tIIRilMESOTffi|In lRtil5ilTlllzslWritings of Leon Trotshy is a collection,in twelve volumes, of pamphlets, articles,letters, and interviewswritten duringTrotsky'sthird and final exile (1929-40).Theyinclude manyarticlestranslatedintoEnglishfor the first time. They do notinclude the books and pamphlets fromthis period that are permanently in print,nor most of the unpublishedmaterialinthe Trotsky Archives at HarvardUni-versityLibrary. Five of the volumes coverTrotsky'sresidenceinTurkey (1929,1930, 1930-31,1932,1932-33); two inFrance (1933-34, 1934-35); onein Nor-way ( 1935-36);and four in Mexico ( 193G37, 1937-38,1938-39, 1939-40).utRmnES 0rlE0nffiOI5HUIszs]PATHFINDENPRESS,INC.NEW YORKThisvolumeig dedicated tothememoryof JAMESP. CANNON (1890-1974)Copyright @ 1975by PathfinderPress,Inc.Libraryof CongressCatalogCardNumber73-88120ISBN0-87348'459-2 (paper edition)ISBN0-8734&458'4 (cloth edition)Manufactured in the UnitedStatesof AmericaEdited by GeorgeBreitmanand SarahLovellFirst Edition,1975PATHFINDER PRESS,INC.410 WestStreetNew York,N.Y. 10014CONTENTSIntroductiontn Writingsof Leon Trotsky (1929-40)PrefaceChronologyC'est la Marchedes Evenements! (February 25, 1g2g)Deportationfrom theSovietUnion (February 25, 1g2g)How Could This Happen? (February 25, 1929)Stalin'sVictory (Februory 25,1929)WhereIs the Soviet RepublicGoing?(February 25, 1929)Is ParliamentaryDemocracy Likely to ReplacetheSoviets? (February 25,1929)On the SecretBallot (Februory 27, 1929)What Is theImmediateAim of Exiling Tlotsky?(Morch 4, 1929)Proteetsto the GPU (March 5 and 8, 1929)Interviewby theDoily Erpress (Morch 16,1929)Within the Right-CentrietBloc (Morch 20,1929)OpenLetterto the TVorkersof the USSR(Morch 29, 1929)Groupingsin the CommunistOpposition (March 31, Ig2g)Tasksof the Opposition (March 1929)TVhatWe Intend to PublighFlret (Morch 1929)Communietsandthe BourgeoisPreaa (Morch 1929)Stater.rentto the Preee (April 15, 1929)A Lessonin DemocracyI Did Not Receive(April 22, 1929)Intcrviewby the Osako Moinichi (April 24, 1929)SixYears of the Brandleritea(April 25,1929)Prefacetn La Revolutbn Defiguree (Moy 1, lg2g)9r3t72l28364045525860636567748086909398100108111LL7TheBasic,Fundamental Question (Moy 10, 1929)Taekgof the American Opposition (May 1929)TheCapitulators of theThird Wave (Moy 22,1929)Radekand the Opposition (Moy 26, 1929)r?f,,130135139ThePolitical Situation in ChinaandtheTaeks ofthe Bolshevik-Leninist Oppoeition (June 1929)143TheBolshevikOppositionistsNeedHelp (June 1, 1929)150Why I Want to Come to London (June 11, 1929)151OnceMoreon BrandlerandThalheimer (June 12, 1929) 155Tenacity,Tenacity,Tenacity! (Junc 14, 1929)161What Willthe First of AugustBring? (June 26, 1929)165Combatting LiesandSlanders (June 1929)I74hologue,MisPeripeciasen Espano (June 1929)175FromthePublisher (July 1929)I77NecessaryClarificationsConcerningtheFirstofAugust (July 1929)Diplomacyor Revolutionary Politica? (JuIy 1, 1929)A Man Overboard (July 3, 1929)How RevolutionariesAre Formed (July 11, 1929)A Letter to the Doily Herold (July 15, 1929)TheSino-SovietConflict:A PressStatcment(July 22, 1929)A Wretched Document (July 27,1929)TheSino-SovietConflictandthe Opposition(August 4, 1929)An Open Ictterto the EditorialBoardof La Verite(August 6, 1929)A Declarationof La Verite (August 1929)A Letterto the EditorialBoard of Lo Lutte deClasses (Angust 11, 1929)Tothe Marx andLenin Circle (August 22, 1929)Questions for the Leninbund (AWust 24, 1929)From a Lnttnr to an Oppositionistin the USSR(August 24, 1929)On the Psychology of Capitulation (September 1929)ComradeSosnovsky's lrtters (September 1929)FromthePublisher (September 1929)G.I. Myasnikov's Escapeand HisOrdeal(Septernber 1929)mRadekand the Bourgeois hess (Sepfember 1929)26LDefense of the SovietRepublicandtheOpposition(September 7, 1929)262178180188190195196198213222226236246247250254?57259WhereIs theI-eninbund Going? (September 19, 1929)304A Letterto the Italian Left Communists(September 25, 1929) 318AnOpenIctter to the Bolshevik-LninistsWhoSienedthe August22 Declamtion (Septernber 25, 1929)325I*tter to theUSSRAccompanyingtheAugust22Declaration (September 25, 1929)329The Sino-Soviet Conflictand thePositionof theBelgianOppositionists (Septernber 30,1929)332On the Politicsof the l.eft Oppositionin Germany(September 30,1929) 337WhatNext? TheBolshevikOppositionin the CPSU(October 1929) 340Rebuketo a Capitulatot (October 1929)345Disarmamentandthe Unitcd Statesof Europe(October 4, 1929) 346A Letterto Ftiendsin the USSR (October 1929)358The TwelfthAnniversaryof October (October 17,1929)362Greetings to the WeeklyMilitont (October 19, 1929)370An Interviewon the August 22 Declaration(October 19,1929) 972On Socialigm in One Countryand IdeologicalProstration (Nouernber 1929)373IriVe NeedHelp (Nouember 1929)375The Faces Change,the System Remains(November 7, 1929) 379The Austrian Crisisand Communism(Nouember 13, 1929) 383How to Help the Centrists (November 26, 1929)397A Returnto the Party? (Autumn 1929)399Fromthe Opposition'sCircular-I:ttrs(December 20 ond.28, 1929) 401Bessedovsky's"Revelations" (December 21, 1929)406A Reply to the ChineseOppositionists(December 22, 1929)4O7The Murderof JakobBlumkin (December 1929)4L2Notee andAcknowledgments4L5Index 455Other Writingsof 1929461INTRODUCTION TOWRITINGS OF LEON TROTSKY(Leze-40)The life andwork of LeonTrotskymaybe conveniently dividedintothree parts: from his birthin 18Zgto the RussianRevolutionin 1917, whenhe becamea leaderof thenewSoviet government;from1917tn L929,whenhe wasexiledto Turkey;histhird andlaet period of exile, from1929to his assassinationin Mexicoin1940.It is generally agreedthathis writingsin this exile periodwere the mogtmatureexpressionof hisideaeand philosophy.Withthe publication of the twelvevolume Writingsof LeonTrotshg (1929-40) itcanbe said that everything writtenbyTlotsky in this period and published in any language duringhislifetimeor since is now available to theEnglish-readingpublic.The Writingseerieshas brought togethermanypamphlets,articles, and lettere previously translatedintoEnglishbutdiffrcult to locatebecausethey appearedin periodicals unknownto the general reader or in internal bulletinsrestrictedto themembership of varioussmall political organizations;in addition,it includes manyarticlesthathad never been translated intoEnglishbefore, and manyothersthat had not been published inany language an5rwhere.Countingthe twelvevolumeein thisseries, the total ofTlotsky'spublished work from the eleven and a half years of hislast exileruns between g,500 and 10,000printedpages-theequivalentof around twenty-eightaveragesizedvolumes.A listof thetitlee will give someidea of their ecope:Booksand pornphlets of the exile period, etill in print andpublished while Trotskywas alive, are My Life, The Histnryofthe Rusaian Reuolution,The Young Lenin, TheReuolutionBetroyed,TheirMorols anl, Ours,and, Marxism in OurTime (the10 Writingsof I'eon Trotskv (1929)introduction tn TheLivingThoughtsof Karl Marx).The Case ofLeon Trotsftyshouldbe includedeventhough it ie Tlotskyanswering the questionsof an internationalcommissioninvesti'gating the Moscowtrials, ratherthaneomething written byTlotskyalone.In additionto theuncompletedbiography Stalin, posthumousbooks and pamphlets,entirelyfrom theexile period,in chronolog'ical order of publicationare In Defense of Marxism,Trotsky'sDiaryin Exite-1935, LeonTrotskyon Black Nationalisrn andSelf-Determination, LeonTrotskyon theJewish Question, TheStruggleAgainstFoscism in Germany,The SpanishReuolution(1931-39),TheTransitionol Program for SocialistReuolution, antdLeon Trotskyon France (an expansionof the out'of-printWhitherFrance\.Otherworke, containing material fromthe exile period as wellas materialfrom preceding periods,areThePerrnanentReuolu'tion,TheStalin Schoolof Falsification,LeonTrotsky on theTrade (Jnions, LeonTrotsky on Literatureand Art,Leon TrotskySpeaks, Lenin'sFight Agoinst Stalinism, LeonTrotsky onChina,and,PoliticalPortraits.Plus,of course, thetwelve volumes of the Writings.The above, it shouldbe noted, is the publishedpart of whatTrotekywrotein his lastexile. He wrote much mote,in theformof politicallettereto his cothinkers inseveralcountries,discuseing questionsof revolutionary strategyand tactics.Asmall portion of theseis includedthroughoutthe Wrdfings,butthe great majorityis lockedaway in the"closed gection" of theTtotsky archivesat HarvardUniversityae a result of astipulation Tlotskymade whenhe turnedhie papersovertoHarvardin 1940.World War II was ragingandTrotsky,seekingto protectthe recipients of theeelettersand others mentioned inthem, insistcdthat they not be made publicuntil 1980.WhenIsaacDeutscher was working on his biographyof Trotsky in1959 he receivedspecial pemieeionfromNatalia Sedova,Ttotsky's widow, to examinethe closedsectionat Han'ard. If hiseatimate (in The ProphetOutcost,1963)was accurate, Tlotsky'spolitical correspondence will frll manythousandsof printedpages.Theeditorsare gratefirl to themanytranslators whocontributed to this series (identified in the "Notesand Acknowledg'ments" sectionin each volume) andto themanyother peopleonIntroductianto Writingsof Leon Tlotsky (1929-40) 11fourcontinents-friendsandstrangers, experts and amateurs, toonumerousto list here-who helped in the compilationof thenotesabout people andeventsof the thirties.We are unableto expressadequatelyour debt to LouisSinclair, withoutwhosemonumentalLeonTrotsky: A Bibliography (Hoover InetitutionPrese, 1972)this serieswouldhave been seriouslyincomplete andsubjecttomoredefects than it now has. rlhe EditorsJuly 1974LeonTlotekyPREFACEThe present volume covers the period from February L929,whenTlotsky reachedT\rrkey as an exile fromthe SovietUnion,through the endof 1929.His main political objectives duringthese monthswere:1. tohelpcirculatehisversion ofthe facts aboutthestruggle insidetheCommunistParty of theSoviet Union andthe CommunistInternationalfrom 1923to L929;2.to stmthe tendenciesamongimportantleadersof the Russian Left Opposition to surrendertothe Stalinist bureaucracy; and3.to promote the consolidation, ona revolutionarybasis,of various Oppositional groups throughouttheworld as an internationalfactionoftheCommunistInterna-tional.1. Tlotsky managedto gain a worldwideaudiencefor hisaccountof the Stalin-Tlotskystrugglewhenan Americannewss5rndicateeerialized parts of a pamphlet whichhe wrote as soonas he got to T\rrkey; it is newlytranslatedhere into English,infull for thefirst time,as the first six articles in thisvolume.Healsotold the story in much greater detailin his autobiographyMyLife,whichhe completedin thesummerof 1929.2. Thefirstdefectione fromthe Opposition came at the endof1927,whenthe Left Oppositionistswereexpelledfromthe CPSU;Zinovievand Kamenev immediately broketheirbloc withTlotsky andrenouncedtheirideas in orderto seekreadmissioninto the party. Ttren in February1928,a monthafterTlotsky waebanishedto Alma-Ata, a "Becond wave"of capitulationsbeganwiththe defectionof Pyatakov,Antonov-Ovseenko, Krestinsky,and others. Despitethis, and the arrestsand banishmentofTlotskyandothers, the ranksof the Oppositionseem to havestood firmandevento have grown during 1928.1314Writingsof Leon Trotsky (1929)Stalin didall hecouldto reversethis trendandto break uptheLeft Opposition;his best