Work of the Stalin in English (3 Tematicas)

8/12/2019 Work of the Stalin in English (3 Tematicas)

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Work of the Stalin in english (3 tematicas)

Correspondencia con Lenin y otros...Correspondencia con el Presidente Mao Tse TungProhiici!n de la armas at!micas

J.V. Stalin

Telegram to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pulished#Proletarskaya Revolutsia$ %o. &$ '3*Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works,,olume -$ pages '' / ''. "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$'23Transcription# 0ari umar for 4lliance/ML

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4rri9ed in Tsaritsyn on the th. ('):espite the confusion in e9ery sphere of economic life$ order can eestalished.

6n Tsaritsyn$ 4strakhan and Sarato9 the grain monopoly and fi;ed prices 1ere aolished y the So9iets*and there is chaos and profiteering. 0a9e secured the introduction of rationing and fi;ed prices inTsaritsyn. The same must e done in 4strakhan and Sarato9$ other1ise all grain 1ill flo1 a1ay throughthese profiteering channels. Let the Central ail transport is completely dislocated o1ing to the efforts of the multiplicity of collegiums andre9olutionary committees. 6 ha9e een oliged to appoint special commissars* they are alreadyestalishing order despite the protests of the collegiums. The commissars are disco9ering heaps oflocomoti9es in places 1here the collegiums did not suspect their e;istence. 6n9estigation has sho1nthat eight or more through trains a day can e sent y the Tsaritsyn/Po9orino/5alasho9/o?lo9/>ya?an/Mosco1 line. 4m no1 accumulating trains in Tsaritsyn. Within a 1eek 1e shall proclaim a@Arain Week@ and shall dispatch to Mosco1 right a1ay aout one million poods 1ith a special escortof rail1aymen$ of 1hich 6 shall gi9e you due notice.

The hold/up in ri9er transport is due to the fact that %i?hni/%o9gorod has not een sending steamers$presumaly ecause of the C?echoslo9aks. Ai9e orders that steamers e sent to Tsaritsyn immediately.

We ha9e information that in the uan$ in Sta9ropol$ there are fully reliale purchasing agents 1ho areusy getting out the grain from the South. 4 line is already eing laid from i?lyar to the sea* the0asa9 BurtPetro9sk line has not yet een restored. Let us ha9e Shlyapniko9$ ci9il engineers$ intelligent1orkmen$ also locomoti9e cre1s.

0a9e sent a messenger to 5aku$ and shall e lea9ing for the South myself in a day or t1o. Chief Trade4gent aitse9 1ill e arrested today for ag/trading and speculating in go9ernment goods. TellSchmidt not to send any more scoundrels. Let oo?e9 see to it that the fi9e/man collegium in,orone?h(7)in its o1n interests does not create difficulties for my agents.
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6t is reported that 5ataisk has een captured y the Aermans.

People=s CommissarStalin

(')Dn May 7$ ''$ the Council of Peoples Commissars appointed +.,.Stalin Aeneral :irector of

"ood 4ffairs in South >ussia. 0is mandate read#

@People=s Commissar +ospeh ,issarionio9ich Stalin$ Memer of the Council of Peoples Commissarshas een appointed y the Council of Peoples Commissars Aeneral :irector of "ood 4ffairs in South>ussia and is 9ested 1ith e;traordinary po1ers. Local and regional Councils of Peoples CommissarsSo9iets$ >e9olutionary Committees$ military staffs and chiefs of detachments$ rail1ay organi?ationsand station masters$ organisations of the ri9er and maritime merchant fleet$ post and telegraph$ andfood organi?ations and all commissars and emissaries are herey ordered to carry out the instructionsof Comrade Stalin.

Chairman$ Council of Peoples Commissars

"V.Ulyanov (Lenin)".

(7)The fi9e/man collegium 1as the administrati9e and technical directing ody of the 5oars of theMosco1/ie9/,orone?h other rail1ays 1ith head offices in ,orone?h.

Letter to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pulished# 6n part$ inPravda%o. 38'$ :ecemer 7'$'7Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works,,olume -$ pages '78 / '7'. "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$'23

Transcription# 0ari umar for 4lliance/ML0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882

To Comrade Lenin.

6 am hurrying to the front$ and 1riting only on usiness.

') The rail1ay south of Tsaritsyn has not yet een restored. 6 am firing or telling off all 1ho deser9e it$and 6 hope 1e shall ha9e it restored soon. Bou may rest assured that 1e shall spare noody$ neitheroursel9es nor others$ and shall deli9er the grain in spite of e9erything. 6f our military @e;perts@(unglersE) had not een asleep or loafing aout the line 1ould not ha9e een cut$ and if the line is

restored it 1ill not e thanks to$ ut in spite of$ the military.7) Large Fuantities of grain ha9e accumulated on rail south of Tsaritsyn. 4s soon as the line is cleared1e shall e sending you grain y through trains.

3) 0a9e recei9ed your communication.(')


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special authority (military) to take urgent measures in South >ussia efore it is too late.

5ecause of the ad communications et1een the order regions and the centre someone 1ith roadpo1ers is needed here on the spot so that urgent measures can e taken promptly. 6f you appointsomeone (1hoe9er it is) of# this purpose$ let us kno1 y direct 1ire$ and send his credentials also ydirect 1ire$ other1ise 1e risk ha9ing another Murmansk.(3)

6 send you a telegraphic tape on Turkestan.

That is all for the present.

Bours$StalinTsaritsyn$ +uly &$ ''

(')Dn the night of +uly $ ''$ Lenin informed Stalin of the re9olt of the @left@ Socialist>e9olutionaries (S>) in Mosco1. Lenin=s note$ 1hich 1as recei9ed in Tsaritsyn o9er direct 1ire yStalin personally$ stated# @ these 1retched hysterical ad9enturers$ 1ho ha9e ecome a tool of thecounterre9olutionaries$ must e ruthlessly suppressed e9ery1here..... Therefore sho1 no mercy to the

Left S>=s and keep us regularly informed@* LeninPravdano. 7'* +anuary 7 '3.

(7)4ddressed to S.A.Shaumyan$ Chairman of the 5aku Council of Peoples Commissars$ see:ocuments on the 0istory of the Ci9il War in the GSS> ,olume 7$ '-8$ p.78.

(3)The reference is to the occupation of Murmansk y 5ritish troops in ''.

Letter to V I Lenin

July 10, 1918

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9emer$ ''& / '78Pulisher # "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '23TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788Pulic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788). Bou may freely copy$ distriute$ display andperform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet4rchi9e@ as your source.

Comrade Lenin$ +ust a fe1 1ords.

') 6f Trotsky is going to hand out credentials right and left 1ithout thinkingIto Trifono9 (:on region)$to 49tonomo9 (uan region)$ to oppe (Sta9ropol)$ to memers of the "rench Mission (1ho deser9eto e arrested)$ etc.I it may e safely said that 1ithin a month e9erything here in the %orth Caucasus1ill go to pieces$ and 1e shall lose this region altogether. Trotsky is eha9ing in the 1ay 4ntono9 didat one time. nock it into his head that he must make no appointments 1ithout the kno1ledge of thelocal people$ other1ise the result 1ill e to discredit the So9iet po1er.

