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Imre Lakatos’s conception of scientific methodology began as an adaptation of Karl Popper’s ideas on falsificationism. Lakatos did not agree that a scientific theory could be so decisively refuted by a single experiment as Popper suggested and set about constructing his own commentary on scientific methodology, a methodology that he called ‘Methodology of Research programmes’ (MRP).
Citation preview
How good an account does Lakatos’ MRP give of the Big Bang
revolution?
Imre Lakatos’s conception of scientific methodology began as an
adaptation of Karl Popper’s ideas on falsificationism. Lakatos did not
agree that a scientific theory could be so decisi vely refuted by a single
experiment as Popper suggested and set about constructing his own
commentary on scientific methodology, a methodology that he called
‘Methodology of Research programmes’ (MRP).
In this essay I will begin by explaining the charact eristics of Lakatos’
MRP, specifically highlighting the nature of rival research programmes
and the transition between what Lakatos calls ‘progressive and
degenerative’ research programmes. Once Lakatos’ MRP has been
clearly presented I shall surrender i t to Lakatos’ own assessment
cri teria, “which histographical research programme is the superior may
be tested by seeing how successfully they explain the scientific
progress.”1
The success of Lakatos MRP has been measured against ‘The
Copernican Revolution ’2 by Lakatos himself, it has also been measured
against ‘Atomism versus thermodynamics’ 3 by Peter Clark. The most
recent measurement of Lakatos’ MRP’s success has been against the
two rival research programmes of Einstein and Lorrentz surrounding
the ‘Theory of Relativity’ at the turn of the 20 t h century. If Lakatos
MRP is an accurate account of scientific progress then it should be the
methodology of both past and present scientific communities. To test
Lakatos methodology I shall introduce the relatively modern rivalry in
physics between Fred Hoyle’s ‘Steady State Model’ and the ‘Big Bang
Model’ of the universe that began in the scientific community of the
1950’s.
I will discuss the history between the development of the two rival
research programmes and show how although both significantly
different programmes they both shared sustained periods of success and
failure. I will show how Lakatos’ MRP accurately describes the
emergence of the favoured ‘Big Bang Model’ and the scientific
isolation of the ‘Steady State Model’ due to its decreasing correlation
with observations.
Lakatos Methodology
Lakatos began, what was to become his MRP, trying to amend the
problems that Popper’s falsificationism was confronted with. Popper
1 Why Copernicus’s Programme Superseded Ptolemy’s 1976 Lakatos and Zahar page 192 2 Why Copernicus’s Programme Superseded Ptolemy’s 1976 Lakatos and Zahar 3 ‘Atomism versus Thermodynamics’ by Peter Clark Taken from ‘ Method and appraisal in the
physical sciences – the critical background to modern science 1800 – 1905’, edited by Colin Howson.
over simplified the modus tollens reconstruction of the
falsificationists’ argument by claiming that:
1. If T (theory) is true, then O (observation) will be observed
2. O is not observed
C: So T is not true
Lakatos, along with many others (like Duhem and Putnam 4), thought
that such a decis ive refutation of ‘T’ couldn’t be concluded from ‘not
O’, as all theories strongly rely on the auxiliary hypotheses and prior
theories on which current theories are based. By observing ‘ not O’ one
can only conclude that a theory combined with certain auxil iary
hypotheses is false. To avoid refutation scientists can simply adjust the
auxiliary hypotheses. This argument is widely known as the ‘Duhemian
Point’5 and it highlights that falsificationism is based on the incorrect
premise that a theory can be tested and falsified in an isolated manner.
Lakatos proposed an alternative view of science that “we view each
science dynamically as a sequence of ‘phases’ of theory, some of which
initially exhibit growth and later exhibit a decline or stagnation” 6 and
Lakatos names these sequences as ‘scientific research programmes’
(SRP.) Lakatos describes an SRP’s structure as having a ‘had core’ set
of theories at its centre, surrounded by that SRP’s heuristic and
auxiliary hypotheses (see figure 1). The ‘hard core’ of a n SRP cannot
be decisively refuted by any single crucial experiment as suggested in
Popper’s somewhat naive falsificationism. In this respect Lakatos’
methodology is a sort of sophisticated falsificationism, as surrounding
the SRP’s ‘hard core’ is the heuristics of that programme that serve to
protect the ‘hard core’ from refutation.
Figure1: A conceptual illustration to show the structure of Lakatos’
MRP.
4 Duhem and putnam 5 Duhemian Point 6 Theories of Scientific Method - Popper Lakatos and Scientific method – Robest Nola and Howard
Sankey, section 10.2, page 274.
