking from

London to Edinburgh without confirmation of his position he may take

a longer route with more obstacles in his way but ultimately if he

15 Predicted by Gamow, Alpher and Herman in 1948. 16 Predicted by Gamow, Alpher and Herman in 1948. 17 Need to clarify several attempts and if this section is true at all

maintains his northern direction he will be progressing. Similarly

assuming that the time required to progress with out empirical

confirmation is not too long, then the SRP can progress without

becoming lost .

To summarise, Lakatos’ MRP places a lot of pressure on the positive

heuristic to be active and progressive in producing novel predictions,

in order to sustain the ‘progressive’ tit le of the SRP. A progressive

heuristics may continue to progress without the confirmation of such

novel predictions all though progress will be slow and challenging. It

is, however imperative that an SRP’s novel predictions are falsifiable

to avoid an SRP becoming pseudoscientific. Newton’s ‘cosmological

constant’ could be classed as borderline unscientific due to i ts ad hoc

origins however it did correctly amend his ‘General theory of

relativity’ that collectively was a successful SRP.

Post hoc problem

Along with the work of the positive heuristic of an SRP Lakatos’ MRP

also describes the work of the negative heuristic of an SRP.

Returning once again to the BBM’s novel prediction of It appears, as

Thomas Nickles highlights, that Lakatos believes “s cientific rationality

to be ‘post hoc’…we can only be wise after the event” [Nickles, 2001,

209.]

Negative Heuristics at work

In this section I will apply the definition of negative heuristics given

in section 1 of this paper to the historic evidence of the cosmological

debate in question.

The BBM had predicted the ‘Cosmological Background Radiation’ as it

was to become known, which was confirmed in 1964 by American

physicists at the Bell laboratories’ Horn Antenna 18. The confirmation of

the radiation was a decisive empirical progression for the BBM camp

however, how could Hoyle’s SSM account for this radiation?

Perhaps one could argue that the SSM’s heuristic has not predicted the

background radiation and therefore the SSM could only explain this

new observation in an ‘ad hoc’ way. If Lakatos’ MRP classifies the

process by which SRP’s (that did not expect the new empirical

observations) try to explain any new observation as ‘ad hoc’ then he

would be forced to classify most modern scientific theories as ‘ad hoc.’

This surely cannot be Lakatos’ opinion.

18 Robert Wilson and Arno Penzias at Crawford Hill, New Jersey.

I believe such a counter argument falsely stereotypes an SRP’s

heuristics as ‘ad hoc’ when it is explaining evidence it did not predict.

I find it necessary that this is a false assumption in order to avo id

Lakatos’ requiring SRP’s to have a kind of a prior knowledge of future

experiments. The notion ‘ad hoc’ does indeed imply that an

explanation was improvised to suit a specific observation, however it is

important not to confuse ‘improvise’ with an obser vation inspiring a

theory in an SRP. Lakatos draws the distinction that theories are not

‘ad hoc’ i f:

“they not only explain the given facts they were intended to explain but

also predict some new fact as well.’’ [Lakatos, 1976, 179]

I believe the distinction between an improvised explanation and an ex

post facto explanation is a vital part of distinguishing between

progressive and degenerative programs when discussing rival SRP’s.

In the above quote Lakatos is quoted as demanding ‘new facts’ from

otherwise ‘ad hoc’ explanations, however I find that Lakatos

alternative description of ‘novel facts’ as a far more fitting criterion.

The dist inction is that ‘new facts’ imply that an explanation of an

observation must explain why this has been observed and wh at will be

observed in the future. I do not believe that Lakatos can commit to

measuring the progression of an SRP in respect to its ability to predict

future events. If this were the case then the BBM would have been

degenerative up to and including the point until back ground radiation

was confirmed in 1964, a view that seems to overlap with the idea of

Popper’s crucial experiments as it pins to much priority on

experimental confirmation. Furthermore it contradicts what Lakatos’

later statement:

“Anomalies, inconsistencies, ad hoc stratagems, even alleged negative

‘crucial’ experiments, can be consistent with the overall progress of a

research programme.” [Lakatos,319] crucial exp

On the other hand to demand ‘novel facts’ from an SRP is not to

demand future knowledge. The exact meaning of a ‘novel fact’ is

dissected in Nola and Sankey’s book ‘ Recent Issues in Theories of

Scienti fic Method’ 19 where I believe they correctly segregate ‘logical

novelty’ from ‘epistemic novelty’ and ‘anticipatory novelty. ’

