COVER: From an emplacement in a can efieldon Tinian, a pack howitzer gun crew standsready, awaiting firing instructions. The l:ght-we:ght, easily transported 75mm pack howit-zer served Marines throughout the island-hopping campa:gns of World War II. Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC) 127-N-90945

A BRIEF HISTORY OFTHE 14TH MARINES

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. BrownU.S. Marine Corps Reserve

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGIDN, D.C.

1990

Other Volumes in the Marine CorpsRegimental Histories Series

A Brief History of the 1st Marines, 1960, rev. eds. 1962, 1968

A Brief History of the 2dMarines, 1961, rev. eds. 1962, 1969

A Brief History of the 3d Marines, 1961, rev. ed. 1968

A Brie/History of the 4th Marines, 1970

A Brie/History of the 5th Marines, 1963, rev. ed. 1968

A Brief History of the 6th Marines, 1987

A Brief History of the 7th Marines, 1980

A Brie/History of the 8th Marines, 1976

A Brief Thstory of the 9th Marines, 1961, rev. eds. 1963, 1967

A Brief Thstory of the 10th Marines, 1981

A Brie/History of the 11th Marines, 1968

A Brie/History of the 12t4 Marines, 1972

A Brief History of the 23d Marines, now in preparation

A Brief History of the 24th Marines, s<heduled for preparation

A Brief History of the 25th Marines, 1981

PCN 190-003108 00

Foreword

This historical monograph is one of a series of active duty and Reserve regimental histories.When completed, this series will cover each regiment in the Fleet Marine Force. The narrativehighlights the significant activities of the 14th Marines and offrts a general history of the MarineCorps activities in which it participated. This particular monograph was assigned to a memberof Mobilization Training Unit (History) DC-7, an organization composed entirely of Reserviststasked with augmenting the activities of the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps. These Reservists provide skills as historians, artists, and curators as part of theirMW duties and stand ready to be called to active duty if needed.

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR, holds a bachelor of arts (with honors) degreein history from Western Michigan University, and a master of arts degree from Eastern MichiganUniversity. Lieutenant Colonel Brown is currently a high school history teacher and football coachin Southileld, Michigan. While on active duty from 1967 to 1971 he served as an infantry officerin the Republic of Vietnam and was stationed at Quantico, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Lejeune.His Reserve activities have taken him to Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Camp Pendleton, TwentyninePalms, Washington, and Quantico. Lieutenant Colonel Brown is the author of many feature arti-cles and is a regular book reviewer for several professional journals.

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes com-ments on this monograph from key participants, Marine Corps activities, and interested individuals.

E. H. SimmonsBrigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

111

Preface

The 14th Marines is the artillery regiment assigned to the 4th Marine Division, the groundcombat arm of the select Marine Corps Reserve. As such the 14th Marines represents one-quarterof the direct support and almost all of the general support heavy artillery in the Marine Corps.A Brief History of the 14th Marines is a concise narrative of the regiment, including its brief serv-ice during the World War I era, its proud service in the Pacific during World War II, and its reacti-vation and reorganizations since 1962. Official records of the Marine Corps and appropriate historicalworks were used in compiling this short history. This monograph is published for the informationof those interested in the 14th Marines and the events that shaped its history.

This monograph was produced under the general editorial guidance of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Editorial contributions were made by Mr.Benis M. Frank, Dr. V. Keith Fleming, and Mr. Jack Shulimson. Final editing in preparation forpublication was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith. Some of the research on Saipan and Tinian wasprovided by MajorJeremiahJ. Ashcroft II, USMCR. Research assistance was provided by Miss Eve-lyn A. Englander and Mrs. Pat Morgan, Library Section; Mr. Danny). Crawford of the ReferenceSection; and Mrs. Joyce F. Bonneti of the Archives Section. Photographic support was renderedby Mrs. Regina Strother of the Reference Section. The index was prepared by Mr. Benis M. Frankand Mrs. Meredith P. Hartley.

The various production phases this volume went through before publication were professional-ly handled by the head of the Publications Production Section, Mr. Robert F. Struder. Themanuscript was typeset by Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns. The maps and charts were produced by Mr.W. Stephen Hill, who also designed the volume.

Special thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel Cyril V. Moyher, USMCR, who offered patientadvice, valuable guidance, and outstanding administrative support while attached to MTEJ(Hist)DC-7; and to Colonel Torrence W. Rogers and Sergeant Major Richard L. Butcher for their con-cern and support for this project. Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the current and former"cannoneer?' of the 14th Marines who reviewed the comment draft.

RONALDJ. BROWNLieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

v

Table of Contents

Foreword .Preface V

Table of Contents VII

Maps and Charts lx

Introduction xi

606571

77

NOTES 83

Officers, 14th Marines 87

8991

D. Honors 93

E. Contributors 95

I World War I2 Reactivation,3 Roi-Namur..4 Maui, 1944..

Era...1943..

ChapterChapterChapterChapter

ChapterChapterChapterChapter

5 Saipan, 19446 Tinian, 19447 Iwo Jima, 1945....8 Deactivation, 1945.

1

4

11

20

23

36

46

56

Chapter 9 The Marine Corps Reserve: 1945-61.ChapterChapterChapter

10 Rebuilding A Force In Readiness: 1962-69.11 New Missions and Structure: The 1970s.12 The Modern 14th Marines: The 1980s.

APPENDICESA. CommandingB. Chronology..C. Lineage

vii

Maps and Charts

Organization of 14th Marines, Roi-Naniur, February 1944.Pacific Ocean Areas of the 14th MarinesD-Day in the North14th Marines at Saipan, 1944Saipan 1944Saipan D-Day, 15 June 1944Task Organization at TinianArtillery Landings on Tinian, 1944Iwo Jima, 1945 hrnrth Marine Division Zone of Action...The Modern 14th Marines

ix

8

8

16

24

2529374053

78

Introduction

The ultimate goal of any military force has alwaysbeen to ensure victory by concentrating the maximumamount of combat power at the decisive point duringthe crucial time of the battle. In the early ages ofwarfare, this most often meant simply massing moretroops than the enemy could muster, and then over-powering them with sheer force of numbers. As timepassed, technology advanced and dramatically in-creased the commander's firepower and mobility. Even-tually, armies grouped together soldiers who hadmastered certain skills to form specialized "arms" to5UOt the maneuver elements. One of the oldest,best known, and most common of these separate armsis the one associated with the science of gunnery calledthe artillery.

The primary mission of the artillery always has beenclose combat support for the maneuver elements ofan armed force. This has been true ever since the firstunknown warrior picked up a rock and flung it at hisenemy. Despite vast tactical and technological inno-vations, the fundamental task has remained un-changed, even with the passing of centuries. Modernfield artillery still provides timely, accurate, long-rangefire in support of the units at the forward edge of thebattle zone. While the mission of the artillery has re-mained constant, the war machines themselves haveundergone revolutionary changes. It hardly seems pos-sible that today's ultrasophisticated weaponry like theCannon-Launched, Guided Projectile, capable of strik-ing a moving target 30 kilometers away with deadlycertain accuracy, is a distant relative of the simple slingof Biblical days. Yet, it is true. Artillery weapons havesimply kept pace with the sweeping technological ad-vances of mankind.

x

Most field artillery weapons are bulky, complexmachines that are extremely vulnerable to direct fireby enemy weapons; therefore, in all but the most un-usual circumstances, they operate outside the rangeof small arms fire. As a result, their contributions tovictory have sometimes been overlooked by historiansmore interested in the heroic actions of units or in-dividuals engaged in close combat with enemy forces.Too frequently the fact that successful military opera-tions in conventional war were the result of close coor-dination of all combat arms was forgotten. This hasbeen particularly true of Marine Corps operations.Once ashore, one-half the ground-based firepower ofa Marine division is furnished by its organic artilleryregiment. This is the story of one such regiment, the14th Marines.'

Currently, the 14th Marines is one of the regimentsassigned to the 4th Marine Division. The 14th Ma-rines differs from the other numbered regiments inthe division because it is an artillery unit.2 The 14thMarines is organized, equipped, and trained to pro-vide dose and continuous indirect fire support for thedivision's maneuver elements. The 4th Marine Divi-sion is the ground force of the selected Marine CorpsReserve. Its members must be ready to mobilize andaugment regular units in times of national emergen-cy or at the direction of the President of the UnitedStates. The guns of the 14th Marines have alwaysprovided outstanding support for the units of the 4thMarine Division day and night, in all types of terrain,weather, and climate. Today, the Reserve cannoneersof the 14th Marines stand always at the ready, preparedto resume fifing whenever and wherever they may beneeded.

CHAPTER 1

World War I Era

The heritage of the 14th Marines began just afterthe end of World War!. Earlier, on 6 April 1917, theUnited States declared war on Germany. The climateof opinion in America strongly supported this act ofCongress and a wave of patriotism swept across thecountry. Young men, attracted by slogans such as "BeFirst To Fight" or "Tell It To The Marines," rushed toenlist in the United States Marine Corps in unpre-cedented numbers.' Soon, recruit depots at Parris Is-land, South Carolina, and Mare Island, California,were overloaded. Space for training remained limiteddespite the establishment of several more facilities. Toalleviate this congestion, the Marine Corps leased sixthousand acres of land just south of Washington, D.C.near the little town of Quantico, Virginia? This beau-tiful spot, along the Potomac River in the rolling hillsof Virginia, remains a key Marine Corps training centertoday?

At Quantico, the 14th Regiment was formed to fillthe vacuum left when the 10th Regiment departed forthe Naval Proving Grounds at Indian Head, Maryland,to receive further gunnery instruction with its new7-inch naval guns. The newly activated regiment

received its first colors on 26 November 1918 Theofficers and noncommissioned officers of the 14thRegiment were seasoned veterans. Some had seen serv-ice in Cuba in 1898, many had participated in one ormore of the frequent American interventions in theCaribbean area, and a IS were recently retumed fromFrance? The fledgling 14th Regiment took over muchof the equipment left behind by the 10th Regiment.The 14th Regiment inherited many of its finest en-listed men from the 10th Regiment as well. Theyformed a tough and uncompromising cadre aroundwhich an outstanding new unit could be built. ColonelRichard M. Cutrs, a preeminent Marine of the era, wasselected to command the 14th Regiment.° ColonelCutts gained fame as the coinventor of the Cutts Com-pensator, a muzzle brake for the Thompson sub-machine gun. He also gained recognition for his out-standing performance as the commander of the PoliciaNacionalDominicana, the national police force of theDominican Republic?

The new regiment mustered 28 officers and 1,027enlisted men. It consisted of one headquarters detach-ment and three battalions. The headquarters detach-

Marine crew loads a 3-inch naval gun similar to those used by the regiment in trainingdrills during the first six months of 1918 in preparation for possible duty in France.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

I

ment was led by regimental adjutant Harry H.Courvette and contained nine officers and 53 enlist-ed Marines! This detachment was responsible for theregiment's administration, supply, signals, and oper-ational planning. Captain Courvette wore many hats.In addition to his job as regimental administrative of-ficer, he also functioned as the regimental executiveofficer, reconnaissance officer, and signal officer.

The requirements for entering the detachment'stechnical staff were stiff. Before being posted to it,each enlisted man had to pass a competency test ad-ministered by the regiment's officers. These few Ma-rines performed all of the functions of a modernregimental staff, as well as the additional duty of car-ing for the horses and mules needed for headquarterstransportation.°

Most of the regiment's manpower was in its threebattalions, which were divided into companies. Whileactual manning levels fluctuated, each company wasauthorized 4 officers, 24 non-commissioned officers(NCOs), and 75 privates. Most companies musteredtwo or three officers and about 100 enlisted men dur-ing this period.10 Major, later Major General, EmileP. Moses commanded the 1st Battalion. The 1st Bat-talion had four companies: the 170th, 171st, 172d, andthe 173d. Major Victor I. Morrison's 2d Battalion con-trolled the 174th, 175th, 176th, and 177th Compa-nies. The 3d Battalion was a light battalion of onlytwo companies, the 178th and 179th."

The new 14th Regiment had three primary tasks toaccomplish during its rigorous training program. Onemajor task involved basic military training. A secondobjective was to familiarize the neophyte Marines withthe regiment's 3-inch naval guns. The last task waspreparation for possible duty overseas.* The skills re-quired to operate the complex artillery pieces werevastly different from the skills used by infantrymen;therefore, the men of the 14th Regiment faced a dualcommitment.

To accomplish the first two goals, the companiesconducted infantry drill with rifles during the morn-ing, and artillery gun drill in the afternoon. The com-mand considered infantry drill necessary fur two rea-sons. First, rifle drill helped the gunners of the 14thMarines maintain a high state of discipline. It alsotrained them to act as an infantry force should theirbattery positions be threatened by an enemy assault.

flaining with their artillery weapons involved learn-ing the "mechanism of fire" for the unfamiliar guns.Instruction began in the classroom, followed by hands-on experience gained through the seemingly endlessgun drills on the parade ground where men respondedby the numbers, loading imaginary ammunition and

*ftkfter the armistice, the 4th Marine Brigade was sent to Get.many for occupation duty. Othet AEF units were posted to Russiato protect American lives and property. A small detachment of Ma.rines landed at the Russian port of Vladivostok in 1919.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Marine gun crew at field artillery drill at Quantico in 1918. These Mariner were equippedwith the 3-inch field gun rather than the French 75mm gun used by the Army in France.