7) 6f you don=t let us ha9e aeroplanes and airmen$ armoured cars and /inch guns$ the Tsaritsyn "rontcannot hold out and the rail1ay 1ill e lost for a long time.
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3) There is plenty of grain in the South$ ut to get it 1e need a smoothly/1orking machine 1hich doesnot meet 1ith ostacles from troop trains$ army commanders and so on. More$ the military must assistthe food agents. The food Fuestion is naturally ound up

-) 1ith the military Fuestion. "or the good of the 1ork$ 6 need military po1ers. 6 ha9e already 1rittenaout this$ ut ha9e had no reply. ,ery 1ell$ in that case 6 shall myself$ 1ithout any formalities$ dismissarmy commanders and commissars 1ho are ruining the 1ork. The interests of the 1ork dictate this$

and$ of course$ not ha9ing a paper from Trotsky is not going to deter me.

J. Stalin

Tsaritsyn$

+uly '8$ ''

Letter to V I Lenin

August 4, 1918


The situation in the South is no easy one. The Military Council inherited a state of utter disruption$

caused partly y the inertness of the former commander$ and partly y a conspiracy on the part ofpersons appointed y him to the 9arious di9isions of the Military 4rea.


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Thus$ a situation has een created in 1hich communications 1ith the food areas of the South ha9e eense9ered$ and the Tsaritsyn area itself$ 1hich connects the centre 1ith the %orth Caucasus$ has in its turneen cut off$ or practically cut off$ from the centre.

6t 1as in 9ie1 of this that 1e decided to call off the offensi9e in the direction of Tikhoretskaya$ to takeup a defensi9e position$ 1ithdra1 the comat units from the Tsaritsyn "ront and from them form anorthern striking force of aout si; thousand men$ and direct them along the left ank of the :on as far

as the hoper >i9er. The aim of this mo9e is to clear the Tsaritsyn/Po9orino line$ turn the enemy=sflank$ disorgani?e him and hurl him ack. We ha9e e9ery reason to elie9e that 1e shall e ale toe;ecute this plan in the 9ery near future.

The unfa9ourale situation descried ao9e is to e attriuted #

') To the fact that the front/line soldier$ the @competent mu?hik$@ 1ho in Dctoer fought for the So9ietpo1er$ has no1 turned against it (he heartily detests the grain monopoly$ the fi;ed prices$ thereFuisitions and the measures against ag/trading).

7) To the Cossack make/up of Mirono9=s troops (the Cossack units 1hich call themsel9es So9iet areunale and un1illing to 1age a resolute fight against the Cossack counter/re9olutionaries* the Cossackscame o9er in 1hole regiments to Mirono9 in order to recei9e 1eapons$ acFuaint themsel9es 1ith the

disposition of our forces on the spot$ and then desert to rasno9$ carrying 1hole regiments along 1iththem* the Cossacks surrounded Mirono9 three times$ ecause they kne1 e9ery inch of his sector$ and$of course$ utterly routed him).

3) To the fact that ik9id?e=s units are uilt on the detachment principle$ 1hich makes liaison andcoordinated action impossile.

-) To the isolation$ ecause of all these reasons$ of Sie9ers= forces$ 1hich ha9e lost their support on theleft flank.

Dne fa9ourale factor on the Tsaritsyn/Aashun "ront is the complete elimination of the muddle due tothe detachment principle$ and the timely remo9al of the so/called e;perts (staunch supporters either ofthe Cossacks or of the 5ritish and "rench)$ 1hich has made it possile to 1in the sympathy of themilitary units and estalish iron discipline in them.

%o1 that communications 1ith the %orth Caucasus ha9e een cut$ the position as regards food hasecome hopeless. D9er se9en hundred 1agon/loads are standing on rail in the %orth Caucasus$ ando9er a million and a half poods are ready for dispatch$ ut it is Fuite impossile to get the freight outecause of the interruption of communications oth y rail and y sea (i?lyar and 5ryan/skoye are nolonger in our hands). There is Fuite a lot of grain in the Tsaritsyn$ otelniko9o and Aashun districts$ utit has to e har9ested$ and Chokprod 'is not adapted for this 1ork$ and has een unale to adapt itselfto this day. The crop must e gathered and hay must e pressed and accumulated in one spot$ ut Chok/prod has no presses. The grain har9est must e organi?ed on a large scale$ ut Chokprod=s organi?ersare utterly incompetent. The result is that food deli9eries are in a ad 1ay.

With the capture of alach 1e secured se9eral tens of thousands of poods of grain. 6 ha9e sent t1el9elorries to alach$ and as soon as 1e can get it to the rail1ay 6 shall send it to Mosco1. Aood or ad$har9esting is proceeding. 6 hope to secure se9eral tens of thousands of poods of grain in the ne;t fe1days and send it to you also. We ha9e more cattle here than 1e need$ ut there is 9ery little hay$ and1ithout hay dispatch of cattle in large Fuantities is impossile. 6t 1ould e 1ell to organi?e at least onecanning factory$ estalish a slaughter/house$ etc. 5ut$ unfortunately$ so far 6 ha9e een unale to findmen of kno1ledge and initiati9e. 6 ordered the otelniko9o agent to arrange for the salting of meat on alarge scale* the 1ork has egun and there are already results$ and if the usiness de9elops there 1ill eenough meat for the 1inter (-8$888 head of cattle ha9e accumulated in the otelniko9o district alone).
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There is no less cattle in 4strakhan than in otelniko9o$ ut the local food commissariat is doingnothing. The representati9es of the Perishale "oods Procurements 5oard are fast asleep$ and it may econfidently prophesied that they 1ill procure no meat. 6 ha9e sent an agent named almaye9 there toprocure meat and fish$ ut 6 ha9e had no 1ord from him yet.

The Sarato9 and Samara guernias are far more promising as far as food is concerned# there is plenty ofgrain there$ and 6 elie9e Bakuo9=s e;pedition 1ill e ale to get out half a million poods or e9en

more.

6n general$ it should e said that until communications 1ith the %orth Caucasus are restored$ 1e cannotcount (9ery much) on the Tsaritsyn area (as far as food is concerned).

Bours$

J. Stalin

Tsaritsyn$ 4ugust -$ ''

Notes'.Chokprod I egional "ood Committee in South >ussia.

Letter to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pulished# "irst pulished in '3$ in the maga?ine 5olshe9ik$ %o.7$Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works,,olume -$ pages '7. "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '23Transcription# 0ari umar for 4lliance/ML0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882

:ear Comrade Lenin$(')

The fight is on for the South and the Caspian. 6n order to keep all this area (and 1e cankeep itE) 1eneed se9eral light destroyers and a couple of sumarines (ask 4rtyom aout the details). 6 implore you$reak do1n all ostacles and so facilitate the immediate deli9ery of 1hat 1e reFuest. 5aku$ Turkestanand the %orth Caucasus 1ill e ours (unFuestionalyE)$ if our demands are immediately met.

Things at the front are going 1ell. 6 ha9e no dout that they 1ill go e9en etter (the Cossacks areecoming completely demorali?ed).

Warmest greetings$ my dear and elo9ed 6lyich.Bours$ Stalin4ugust 3'$ ''

(')Dn recei9ing +.,.Stalin=s letter$ ,.6.Lenin deleted the superscripsion and suscription and sent it toPetrograd as his personal directi9e.
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Report to V. I. Lenin

January 19, 1919


To Comrade Lenin.