Hard core
Protective Belt…
…of auxiliary hypotheses
Positive
Heuristics adds to
the protective belt
of Hypotheses
Negative Heuristics removes hypotheses that
should be avoided to
protect the hardcore
A heuristic is a ‘rule of thumb’ method for problem solving that
incorporates past experiences. Lakatos uses the word heurist ic to
describe the route a scientist should take when perusing a certain SRP.
To clarify Lakatos’ use of heuristics consider the well -known heuristic
of ‘Occam’s razor’, where by the simplest explanation is usually the
best . Occam’s razor is not logically sound but it is a ‘rule of thumb’
process that has a strong conviction in any argument.
In his MRP Lakatos goes further to divide heuristics into the “Positive
heuristic that defines problems, foresees anomalies and turns them
victoriously into examples” [Lakatos, 1973, 318] and the ‘Negative
heuristic’:
“The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the
modus tollens at [the SRP’s] ‘hard core.’ Instead, we must use our
ingenuity to articulate or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses,’ which
form a protective belt around this core, and we must direct the modus
tollens to these.” [Lakatos, MRP, 48]
Auxiliary hypotheses are crucial to all theories, they account for the
initial conditions and the domain in which a theory holds true.
It is the role of the positive heuristics that scientist actively engage in
that generates the explanations of how their SRP can accommodate the
empirical evidence. Thus the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses is
continuously shaped by scientists in attempt to explain away any
anomalies. Lakatos explains how ‘A research programme never solves
all its anomalies.’ [Lakatos, MRP, 49] I believe Lakatos’ statement to
be justified, as there are no current or past ‘anomaly free’ r esearch
programmes.
Lakatos chooses not to measure a programmes success against the
anomalies it cannot explain but focus more on the empirical success it
can explain. Lakatos measures the success of an SRP in respect to
whether it is what he calls ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’.
‘It is theoretically progressive if each modification leads to new
unexpected predictions and it is empirically progressive i f at least
some of these novel predictions are corroborated It is always easy for
a scientist to deal with a given anomaly by making suitable adjustments
to his programme. Such manoeuvres are ad hoc, and the programme is
degenerating, unless they not only explain the given facts they were
intended to explain but also predict some new fact as well .’’ [Lakat os,
1976, 179]
The best example of a progressive research programme is one that is
both empirically and theoretically progressive, where predictions are
backed up by empirical evidence. SRP’s that are degenerative resort to
ad hoc explanations that diverge from the heuristics of that SRP and
whilst Lakatos believes this remains scientific method, it no longer
produces novel facts or predictions. A single ad hoc adaptation of
auxiliary hypotheses by no means renders an entire SRP as degenerate
so long as its positive heuristic remains active.
Unlike Thomas Kuhn’s idea that science follows a specific paradigm
that undergoes transitional shifts over time; Lakatos MRP allows for
many rival SRP’s to co -exist in the scientific community. It is in the
debate between rival SRP’s that the progression of each programme is
most thoroughly scrutinised, “one research programme supersedes
another if it has excess truth content over its rival, in the sense that it
predicts progressively all that i ts rival truly predicts and some more
besides.” [Lakatos, 1973,179]
Lakatos requires a substantial elapse of time to assess a SRP’s
progression or degeneration and it seems to appear a measurement that
can only be made with hindsight. For how can a scientist involved in
an SRP know whether any given success is the start of a period of
sustained progression or alternative that it is just circumstantial
supporting evidence for a programme that will inevitably degenerate?
This appears to be a tricky question and it is a problem t hat is all too
evident in the ‘Big Bang’ case study that follows. I shall present this
historical example as a confirming example of Lakatos’ methodology. I
will also use this example to answer the ‘problem’ of having no
demarcation criteria or time limit to an MRP that can declare a SRP as
completely degenerated. I believe the answer can be found in the
proposed ‘problem’ as I argue that a degenerative SRP is in fact
beneficial to the scientific community and I shall aim to prove this
through the historica l account of the ‘Big Bang revolution.’
2. Big Bang revolution
Rival Programmes
In 1909 Albert Einstein published his long awaited final work on
‘General Relativity.’ General Relativity found success where
Newtonian mechanics failed; that is applying the gravitational force on
a large scale. The implications of General relativity when it was
applied to the even larger -scale universe were not so successful . The
mathematics of General relativity stated that the gravitational force of
galaxies would be so strong that it would pull all matter towards it.
Consequently, if the assumed eternal and static nature of the universe
was correct , then General relativity predicted that gravity should have
caused the universe to collapse long ago.
Einstein managed to adjust the mathematics of general relativity by
introducing the ‘cosmological constant’ that could be applied to
equations so they would not equate to the universe collapsing. The
‘cosmological constant’ could not be tested or observed, i t simple had
to be, if the universe was static and eternal. Einstein’s defence of the
eternal universe is the primitive shell of the research programme that
would become known as the ‘Steady State Model’ (SSM).