cardwas the "lefl turn" his regimebeganin 1928,whichwasrationalizedby numerousformer LeftOppositionistsas Stalin'sacceptance of the Left Oppositionprogtam. In July 1929 Radek, Preobrazhensky,and Smilgaledthethird waveof the capitulations, andby Octoberthey werefollowedby another group of formerLeftOppositionistsheadedby Smirnov.The mainresistanceto this course wasledbyChristianRakovskyand a eizable group associated with him inthe prison campsand places of penal exile.More thana dozenof the articlesandlettersin this bookanswer the argumentsof the capitulators,analyzethe meaningand scopeof theStalinistleft turn in boththe SovietUnionandworld politics, and strive to sustain political moraleand tenacityamongthediehardOppositionistsof the Rakovsky type. Amongthese are the pamphlet "AWretched Document," "OnthePsychology of Capitulation," "AnOpenLetterto the Bolshevik-Leninists Who Signedthe August22 Delc,laratton,"and "OnSocialismin OneCountry andIdeologicalProstration," all ofwhich appear herein English for the firsttime.3. Whiletheconditionsfacing the Oppositionistsin the SovietUnion wereso difficultthattheirsurvival as an organizedtendencywasin question, the prospects of the Oppositionietgelsewherewere good, in Tlotsky's opinion, provided theycouldachieveideologicalclarificationandhomogeneity.With this inmind,hebegana series of articles and letterstohis cothinkersinseveralcountries,raising whathe considered to be themostpressingpolitical andtheoretical problems facingtheirmove-ment.The firstthingthe LeftOppositionistshadto get clear,hewrote,wastheirreconcilabilityof their positions and thoseof theRightOpposition,representedin the Soviet Union by Bukharin,Rykov,andTomsky;in Germanyby Brandlerand Ttralheimer;and in the UnitedStates by Lovestone.Tlotsky'sviewson thisquestion-as in "Six Years of theBrandlerites,"and"OnceMoreon Brandler andThalheimer"-wereacceptable to mostLeftOppositionists,buttheyalienatedothers whofelt that numbers\ryeremoreimportantthan principlee andthat all Oppositionistsshould get togetherin a common group against the Stalinistsdespitethe differences amongthemselves.The secondthingTrotskyinsisted on was the needfor theLeftOpposition to take a clear position on the fundamental questionsPrefaceraisedin recent yearsduring thedisputesin the Cominternoverthe Chinese revolutionof 1925-27,the Anglo-RussianCommitteeof 1925-27,and economic-political policy in the SovietUnionfollowingLenin'sdeathin 1924. Notendencycould be regardedas serious,no tendencydeservedthename of internationalist,if itignoredor evaded takinga position on the chief issues of theclass strugglethat had tested the variouscommunisttendenciesin the years leadingup to 1929.This wasthemainthrustof hisarticles euch as "Groupings in the CommunistOpposition" and"Tagks of the Opposition."Tlotskyalgo believedthat many of thosewhoboretheLeftOppositionistlabeldid so throughaccidentor misunderstanding,thattheiradherenceto the LeftOpposition did it moreharrrthangood, andthatthe sooner they were separatedfrom the I*ftOpposition,the soonerit wouldbegin to makerealheadwayamongthe workers in theCommunist parties. Hie contributionsto this kind of clarificationanddemarcationwill befound in hislettersin this volumeabout France,where therewere severalgtoups in 1929thatconsidered themselvesl.eftOppositionists butcould not find a basis for workingtogether.In addition,heconespondedwith theeditorialboard of Thc Militont,whichhadbeeninitiatcdin 1928;the leadersof theGerman Leninbund,whichconsidereditselfan adherentof theLeft Oppoeitionin1929; and Oppoeitionistsin China, Italy, Belgium,Czechoslevakia, and elsewhere.ltotsky'sinterventionshadthe desiredeffect of solidifyingacadrewhoserepresentativeswere to cometogetherin April1930to establish theInternationalLeftOpposition as a faction oftheComintern,dedicatedto its regenerationand reform alongLeninist lines.Later,in1933, the ILO decidedthat theComintern'sbankruptcyinlettingHitlercome to powerwithouta serious strugglemeantthat the Cominterncould nolonger be refomedand neededto be replacedby a newrevolutionaryInternational.But it is important for the readertobear in mind thatTloteky was adamantlyopposedto formingnew parties or a new Internationalthroughout 1929and until1933.Besides encouraging the foundationof an Oppositionalweeklyin France (tro Verite) Trotskystarteda Russian-languageperiodical, BiulletenOppozitsii, which was editd by him andhissonLeon Sedov.In the Biulletenand otherOppositional papers,Tlotskyalsowroteat length on themoatimportantdevelopments1516Writingeof Leon Trotsky (1929)in 1929-the SinoSovietconflict overthe ChineseEaeternRailroadthatalmostledto war in Manchuria;the constitutionalcrisisthatbrought Auetriaclose to the vergeof civil war;the"disarrnament" propoeals and conferencegthatwereto litter thesceneduringthedecadebeforeWorld WarII; the Comintern'sdesignation of August1 as an "international redday"; thedefeatand degradationof the RuseianRightOpposition; alarmingsymptoms in the Sovieteconomy;andthe StalinistexecutionofJakob Blumkin,a GPU official whovisited Tlotsky in Ttrrkey.Considerablymorethan half of theselectionsin thie volumeare tranelatdintoEnglishfor the first time, primarily.from theBiulleten Oppozitsiiandmaterialat the HaryardCollege Library.Acknowledgmentsaboutthe articlesand translations,andexplanatorymaterial about the persons andevents mentionedinthem, will be foundin the section "Notes and Acknowledgments."Severalof the articleswereaignedby pen namesor wereunsignedwhenfirst publiehed. The date preceding each selectionindicateswhen it was completed;if that is notknown, the datewhen it was firet published ie given. All of the selectionsduringTloteky'sfirst month in Turkeywerewritten at the Sovietembassy in Constantinople;mostof the others, startinga fewweekslater, at Prinkipo.Tlanelationsoriginallydone in the1930sand40e havebeen revised to correct obviouserroreandachieveuniformityin style, spelling, punctuation, etc. "OtherWritings of 1929"lists the books, pamphlete, and articleefromthat period which arenot included in this volumebecausetheyare in print andavailableeleewhere.The EditorsJuly 1974CHRONOLOGY-rcn-February 11-T!otskyand his family arrive in Constantinople.Februaryl?-Tlotskyasks Geroranyfor a visa, the firstof aseries of unsucceeefulattempts to obtainasylumin WesternEurope.February-Leadersof the RightOpposition in the CommunistPartyof the Soviet Union aresummonedbefore the Politburoandthe CentralControlCommissionto explaintheir secretdiscussionswith Kamenev.February 25-Ttotskycompleteshis pamphlet Whot Hoppenedand How?March-Ttotskybegins analyzingthe different tendenciesamongthe various groups calling themselves Left Oppoeitioniststhroughoutthe world.April 12-TheGermancabinetannouncesits denial of Tlotsky'srequestfor a visa.April 23-29-TheSixteenthConferenceof the CPSUadoptsaprogram foran ambitiousfiveyear plan andcollectivizationofthe land.Stalin indictsleadersof the Right Oppositionat theplenum of the CentralCommittee preceding the conference.May 1-ACommunistPartyMayDay demonstrationis brutallyrepressedby the Berlin police.May8-The'WestEuropean Bureau of the CommunistInterna-tional designatesAugust1 as a "redday."May 17-19-TheLeft Oppoeitionin the United Statesholds itgfirstnational conferencein Chicagoand establiehestheCommunistLeagueof America (Opposition).May28-TheCongressof Sovietsclosesaftr approving the fiveyear plan.17f8 Writings of LeonTtotshy (1929)May30-TheBritishLabourParty defeatsthe Coneervativesina parliamentary election;MacDonaldbecomes prime ministerof the secondLabourgovernment on June6.June2-Right OppoeitionleaderTomsky is removedas headofthe hadeunions.June 15-TheSovietSupremeCouncilof NationalEconomydecreegan "uninterruptedworkweek" (360 workdays and 5holidays).July 3-Bukharin is removedas president of the CommunistInternational.July 3-19-TheTenthPlenumof t,Le ExecutiveCommitteeof theCommunistInternational (ECCI) reaffrrrrs the ultraleft policyadoptedby theSixthTtrorldCongressin 1928.July l0-Chineeeauthorities anest SovietofEcialeand employ.eee of the ChineseEaeternRailroad, leadingto a breakindiplomaticrelations andthedispatch of both ChineseandSoviet hoopeto the Manchurianfrontier.July ll-Ttre BritighLabour government announoes its rejectionof asylumfor Trotsky.July l4-Radek,Preobrazheneky,and Smilgalead fourhundredformer kftOppoeitionists in the "third wave" of capitulationsto Stalin.July22-Trotskygives an Americanreportcra etatementeupportingtheSoviet Union in the conflictwith China.July 24-U.S. president Hooveretateethat the Kellogg-Briandantiwartrea$,havingbeen signedby sixty-twocountriee, ienowin effect.July-The RuseianLeftOppoeitionpublishee thefrrgt iseueof itgmagazine,BfuIletcnOppozitsii (Bulletin of the Oppoeition),editdby Troteky.Augustl5-Sovietand Chineeetroopafight alongRiver.Auguet15-Thefirst i$ue of Lo Verite ie publiehedOppoeitionists.the Amurby FlenchAuguet22-Rakoveky and otherexiled Oppoeitionistsiseueadeclarationin the form of an open letterto the CentralCommittce andtheCentralControl Corn'niesionof the CPSU.Auguet8O-fire Soviet government accepte China's propoeale toeettleall gueetione arisingfromtheChineseEasternRailroaddiepute.SeptembenS-French premier Briandoutlineehis propoeal for aUnitd States of Europeto the Leagueof Nationsat Creneva.Chronology 19September25-Tlotskyendorsesthe August 22 declarationbyRakovsky.October3-Bessedovsky,a Stalinist functionaryin Paris, defectsto the capitalists.October24-WallStreet crashsignalsthe comingof the GreatDepressionof thethirties.October-Smirnovand otherscapitulatein the "fourthwave."November5-The BritishHouse of Commonsapprovestheresumptionof diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.November l7-Bukharinis expelled from the Politburoandotherright-wingleaders are warnedfollowingthe NovemberCentralCommittee plenum of theCPSU.December2?