We ha9e recei9ed your ciphered telegram. We ha9e already informed you of the reasons for thecatastrophe as re9ealed y the in9estigation# 'an army 1ith fatigued units and 1ith no reser9es nor a

firm command$ and$ moreo9er$ occupying a flank position open to en9elopment from the %orthIsuchan army could not ut collapse in the face of a serious assault of superior and fresh enemy forces. 6nour opinion$ the troule lay not only in the 1eakness of the Third 4rmy agencies and the immediaterear$ ut also

') 6n the Aeneral Staff and the 4rea Military Commissariats$ 1hich formed and sent to the front units1hich 1ere patently unreliale*

7) 6n the 4ll/>ussian Commissars 5ureau$ 1hich supplied the units eing formed in the rear 1ithcallo1 youths$ not commissars*

3) 6n the >e9olutionary Military Council of the >epulic$ 1hose so/called instructions and ordersdisorgani?ed the control of the front and the armies. Gnless the necessary changes are made at centralheadFuarters$ there can e no guarantee of success at the fronts.

0ere are our replies to the military.

'. The two rei!ents. T1o regiments surrendered# the 'st So9iet and a regiment of sailors from Petro/grad. They did not egin any hostile actions against us. 6t 1as the '8th Ca9alry >egiment of the '8th:i9ision stationed in the 9illage of 6lyinskoye$ 1hich had een formed y the Gral 4rea MilitaryCommissariat$ that started hostile actions. "urther$ 1e managed to forestall a mutiny of the '8th>egiment of e9olutionary Military Council of the army$ 1hich displayed incredile mismanagement. "i9e/si;thsof Moto9ilikha=s 1orkers 1ere left ehind in Perm$ as also 1ere the entire technical staff of the plantand its ra1 materials. 4ccording to a9ailale information$ the plant can e restarted in aout a monthand a half. >umours of a re9olt of the Moto9ilikha 1orkers on the e9e of the fall of Perm are not
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confirmed* there 1as only serious unrest due to ad food supply.

3.#e!olition o$ the %ride and valua%le installations. The ridge$ etc.$ 1ere not lo1n up o1ing tomismanagement on the part of the >e9olutionary Military Council of the army and lack of liaisonet1een the retreating units and army headFuarters. 6t is asserted that the comrade 1hose duty it 1as tolo1 up the ridge could not accomplish his mission ecause he 1as killed y 1hiteguards a fe1minutes efore the charge 1as to e fired. 6t has een impossile so far to 9erify this 9ersion ecause of

the flight of the ridge guards and the departure of a 1hole numer of @So9iet@ officials @no one kno1s1hereto.@

-.Reserves at Per!. The reser9es consisted of one still 1eak and unreliale @So9iet regiment$@ 1hichupon its arri9al at the front immediately 1ent o9er to the enemy. There 1ere no other reser9es.

2.Losses o$ !ateriel and !en.6t is still impossile to construct a full picture of the losses ecause ofthe disappearance of a numer of documents and the desertion to the enemy of a numer of the@So9iet@ specialists concerned.

4ccording to the scanty data a9ailale$ our losses 1ere# 7& locomoti9es (of 1hich$ in disrepair)$aout 3$888 rail1ay 1agons (proaly more)$ 88$888 poods of oil and paraffin$ se9eral hundredthousand poods of caustic soda$ t1o million poods of salt$ fi9e million rules= 1orth of medical

supplies$ the storehouses of the Moto9ilikha plant and the Perm rail1ayshops 1ith the 9ast amount ofmaterials they contained$ the machinery and parts of the Moto9ilikha plant$ the machinery of thesteamers of the ama flotilla$ 2 1agon/loads of leather$ '28 1agon/loads of food elonging to thearmy supply di9ision$ the huge 1arehouse of the :istrict/ Water Transport 5oard containing cotton1ool$ te;tiles$ mineral oil$ etc.$ ten cars of 1ounded$ the a;le stores of the rail1ays 1hich includedlarge stocks of 4merican a;les$ 7 guns$ '8$888 shells$ 7$888 rifles$ million cartridges* o9er $888men killed$ 1ounded or missing in the period :ecemer 77 to 7. The rail1ay specialists andpractically all the supply specialists ha9e remained in Perm. The counting of losses continues.

.Present $ihtin strenth o$ the ar!y. The Third 4rmy consists at present of t1o di9isions (7th and38th)$ 1ith '-$888 ayonets and 3$888 sares$ 373 machine guns and & guns. >eser9es# a rigade of

the &th :i9ision sent from >ussia 1hich has not yet een sent into action ecause of its unreliailityand need of thorough sifting. The three regiments promised y ,atsetis ha9e not yet arri9ed (and 1illnot$ ecause yesterday$ it appears$ they 1ere redirected to %ar9a). 3The units in action are attered and1orn out and are holding their positions 1ith difficulty.

&. &ontrol syste! o$ the Third 'r!y. Dut1ardly$ the system of control seems the usual one and@according to the manual.@ 4ctually$ there is no system at allIthe administration is utterlyincompetent$ has no liaison 1ith the comat area$ and the di9isions are 9irtually autonomous.

.ave adeuate !easures %een taken to halt the retreat* Df the measures taken$ the follo1ing may econsidered of serious 9alue# ') ad9ance of the Second 4rmy to1ards ungur$ 1hich is undoutedly ofgreat support to the Third 4rmy$ and 7) the dispatch to the front$ thanks to the efforts of Stalin and:?er?hinsky$ of 88 fresh and fully reliale ayonets 1ith the oJect of raising the fallen morale of theThird 4rmy. Within a couple of days 1e shall dispatch to the front t1o sFuadrons of ca9alry and the7nd >egiment of the 3rd 5rigade (already sifted). 4nother regiment 1ill e lea9ing in ten days. Thefront of the Third 4rmy kno1s this and sees the solicitude of the rear$ and its morale is stiffening.Without a dout$ the situation is etter than it 1as a fortnight ago. 6n places the army is e9en assumingthe offensi9e$ and not 1ithout success. 6f the enemy allo1s us another couple of 1eeks= respite$ that is$if he does not ring up fresh forces to the front$ there is hope that a stale situation 1ill e created inthe Third 4rmy=s area.

We are at present engaged in liFuidating a northern en9eloping mo9ement of se9eral enemy
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detachments in the direction of ,yatka$ along the road that runs through aigorod. Dne reason$incidentally$ 1hy 1e ha9e come to ,yatka is to send a ski detachment to aigorod$ 1hich 1e shall do.4s to other measures (for strengthening the rear)$ 1e are moili?ing personnel$ rank/and/file andother1ise$ and appointing them to the army units in the rear$ and are purging the Ala?o9 and ,yatkaSo9iets. 5ut$ of course$ the results of this 1ork 1ill not make themsel9es felt for some time.

This e;hausts the measures taken. They can y no means e considered adeFuate$ ecause the 1eary

units of the Third 4rmy cannot hold on for long 1ithout at least partial replacement. 6t is thereforenecessary to send us at least t1o regiments. Dnly then may the staility of the front e consideredguaranteed. 4part from this$ it is necessary#

') To replace the army commander*

7) To send three efficient political 1orkers*

3) To dissol9e immediately the >egional Party Committee$ >egional So9iet$ etc.$ 1ith a 9ie1 to thespeedy moili?ation of the e9acuated officials.

