Youth, Politics and Social Youth, Politics and Social

Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary IndonesiaNurman Nowak

Imprint©2021 Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungIndonesia OfficeJalan Kemang Selatan II No. 2 A | Jakarta 12730INDONESIA

Responsible :Sergio Grassi | Resident Director

Phone : +62-21-7193711Fax : +62-21-71791358Email : [email protected]: www.fes-indonesia.org

Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

About the author: Nurman Nowak has a Master in Southeast Asian Studies and is a PhD-candidate at the University of Göttingen, currently conducting field research in urban poor communities in Jakarta. Previously he worked for FES Indonesia where he participated in political education programs focusing on youth and has written extensively about the political and civil society development in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany.The foundation is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany. With an international network of more than 100 countries worldwide, it contributes to fostering the core of social democracy – freedom, solidarity and social justice.

FES established its Indonesia Representative Office in 1968 and since 2012 has been in cooperation with the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK) Republic of Indonesia in order to pursue social justice in politics, the economy and in the society as one of FES leading principles worldwide, FES Indonesia has been conducting various activities in recent years to support the Social Security Reform, Welfare State, and Social Economic Development in Indonesia as well as promoting Indonesia as a reference to other countries in the region and at the international level for democratization, socio-economic and peaceful development.

www.fes-indonesia.org

Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia


Imprint©2021 Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungIndonesia OfficeJalan Kemang Selatan II No. 2 A | Jakarta 12730INDONESIA

Responsible :Sergio Grassi | Resident Director

Phone : +62-21-7193711Fax : +62-21-71791358Email : [email protected]: www.fes-indonesia.org

Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany.The foundation is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany. With an international network of more than 100 countries worldwide, it contributes to fostering the core of social democracy – freedom, solidarity and social justice.

FES established its Indonesia Representative Office in 1968 and since 2012 has been in cooperation with the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK) Republic of Indonesia in order to pursue social justice in politics, the economy and in the society as one of FES leading principles worldwide, FES Indonesia has been conducting various activities in recent years to support the Social Security Reform, Welfare State, and Social Economic Development in Indonesia as well as promoting Indonesia as a reference to other countries in the region and at the international level for democratization, socio-economic and peaceful development.

www.fes-indonesia.org


Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Indonesia - 2021

Content

Youth, Politics and Social Engagement

in Contemporary Indonesia .................................................1

Introduction .........................................................................2

The role and legacy of youth activism in Indonesia ........3

Youth activism and the emergence of new arenas of struggle ................................................................................4

Youth and student activism in the Jokowi-era: A polarized society ..............................................................7

Youth and formal politics in the Jokowi-era .....................8

Beyond formal politics – New forms and ways of participation ......................................................................10

Youth policies, the government and the corona crisis ... 13

Approaching a new juncture ............................................ 15

Bibliography ........................................................................... 17

List of Abbreviations ..........................................................20



1

Executive Summary:

▪ (IndonesianyouthmakeupaquarterofIn-

donesian society and youth development

is decisive for the country’s future socio-

economicdevelopmentas ademographic

bonusisreached.Theyarethedriverofthe

digitalizationofeverydaylife,asmorethan

80%areconnectedtothe internet.Social

media is widely used, mainly to connect

with their peers, but it also serves as an

importantsourceofinformationaboutthe

generalstateofaffairs.)

▪ Youth have played a decisive role at all

historical junctures of Indonesia’s politi-

cal development, especially the student

movement. Yet the transformationof the

politicalsystemintheearly2000sbrought


Nurman Nowak, University of Göttingen14 January 2021

about its decline intomarginalizationand

hascausedapolarizationdefinedbyacon-

servative Islamic right and a democratic,

liberal/progressive left that defined Indo-

nesian politics for the largest part of the

pasttwodecades.

▪ Thedemographicdominanceofyouthren-

ders thempotentially a decisive electoral

factoras theymakeupabout50%of the

electorate.Millennials andGenZhowever

areperceivedasreluctant inparticipating

in formal politics, despite being (or per-

haps because they are) better informed

aboutpolitics than anyother group.New

alternative forms of activism have since

emerged,betheypoliticalorsocial,online

andoffline,whichcounterstheclaimofpo-

liticalapathy.Theirengagement,however,

2


is limitedto the localaffairsandstructur-

alshortcomingsofIndonesiancivilsociety

hamperingthedevelopmentofinstitution-

alizedandinternationalcooperation.

▪ TheeffectsoftheCOVID19-pandemichave

imposeddevastatingeffectsontheyoung

generation.Youthhavebeen identifiedas

the most vulnerable group to unemploy-

ment and as internet access is unequally

distributed along social and geographic

(urban/rural divide) lines, the study-from-

home measures (closure of schools and

universities), will consolidate social in-

equalities and have long term effects for

the development of youths in underprivi-

legedpositions.

▪ In thepast two years, the studentmove-

ment has appeared to revive itself and

showssignsofovercomingthepolarization

of thepastdecadesas thegovernment is

beingcriticizedoffallingbackintoauthori-

tarianpatternsofgovernancewhichinturn

has brought about a new common cause

andmoralcallingtodefendthedemocrat-

ic and liberal achievements of the refor-

masi-movement. However, a momentum

of Islamic tinged right-wing populism is

threateningtoco-optthisrevivedstudent

andyouthagitationaugmentedbythede-

structiveeffectsofcorona-policies.

Introduction

The future belongs to the youth!isaphrase

often heard by politicians and activists and

indeed,aglimpseintothehistoryofthepast

let’ssay100yearsshowsthatiftheyouthor-

ganizesitsrebelliousenergyandtakesastand

intheaffairsofthenationoreventheworld,

unthinkablechangeispossible.Socialupheav-

als, technological progress, economic, and

politicaltransitionsandtherealizationsofuto-

piaareoftenunleashedandwelcomedbythe

young generation. Yet theymay also be the

firstat the receivingendof theirdestructive

side-effectsandcrisesthataredecisiveforthe

futureofacommunity,society,nationoreven

theworld.