2

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 525409ColRichardM. Cutti assumed command of the 14thRegiment, activated at Quantico, Virginia, in 1918.

'Thing" at imaginary targets. Then came live-fire ex-ercises in the field. Once each gunner was an expertat his own craft, he was cross-trained to perform theduties of a technical NCO. This training allowed theunit to function smoothly should an NCO be trans-frred, absent, or disabled in combat. The men spentthe evening hours with the care and feeding of theanimals that made up the bulk of the regiment's trans-portation.12

3

During field firing, an officer commanded each pla-won. The senior lieutenant supervised the advance toaction, the establishment of a proper fifing position,and the correct delivery of fife on targets designatedby the company commander. Sergeants commandedspecific guns. Corporals were in charge of gun crews,caissons, and limbers, or motor tractor operations. Thegunnery sergeant and his technical NCOs functionedsimilarly to a modem fire direction center (FDC). Theylocated targets, computed and relayed proper firingdata to the guns, and helped supervise the conductof fire. Each company had four guns, eight caissons,and sufficient mounts or motor tractors to transportits equipment.' Then, as now, artillery support re-quired the smooth incorporation of all hands into awell-knit team. The long hours and hard work put inby the Marines of the 14th Regiment ensured thisdegree of cooperation.

In early 1919 the expeditionary troops began return-ing to the United States from Europe, and America nolonger needed its extensive wartime military establish-ment. Demobilization was the order of the day. In 18months the total strength of the Marine Corpsdropped from 75,101 in 1918 to only 17,047 in 1920.'The 14th Regiment was not immune from these cut-backs and soon received orders to stand down and pre-pare for deactivation. Colonel Cutts departed in Aprilto take command of the 10th Regiment. His replace-ment was Colonel Philip M. Bannon. The 14th Regi-ment officially deactivated on 19 June 1919) Duringthe entire time of its initial activation, the 14th Regi-ment was at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.Although never called on for actual combat, the 14thRegiment of 1918-1919, like the modern 14th Marines,stood as a fbrce in readiness, prepared to fight whereverand whenever needed.

CHAPThR 2

Reactivation, 1943

American dreams of peace and any lingering illu-sions of isolationism vanished 7 December 1941 withthe surprise Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. Huge num-bers of infuriated Americans flocked to Armed Forcesrecruiting stations for the second time in the 20th cen-wry. Once again the ranks of the Marine Corps beganto swell as they had in 1917. The Marine Corps in-stituted crash training programs and quickly formednew units to accommodate the growing number ofvolunteers. The 1st Marine Division and elements ofthe 2d Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal in1942. The 3d Marine Division formed in Septemberof that same year, and went to the South Pacific inmid-February of 1943. The 23d Marines, under thecommand of Colonel Louis R. Jones, detached fromthe latter division and remained behind to becomethe nucleus of the new 4th Marine Division. By lJune1943 the 14th Marines again was operational as a regi-ment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel, laterMajor General, Randall M. Victory.' Once again, af.ter a quarter-century lapse, the 14th Marines joinedthe proud ranks of the Marine artillery and beganpreparing for the business at hand, the total delèatof the Japanese Empire in the Pacific Theatre.

The 14th Marines, like its parent organization, the4th Marine Division, was formed in two echelons. One,on the east coast, trained at Camp Lejeune, New River,North Carolina. The other, on the west coast, servedat Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California. The 1stand 3d Battalions made up the East Coast Echelon.The 2d Battalion was the West Coast Echelon. The4th Battalion was later activated at Camp Pendletonafter the East and West Coast Echelons were unitedA

The 1st Battalion, with firing batteries A, B, andC, was activated on 1 May 1943 at Camp Lejeune. The2d Battalion did the same on 26 March at Camp Pen-dleton, with three firing batteries and a Headquart-ers and Service Battery. Battery D originally formedon 3 December 1942 at ']IIaining Camp (later CampLejeune), New River, North Carolina. Its initial desig-nation was the Pack Howitzer Battery, 1st Separate Bat-talion (Reinforced). On 9 March this battery departedNorth Carolina for Camp Pendleton. Upon its arrival,the battery was attached to the 24th Marines for train-

4

ing. Battery E had been the Pack Howitzer Battery ofthe 2d Separate Battalion (Reinforced), also locatedat New River. It moved to Camp Pendleton on 16March. It also was attached to the 24th Marines fortraining. Battery A, 3d Separate Battalion (Reinforced)entrained on 17 March for Camp Pendleton. It becameBattery F, 14th Marines after it arrived in California.Although the 2d Battalion officially joined the 14thMarines on 26 March 1943, its firing batteries did notphysically link up with the rest of the regiment untilthey returned from field exercises on 19 August 1943.The senior battalion of the 14th Marines was the 3dBattalion. It became operational on 22 July 1942 asthe 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division.Its designation changed on 20 February, and it becamea cadre for the 14th Marines. This battalion officiallyjoined the 14th Marines on iJune 1943. The 4th Bat-talion received its colors on 29 July 1943. From 9 Au-gust through 19 August the battalion reached itsauthorized strength when all its firing batteries joinedtheir parent organization. The 4th Battalion enteredthe 14th Marines' muster book on 19 August 1943.The official reactivation of the 14th Marines was com-plete on 1 June 1943 with the activation of the Head-quarters and Service Battery.3

The 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions were the direct sup-port battalions of the regiment. In combat, each ofthese battalions devoted its fire to a single rifle regi-ment, hence, the term "direct support!' A direct sup-port artillery battalion provided liaison officers toithntry regimental headquarters and assigned forwardobservation teams to different combat teams. A fbr-ward observation team consisted of the forward ob-server or "FO," an artillery officer who spotted andadjusted artillery fire, and a communications sectioncharged with maintaining either radio or land-linetelephone communications links with the artillery bat-talion. The purpose of direct support was to providemaneuver units with immediate fire support and re-quired the artillery battalion to give its highest pri-ority of fire to the supported regiment.4 This tacticallowed a close working relationship to develop be-tween the infantry and artillery units. The direct sup-port mission was one of the most effective, most

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A352190

Pictured as a brigadier general, LtCol Randall M.Victory, a former "Horse Marine" in China, assumedcommand of the reactivated 14th Marines in 1943.

demanding, and most decentralized of all artillerymissions. A major liability of this tactic was that it pro-hibited the assignment of an artillery battalion's fireto more than one maneuver unit at a time, however,if all three infantry regiments were not actively in-volved in the scheme of maneuver (a common occur-ence, as one of the three regiments was often inreserve) it was possible to use one of the direct sup-port battalions to reinforce the fire of another unit.The direct support battalions were originally armedwith the 75mm pack howitzer, Ml or MIA1.*

The pack howitzer concept originated from the re-quirement for a mobile cannon suitable for operationsin rugged mountain terrain. The feature which madepack howitzers unique was that they could be easilybroken down into their major components for trans-port. Although originally designed for mountain oper-ations, its inherent mobility, its light weight, and itstough design made the pack howitzer a perfect weaponfor amphibious operations as well. During the 1930sthe United States did not have a landing craft witha front ramp, so all equipment had to be manhandled

*The difference in the two weapons was in the breechblock andbreechblock rings, which were not interchangeable.

5

over the side, or offloaded at a docking facility. TheMl pack howitzer, which could be broken down intosix components, fitted the bill perfectly. The weaponwas compact. Its tube was extremely short, barelylonger than its recoil mechanism. The major recogni-tion factors of the cannon were the carrying handlewelded to the front of the barrel and the holes drilledinto the box trail to decrease its weight. The 75mmhowitzer weighed only 1,379 pounds. It could fire a14.7-pound high explosive (HE) projectile 9,600 yardswith a muzzle velocity of 1,250 fret per second. Therewas no protective shield for the gunners. This fine can-non was nicknamed "Little Dynamite." It offered threeadvantages over the 105mm howitzer. It was muchmore accurate at short and medium ranges. The packhowitzer was easier to set up and camouflage becauseof its small size. In fact, the entire cannon was only37 inches high when the barrel was at zero degreeselevation. Ammunition handling was much easier aswell

The 4th Battalion was the regiment's general sup-port battalion. This battalion was the only one origi-nally armed with the 105mm howitzer. The 105mmhowitzer (in 1943 designated the M2, but later redesig-nated the M1O1A1) was one of the finest artillery piecesever made. From 1940 to 1953, 10,202 were producedand sent to 46 different armies in the world.**The 105mm howitzer offered several advantages overthe 75mm pack howitzer it had a longer range, 11,000meters as opposed to 8,800 metets with the 75mm;a heavier shell, 33 pounds as opposed to 14.7 pounds;and a larger explosive burst radius, 20 by 30 metersas opposed to 10 by 20 meters. The "105" featureda relatively short barrel over a conventional carriagewith a box section, split trail legs, and built-in spades.It weighed 4,250 pounds and fired a high explosiveprojectile 12,250 yards with a muzzle velocity of 1,550feet per second. A crew of eight manned the 105mmhowitzer. It could fire a maximum of eight rounds perminute and keep up a sustained rate of four roundsper minute. The 105mm howitzer was able to shoota more powerful shell much further than the 75mmpack howitzer, but at the cost of decreased mobilityand increased complexity. The executive officer of the4th Battalion, Major (later Colonel) RolandJ. Spritzen,believed there were several reasons the 75mm pack

**The 105mm howitzer was the mainstay of the Marine Corpsartillery direct support batteries in Korea and Vietnam, finally be-ing replaced by the M198 in the mid-1980s. Marine Corps artillerybattalions still retain the 105 to answer sticky tactical problems thatrequire an airlift using CH-46 Sea Knight or CH-53D Sea Stallionhelicopters. Brassqts Artillery ofthe WMd(tnndon: Braey's, 1977),

pp. 44-45.

howitzer was first used as the direct SUppOrt artilleryweapon instead of the 105mm howitzer:

Ar this rime. there weren't enough 105mm howitzersavailable and . there wasn't the know-how and meansto land the 105mm howitzers, except from ICM's (landingCraft, Mechanized —a large landing boat with a bow rampdesigned to land trucks, tanks, and artillery prime moversdirertly onto the beach) and those were in short supply

When the means to transport and land the. . (105's)

were available the direct support units would be 105mm andthe genera] support would be l55mmP

As the war progressed four of the five battalions as-signed to the 14th Marines used the 105mm howitzerin combat.

The 14th Marines received a new commanding of-ficer on 7 June 1943 when Colonel Louis G. DeHavenassumed command, and Lieutenant Colonel Victorybecame the regimental executive officet A veteran ar-tillery officer, Colonel DeHaven served in combat inWorld War I and later in the Dominican Republic priorto joining the 14th Marines. He received his promo-don to colonel in 1942, and commanded the 14th Ma-rines in all of its combat actions in World War II?

On 1 june 1943 the 14th Marines became parr ofthe East Coast Echelon, 4th Marine Division, underthe command of Brigadier General, later LieutenantGeneral, James 1. Underhill. On 5 August 1943 the1st Battalion, the 3d Bartalion, and Headquarters and

Service Battery left North Carolina by train. They ar-rived at Camp Pendleton on 14 August. On 16 Au-gust the 4th Marine Division, including the 14thMarines, became operational. The acting division com-mander was Brigadier General Underhill. Two dayslarer, 18 August 1943, Major General Harry Schmidtassumed command, and Brigadier General Underhillbecame the assistant division commander. By 10 Sep-tember, the last of the East Coast Echelon had arrived.At the end of September, the division was at full com-bat strength with 17,831 officers and men! Time wasshort, and training intensified as the division preparedfor combat.

The 14th Marines did nor have much time to shar-pen its combat skills after arriving in Califbrnia. Thetentative date for deployment to the Pacific was 1 De-cember 1943. With this in mind, the 14th Marinesdevoted the month of September to individual train-ing and gun crew familiarization.

In 1943 Camp Pendleron was still a new base andsuffered many growing pains. The largest problemsfacing the 14th Marines were the lack of suitable live-fire impact areas and a limited road network.Whenever a live-fire problem was conducted, a goodpart of the training time was spent putting out firesstarted by the shell bursts. While the batteries andbattalions were able to conduct some combat train-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 57209A 75mm pack howitzer crew sets up and readies the gun for action. The regiment's directsupport battalions were armed with this lightweight, easily transportable artillery piece.

6

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19541

Arming the regiment's general support battalion was the 105mm howitzer which wasto become the mainstay of Marine direct support artillery batteries in later years.