J. StalinF. Dzerzhinsky

,yatka$ +anuary '$ ''

P. S. We shall e returning to Ala?o9 in a fe1 days to complete the in9estigation.

Notes

'.Dn +anuary '3$ ''$ +. ,. Stalin and ". eport@ on the progress of the inFuiry into the reasons for the Permdisaster. 6t also outlined the measures proposed y the commission for restoring the situation in theThird 4rmy sector and to enale the army to pass to the offensi9e. 6n response to the report$ ,. 6. Lenin$

on +anuary '-$ sent the follo1ing telegram#@To Stalin and :?er?hinsky at their address in Ala?o9.

@0a9e recei9ed and read your first ciphered dispatch. ussian


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Written# May 72$ '' (')"irst Pulished# in the symposium#ocu!ents on the eroic #e$ence o$ Petrorad in ++$ Mosco1$'-'Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works,,olume -$ page 7/7&8. "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$'23Transcription# 0ari umar for 4lliance/ML

0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882

The dispatch of units is undoutedly etter organi?ed no1 than it 1as some three months ago$ ut it isalso clear to me that neither the Commander/in/Chief nor his chief of staff kno1 anything aout theunits 1hich are eing sent to Petrograd. 0ence such surprises as the arri9al of mere handfuls of menunder the guise of regiments of the 7nd 5rigade or the Ca9alry 5rigade from a?an. 4t any rate$Petrograd has recei9ed so far only si; hundred men from military schools 1ho are really fit for action.

5ut the chief thing$ of course$ is not the Fuantity$ ut the Fuality of the units. 4ll 1e need to dri9e the1hole pack eyond %ar9a is three infantry regiments I fit for action$ of course I and at least oneca9alry regiment. 6f you could ha9e seen your 1ay to meet this small reFuest in time$ the easons# first$ if ig units are to e con9erted

into floating rafts it 1ill e impossile to operate their guns$ that is$ the latter 1ill simply not shoot$ecause there is a direct connection et1een the mo9ement of a ship and the action of its guns*secondly$ it is not true that 1e ha9e no large/calire shells / the other day t1el9e arge/loads of shells1ere @disco9ered@* thirdly$ the fuel crisis is passing$ ecause 1e ha9e already succeeded inaccumulating four hundred and t1enty thousand poods of coal$ apart from ma?ut$ and are recei9ing atrainload of coal daily* fourthly$ 6 ha9e con9inced myself that our na9y is eing turned into a real na9y$1ith 1ell/disciplined sailors 1ho are prepared to defend Petrograd might and main.

6 do not 1ant to mention here the numer of attle units already fit for action$ ut 6 consider it my dutyto say that 1ith the na9al forces a9ailale 1e could defend Petrograd 1ith credit against any attackfrom the sea.

6n 9ie1 of this$ 6$ and all the Petrograd comrades$ insist that the Commander/in/Chief=s proposal ereJected. "urther$ 6 consider it asolutely essential that coal deli9eries e increased to t1o trainloads aday for a period of three or four 1eeks. This$ our na9al men assure us$ 1ill enale us to put oursumarine and surface fleet definitely in fighting trim.

Stalin

(')6n connection 1ith Budenich=s offensi9e of May '' and the threat of encirclement and capture ofPetrograd y the Whites$ +.,.Stalin 1as sent to the Petrograd "ront as plenipotentiary of the Council of
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:efense$ 1hich furnished him 1ith a mandate$ dated May '&th ''$ stating that he 1as eing sent ona mission to the Petrograd and other areas of the Western "ront for @the adoption of all urgent measuresnecessitated y the situation on the Western "ront.@ +.,.Stalin arri9ed in Petrograd on May '$ ''.

Telegram to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pulished#Pravda%o. 38'$ :ecemer 7'$'7Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works,,olume -$ page 7&'. "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '23Transcription# 0ari umar for 4lliance/ML0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882

"ollo1ing the capture of rasnaya Aorka$ Seraya Loshad(')has een taken. Their guns are in perfectorder. 4 rapid check of all the forts and fortresses is under 1ay.

%a9al e;perts assert that the capture of rasnaya Aorka from the sea runs counter to na9al science. 6

can only deplore such so/called science. The s1ift capture of Aorka 1as due to the grossestinterference in the operations y me and ci9ilians generally$ e9en to the point of countermanding orderson land and sea and imposing our o1n.

6 consider it my duty to declare that 6 shall continue to act in this 1ay in future$ despite all myre9erence for science.

Stalin

+une '$ ''

(')Succuming to the counter/re9olutionary agitation of 1hite guards connected 1ith the Socialist/>e9olutionaries and Menshe9iks$ the garrisons of rasnya Aorka and Seraya Loshad$ t1o forts nearPetrograd$ mutinied against the So9iet Ao9ernment on +une '3 ''. That day$ on +.,.Stalin=s orders$9essels of the 5altic "leet put out to sea to take action against the mutineers.$ 4t the same time a core$1as formed in Dranienaum. Dn +une '-$ +.,. Stalin arri9ed in Dranienaum$ and conferred 1ithrepresentati9es of the na9al and army commands and commanders and commissars of units anddetachments. The plan he proposed for the capture of rasnaya Aorka y a simultaneous lo1 from seaand land 1as adopted. The attack 1as launched on +une '2 y the Coastal Aroup and other units$supported y 9essels of the 5altic "leet$ the operation eing personally directed y +.,.Stalin from theattle lines. The mutineers 1ere o9er1helmed at the approaches to ranaya Aorka$ and at 8.38 am on+une ' the fort 1as captured. Seraya Loshad 1as taken a fe1 hours later.

Note to V. I. Lenin from Petrograd y Dire!t"ire

June 18, 1919
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6 consider it necessary to dra1 your attention to the follo1ing Fuestions.

-irst.olchak is the most serious enemy$ ecause he has sufficient space for retreat$ sufficient manpo1er for his army$ and a rear aounding in food. Compared 1ith olchak$ Aeneral >od?yanko is amere gnat$ ecause he has neither food in his rear$ nor space for retreat$ nor sufficient man po1er. Themoili?ation of t1enty age classes$ to 1hich he is no1 compelled to resort in his t1o or three uye?dso1ing to lack of man po1er$ 1ill mean the end of him$ since the peasants cannot stand moili?ation onsuch a scale and are ound to turn a1ay from him. ConseFuently$ under no circumstances should forcese 1ithdra1n from the od?yan/ko. The rele9ant documents ha9e fallen into our hands.

6t is no1 clear to me 1hy >od?yank$ 1ith his relati9ely small forces$ ad9anced so ra?enly on Petro/grad. The insolence of the "inns is no1 also understandale. Gnderstandale$ too$ are the 1holesaledesertions of our comat officers. So is the strange fact that at the moment of the etrayal of rasnayaAorka the 5ritish 1arships 9anished from the scene* the 5ritish$ o9iously$ considered that direct

interference on their part (inter9entionE) 1ould not e @con9enient$@ and preferred to turn up after thefortress and the fleet had fallen into the hands of the Whites$ 1ith the oJect of @helping the >ussianpeople@ to estalish a ne1$ @democratic system.@

D9iously$ >od?yanko and Budenich (to the latter can e traced all the threads of the conspiracy$ 1hich1as financed y 5ritain through the 6talian$ S1iss and :anish emassies) ased their 1hole scheme onthe e;pectation of a successful issue of the conspiracy$ 1hich$ 6 hope$ 1e ha9e nipped in the ud (allpersons implicated ha9e een arrested and the in9estigation is proceeding).