‘Logical novelty’ is the novelty that is unique to that new theory. The

fact that theory Tn +1 predicts a fact that T n did not is a ‘novel

19 Title After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method

Volume 15 of Australasian studies in history and philosophy of science

Authors Robert Nola, Howard Sankey

Editors Robert Nola, Howard Sankey

Publisher Springer, 2001

ISBN 1402002467, 9781402002465

prediction’ and if the fact is corroborated with empirical evidence then

it becomes a logically ‘novel fact’ of T n +1 . [Nola, 276]

‘Epistemic novelty’ describes a fact that has been made accessible by a

theory Tn +1 , which may be supported by T n , but this fact discovered

first by Tn +1 makes i t novel to the new theory. “The time at which we

acquire our first knowledge that p of a consequence of T n +1 marks the

difference between logical and epistemic novelty” [Nola, 277] where p

is the novel fact in question.

Finally, ‘Anticipatory novelty’ is when “a theory anticipates some true

proposit ion p by entail ing it ,but no one knows at the time the

consequence is drawn whether it is true or false, ultimately, however it

turns out to be true” [Nola, 278]. The theory was unaware of the

confirmation of a prediction at the time of its creation. It is simply

prediction and empirical confirmation at a later date. Needs to be

related to SSM baby galaxies

The dist inction that Nola and Sankey apply to Lakatos’ general term of

‘novel facts’ al lows for SRP’s being progressive even when their

theoretical predictions are lagging the empirical evidence of current

experiments. This explains how Lakatos’ MRP accounts for SRP’s that

may appear to be the weaker of rival SRP’s but continue to be

progressive as long as their heuristics are working and gives them the

chance to perhaps, in time, become the next favoured SRP.

Returning to the current problem faced by the SSM of how to explain

not only the fact that the cosmological background radiation existed

but also that it was found to be at the predicted wavelength (radio

waves.) The SSM now has one of two options. It could use i ts positive

heuristic to explain the origins of the background radiation making it a

‘logical novel fact’ for the SSM. Alternatively i t could use the negative

heuristics of the SSM to disregard this discovery as an anomaly or

invent an ‘ad hoc’ hypothesis that incorporates the radiation.

History shows that the SSM turned to it’s negative heuristic to protect

its ‘hard core .’ Hoyle questioned the readings of background radiation

claiming that they could not be sure of the or igins of the radiation and

it by no means confirmed the BBM. Hoyle could only attribute the

radiation as an anomaly; there was no way to incorporate it as a novel

fact . Lakatos’ MRP describes that attributing such observations as

anomalies by no means rendered the SSM as false, as Hoyle explained

himself in a defiant speech to the Royal Society in 1968:

“I think it is fair to say that the theory has demonstrated strong

survival quali ties, which is what one should look for in a theory. There

is a close parallel between theory and observation on the one hand,

and mutations and natural selection on the other. Theory supplies the

mutations and observation provides the natural selection. Theories are

never proved right. The best they can do is to survive” [Hoyl e, 1968]

Hoyle’s SSM was no longer progressive. The positive heuristics could

no longer match the empirical evidence, where as the BBM was going

from strength to strength with confirmation after confirmation of its

predictions.

When to give up and go home.

I believe the main source of crit icism in Lakatos’ MRP is the lack of a

distinct demarcation criterion. Popper’s falsificationism relies on

crucial experiments that render out of date theories immediately

obsolete. Lakatos’ MRP allows a progressive SR P’s to have anomalies,

a belt of protective adjustable hypotheses and “even alleged negative

crucial experiments.” [Lakatos, 1976,179] If this is the case, it seems

impossible that an SRP could ever be considered as completely

degenerate and that to pursue any SRP is rational and scientific.

Lakatos offers a general answer to this:

“But when should a particular theory, or a whole research programme,

be rejected? I claim, only if there is a better one to replace it.”

[Lakatos, 320]

The demarcation criterion of being replaced if there is ‘a better one’ is

easy to agree with when discussing a single theory. When discussing a

single theory that is only a part of a series of theories that make up an

SRP, Lakatos states such a theory can be completely falsified.

“We regard a theory in the series ‘falsified’ when it is superseded by a

theory with a higher corroborated content”[Lakatos,1980 ,34]

The replacement of single theories within an SRP is commonplace in

science by simply adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses , however the

‘hard core’ of an SRP cannot be so sharply falsified. As a result of the

structure of Lakatos’ MRP it is impossible to completely corroborated

an entire SRP and consequently impossible for it to be completely

falsified. So does Lakatos sugges t that once an SRP has began it cannot

be stopped? A scientist is well within his rights to pursue an SRP even

if it is clearly degenerative?