Thousands of miles away from Einstein’s research the Russian scientist
and mathematician Alexander Friedmann began to construct his own
research programme that was a progeny of Einstein’s work. Friedmann
was a strong believer in General relativity, however he did not agree
with Einstien’s introduction of the cosmol ogical constant. Friedmann
placed complete faith in General Relativity as his ‘ hard core’ principle
and applied the mathematics of General relativity without the
cosmological constant and without any a prior assumptions of the
nature of the universe. Friedmann calculated that General relativity,
without the cosmological constant, predicted a dynamic expanding
universe and not the static universe that Einstein and many others had
assumed. Friedmann’s SRP was the primitive shell of what would
become known as the ‘Big Bang Model.’ (BBM)
Friedmann’s work hard sparked the great cosmological debate of the
20 t h century as he had presented the following ult imatum: either the
theory of General Relativity is correct and our universe is a dynamic
system or Einstein’s cosmological constant is correct and our universe
is eternal and static.
Hubble’s Empirical evidence
The debate between Einstein and Friedmann symbolised the divide that
was growing in the scientific community between those that believed in
an eternal universe and those that believed in a dynamic universe.
Lakatos’ MRP predicts that it is the progressive SRP, the programme
that shows both empirical and theoretical progression, which will
ultimately triumph in the scientific community.
In the initial debates between Friedmann and Einstein there was a
severe lack of empirical evidence that either side could draw upon
because the telescopic power of astronomers in the 1920’s was limited.
That was until in 1929 the astronomer Edwin Hubble began to look
beyond our own Milky Way into the farther reaches of space. Hubble
observed that the wavelength of the radiation emitted by distant
galaxies is shifted towards the longer wavelength end of the
electromagnetic spectrum. According to the scientific principle know n
as the ‘Doppler effect’ a shift in wavelengths towards the longer
wavelength end of the spectrum means that the source relative to the
observe has a velocity away from the observer. The same scientific
principle explains the shift in pitch of an ambulanc e’s siren as it passes
past your ears. From this observation Hubble inferred that distant
galaxies are travelling at great velocities away from our own galaxy
with speeds that are proportional to their distance from the Milky Way
(See figure 2).
Figure 2: Shows Hubble’s original 1931 measurements of galaxies and their
recession speeds. The graph shows the farther the galaxy is away from the
Milky Way the faster i t is travell ing. Where velocity is in kilometres per
second and distance is in Mpc (where 1Mpc = 3.26 mill ion l ight years away)
Hubble’s measurement of the Doppler Shift of galaxies sparked a race
between the two rival SRP’s to answer the question why are galaxies
observed to be travelling away from our galaxy? 7
BBM interpretation
Hubble had finally presented empirical evidence that both the
heuristics of BBM and SSM would have to explain. The BBM was now
fronted by the Belgian physicist Georges Lemaítre who had writ ten in
his 1927 paper8 the prediction that if the BBM was corre ct then
galaxies should be racing away at speeds proportional to their distance.
This was the first sign of the BBM being a progressive programme. The
BBM had made a prediction in 1927 that was then verified in 1929 by
Hubbles undisputed measurements. Lema itre interpreted Hubble’s
results in the following way: “If the galaxies are receding then:
Tomorrow they will be further away from us
But yesterday they were closer to us
And last year they were closer still
7 Th e ap p a r en t u n iq u e s i gn i f i c an ce o f ou r u n ive rs e ap p ea r i n g t o b e a t t h e c en t r e o f t h e u n iver s e
wa s q u i ck ly a t t r i b u t ed t o b e n on e r e la t i v i s t i c . Th a t i s t o s a y t h e exp an s ion o f t h e u n iv er s e wou ld
l ook t h e sam e n o ma t t er wh e re you wer e i n t h e u n iv e rs e . In c omp ar i s on t h in k of sp ot s p a in t ed on to a b a l l o on ; a s t h e b a l l oon i s i n f la t ed an d exp an d s , r e la t i v e t o each sp ot t h e o th e r sp ot s wou ld a l l b e
t rav e l l i n g a wa y f r om you . 8 ‘A homogeneous Universe of constant mass and growing radius accounting for the radial velocity of
extragalactic nebulae’, G. Lemaître published in Annals of the Scientific Society of Brussels, Vol. 47, p.
49, April 1927
At some point in the past all galaxies must ha ve been right on
top of us.”9
Hubble’s evidence appeared to fit the BBM very well as it reinforced
the ‘hard core’ principle of the BBM, explicitly that the universe
expanded from a singularity in space and time. Yet despite the apparent
perfect match between the story of the BBM and Hubble’s data there
remained a fundamental problem when considering the consequences of
this data.
