XINJIANG The Uygurs’ Doomed Quest for Autonomy/Independence The Uygurs’ Doomed Quest for Autonomy/Independence Royal Dutch/Shell 26 March 2003 Willem

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Slide 2 XINJIANG The Uygurs Doomed Quest for Autonomy/Independence The Uygurs Doomed Quest for Autonomy/Independence Royal Dutch/Shell 26 March 2003 Willem van Kemenade Willem van Kemenade Slide 3 Willem E.C. van Kemenade Analyst/Consultant, China/East Asia, International Crisis Group, Brussels Adjunct Professor, EU China Junior Managers Training Programme, Beijing; Maastricht School of Management, Outreach Programmes in China; China-Europe International Business School, Shanghai. Author China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc., The Dynamics of a New Empire, New York 1997, 1998, 1999; Syllabus International Political Economy China & East Asia, Shanghai 2000. Special Contributor The Washington Quarterly 2 website: e-mail: Slide 4 3 W e must turn the small handful of national splittist elements into rats running across the street where everybody cries `kill them. Abulahat Abdurixit, Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Government Abulahat Abdurixit, Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Government Slide 5 4 Selected Figures 1.66 Million Sqkm., Population: 18.3 m Uygur: 47.5 %; Han-Chinese: 39 %; Kazakh: 7.3 %; small numbers of Mongols, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Hui. Life-expectancy for Uygurs: 63, for Han 70 Agriculture: Cotton, sugar beets, fruits raisins. Industry: Textiles, food-processing, leather, paper, sugar, carpets, oil GDP: Yn. 148.54 billion ($ 17.97 billion) = 1.57 % of National GDP of Yn. 9.434 trillion ($ 1.142 trillion) Treasure trove of minerals: 2.12 billion tonnes of oil and 280 billion cubic metres of natural gas, 27.1 per cent and 22.1 per cent respectively of national reserves. Top cotton producer, growing one third of the national crop. Slide 6 5 Nationalities, Languages and Dialects of China Nationalities, Languages and Dialects of China Slide 7 6 How Stable is Xinjiang ? Xinjiangs leaders warn regularly that China will not make the same mistakes as the Soviet-Union, which introduced ill- conceived political reforms that eroded government-authority and encouraged ethnic and religious groups to agitate for their own communal, nationalistic and separatist goals. Xinjiangs links with the Chinese Empire, although not continuous, are much longer and stronger than those of Russia with the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Considering the deep troubles in former Soviet Central Asia, the economic decline, the civil war in Tajikistan, the problems with Islamic radicalism, a large number of Uygurs claims to be very happy to be part of China. The simple Han approach is: "There's a lot of us, Han, but only a few of them, Uygurs. "They have got to accept our rule. Slide 8 7 Background to Xinjiangs Terrorist Threat Sino-Pakistani-American Anti-Soviet Axis 1980~1989: Background to Xinjiangs Terrorist Threat Sino-Pakistani-American Anti-Soviet Axis 1980~1989: China joined the US-led Holy War against the Soviet-occupation of Afghanistan in 1980 and later paid a price for this. Central tenet of US-China coalition was construction of two electronic intelligence stations in Xinjiang, monitoring Soviet missile tests and communications after Khomeinys men seized the CIA-installations in Iran. The US and China jointly trained Uygur recruits to fight the Soviets. No indications have come to light that the Chinese considered the possible blowback on China of this risky policy. Mainly Chinese arms were brought in by Pakistans ISI to supply Afghan, Arab and other Muslim volunteers to fight the Soviets. The Uygurs later returned to Xinjiang where their discontent with Chinese rule now culminated in an organized secessionist, occasionally terrorist movement. China sent 300 instructors to training-camps in Pakistan and later set up camps in Xinjiang as well, training 55.000 in total without specifying their ethnicities. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London 2000, Chapter 4. Slide 9 8 Beijing Response to September 11 Political Re-education Campaign for 8.000 imams: tighten controls on religious activities and sever ties between mosques and alleged separatist activities. Imams are required to attend seminars, participate in ideological discussions and individual consultations with a special focus on "anti-splittism. "Each session is a 20-day programme aimed at re-establishing correct ideological understanding and improving the political qualities of the religious leaders," Xinhua quoted officials as saying. "These lessons are essential to the long-term stability of Xinjiang as they will guide our students away from ideological confusion and mistakes," Xinhua said. Slide 10 9 US China Cooperation on Terrorism A State Council Report on January 21, 2002, one month before president George W. Bush visit to Beijing, blamed "East Turkestan" forces for more than 200 incidents between 1990 and 2001, resulting in 162 dead. It said