Indonesia lawUU no. 40 of 2009 defines

youthasIndonesiancitizensbetweentheage

of16and30years.Contemporarydiscourses

divide them into the millennial generation,

bornbetween1981and1997andGenZ,born

between1998and2010.Accordingtoofficial

numbers,thereare64,19millionyouthsincon-

temporaryIndonesiaasdefinedbythestate,

one quarter of the entire population (BPS

2019).ThefateofIndonesia’sfuturedevelop-

ment restson their shoulders, aspopulation

developmentisapproachingtheso-calledde-

mographic bonus,ademographicconditionin

whichtheproductivepopulationoutnumbers

thenon-productiveone.Ifmanagedproperly,

thisdemographicbonuscanbringaboutposi-

tiveeffectsforsustainedeconomicgrowthbut

itrequiresgreateffortsintermsofeducation

andemploymentopportunitiesbythestateto

createfavorableconditionsforthistohappen

(BPS2019).Inthemeantime,itisthecommer-

cialsectorthatisgoingtogreatlengthstowin

consumersfromthisgroupwithconsumerism

being rampant, especially amongurbanmid-

dleanduppermiddle-classyouth.Asthefirst

digitalnativesinhistory,youtharethedriving


3

forcebehindthedigitalizationofeverydaylife.

AccordingtothelatestyouthreportofAlvara

Institute 88,4% of millennials and 93,9% of

GenZareconnected to the internetwith the

latterspendingmorethansevenhoursonline

everydaygivingevidencetotheclaimthatIn-

donesianyouthareutterlytechsavvy(Aliand

Purwandi2020).

This article is, however, concerned with

the role of Indonesian youth in politics and

civilsociety.Theupcomingchapterswillshed

lightonthepoliticaldevelopmentof Indone-

siafromayouthandstudentperspective.As

we shall see, their contributions have been

decisiveinbringingaboutthecurrentstateof

politicalaffairsandduetotheirdemographic

mass,theyarepotentiallyapowerfulpolitical

force. Challenging the claim that millennials

andGenZareapathetictopolitics,newforms

andways of political and social engagement

willbepresentedandfinally,theeffectsofthe

coronapandemicinconjunctionwiththenew-

estpoliticaldevelopmentswillbeputforward.

The role and legacy of youth activism in Indonesia

The famous IndonesianwriterPramoedya

AnantaToeroncestated that the“historyof

theworld is thehistoryof its youth”and in-

deed, youth and students have played a de-

cisiveroleatimportanthistoricaljunctionsin

thecountry’spoliticaldevelopmentasaback-

dropfromthesocialandpoliticalchangesthey

experienced.

Itwasyouthwhowereattheforefrontof

the nationalist movement that emerged in

theearly20thcenturytoresistandeventually

overcomecolonialism.Inameetingin1926in

Batavia, today’s Jakarta, theyouthfulattend-

eespledged loyaltytothe IndonesianNation

based on the principles of one unified land,

one nation andone language. Every year on

28th October the so-called sumpah pemuda

(youth pledge) is commemoratedwith a na-

tionalholiday.17years later inAugust1945,

theJapanesegovernment,whosetroopsoccu-

pied the Indonesian archipelago at thetime,

surrenderedtotheallies.Withtheoccupying

forcedefeated and the former colonialmas-

ters still away, a nationalist euphoria broke

out. Fanatic radical nationalist youth-groups,

the Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth),

were at the forefront to demand immediate

independence. Impatient towait any longer,

agangofpemudakidnapedSukarno,thepre-

eminent leader of the nationalist cause, to

force him to finally proclaim independence

thenextmorning,the17thAugust1945.Inthe

subsequentIndonesian revolutionyouthfrom

all backgrounds formed thebackboneof the

armyoftherepublicofIndonesiathatfought

British andDutch forces.General Soedirman

himselfwasonly29yearsoldwhenvotedinas

commanderinchief.Thepemudaareseenas

theprimaryactorsinIndonesia’snationalrev-

olutionandheraldedasheroesinthegeneral

publictothisday.

Twenty years later, in 1965 another junc-

ture of Indonesian history was reached in

whichyouthfulprotagonistswouldplayakey

role, prompting the emergence of the most

important youth movement in Indonesia –

thestudentmovement.Inthemid-1960sthe

4


politicalclimateinIndonesiawasatatipping

point as President Sukarno and the commu-

nist party of Indonesia (PKI) grew ever clos-

er which worried the conservative sections

of themilitary and the Islamic-oriented part

of society. Tensions eventually escalated in

1965 and prompted anticommunist students

tofoundtheIndonesianStudentActionFront

(KesatuanAksiMahasiswaIndonesia–KAMI)

thatorganizedmassprotestsdemanding the

banofthePKI,apurgeofleftistsfromcabinet

and eventually the dismantling of the Sukar-

no-government.

Whatfollowedintheupcomingyearswas

the establishment of an authoritarian state

withthemilitaryasitsmainpillarandgener-

alSuhartoasPresidentatitshelm.Basiccivil

rightswere scrappedand anypolitical agita-

tion outside strict government-controlled in-

stitutions was suppressed, though with one

exception:Oncethecampuseswerecleansed

of leftist elements, the studentswhohelped

toset-uptheNewOrderregimewerealmost

exclusivelytheonlygroupinIndonesiansoci-

etybestowedwiththeprivilegetoopenlycrit-

icize the government. A newnotionwas de-

velopedthatwouldframestudentactivismto

thisday:thestudentsasamoral force. Inthis

understanding,politicalagitationbystudents

is “motivated bymoral principles and ethics

uncontaminated by the dirty and corrupting

world of politics” (Aspinal 2012). Students

maytakeactiontosavethenationattimesof

crisisandassuchstudentactivistspositioned

themselvesasstaunchbutloyalcriticsofthe

Suharto regime,demanding integrity,criticiz-

inguncheckeddestructivedevelopmentalism

withtheaimhowevertostabilizetheregime

theyhadhelpedtobringintopower.