Co/Louis G. DeHaven, pictured here as a lieutenantcolonei assumed command of the regiment in 1943andcontinuedin commandthroughout World War II.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A401391

7

ing, the regiment had no opportunity to train, test,or communicate as a unit while at Camp Pendleton.Therefore, in November 1943 the 14th Marines movedto Camp Dunlap, Niland, California, for extensivepractice at the regimental level. Ar Camp Dunlap, the14th Marines became the smooth team that wouldoperate so well at Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian, and IwoJima. The forward observer teams manned their ob-servation posts (OPs) at the edge of the impact area.The communications technicians worked out the bugsin their radio and telephone procedures. The firedirection centers (FDC) practiced solving difficult gun-nery problems under simulated combat conditions.Along the firing line, gun captains supervised theirsections. Marines practiced giving and repeating firecommands and setting chart data on the howitzers.Ammunition handlers set F.izes and tore off chargeincrements. Shells were slammed into their breeches,breechblocks locked in place, and lanyards pulled.Time and time again the shells of the 14th Marineswhistled overhead and exploded in the target area. Af-ter a live-fire problem ended, Marines cleaned eachgun with care, and then lubricated it for its next fir-ing. The 14th Marines was well prepared when itreturned from Camp Dunlap and rejoined the 4th Ma-rine Divisions

While the 14th Marines were at Camp Dunlap, the

rest of the division conducted a field problem at AlisoCanyon on 14-15 December 1943. At this same time,the division staff was finishing up work on OperationPlan 3-43, the plan for the upcoming assault on theMarshall Islands. Operation Plan 3-43 went out to allunits on 31 December. The division's training carriedover into an actual rehearsal for combat. The 14th Ma-rines boarded assigned shipping on 1 January 1944,and participated in the final practice landing at SanClemente Island on 2-3 January. The 14th Marinesreembarked on 6January and left on the longest shore-to-shore operation in Marine Corps history."

The voyage to Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls wasthe first extended sea voyage for most of the men of

S

the 14th Marines. It was quire an initiation. The convoytraveled more than 4,400 miles from embarkationpoint to landing, and the 14th Marines was on boardits transports for 25 days. The conditions on board shipwere not what some of the Marines expected. Soonafter the hazy coast of California slipped over thehorizon, many Marines discovered that the rolling andpitching deck of a troop ship did little to improve anupset stomach. The holds were sweltering, and the saltwater showers offeted little refreshment. The Marineslay in racks stacked eight tiers high. Each man hadso little space that he could not turn over without dis-turbing all the others. The Marines' days were filledwith abandon ship and debarkation drills plus lectures

9

on various military skills. After the convoy left its ren-dezvous point at Hawaii, the men of the 14th Marineslearned their destination. Officers briefed the men onplanned unit locations, missions, phase lines, callsigns, and other necessary details. Slowly, the convoyplowed through the Pacific waters. On the fringes of

10

the convoy, destroyers raced to and fro, ever vigilantfor the enemy. Finally, on the night of 30 january 1944,the convoy arrived at its destination, Kwajalein Atollin the center of the Marshall Island chain. The 14thMarines was about to earn its first streamer for com-bat action.h1

CHAPThR 3

Roi-Namur

While the 4th Marine Division trained in the Unit-ed States, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commanderin Chief Pacific Fleet/Commander in Chief PacificOcean Areas, directed Vice Admiral Raymond A.Spruance, Commander, Fifth Fleet and Central Pa-cific Thrce, to assault the Marshall Islands on 1 April1944. The V Amphibious Corps (VAC) would providethe expeditionary troops for this operation, with the4th Marine Division slated to land at Roi-Namur.' TheMarshalls offensive was initially codenamed "Bank-rate:' but this was later changed to "Flintlock?' Oper-ation Flintlock initially involved an amphibious assaulton the large islands located along the southern andeastern approaches to the Marshalls.*

As the 14th Marines trained at Camp Pendleton andCamp Dunlap, their comrades-in-arms of the 2d Ma-rine Division were storming the beaches of Betio, lira-wa Atoll, in the Gilbert Islands. lirawa was one of themost viciously concentrated battles in the history ofthe Marine Corps. It marked the beginning of a newtype of warfare in the Pacific. The previous Marinecampaigns at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and CapeGloucester were all prolonged struggles of enduranceand maneuver to seize large islands covered by densetropical rain hrest. In this jungle-covered terrain,stealth, surprise, and swiftness of movement charac-terized the fierce fighting. In the Central Pacific,however, the islands were coral atolls, small isletsringed by sharp coral reefs. Their small size and almosttotal lack of cover and concealment offrred tacticalplanners very IS options. Every island large enoughto hold an airfield was a Japanese fbrtress protectedby underwater obstacles to break up a landing, a seriesof mutually supporting machine gun positions, andheavy coastal artillery in reinforced concrete pillbox-es. There was no room to maneuver, and little oppor-tunity to surprise the vigilant defenders. Therefore,the tactical keys to conquering the Japanese holdingsin the Central Pacific became the proper use of massand effective use of supporting arms.** The guns of

*These included the heavily fortified islands of Wotje, Maloe-lap, and Mille.

**'Ian's 3,000-plus casualties in 76 hours shocked the mili-tary planners of Flintlock. Among the casualties were two of the

11

14th Marines would play an important role in the up-coming operation.

The lessons learned at Tarawa influenced the plan-ning for Operation Flintlock in all areas. At the stra-tegic level, Admiral Nimitz made the sweepingdecision to bypass the outer islands of the Marshallsand to strike directly at theft heart, Kwajalein Atoll.Major General Holland M. Smith, commandinggeneral of the VAC, changed his operational plans toinclude more amphibian tractors, known as LTh, andsignificantly increased the use of all supportingarms.*** The staff planners of the 4th Marine Divi-sion and the 14th Marines arrived at a tactical con-cept of artillery support that ensured the maximumeffectiveness of the howitzers. They decided to landthe guns on four small adjacent islands prior to themain assault on Roi-Namur proper. This tactic, a directlegacy of Tarawa, reduced the casualty rate of Opera-tion Flintlock, and was instrumental in the successfulamphibious operations at Kwajalein Atoll.2

With the lessons of Tarawa fresh in their minds, anew plan for Operation Flintlock quickly took shape?The basic elements of the plan were £r the invasionforces to mount out from the United States andHawaii, bypass and neutralize the outer islands of theMarshalls, and strike directly at Kwajalein with simul-taneous assaults miles apart. The attacking force con-sisted of a major naval fleet and the 53,000 troops ofthe VAC. The U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division wasto land at Kwajalein Island in the south, while the4th Marine Division was to strike at the twin islets ofRoi and Namur in the north. Two separate rifle regi-ments, the 22d Marines and the 106th Infantry Regi-ment (U.S. Army), were the VAC reserve forces.

The Marshall Islands offered an excellent steppingstone from the Gilberts to the Marianas, the next tar-get on the road to Japan. Kwajalein was the largest

four 4th Marine Division observers, one of whom died of wounds.En further infurmation see Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Naity,and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Centre/Pacific Dnve—Histo,y of US. Ma-rine Corps Operations in World War H (Washington: HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, 1966).

***The amphibian tractor's official designation was Landing Ve-hicle, Tracked, hence "TNT?'

atoll in the world. It was approximately 65 miles longand about 18 miles across. Kwajalein Lagoon, an out-standing potential fleet anchorage, was ringed by 240miles of coral reef with at least 88 islands which variedin size from Kwajalein Island to pinpoint coral dots.Most of the Japanese facilities and both airfields werelocated on the two major land masses, Roi-Naniur andKwajalein Island.

The major objectives of the 4th Marine Division'sassault were the twin islands of Roi and Namur.Viewed ftom above, they resembled a pair of waterwings joined by a sand spit about 400 yards long onthe lagoon side, and further linked by a 500-yard,man-made causeway. Roi was the larger of the two is-lands, and was the site of the largest Japanese airfieldon the atoll. It was roughly thtee-quarters of a milesquare. There was little vegetation as its airfield hadthree runways that formed a large figure "4," two serv-ice aprons, two hangars, assorted service buildings, acontrol tower, and 30 aircraft revetments. This barrenisland was codenamed "Burlesque."

Namur, located to the east of RDi, was about one-half square mile. Unlike Roi, it was covered by heavyvegetation and dotted with many palm trees. Numer-ow buildings lined its crushed coral streets. The heavysurf which pounded its oceanside coral reef dis-couraged landing operations and dictated a lagoon ap-proach by small craft. Namur was codenamed"Camouflage."

The defenses of Roi-Namur were typical of thosefound in the Central Pacific area. There were twostrong points, Wendy Point on Roi and Sally Point onNamur, each equipped with Japan's most moderndual-purpose guns. A series of 19 concrete pillboxesconraining 28 heavy machine guns protected thestrong points. Antitank ditches zigzagged across Roiand Namur just behind the beachline to halt the in-land progress of American amphibian tractors andtanks. Four major reinforced concrete structures servedas command posts and ammunition storage areas. TheJapanese defenders planned to launch a counterattackwith all available forces if these defensive preparationsfailed to stop the landing ftsrces (Americans called suchefforts "Banzai attacks" because of the patriotic sloganschanted by the Japanese during the arrack)P

The defenders of Roi-Namur were under the titularcommand of Vice Admiral Mashi Kobayashi, com-mander in chief of the Fourth Fleet at Truk Island.TheJpanese garrison forces were members of specialnaval guard units attached to the 6th Base Force underRear Admiral Monzo Ajiyama whose headquarters wason Kwajalein Island. The actual forces on Roi-Namurtotaled about 3,000 men. Most of these belonged to

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the 24th Naval Air Flotilla. There was also a Provi-sional Defense Battalion, Soyonama Unit, 61st NavalGuard Force, with about 500 men. In addition, therewere about 1,000 or so workers from the Naval AirConstruction and Service Corps. All of these men wereunder the immediate command of Vice AdmiralMichiyuki Yamada's headquarters on Namur. Ameri-can intelligence estimated a like number ofJapanesetroops on Kwajalein Island, with about 2,000 morescattered throughout the smaller islets of KwajaleinAtoll

The 14th Marines, along with the rest of the 4thMarine Division, was assigned to the Northern Land-ing Force by VAC. The ground elements of the North-ern Landing Force were commanded by Major GeneralSchmidt, and the Northern Attack Force was com-manded by Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, com-mander of Task Force 53* The general plan called fora three-part operation. Phase I was the seizure of sever-al off-shore islands which controlled the lagoon pas-sages and dominated the area around Roi-Namur.Marine artillery would use these islands for providingfire support for the main landings. Phase II was theacruaj assault on Roi-Namur, the tactical and logisticalcenter of air activity at Kwajalein Atoll. The final phasewas the capture of 11 other small islands in the gener-al proximity of Roi-Namur. Because of the complexi-ty and importance of Phase I, a special landing force,Group Ivan, was formed to accomplish this task. Thisgroup included the entire 14th Marines, along withinfantry battalion landing reams in assault and sup-porting units, such as the 4th Special Weapons Bat-talion (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift,Jr.) armed with 37mm towed antitank guns and half-tracks mounting 75mm howirzers.

While the infantry assault was a traditional "two upand one back" attack, the artillery played a uniquerole in the capture of Roi-Namur. The tactical plannersof Operation Flintlock quickly recognized the valueof placing artillery on the small islets which had tobe seized to ensure a safe entrance into the lagoon.One of the greatest limiting factors of Marine Corpsartillery was its inability to fire during the inirial stageof most amphibious landings. Unless Marines capturedoff-shore islands or convenient promonrories before themain landings, the artillery had to circle in "on call"waves of landing craft until the assault force movedfar enough inland to secure adequate areas to serveas firing positions. Since this sometimes happened late

*After Roi-Namur he became known as "Close-in Conolly" be-cause of his orders to his naval gunfire ships to close in to the beachuntil their bottoms srraped sand.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70547MajGen Har,y Schmidt, right, commanding the 4th Marine Division, andRAdm RichardL. Conolly, commander of the Northern Task Force, review a map ofRoi-Namur prior toattacking the heavily -fonsfiedjapanese-beld island in the northern pan of Kwajalein Atoll.

in the day, Marine artillerymen occasionally had toconduct difficult night landings. Another disadvan-tage was that selection of available firing positions waslimited to those in the beachhead area, thus, the ar-tillery often had to use less than desirable positionsdue to the combat situation. The artillery also wasmost vulnerable during this period. Any extensivedamage to the landing craft during the transportationphase usually resulted in the loss of the artillery pieceas well. Colonel DeHaven and his operations officer,Major FrederickJ. Karch, realized that the use of theseneighboring islands would offer the 14th Marinesmany advantages and minimize the factors whichhampered the proper use of their guns.*

Naval gunfire, close air support, and armored am-phibian tractors usually took up the slack for artilleryfire during the opening stages of an amphibious as-sault, but sometimes lost their effectiveness as timepassed and the landing force moved inland. Artilleryoffered several very real advantages over the other sup-porting arms available to the VAC. The guns of the14th Marines would be mounted on a stationary land

Major Karch, a brigadier general in 1965, led the first Marine air-ground ream to be committed to South Vietnam, the 9± MarineExpeditionary Brigade.

