IMTECH
APG FINANCE AND RISK CONFERENTIE
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
Increase in revenues = 323M
(14%)
Of which 83M Germany and Eastern Europe
BALANCE SHEET
Due from customers grows by 241M in H1
Trade Receivables grow by 15M
38%
Non-current assets grow 7% (101M)
German assets grow by 107M in H1
and 406M ltm
Only a bit is due to acquisitions
ABN AMRO Report – Imtech: working through its capital
And what’s happening with the cash?!
THE FRAUD WITH ADVENTURE WORLD WARSAW
On 28 December 2011, when AWW was unable to
make two advance payments of EUR 21 million
and EUR 37.3 million the following was done:
• The Austrian bank lended the money to AWW
• Imtech Poland provided security for the loan to AWW in favour of the Austrian
bank by creating a pledge over the amount credited to its account with the
Austrian bank, which therefore was not available to Imtech.
In June 2012 the amounts due from AWW had substantially increased. Apart from
the “trick” above, AWW and Imtech did the following:
• AWW wrote a promissory note (“wechsel”) of 147 million, which Imtech
booked as “cash”.
• KPMG argued that it should have been booked as other financial assets, but
this was waived away by management and the supervisory board
• AWW still did not have any financing in place.
THE X-GROUP
• In its reports on the fraud, Imtech referred to a mysterious group of people
called “the X group”.
• It has later become clear that this referred to a network of people among which
the grandson of the founder of Imtech Germany.
• Imtech Germany made payments to the X group of nearly 30 million Euro for
which no legitimate business purpose could be established.
• Moreover, Imtech Germany provided guarantees for liabilities of members of
the X group for which no business purpose could be established. The
transactions were instigated by Klaus Betz.
• Imtech Germany was able to hide these payments, because it kept
bookkeeping systems that were out of sight for Imtech Head Offices.
“Kaiser Klaus”
CONCLUSIONS FORENSIC INVESTIGATION
Corporate culture
We believe that the fraudulent actions referred to in paragraph 2.2 might have been mitigated if Imtech's corporate culture had been more open and sceptical. It has become clear to us that over the past years the "tone from the top" from the Former Board of Management has been to focus on "good news". By way of an example, there is evidence that the Former Board of Management was not receptive to downward adjustments of forecasts compared to budgets as proposed by operational management, and that with the involvement of the Former Board of Management the management of Imtech Netherlands under pressure upwardly adjusted Imtech Netherlands' forecasts and interim results for 2012 to a level which the management of Imtech Netherlands considered overly optimistic. Risk management often seems to have been considered as being primarily driven by external compliance requirements and not as a source of competitive advantage. Internal control overrides, including by the Former Board of Management, or its members, were not uncommon. The Former Board of Management approved intra-group invoicing for reasons which we believe to be inadequate. The resulting culture was enforced by Imtech's focus on revenue and EBITA growth and the direction of its management remuneration policies towards those goals of accounting triggers rather than cash triggers.
INSUFFICIENT BUSINESS CONTROLS