In the 1970s, massive student protests

swept through the streets which provoked

the enactment of the campus-life normal-

ization acts (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus

- NKK) that suppressed political agitation on

university campuses. This policy did curtail

any studentactivism fora considerabletime

but it also pushed themore outspoken and

radicalstudents intotheundergroundwhere

they developed clandestine structures. In

themeantimeeconomicconsolidation led to

theexpansionoftheIndonesianmiddleclass

whoseyouthflockedtothecampuses.While

therewere about 255.000 students in 1970,

this number rose to 1,6million in 1990 and

thento3,6millionstudentsbythelate1990s

(Aspinall 2012) making university students a

considerable socialmass.With this increase,

theclandestinestructuresofstudentactivism

eventuallyexpandedinthelate1990s.When

theAsianfinancialcrisisof1997hitthecoun-

try, another decisive historical junction was

approached. Student activists mobilized the

studentmassesandsetthescenefortheen-

suingpopularuprising–thereformasi move-

ment-thatdemandedandeventuallyrealized

ademocraticIndonesia.

Youth activism and the emergence of new arenas of struggle

Civil rights among others the freedom of

press,speech,assemblyandassociationwere

restoredandthefirstfreeandfairparliamen-


5

tary elections with 48 participating parties

tookplacein1999.Thesubsequentfiveyears

saw tremendouschangewith the implemen-

tation of a decentralization of power from

thenational to thedistrict level.While 1998

–2001sawthreepresidentscomingandgoing

i.e. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wa-

hid(1999-2001)andMegawatiSukarnoputeri

(2001-2004),aphaseofrelativecalmensued

with the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yud-

hoyono(2004-2014),thefirstdirectlyelected

presidentinIndonesianhistory.

Itwasin1999-2004,theperiodwhenpow-

erstructureswerebeingreorganized,thatthe

studentmovementshowedsignsofdissolution

astherealizationtookholdthattheideaofa

unified student movement solely motivated

bymoralprinciplesisamyth.AsYatunSastra-

midjajapointedout,thesuccessofthestudent

movementtogarnersupport fromthewider

populationintopplingtheSuhartoregimewas

the result of its ideological diversity thereby

making itpossible to reachout toallmilieus

of Indonesian society (Sastramidjaja 2019a).

Once the unifying cause vanished, ideologi-

cal differences and personalized loyalties to

politicalelitescametothefore,whichpitted

studentsgroupsagainsteachother,causinga

processoffragmentationthathaslastedever

since. Themaindivisions canbe roughly de-

finedastwopolitico-culturalstreams,the Is-

lamicstreamandthestudentleft.

Many researchers of Indonesia’s transi-

tion to democracy agree that it was main-

ly the activist work of the student left that

eventuallybroughtaboutthefalloftheNew

Order as theywere the first to demand the

abolishmentofthemilitary’spreeminentpo-

sitionandtheresignationofPresidentSuhar-

tohencedepartingatleastpartiallyfromthe

moral force-notion. Their ideological outlook

is based on (neo-)marxist ideas of the New

Left, the Frankfurt school of philosophy and

otherleftistschoolsofthought.Aselsewhere

intheworld,thestudentleftisandwasalways

ideologicallydivided,buttheyshareagener-

alvisionfortheircountryi.e.anopensociety

with a just distribution of wealth, a cultural

andpoliticalsystemthatisinclusivetoallcit-

izens irrespectiveof religions,ethnicity, class

etc. anddemocratic structures in all spheres

of government and the economy.Numerous

leftist student organizations existed in the

yearsofthelongtransition(early1989–2004)

yetsplinteringandthedepartureofimportant

activistnetworksintoformalpoliticshaveled

toitsdeclineintomarginalization(ibid).

Yetthisisbynomeanstheendofprogres-

sive youth structures in Indonesia’s political

landscape. The democratization of the Indo-

nesian system led to amassive increase and

expansion of an independent civil society in

whichactorsareoperatingatallspheresfrom

thedistrictstothenationallevel.Whilesome

activistsbecamepoliticians,manyothersen-

teredor foundednewCivilSocietyOrganiza-

tions(CSO)inthefieldsofhumanrights,legal

aid,thefightforlandrightsoftheindigenous,

farmer’s, urbanpoor, theworker’s, theenvi-

ronmentalist movement, women and youth

empowerment etc. These structures are viv-

idandattractiveforstudentsandyouthwith

a progressive leaning and idealistmindset in

6


contemporaryIndonesia(ibid).

Theseorganizationsareoftenlooselycon-

nected to eachother in the formof person-

alizedactivistnetworks i.e.manyknoweach

other from campus or conferences, yet in-

stitutionalized cooperation is hampered by

structural weaknesses such as competition

for funding and affiliations to opposing pa-

tronage-networks.WhilemanyCSOsarepart

of international networks and their agendas

refertotheUN-SDGs,mostofthemfocuson

issuesoflocalsignificance(Aspinall2012).

The other side of the spectrum is domi-

natedbypolitical Islamwhichhasever since

beenan importantpillar in Indonesia’s polit-

ical and socio-cultural landscape,andgained

a renewed tractionwith the so-called Islam-

ic awakening i.e. the increaseof religiouspi-

ety among youth and the wider society. Its

emergence was sparked by the agitation of

studentsreturningfromthemiddleeastwho

wereinspiredbydakhwa-groups(Islamicmis-

sionarygroups)theyencounteredthere.They

preached in communities throughout the ar-

chipelago and found receptive audiences as

religionprovidesfororientationinthefaceof

fundamentalsocialchangessparkedbyrapid

development and rampant urbanization. Is-

lamic organizations are among themost ac-

tiveandsociallyinfluential.Todaytheycanbe

divided into a mainstream and conservative

camp,andbotharerepresentedbynumerous

student and youth organizations, off and on

campus.

The mainstream Islamic camp is among

others represented by the HMI (Himpunan

MahasiwaIndonesia–IslamicIndonesianstu-

dent association) that finds its roots in the

pre-NewOrderandhasa followingof about

500.000 students. HMImaintains links to all

Islamic parties in the current post-reformasi

erabutinsistsonbeingindependent.Itsalum-

niaretobefoundinpowerfulpositionsinthe

civilservice,parliamentandcivilsociety(Inter-

viewFajarIman).TogetherwithotherIslamic

organizationsitremainsthemainprotagonist

ofdakhwa-activities(Islamicmissionaryactiv-

ities)oncampus.