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platform, not on a rolling or pitching deck, ensuringmuch greater accuracy. The location of the guns, closeto the using units, ensured good communications andquicker reaction time to calls for fire. The shore-basedhowitzers were not subject to limited time on station,as was aviation, nor were they forced to alter courseto avoid navigational hazards. Once Marines capturedthe small, outlying islands on D-Day, the field piecesof the 14th Marines could be brought ashore to sup-port the landing and exploitation phases of the oper-ation. These guns would provide round-the-clock,dose fire support for Regimental Combat Team (RCT)23 and RCT 24 when they stormed Roi-Namur'sbeaches.**

Four islets were large enough to accommodate ar-tillery emplacements, and became key targets of theD-Day assault by Group Ivan. Mellu and Ennuebing,codenamed "Ivan" and "Jacob" repectively, were south-west of Roi, and dominated the passages through thecoral reef. After they secured these two islands, Ma-rines would capture more islands southeast of Namur.

**A similar plan calling for the capture of Bairiki Island at lhra-wa was rejected due to time limitations and the anticipated lossof surprise. For Operation Flintlock, fire superiority was deemedmore important than the element of surprise.

These were Ennumenent (Albert), Ennubirr (Allen),and several others. Each was small in size, within ar-tillery range of the landing zones, and lightly defend-ed. The planning staff anticipated a quick capture ofeach. This allowed sufficient time to land, set up, andregister the howitzers of the 14± Marines so they couldprovide proper fire support for the main landings thenext morning?

The dawn which broke over Kwajalein Atoll onD-Day (31 january 1944) revealed a colorful panorama.The plush green of the island vegetation outlined thebright white sand which ringed every islet, and provid-ed a sharp contrast with the blue-green colors of thesurrounding waters. Shortly, bright orange flashes fromthe guns of the fire support ships of Admiral "Close-in" Conolly's Task Force 53 engulfed those islands. Adull grey overcast covered the sky, and choppy swellsbroke over the reefs. The choppy water caused someproblems for the landing fbrce. A strong Force 7 wind(19 knots) blew in from the east, and weather fore-casters predicted intermittent rain squalls throughoutthe day. At 0530 the Marines of Group Ivan went overthe side of their ships, and scrambled down the cargonets into the landing craft below. Among the membersof the 2d Battalion's Battery B were brothers ClaytonB. and Auden B. Ponder, both of whom would par-ticipate in all of the combat operations of the 14thMarines.'°

Brigadier General James L. Underhill, the assistantdivision commander and a veteran artilleryman, com-manded the Ivan group.t It consisted of landing teamsfrom the 25th Marines, the firing batteries of the 14thMarines, some of the new LVT(A)s assigned to the 1stArmored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and the am-tracs of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.**11This was the first time in history that a landing oper-ation relied on large-scale use of lYE as the primarytransport ashore.*** The LYTs wçre not selected be-cause they were swift or graceful on either land orwater, but because they could operate in both environ-ments.**** The planners of Operation flintlock did

Brigadier General Jinderhill commanded the lath Marines from19 December 1928 to 13 November 1930.

"These tractors mounted a 37mm gun and several machine guns.Their purpose was to provide close support fin the landing forcesas they crossed the beach.

***LVTs were used as supplementary transportation at Tarawa.Mter the assault waves landed, they were pressed into heavy usagewhen the regular landing craft could not cross the coral reef aroundthe atoll.

""LVTs, originally nicknamed "amphtracs" and then "annracs'were bulky, poorly armored vehicles with very high silhouettes. Theyhad poor cross-country performance, a maximum speed of i4 milesper hour on land, and they could waddle through the water no fasterthan 7.5 miles per hour.

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A556710

MajFrederickJ. Kvvh, here shown as a bnadiergen-eral, served with the regiment throughout World War11, first as battery commander then as battalioncommander and finally as the operations officer

not realize that the principles and standards used foilanding boats were not applicable to annracs. The LVTsused far more fuel, had very little freeboard spaceabove the water, and depended upon their movingtracks fur propulsion. Because of the high winds, heavysurf, hidden coral reefs, and their slow speed, manyanuracs floundered in the pounding surf, lost power,and sank. These unfortunate circumstances aftctedall elements of the Flintlock landing plans, and wereparticularly troublesome to the 14th Marines' land-ings later in the day.***** H-Hour, scheduled fur0900, had to be postponed due to the high winds andheavy surf. Group Ivan's landing operation took muchlonger than expected, which interrupted the entirelanding schedule.

The initial objectives of the Ivan landing group wereMellu and Ennuebing Islands. The seizure of thesetwo islands gained a passage into Kwajalein Lagoon

*****Tlth poor perfbnnance stemmed from inherent design flawsin the Ifl, the inexpesienced crews operating them, and poor coor-dination among Marine BT crews and the Navy crews on boardship. Only one practice landing took place at San Clemente andshowed many of these problems; however, the transports embark-ed before a critique was held and the problems worked out.

for the follow-up forces and allowed two battalions ofthe 14th Marines to land and support the rest of theoperation. Despite problems in transferring fromLCVPs to WTs, Marines quickly secured both islands.*Ennuebing fell to Company B, 25th Marines in lessthan one hour. The Marines killed 13 enemy soldiersand captured three prisoners of war. Mellu took a lit-tie longer, but showed similar results: 17 enemy deadand two captured. Immediately after Brigadier Gener-al Underhill received word of the successful landingsat about 1145, he flashed the order to land the artillery.The 14th Marines' first combat action was underway.12

The structure of the 14th Marines landing groupsat Roi-Namur was the same as that used in all subse-quent campaigns. Due to the limited space on boardthe assault transports, only skeleton firing crews werelanded at first. A firing battery's first days and nightsashore were busy times fot these individuals, as theyhad to fire missions and stand watch in addition tothe burden of unloading the weapons, supplies, andammunition until the test of the battery was able tocome ashore. The headquarters section was to main-tain command and control of the firing sections. Thisgroup was usually made up of the commandingofficer, the executive officer, the first sergeant, a clerk,a runner, and a survey team. Each of the four guns

*The ICVR or "landing craft, vehicle, personnel," was a small,shallow draft vessel with a bow ramp. It could carry approximately36 persons.

was assigned a skeleton firing section to operate thehowitzers. A motor transport section was charged withpulling the howitzers and hauling ammunition andsupplies. These men were expected to fill in as neces-sary when not transporting guns, ammunition, or sup-plies. A communications section was needed tomaintain open lines of communication, string tele-phone wire, and keep radio contact. The ammunitionsection was responsible for handling and distributingammunition and supplies. Forward observation teamswere attached to the maneuver battalions before thelandings. A machine gun section, armed with two.50-caliber heavy machine guns, was responsible forground and air defense of the battery. These Marineswere often required to haul supplies, unload arnmu-niition, or act as gun crewmen when first ashore. Asthe battle progressed and more ship-to-shore trans-port became available the batteries were fleshed ourwith the arrival of more cannoneers. The first daysashore were tiring and hectic for the members of theseskeleton crews.

The early morning hours of D-Day found the 14thMarines on board the Epping Forest (LSD 4) and sever-al J.STs in the transport area about 3,000 yards fromshore.** The 75mm pack howitzers had been prepack-ed at San Diego, one per LVI with a small amount

"'An LSD (landing ship dock) was a large attack transport with astern ramp and a well deck which could be flooded kr use by boatsand LVII. An LST (landing ship, tank) had two bow doors and aramp for discharging EVil at sea, or vehicles directly on the beach.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70364

Marines of the 4th Division hug the beach soon after their assault on Roi-Namur

15

of ammunition and some necessary tools and equip-ment. Unfortunately, the small 17Th could not carrya full howitzer crew nor a complete unit of fire. Theshortage of IIYTs required the gun crews and ammu-nition stocks to land in separate supply waves. Thebulky 105mm howitzers of the 4th Battalion had tobe loaded in 14 larger LCMs (landing craft,mechanized).

On order, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mac-Farlane's 3d Battalion, 14th Marines began movingtoward Ennuebing's sandy shores. The pounding surfand heavy loads proved too much fur two of the LVTs.They floundered and sank, causing the loss of two75mm howitzers and four lives. These were the firstcombat casualties suffrred by the 14th Marines. SeveralMarines were saved by the heroic efforts of the 3d Bat-talion's surgeon, Lieutenant Ira D. Hardy, MC, USN,a former Ibotball stat at Harvard University. DoctorHardy repeatedly swam out to assist swimmers in trou-

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ble. He later received a Bronze Star Medal for hisactions.13

Major, later Major General, Carl A. Youngdale's 4thBattalion made it ashore without losing any guns, butarrived too late to support Lieutenant Colonel JusticeM. Chambers' 3d Battalion, 25th Marines' landing onthe far side of the lagoon as originally planned. TheMarines of Battery K (First Lieutenant Russell F.Sclioenbeck), Battery L (Captain Martin R. Burdett),and Battery M (First Lieutenant, later LieutenantGeneral, Joseph C. Fegan, Jr.) struggled to move theirheavy field pieces across the island and into selectedpositions along the northern shore. As the Marineshauled the guns of the six batteries of the 3d and 4thBattalions into position, the command group underlieutenant Colonel Randall M. Victory moved ashore.The regimental command post quickly took steps toestablish centralized control over the widely spread fir-ing batteries. The major task of both battalions was

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to fire registration rounds before dark and then tostockpile ammunition needed to support the mainlandings the next morning.

The landings on Ennubirr, Ennumennet, and En-nugarret did not go well. Unexpected high waves,insufficient numbers of LVTs, and poor communica-tions delayed 1-1-1-jour for the members of LandingTeam 2 who had to capture the islands southeast ofNamur. Luckily, they encountered little opposition,and the islands fell quickly. Once these were secured,landing the remaining artillery units before dark be-came the highest priority. The 1st Battalion, 14th Ma-rines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry J.Zimmer, landed across Blue Beach 4 on Ennubirr justbefore 1700 that evening. Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeB. Wilson's 2d Battalion crossed at Blue Beach 3 onEnnumennet at about the same time. Amtracs car-ried the pack howitzers of both battalions directly totheir firing positions. This procedure saved precioustime in getting the guns ready to fire. The majorproblem was getting the gunners ashore and unload-ing sufficient ammunition. The cannoneers and am-munition of the 14th Marines were scheduled to bebrought ashore by LVTs and LCVPs making supply runsafter they had landed the first wave. However, the lead-ers of the assault waves commandeered all of the LVTsand many of the I.CVPs to replace transportation lostduring the initial phase of the landing. Anxious Ma-rines on board the Epping Forest waited as the situa-tion became more confused. One skeptic named thelanding procedute "Operation Fubar" and the irrever-ent title stuck.*

The resulting delays forced many of the gun crewsto land well after dark. In fact, it was not possible toland some of the howitzers until the afternoon of Dplus i.' Most of the guns were set up by 2000 butdarkness prevented their registration until after dawnon D plus 1.16 The 14th Marines' first day of combatended in a flurry of activity, as most of its men spentthe entire night unloading ammunition.

The howitzers of the 14th Marines joined the mas-sive air and nanl bombardment of Roi-Namur at 0658on 1 February 1944 (D plus 1). At 0700 Group Ivanwas dissolved, and the 14th Marines again became theDivision Artillery Group with Colonel DeHaven incommand. The barren Roi received the concentratedfire of the cannoneers of Captain Alfred T. Brown'sBattery G, Captain Guido A. Morengo's Battery H,and Captain Earl F. Ziegler's Battery I. Their targetswere located along Red Beach 3, east of Tokyo Pier.The 105mm howitzers of the 4th Battalion focused

*Bowdletized as 'ibuled Up Beyond All Redress?'

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their attention on Red Beach 2, west of Tokyo Pier.For more than three hours the two battalions pepperedRoi's beaches, stopping only to allow close air strikes.At about 1010 the artillery's fires shifted inland tomake room for the first assault waves of Colonel LouisR. Jones' RCT 23.

The 23d Marines struck Roi with two battalionsabreast. They moved across an antitank ditch towardtheir first objective, Phase Line 0-i. The guns of the3d Battalion were in direct support of LieutenantColonel Edward). Dillon's 2d Battalion, 23d Marineson the right flank. Although usually designated thegeneral support battalion of the 14th Marines, the 4thBattalion assigned its highest priority of fire to the 1stBattalion, 23d Marines during the landings because itsiO5nim howitzers were the only artillery pieces in theregiment with sufficient range to reach the eastern por-tion of Roi Island.