My reFuest# make no rela;ations in regard to the arrested emassy officials$ keep them in strictconfinement until the completion of the in9estigation$ 1hich is re9ealing a host of ne1 threads.

6 shall gi9e you a more detailed account 1ithin three or four days$ y 1hich time 6 hope to come to

Mosco1 for a day$ if you ha9e no oJection.

6 am sending the map. 6 could not do so until no1 simply ecause 6 1as a1ay all the time on front/lineusiness$ mostly at the front itself.

Stalin

+une '$ ''$ 3 a. m.

"irst pulished in Pra9da$ %o. 23$ "eruary 73$ '-'


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Note to V. I. Lenin from Petrograd y Dire!t"ire

June 18, 1919


6 consider it necessary to dra1 your attention to the follo1ing Fuestions.

-irst.olchak is the most serious enemy$ ecause he has sufficient space for retreat$ sufficient manpo1er for his army$ and a rear aounding in food. Compared 1ith olchak$ Aeneral >od?yanko is amere gnat$ ecause he has neither food in his rear$ nor space for retreat$ nor sufficient man po1er. Themoili?ation of t1enty age classes$ to 1hich he is no1 compelled to resort in his t1o or three uye?dso1ing to lack of man po1er$ 1ill mean the end of him$ since the peasants cannot stand moili?ation onsuch a scale and are ound to turn a1ay from him. ConseFuently$ under no circumstances should forcese 1ithdra1n from the od?yan/ko. The rele9ant documents ha9e fallen into our hands.

6t is no1 clear to me 1hy >od?yank$ 1ith his relati9ely small forces$ ad9anced so ra?enly on Petro/grad. The insolence of the "inns is no1 also understandale. Gnderstandale$ too$ are the 1holesaledesertions of our comat officers. So is the strange fact that at the moment of the etrayal of rasnayaAorka the 5ritish 1arships 9anished from the scene* the 5ritish$ o9iously$ considered that directinterference on their part (inter9entionE) 1ould not e @con9enient$@ and preferred to turn up after thefortress and the fleet had fallen into the hands of the Whites$ 1ith the oJect of @helping the >ussianpeople@ to estalish a ne1$ @democratic system.@

D9iously$ >od?yanko and Budenich (to the latter can e traced all the threads of the conspiracy$ 1hich1as financed y 5ritain through the 6talian$ S1iss and :anish emassies) ased their 1hole scheme onthe e;pectation of a successful issue of the conspiracy$ 1hich$ 6 hope$ 1e ha9e nipped in the ud (allpersons implicated ha9e een arrested and the in9estigation is proceeding).

My reFuest# make no rela;ations in regard to the arrested emassy officials$ keep them in strictconfinement until the completion of the in9estigation$ 1hich is re9ealing a host of ne1 threads.

6 shall gi9e you a more detailed account 1ithin three or four days$ y 1hich time 6 hope to come toMosco1 for a day$ if you ha9e no oJection.


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6 am sending the map. 6 could not do so until no1 simply ecause 6 1as a1ay all the time on front/lineusiness$ mostly at the front itself.

Stalin

+une '$ ''$ 3 a. m.

"irst pulished in Pra9da$ %o. 23$ "eruary 73$ '-'

Letter to V. I. Lenin ao#t the Sit#ation on the"estern Front $

August 11, 1919


To Comrade Lenin.

The situation on the Western "ront is ecoming more and more ominous.

The old$ attered and 1eary units of the Si;teenth 4rmy$ 1hich is eing hard pressed y the mostacti9e enemy on the Western "rontIthe PolesIare not only unale to 1ithstand the onslaught$ are notonly unale to defend themsel9es$ ut ha9e e9en ecome incapale of co9ering the retreat of theiratteries$ 1hich are$ naturally$ falling into the hands of the enemy. 6 am afraid that$ 1ith its units insuch a state$ the Si;teenth 4rmy in its retreat to the 5ere?ina 1ill find itself 1ithout guns or aggagetrains. There is also the danger that the attered and asolutely demorali?ed cadres of the maJority ofthe regiments may soon e incapale of assimilating replenishments$ 1hich moreo9er I it must esaid I are arri9ing 1ith preposterous delay.

The enemy is dri9ing to1ards the 5ere?ina along t1o main directions# to1ards 5oriso9$ and to1ardsSlutsk and 5oruisk. 4nd he is dri9ing successfully$ for he has already ad9anced some thirty 9ersts inthe direction of 5oriso9$ and in the South$ 1ith the capture of Slutsk$ he has sei?ed possession of the

key to 5oruiskIthe splendid high1ay$ the only one in the area.

6f 5oriso9 is captured$ and if$ as is likely$ the se9erely attered '&th :i9ision of the Si;teenth 4rmyrolls ack as a result$ the "ifteenth 4rmy 1ill e in Jeopardy$ and Polotsk and :9insk 1ill e directlymenaced. 4nd if 5oruisk is captured and the enemy strikes at >echitsa (1hich is his direct aim)$ theentire Pripyat group of the Si;teenth 4rmy$ that is$ the th :i9ision$ 1ill automatically suffer disaster$Aomel 1ill e directly threatened$ and the flank of the T1elfth 4rmy 1ill e laid are.

6n rief$ if 1e allo1 the enemy to knock out our Si;teenth 4rmy$ and he is already doing it$ 1e shall eletting do1n the "ifteenth and T1elfth 4rmies$ and 1e shall then ha9e to repair not only the Si;teenth


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4rmy ut the 1hole front$ and at a far hea9ier cost.

iga$ Warsa1 and ishine9.

4out three 1eeks ago 6 elie9ed that one di9ision 1ould e enough to enale us to launch anoffensi9e and occupy the Molodechno and 5arano9ichi Junctions. %o1 one di9ision may not eenough e9en to enale us to hold the 5oriso9/5oruisk/Mo?yr line.

4 successful offensi9e is not e9en to e thought of$ ecause for this 1e should no1 (4ugust '') need atleast t1o or three di9isions.

%o1 decide yourself# can you let us ha9e one di9ision$ if only in successi9e rigades$ or are you goingto allo1 the enemy to smash the already crumling Si;teenth 4rmy 5ut decide 1ithout delay$ ecausee9ery hour is precious.

Bours$

+. Stalin

P. S. This letter has een read and appro9ed y all the memers of the >e9olutionary Military Councilof the Western "ront$ not e;cluding the "ront Commander. 4 similar statement 1ill e sent in a day ort1o to the >e9olutionary Military Council of the >epulic.