TheIslamicawakeningalsogaverisetocon-

servativeIslamicgroupsofwhichdakhwa tar-

biyahisthemostimportantprotagonist,culti-

vatingaformofstudyand interpretationsof

theholyIslamicscripturesinaliteralmanner,

thetheologicalfoundationofreligiousfunda-

mentalism.AdherentsoftheEgypt-basedbut

transitionally oriented Muslim brotherhood

infiltrated Indonesiancampuses in the1980s

and 1900s through the tarbiyah’s channels,

popularizing teachings of Islamist thinkers

likeSayydQubt.In1998,activistsfromthese

networks in unison with other conservative

oriented student groups founded KAMMI

(Kesatuan AksiMahasiswaMuslim Indonesia

–IndonesianMuslimaAction’sfront).KAMMI

maintainsstronglinkstoPKS(PartaiKeadilan

Sejahtera) a conservative Islamist party and

offshootoftheMuslimBrotherhood(Laskow-

ska2019).

In contrast to the student left the Islamic

movement has developed a strong ideolog-

ical foothold in Indonesia with representa-

tioninparliamentthroughPKSandlong-term


7

strategies of political agitation based on de-

cades-longideologicalsocializationsof itsse-

niorandjunioradherers.Islamicconservative

organizations are themost popular and suc-

cessfulorganizationsamongMuslimstudents

representedby amyriadof organizationson

and off campus (Sastramidjaja 2019a).Many

maintainaninternationaloutlookintheircalls

ofIslamicsolidaritye.g.bysupportingthePal-

estinian intifadaor theUighurs in China and

hold meetings with Islamic groups in other

countries.

The power of the conservative Islamic

movement ledbyyouthfulactivists isbest il-

lustratedbytheirsuccessfulconquestofhege-

monyinIndonesianIslaminthemid-2000s.At

theendofthe20thcentury,IslaminIndonesia

hadareputationofbeingexceptionallytoler-

antasaresultoftheinfluenceofliberalmind-

ed Islamic intellectualswho led the twopre-

eminentIslamicmassorganizationsNahdlatul

UlamaandMuhammadiyah.Theywereeven-

tuallysidelinedasanewgenerationofyoung

Islamicactivists,socializedandgroomedinthe

conservativetabliya-networks,weresuccess-

ful in installing conservativeUlamas (Islamic

scholars) in strategic positions. Soon fatwas

i.e. non-binding legal opinionswere enacted

statingthatpluralism,secularismand liberal-

ism are incompatible with Islamic teachings,

a heavy assault on the progressive develop-

ments since reformasi ushered in (van Bru-

inessen2012).

The effect of this “conservative turn”

(ibid) in Indonesian Islam led to increased

intolerance, persecution and in parts vio-

lent actions against religious and sexual mi-

norities. Discourses emerged that suggested

thatitisagainstIslamicteachingsforwomen

and non-Muslims to exert power overMus-

limmajority populations in high offices. This

conservative Islamic movement represents

acountermovement that intends todoaway

with the progressive achievements since the

fallofSuharto. It couldstriveand impose its

influence on Indonesian society also due to

the laissez-faire and inclusive approach of

theSBY-administration(2004-2014), thatwas

moreco-optingthanconfrontingconservative

forces. And like its progressive antipode this

illiberal countermovement finds a large part

ofitsmembershipamongstudentsandother

youthsinthewiderIndonesiansociety.

Youth and student activism in the Jokowi-era: A polarized society

Thispolarization isan importantdriverof

politicalagitationincontemporaryIndonesia.

When this countermovement is plotting an-

other assault onprogressive institutions, the

othersidewillmobilizeitsadhererstodefend

the achievements they have fought for and

vice-versa.

In2014thispolarizationwouldreachafirst

climaxinthecontextofthepresidentialelec-

tions. Islamist groups joined forceswithPra-

bowoSubianto,ex-soninlawofSuharto,for-

mer general of the Indonesian armed forces

deemed responsible for the violence against

the reformasi movement and now presiden-

tialcandidate.HiscontenderwasJokoWido-

8


do (or Jokowi),whomaintained an image as

a progressive newcomer, untainted by the

corruptionthatremainsnotoriousamongthe

politicalelite,theradicalantipodetotheNew

OrdergeneralPrabowo.In2012,hewonthe

Jakarta-elections,makinghimgovernorofIn-

donesia’s capital before the PDI-P party em-

bracedhimaspresidentialcandidatein2014.

The 2014 presidential elections were

deemeddecisiveforthefutureofIndonesia’s

politicaldevelopment,whichmobilizedmany

formerreformasi-activistsofthestudentleft.

Theywould unite behind Jokowi and form a

network called Seknas Jokowi. This network

succeededinmobilizingthousandsofyouthful

volunteersfromamyriadofprogressivesocial

movementsthatwouldboostJokowi’syouth-

ful, corruption-free image which turned out

decisive inpersuadingvotersofthemillenni-

algenerationinJokowi’sfavor.(Sastramidjaja

2019b)

TheJokowierathatlaststothisdaywould

turnouttobeatumultuousoneandconsol-

idatethepolarizationwhichescalated in late

2016whenthebiggestdemonstrationsinde-

cadeseruptedinJakarta.Hisformervice-gov-

ernor Basuki Tjahja Purnama (or Ahok), a

Chinese Indonesian and Christian, had since

taken over the governor-office once Jokowi

becamepresident.InSeptember,avideowith

doctoredsubtitlesbecameviral showinghim

allegedlyinsultingIslaminaspeech.On2Dec.

2016massprotestswith500.000participants

underthenotionbela islam(defendIslam)led

bythecontroversialulamaRizieqShihabwere

unleashed demanding Ahok’s prosecution

(GrassiandNowak2017).Manyofthedemon-

stratorsweremembersofthemillennialgen-

eration,seniorpupilsof Islamichighschools,

university students and independent youth

following the call to “defend their religion”.

ThisIslamist-tingedanti-Ahokmovementhad

asoursideeffectastheeventsposedachal-

lenge to Indonesia’s pluralist and inclusive

national culture. This then sparked counter

demonstrations with thousands of partici-

pants,mainlyfromtheurbanmiddle-andup-

perclassinfavorofAhokandindefenseofthe

pluralistandinclusivenarrativeofIndonesia’s

nation-building.Buttheiractivismwasinvain.