-Stalinmakesa speechto agriculturalexpertsproclaiming a change from the policy of limitingtheexploitingtendenciesof thekulaksto a policy of liquidatingthe kulaks asa class.December-Stalin's fiftieth birthday is celebratedwithmuchadulationand fanfare in the SovietUnion.December-Blumkinis murdered by the GPU.JI. A. TPOIIHNNqrl l| ililt ilp[ltililil0 IMECTb C"TATEfiruIfl MIIPOBOfi BYPilTYASHOtrIIETIATITnAPUlf(1929Cover page of the pamphlet ChtoiKakProizoshlo? (WhatHappened and How?).C'ESTLA MARCHEDES EVENEMENTS!'February 25, 1929Sensationis theinevitableshadowof politics. In thematterofmy expuleionfrom the SovietlJnion, this shadowhas,however,acquireddimensionsthatare too grotesque. Moreover,sensation-alismis inimicalto thekind of politics thatis directedtowardgreat ends. My objectin writingtheselines is not to createmoreof a sensationbut,on thecontrary,to undercut thisby providingpublic opinionwith objectiveinformation-sofarasobjectivityisattainable in political etruggle in general.In orderto blunt theedgeof sensationalism,let me say at theoutsetwhatone must supposeis not necessaryfor thoeereaderswho areat all well informed,namely,that ourattitudetoward theOctoberRevolution,Sovietpower, Marxistdoctrine,and Bolshevism2remains unchanged.Wedo not measurethe historicalprocess by the yardstick of our personal fate.It is true that I am now resortingto a way of communicatingwith the public that is rather exceptional from the standpointofthe methodsto whichI have beenaccustomedduringmy politicallife. But this flows from theexceptionalnature of theconditionsin which I am now placed.An avalancheof guesses, inventions,and fantasieshas piledup aroundthe question of my personal fate-something I wouldfeel quite untroubled about if it did not at thesame time meaninjury to the caueethatI serveandhave served.I have noreasonto wrap my pereonal fate in mystery,especiallysinceit hasbeenboundup oneway or anotherwith interestsof a general nature.On the contrary. Nowmorethan ever it is in myinteresttopreoent mattersas theyreally are-not only to myfriends but toenemiesas well. My object ig not pmpaganda butinformation.2l22Writings of Leonllotsky (1929)The preconditionI posed to the press agency was completefreedom in stating my pointof view.My articleswereto bepublished as writtn or not at all.I am writingin Constantinople, where the SovietvesselIlyichbrought meon February12from Odeesa.I didnotchoose thisasa placeof residence, despitetheassertions of a numberofnewspapers.My closest friends in Germany andFrance wereabsolutely rightin supposing that Iwasbrought to Turkeyagainstmy will.To the Turkish police officerwho boarded the steamer atBuyukdereto checkthe passengers'papers-therewerenopassengerson the boat besidesmy family andtheagentsof theGPUs-Ihanded the followingstatementfor transmissiont,o thepresident of the Turkishrepublic,KemalPasha:a"DearSir:At the gateway to Constantinople, I have thehonorto inform youthatI havearrived at the Turkishfrontiernot ofmy ownchoice andthat the onlyreason I maycross thisfrontierwill be through the use of forceuponme. I request you,Mr.President,to acceptfrommethe sentiments thatare fitting onthisoccasion.L. Trotsky. February12, 1929."SinceI wasbeingexpelled fromtheUSSR despitemy emphaticprotests, I would naturallyhave preferred to go to a countrywithwhoselanguage,sociallife, andcultureI was closelyfamiliar.But the interests of exilesare rarelycompatible withthoseof thepeoplewho exilethem.So it wasin 1916,whenthe governmentof the Frenchrepublicforciblydepor0edme to Spain, a countr5/ whose languageI did notknow. In its turn, the liberalSpanish government of SenorRomanonesdid notallowmethe timeto learn the languageofCervantes but hastened to arreet me withoutthe slightstgroundsandto deport me to theothersideof theAtlantic.5Ifgloating were a permissiblefeelingin politics, onemight say thatI wassoon g:iven unusual groundsfor satisfaction: Malvy, theRadicalministerof the interiorwhohad me expelledfromFrance,was himeelfexpelled from Francenot longafter by thegovernment of Clemenceau.6Butthere was more.Thechiefof theFrench politicalpolice, MonsieurBidetJ'Fauxpas,"whosereportsservedas the basis for my expulsionfromFrance, was himselfarrestedin 1918in Ruseia,wherehe wascarryingout a notaltogetherfriendly mission. Broughtbeforemeat the Commissar-iat of War, M. Bidet repliedto my question, "Howdid thishappen?"with the rather vaguebut, in its way,magnificentC'estln Morchedes Euenements!23formula:"C'estla marche desevenements! [That's theway thingsgo!1"The new epoch that beganwith the last war is preeminentlyone of great upheavalsandsharp political turns. We havebeenwitnessto manysurprises, andwill be for a long time to come.Inall of them, thatclassic formulaof the policephilosopherwillcome in handy: "C'estla marche des evenementa!"I will not hide the factthat I regard my expulsionfromtheSovietUnionas anythingbut history'sfinalword.It is not, ofcourse, just a matterof my personal fate.Theups anddownsofhistory'srouteare tortuous,to be sure. But in theschool ofhistoricalobjectivityI have learned to make do with the pathspresented by the actualcourse of development.But let us first establish the factsthat are neededin ordertounderstandwhat has happened.In January1928 the Fifteenth Congressof the SovietCommu-nist Party,in realitya congressof the bureaucrats in Stalin'sfaction,expelledthe Oppositionfromthe party and sanctionedthe use of government repressionagainstit.?Soonafterward,manyhundrede-andby now many thousands-of membersofthe Opposition wereexiledto various parts of Siberiaand CentralAsia.Amongthemwere ChristianRakovsky,formerchairmanoftheCouncilof People's Commissareof theUkraineand ambassadorto France,whohas to his creditforty yearsof struggle in theranksof the workingclass in France,Bulgaria, Rumania, andRussia;Karl Radek, one of the most remarkableinternationalMamistwriters;I.N. Smirnov,a people'e commissarup to themomentof his arrestand one of the oldest party builders; Smilga,one of the organizersof the OctoberRevolutionand the RedArsry; Preobrazhensky,an economistwith a profoundeducation,whowas a financialadviserin the negotiationswith France;Muralovand Mrachkovsky,organizersof the RedAmyandmarshalsof therevolutionarywar;Beloborodov, people'e com-missarof internalaffairs beforebeing deporbed;Soenovsky,whobrilliantly servedthe party with his pen as journalist and socialcommentator;Kasparova, leaderof the work of the party andCominternamongwomen of the East; Boguslavsky, formerpresident of the"junior" Council of People's Commissars;andsoon.8The lives of these people, andthoseof dozens of otherOppositionigtswhomI havenot named, areinseparablybound24Writingsof LconTiotsky (1929)up withthe epic tale of three revolutions:those of 1905,February1917, andOctober1917.e The personal fatesof many of themmightBerveas thesubjectof dramas in the grand manner.Moreimportantly,it is beyond dispute thatin a political sense theseexileehave renderedtheSovietrepublic infinitely greater servicesthan have those who exiled them.The place selected formy exile was Alma-Ata,thenew capitalof Kazakhstan,a malarialcity of earthquakesandfloode, at thefoot of the Tyanshanrange, aboutone hundredand fiftymilesfrom thenearestrailroadandtwenty-fivehundred milesfromMoscow. Here my wife and sonro and I spenta yearin thecompanyof books-andnature,whichin theseregionsis trulymagnificent. Ittooknewspapersand lettersanywherefromtwenty daysto a monthor two,sometimeslonger,to arive,dependingon the time of year and the moodof the Moscowauthorities.Although weencounteredsecret friendsat everystep, wewerecompletelyisolatedfrom thesurrounding population, foranyonewho tried to makecontact with us was punished, sometimes quiteseverely. Ouronlylinkewith the outsideworldwere thehuntingtrips my son and I wenton, accompaniedby GPU agents, duringwhichwelivedthelifeof nomads onthe saltflats and semidesertsteppesfor weekson end, camping out under the stars or inKirghiz kibitkas andtravelingby camel.Thisregion is famousfor its abundanceof wild goats, wild boar, ducks, geese, andothergame, but aleo for poisonous snakes,scorpions,andspiders.InJanuarythis year I was infornedby telegram thatthreetigerchadappeared within a hundredand fifty miles of Alma-Ataandwere coming up the Ili River from Lake Balkhash.My sonandIwonderedwhetherwe ehould declarewar-proclaimingit to be adefensive one,of course-orappealto the Kellogg antiwar pact.lrTheshrewd and experiencedoldtigerswould surelyhavetakenan attitude fully sympatheticwith the Kellogg Pact-oneneedonlyreferto Clemenceau'sexampleto seethat-after all, it ie thestrengthof one'eclawsthat decidesthe outcome in the finalanalysie.My son and I hadnot yet come to a decisionregardingtheseBalkhash predators when our fatewas suddenlyalteredby a newturn of events.It beganwithour conespondence.During the firsttenmonthsof exile, ourletters,though censored, neverthelessreachedtheirdestinationsroughlyfifty percent of the t'-'e. CorrespondenceC'est Ia MarchedesEuenements!25among the deporteesacquired a very broadscope.Sometimeslettere assumedthedimensionsof political treatises, and werewidelyreproduced,reachingthe political centersof thecountryand passing beyondits borders. Theywould be printed anddisseminatedin all sorts of ways. Toward theendof Octoberlastyear a suddenchangeoccurred.Ourcommunicationswithcothinkers,fiends, even relatives, were suddenly stopped short;letters and telegramsceasd to reach us at all. At the Moscowtelegraphoffice,as we learnedby specialmeans,hundredsoftelegrams addressed to me were piling up, especiallyduringthedays commemoratingthe OctoberRevolutionand otherrevolu-tionaryanniversaries. Thering around us was closingin tighterandtighter.It shouldbe kept in mind that not onlythe rank andfi.lebutevenfunctionariesin Stalin'sapparatus found it hardto swallowthesereprisalsagainst leadingfigures of the October Revolution.They were appeasedby those on top with the argumentthatharsh measureswould aasure full unanimitywithinthe partyand makeit possible to work in peace. Stalin'sfaction believed,orat least promised, that sending the Oppositionleaders intointernal exile wouldbringtheactivitiesof the "Tlotskyists"toan end.Butthatwas precisely what did nothappen.The year followingtheFifteenth Congress was the mosttroubled year of the party'sexistence.Indeedit was onlyafter the FifteenthCongressthatwidelayersof the party and working claes beganto takea realinterest in the struggle going on at the top and realizedthatfundamentaldifferencesof principle mustbe at stake,sincedozens,hundreds, and even thousands ofpeopleknownthrough-out the country,or at leastthroughouttheirregions, dietricts,or plants,werewilling to undergo expulsion from the party anddeportationfor the sake of theirideas.During1928, despitecontinualwavesof repression,theOpposition grew noticeably,especiallyat majorindustrial plants. Thie led to furtherintcnsificationof repression andin particular to prohibition ofcorrespondenceby exilee,even among themselves.We expectedother measures of the same sortto follow,and wewerenotmistaken.On December16 a specialrepresentative of theGPUarrivedfrom Moscowand in the name of thatinstitution handedme anultimatum:to stop leading the struggle of theOpposition;otherwise,measureswould be takento ieolat mefrom political26 Writingsof Leon Trotsky (1929)life entirely.Nothing was said about beingehipped abroad. Asfar agI could tell, measures of a domestic nature were implied.Iansweredthis "ultimatum"witha letter laying downbasicprinciples, addressedto the Central Committeeof the party andthe presidium of the Comintern.t2It seems necessaryatthis pointto quote someexcerptsfromthat letter:"ThedemandthatI abstain frompolitical activity is equivalentto demanding that I renounce thestrugglefortheintcrestsof theinternationalproletariat, astrugglewhichIhave wagedunintermptedlyfor thirty-two years, throughoutmy consciouslife.The attempt to representthie activityas 'countelrevolution-ary' comesfromthose whomI accusebeforethe internationalproletariat of trampling upon the basicteachingsof Marx andLenin,l3of injuringthe historical interestsof the worldrevolu-tion,of breakingwiththe traditionsand heritageofOctober,andof unconsciously,.and thereforeall the more dangerously,preparing theway forThermidor."laI omit the next part of the document,which lists our maindifferenceson domesticand internationalquestions. Further on,the letter states:"A period of reaction canoccurnot only after a bourgeoisrevolution,but aftera proletarian one aB well.For six years wehavebeenliving in the USSRunder conditionsof mountingreaction againstOctober, paving