Hubble’s data is presented in figure 2 as a velocity against distance
graph and from this data one can relatively simply deduc e the time
taken for galaxies to travel this distance apart. Using the elementary
equation that time taken is equal to the distance travelled divided by
the velocity of motion one can see that Hubble’s data implies that the
universe is 1.9 billion years old10. The problem with this result is that
geologists had already used radioactive material from the earth’s
surface to date the creation of the Earth at around 3 billion years old 11.
Therefore Hubble’s data when applied to the BBM results in a universe
that is younger than the planets the comprise it, a complete
contradiction.
It is here that I find Lakatos’ MRP favourable over alternative
scientific methodology as such damning contradictory evidence could
well come within the falsifiable bracket of Popper’ s methodology but
here MRP allows the BBM this anomaly. In Lakatos cri tique of
Popper’s falsificationism, he quotes Popper as saying “A self-
contradictory system must be rejected” [Lakatos, 1973,317] and there
are few more self-contradictory examples than that which the BBM
presented in the 1930’s. Contrary to Popper’s falsification, Lakatos’
MRP states:
“For in large research programmes there are always known anomalies:
normally the researcher puts them aside and follows the posit ive
heuristic of the programme. In general he rivets his attention on the
positive heuristic rather than on the distracting anomalies, and hopes
that the ‘recalcitrant instances’ will be turned into confirming
instances as the programme progresses.” [Lakatos, 1973,317] crucial
exp
Lakatos’ idea of sett ing aside anomalies until the programme progress
is confirmed by the action of the BBM as this is exactly what they did.
The BBM rendered the universes age as an anomaly to be solved later
and focused on applying their positive heuri st ics to produce novel
facts. (see figure 3)
9 ‘Big Bang’ The Great debate, Simon Singh, page 263, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005, ISBN:
0007152523 10 Using data from figure2 and the line of best fit. Take v = 500km/s and d = 3.26 million light years. 11 Big Bang’ Paradigm shift, Simon Singh, page 372, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005, ISBN:
0007152523
Positive Heuristics:
Infinitely hot &
dense beginning
Universe is
constantly expanding
Predicts observable
signs of the initial
explosion to still exist
Negative Heuristics
Age of the Universe
How galaxies
formed from the
explosion
How complex matter
formed from the
explosion
Figure 3: a basic construction of the BBM. Note there are far more
detailed positive and negative heuristics than I have incorporated.
The SSM’s interpretation
The SSM camp, now predominantly fronted by three Cambridge
University colleagues Hoyle, Gold and Bondi, found Hubble’s evidence
disturbing. Disturbing but not damning. Hoyle was to become the key
protagonist of the SSM and he set about redefining the SSM in light of
Hubble’s evidence. Hoyle adjusted the auxiliary hypotheses of the
SSM, so that it no longer required the universe to be static but the SSM
universe was now also dynamic. Hoyle argued that whilst the space
between galaxies was proven to be expanding, the idea of an e ternal
universe could incorporate this expansion.
Hoyle and Gold proposed that new matter was created when the space
between galaxies expanded. They could not account for how or when
the matter would be created; they could only infer that this had to be
the case if the SSM was true. This is a clear example of the negative
heuristics of an SRP at work. Hoyle and Gold believed so strongly in
the ‘hard core’ principle of an eternal universe they had to adjust their
SRP’s hypotheses to account for matter bein g created out of nothing. In
order to explain the spontaneous creation of matter Hoyle hypothesised
‘the creation field’ or ‘C-f ield’ that existed undetected in our universe.
Arguably there is no supporting evidence whatsoever of the
spontaneous creation of matter however Hoyle explained that the
amount of matter required to be created to explain an expanding
universe would be on a scale so small it would be experimentally
unobservable. Hoyle made the analogy that “the universe’s expansion
required a rate of creation of only ‘one atom every century in a volume
equal to the Empire state building’” 12 The interesting product of the
12 ‘Big Bang’ Mavericks of the cosmos, Simon Singh, page 347, Edition 1,Published by Harper Perennial 2005,
ISBN: 0007152523
Universe exploded into
existence from a single point
in space & time.
Positive Heuristics:
Predicts ‘baby
galaxies’
Can account for the
formation of galaxies
Negative Heuristics
Hoyle’s “Creation
field”
How complex matter
formed
Hoyle’s C -field was that it made the novel prediction of the formation
of new matter al l over the universe as time continued. Hoyl e claimed
that this new matter would cluster to form new ‘baby galaxies’ 13 that
should be observable beyond our own Milky Way.
Hoyle’s C-field is analogues to Einstein’s ‘cosmological constant’ as
both explanations appear to be introduced ‘ad hoc’. It app eared that the
SSM had shrugged off the need for Einstein’s questionable
‘cosmological constant’ by allowing for a dynamic universe, however
in doing so the SSM had found itself having to introduce another
questionable hypotheses of the ‘C-field.’ The SSM seemed to rely on
improvised ‘ad hoc’ theoretical hypotheses to explain the empirical
evidence supplied by the modern telescopes’ observations. The SSM
was beginning to show characteristics of a ‘degenerative programme’ .