In the upcoming gubernatorial elections of

February2017AniesBaswedan,whohassince

been embraced by PKS and Prabowo’s party

Gerindra, won by harnessing religious senti-

mentswhile Ahokwas soon after sentenced

toatwo-yearjailterm.

Youth and formal politics in the Jokowi-era

TheIndonesiandemographicdevelopment

hasbestowedanotherstrategicpositiononIn-

donesianyouth–thedecisivenessoftheyouth

vote that representsalmost50%of theelec-

torateinpresidentialelections.

The 2014 elections are generally consid-

eredthefirstIndonesianelectionswithaspe-

cial onlineelection campaign catering to the

youthonsocialmediaandYouTube. In2019,

both camps spentmillions of dollars for on-

linecampaignsonmultiplesocialmediaplat-

formsandwouldgotogreatlengthstocreate

a youthful imageof their respectiveelection


9

candidates(Sastramidjaja2019b).

When president Jokowi entered the Stadi-

umtoopenthe2018AsianGames,herode in

onabigchopperbike,wearingaDenimjacket

andwhitesneakers-hiselectioncampaignout-

fit.Soonafter,hepresentedhisadministration’s

infrastructuredevelopmentachievementsinthe

samevein,bytouringPapuaonamotorbikewith

somemembersofhiscabinet.Instagram,Twit-

terandFacebookfeedswouldsoonbeflooded

with thesepicturesandvideos, impressing the

millennialsandGenZasthecommentssuggest.

The Prabowo-team on the other hand picked

SandiagaUnoastherunningmate,apolitician

inhis40swhomadehisfortuneasabusiness-

man in theUS andwould soonmodel his im-

age after prominent entrepreneurs like Elon

Musk–thenewrolemodelsofthemillennials

andGenZ.Influencerswithmillionsoffollowers

werehiredtospeakupinhisfavorcontributing

to the #gantipresiden-campaign (change pres-

ident-campaign). And both camps would urge

theirsupporterstobecybertrooperswhowould

comment,sharepostsandcreatememes.How-

ever,besidesthissymbolism,therewaslittlethat

correspondedwith the actual problems youth

arefacingi.e.education,affordablelivingaswell

as improving “youth facilities’’ in public places

(Irwanto2020)

Whilethe2014presidentialelectionswere

deemed decisive for the direction of Indo-

nesia’s future political development and the

young votewasidentifiedasthekeyforJoko-

wi’svictory,oneshouldnotehoweverthatless

than50%of themactuallycasted theirvote.

Andwhilethegeneralelectionparticipationin

2019reachedanewhighwith80%,theyouth

votewasagainrelativelylow.

This gives evidence to the claim ofmany

youth studies that millennials and GenZ are

apathetictoformalpoliticswhileatthesame

timebetter informedthananyothergenera-

tionalgroupabout thepoliticalaffairsof the

day (ChenandSyailendra2014,Tumenggung

and Nugroho 2005). Political news typical-

lypopsup inFacebook,Twitteror Instagram

feeds somewhere between cat videos and

selfies.Apathy,however,doesnotnecessari-

lymeandisinterest. In2019, vloggerVincent

Ricardo’sfactcheckingvideoabouttheclaims

madeintheelectiondebatesearnedhimmil-

lionsofviews (Insani2019).Hencemanyob-

servers suggest to interpret this apathy as a

reactiontothedirectionthedemocratictran-

sitionhastakenofwhichyouthareverywell

aware.

Whilenominallythetrackrecordofdemoc-

ratizationseemsimpressive,anumberofstud-

ieshavecometotheconclusionthatthenew

democratic institutions have been captured

byoldeconomicandpoliticalelites.Manyof

thenewpoliticalpartiese.g.representpoliti-

calvehiclesofformercroniesclosetotheSu-

harto-familywhoreestablishedthemselvesas

powerfulinfluentialfigures(RobisonandHad-

iz 2004). Politics is considered anelite affair,

wheretheinterestsofthecommongoodtake

abackseat.Arelatedissueisthenotorietyof

corruption scandals. Just recently a cabinet

memberwas arrested for his involvement in

a graft case related to COVID19 relief goods

(Fachrinasyah2020).Corruption,collusionand

10


nepotismare as rampant in the new system

astheywereintheoldandagainstthisback-

groundtheyounggeneration’sapathytofor-

malpoliticsiscomprehensible.

Asoneresponsetothis,anumberofjour-

nalistsandformeractivistsfoundedthePartai

SolidaritasIndonesia(PSI)in2013,aself-pro-

claimedmillennialparty“nolongerhostageto

oldpolitical interests,bad track records,his-

toricallegaciesandbadimagesfromprevious

parties”.Toobtainandholdoffice,onecannot

beolderthan45yearsoldand50percentof

partyofficialsneedtobefemale.Theiragen-

da comes in a progressive anti-intolerance,

anti-corruption andpro-pluralist rhetoric yet

themembershipofindividualsknowntohave

beeninvolvedincorruptioncasesandtransac-

tionalpoliticsandtheunconditionalsupportof

controversial law-enactments have tarnished

thisimageconsiderably(Sastramidjaja2019b).

Student organizations at campuses that

are linked to youthwings of political parties

havesincetriedtomarketthemselvesinmore

un-political non-partisan ways as a study

about students’ organizations at Universitas

Indonesia shows. The Gerindra-linked (Par-

bowoparty)TIDARe.g.promotesa“fivelove

philosophy”basedon“self-love,mutuallove,

love for learningand love for thegoodman-

neredandloveforIndonesia’’whilethePDI-P

(Jokowi-party)-linkedGMNIhasa“non-parti-

san, non-conformist appeal to studentswho

are secular-minded, into indie-rock and con-

cernedabouttheindigenousstateofaffairsof

therepublicatthegrassrootslevel”(Chenand

Syailandra2014).