theway for Thermidor.Themostobviousandcompleteexpressionof thisreaction within theparty is the houndingandorganizationalroutingoftheleft wing."In its recentattemptsto resist the openlyThermidoreanelements,theStalin faction is livingoff of the 'floteam'and'jetsam'of the Opposition's ideae.As far as creativity goes, it ieimpotent.The struggle against the left has deprivedit of anystability.Its practicalpolicies have no backbone;theyare false,contradictory, and unreliable.The noisy campaignagainettherightdanger remainsthree-quarteresham and serveeabove all ascamouflagefor themasses,to hidetherealwar of annihilationagainstthe Bolshevik-Lcninists."My letter concludea:"In the declarationwe submittd to the Sixth [World]Congrese.weansweredthe accusationof factionalwork withthe statementthatitcouldbe endedonlyifArticle58,t5treacherouslydirected againstus, were revoked and ourselvesreinstatd inthe party, not aa repentantsinners but asrevolutionaryfightere who do not betray their banner.And as ifC'est Ia Marchedes Euencm.ents! 27in foreknowledge of the ultimatum handed me today,we wrotethe following,word forword:"'Onlycompletely cormptedbureaucrats coulddemand such arenunciationfrom revolutionaries'(renunciation of politicalactivity, i.e., of serving the party and the international proletar-iat).'Onlycontemptiblerenegadescould give such a promise.'"Thereis nothing I canchangein those words."To eachhie own. You wish to continueto conductaffairsunder the prompting of class forceshoetileto the proletariat. Weknowour dutyandwill do it to the end. L. Trotsky.toAlma-Ata,December16,1928."DEPORTATIONFROM THE SOVIET UNION1TFebruary25, L9.2gTo recapitulate: I had replied to the demandthat I ceasealipolitical activity withthe statement that only corruptedbureau-crats couldmake sucha demandand only renegadescouldagreeto it. The Stalinists themselves couldhardlyhaveexpectedadifferentanswer.Afterthat, a month passed without incident.Ourconnectionswith the outsideworldhad beencompletelybrokenoff,including theillegal onesorganizedby youngcothink-ers,who overcamethe greatest difficultiesanduntil the end of1928accuratelysuppliedmein Alma-Ata with an abundanceofinformationfrom Moscow andother centers.DuringJanuary ofthis yearwereceivedonlythe Moscownewspapers.The moretheywroteaboutthe struggleagainstthe right wing,]8 the morecertain we felt in expectinga blow againstthe left. That isStalin's politicalmethod.The GPUrepresentativefromMoscow, Volynsky, remainedinAlma-Ata all this time, awaitinginstructions.OnJanuary20 heappeared at our house, accompaniedby a largenumberof armedGPUagents,who occupiedall entrancesand exits,and hehanded me the followingextractfrom the minutesof the GPUspecialconferenceof January18, 1929:"Considered:the caseof citizen Tlotsky, Leon Davidovich,underArticle58/L0 of the CriminalCode, on the charge ofcountenevolutionary activity,expressing itself in theorganiza'tion of an illegal anti-soviet party, whoseactivityhas latelybeendirected toward provokinganti-Soviet actions and makingpreparationsfor armedstruggleagainstSoviet power.Resolved:CitizenTlotsky, Leon Davidovich, to be deportedfrorntheterritoryof the USSR."WhenIwasaeked to sign a statementacknowledgingthat I28Deportation from the SouietUnian Zghad beeninformedof this ruling, I wrote: "TheGpU ruling,criminalin essenceandillegal in form,has beenannouncedtome, January 20, Lgn. Tlotsky."I calledtherulingcriminal becauseit accuses me of prepara-tions for armed struggleagainstSoviet power, a deliberate lie.Such a formula,neededby Stalin to justify my deportation,inandof itselftcnds to undermine Soviet power in the mostviciousway. For if it weretruethat the Oppoeition,led by people whohelpedorganizethe October Revolutionand built the SovietrepublicandRedArmy,was preparing to overthrowSoviet powerby force of arme, that in itself wouldsignify a disastroussituationin the country. If that wereso, even themost favorablydisposedcounterrevolutionary agentfrom the bourgeoisworldwouldhave to say: "Thereis no need to be hastyaboutestablishing economic tieswiththe Soviets; better to wait andseehowthe armedconflict turns out."Fortunately,however,the GPU formula is a barefacedpolicelie.Wearewholly euided by the convictionthat Sovietrulehasprofound vitalityand great elasticity. Our courseis one ofinternalreform.I takethis opportunityto proclaim thisto thewholeworld and by so doingtp at leaet partially wardoff theblowto the interests of the Sovietrepublicdealtby the GpUformula,dictatedby Stalin, which is false throughand through.Howevergreat may be the internaldifficultiesof the Sovietrepublic today,theresultnotonly of theobjectivecircumstancesbut also of the impotent policy of zigzags,all thosewho onceagain look fonvardto an early collapseof Soviet power aremaking grievous miscalculations,as they werebefore.Mr. Chamberlainreapparentlyentertains no such illusions.Hegoes by criteria of a more practical kind.If one can believereportsinsistently repeated in the press, in particular the reportin the Americanmagazine TheNation,Mr. Chamberlain hasexpressed himself to the effectthat correct diplomatic relationgwith theSoviet Unionwould be fullyposeible on theday afterTlotsky had,as he put it, "been placed against a wall."Thislapidaryformuladoeshonorto the temperamentoftheConserva-tive minister, who when speaking of the American navy,at anyrate,speaksmore in the languageof the vegetarian.AlthoughIarn entruetedwith no diplomatic powers, Ineverthelessventure, in theinterests of the cause (andpartly inmy own interests as well), to advisetheBritishminister offoreignaffairsnot to insist onhis demandtoo literally.Stalinhas30Writings of LeonTrotskY (1929)shown hisreadinessto meet Mr' Chamberlain's wishes wellenoughby expellingme from the SovietUnion.If he did not domore, it was notbecause of a lack of willingnessto please. Itwould be too foolishto makethat a reason for punishingtheSoviet economyand Britishindustry.Beyondthat,I might aleopoint out that international relationsare basedon the principle ofreciprocity.Butthisis a dieagreeablesubjectand I preferto dropit.In my written acknowledgmentthatthe GPUrulinghadbeenmade knownto me I calledit not only criminal in essencebutalsoillegal in form. BythisI meantthat theGPU may offerapersonthechoiceof leavingtJre countryon pain of reprisalsinone form or anotherif the personremains,butit maynot aetuallydeport someonewithoutthat person's agteement.WhenI asked how I was to bedeported and to what country, IreceivedtheanswerthatI wouldbe informed in European Russiaby a GPU representativebeingsent to meetmethere'Thewholenextday wastaken up withfeverish packing,almostexclusivelyof manuscriptsand books. Our two pointerslooked onwithalarrnat this crowd of noisy people in the usually quiet household. Ishouldnote in passingthat there was not even a hint ofhostilityon the part of the GPUagents. Quite the contrary,At dawnon January22 my wife,my son, and I, with theGPUescort,set off in a buswhichdrove us over a road coveredwithsmoothly packed snow to the mountain pass of Kurday.Ttrereweencountered strong winds and heavydriftingof snow' The power-ful tractor that wasto towus throughthe passwassunkin overits headin snowdriftsalongwith the sevenmotor vehiclesit wastowing.Duringheavydrifting in this pass, sevenmenanda goodmanyhorses hadfrozento death.We were obligedto transfer tosledges.It tookus morethansevenhours to coverabouttwentymiles.Along the drifted roadwe encounteredmanyabandonedsleighs,their shaftssticking up, manyloads of materialfor theT\rrkestan-Siberiarailroadnowunder construction, many tanksof kerosene-all deep in the snow. Men andhorseshadtakenrefugein the nearbywintercamps of the Kirghiz'Onthe othersideof the pass we boardeda bus again,and atPishpek (now Frunze),a railwaycar. The Moscow papers wemetalongthe wayshowedthat publicopinionwas being preparedforthedeportation of the leadersof the Oppositionfromthecountry.In the region of Aktyubinska communicationby direct wireinformedus that the placeof exilewasto be Constantinople. IDeportation front. the Souiet (Jnion Jldemanded a chanceto seethe two rnembers of my family inMoscow.20 Theywerebroughtto theRyazhskstation andplacedundersurveillance with us. The new Gpurepresentative, Bu-lanov, tried to persuade meof theadvantages of going to Con_stantinople. But I categorically refused.Bulanov "rrg.g"d ir, ,rogotiations with Moscowby direct wire. There ".n"tytttittg ttrdbeenforeeeen except the possibility that I mightrefiise to*leavethe countryvoluntarily.our train is diverted from its route,slowly rolls back downthetrack,finally stope on an out-of-theway sidetrack neara deadlittle station,andthere sinksinto a coma between two shetchesof thin woods. Day after day goes by.Moreand moreempty tincansaccumulate aroundthetrain.crows andmagpiesgather forthe feastin largerandlarger flocks.There are "o "auuits about;aterrible epidemicthat autumnhadsweptthem away.so the foxhad madea regular trackby night, right up to our train.The engine,with onecar hitchedto it, makesdaily trips to alargerstation to fetchthe mainmeal.Grippe ragesin our car.WerereadAnatole France andKlyuchevsky's history of Russia. Thecold reaches53 degreesbelow zero. our enginekeeps rollingbackand forth to keep thewheelsfrom freezing to the raile.Distantradio stationswere calling back and forth, groping in the etherfornewsof our whereabouts. we did nothear theirluestions; wewere playing chess.But evenif wehad heardthem,we wouldnothavebeen able to answer;brought to ourlocationby night,weourselves did not knowwherewe were-only thatit wassomewhere in the region of Kursk.Thuspassed twelvedaysand nights. While there, welearnedofnewarrests-of severalhundredpeople, including a hundred andfifty members of a so-called ,,Ttotskyist center.,,Amongthepublished nameswere those of Kavtaradze, formerchairman ofthe Councilof People's Commissars of Georgia; Mdivani, theformer Soviet trade representative in paris; Voronsky, the party'sbestliterarycritic;andDrobnis, oneof themost heroicfigurerofthe Ukrainianrevolution.2l All ofthem were central figures in theparty, men whohelpedorganize the OctoberRevolution.On February 8 Bulanov announced: .,Despite the best effortsonMoscow'spart, theGermangovernment categorically refuses toadmit you to Germany.I have beengiven finalinslructions toconductyou to Constantinople.""ButI will notgo voluntarily; and I will make a declaration tothateffectat the T\rrkishborder.',g2 Writingsof Leon TYoEhY (1929)'"Ihat will not change matters; you will be conducted intoTurkeyin anycase.t'"Then you havemadea deal witht,Le T\rkish policefor myforcibledeportationto Thrkey.""Weknow nothingaboutthat," he replied."TVe only carry outorder8.t'After twelvedays of standing still, our train was again underway.Modestae it wae,the train beganto gtow longeras theeecortincreased. Throughoutthetrip, eversincePishpek,we werenot allowedto leaveour car. Now we were going at fullspeedsouthward. The only stops wereat small gtations totake onwaterand fuel.Theee extreme precautions were prompted by recollec-tions of the demonstration at theMoscowetationat the timewhen Iwas deportedfromMoscowin January1928;thedemonstrators forcibly preventedthe train from leavingforTashkenton that occasion,and it had only