That being said, the positive heuri stics of the SSM were alive and
active and made the testable ‘novel prediction’ of ‘baby galaxies’ (see
figure 4.)
Unfortunately despite the vast improvements of astronomer’s
telescopes in previous years, the telescopes were not yet powerful
enough to distinguish the predicted baby galaxies from any other
galaxy. The cosmological community was at face off.
SRP Face off
At this stage in the debate, around the 1940’s, there was stalemate
between the SSM and the BBM. The BBM, specifically Lemaitre , had
correctly predicted that galaxies should be receding and at rate
proportional to their distance from the Milky Way. In terms of
Lakatos’ MRP, the BBM was both theoretically and empirically
progressive. However the BBM stil l had to ac count for the hugely
contradictory anomaly that the Earth was supposedly older than the
universe.
13 ibid pg 348
Universe eternal, it has no
finite beginning.
On the other hand, the SSM replaced an already ad hoc hypothesis of
Einstein’s ‘cosmological constant’ with the reinvented dynamic SSM
and the introduction of a new ad hoc hypothesis in Hoyle’s ‘C-f ield.’
Lakatos’ MRP would regard the SSM as degenerative was i t not for the
active nature of its positive heurist ic that made the novel prediction of
‘baby galaxies.’ Considering the active nature of the heuristics of the
SSM I believe the Lakatos’ would brand the SSM ‘stagnant’ as
opposed to degenerative or progressive , allowing its future label to be
determined as and when its novel prediction was confirmed or rejected.
The scientific community of 1950 still remai ned divided in its attempts
to answer the nature of the universe because both of the SRP’s had
areas of success and failure. (See figure 3)
Figure 3; is a table showing the successes and failures of the BBM and
the SSM.
In addition to those arguments presented in figure3 both models failed
to account for several other phenomena of the universe 14, the most
important of these was the unobserved background radiation predict by
the BBM.
Novel predictions
The SSM had made the novel prediction of the existence of ‘baby
galaxies’ that unfortunately required cosmological technology beyond
its years. The SSM had to wait for empirical evidence.
On the other hand, the BBM had made a novel prediction that was
testable with the equipment available to them. The BBM stated the
universe began with an explosion of ext remely hot and extremely dense
14 for ins tance: the format ion of the var ious e lements, the distr ibut ion of galaxies
wi thin the universe
Cri ter ion Big Bang Model (BBM) Success Stead y S ta te Model (SSM) Success
Redshi f t and the Expanding universe
To be expec ted f rom a un i ve rse that i s c reated i n
a dense s ta te and then expands
Yes
To be expec ted f rom an e terna l un i ve rse that expands , wi t h new mat ter be ing c reated i n
the gaps
Yes
Format ion of Galaxies
The B ig Bang expans ion would perhaps have pu l led apar t baby ga laxies before
they cou ld evo lve, but nobody cou ld exp la in how.
?
Mat te r i s c reated by the c - f ie ld and an e te rn i t y o f t ime a l lows
ga lax ies to deve lop and d ie . No v io l ent exp los ion to contes t
w i th .
Yes
Age of the Universe
The un iverse is apparent l y younger than the p lanets
that compr ise i t . Cont rad ic tory
No The un iverse is e t erna l . Yes
plasma comprised of the fundamental particles, Leptons (photons) and
Hadrons (quarks). As the universe expanded the hot plasma cooled and
the Hadrons clumped together to form atoms separating from the ‘fog’
of Leptons. The BBM predicts that as the universe expanded further the
once dense fog of photons would be affected by the ‘Doppler shift’ as
mentioned early, this shift of wavelength should be measurable today
as microwave radiation. The BBM predicted this in 1948 15 however no
such radiation was detected until 1964.
It is easy to access the progress of the BBM with hindsight. Knowing
that the novel prediction of microwaves was going to be confirmed in
1964, we can therefore label the 16 years from its prediction in 1948 16
as a period of ‘ theoretical progression’ but not ‘empirical
progression. ’ That being said the ‘theoretical progression was far from
clear for scientists working during this period.
Take for example the year 1955, at this point in the cosmological
debate both SSM and BBM had made novel predictions and both were
yet to be observed. It seems unfair to attribute the same impediment to
the SSM, who’s prediction was unobserved due to lack of technological
expertise, as to the BBM who’s prediction remained unobserv ed despite
several attempts 17 to detect it . Lakatos appears to suggest that such
unobserved predictions are treated in the same manner as anomalies,
just put to the side until the positive heuristics of an SRP finds an
answer. I find a sl ight problem with MRP here, as if the positive
heuristics of an SRP have made a novel prediction that is not
confirmed it would be very hard to continue to be progressive without
such confirmation on its work so far. Consider a man attempting to
walk from London to Edinburgh . He would know the general direction
he wanted to go was north, however if he could not stop to ask for
directions and verify his location he would be reluctant to say at any
given time on his journey whether he was progressing in the correct
direction or not.