J. St.

Smolensk$ 4ugust ''$ ''

Notes

'.4t the eginning of +uly '' the Polish 1hiteguards launched a general offensi9e and created adirect threat to the So9iet >epulic from the West. +. ,. Stalin 1as instructed y the Central Committeeof the Party to take o9er personal direction of the Western "ront. 0e 1as appointed a memer of the>e9olutionary Military Council of the Western "ront$ and he arri9ed at front headFuarters in Smolenskon +uly $ ''.
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Letter to T% V. I. Leninfrom the So#thern Front $

October 15, 1919


Comrade Lenin$

4out t1o months ago Aeneral 0eadFuarters did not oJect in principle to the main lo1 eingdeli9ered from 1est to east$ through the :onets 5asin. 4nd if it reJected it ne9ertheless$ it 1as on theplea of the @legacy@ left y the retreat of the southern troops in the summer$ that is$ the hapha?ardgrouping of troops in the area of the present South/epulic$ 1hich is culti9ated in Aeneral 0eadFuartersy that @strategic@ antam cock Ause9. The other day Aeneral 0eadFuarters issued instructions toShorin to ad9ance from the Tsaritsyn area on %o9orossiisk through the :on steppe y a line along1hich it may e con9enient for our a9iators to fly$ ut along 1hich our infantry and our artillery 1illfind it Fuite impossile to plod. 6t does not need to e pro9ed that this insane (proJected) campaignthrough a hostile en9ironment and 1here there are asolutely no roadsthreatens us 1ith utter disaster.6t should not e difficult to understand that such a campaign against Cossack 9illages$ as recente;perience has sho1n$ can only rally the Cossacks around :enikin and against us in defence of their9illages$ can only ser9e to set up :enikin as the sa9iour of the :on$ can only create a Cossack army for:enikin$ that is$ can only strengthen :enikin.

Precisely for this reason it is essential at once$ 1ithout loss of time$ to change the old plan$ 1hich hasalready een aolished in practice$ and replace it y a plan under 1hich the main lo1 1ill e directedfrom the ,orone?h area$ through harko9 and the :onets 5asin$ on >osto9. "irstly$ here 1e shall ha9ean en9ironment that is not hostile$ ut on the contrary$ sympathetic to us$ 1hich 1ill facilitate ourad9ance. Secondly$ 1e shall secure a most important rail1ay net1ork (:onets) and the maJor supplyartery of :enikin=s armyIthe ,orone?h/>osto9 line (the loss of 1hich 1ill lea9e the Cossack army1ithout supplies in the 1inter$ ecause the :on >i9er$ y 1hich the :on 4rmy is supplied$ 1ill ha9e


17/43

fro?en o9er$ and the ail1ay$ Likhaya/Tsaritsyn$ 1ill e cut). Thirdly$ y this ad9ance 1eshall e cutting :enikin=s army in t1o$ one part of 1hich$ the ,olunteer 4rmy$ 1e shall lea9e toMakhno to de9our$ 1hile the Cossack armies 1e shall threaten 1ith the danger of eing outflanked."ourthly$ 1e shall e in a position to set the Cossacks at loggerheads 1ith :enikin$ 1ho$ if our ad9anceis successful$ 1ill endea9our to mo9e the Cossack units 1est1ard$ to 1hich the maJority of theCossacks 1ill not agree$ if$ of course$ y that time 1e put efore them the issue of peace$ of

negotiations for peace$ and so on. "ifthly$ 1e shall secure coal$ and :enikin 1ill e left 1ithout coal.This plan must e adopted 1ithout delay$ since Aeneral 0eadFuarters= plan of transfer and distriutionof regiments threatens to nullify our recent successes on the Southern "ront. 6 say nothing of the factthat Aeneral 0eadFuarters is ignoring$ and* has 9irtually rescinded$ the recent decision of the CentralCommittee and the [email protected].(5.) of Septemer 7$ ''$ +. ,. Stalin 1as sent to the Southern "rontto organi?e the defeat of :enikin. 0e arri9ed at front headFuarters on Dctoer 3. The plan he proposedfor routing :enikin 1as appro9ed y the Central Committee of the Party.

Telegram to V. I. Lenin

October 26, 1919

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The Ca9alry Corps of Shkuro and Mamonto9$ created after such long effort y the ed heroes. 4 mass of trophies has eencaptured and is no1 eing counted. 6t is already ascertained that all the enemys personally namedarmoured trains ha9e een captured$ the Aeneral Shkuro 4rmoured Train first among them. Pursuit ofthe routed enemy continues. The halo of in9inciility created around the names of Aenerals Mamonto9

and Shkuro has een shattered y the 9alour of the >ed heroes of Comrade 5udyonnys Ca9alry Corps.>e9olutionary Military Council of the Southern "ront

Stalin

Dctoer 72$ ''

Petroradskaya Pravda, %o. 7--$ Dctoer 7$ ''

Lenin as the organiser and leader of the R#ssian

&omm#nist PartyApril 23, 1920


There are t1o groups of Mar;ists. 5oth 1ork under the flag of Mar;ism and consider themsel9es@genuinely@ Mar;ist. %e9ertheless$ they are y no means identical. More$ a 9eritale gulf di9ides them$for their methods of 1ork are diametrically opposed to each other.

The first group usually confines itself to an out1ard acceptance$ to a ceremonial a9o1al of Mar;ism.5eing unale or un1illing to grasp the essence of Mar;ism$ eing unale or un1illing to put it intopractice$ it con9erts the li9ing$ re9olutionary principles of Mar;ism into lifeless$ meaningless formulas.6t does not ase its acti9ities on e;perience$ on 1hat practical 1ork teaches$ ut on Fuotations fromMar;. 6t does not deri9e its instructions and directions from an analysis of li9ing reality$ ut fromanalogies and historical parallels. :iscrepancy et1een 1ord and deed is the chief malady of this

group. 0ence the disillusionment and perpetual grudge against fate$ 1hich time and again lets it do1nand makes a @dupe@ of it. The name for this group is Menshe9ism (in >ussia)$ opportunism (in


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not ase its acti9ities on Fuotations and ma;ims$ ut on practical e;perience$ testing e9ery step ye;perience$ learning from its mistakes and teaching others ho1 to uild a ne1 life. That$ in fact$e;plains 1hy there is no discrepancy et1een 1ord and deed in the acti9ities of this group$ and 1hythe teachings of Mar; completely retain their li9ing$ re9olutionary force. To this group may e fullyapplied Mar;=s saying that Mar;ists cannot rest content 1ith interpreting the 1orld$ ut must go furtherand change it. 7The name for this group is 5olshe9ism$ communism.

The organi?er and leader of this group is ,. 6. Lenin.

ILenin as the organiser of the R#ssian &omm#nist Party

The formation of the proletarian party in >ussia took place under special conditions$ differing fromthose pre9ailing in the West at the time the 1orkers= party 1as formed there. Whereas in the West$ in"rance and in Aermany$ the 1orkers= party emerged from the trade unions at a time 1hen trade unionsand parties 1ere legal$ 1hen the ourgeois re9olution had already taken place$ 1hen ourgeoisparliaments e;isted$ 1hen the ourgeoisie$ ha9ing climed into po1er$ found itself confronted y theproletariatIin >ussia$ on the contrary$ the formation of the proletarian party took place under a most

ferocious asolutism$ in e;pectation of a ourgeois/democratic re9olution* at a time 1hen$ on the onehand$ the Party organi?ations 1ere filled to o9erflo1ing 1ith ourgeois @legal Mar;ists@ 1ho 1erethirsting to utili?e the 1orking class for the ourgeois re9olution$ and 1hen$ on the other hand$ thetsarist gendarmerie 1as roing the Party=s ranks of its est 1orkers$ 1hile the gro1th of a spontaneousre9olutionary mo9ement called for the e;istence of a staunch$ compact and sufficiently secret fightingcore of re9olutionaries$ capale of directing the mo9ement to the o9erthro1 of asolutism.