In spite of some initial confusion, the attack wentwell. The 23d Marines encountered little organizedresistance, a tribute to the effectiveness of all support-ing arms. At 1158 Colonel Jones radioed: "This is apip . . . no opposition." The 14th Marines, workingin concert with air strikes, naval gunfire, and theweapons of the new LVT(A)s, did their job with deadlyefficiency. In Company F's sector, not a single Japanesepillbox was still manned when the Marines' supportingfires lifted. After action reports estimated that sup-porting arms killed 60 percent of the enemy. The re-maining Japanese on Roi were too shell-shocked to putup any effective resistance.'7 The island was declaredsecure at 1802, with mop-up operations scheduled forthe following morning. The swifmess of the battle al-lowed the 3d and 4th Battalions to stand down on themorning of 2 February 1944.18

Namur was the tougher nut to crack. The 1st and2d Battalions began registration fires at about 0650on D plus 1. Once registered, they fired for effect un-til ordered to shift their fires at mid-morning. SallyPoint on Namur's east side was the target of BatteriesA, B, and C. The area around Yokohama Pier shookunder the fires of the gunners of D, E, and F Batteriesof the 2d Battalion. As the landing progressed inland,the guns of the 1st Battalion fired missions requestedby the forward observers attached to Landing Team 2(2d Battalion, 24th Marines [Reinforced]). The 2d Bat-talion fired in direct support of Landing Team 3 (3dBattalion, 24th Marines).

Again, as at Roi, the landings were very confused.Supporting fires were so intense that they obliteratedthe streets designated as phase lines to control RCT24's advance. The debris created by the heavy bomb-ardment and the dense vegetation slowed movement

and provided excellent cover hr numerous Japanesesnipers. Reports to Colonel Franklin A. I-tart, com-manding officer of RCT 24, indicated no organizedresistance in the area of Green Beach 2, and only"punch drunk" enemy soldiers were present at GreenBeach 1.

A spectacular explosion at about 1305 halted theMarine advance inland. Satchel charges tossed into aconcrete blockhouse detonated the torpedo warheadsstored inside. The resulting explosion shook the en-tire island and awed everyone involved in the attack.A column of black smoke rose about 1,000 feet overNamur as debris showered the entire island and muchof the lagoon. This tragic event took the lives of 20Marines and wounded over 100 others. The hrce of theblast was such that a spotter aircraft carrying an aerialobserver from the 4th Battalion, 14th Marines wascaught in the explosion and knocked from the sky. Theshock of the explosion and its aftermath severely dis-organized Colonel Hart's attack plans.'

Before dark the 14th Marines fired a series of regis-tration rounds all along the frontline to protect theMarines on Namur in case of ajapanese night counter-attack, but the evening hours passed with very littleenemy action. The next morning, however, found thecannoneers of the 14th Marines shooting defensive fixesto support Companies I and IL, 24th Marines. TheJapanese mounted an attack which the Marine infan-trymen repelled by hand-to-hand combat. Later thatday, the 24th Marines overran the test of Namur, and

the island was declared secure at 1418 on 2 February1944. The members of the 14th Marines, except forthe 1st Battalion which would serve as a garrison unit,stood down and prepared to reembark for their newhome at Maui, Territory of Hawaii.2°

The third and final phase of Operation Flintlockbegan on D plus 2 when Major General Schmidt or-dered Colonel Samuel C. Cumming's RCT 25 to com-plete the capture of all the islands neat Roi-Namur.Landing Team 2, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis C. Hud-son's 2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Reinlbrced), movedout under the cover of an artillery barrage providedby the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines. The infantrymensoon discoyered that the islands were unoccupied. The1st Battalion's 7 5mm howitzers remained silent the restof the day. On D plus 4, First Lieutenant Curtis P. Ir-win, Jr.'s Battery C accompanied Lieutenant ColonelChambers' Landing Team 3 on the last leg of Opera-tion Flintlock. By the afternoon of D plus 7 the forcehad captured 39 islets, made friends with 250 natives,and thund no Japanese. The next day, 8 February 1944,was declared the last day of the Roi-Namurcampaign.2'

When the battle of Roi-Naniur ended, most of themen of the 14th Marines were busy crating, packing,and loading gear on board the ships which would carrythem to their new base camp. The 4th Battalion, load-ed on board the Bolivar (APA 34), the Alcyone (AKA7), and the Calvert (MA 32) on 5 February, departedon 8 February, and arrived at Maui on the evening of

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70694

LVTs with mcket launchers support the 14th Marines' landings and occupation of thefour smaller islands flanking the main objective, Roi-Namur in the Marshall Islands.

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16 February 1944? The 3d Battalion boarded theLiSalle (APA 102), the Sheridan (APA 151), and theCalvert, and travelled in the same convoy as the 4thBattalion. Most members of the 2d Battalion alsoboarded the LsSalle, but some elements of Battery Dembarked on board the Santa Monica and the Cal-vert. The 1st Battalion remained on Ennubirr Islandas part of the garrison force until 29 February, whenit departed for Hawaii on board the Neville (APA 9)and the Electra (AKA 4).u2 Before their departure themen of the 1st Battalion saiv another spectacular ex-plosion on 13 February when Japanese incendiarybombs struck an ammunition dump on Roi. The en-suing fire destroyed an estimated one million dollarsworth of ammunition and other supplies being storedthere?

The departure from Kwajalein Atoll marked the endof the 14th Marines' first combat action. The regimentperformed its duties well, and helped the 4th MarineDivision inflict 3,376 casualties on the enemy, whileincurring only minimal losses.** The 14th Marines

*APA was the hull designation for attack transports; AKA indi-cated attack cargo ships. The current designations are LPA and LKA,respectively.

"The 14th Marines' losses were six killed and 11 wounded. MRoII,14th Marines, lbruary 1944.

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proved the validity of the tactics and techniques of off-shore artillery support which would be used success-fully in later Pacific campaigns. After-action reportscredited the use of artillery against Roi-Namur as amajor &ctor in the success of the landing operations.These fires kept the enemy groggy throughout thenight of 31 january - 1 &bruary. The ability of the14th Marines' howitzers to lift their observed fires justahead of the actual assault waves, instead of at somearbitrary point, gave the landing force constant sup-porting arms fire?

The battle fir Roi-Naumur was a well planned oper-ation where naval gunfire, artillery, and aerial bomb-ing played a major role in neutralizing japanesepositions. It involved the longest distance ever coveredin one shore-to-shore operation. It was the only majorcombat operation staged from a stateside training basedirectly into a combat zone. The capture of KwajaleinAtoll marked the first American penetration of prewarjapanese mandated territory. It provided an excellentfleet anchorage and staging base for naval operations.Its airfields extended the range of American land-based airpower enormously. Finally, it virtually elimi-nated the threat of any japanese operation toward PearlHarbor, the United States, or the Panama Canal.25

CHAPTER 4

Maui, 1944

The first ships carrying the 14th Marines back fromRoi-Namur arrived at Maui, Territory of Hawaii, on17 February 1944. Actually, some members of the 14thMarines had their first glimpse of Maui just over amonth earlier when the Kwajalein- bound convoy stop-ped at Lahaiana Roads to take on fuel and provisions.Maui looked just as beautiful in February as it had be-fore. The Marines were struck by the colorful contrastsof the gleaming white sands, the light green of thesugar cane fields, the darker green of the backgroundvegetation, and the majestic dark purple of MountHaleakala, the world's largest extinct volcano. The tegi-ment boarded trucks near the Kahului docks and be-gan the slow trek to Camp Maui, the home base forthe 4th Marine Division for the rest of World War H.The convoy passed through the towns of Paia andMakawao. It snaked along narrow roads lined with ele-gant palm trees and dotted with colorful floweringplants, flame trees, hibiscus, and wild roses. Gradu-ally the trucks worked their way up about 1,500 ofHaleakala's 10,000 feet above sea level. When the con-voy arrived at Camp Maui the island seemed to losemuch of its beauty.

Camp Maui was primitive, to say the least. Therewas no electricity. The mud was ankle deep everywhere.Tents provided the only shelter from the elements.Only open-air showers were available. To make mat-ters worse, it was raining. Immediately after leavingthe trucks, the men of the 14th Marines learned therewould be no liberty for at least one week; the entiredivision was quarantined because of the possibility ofexposure to communicable diseases during OperationFlintlock. About this time the Marines also discovereda freak meterological phenomenon. The lovely cloudsthat moved over the crest of Haleakala turned intothreatening rain clouds as they descended on CampMaui's side of the mountain, and it did not take themlong to release their pent-up moisture. The result wasdaily rain. At this point, many of the regiment's cyn-ics considered the title "rest camp" a misnomer.1

Gradually Camp Maui took on the appearance of aMarine base, in spite of the incessant rain, sticky mud,and gusting winds. Marines plowed roads through themud, constructed some wooden frame office build-

20

ings and messhalls, then strung electric wires acrossthe camp. A post exchange ofkred candy, tobacco, andsoft drinks. Public address systems blared announce-ments and popular music. The Marines took advan-tage of entertainment provided by nightly movies,touring USO shows, hula girls, and Sergeant Lee Co-hen's "Fubar Follies:' a popular amateur night or-ganized by the outgoing Special Services NCO?

On 1 April 1944, Major General Harry Schmidtpresented Purple Heart Medals to members of the 14thMarines wounded during Operation Flintlock. A moreextensive awards ceremony occurred on 26 April whenAdmiral Nimitz presented personal decorations todeserving Marines. Among the recipients was Lieu-tenant Colonel HarryJ. Zimmer, commanding officerof the 1st Battalion, who received a Legion of Meritmedal. Additionally, the regiment affixed its first bat-tle star to the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign streamer onits colors.

Several organizational changes took place at CampMaui. First, the regiment absorbed newly-arrived Ma-rines to replace those transferred or lost during Oper-ation Flintlock. It activated a new battalion, armedwith 105mm howitzers and carrying the designation5th Battalion, 14th Marines. This unit was command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas F. Reeve who hadserved as the naval gunfire officer of the D-3 Section,4th Marine Division at Roi-Namut The 5th Bartalion,however, soon shifted to Corps Artillery, but remainedattached to the 14th Marines during the next combataction, Operation Forager. On 30 April 1944 MarineObservation Squadron 4 (VMO-4) opened its own air-strip and joined the 4th Marine Division. The 4th Bat-talion provided two aerial observers who continuallyspotted for all types of fire (artillery, naval gunfire,close air support) missions while flying in the lightplanes of VMO-4. The aviators of VMO-4 operatedclosely with the 14th Marines throughout the rest ofWorld War 11.

Implementing the lessons learned at Roi-Namur,the 14th Marines spent most of its time training toimprove its combat efficiency. The regiment spentmany of its long training days on the far side of Maui,away from the few comforts of the base camp, firing

Upon its return from Roi-Namur the 14th Marines,along with the division, took up residence at CampMaui, Hawaii. Despite the incessant rain, ankle- deepmud; and little initial liberty, the camp gradually tookon the appearance of a more permanent base with allthe amenities of a stateside post ITtben not engagedin softball' playoffs, boxing matches, or watching USOshows, the men of the 14th were either servicing theirhowitzers or training at one of the division's 47 train-ing areas near the camp. Command post exercises,overnight pro blems, and hikes became a weekly rou-tine. Implementing the lessons learned at Roi-Namurthe regiment's artillerymen also took part in severalfield problems at the division's artillery range nearMaalaea Bay. These problems involved transportingthe gun, in this case a 75mm pack howitzer swing-ing it into position, correctly szhting the weapon, andthen firing at specific targets. This training preparedthe regiment for its next objectives, Satjan and Tinian.

21

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 146359

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 146360

various types of gunnery problems and making sureits communications was letter perfect. The 3d Battalionwas rearmed with 105mm howitzers and required ad-ditional training to be able to load efficiently, unload,fire, and service its new weapons. The cannoneers ofthe 14th Marines could only infrequently enjoy rhecold beer and hot showers of local liberty towns likeHaiko, Makawao, Kahului, and Wailuku. While onliberty, they enjoyed traditional American dishes ofsteak, hamburgers, and banana splits. Many also be-came accustomed to typical Hawaiian dishes such asfresh pineapple and poi. Marines danced ro the heatof native drums and the twang of steel guitars with

22

carnation leis Mound their necks. Despite their home-sickness, the men of the 14th Maines became very fondof Maui and its friendly population.

Late April and early May brought the final prepa-rations for further combat. The 14th Marines moveddown the slopes of Haleakala to the tent camp bivouacnear Maalaea Bay. Once there, the 14th Marines par-ticipated in live-firing exercises. It fired in support ofrhe 4th Marine Division's regimental combat teamsas they rehearsed for the next assault. Finally, the 14thMarines embarked on board the Leonard rood (AP25), and departed on 12 May 1944 for Pearl Harbor,a stop on the way to Saipan.6

CHAPTER 5

Saipan, 1944

On 12 March 1944, theJoinr Chiefs of Staff directedAdmiral Nimitz to continue the Central Pacific drive.Buoyed by the swift and easy conquest of the Mar-shall Islands, they decided to bypass the Japanese for-tress island of Truk and strike at the Mariana Islands.One of the major deciding factors was the proximityof the Marianas to Japan, well within the 1,500 milerange necessary for successful operations by the U.S.Army Air lbrce's new Boeing B-29 Superfortress longrange, heavy bombers.' The attack plan, OperationForager, was divided into three phases: the capture ofSaipan, the seizure of Tinian, and the recapture ofGuam. The 14th Marines, fresh from its successfuloperations at Roi-Namur, prepared to participate intwo of the three upcoming combat actions.