I believe that as negative as this example may sound this is exactly
what Lakatos’ MRP is describing. It is important to remember here that
a methodological description, such as Lakatos’ MRP, is not an
explanation of an ideal scientist working in an ideal efficient world but
rather an explanation of what real world scientists have done
throughout history. With this in mind I believe Lakatos is correct in
allowing SRP’s to continue without empirical confirmation as although
without empirical confirmation progress may be slower and harder (as
they can not rely too heavily on what has not yet been confirmed),
ultimately the positive heuristics will ensure they are heading
relatively in the correct direction. Analogously the man walking from
London to Edinburgh without confirmation of his position he may take
a longer route with more obstacles in his way but ultimately if he
15 Predicted by Gamow, Alpher and Herman in 1948. 16 Predicted by Gamow, Alpher and Herman in 1948. 17 Need to clarify several attempts and if this section is true at all
maintains his northern direction he will be progressing. Similarly
assuming that the time required to progress with out empirical
confirmation is not too long, then the SRP can progress without
becoming lost .
To summarise, Lakatos’ MRP places a lot of pressure on the positive
heuristic to be active and progressive in producing novel predictions,
in order to sustain the ‘progressive’ tit le of the SRP. A progressive
heuristics may continue to progress without the confirmation of such
novel predictions all though progress will be slow and challenging. It
is, however imperative that an SRP’s novel predictions are falsifiable
to avoid an SRP becoming pseudoscientific. Newton’s ‘cosmological
constant’ could be classed as borderline unscientific due to i ts ad hoc
origins however it did correctly amend his ‘General theory of
relativity’ that collectively was a successful SRP.
Post hoc problem
Along with the work of the positive heuristic of an SRP Lakatos’ MRP
also describes the work of the negative heuristic of an SRP.
Returning once again to the BBM’s novel prediction of It appears, as
Thomas Nickles highlights, that Lakatos believes “s cientific rationality
to be ‘post hoc’…we can only be wise after the event” [Nickles, 2001,
209.]
Negative Heuristics at work
In this section I will apply the definition of negative heuristics given
in section 1 of this paper to the historic evidence of the cosmological
debate in question.
The BBM had predicted the ‘Cosmological Background Radiation’ as it
was to become known, which was confirmed in 1964 by American
physicists at the Bell laboratories’ Horn Antenna 18. The confirmation of
the radiation was a decisive empirical progression for the BBM camp
however, how could Hoyle’s SSM account for this radiation?
Perhaps one could argue that the SSM’s heuristic has not predicted the
background radiation and therefore the SSM could only explain this
new observation in an ‘ad hoc’ way. If Lakatos’ MRP classifies the
process by which SRP’s (that did not expect the new empirical
observations) try to explain any new observation as ‘ad hoc’ then he
would be forced to classify most modern scientific theories as ‘ad hoc.’
This surely cannot be Lakatos’ opinion.
18 Robert Wilson and Arno Penzias at Crawford Hill, New Jersey.
I believe such a counter argument falsely stereotypes an SRP’s
heuristics as ‘ad hoc’ when it is explaining evidence it did not predict.
I find it necessary that this is a false assumption in order to avo id
Lakatos’ requiring SRP’s to have a kind of a prior knowledge of future
experiments. The notion ‘ad hoc’ does indeed imply that an
explanation was improvised to suit a specific observation, however it is
important not to confuse ‘improvise’ with an obser vation inspiring a
theory in an SRP. Lakatos draws the distinction that theories are not
‘ad hoc’ i f:
“they not only explain the given facts they were intended to explain but
also predict some new fact as well.’’ [Lakatos, 1976, 179]
I believe the distinction between an improvised explanation and an ex
post facto explanation is a vital part of distinguishing between
progressive and degenerative programs when discussing rival SRP’s.
In the above quote Lakatos is quoted as demanding ‘new facts’ from
otherwise ‘ad hoc’ explanations, however I find that Lakatos
alternative description of ‘novel facts’ as a far more fitting criterion.