Apathytopoliticsisalsoapparentintheex-

tra-parliamentarysphere,perhapsbestillustrat-

edbythemarginalizationofthestudentmove-

ment. Andwhile there is indeed a strong par-

ticipationof youth inother socialmovements,

betheyconservative,progressiveorotherwise,

this is not representative of Indonesian youth

in general. Additionally, these movements are

notyouthmovementsintheliteralsensei.e.de-

mandingrightsandairinggrievancesforandof

theyounggenerationsuchasFridays for Future

intheWest,butrepresentparticularisticorsec-

tionalinterestsinwhichyouthagitatealongside

activistsfromothergenerations.

Asfarasthemarginalizationofthestudent

movementisconcerned,therearealsostruc-

turalfactorsthathavetobetakenintoconsid-

erationthathaunttheentiresociallandscape.

Arenewedtrendofprivatizationinthepolicies

ofhighereducationexcludesyouthofunder-

privilegedbackgroundsfromuniversitieswho

cannotaffordthefeeswhichhamperpolitical

agitation.Studentscomplainoftightersched-

ulesandhigherworkloads,theaccompanying

features of such policies leaving little time

and space for social engagement. Likewise,

campusauthoritieshavebecomeincreasingly

intolerant with student activism on campus

(Sastramidjaja2019a).

Beyond formal politics – New forms and ways of participation

Youthapathytopoliticshoweverdoesnot

meanthatthereisageneralrejectionofsocial

engagement.Whenever another catastrophe


11

hitsthecountry,studentsandyouthorganize

donationsandfundstosupportreliefefforts.

Thereisalsoastrongdemandforvolunteering

activitiese.g.asteachersinNGO-runschools

for underprivileged children, often based in

so-called urban kampungs, the dwellings of

the urban poor or at places further away in

neglected districts and townswhere the so-

cial infrastructure of government is absent.

Thereliefeffortstocounterthesocialeffects

of the corona crisis is another case in point.

Forseveralmonthsyouthandstudentswere

seen to give out food, hand sanitizers and

masks.Theyassistedinorganizingandsetting

upmake-shifthandwashing sinks and creat-

ed online fund-raising campaigns to finance

their efforts. These forms of social engage-

menthoweverareoftenreferredtoas‘charity

activism’andconsideredbeyondthepolitical

sphere(Sastramidhaja2019b).

Theclaimthatyouthareapoliticalbecomes

evenmorefragileonceonelooksbehindthe

distinctions of the formal and informal. In

fact,lessthan7%ofyouthareactuallyofficial

membersofanorganizationofanysort(Dewi,

2020). Dr.Muhammad Faisal, founder of the

YouthLabIndonesiaandhisteamofcommit-

tedresearchershaveextensivelystudiedIndo-

nesianyouthinanethnographicapproach.

His narrative of contemporary youth en-

gagementstressestheconjunctionofpolitical

activism with independent alternative youth

culture. Beginning in Bandung in the early

2000s, a movement took hold that blended

activismwithindierockmusic,popcultureand

certainfashionstylesthatwassoonpickedup

byyouthinotherIndonesiancities.Anexam-

pleofthiskindofyouthactivismis thepunk

rockbandSuperman ís deadfromBaliandits

huge fan community. In 2015, the band de-

clareditssolidaritywithcoastalcommunities

whowouldlosetheirlivelihoodcausedbyrec-

lamation projects on the Bali coast for new

types of luxurious hotels and resorts. They

wereinvolvedintheattemptstoformasocial

movementunderthenotiontolak reklamasi!

(stop reclamations!) forwhich thebandpro-

videdthesoundtrackofresistanceaswellas

themobilizationof thousandsof youth from

Baliandbeyond.Suchindiepop-cultureinter-

twinedwith (sporadic) activism is ubiquitous

in Indonesian cities and happens in informal

ways, often around musicians and bands in

the underground. The networks and friend-

ship-ties thatdevelop in thesecontexts then

roam the streets if a political issue catches

theirattentionorinamorehands-onactivity,

supporte.g.thecreationofanurbangarden-

ingprojectintheneighborhoodorthefound-

ing of coffee shops that sell the local coffee

(Interview,November2020).

Online activism is another form in which

themillennialandGenZgenerationaredomi-

nant.Althoughfrequentlyreferredtoas‘click-

tivism’withoutanyrealimpactinreality,this

formisoftenconsideredpseudo-activism,yet

thislabelismisleading,astheeffortsbymany

youthe.g.insettingupfact-findinginitiatives

thatdebunkandexposefake-newsisamean-

ingful and important contribution to online

literacy.

Theseexamplesshowthatmuchofthepo-

12


liticalandsocialagitationbytheyounggener-

ationgoesunnoticedasithappensininformal

waysoftenlinkedwithotherspheres.

Aselsewhere in theworld,politicalyouth

activism is dominated by members of the

middleclass.Andwhilestudentshaveindeed

become a considerablemass in themillions,

they make up only about 10 percent of the

youthpopulation(BPS2019).Thispointstoa

problemwiththegeneralnotionof‘youth’as

that termbrushesaside thecomplexdiversi-

tythis(quasi-)groupentails.Youtharedivided

byplace(urbanandrural),gender,socialclass,

ethnicity and religion which influences not

only ideological orientation and identity but

alsoinfacttheircapabilitiesofparticipation.

IntheurbanworldofJakarta,socialinequal-

itymanifestsitselfinsocialsegregation.While

theyouthofthemiddleclassspendmuchof

their time in the many shopping malls, the

younggenerationoftheurbanpoorloitersin

theurbankampungsandthestreetsofthecity

insearchofemploymentintheinformalsec-

tor.Themembersofthisyouthgroupwhose

numbersarenotexactlyknownbutreachthe

millions in e.g. greater Jakarta, are a target

forrecruitmentofsocalledpremanorganiza-

tionslikeForumBetawiRempug(FBR–Betawi

BrotherhoodForum)orOrmas like theFront

PembelaIslam(FPI–IslamicDefenderFront).

In the absence of state power, these groups

controlpartsof the informalworld i.e. infor-

mal streetmarkets andbus terminalswhere

they charge protection money from street

vendors and control parking lots. The FPI is

notoriousforitsassaultson“immoral”estab-

lishments like alcohol parlors andbars. Both

organizationshavebeen“hired”inthepastas

streetmusclebyinvestorsorpoliticiansinthe

contextof conflictsover thecontrolanduse

of urban land, and during elections they of-

tenserveasvotingbanksinwhichthehighest

bidder canbuy thousandsofballotsandcan

provideprotestersforstreetdemonstrations.