bin Laden's al-Qaeda had provided training, financial and material aid to them. Beijings charges referred to small scale bombings of buses, markets, government institutions, riots etc., but not a single larger scale, highly organized terrorist attack. In July, China Central TV showed a programme, claiming that hundreds of Uygurs had been trained in Osama bin Ladens camps in Afghanistan. Evidence were statements by defectors. In October 2002, Beijing claimed that more than a dozen Uygurs were captured in Afghanistan and detained in the US Terrorist Detention Center in Guantanamo, Cuba. Slide 11 10 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement After September 11, China warned the Bush Administration that ETIM had ties to Al Qaeda. The US, in response, in August 2002 put ETIM on the global terrorist list. No real evidence, only vague generalisations were given. The listing was widely seen as a sop to soften Chinese opposition to the impending US-led war on Iraq. Many US experts and even some Chinese question the extent of ETIMs terrorist activities and its links to global terrorism. US information is coming from a handful of Uygurs, captured in Afghanistan and now detained in Guantanamo, Cuba. The Chinese have presented their campaign against Uygur separatists as a flank in Americas global war on terrorism and have persuaded the Americans to drop their long-standing protest against Chinese human rights violations in Xinjiang. Slide 12 11 US ostracism of ETIM No Licence to China In December 2002, US Assistant-Secretary of State for Human Rights Lorne Craner visited China and told Beijing that the US rejected the notion that Uygurs are terrorists. He passed on a message from president George Bush that no nation can use the war on terror as an excuse to repress its minorities. Prior to his visit which included Xinjiang, Craner met with the Uygur American Association and promised to press China to release political prisoners such as Rebiya Kadir. Craners trip has given the Uygurs hope that Washington hasnt abandoned them and dispelled the suspicous feeling some felt after the US put ETIM on the global terrorist list in September. Within a week after Craners visit, Party-Secretary Wang Lequan vowed to intensify the crackdown on the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Slide 13 12 Evaluation of the Uygurs Terrorist Threat Experts reject the Chinese assertion that there is a terrorist, or even a cohesive separatist movement. Dru Gladney, a specialist in Chinese Muslim minorities at the University of Hawaii says: This is mostly social and civil unrest by disorganized, disgruntled, fairly impulsive young men, not a widespread movement. Significantly, Gladney notes that despite many incidents of ethnic and civil unrest in the region, not one significant terrorist attack against any strategic infrastructure target (oil refinery, pipeline, railroad, dam or bridge) has been documented, nor have any local or international incidents been positively identified with any international Uygur or Islamic organisation. A big explosion of a military truck in Urumqi in 2000 with 67 dead, was initially suspected to be a terrorist attack, but it appeared to be a case of gross mismanagement by the PLA. Slide 14 13 Xinjiangs Economy Xinjiang has two parallel economies: The regular, regional economy. The Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps Economy, (since 1998 Corp) Economy, a PLA-run state within the state. The XUAR- economy is deeply polarized. Uneven benefits of development aggravate antagonism between native Uygurs and Han-settlers and threaten the development of the promising energy sector. Few Uygurs are part of the senior levels of the modern sectors of the economy: oil, gas, mineral wealth. One reason is lack of access to first rate education. Another may be deliberate exclusion based on security considerations and cultural factors. The government actively promotes internal and cross-border trade and economic development, while at the same time keeping tight political controls, both with the active cooperation of neigboring governments. Slide 15 14 Xinjiangs Foreign Trade and Investment TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE 2001: $ 1.771 bn. A decrease of 22.64 % Exports 668 m.,, 44.48 % Imports 1.102 bn. Increase of 4.1 % Major Trading partners: Kazakhstan (31 %), Hong Kong (9.69%), US (8.83 %), Russia Major Exports: Tomato Ketchup, mechanical/electronic products, footwear, cotton, yarn, garments, chemicals, mine products, furniture; Major Imports: Scrap steel and iron, copper, barley, polyethylene FOREIGN INVESTMENT: Aggregate total $ 407 m. 2001: Hong Kong $ 69.5 m.; Taiwan $ 23.97 m.; Japan $ 5.17 m. The Army Corps has its own considerable foreign trade figures, amounting $ 654 m. in 2001. Slide 16 15 Economic Development and Ethnic Issues Due to their exclusion from the Han-economy, the Minorities are losing interest in learning Chinese but study Urdu, Farsi and Turkic languages instead. They trade mainly with Central and South Asia strengthening their common identity with the Musl