“One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is

overtaken by a rival and even after that. What one must not do is to

deny its poor public record… it is perfectly rational to play a risky

game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk” [Lakatos,

MRP, 177]

Lakatos MRP incorporates a personal element into the scientific

demarcation criterion, a “psychological premise” 20 as Zahar describes it

in his adaptation of the MRP. I agree with both Lakatos and Zahar on

the idea of an individual psychological premise for the simple reason

that this best describes the true methodology of scientists. For example

consider the confirmation of the BBM’s predicted background radiation

in 1964. The challenge of explaining the confirmed background

radiation was believed to be beyond the scope of the SSM by one of its

founding scientists Hermann Bondi. Nevert heless, both Hoyle and Gold

continued to support the SSM.

The concept of allowing emotional and psychological elements into a

scientific methodology describing the rational and logical progress of

science may seem out of place. That being said I think i t is vital to

once again express that the MRP is not a description of what scientists

ought to do, but what they do do.

One may argue that such mavericks of science as Hoyle and Gold who

refused to adhere to the mainstream scientific community are unique

and isolated cases who do not represent the true rational scientific

mentality to theories. I believe such a counter argument is correct.

What I do not believe is that this is a problem for Lakatos MRP or for

science. There are many accounts of scientists that were once deemed

as mavericks and extremists who contributed to the progression of

science more than an entire SRP ; James Lovelocks’ famous work on

‘Gaia theory’ is such an example . Furthermore, Hoyle’s relentless

work on ‘Stellar nucleosynthesis’ (how different elements can be

created in stars) began as a SSM heurist ic but i t contributed vastly to

the progression of the BBM that was struggling with this concept.

When consulting the history of science what quickly becomes apparent

is scientists reluctance to except the falsification of their SRP, despite

mounting countering evidence and Lakatos’ MRP is unique in

accounting for such physiological affects in scientific methodology.

Whilst working on a degenerative programme may not itself turn

progressive anytime soon, the work of a rival SRP in challenging

another SRP can only add to sciences progression overall .

Conclusion

Lakatos’ MRP began as a sophisticated falsificationism by introducing

a structured research programme that was a combination of t heories,

hypotheses and a problem solving heuristic. In this paper I have

applied Lakatos MRP to the history of science in an attempt to confirm

its relevance and accuracy.

20 190

I found that when applied to the 20 t h century cosmological rivalry

Lakatos’ MRP successfully describes how each rival research

programme had periods of progression and degeneration, but neither

was falsified. Lakatos MRP correctly predicts that the empirical and

theoretical progression of the BBM means that i t would become the

leading scientific programme. Furthermore, Lakatos’ MRP also renders

the isolated work of maverick scientists such as Hoyle as scientific and

rational to pursue. I believe this is the MRP’s biggest strength, as at

any given moment we cannot brand an SRP as a succe ss or a failure

because we do not know what future experiments will reveal. Even

with all the progression in technology there are still anomalies in the

BBM and new ‘ad hoc’ explanations emerging all the time. Perhaps,

even after a century of debating, the BBM is beginning to degenerate?

‘Theories of scientific progress: an introduction’ Author John

Losee, Edition il lustrated, Publisher Routledge, 2004 . ISBN

0415320666, 978041532066

‘Lakatos’ Thomas Nickles, presented in Title A companion to the

philosophy of science

Blackwell reference online

Author W. H. Newton-Smith

EditorW. H. Newton-Smith

Edition 2, illustrated, reprint

Publisher Wiley-Blackwell, 2001

ISBN 0631230203, 9780631230205

Title The methodology of scientific research programmes

Volume 1 of Philosophical papers, Imre Lakatos

The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Imre Lakatos

Cambridge paperback library

Philosophical Papers Volume I

Authors Imre Lakatos, John Worrall , Gregory Currie

Editors John Worrall, Gregory Currie

Edition illustrated, reprint

Publisher Cambridge University Press, 1980

ISBN 0521280311, 9780521280310

Fred Hoyle's universe

Author Jane Gregory

Edition illustrated

Publisher Oxford University Press, 2005

ISBN 0198507917, 9780198507918

Length 406 pages

Title For and against method: including Lakatos 's lectures on

scientific method and the Lakatos -Feyerabend correspondence

Authors Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Matteo Motterlini

EditorMatteo Motterlini

Edition illustrated

Publisher University of Chicago Press, 1999

ISBN 0226467740, 9780226467740