TheFPIe.g.,playedavitalroleintheorgani-

zationof theanti-Ahokprotestsof2016.Yet

these organizations are also known for their

involvement in charity and community relief

efforts,andmayprotecturbankampungshit

bydisasters from lootingorare soughtafter

asmanpowerinattemptstorebuilddestroyed

urbankampungsafterevictions.Formanyim-

poverished youths, these organizations offer

employmentandawelcomedistractionfrom

thedailystrugglestheyfaceandtheirengage-

ment in relief effortsmay also receive some

appreciation and respect (Ian Wilson 2019).

More importantly though, Habib Rizieq, the

founderandleaderoftheFPIhasrisentobe-

comeapoliticalactor,aligninghimselftothe

anti-Jokowi camp with the result that most

of the urban-based preman and community

organizationsandnetworks linked to theFPI

now represent an oppositional force. They

are howevermore thanmere objects in the

political game of their patrons. In personal

conversations,membersofsuchorganizations

put forward comprehensive and legitimate

reasonsfortheirinvolvement,statingthatthe

movementisgivingthemachancetoairtheir

grievancesagainstthegovernment. Youthful

membersthenbecomeactorsinthepolitical

arenaandthecivilspherethemselves,not in

allinstancesunconsciouslyandattimesdeci-


13

siveinthepowerstrugglesthatprevail1.

Youth policies, the government and the corona crisis

Ithasbecomeclearthusfarthatinthepro-

cess of the consolidation of elite politics, is-

suesconcerningthecommongoodhavetaken

abackseatandneoliberalagendasthatfavor

theinterestsofbigbusinessremainthenorm.

Thisalsobecomesevidentintheimplementa-

tionofthegovernment’syouthdevelopment

programs although official state policies and

laws stress the importance of youth for the

futuredevelopmentoftheIndonesiannation.

Thepoliciesofthelasttwodecadesstress

youthentrepreneurshipandthepromotionof

micro,smallandmediumenterprises(UMKM

–Usahamikro,kecildanmenengah)asastra-

tegicfieldtoimprovethewelfareofyouthin

the face of stagnating industrialization that

wouldallowadifferentapproach.Onthe lo-

callevelthemunicipalinstitutionsconcerned

withUMKM-coordination(DinasUMKM)offer

amyriadofeducationalprogramsandfunding

schemes to realize this policy. This policy is

likewiseprettymuch in linewith youthaspi-

rationsasmanystudieshaverevealedthatbe-

coming anentrepreneur is themostpopular

desired occupation of millennials and mem-

bersofGenZ(Faisal2019).

Thepressing issuesamongyouth,howev-

er, are education, (reproductive) health, em-

ployment, food security and the spread of

1 Field Research, Jan. 2020 – Dec. 2020

extremistideology.AsummarybyTheSMERU

ResearchInstitute (Dewi 2020) regarding the

current state of youth (2018/2019) revealed

amongotherthingsthatthequalityofeduca-

tionisinadirestateininternationalcompar-

isonwith Indonesia reaching 72nd place out

of 78 participating countries in the 2018 PI-

SA-study.Intermsofunemployment,thesta-

tisticsshowthatthreeoutoffourunemployed

citizensareyouthdespitemostof themhav-

ingat leastahighschooldegree.Stunting,a

healthconditionthathamperstheearlydevel-

opmentofchildrenduetoimpropernutrition

anddiet remains rampant,which is not only

aproblemoffoodsecuritybutcontributesto

theimpairmentofeducation,anissueparticu-

larlycommonwithyouthfulmothers.

AccordingtoaUNESCO-coordinatedstudy

from2013(Ramadhan2013)thereisnocoor-

dinatedpolicy implementationastherewere

eight different programs coordinated by dif-

ferentministriesdefiningdifferent intentions

and even following different definitions of

youth.ThisconditionaccordingtoFajarIman

Hasanie, a youth researcher fromMerial In-

stitute has not considerably improved since

then (Interview, November 2020) despite a

presidential decree in 2017 that defines this

aim.TheUNESCO-reportfurtherlamentsthat

youth, despite their inherent diversity, are

regarded as a homogenous category which

ignoresproblems thatarespecific forpartic-

ular sub-groups such as teenagemothers or

youthwithspecialneeds.Manyyouthpolicies

hencedonotaddresstheproblemsthatpre-

vailsufficiently.Anotherreasonforthisisthe

insufficientinclusionofyouthorganizationsin

14


thedraftingof lawsandpolicydevelopment.

Thefewyouthleaderswhowereconsultedre-

portedthattheirvoicesinthemeetingswere

notheardorignored,alegacyofacultureof

paternalismoftheneworderera,inwhichso-

cietywasseenasabigfamilyinwhichchildren

oryoutharetoobeytheelderlyi.e.thesenior

civilservants,andarenottodemandconces-

sions nor air grievances. The report further

acknowledgestheworkandsuccessfulimpact

of NGOs and youth organizations, especially

thosewhoconsiderthespecificconditionsof

thelocalorsectoralenvironment,butcriticiz-

es thatmany of them are not eligible to re-

ceivefundingfromyouthprogrambudgetsas

theseorganizationsoftendonotqualifytobe

recognizedasyouthorganizationsasdefined

byanoutdatedregistrationprocessprovision.

Theseproblemshoweverrepresentedthe

statusquobeforethecoronapandemichitthe

country. In thetimeofwriting,earlyDecem-

ber2020,therehavebeenmorethan586.000

positive corona cases and 18.000 have per-

ished - and counting. While youth are less

pronetoseverecasesofthediseasetheyare

affectedbythepandemicinotherways.