been possibletodeport me secretlythe followingday.Tlte tte*'"papersreceiveden routebrought echoeeof the bignewcampaignagainst "Tlotskyists." Betweenthe linescertainhints slippedthroughof a struggleat the top overthe questionofmy deportation. TheStalinfactionwasin a hurry. Andthey hadreaaon enough:therewere not only political difficulties toovercomebut physicalones as well.The steamer Kalinin had'beenassignedto takeus from Odessa,but it had beenfrozenin'All the efforts of the icebreakers were in vain. Moscowwagstanding at thetelegraphwire, urginghaste. TtteetnamerIlyichwas made readyon shortorder.Ourtrain arrivedin Odessaonthenight of February10. Through the window I saw familiarplaces. I hadspent seven years of my school life in this city'Our""" *""broughtright up to the steamer. It was bitterly cold.Despite the latenees of the hour,the pier was surroundedby GPUtroopsand agents. Herewehad to take leave ofthe two membersof ourfamilywho had shared imprisonmentwith us for twoweeks.As we peered throughthe trainwindowat the steamerawaitingus, we could not help rememberinganotherboatthat had oncetaken us to a destinationnotof ourchoosing.That was in March191?,off Halifax,Canada,whenBritish marines,beforetheeyesof a crowdof passengers, had caried me bodily off of theNorwegianeteamerChristianiafiotd, on whichIhad beentraveling with the full necessarycomplement of documentsandvisastowardChristianiaand Petrograd.Our farnily had beentheDeportation from the Souiet (Jnion BBsamethen,only twelve years younger. My eldestson had beenelevenat Halifax, and he hadstruck one of theBritishmarineswith his little fist before I couldkeep him fromthatgesture, bywhich he hadhoped, naively,towin my freedom .rrd "born" .it torestoremeto a vertical position. Insteadof petrograd my chancedestinationhad thenbeena concentration camp.Tlhellyich,without cargoor other passengers, shippedout ataboutone in the morning.Forsixty miles an icebreaker madepassage for us. The gale that had beenraging in the areaonlybrushedus lightly with the last strokesof its wings. OnFebruary72 weenteredtheBosporus. To the T\rrkiehpolice offrcer, whlhad beenwarned in advancethat the steamer was carr5ringmyl*il{ and myself, Ihandedthe declaration that twL b'eingbrought to constantinople against my will.It had no results.Th-esteamer proceeded on its course. Aft,er a journey of twenty-twodays, havingcovered a distance of fourthousandmiles, we ioundourselves in Constantinople.ffiI-eon Tlotsky and Natalia Sedova being drivento the Sovietconsulate on their arrival in Constantinople'itt,-. ,,; :telt.t'l.""i rtr:i::i:::::i!:i+:Tlotsky and Sedova on a boattrip off the coastof T\rrkey.HOW COULD THIS HAPPEN?2zFebruarY 26, lg2gHow was it possiblefor this to happen? That question maybeanswered in twodifferent ways:eitherby describingtheinternalmechanismof the strugglebetweenthe ruling groupsor byrevealing the more profound underlyingsocialforces. Eachoftheseapproaches has its rightful place.And they are notmutually exclusive; rather,they complement oneanother'It isnatural for the reader to wish to know first of all how sucharadicalchangein the leadership cameabout concretely, by whatmeans Stalin managedto become master of the apparatus anddirectit againstothers.Compared to theessential question of therealignment of class forces andthe progressionof the variousstages of therevolution,the questionof personalgroupingsandcombinations is only of secondary significance. But within itslimits it is completely legitimate. And it mustbe answered'What is Stalin? Fora concise characterization onewouldhaveto say: he is the mostoutstanding mediocrity in our party'He isgiftedwith practicalsense'a strong will, and perseverancein thepursuitof his aims.His politicalfield of visionis extremelynarrow. And his theoretical levelis equally primitive. Hisworkofcompilation,Found,ationsof Leninrsm,in whichhe made anattempt to give the theoretical traditions of the party theirdue, iefull of sophomoricerror. His ignoranceof foreignlanguages-hedoesnot knowa single one-compels him to follow the politicallife of othercountriessecondhand. His mindis stubbornlyempiricaland devoidof creative imagination. To theleadinggroup of the parW (in broader circles hewas not knownat all)healways seemed destinedto play secondary or evenmoresubsidiary roles. And the factthattodayheis plavingthe leading36How CouldThis Hoppen?g7roleis not go much a reflection of his own personality as acharacterization of the present transitionalperiod of ungtableequilibrium. As Helvetiusonce said: ,.Every period has its greatmen,andif theseare lacking,it inventsthem."Like all empiricists stalin is full of contradictions. Heactsonimpulse,withoutperepective. Hie politicar rineis a seriegofzrgzags.For eachzig ot zag he createssome ad hoc theoreticalbanality, or assigns othersto do eo. He has an extraordinarilyunceremonious attitudetowardfactsandpeople. Henever finds itawkward to call somethingwhitetodaytnttictt yesterday hecalledblack.onecould without difficulty compilean astouniingcatalogueof stalin's contradictory statements.I will cite only oneexample, which will fit more eaeilyin theframework of anewspaper articlethanothers. I apologize in advance that theexampleconcerns me personally. In recent years Stalinhasconcentratedhis efforts on whatis calledthe deglorification ofTlotsky.A new historyof the octoberRevolution washastilyworked up, along with a new historyof theRed Army anda newhistoryof the party. stalin gave the signalfor the revising ofvaluesby declaring on Novemberlg, lg24:,,Ttotsky did not-andcouldnot have played any apecialrole in the party or in theoctoberinsurrection." He began to repeatthis assertion on everypossible occasion.stalin was reminded of anarticlehehimself hadwritten on thefirst anniversary of the revolution. Thearticlesaidliterally: ,,Allthe work of practical organization of the insurrection wasconductedunderthe immediate leadership of the chairmanofthePetrograd soviet,Tlotsky. one may say withas'urance that theswift paseing of the garison to the sideof the sovietandthecapableorganization of the workof theMilitary Revolutionar5rCommittee,theparty owes principally and primarily to Trotsky.;,_ Howdid stalin get outof this embanassing contradictibn?verysimply: by intensifying the etream of invective aimed at the"Tlotskyiats." There are hundreds of such examples. Hiscomments on Zinoviev and Kamenev2' are notablefor theirequallyglaring contradictions. Andonemay restassured that inthenear future Stalin will begin, in mostvenomousfashion, toexpressthe veryeameopinionsabout Rykov,Bukharin, andTomsky2a thatuntil now he denounced as vicious calumnyby theOpposition.Howdoes hedare indulge in euch flagrant contradictions? Thekeyto it is that he makeshis speechesor writes hisarticles only38 Writingeof Leon TrotskY (1929)afterhis opponenthasbeen deprivedof the chance to reply'stalin's polemicsareonly the belated echo of hie organizationaltechnique. What Stalinism is, above all,is theautomatic workingof the apparatus.Lenin,in his eo-calledtestament,2s commented on two charac-teristicsof stalin:nrdeness anddisloyalty. But only afterLenin'sdeathdid these developto their fullest extent.stalin ispreoccupiedwith creating as poieonousan atmosphere aspossiblJin theinternal party struggle andintendsby that meangio confrontthe party with the accomplished fact of a split'"Ttris cookwif prepareonly pepperydishes,"Leninwarnedtheparty as early as tgzZ.ttfire GPUdecreeaccusing the Oppoeitionof pieparingfor amedstruggle is not Stalin's only dish of thiskind. ln July 192?, that is, at a time whenthe Opposition wasetill in the party andite representatives wenestill on the centralCommittee, Stalinsuddenlyraisedthe question:"Is the Opposi-tion really opposed to the victoryof the USSRin the comingbattles with imperialism?"Needless to say,there wae notthe glightest foundation for suchan insinuation. But thecookhad already begunto preparethediehhe calledArticle58.sincethe question of the opposition'sattitude towardthe defenseof the ussRhas internationalimportance,I consider it necessary, in the interest8of the Sovietrepublic,to quote excerptsfrom the speechin which I repliedtoStalin's question:,,Let us leaveasidefor the momentthebrazenimpudenceof thequestion,"I saidin my speech at the jointplenumof the Centr-alCommittee and Central ControlCorn"'ission in Auguet1927'"And let us not dwellat this time on Lenin's carefully weighedcharacterization of stalin'smethode-'rudeness and disloyalw.'Wewill takethe questionas it has been posed and givean answerto it. OnlyTVhiteGuards2? could be 'opposed to the victory of theUSSRin thecoming battles withimperialism.' . . ' WhatStalinreally has in mindis a different question,na"urely, 'Does theopposition reallythinkthat theleadershipof stalin is incapableof a"su"ittg victoryto theUSSR?' . . Yee,the Oppoeition thinksthatthe leadershipof Stalin makesthe victory moredif6cult.. . . All Oppositionists . . . will, in the eventof war, take upwhatever post,at the frontor behindthe linee, the party assignsthem to. . . . But none ofthem will renounce their right and dut}to fightfor the conectionof the party'ecourse. ' ' ' Tosum up:for ihesocialietfatherland? Yes! For theStalinist course?No!"HowCould.ThisHappen? ggEventoday, in spite of thechangedcircumstances, thesewordsretaintheirfull forceandare equallybinding nowas then.Together with thequestion of theOpposition'salleged prepara-tions for armedstruggleandour allegedlynegative attitudetoward the defense of the Soviet state, Iam obliged to callattention to a third dish on Stalin's menu of specialties-thecharge of terroristacts. As I discoveredon arriving in Con-stantinople,certainobscure reportshave alreadyappeared in theworldpress concerningallegedterroristplots said to involvecertain groups of the "Tlotskyist" Opposition. The gource of theserumorsis obviousto me. In lettersfrom Alma-AtaI frequentlywarnedmyfriendsthat Stalin,having takenthe road that hehad,wouldfind it an increasingly urgentnecessity to discover"terrorist plotting" amongthe "Tlotskyists.',To attributeplans for an ameduprisingto the Opposition,whichis led by a general staff of fully experiencedandreeponsiblerevolutionists, wasan unpromising task. A mucheasier job wouldbeto attributeterroristairnsto someanon1finouggroup of "Tlotskyists."Thatevidently is the direction Stalin,sefforts aretaking today.By crying out an advancewarningforall to hear,one may not render Stalin,s plans altogetherimpossible of fulfrllment, but at least one may makehis taskmoredifficult.Thatis why I s'n doing it.Stalin's methodsofstruggle are suchthat as earlyas 1926I feltobligedto say to him,during a meetingof thePolitburo,2sthat hewasmaking himselfa candidatefortheroleof gravedigger of therevolutionand of the party. I repeat that warningtodaywithredoubledemphasis.However,eventoday,we are as profoundlyconvincedaa we werein 1926 that the party will get the betterofStalinand not Stalinof the party.STALIN'S VICTORY2gFebruary 26, Lg29Stalin was elected general secretarywhile Leninwas still alive,in L922.At that time the posthad moreof a technical thanpolitical character.Nevertheless,eventhen,Lenin was opposedto Stalin's candidacy. It was preciselyin t,Lisregard thathespokeof a