Saipan was located about 1,250 nautical miles fromTokyo. The island resembled an inverted pipe wrench,with Marpi Point the tip of its northern handle andMagicienne Bay as the gap between the jaws formedby the Kagman Peninsula and Nafutan Point. Saipanwas much larger than the miniscule coral islets of Roiand Namur; hence, its capture presented many differ-ent problems for the planners of Operation Forager.Saipan covered about 72 square miles; it was over 14miles long on irs north-south axis, and about 6.5 milesacross at its widest point. Its terrain was very ruggedand heavily vegetated. Mount Tapotchau rose 1,554feet above the numerous cliffs, ravines, ridges, and val-leys which crisscrossed the island's waist. Lake Susupeand its surrounding swamps formed a barrier to in-land movement near the beaches selected for landingsby the assault forces. Unlike the previous objectivesin the Central Pacific, Saipan had a relatively largecivilian population. These civilians, Japanese andChamorros, primarily lived in Garapan and CharanKanoa, the urban centers on the west coast. The majormilitary centers on the island were Aslito Airfield inthe south and Marpi Point Airfield in the north. Sai-pan was a formidable target which required the properbalance of fire and maneuver in an extendedcampaign.2

Saipan was the home of the headquarters ofjapan'sThirty-First Army and of the Imperial Navy's CentralPacijIc Fleet. The commander of the Central PacijicFleet was Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the leader

23

of the carrier task force which smashed the Americanfleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. More than31,000 Japanese defenders were located on Saipan.Many were members of organized units such as thecrack 43d Division, the 47th Independent MixedBrigade, the 3dMountain Artillery Regiment, the 9thTank Regiment, and the 55th Naval Guard Force, orthe elite 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Lznding Force;the remainder were survivors of American submarineand air attacks which had isolated the Marianas. Lieu-tenant General Yoshitsugu Saito planned his defenseswith great care. He sited his artillery to cover all poten-tial landing areas. Range flags and off-shore markersaided fire direction. Mechanized reserves had positionsnear Magicienne Bay, and stood ready to mount acounterattack. Each of the resolute defenders of Sai-pan took a vow to take seven enemy lives for his coun-try. Both theJapanese and the Americans realized thevital importance of Saipan, and the upcoming battlepromised to be a desperate struggle for supremacy inthe Central Pacific?

Holland M. Smith was Commanding General,Northern Troops and Landing Force (NTLF) as partof his duties in Operation 1brager.* The NTLF con-sisted of the 4th Marine Division and the 2d MarineDivision (Major General Thomas E. Watson). TheNTLF reserve was the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Divi-sion, commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith.A special unit, XXIV Corps Artillery, commanded byBrigadier General Arthur M. Harper, USA, was at-tached to the NTLF to provide additional fire support.Major Genera! Schmidt commanded the 4th MarineDivision. Colonel DeHaven retained command of the14th Marines, with Lieutenant Colonel Victory as ex-ecutive officer. The regimental staff officers were: FirstLieutenant Cecil D. Snyder, R-1; Captain Harrison L.Rogers, R-2; Major FrederickJ. Karch, R-3; and MajorRichardJ. Winsborough, R-4.4 On Maui, the 3d Bat-taion rearmed with 105mm howitzers to replace the75mm pack howitzers which served it so well at Roi-Namur. These cannon added range and explosive pow-er to the punch of the 14th Marines. Lieutenant

*General Smirh actually had three jobs at Saipan: CG NTLF;CG, Expeditionary Troops: and CG, VAC.

Colonel Douglas F. Reeve led the separate 4th 105mmHowitzer Battalion, which VAC created by redesignat-ing the 5th Battalion, 14th Marines on 16 April 1944.The new battalion, however, was attached to the 14thMarines for Operation Forager, so its title was an offi-cial name change only, and it did not affect the tacti-cal direction of the unit.* In all, the 14th Marinesmustered two battalions of 75mm pack howitzers,three battalions of 105mm, and could call on the sup-port of the 155mm guns and howitzers of XXIV CorpsArtillery for reinforcement or deep support.

At Saipan, unlike Roi-Namur, there were no con-venient off-shore islands, thus forcing the planners todevelop other tactics. Instead of landing first and sup-porting the combat teams during their ship-to-shoremovement as at Roi-Namur, the 14th Marines wouldwait in the transport area during this pan of the land-ing operation. Rather than coming ashore as part ofa regularly scheduled assault wave, the 14th Marineswas to land "on order'; that is, it would send its gunsashore when the situation on the beach dictated, notat a specific time. This plan was the most flexible; irwas also the most complex. The gunners had to standat their debarkation stations for long hours, nervouslywaiting for the order to move ashore. Because of thedemands of this mission, the regiment instituted spe-cial landing procedures. The 105mm howitzers were

tln fact the 14th Marines After Acrinn Reports referred to the4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion as "5/14.'

24

preloaded on board specially modified two and one-half ton amphibian cargo trucks, officially labeledDUKWs but tabbed "ducks" by the troops using them.The DUKWs used for this purpose required structuralreinforcement of the cargo compartment and somemounted an "A" frame lift on the back. Each howit-zet's wheels needed modification to reduce its width.The 105mm howitzers were too large to be loaded inLVTs, and the LCVP landing craft were unable to car-ry the unwieldy howitzers across the beach. The useof DUKWs allowed the howitzers to be carried directlyto their firing positions, and simplified the unload-ing by using the "A?' frame. The loading and unload-ing procedures required hours of practice before thecrew became proficient at this operation.** To facili-tate this technique, the three 105mm howitzer bat-talions embarked on board tank landing ships (1ST340, 1ST 354, and 1ST 40) at Eniwetok. A fourth, 1ST23, carried ammunition. The 1st and 2d Battalionsembarked on attack transportsJames 07-lam (APA 90)and Leon (ARk 48). The landing plans called for thosetwo battalions to disembark in ICVPs, then changeto the same DUKWs used by the 3d and 4th Battal-ion for the final leg of the movement to shore.***

**The Dt.JKW5 and these unloading techniqueswere developedby the U.S. Army, particularly the 7th Infantry Division, duringOperation Flintlock.

***This was possible because the pack howitzer was small enoughto be manhandled over the side.

14th Marines at Saipan, 1944

14th 4th MarDiv

HQISIII II II

1111 2Ij I•II

I • IVAC105mmHowitzer

The 4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion was designated from the 5th Battalion, 14th Marines just priorto the Marianas assault, but was still referred to as 5/14 in 14th Marines action reports until afterthe Tinian operation. Officially, the 4th 105mm Battalion was part of V Amphibious Corps Artillery,but was attached to the 14th Marines for the entire Marianas Campaign.

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25

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NotutOfl PtSCALE

Saipan 1944

The American armada assembled off Saipan's coaston the night of 14-15 June 1944. The naval supportgroup and carrier aircraft began pounding Saipan atdawn. At 0542 Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Com-mander Expeditionary Forces, gave the order to "Landthe Landing Force." The LSTs and APAs carrying rhe14th Marines moved into position about 1,200 yardsfrom the beaches designated Yellow and Blue by theVAC staff At 0843 the first Marine infantry unitscrossed the beach into a steel curtain ofjapanese fire.Following waves suffered under the mortar and artilleryfire as well. The progress of the landing force was spor-ty and uneven. In places the attack moved across thebeach and penetrated to the 04 line; at other placesthe assault mired in the sand along the beach. In thecenter, units of RCT 23 moved as far as the base ofthe cliff which overlooked the beachhead, while otherelements around Charan Kanoa could not maneuver.The combat teams of the 25th Marines suffered a simi-lar fate. In the center they moved inland quickly. Onthe extreme right flank, the attack gained only a fewyards as frontal, enfilade, and indirect fires poured intothat area of the beachhead. The situation on shore wasdesperate. Casualties were high and many units lostleaders. Enemy fire swept the entire landing area. Theattack plan broke down in the face of devastating fire

from the 3d Mountain Artillery Regiment located nearHill 500. The American attack slowed to a crawl asmote and more Marines fell on Saipan's sandy beach.At about noon, Colonel Louis R. Jones, Command-ing Officer of the 23d Marines, radioed GeneralSchmidt's command post and requested that the ar-tillery be sent ashore. The division relayed this requestto Colonel De}laven, and he ordered the 14th Ma-rines to begin landing at about 1315 that afternoon.

The first unit to head for the beach was LieutenantColonel Robert E. MacFarlane's 3d Battalion. ItsDUXWs churned into the water as soon as the 1STopened its doors and lowered the ramp. As theDUKWs paddled toward the shore, one suffered amechanical &ilure and sank, taking a 105mm howitzerwith it. The test of the small flotilla made the beachwith the remaining 11 howitzers on board. They cross-ed Yellow Beach 2 and followed guides from the recon-naissance party to the firing positions about 50 yardseast of Yellow 2. The 3d Battalion began firing in sup-port of RCT 25 around 1445.

The next unit ashore was the 4th 105mm HowitzerBattalion, VAC (commonly called the 5th Battalion,14th Marines). Lieutenant Colonel Reeve's battalionmade it to the firing positions on Yellow Beach 2 atabout 1600 without losing a gun. Unfortunately, this

National Archives Photo 127-N-84353A 105mm howitzer section from the SdBattalion, 14th Marines pauses while in supportof the embattled 25th Marines, shortly after landing on Sazban on 15 June 1944.

26

luck didn't hold, and the battalion suffered heavy loss-es the next morning. The unloading process slowedconsiderably after a Japanese dual-purpose gun des-troyed one of the "A" frame DUKWs with a direct hit.The battalion gained a measure of revenge when itknocked our that particular gun immediately after fir-ing its registration rounds just after 1800.6

The order to land sent Lieutenant Colonel Carl A.Youngdale's battalion in over Blue 2 at about 1700.Earlier in the day, the reconnaissance party of the 4thBattalion was assigned to a "free boat" (an LVT notplaced in a specific wave) and landed between the 3dand 4th waves on Blue Beach 1. The beach, like allthe others on Saipan that June day, was undet veryheavy fire. Colonel Youngdale split up the reconnais-sance patty, and led a small group inland. This scoutgroup moved forward through aJapanese fuel dump,over the sugar mill railway tracks, and into a clearedarea located near a vacatedJapanese store on the out-skirts of Charan Kanoa. The group occupied a numberof Japanese dugouts and established the 4th Battal-ion command post. Colonel Youngdale moved about200 yards further and established contact with an in-fantry battalion dug in along Lake Susepe (actuallya semi-dry marsh). After his return to the artillerycommand post, Colonel Youngdale ordered the testof the reconnaissance party forward and asked that thebattalion be sent ashore. Unfortunately, some of themembers of the reconnaissance party left on the beachhad been wounded by artillery and mortar fire thatrained down on the landing area. The order to goashore was given at about 1700. The battalion lost onehowitzer when the DUKW carrying it ran out of fueland sank while attempting to reenter the ship. Hardluck continued to dog the 4th Battalion when enemyfire damaged four more howitzers at the beachhead.The battalion finally set up about 350 yards inlandfrom Blue Beach, just east of the coastal road.Although not completely dug in, the determined can-noneers of the 4th Battalion began shooting that even-ing. The hard working ordnance men were able to putall four damaged guns back on the firing line the nextday?

D-Day on Saipan was tough for everyone, but theexperiences of one member of the 14th Marines typi-fied what the forward observers went through duringan amphibious assault. First Lieutenant Daniel M.Manfull, a former football and basketball coach at anOhio high school, was a forward observer assigned toland with the fifth wave. His mission was to lead afive-man forward observation team inland about 1,500yards, and establish communications with the 1st Bat-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 05454

LtCol CarlA, Youngdale served as commanding officerof the 4th Battalion during all combat actions thebattalion was involved in during World War II.

talion, 14th Marines. Despite massive preparatorybombardment the Japanese defenses were still effec-tive as the landing waves went ashore. Because of theconfusion on the beach due to intense Japanese shell-ing, Manfull's ream had to jump out of their LVT intochest-deep water and wade ashore. While moving in-land, a shell exploded about 25 feet from Manfull,wounding all the other members of the team and des-troying both radios. Manfull evacuated his team, thencontinued to move forward where he was able to linkup with another forward observation team. Using bor-rowed radios, he was able to adjust preplanned defen-sive fires. Finally, at about midnight, all the protectivefires were properly registered in front of the Marinelines. This was an important task because preplannedfires allowed the artillery to shift its concentrationsquickly. A forward observer could call for accurate ar-tillery fire by giving a simple command such as "Fireconcentration iio," rather than having to rely on alengthy period of adjustment by bracket or creepingfire. At about 0400 on 16 June 1944 the Japaneselaunched a fierce counterattack. Manfull, stationed atthe infantry command post, called for fire. TheJapanese were repulsed with heavy losses, primarilythe result of artillery fire. When a second attack be-gan, Manfull skillfully shifted the artillery arid once

27

again inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. Forhis action Lieutenant Daniel M. Manful! was award-ed the Bronze Star Medal.