The dist inction is that ‘new facts’ imply that an explanation of an
observation must explain why this has been observed and wh at will be
observed in the future. I do not believe that Lakatos can commit to
measuring the progression of an SRP in respect to its ability to predict
future events. If this were the case then the BBM would have been
degenerative up to and including the point until back ground radiation
was confirmed in 1964, a view that seems to overlap with the idea of
Popper’s crucial experiments as it pins to much priority on
experimental confirmation. Furthermore it contradicts what Lakatos’
later statement:
“Anomalies, inconsistencies, ad hoc stratagems, even alleged negative
‘crucial’ experiments, can be consistent with the overall progress of a
research programme.” [Lakatos,319] crucial exp
On the other hand to demand ‘novel facts’ from an SRP is not to
demand future knowledge. The exact meaning of a ‘novel fact’ is
dissected in Nola and Sankey’s book ‘ Recent Issues in Theories of
Scienti fic Method’ 19 where I believe they correctly segregate ‘logical
novelty’ from ‘epistemic novelty’ and ‘anticipatory novelty. ’
‘Logical novelty’ is the novelty that is unique to that new theory. The
fact that theory Tn +1 predicts a fact that T n did not is a ‘novel
19 Title After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method
Volume 15 of Australasian studies in history and philosophy of science
Authors Robert Nola, Howard Sankey
Editors Robert Nola, Howard Sankey
Publisher Springer, 2001
ISBN 1402002467, 9781402002465
prediction’ and if the fact is corroborated with empirical evidence then
it becomes a logically ‘novel fact’ of T n +1 . [Nola, 276]
‘Epistemic novelty’ describes a fact that has been made accessible by a
theory Tn +1 , which may be supported by T n , but this fact discovered
first by Tn +1 makes i t novel to the new theory. “The time at which we
acquire our first knowledge that p of a consequence of T n +1 marks the
difference between logical and epistemic novelty” [Nola, 277] where p
is the novel fact in question.
Finally, ‘Anticipatory novelty’ is when “a theory anticipates some true
proposit ion p by entail ing it ,but no one knows at the time the
consequence is drawn whether it is true or false, ultimately, however it
turns out to be true” [Nola, 278]. The theory was unaware of the
confirmation of a prediction at the time of its creation. It is simply
prediction and empirical confirmation at a later date. Needs to be
related to SSM baby galaxies
The dist inction that Nola and Sankey apply to Lakatos’ general term of
‘novel facts’ al lows for SRP’s being progressive even when their
theoretical predictions are lagging the empirical evidence of current
experiments. This explains how Lakatos’ MRP accounts for SRP’s that
may appear to be the weaker of rival SRP’s but continue to be
progressive as long as their heuristics are working and gives them the
chance to perhaps, in time, become the next favoured SRP.
Returning to the current problem faced by the SSM of how to explain
not only the fact that the cosmological background radiation existed
but also that it was found to be at the predicted wavelength (radio
waves.) The SSM now has one of two options. It could use i ts positive
heuristic to explain the origins of the background radiation making it a
‘logical novel fact’ for the SSM. Alternatively i t could use the negative
heuristics of the SSM to disregard this discovery as an anomaly or
invent an ‘ad hoc’ hypothesis that incorporates the radiation.
History shows that the SSM turned to it’s negative heuristic to protect
its ‘hard core .’ Hoyle questioned the readings of background radiation
claiming that they could not be sure of the or igins of the radiation and
it by no means confirmed the BBM. Hoyle could only attribute the
radiation as an anomaly; there was no way to incorporate it as a novel
fact . Lakatos’ MRP describes that attributing such observations as
anomalies by no means rendered the SSM as false, as Hoyle explained
himself in a defiant speech to the Royal Society in 1968:
“I think it is fair to say that the theory has demonstrated strong
survival quali ties, which is what one should look for in a theory. There
is a close parallel between theory and observation on the one hand,
and mutations and natural selection on the other. Theory supplies the
mutations and observation provides the natural selection. Theories are
never proved right. The best they can do is to survive” [Hoyl e, 1968]
Hoyle’s SSM was no longer progressive. The positive heuristics could
no longer match the empirical evidence, where as the BBM was going
from strength to strength with confirmation after confirmation of its
predictions.
When to give up and go home.
I believe the main source of crit icism in Lakatos’ MRP is the lack of a
distinct demarcation criterion. Popper’s falsificationism relies on
crucial experiments that render out of date theories immediately
obsolete. Lakatos’ MRP allows a progressive SR P’s to have anomalies,
a belt of protective adjustable hypotheses and “even alleged negative
crucial experiments.” [Lakatos, 1976,179] If this is the case, it seems
impossible that an SRP could ever be considered as completely
degenerate and that to pursue any SRP is rational and scientific.
Lakatos offers a general answer to this:
“But when should a particular theory, or a whole research programme,
be rejected? I claim, only if there is a better one to replace it.”
[Lakatos, 320]
The demarcation criterion of being replaced if there is ‘a better one’ is
easy to agree with when discussing a single theory. When discussing a
single theory that is only a part of a series of theories that make up an
SRP, Lakatos states such a theory can be completely falsified.