The task 1as to separate the sheep from the goats$ to dissociate oneself from alien elements$ to organi?ecadres of e;perienced re9olutionaries in the localities$ to pro9ide them 1ith a clear programme andfirm tactics$ and$ lastly$ to gather these cadres into a single$ militant organi?ation of professionalre9olutionaries$ sufficiently secret to 1ithstand the onslaughts of the gendarmes$ ut at the same timesufficiently connected 1ith the masses to lead them into attle at the reFuired moment.

The Menshe9iks$ the people 1ho @lie do1n@ on the point of 9ie1 of Mar;ism$ settled the Fuestion 9erysimply# inasmuch as the 1orkers= party in the West had emerged from non/party trade unions fightingfor the impro9ement of the economic conditions of the 1orking class$ the same$ as far as possile$should happen in >ussia* that is$ the @economic struggle of the 1orkers against the employers and thego9ernment@ in the localities 1as enough for the time eing$ no all/>ussian militant organi?ationshould e created$ and later . . . 1ell$ later$ if trade unions did not arise y that time$ a non/party laourcongress should e called and proclaimed as the party.

That this @Mar;ist@ @plan@ of the Menshe9iks$ utopian though it 1as under >ussian conditions$ne9ertheless entailed e;tensi9e agitational 1ork designed to disparage the notion of the Party principle$to destroy the Party cadres$ to lea9e the proletariat 1ithout its o1n party and to surrender the 1orking

class to the tender mercies of the lieralsIthe Menshe9iks$ and perhaps a good many 5olshe9iks too$hardly suspected at the time.

The immense ser9ice Lenin rendered the >ussian proletariat and its Party 1as that he e;posed the1hole danger of the Menshe9iks= @plan@ of organi?ation at a time 1hen this @plan@ 1as still in emryo$1hen e9en its authors percei9ed its outlines 1ith difficulty$ and$ ha9ing e;posed it$ opened a furiousattack on the la;ity of the Menshe9iks in matters of organi?ation and concentrated the 1hole attentionof the Party=s practical 1orkers on this Fuestion. "or the 9ery e;istence of the Party 1as at stake* it 1asa matter of life or death for the Party.


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To estalish an all/>ussian political ne1spaper as a rallying centre of Party forces$ to organi?e staunchParty cadres in the localities as @regular units@ of the Party$ to organi?e these cadres into one entitythrough the medium of the ne1spaper$ and to 1eld them into an all/>ussian militant party 1ith sharply/defined limits$ 1ith a clear programme$ firm tactics and a single 1illIsuch 1as the plan that Leninde9eloped in his famous ooks$ What s To /e #one*3and 0ne Ste1 -orward, Two Ste1s /ack. -Themerit of this plan lay in the fact that it fully conformed to >ussian realities$ and that it generali?ed in

masterly fashion the organi?ational e;perience of the est of the practical 1orkers. 6n the struggle forthis plan$ the maJority of the >ussian practical 1orkers resolutely follo1ed Lenin and 1ere not deterredy a possile split. The 9ictory of this plan laid the foundation for that close/knit and steeledCommunist Party 1hich has no eFual in the 1orld.

Dur comrades (not only the Menshe9iksE) often accused Lenin of an e;cessi9e inclination to1ardscontro9ersy and splits$ of eing relentless in his struggle against conciliators$ and so on. 4t one timethis 1as undoutedly the case. 5ut it 1ill e easily understood that our Party could not ha9e rid itself ofinternal 1eakness and diffuseness$ that it could not ha9e attained its characteristic 9igour and strengthif it had not e;pelled the non/proletarian$ opportunist elements from its midst. 6n the epoch ofourgeois rule$ a proletarian party can gro1 and gain strength only to the e;tent that it comats theopportunist$ anti/re9olutionary and anti/party elements in its o1n midst and 1ithin the 1orking class.

Lassalle 1as right 1hen he said# @The party ecomes strong y purging itself.@ 2

The accusers usually cited the Aerman party$ in 1hich @unity@ at that time flourished. 5ut$ in the firstplace$ not e9ery kind of unity is a sign of strength$ and secondly$ one has only to glance at the lateAerman party$ rent into three parties$to reali?e the utter falsity and fictitiousness of @unity@ et1eenScheidemann and %oske$ on the one hand$ and Lieknecht and Lu;emurg$ on the other. 4nd 1hokno1s 1hether it 1ould not ha9e een etter for the Aerman proletariat if the re9olutionary elements ofthe Aerman party had split a1ay from its anti/re9olutionary elements in time . . . %o$ Lenin 1as athousand times right in leading the Party along the path of uncompromising struggle against the anti/Party and anti/re9olutionary elements. "or it 1as only ecause of such a policy of organi?ation that ourParty 1as ale to create that internal unity and astonishing cohesion 1hich enaled it to emergeunscathed from the +uly crisis during the erensky regime$ to ear the runt of the Dctoer uprising$ to

pass through the crisis of the 5rest period unshaken$ to organi?e the 9ictory o9er the ussian Communist Party in the field of organi?ation are only one aspect of thematter. The Party could not ha9e gro1n and ecome strong so Fuickly if the political content of its1ork$ its programme and tactics had not conformed to >ussian realities$ if its slogans had not fired the

masses of the 1orkers and had not impelled the re9olutionary mo9ement for1ard. Let us pass to thisaspect of the matter.

The >ussian ourgeois/democratic re9olution ('82) took place under conditions differing from thosethat pre9ailed during the re9olutionary uphea9als in the West$ in "rance and Aermany$ for e;ample.Whereas the re9olution in the West took place under the conditions of the manufacturing period ofcapitalism and of an unde9eloped class struggle$ 1hen the proletariat 1as 1eak and numerically smalland did not ha9e its o1n party to formulate its demands$ 1hile the ourgeoisie 1as sufficientlyre9olutionary to 1in the confidence of the 1orkers and peasants and to lead them into the struggleagainst the aristocracyIin >ussia$ on the other hand$ the re9olution egan ('82) under the conditions
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of the machine/industry period of capitalism and of a de9eloped class struggle$ 1hen the >ussianproletariat$ relati9ely numerous and 1elded together y capitalism$ had already fought a numer ofattles 1ith the ourgeoisie$ had its o1n party$ 1hich 1as more united than the ourgeois party$ and itso1n class demands$ 1hile the >ussian ourgeoisie$ 1hich$ moreo9er$ susisting on go9ernmentcontracts$ 1as sufficiently scared y the re9olutionary temper of the proletariat to seek an alliance 1iththe go9ernment and the landlords against the 1orkers and peasants. The fact that the >ussian re9olution

roke out as a result of the military re9erses suffered on the fields of Manchuria only accelerated e9ents1ithout essentially changing the state of affairs.

The situation demanded that the proletariat should take the lead of the re9olution$ rally there9olutionary peasants around itself and 1age a determined fight against tsardom and the ourgeoisiesimultaneously$ 1ith a 9ie1 to estalishing complete democracy in the country and ensuring its o1nclass interests.

5ut the Menshe9iks$ the people 1ho @lie do1n@ on the point of 9ie1 of Mar;ism$ settled the Fuestionin their o1n fashion# since the >ussian re9olution is a ourgeois re9olution$ and since it is therepresentati9es of the ourgeoisie that lead ourgeois re9olutions (see the @history@ of the "rench andAerman re9olutions)$ the proletariat cannot e;ercise hegemony in the >ussian re9olution$ theleadership should e left to the >ussian ourgeoisie (the 9ery ourgeoisie that 1as etraying there9olution)* the peasantry should also e handed o9er to the tutelage of the ourgeoisie$ 1hile theproletariat should remain an e;treme Left opposition.