A major weakness in the landing plan became evi-dent when the 1st and 2d Battalions tried to land. TheDUKWs which were supposed to carry these two bat-talions to shore never showed up; they were either lostat the beach or sent on other missions. LieutenantColonel Harry J. Zimmer's 1st Battalion circled inICVPs unti! told to move to the assembly area wherethey would link up with LVTs. At this point, just shortof the line of departure, Marines heaved the packhowitzers over the rails and into the bobbing tractorswithout the loss of a single one. The amtracs carriedthe guns across Yellow 1 at about 1700. The 1st Bat-talion set up about 100 yards inland of the 3d Battal-ion. This congestion was neither desirable not accord-ing to tactical doctrine, but the situation left no choice.The beach conditions prohibited proper dispersal.

The 2d Battalion made the most difficult landing.ilansportation for Lieutenant Colonel George B. Wil-son's guns became available only one vehicle at a time.The result was chaos. Equipment had to be handlowered over the side of the transport ships into thebobbing ICVPs below. This required the pack howit-zers to be broken down into six separate loads. Oncethe equipment was on board, the cannoneers scam-pered over the rail and made their descent into thewaiting LCVPs. The LCVPs then made their way tothe reef, where plans called for the men and equip-ment to be transferred to LVTs for the final leg of the

journey to shore. The guns and their skeleton crewslanded all over the beaches. Once ashore they haddifficulty finding guides to lead them to the properfiring positions. One group attempted to land fromtheir LCVPs but were turned away by heavy fire whenit reached the channel entrance. This group went backto the assembly area and circled until it was able toreturn later in the day. The battalion lost two packhowitzers when the LVTs carrying them broached atthe reef and dumped their cargo into the sea. The Ma-rines later recovered the pieces and reassembled thehowitzers. Enemy fire knocked out two more howit-zers; however, by using parts from both, the gunnerscreated a single new one. Hardest hit was Battery E,which lost two howitzers on the way to shore and thenlost another to a direct hit by Japanese artillery dur-ing the first night ashore. Losses of personnel andequipment forced Colonel Wilson to reorganize andform two batteries out of the remnants of the threethat started for Saipan earlier in the day. Battery F wassplit between Batteries D and F for the rest of the bat-tle, but was reconstituted during the lull before theTinian landingP

The regimental command group, under LieutenantColonel Victory, landed at Blue Beach 2 at about 1300.It established a command post in an abandonedtrenchline located in a small grove of trees about 500yards inland. While the position offered relative safety,the Marines killed two snipers within 40 yards of thecommand post. In spite of the hardships and confu-sion at the beach, the 14th Marines had all of its bat-

Despite problems getting ashore, a 75mm pack howitzer from LtCol Harry]. Zimmer's1st Battalion prepares to fire from a camouflaged position, ioo yardsfrom Yellow Beach.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 84792

28

teries ashore and firing before dark. The harriedfront-line Marines were happy to know their own "bigstuff' was on hand and ready to reply to the Japanese"incoming," round for round.b0

The tactical situation dictated that the combatreams along the forward edge of the battle area read-just their lines before darkness covered Saipan. Whitethis was going on, the attillery battalions registeredtheir night defensive fires on likely assembty areas andavenues of approach. At the same time, the infantryregisrered its mortars to cover the dead spots betweenthe fire lanes of the heavy machine guns along themain line of resistance. Individual riflemen dug fox-holes in anticipation of a Japanese counterattack. For-ward observers checked retephone lines to the batteries,and arranged for radio backups, as the heavy enemyshelling and numerous tracked vehicles in the areaconsranrly severed wire lines. Ar the guns, men readied

29

ammunition and dug gun pits. Alt this hard work paidbig dividends tater that night. The 14th Marines as-sisted RCT 23 in repetling an estimated 200 Japanesenear Lake Susupe. Ar 0330, RCT 25 stopped one at-tack with the support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Ma-rines. Later, First Lieutenant James V. Walker, aforward observer from the 1st Battalion, spied a groupof "civilians" approaching the lines of Company C,1st Battalion, 25th Marines. These "civitians" soonturned out to be Japanese soldiers. The alert youngofficer immediately called for fire. The 1st Battalionran out of ammunition before the enemy attack haIr-ed, and the regiment shifted the fire mission to the3d Battalion. Aware of the critical situation, the 3dBattalion had been tracking every adjustment eventhough its batteries were nor engaged. This foresightallowed the 3d Battalion to commence firing withouthesitation and destroy the attackers. The Japanese at-

tack failed because of a cooperative effort by two bat-talions of the 14th Marines. Lieutenant Walker waslater awarded the Silver Star Medal for his actions thatnight."

On the morning of 16 June the artillery duel be-tween the 14th Marines and the 3dMountain Artillery(reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 10th Field Artillery)heated up. The attached 4th 105mm Howitzer Bat-talion was the hardest hit, taking an estimated 300incoming rounds in less than 24 hours. Enemy fireknocked out every gun in Battery B by 0500, and thendid the same to Battery A by 0730. Battery C lost twoguns. At 0800 Lieutenant Colonel Reeve notifiedColonel DeHaven that he had only two guns still oper-able. This forced Colonel DeHaven to relieve the bat-talion of any further fire missions until it couldreorganize.

The unsung heroes of the battle for Saipan were theMarines of the division Ordnance Company. Theyworked miracles with the battered weapons theyreceived. Howitzers came in with trails blown off, recoilmechanisms damaged, hydraulic cylinders punctured,sights damaged or missing, and cracked barrels. Themechanics spotwelded ruptured seams, jury-rigged fir-ing mechanisms, cannibalized damaged guns for spareparts, and devised field expedients to keep the maxi-mum number of guns at the firing line throughoutOperation Fbrager. On D plus 1, enemy fire knockedout 4 of the 15 batteries of the 14th Marines; the ord-nance mechanics later repaired and returned all ofthese cannons to the fight. One howitzer, named"Belching Beauty," survived a direct hit on its gun pitwhich killed or wounded all its crew but one; mechan-

ics repaired the 105mm howitzer and returned it toaction on the same day. All 10 of the howitzers lostby the attached 4th Battalion had received repairs andwere firing by 1000 the same day. Through this out-standing effort, the ordnance repairmen kept the 14thMarines in the thick of the fight for Saipan.12

An unusual opportunity presented itself to the 4thBattalion. First Lieutenant Russell F. Schoenbeck, theformer commanding officer of Battery K, and at thattime the assistant operations officer, responded to acall for help to stop a column of about 30 japaneseadvancing along the coast. Without moving from hisperch atop the FDC, Schoenbeck directed a fire mis-sion on the enemy positions by shouting his fire ad-justments to Major Spritzen's fire direction section ina dugout below. After observing the impact area, hewould make the proper corrections and yell the newfire command. Soon the rounds had bracketed theenemy and Schoenbeck called "fire for effect:' Shellafter shell whistled overhead on its way to the enemyposition until the fire mission had destroyed theJapanese force. The Japanese retaliated later that af-ternoon when they scored a direct hit on one gun sec-tion of Battery M.'5

On this same day, 16 June 1944, the U.S. Navyreaped one of the dividends of the decision to attackthe Marianas. Admiral Spruance, Commander FifthFleet, reported that the Japanese First Mobile Fleetwas sailing to assist Saipan's defenders. Admiral Turnerordered the 27th Infantry Division and XXIV CorpsArtillery to land at once so all naval forces would befree to meet the enemy at sea. To make room for thesenew units on the crowded beachhead, General Smith

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 84815

A Marine 105mm section from the 3dBattalion readies for action. Marine 105mm howit-zers played a major role in the duel with the Japanese 3d Mountain Artillery Regiment.

30

ordered the 4th Marine Division to press its attack withall three regiments abreast. The decision to hurry thelandings was a wise one, in spite of the confusion andfrustration caused when equipment was losr, landedon the wrong beach, or left in the hold of a departingtransport ship. On 19 june, Vice Admiral Marc A.Mitscher's carrier forces inflicted such heavy damageon the Japanese Fleet in the Philippine Sea that thisengagement became known as the "Marianas TurkeyShoor."*

Once the 27th Infantry Division and XXIV CorpsArtillery were safely on shore, the tactical plans calledfor the Marines to drive toward Mount Tapotchau andMagicienne—called "Magazine'LBay ro cur the islandin half. Aslito Airfield and Nafuran Point were ob-jectives assigned to a regiment of the 27th InfantryDivision. The 14th Marines divided its attention be-tween supporting the drive to Magicienne Bay andcounterbattery fire to silence the Japanese artillerywhich still hampered the landing force. One night,while firing a harassment mission far to the japaneserear near Magicienne Bay, the howitzers of the 4th Bar-talion struck an unknown target which caused a gigan-tic explosion and a huge fireball lit up the eveningsky for miles around.

The 14th Marines direct support mission changedso often during the battle that each of the five artillerybattalions fired in support of each of the rifle regi-ments at some time in the 25-day campaign for Sal-pan. At times, the cannoneers of the 10th Marines (2dMarine Division) fired in support of 4th Marine Divi-sion; at other times, the 14th Marines fired fbr the 2dMarine Division. After the Army division's initial land-ings, the 14th Marines fired in support of the 27thDivision's RCT 165 during its attachment to the 4thMarine Division. These complex operations called forgreat flexibility, good communications, excellent liai-son work, and a unique spirit of teamwork which tran-scended unit or service loyalty. This cooperative effortwas obvious in mission assignments, fire direction,communications relays, and logistical support. Attimes early in the campaign, the 14th Marines bor-rowed 105mm ammunition from U.S. Army dumps,then returned the favor when Army artillery unitsdepleted theirs during the drive to Marpi Point.**

The drive to Magicienne Bay progressed well. The165th Infantry Regiment captured Aslito Airfield and

*The Japanese lost mort than 400 aircraft and many pilots; theU.S. Navy suffered minimal losses. This action virtually destroyedJapanese carrier aviation for the rest of the war.

**Colonel DeHaven stated in a letter to the Commandant on9January 1950 that the logistical situation might have gotten outof hand it it were not for this cooperation. (Hoffman, Sattan, p. 121.)

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continued its push to pinch off Nafuran Point and iso-late the defenders. At about the same time that Ad-miral Mirsdier's forces began rhe Battle of thePhilippine Sea, the 14th Marines had a "turkey shoot"of its own, albeit or. a much smaller scale. At about0700 on the morning of 19 june, Marines spotted alarge group ofJapanese, reinforced by tanks, in an as-sembly area. The 14th Marines opened up with all ithad. Every battery executed a "fire for effect" on theJapanese position. There was no attack by this enemyforce. General Saito's plans failed because of the ac-curacy of the 14th Marines' howitzers. Immediately af-ter finishing this mission, the 2d and 4th Battalionsbegan preparatory fires on Hill 500 to soften it for afuture assault.

Hill 500 was the dominant terrain feature in the4th Marine Division's zone of action. The 3d Battalion,25th Marines, nicknamed "Chambers' Raiders" afterits commanding officer, Lieuteuant Colonel Justice M."Jumping Joe" Chambers, received the mission of cap-turing Hill 500. Colonel Chambers—a former Raider,Guadalcanal veteran, and future Medal of Honorrecipient—decided to make maximum use of support-ing arms for this attack. The 1st and 2d Battalions,14th Marines, alternately fired white phosphorus andhigh explosive shells to neutralize the defenders.Smoke rounds hid the movement of the attacking Ma-rines when they crossed an open valley. Joining the14th Marines on this mission were the mobile rocketartillery and 81mm mortars. When the assault forcereached the road marking the line of departure, allthe supporting arms shifted their fires to box in theobjective area and prevent the attackers from escapingor reinforcements from coming to their aid. Thedefenders, blinded by the smoke, were huddled deepin their bunkers when the rifle battalion began its as-sault. The battalion surged to the top of Hill 500. Theattack was a success. An excellent scheme of maneuverand masterful use of supporting arms made this atextbook-perfect artack.'

Operation Forager was notable for the cooperationand smooth coordination of all artillery units—the14th Marines, the 10th Marines, 27th Division Ar-tillery, and XXIV Corps Artillery—during the entirecampaign. After landing on D plus 1, Army BrigadierGeneral Harper began holding daily conferences at-tended by the operation officers of each artillery unit.They discussed plans, problems, solutions, and tech-niques. Major Karch credited General Harper with in-stilling a feeling of confidence, cooperation, and unityin these meetings.' After the campaign General Hol-land M. Smith spoke of General Harper in the mostlaudatory terms.'6 One incident, symbolic of the ar-

tillery cooperation, happened on 19 June. A forwardobserver from 1st Battalion, 14th Marines sported aJapanese artillery position near Magicienne Bay. Hecould not contact the FDC using his own 5CR 300 ra-dio, therefore, he had to relay his fire requests bycontacting another artillery observer who then told theFDC. The 1st Battalion could not tespond to the re-quest because it was firing a mission with a highet pri-ority. The 1st Battalion contacted the regimental FDCby land line, only to discover that all the other bat-teries of the 14th Marines also were engaged in firing.The regimental FDC phoned XXIV Corps Artillery,whose 155mm howitzers fired the mission. Using thiscombination of radio and telephone links, the Armyguns destroyed the target. This complicated procedurecould not have succeeded without the smooth-workingrelationship and strong sense of teamwork so obviousin all artillery operations during the capture of Sai-pan and Tinian.'