“We regard a theory in the series ‘falsified’ when it is superseded by a
theory with a higher corroborated content”[Lakatos,1980 ,34]
The replacement of single theories within an SRP is commonplace in
science by simply adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses , however the
‘hard core’ of an SRP cannot be so sharply falsified. As a result of the
structure of Lakatos’ MRP it is impossible to completely corroborated
an entire SRP and consequently impossible for it to be completely
falsified. So does Lakatos sugges t that once an SRP has began it cannot
be stopped? A scientist is well within his rights to pursue an SRP even
if it is clearly degenerative?
“One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is
overtaken by a rival and even after that. What one must not do is to
deny its poor public record… it is perfectly rational to play a risky
game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk” [Lakatos,
MRP, 177]
Lakatos MRP incorporates a personal element into the scientific
demarcation criterion, a “psychological premise” 20 as Zahar describes it
in his adaptation of the MRP. I agree with both Lakatos and Zahar on
the idea of an individual psychological premise for the simple reason
that this best describes the true methodology of scientists. For example
consider the confirmation of the BBM’s predicted background radiation
in 1964. The challenge of explaining the confirmed background
radiation was believed to be beyond the scope of the SSM by one of its
founding scientists Hermann Bondi. Nevert heless, both Hoyle and Gold
continued to support the SSM.
The concept of allowing emotional and psychological elements into a
scientific methodology describing the rational and logical progress of
science may seem out of place. That being said I think i t is vital to
once again express that the MRP is not a description of what scientists
ought to do, but what they do do.
One may argue that such mavericks of science as Hoyle and Gold who
refused to adhere to the mainstream scientific community are unique
and isolated cases who do not represent the true rational scientific
mentality to theories. I believe such a counter argument is correct.
What I do not believe is that this is a problem for Lakatos MRP or for
science. There are many accounts of scientists that were once deemed
as mavericks and extremists who contributed to the progression of
science more than an entire SRP ; James Lovelocks’ famous work on
‘Gaia theory’ is such an example . Furthermore, Hoyle’s relentless
work on ‘Stellar nucleosynthesis’ (how different elements can be
created in stars) began as a SSM heurist ic but i t contributed vastly to
the progression of the BBM that was struggling with this concept.
When consulting the history of science what quickly becomes apparent
is scientists reluctance to except the falsification of their SRP, despite
mounting countering evidence and Lakatos’ MRP is unique in
accounting for such physiological affects in scientific methodology.
Whilst working on a degenerative programme may not itself turn
progressive anytime soon, the work of a rival SRP in challenging
another SRP can only add to sciences progression overall .
Conclusion
Lakatos’ MRP began as a sophisticated falsificationism by introducing
a structured research programme that was a combination of t heories,
hypotheses and a problem solving heuristic. In this paper I have
applied Lakatos MRP to the history of science in an attempt to confirm
its relevance and accuracy.
20 190
I found that when applied to the 20 t h century cosmological rivalry
Lakatos’ MRP successfully describes how each rival research
programme had periods of progression and degeneration, but neither
was falsified. Lakatos MRP correctly predicts that the empirical and
theoretical progression of the BBM means that i t would become the
leading scientific programme. Furthermore, Lakatos’ MRP also renders
the isolated work of maverick scientists such as Hoyle as scientific and
rational to pursue. I believe this is the MRP’s biggest strength, as at
any given moment we cannot brand an SRP as a succe ss or a failure
because we do not know what future experiments will reveal. Even
with all the progression in technology there are still anomalies in the
BBM and new ‘ad hoc’ explanations emerging all the time. Perhaps,
even after a century of debating, the BBM is beginning to degenerate?
‘Theories of scientific progress: an introduction’ Author John
Losee, Edition il lustrated, Publisher Routledge, 2004 . ISBN
0415320666, 978041532066
‘Lakatos’ Thomas Nickles, presented in Title A companion to the
philosophy of science
Blackwell reference online
Author W. H. Newton-Smith
EditorW. H. Newton-Smith
Edition 2, illustrated, reprint
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell, 2001
ISBN 0631230203, 9780631230205
Title The methodology of scientific research programmes
Volume 1 of Philosophical papers, Imre Lakatos
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Imre Lakatos
Cambridge paperback library
Philosophical Papers Volume I
Authors Imre Lakatos, John Worrall , Gregory Currie
Editors John Worrall, Gregory Currie
Edition illustrated, reprint
Publisher Cambridge University Press, 1980
ISBN 0521280311, 9780521280310
Fred Hoyle's universe
Author Jane Gregory
Edition illustrated
Publisher Oxford University Press, 2005
ISBN 0198507917, 9780198507918
Length 406 pages
Title For and against method: including Lakatos 's lectures on
scientific method and the Lakatos -Feyerabend correspondence
Authors Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Matteo Motterlini
EditorMatteo Motterlini
Edition illustrated
Publisher University of Chicago Press, 1999
ISBN 0226467740, 9780226467740