cook witha preferencefor pepperydishes.But Leninvielded on this pointto othermembersof the Politburo,thoughwith little enthusiaem: "We'll t4r it and see."Lenin'sillnessentirelychangedthe situation.Until thenLeninhadetoodat the central leverof power,heading upthe Politburo.The secondarylevel of work,that of implementingcentraldecisions,wasentruetedto Stalin as general secretary' All of theother membersof thePolitburowereoccupiedwiththeir ownspecial functions.Lenin's removalfromthe eceneautomatically placed thecentral lever inStalin'shands.This wasregardedas aprovisional arrangement.Noone proposed any changes becauseeveryonehopedfor Lenin's rapid recovery.Duringthat timeStalin was feverishlyactivein selectinghisfriends for advancement within the apparatus. Recoveringfromhis frrst stroke andtemporarilyreturning to work in 1922-23,Lenin was horrifiedat how far the bureaucratizationof theapparatus had gone andat how omnipotcntit seemed in relationto the masses of the party.Insistingthat I shouldbecome his deputyin the Council ofPeople'sCommissars,Lenin helddiscussionswithme aboutwaging a joint struggle againstStalin's bureaucratism.Thetaskwasto carrythis strugglethrough with theleast poesible numberof convulsionsand shocksto the party.40Stolin'sVictory 4lButLenin's healthagaingrew worse.Inhis so-calledtestament,writtenJanuary 4, 1923, Lenin insistentlycounseledthat the party remove Stalinfrom the centralworkbecauseof hisdisloyaltyand tendencyto abusehis power. But again Lenin hadto take to his bed.The provisional arrangementwith Stalin atthe helmwas renewed.Atthe same time hopesfor knin'srecovery were fastfading. The prospect that he would havetowithdraw fromthework altogetherbrought the question of theparty's leadership to thefore.At thattimenodifferencesof a principled naturehad yet takenshape. The grouping that opposedme had a purelypersonalcharacter.Thewatchwordof Zinoviev, Stalin,and Company was,"Don't let Tlotskytakeover theleadershipof the party." In thecourseof the laterstruggleby ZinovievandKamenevagainstStalin,the secretsof this earlierperiod were revealedby theparticipants in theconspiracy themselves. Fora conspiracyitwas.A secret Politburo(the Septemvirate)was createdconsistingofall themembersof the offrcialPolitburootherthan myself,and.,in addition,Kuibyshev, the present chairmanof the SupremeCouncil of National Economy.soAll questions were decidedinadvancein this secret center,whose members werebound bymutual vows. They undertooknot to engagein polemics againstoneanotherand at thesame time to seekopportunitiesto attackme. Thereweresimilarsecretcenters in the local organizations,and they were boundto theMoscowSeptemvirate by etrictdiscipline.For communications, specialcodeswere used. Thiswas a well-organized illegalgroup withinthe party, directedoriginallyagainst oneperson. Peoplewere selectedforresponsi-ble positions in theparty and state accordingto a singlecriterion:opposition to Tlotsky.During the prolonged "interregnum"created by Lenin'sillness,thiswork was carriedon untiringlybut stillcautiouslyand indisguised fashion, so thatin theeventof Lenin's recovery themined bridges couldbe keptintact. The conspiratorsactedbyhints.Candidatesfor posts wererequired to guess what waswantedof them. Thosewho "guessed"went up theladder.Thus aspecial typeof careerism came into beingwhichlater on acquiredthe public designation, "anti-Trotskyism."Lenin's deathuntiedthe conspirators'handsandallowedthemto comeinto the open.Partymemberswho raisedtheirvoicesin protest against thisconspiracybeca"'ethe victims of treacherous attacksbasedon42 Writingsof Leon TrotskY (1929)the mostfarfetched pretexts,often purely fabricatedones.Ontheotherhand, morally unstable elementsof the type which duringthe firstfive years of Soviet powerwouldhavebeenruthlesslydrivenout of the party now boughtinsurance for themselvesbynothing morethanhostileremarks against Trotsky.Beginninginlate1923the sameworkwascarried out in all the parties of theComintern:someleadersweredethronedandothersappointedintheir placesexclusivelyon the basisof their attitude towardTlotsky. A strenuoue,artificial process of selection was accom-plished,selection not of the bestbutof the mostadaptable' Thegeneral policywas to replaceindependent and Sifted people withmediocritieswho owedtheir poeitions entirely to the apparatus'And the highest expressionof that mediocrityof the apparatuscameto be Stalin himself.By late 1923 threequarters of the apparatus hadalreadybeenpicked overandlinedup, ready to carrythe fightinto the ranksof the party.Everytypeof weapon was ready andin place,waiting for the siginal to attack.Thenthe signalwas given.Thefirst two open "discussion" campaignsagainstme, in autumn1923 and autumn 1924,coincided-inboth instances-withmybeingtakenill, which preventedme from addressingany partymeetings.Withfurious pressure exerted by theCentralCommittee, theworkingoverof the rank andfrle began from all directionsatonce.My old differenceswithLenin,which precedednot onlytherevolutionbut the world war too andwhichhad longsincebeendissolved in our joint work,were suddenly draggedup into thelight of day, distorted,exaggerated,and presentedto theranks oftheuninitiatedin the party as mattersof most pressingurgency.Theranks were stunned,thrown off balance,intimidated.Simultaneouslythe methodof selecting personnelmoved down astep. Now itbecameimpossibleto hold a post as factorymanager,secretaryof a shop committee, chairmanof a countyexecutivecommittee,bookkeeper,or recordingsecretarywithoutrecommending oneself by one's anti-Tlotskyism'I avoidedentering into thisfightas longas possible, sinceitsnaturewas that of an unprincipled conspiracydirected againstme personally,at least in thefirst stages.It was clear to me thatsuch a fight, onceit broke out,would inevitably take onextremelysharpfeaturesand mightunder the conditionsof the revolution-arydictatorship leadto dangerousconsequences.This is not theplace to discusswhetherit was correct to try to maintainsomeStolin'eVictory 48commonground for collective work at the price of very greatpersonal concessionsor whetherIshouldhavetaken theoffensive all alongthe line, despitethe absence of euffrcientpolitical grounds for such action.Thefact is that I choeethe firstway and, in spite of everything,I do not regretit. Therearevictoriesthat lead intoblindalleys, andthere are defeats thatopenup new avenues.Evenafter profoundpolitical differenceshadcometo light,pushingpersonal intriguesway into the background, I triedtokeep thedisputewithin theboundsof a discussion of principlesand tried to counteractor prevent anyforcing of thJ issue,toallow for the possibility that the conflicting opinions andprognoses mightbe testedagainstfacte and experiences.By contrast, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin,who at firstcautiously concealedhimselfbehind the othertwo, pressed theissue withall theirmight.Theyhad no desire whatsoever for theparty to take time andthinkover the differences andtest theminthe light of experience.when ZinovievandKamenev broke withstalin, the latterautomatically directed againstthemthe sameanti-"TYotskyist" slandercampaign,withits overpowering forceof inertia, that the three of them togetherhad developed over aperiod of threeyears.Theforegoing is not a historical explanation of starin's victory,but simplya roughoutlineof howthat victory was won.Leastofall is it a complaint againstintrigue. A political line thatfindsthe causeof its defeatin the intrigues ofits adversaryis a blindandpathetic one. Intrigue is a particular kindol technicarimplementation of a task; it canonly pray a subordinate role.Greathistoricalquestions are resolved by the actionof greatsocialforces, not petty maneuvers.stalin's victory,in all its shakiness and uncertainty, expressessignificant shifts that have occurred in class relations in therevolutionary society.It is the triumph or semitriumph of certainlayers or groupings overothers. It is the reflection oichanges inthe international situation that have taken place in thehJt fewyears. But these issues constitutea themeof such scopeas willrequire separatetreatment.At thispoint only one thingshourdbe stated.Despite alr themistakes and confusion of the world press, hostile to Bolshevism,in evaluating the various stages and events in the internalstruggle in the USSR,it has on the wholemanagedto breakthroughthe outer husksto extractthe social kernelof that44 Writingsof LeonTlotskY (1929)struggle-namely, that Stalin'svictory is the victory of themoremoderate, moreconservative,bureauctatic, property'minded,andnationallylimited tendenciesoverthe tendenciessupportingtheinternational proletarian revolution and the traditionsof theBolshevikParty.To that extent I have no reaaonto protestagainstthe praiseof Stalin'srealismso commonlyencounteredin ttre bourgeois press. How solidand lastinghis victorywill beand what direction future developments will take-that issomething elseagain.WHEREISTHE SOVIETREPUBLIC GOING?3lFebruary 25, l92gsince the octoberRevolution,thisquestion has neverleft thecolumnsof the world press. At the present momentit is beingdiscussedin connectionwith my expulsionfromthe USSR,whichthe enemiesof Bolshevismregardas a symptomof the long-awaited "denouement."Thatmy expulsionhas an importancethat ie not personal but political is notfor me to deny.HoweverIdefinitely wouldnot adviseanyoneto jump to conclusionson thisoccasionabouta "beginningof the end.,,Thereis no need for a reminder that historical forecasts, unlikethoseof astronomy, are always conditional, containingoptionsand alternatives.Any claims to powers of exactprediction wouldbe ridiculous wherea struggle betweenlivingforcesis invorved..The task of historicalprediction is to differentiate betweenthepossible andthe impossible and to separatethe most likelyvariantsout from all thosethat are theoretically possible.To be well founded,anyanswerto thequestion of wheretheSovietrevolutionis going would haveto be the resultof ananalysisof all its innerforcesandof theworldsituationin whichtherevolution finds itself. A study of thatkindwouldhave tobe abook.In Alma-AtaI beganworkon such a book, andI hopetocompleteit in the near future.Here I can only indicatethe lines alongwhichthe answer mustbe sought:Is it true that the SovietUnionis on theverge ofannihilation?Haveits internalresourcesbeen exhausted?Whatmightfollowifitweredestroyed-democracy? dictatorship?restoration of themonarchy?Thecourseof the revolutionary process is muchmore complexthan thatof a mountain etream.But in both caseswhatmay4546 Writingsof Leon TYotakY (1929)seema highly paradoxical change of direction is actually quitenormal, thatis, in conformity with naturallaws. There is noreasonto expectschematic or superfrcial conforrnity withsuchlaws. One must proceed fromthe normalityof natureasdeterminedby the maesof the water'sflow' the local geologicalrelief, prevailingwind patterns,andeo on.In politics thatmeansbeingable to seebeyondthehighest upsurges ofthe revolutiontoforecastthe possibility andeven probability of sudden,sometimes prolongedperiodsof subsidence;and on theotherhand, attimesof greatestdecline, for example, during the Stolypincounterrevolution (1907-1910),32being able to distinguieh whatthe