On D plus 6, General Smith ordered, "Hold presentlines?' While it was a day of test and replenishmentfor most units on Saipan, this was not true for the 14thMarines. The cannoneers continued to fire on targetsof oppottunity, destroyed suspected Japanese positionsin front of the 4th Division, and reinforced the firesof the 27th Division's artillery. Ar this rime, anotherexample of interservice cooperation surfaced. Whileammunition supplies never reached critically low lev-els, resupply continued to be Colonel DeHaven's big-gest headache. At his request, the Army willingly

supplied the 14th Marines from its own ammunitionreserves until the Marines' replacement stocks arrived.'8

The morning of 24 June 1944 brought a tempestas great as any turbulence that rocked the Pacific areain World War II. Marine General Holland M. Smith,dissatisfied with the performance of the 27th InfantryDivision, relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith,USA, of his command. Major General SanderlbrdJar-man, USA, took temporary command of the 27thDivision until Major General George W. Griner, USA,arrived on the island. The dark clouds created by thissrorm hung over this operation and marred interservicerelations for years to come. Another unfortunate out-come of this incident was that General Harper's dailyconferences were curtailed soon afterward.*

The next day the 1st Battalion moved four of its packhowitzers to the northeast slopes of Hill 600. This po-sition permitted close, direct fire missions for the as-sault battalions. At this same time, enemy fire from"Purple Heart Ridge" hampered actions in the 4th Ma-rine Division's sector. To resolve this problem, Head-quarters, 14th Marines asked fbr and receivedpermission to fire into the 27th Division's zone of ac-tion. The enemy guns remained silent for the rest ofthe day, and allowed RCT 23 to continue its driveacross the Kagman Peninsula. By late afternoon the

5HolIarid M. Smith presented his personal view in Coral and Bress.

In the official histories, Shaw, Nairy, and Turnbladh, Central Pacijic Dnvc and Crow!, Madanas present the views of the respectiveservices; Isley and Crowl, Amphibious War is another good source.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 82549

A typical Marine 105mm position which not only supportedthe drive to Magicienne Bay,but fired continuous counter-battery missions in an effort to silence Japanese artillery.

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National Archives Photo 127-N-86002

LtCol Justice M. Chambers, left, discusses the tacticalsituation with the 14th Marines operations officer,LtCol William 1? Thyson, Jr., prior to 3d Battalion,25th Marines' assault on Hill 500, an assault heavilysupported by the 1st and 2dBattalions, 14th Marines.

Americans had occupied the entire peninsula and hadbegun mopping up.'9

To support the 4th Marine Division's rapid drive upthe right side of Saipan, the 14th Marines had to dis-place and move to positions located between AslitoAirfield and Hill 500. To the south, infantrymen ofthe 27th Division tried to seal off the Nafutan Penin-sula. On the night of 25-26 june more than 500Japanese attacked Aslito Airfield and Hill 500. Atabout 0530, elements of this force struck the 14th Ma-tines' positions. The blow hit the 2d Battalion fullforce. At first, the cannoneers held their fire, think-ing the attack force was an expected patrol returningto American lines. The gunners leapt into action whenthey discovered the true identity of the approachingforce. All along the line heavy machine guns spittracers at the enemy. Gun crews swung their fieldpieces around to face the attackers. Gunners loweredmuzzles and cut fuses short. The howitzers fired rapid-ly into the mass of humanity moving toward them inthe darkness. Rifles and hand grenades joined the cho-rus of firing as the Japanese moved forward. Whenthe smoke cleared and daylight arrived, 143 enemybodies lay in front of the 2d Battalion. The previous

In the 4th Marine Division's rapid drive up the right side of the island, the 14th Marinesdisplaced to positions between Aslito Airfield and Hill 500. Here a 75mm gun sectionfires a round while an observer notes the location of impact and adjusts subsequent fire.

National Archives Photo 127-N-85328

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Narional Archives Photo 127-N-88352

A typical 105mm howitzer position, here firing in support of the assault on Garapan.

long hours of drill with infantry weapons paid big divi-dends on that morning.20

The terrain characteristics of central Saipan madeaccurate fire support extremely difficult. The islandwas a vast tangle of indistinguishable ravines andridges, all covered by dense underbrush. Place nameslike "Death Valley:' "Hell's Pocket:' and "Purple HeartRidge" were nicknames given to some of these loca-tions by the participants. To advance through this area,General Smith ordered an attack with all three divi-sions abreast: The 2d Division on the left, 27th in thecenter, and 4th on the right. The plan faltered be-cause of an uneven advance over the rough terrain. Thetwo flanks moved rapidly while the center remainedanchored near its original line of departure. The ir-regular front lines, compounded by inaccurate mapsand faulty land navigation, caused several near-tragicaccidents when artillery landed on or near Americanlines. A shower of green flares shooting skywardbrought an immediate ceasefire until the problemcould be worked out. Soon, the primary mission formost artillery became deep support and counterbat-tery fire. Light tanks, self-propelled 75mm guns, andthe 37mm guns of the infantry regiments were theprimary direct support weapons during this stage ofthe fight.

Another important fire support assignment for theartillery at this time was preparatory fire on a clearlydefined objective. Places like Hill 767, "Radar Hill:'and "Iburth ofJuly Hill" were pounded by volley aftervolley of 75mm and 105mm fire from the 14th Ma-rines. These "prep fires" knocked out few actual posi-

34

tions, but kept the enemy groggy, disrupredcommunications, and prevented troop movement.When used properly the artillery proved to be an ef-fective weapon even in this difficult zone.2t

As the campaign drew to a close, artillery supportplayed a larger role because the flat terrain made tar-get acquisition easier, fewer units were on the frontline, and there were fewer counter-battery missions.All these factors increased the number of guns availa-ble per maneuver unit along the front. When the 4thMarine Division assaulted the 0-8 Phase Line, it calledon the massed fires of the 10th Marines, the 14th Ma-rines, and XXIV Corps artillery. When Japanese firefrom a small hill held up RCT 24, fire from eight ar-tillery battalions pounded the enemy position for onehalf-hour. An example of the effectiveness of the 14thMarines occurred when one of its phosphorus shellsstruck ajapanese dual-purpose gun being wheeled inand out of a cave near the beach. The enemy gun ex-ploded in front of a Marine rifle company that cheeredthe result.

On the west coast, VAC attached the 3d and 4thBattalions, 10th Marines to the 4th Marine Divisionto support RCT 23's drive toward Marpi Point. On thenight of 6-7 July, a large Japanese force penetrated thelines of the 27th Division. At about 0500 this forceprobed the position manned by the 10th Marines.Soon the Japanese charged out of the darkness in anattempt to overrun the artillerymen. In the ensuinghand-to-hand combat the 10th Marines lost a battal-ion commander, Major William L. Crouch; PrivateFirst Class Harold C. Agerholm earned a posthumous

Medal of Honor; and the 10th Marines received aNaval Unit Commendation for its gallant stand.22

The futileJapanese attack on 7 July broke the backof the enemy resistance on Saipan. American forcespushed north at a tapid pace and gained Marpi Point.Genetal Smith declared the island secute at 1615 on9 July 1944. Horror, not joyous celebrations of victo-ry, colored the end of the Saipan campaign. As theAmericans watched helplessly, Japanese soldiers andcivilians jumped from the rocky cliffs into the oceanrather than submit to capture by American forces. Hu-manitarian efforts failed to halt the wholesale slaugh-ter. It was a sad ending to the 25 days of bitter conflictthat marked the struggle for Saipan.

Saipan was a resounding victory and a strategic suc-cess which yielded many rewards—a major defeat forthe Japanese fleet and its naval air arm, interdiction

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of Japanese lines of communication, acquisition ofheavy bomber bases within range of Tokyo, and ajumping off place for the attack on Tinian. The cam-paign, however, became synonymous with the inter-service hostility caused by the relief of General RalphSmith. It is important to note that artillery operationson Saipan made a lie of the myth that the Marinesand the Army could not work in harmony; in fact, therelationships between the two services were cordial andeffective throughout both Saipan and Tinian. The 14thMarines landed on D-Day in DUKWs developed bythe U.S. Army, using techniques pioneered by the U.S.Army. The calm, efficient leadership of BrigadierGeneral Harper, an Army officer, impressed all Ma-rine leaders. Marine and Army artillery units sharedrations, supplies, ammunition, and infbrmation in anunseWish manner; each reinforced the fire of the otherat one time or another during Operation Forager.

CHAPTER 6

Tinian, 1944

The assault on Tinian was one of the most obviousoperations of the Second World War, a fact not loston the island's Japanese defenders, most of whom werespectators while the battle of Saipan raged only a fewmiles away. Since there was virtually no chance fur stra-tegic surprise as at Roi-Namur or Saipan, the Americanplanners relied on tactical surprise alone. This result-ed in a brilliant scheme of maneuver and fire supportunparalleled in originality and effectiveness duringWorld War II in the Pacific. This masterful use of the"indirect approach" took place under a heavy umbrellaof supporting arms, utilized an original logistical plan,and followed a convincing feint that left the Japanesein disarray because they were unable to identify thecorrect landing area. After the war, General HollandM. Smith labeled Tinian "the perfect amphibiousoperation."

Tinian lay about three and one-half miles south ofSaipan's Nafutan Point. It sat in the aiure Pacificwaters like a misplaced billiard table. It had a rela-tively flat interior, and, other than the steep cliffs thatsurrounded it, Tinian's only height of note was MountLasso, which rose only 564 feet above sea level. In 1944,the main industry on Tinian was the raising of sugarcane, and thick cane fields covered about 90 percentof the island's surface. The only urban area, TinianTown, centered around the sugar refinery.

Before the invasion, Marine reconnaissance teamslocated only three beach areas suitable for an amphibi-ous landing. The most favorable, in terms of terrain,was at Tinian Town. A second was at Asiga Bay on theeast coast. The least likely, because of its small size,was on the island's northwest corner and had two ex-tremely narrow beaches codenamed White 1 andWhite 2. The major military targets of note were theairfields which cut across the cane fields at four differ-ent locations. Indeed, Tinian's flat terrain and its suita-bility for constructing the long airstrips necessary forthe U.S. Army Air Force's B-29 bombers were a majorreason for the selection of Saipan and Tinian as ob-jectives for Operation Forager. Of particular interestwere the two fields near Ushi Point and the one justinland of Gurguan Point, about midway down the is-land's west coast. In general, the flat terrain of Tinian

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could support rapid movement by rank-infantry teamswithout natural obstacles barring the way. The enemyforces on Tinian were a mixture ofJapanese Army andNavy units under the command of Colonel KeishiOgata. Colonel Ogata commanded the 50th InfantryRegiment, 29th Division, plus a battalion of the 135thInfantry Regiment (reinforced), and the 56th NavalGuard Force. The Americans estimated the total num-ber ofJapanese available to defend Tinian at just over9,000 men.2

Immediately after the battle for Saipan, the 4th Ma-rine Division changed hands. Lieutenant General Hol-land M. Smith became Commanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, and Major General HarrySchmidt, until then the commanding general of the4th Marine Division, received appointment as the newCommanding General, VAC. Major General Clifton B.Cates, later Commandant of the Marine Corps, tookover the 4th Marine Division. General Schmidt's firsttask was to complete planning for the capture of Tin-ian, scheduled to begin a fortnight after the securingof Saipan. After careful study, the landing force staffrecommended a plan that took full advantage of themilitary principle of surprise. Rather than force a land-ing at the most obvious spot, it recommended sneak-ing in the "back door." The 2d Marine Division wouldconduct a demonstration landing at Tinian Town tohold the Japanese main forces in place, while the ac-tual assault would consist of the 4th Marine Divisionlanding over the miniscule White Beaches to thenorth. One of the major determinants in GeneralSchmidt's approval of this controversial plan was thatthe White Beach landings could occur under themassed fires of 13 different artillery battalions shoot-ing from Saipan. At Tinian, as at Roi-Namur, the ad-vantages of shore-based artillery were apparent. Theability of the artillery to conduct accurate fire missionswithout regard to weather was very important, as thetyphoon season was approaching rapidly, and a stormmight strike the Marianas sometime during the Tiniancampaign. The location of the firing positions, closeto their resupply dumps, eased the logistical burden.The stable land platform provided by Saipan allowedcareful selection and destruction of targets without fear