Asabackdropfromtheviruscontainment

measures,theIndonesianeconomyhassince

tumbled into a recession causing the loss of

2,76 Million jobs. In total, 9.77 million peo-

plewereunemployed inAugust 2020, upby

37.61percent fromAugust 2019as reported

inearlyNovember(Akhlas2020a).Youthhave

been hit considerably harder than any oth-

ergenerationalgroup.According tostatistics

bytheministryofmanpower,67,7%ofyouth

agedbetween15and19,27,7%agedbetween

20 and24 years andfinally 11,65%agedbe-

tween 24 and 29 have lost their jobs (Dewi

2020).Thesefiguresonlyshowthesituationin

theformalsector.Theinformalsector,where

most of theurbanpoor youthsfindemploy-

menthasbeenhitevenharder.

There will likewise be long term effects

in youth development in the years to come.

In June 2020 the government decided a

COVID19-stimulusbudgetof695,2 trillion In-

donesianRupiah(Rp.)(ca.49,3billionUS-Dol-

lars)tosupporttheeconomyandfundsocial

reliefprogramsandmedicaltreatments(Akh-

las 2020b). The reshuffling of the state bud-

get to finance this endeavor required costs

inotherministry’sbudgetswhichwillhavea

lastingeffectontheimplementationofpolicy

programs,includingthosethatcatertoyouth.

In thecapitalandsomeareas throughout

Indonesia,schoolsanduniversitieshavebeen

shut for weeks if not months with students

urgedtostudyfromhome.Structuraldispari-

tieswillwidenthegapbetweentheprivileged

andtheunderprivilegedevenfurtherasinter-

netaccessisunevenlydistributedwhilestudy

conditionsathomedifferconsiderably,posing

achallengeforpoorerandruralyouthtokeep

up.

Approaching a new juncture

The Jokowi government, despite being

busy in dealing with the corona situation,

has since continued to implement its invest-

ment-friendlyagendainrecentmonthsinthe


15

guise of the so-called omnibus-bill, a reform

designedtoattract foreign investment.How-

ever,ithasbeencriticizedbecauseitcutsback

worker’srightsandenvironmentalprotection

measures.

InOctober 2020, once the second partial

shutdown in Jakarta ended, a seriesofmass

demonstrationsusheredintoprotesttheup-

coming Omnibus-bill enactment. The mobi-

lized crowd represented theentire spectrum

of Indonesia’s extra-parliamentary political

landscape.Tradeunions,membersof theur-

ban social movement and environmentalist

groupsmarchedalongsideIslamicgroupsofall

leanings,revivingthestudentmovementthat

was prominently represented not the least

by6000membersoftheBEMSI(All Indone-

sianExecutiveStudentBody–BadanEkseku-

tifMahasiswaSeluruh Indonesia), theofficial

non-partisan, secular and politically neutral

studentaffairs institutionpresentatall Indo-

nesiancampuseswhoroamedthestreetswith

fellowstudentsfromtheleftistaswellasthe

Islamiccamp(InterviewwithChairmanofBEM

SI,December2020,FieldResearchNotes).

Therevivalofaunifiedstudentmovement

is a trend that became obvious in Novem-

ber 2019whenafirstwaveofmass student

demonstrations swept through the country

protesting a number of highly controver-

sial laws thathadbeenenacted:A reformed

criminalcodethatmadecriticismofstatein-

stitutions and the president punishable, and

curbed thepowerof the corruptioneradica-

tion commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Ko-

rupsi-KPK),anewOrmas-law(massorganiza-

tionlaw)thatgivesthegovernmentthepower

todissolveorganizationsdeemedthreatening

tonationalunityandthesocalledElectronic

Information and Transaction law (EIT) which

allows prosecution of criticism aired online.

These lawswereofficially justified todefend

democraticinstitutions,curbhatespeechand

the spread of fake-news online and offline,

butcriticshavesinceinterpretedtheseenact-

ments as a revival of state authoritarianism

(AmnestyInternational2019).Anumberofac-

tivistswhoused socialmedia tomobilize for

the demonstrations and criticism have been

prosecuted under the stipulations of these

new laws (Warburton 2019, Aspinall 2020).

Additionally, Jokowi’s cabinet became reflec-

tiveoframpantelitepoliticswhentheconser-

vativeUlamaMa’arufAminwhoplayedanin-

famousroleinthestirringofanti-Ahoksenti-

mentsbecamevicepresident,andevenmore

sowhenPrabowoSubiantowasco-optedand

giventhedefenseministerpostafterthelast

elections.Thisnotonlyestrangedprogressive

supportersbutdeprivedtheconservativeop-

positionofitsleadingfigure.

The widespread anti-authoritarian senti-

ment brought about a new common cause

andrestoredthenotionofstudentandyouth

activismasamoral callingwhichhasat least

partly overcome the polarization of the past

decade.Thishasthepotentialtobringabout

a new social movement demanding social

justice,freedomandintegrity.Moreover,the

youthcouldturnouttobeadecisiveactoras

theyrepresentahugesocialmassaugmented

bytheeconomicimpactofthecoronacrises.

16


It could be a window of opportunity for

progressiveyouthandstudentstouniteonce

againtodefendthedemocraticachievements

former generations have fought for. Yet a

momentumof Islamictinged right-wingpop-

ulism is threatening to co-opt this revived

student and youth agitation augmented by

thedestructiveeffectsofthecorona-policies.

Indeed, it seems thatanother juncture in In-

donesianhistoryisbeingapproachedinwhich

theyouthandthestudentmovementcanplay

adecisiverolebyfollowingitsmoralcalling–

whatdirectionwillittake?


17

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List of Abbreviations

BEM – SI Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa – Seluruh Indonesia Student Executive Body – All Indonesia

BPS Badan Pusat Statistik The Central Bureau of Statistics

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat People’s Representatives Council

FBR Forum Betawi Rempug Betawi Brotherhood Forum

FPI Front Pembela Islam Islamic Defenders Front

Golkar Partai Golongan Karya Party of Functional Groups

GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Student Movement

HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia Islamic Indonesian Student Association

ITE Electronic Information and Transaction Law


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KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia Indonesian Student Action Front

KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia Indonesian Muslim Student Action Front

KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Corruption Eradication Commission

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus Campus Live Normalisation

PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan Democratic Party of Indonesia – Struggle

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia Communist Party of Indonesia

PSI Partai Solidaritas Indonesia Party of Solidarity of Indonesia

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Prosperous Justice Party

UMKM Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

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Youth, Politics and Social Youth, Politics and Social