preconditionsare for a newupsurge.The three revolutions Russiahas experienced in the pastquarter of a centuryin factconstitute stages of one and the samerevolution. Between the first two stagestwelve years passed;betweenthe second and third-only ninemonths.The eleven yearsof theSoviet revolution in their turn may bebrokendowninto a seriesof stagee,there being twomainones'Lenin'sillnese andthe openingof thestruggle against"Tlotsky'ism" can be taken,roughly, as the dividins line betweenthem. Inthe frrst period,the masgee played the decisive role' Historyknoweof no other revolutionsettingeuch maeeesinto motion asthoseroused by the OctoberRevolution. Yet therearestilleccentrics today whoregardOctober as an adventure. Rcasoningin this way, theyreduceto nothing what theythemselves defend.Forof what valueis a social systemif it can be overthrownby an"adventure"? In realitythe successof theOctober Revolution-the very fact that it heldout throughthe most critical yearsagainst a hostof enemies-wasassurdby the activeinterven'tion andinitiative of the masaesof townand countrysidenumberingin the millions.It was onlyon this foundationthat agovernmentapparatus andRedArmy couldbe improvised. Such,at any rate,is themain conclueionI drawfrommy experience inthis area.Thesecond period,which brought abouta radicalchange in theleadership,is characterizedby anunquestionable reduction in thelevel of direct massintervention'Thestreamis oncemorecontained within its banks.Overand abovethe massesthecentralizedadministrativeapparatus risee higher andhigher.The Soviet state,like the army, becomesbureaucratized. Thedistance between the governinglayerand the masses growsgteater. Theapparatusacquiresa moreand moreself-sufficientWhereIs the fuuietRcpublic Going? 47character.Ttre govemment offrcialis increasingly fiued with theconviction thatthe octoberRevolution was madeprecisely inorderto concentrate power in his handsand assurehim aprivilegedposition.Thereis no need,I think,to explain that theactual,livingcontradictions in the development ofthe soviet state thatwe arepointing to do not serve in any way as argumentsin favorof theanarchist "rejection"of the state,that is, the unadorned andunproductive "rejection"of it in general.In a remarkable letter dealingwith the phenomenon ofdegeneration in the etateapparatusand party, myold friendRakovsky has sholvn in very strikingfashion that,aftcrtheconquest of power, an independent bureaucracy differentiateditself out fromtheworking-class milieuandthat thisdifferentia-tion was at firstonlyfunctional, thenlater becamesocial.gsNaturally, the processes within the bureaucracydeveloped inryla{on to theveryprofound processes under way in the country.On the basis of the NewEconomic policy3a a broadlayerof pettybourgeoisiein thetownereappeared or newly "r-" ioto Uling.Theliberalprofessions revived. In thecountryside, therichpeasant, the kulak,raised his head.Broadsectionsofoffrcialdom,precisely becausethey had risenup abovethemasses,drew cloeeto thebourgeois shata andestablished familytieswith them.Increasingly, initiative or criticiemonthe part of the masaes wa'viewedby the bureaucracy as interferetr"L. Ttt" apparatuswasable to exert pressure on the massesmore easilybecause, as hagbeenstated,the moodof reaction in the psychology ofthemaaae'themselves wasexpressedby an unquestionable reductionin thelevelof their political activity. It has happenednotinfrequentlyin recentyeara that workerghave heardbureaucrats or thenewproperty-owning elementsshout peremptorily at them: ,,This isn't1918anymore."In other worde,the relationship of forceshagshiftedto the disadvantage of the proletariat.corresponding to these processes were internal changeswithinthe ruling party itself.It shouldnot beforgottenfor a momentthatthe overwhelming majorityof the millions of party memberetodayhaveonlya vague understanding of what tfreparty was inthe first period of the revolution, to say nothing of theprerevolutionary underground. Suffrce it to say thatZb to g0percent of party members joined onlyafter1928.Thenumberofmemberswith prerevolutionary servicerecords is less than Ipercent. Beginning in 1923 theparty has been artificiallydiluted48 Writings of LeonTYotskY (1929)witha mase of half-raw recruits,whose role it was to serve agpliablematerial in thehandeof the apparatus professionals.Ttris-swamping of the revolutionary nucleusof the partywas thett*""J"ry precondition for the victoryof the apparatus over"Tlotskyism."Let us noteat this pointthat thebureaucratization ofthe partyand governmentestabliehments produced a high incidenceof"o"rrr-ption and arbitrariness. Ouropponents point totheeewithmalicious glee.It wouldhavebeenunnatural for themto dootherwise. but whenthey try to explain these phenomenaby theabsence of parliamentarydemocracy, it is enough to reply bypointingto ihelong eeries of "Panamas," beginning with the oneihi"h, thoughttof th" first, has become a pejorativeterm fo1everytiing of tn" kind,andending with the latest"Panama"involving-the Paris Gozetteand the formerFrench ministrKlotz.35 If someone were to argue that France constitutes anexceptionandthat,for example, in the unitedstates cormptionr-orrg politicians or governmentofficials is unknown, we wouldtry very hardto believethem.But let us returntoour subject. Themajorityofthisoffrcialdomwhich has risen up overthe maseesis profoundlyconservative.Theyareinclinedto think that everything needed for humanwell-beinghas alreadybeendone,and to regard anyone w-ho doesnotacknowledge this asan enemy. Theattitudeofthese elementstowardthe opposition ie oneof organic hatred;they accuse it ofsowing dissatisfaction toward them among the masses by"*p""r-rirrg criticisms,of undermining thestability of theregime,ani of threatening the gaineof October withthe specterof..permanent revolution."36 Ttrisconservative layer,whichconsti-tutcsstalin'smost powerful support in hig struggle against theOpposition, is inclinedto go muchfurther to the right,in thedirectionof the new propertiedelemente, thanStalin himselforthe main nucleus of his faction.Hencethe presentetrugglebetweenStalin and the right wing; hence,too,the prospectof anew purge in the party, not only of "Trotskyists," whoge numtershave grown considerably since theexpulsions and deportations,but also of the mostdegenerateelements withinthe bureaucracy.Thusstalin,s halftrearted policieshave developedin a seriesofzigzaga,withthe consequence that thetwowings of the party,left and right, have glown stronger-at the expense of thegoverningcenterfaction.- Although the etruggleagainst theright winghas not beenWhere Is theSouiet Republic Going? 49removedfrom the agenda,forstalinthe main enemy remains, asbefore,the left. Today thisno longerneedsto be proved. to itreopposition, thiswas obvioussome time ago. As ""ily ," the fiistwryksof the campaign.against theright wing,in aletter to mycothinkers from Alma-Ata on November l0 of lastyear, I wrotethat stalin'stacticalobjective was,when the momeirt *as right,"whenthe rightwing hadbeensufficiently terrified, to turn"hisfire abruptly againstthe left. . . . Thecampaign against therightis only to buildup momentum for a newonslaught againstthe left. Whoever fails to understand this, has undeltooanothing." Thisprediction cametrue soonerand morecompletelythan couldhave been expected.Whensomeone involved in a revolution beginsto backelideyrtloutbreaking from the revolution,s socialbaeeofsupport, thebackslider is forced to callhisdeclinea rise and p""" ti" "iglthand off as the left. It is precisely for that ""i"o., that ihestalinists accusethe oppositionof "counterrevolution,' andmakedesperate efforts to lump their opponents of theright and lefttogetherin oneheap.The same purposea areto be servedfromnow on by the use of theword ,,emigre.,, In reality, there aretwotrnegof emigre today: one,drivenout by themassupsurge of therevolution; andtheother, servingas an index ofthe succelbeingenjoyedby forces hostile to the revolution.When the Opposition speaks of Thermidor, drawing on theanalogy of the classicrevolution of thelate eighteenth ce:ntury,ithas in mind the dangerthat,in view of thl phenomena lndtendencies already indicated, the stalinists' struggle againsttheleft wing maybecome-the startingpoint for a "-t-"eat"-a "h.rrg" in the socialnatureof Soviet power.The question of Thermidor, which has played such animportant part in the struggle between the Opposition andth"rulingfaction, requires some further explanation.The former French president Herriot3l recently expressed theopinion that thesovietregime, which had relied upon violenceforten wholeyears, had by that veryfactpassedjudgment againstitself. Duringhis visit to Moscowin rg2i,Herriot, r" t "t a"Ltooahimat the time, trieda mores5rmpathetic, thougheven then notvery clear'cut, approach towardthe soviets.But nowthat a decade haspassed, he considers it timelyto withdraw his creditfrom theoctober Revolution. I confessI do not understand thepolitical thinking of theRadical very well. Revolutions havenever issuedshort-termpromissory notesto anyone. It took the50 Writingsof I'eon Tlotskv (1929)Great French Revolution ten years,notto installdemocracy, butto bringthe country to Bonapartism'38 Nevertheless it remainsbeyonidispute thatifthe Jacobins had not taken reprisalsaglinst theGirondists andhadnot showntheworld an exampleolho*to deal radically withthe oldorder,all ofhumanitytodaywould havebeen shorter by a head.3eRevolutions havenever yetpassedby leaving no traces uponthefateof humanity. But by the same token,they havenotalways presewedthe gainswonat the time of their highestupward "to*p. Aftercertainclasses, groups' or individuals havemadea revolution, othersbeginto profit from it' Onlya hopelesssycophantwoulddenytheworld-historicalsignificanceoftheir""iFr"rr"hRevolution, although the reaction which followeditwas so deepthat itled the countryto therestoration of theBourbons. Thefirst stage ontheroad of reaction wasThermidor.Ttrenewofficialsand new propertyownerswantedto enjoythefruitsof the revolution in peace.The old Jacobin intransigentswere an obstacleto them. Thenew propertiedlayers did not yetdareto appear under their own banner' They neededa coverfromwithinthe Jacobin milieu itself. They sought out someleadersforthe short term in the personsof certain Jacobins of the secondand third rank.swimming with thecurrent, theseJacobinspreparedthe way for the coming of Bonaparte, whowith hisLayonetsandhis legalcodesolidified the new property system'ilements of a Ttrermidorean process' to be sureonethat iscompletely distinctive, may aleo be foundin theland of theSoviets. They have becomestrikingly evident in recent years'Those whoarein powertodayeither played a secondary roleinthe decisiveeventsof thefirst periodof the revolution or wereoutright opponents of the revolution and only joined it after itrl,."ii"to"ious. They nowservefor themost part ae camouflageforthoselayersandgroupingswhich,whilehostiletosocialism,are too weakfor a counterrevolutionary overturn and therefore"""t" peacefulThermidorean switching back onto the trackIeadingio bourgeois society; they seekto "roll downhill with thebrakes on,"as one of theirideologists has put it'However,it would be a very greatmistake to regardall theseprocessesas havingbeencompleted' Fortunately for someandunfortunately for oiherg,that point is still a long wayoff' Thehistoricalanalogy is a tempting, andfor that reason dangerous'method. To suppose thatthere isa special cyclical law ofrevolutions, wtrictt compels them always to pass from oldWhere Is the SouietRepublicGoing?5tBourbonsto new, by way of a Bonapartiststage, would be tothink toosuperficially.The course of any revolutionis determinedby theuniquecombinationof forces on the national sceneand inthe whole internationalsituation.It remainsno less true thattherearecertainfeaturescommon to all revolutions thatdo admitof analogyandin factimperatively demandit if we are to baseourselveson thelessonsof the past and notto starthistoryoverfromscratchat eachnewstage.Itis possible to explain insociologicaltermswhy thetendencytoward Thermidor,Bona-partism, and Restorationare to be foundin everyvictoriousrevolution worthyof the name.The heart of the matter lies in thestrengthof thesetendencies,the way they are combined,the conditionsunderwhich theydevelop.Whenwe speakof the threatof Bonapartismwedonotin any wayconsiderit a foregoneconclueion,determinedby someabstracthistorical law.The furtherfate of the revolution will bedecidedby the courae of the struggle itself asthe living forces ofthe societyfight it out.Therewilletill beebbsandflows,whosedurationwill dependto a great extcnton thesituation in Europeand throughouttheworld.In an agelike ours, a political trendcan be regardedas hopelesslysmashedto bits onlyif it failstounderstandtheobjective causeeof its defeat andfeelsitself to bea helplesschipof wooduponthe flood-ifa chipofwoodcould besaid to have feeling.IS PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACYLIKELYTO REPLACETHE SOVIETS?40February 25, L929"If Soviet power is faced with mountingdiffrculties;if the crisisof leadershipin the dictatorshipis glowing increasingly acute;ifthe dangerof Bonapartism cannot be excluded-would it not bebetter to takethe road of democracy?" This questionis eitherposed point-blank or persists as an underlyingtheme in a greatmanyarticlesdevotedto recenteventsin the Sovietrepublic.It is not my objectto get into a discussionhere of what is bestandnotbest.Myaim is to disclosewhatis probabl.e,thatis, whatflowsfrom theobjective logicof developments.And I have cometo the conclusion that whatis least probableor' more preisely,what is absolutelyexcluded is a transition fromthe Sovietstoparliamentarydemocracy.Many newspapershave explainedto me politelyandin popularlanguagethat my expulsionwas the resultof the lack ofdemocracyinRussiaand, consequently,that Ishould notcomplain. But first of all, Ihavecomplainedto no one; andsecond,Ihavealso had occasionto be expelled from severaldemocracies.Thatadversariesof theSovietsshouldregardthepresent acutecrisisof leadership in the USSRas the inevitableconsequenceof the ruleof a dictatorship-a dictatorshipforwhichI, of course,assume fullresponsibilif-is quitein theorderof things.In the most general sensethisobservation is true.I am not in the least prepared,on the basisofmy being exiled,tooverthrowhistoricaldeterminism. But if the leadershipcrisis didnot arise by chancefromthe dictatorship,the dictatorship itselfalso did notariseby chance from the ehort'lived democracywhichreplacedczarismin February1917.If thedictatorship isguilty of repressionand all the other evils,then why did52Is Partiomentary Democrocy Likely? AZdemocracy prove itself powerless to preserve thecountry fromdictatorship? And where is the evidence to showthat it wouldnowbeableto hold dictatorship at bay, having taken its place?To express my idea moreclearly, f muet ""p"rrd the geoiaphical frame of reference and at least """all to tni"a ""i"i'tendencies of political development in Europe sincethe war,whichwasnot just an episode but the bloodyprologue to . ,r"*era.Almostall thosewho wereleaders in thewararestilr alive. Themajority of them eaid at the time thatit was therastwar, thatafterit wouldcomethe reignof peace anddemocracy. someofthemeven believedwhat they weresaying.But today not one ofthem wouldbe so boldas to repeat thosewords. Why?Becausethewar brought us into an ageof great tensions and greatconflicts, with the prospect of more great wars.At this hourpowerful trains are speeding toward each otherdown the trackeof world domination. Wecannot measure our epoch by theyardstick of theninetecnth century,which*." p"""Lirrentiy thecenturyof expanding democracy. In manyrespects the twentiethcentury willdifferfrom thenineteenth morethan a[ of modernhistoryhas fromthatof the MiddleAges.-In_ a Vienna newspaper, Herriot """"rrtly en,merated thecasesof democracy's retreatin the face of dictatorship. A*;;"installation of revolutionarypower in Russia and the defeat ofthe revolutionary movement ina numb"" of "oorrhi;;, -*"witnessed the establishment of fascist dictatorships throujhoutall of southern and eagternEurope. How can this extinction ofthe "altarfires"of democracy be explained? It is sometimes saiathat in these caseswe aredealing with states that arebackwardor immature. Thisexplanation is hardly applicable to ltalv. Sutevenwhere it is true,it explains nothing. In the nineieenthcenfury it was thought to be a law of history thatall backwardnations -would rise up the etairs of democracy. why thendoesthetygntiglh centuty drive these nationsdown the road to dictatoi-ship? We think that the explanation emerges fromthe factsthemselves. Democratic institutions have shoin that theycannotwithstand the pressure of presentday contradictions, -be thevinternational or internal or,most frequently, both kinde com_bined.Whether this is good or bad,it is a fact.- By analogy witll electrical engineering, democracy might bedefined as a system of safety ""rit"h"" andcircuit b"eakJrsro"protection against currents overloaded by the national or sociarstruggle. No period of human historyhasbeen_even remotely_54 Writingsof Leon llotskY (1929)so overcharged with antagonismeas oura.The overloadingoflines occuremoreand more frequentlyat different pointsin theEuropean power grid. Undertheimpact of classandinterna-tionalcontradictions that are too highly charged,the safetyswitchesof democracyeither burnout or explode.That isessentially what the short circuiting of dictatorship represents'At the sametime, the strengthof the contradictions withineach countr5r andon a worldscaleis not decliningbut growing'Thereare hardly any grounds forconsolation in the fact that theprocesshas only taken hold on the peripheryof the capitalistworld. Gout may etartin the littlefrnger or big toe,buteventuallyit reachesthe heart. Moreover,no matterwhat the state of affairsis in the countrieewhere capitalismis strongand democracyis oflongstanding-a questionthatwecannot go into here-whatwehave pointedout thue far, wefeel, throwssuffrcient light on thequestion posedin the title of this article.When people counterpose democracyto the Soviete,whattheyusually have in mind is simply the parliamentarysystem. Theyforget about theother sideof the queation,thedecisiveoneatthat-namely, thatthe OctoberRevolution cleared the pathforthe greatestdemocraticrevolution inhuman history' Theconfiecation of the landed estatee, the total elimination of thetraditionalclase privileges and distinctionsof Russiansociety,the destructionof the czaristbureaucraticandmilitary appara'tus, the introductionof nationalequality and national self-determination-all this wastheelementary democraticwork thatthe Februaryrevolutionbarelyevenaddressed itselfto beforeleavingit, almost untouched,for the October Revolutiontoinherit.It was preciselythe bankruptcy of the liberal-socialistcoalition, its incapacityfor this work, that made possibletheSovietdictatorship,basedon an allianceof the workers,peasants,and oppressednationalities. The very samecauses thatpreventedour weakand historicallybelated democracyfromcarryingout its elementary historical task will also prevent it inthefuturefrom placing itself at the headof the country.For inthe interveningtime, the problems anddiffrcultieshave growngEeateranddemocracY weaker.TheSoviet syetemis not simplya form of governmentthatcanbe comparedabstractlywith the parliamentary form.Aboveall itis a newform of propertyrelations. Whatis involved at bottomistheownershipof theland,the banks,the mines,thefactories,therailroads.Ttreworkingmassesremembervery well what thearistocrat,the biglandowner,the offrcial, theloanshark,theIs ParliamentaryDemacracyLikely?55capitalist, and the boss werein czarist Russia. Amongthemassesthere undoubtedlyexistsmuchhighlylegitimatedissatisfactionwith the present situationin the Soviet state.But the massesdonotwantthe landowner,the offrcial,or the boss back.One muetnot overlook these"trifles" in intoxicatingoneselfwith common-places about democracy.Againstthe landowner's return, thepeasants willfighttoday just as theydid ten years ago, to thelastdrop of blood.The great proprietor canreturn to his estatefrom emigrationonly astride a cannon, and he wouldhavetospendhis nightsouton the cannonas well. It is truethat thepeasants couldreconcilethemselvesmore easilyto the return ofthe capitalist, sincestate industrythus far has provided thepeasants with industrial products on less favorableterms thanthe merchantusedto earlier.This, weshould notein passing, isat the rootof all the internal difficulties.But the peaeantsremember that the landownerand capitalistwerethe Siamesetwins of the old regime,thatthey withdrew fromthescenetogether,that duringthecivilwarthey foughtagainst the Sovietstogether,and thatin theterritories occupiedby the Whitesthefactoryownertookbackthefactory, andthelandowner,the land.The peasant understandsthatthe capitalist would notcome backalone,butwiththe landlord.Thatis why the peasant wantsneither of them.And that is a mighty aourceof strength, eventhough in negativeform,for the Sovietregime.Thingsmustbe calledby their right names. Whatis involvedhere is not the introductionof somedieembodieddemocracybutreturningRussiato the capitalistroad.But what wouldRuesiancapitalism look like in its secondedition?Duringthe last fifteenyears the map of theworld has changed profoundly. The stronghave grown immeasurablystronger,the weakincomparablyweaker.The strugglefor world dominationhae assumedtitanicproportions. Thephases of this struggleare played outuponthebonesof the weak and backward nations.A capitalietRusgiacouldnot nowoccupyeventhe third-rateposition to whichczaristRussia was predestined by thecourse of theworldwar. Ruseiancapitalism todaywould be a dependent,semicolonial capitalismwithout any prospects. RussiaNumber 2 wouldoccupy a positionsomewherebetweenRuseia Number1 and India.TheSovietsystemwithits nationalizedindustryandmonopolyof foreigntrade,in spite of all its contradictionsand difficulties,is a protective system fortheeconomicand culturalindependenceof the country.This wasunderstoodevenby manydemocratswhowere attractedto the Soviet sidenotby socialism but by a56 Writingsof LeonTrotshY (1929)patriotism whichhadabsorbedsomeof theelementary lessons ofhistory.Tothis category belongmanyof theforcesof the nativetechnicalintelligentsia,as well as the new schoolof writerswhofor want of a more appropriatenameI havecalled the fellowt