4nd that 9ulgar medley of the tunes of the 1retched lierals the Menshe9iks passed off as the last 1ordin @genuine@ Mar;ismE . . .

The immense ser9ice Lenin rendered the >ussian re9olution 1as that he utterly e;posed the futility ofthe Menshe9iks= historical parallels and the 1hole danger of the Menshe9ik @scheme of re9olution@1hich surrendered the cause of the 1orkers to the tender mercies of the ourgeoisie. The re9olutionarydemocratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry$ instead of the dictatorship of the ourgeoisie*oycott of the 5ulygin :uma &and armed uprising$ instead of participating in the :uma and carryingon organic 1ork 1ithin it* the idea of a @Left loc$@ 1hen the :uma 1as after all con9ened$ and the

utili?ation of the :uma platform for the struggle outside the :uma$ instead of a Cadet Ministry and thereactionary @cherishing@ of the :uma* the fight against the Cadet Party as a counter/re9olutionaryforce$ instead of forming a @loc@ 1ith itIsuch 1as the tactical plan 1hich Lenin de9eloped in hisfamous pamphlets$ Two Tactics o$ Social2#e!ocracy in the #e!ocratic Revolution and The Victoryo$ the &adets and the Tasks o$ the Workers3 Party.

The merit of this plan lay in the fact that it luntly and resolutely formulated the class demands of theproletariat in the epoch of the %oureois2de!ocratic revolutionin >ussia$ facilitated the transition tothe socialist re9olution$ and contained in emryo the idea of the dictatorshi1 o$ the 1roletariat.ThemaJority of the >ussian practical 1orkers resolutely and uns1er9ingly follo1ed Lenin in the strugglefor this tactical plan. The 9ictory of this plan laid the foundation for those re9olutionary tactics thanksto 1hich our Party is no1 shaking the foundations of 1orld imperialism.

The suseFuent de9elopment of e9ents* the four years of imperialist 1ar and the shattering of the 1holeeconomic life of the country* the "eruary >e9olution and the celerated dual po1er* the Pro9isionalAo9ernment$ 1hich 1as a hoted of ourgeois counter/re9olution$ and the Petrograd So9iet of:eputies$ 1hich 1as the form of the incipient proletarian dictatorship* the Dctoer >e9olution and thedispersal of the Constituent 4ssemly* the aolition of ourgeois parliamentarism and the proclamationof the >epulic of So9iets* the transformation of the imperialist 1ar into a ci9il 1ar and the offensi9eof 1orld imperialism$ together 1ith the professed @Mar;ists$@ against the proletarian re9olution* and$lastly$ the pitiale position of the Men/she9iks$ 1ho clung to the Constituent 4ssemly and 1ho 1ere
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thro1n o9eroard y the proletariat and dri9en y the 1a9es of re9olution to the shores of capitalismI all this only confirmed the correctness of the principles of the re9olutionary tactics formulated yLenin in his Two Tactics.4 party 1ith such a heritage could sail oldly for1ard$ 1ithout fear ofsumerged rocks.

6n our time of proletarian re9olution$ 1hen e9ery Party slogan and e9ery utterance of a leader is testedin action$ the proletariat makes special demands of its leaders. 0istory kno1s of proletarian leaders

1ho 1ere leaders in times of storm$ practical leaders$ self/sacrificing and courageous$ ut 1ho 1ere1eak in theory. The names of such leaders are not soon forgotten y the masses. Such$ for e;ample$1ere Lassalle in Aermany and 5lan/Fui in "rance. 5ut the mo9ement as a 1hole cannot li9e onreminiscences alone# it must ha9e a clear goal (a programme)$ and a firm line (tactics).

There is another type of leaderIpeacetime leaders$ 1ho are strong in theory$ ut 1eak in matters oforgani?ation and practical 1ork. Such leaders are popular only among an upper layer of the proletariat$and then only up to a certain time. When the epoch of re9olution sets in$ 1hen practical re9olutionaryslogans are demanded of the leaders$ the theoreticians Fuit the stage and gi9e 1ay to ne1 men. Such$for e;ample$ 1ere Plekhano9 in >ussia and autsky in Aermany.

To retain the post of leader of the proletarian re9olution and of the proletarian party$ one must comine

strength in theory 1ith e;perience in the practical organi?ation of the proletarian mo9ement. P.4;elrod$ 1hen he 1as

a Mar;ist$ 1rote of Lenin that he @happily comines the e;perience of a good practical 1orker 1ith atheoretical education and a road political outlook@ (see P. 4;el/rod=s preface to Lenin=s pamphlet# TheTasks o$ the Russian Social2#e!ocrats'8). What Mr. 4;elrod$ the ideologist of @ci9ili?ed@ capitalism$1ould say no1 aout Lenin is not difficult to guess. 5ut 1e 1ho kno1 Lenin 1ell and can Judgematters oJecti9ely ha9e no dout that Lenin has fully retained this old Fuality. 6t is here$ incidentally$that one must seek the reason 1hy it is Lenin$ and no one else$ 1ho is today the leader of the strongestand most steeled proletarian party in the 1orld.

Signed# J. Stalin

Pra9da$ %o. $ 4pril 73$ '78

Notes

'.The London CongressIthe "ifth Congress of the >ussian Social/:emocratic Laour Party$ 1hichmet from 4pril 38 to May '$ '8&$ in London.

7.See arl Mar; and "rederick uss. ed.$ ,ol. 2$ pp. 3'/--.

-.See ,. 6. Lenin$ Works,-th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. &$ pp. '2/37.2.These 1ords$ 1hich occur in a letter from Lassalle to arl Mar; dated +une 7-$ '27$ 1ere taken y,. 6. Lenin as an epigraph to his What s To /e #one*(see Works,-th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 2$ p. 3').

.The three parties resulting from the split of the old Aerman Social/:emocratic Party 1ere# the Social/:emocratic Party$ the 6ndependent Social/:emocratic Party and the Communist Party of Aermany.

&.The 5ulygin :umaIa consultati9e representati9e assemly 1hich the tsarist go9ernment intended tocon9ene in '82. The la1 instituting the :uma and the regulations go9erning the elections to it 1eredrafted y a commission of 1hich Minister of the 6nterior 5ulygin 1as the chairman$ and 1ere
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pulished simultaneously 1ith the tsar=s Manifesto of 4ugust $ '82. The 5olshe9iks proclaimed anacti9e oycott of the 5ulygin :uma. @. . . The 5ulygin :uma 1as ne9er con9ened. 6t 1as s1ept a1ayy the re9olutionary storm efore it 1as con9ened.@ (,. 6. Lenin$ Works,-th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 73$ p. 73.)

.See ,. 6 . Lenin$ Works$ -th >uss. ed$ ,ol. $ pp. '/''.

.See ,. 6. Lenin$ Works,-th >uss ed.$ ,ol. '8$ pp. '&2/728.

'8.,. 6. Lenin 1rote the pamphlet$The Tasks o$ the Russian Social2#e!ocrats, at the end of '&$1hile he 1as in e;ile. The first edition$ 1ith a preface y P. 4;elrod$ 1as pulished in Aene9a in 'y the League of >ussian Social/:emocrats (see ,. 6. Lenin$ Works,-th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 7$ pp. 7/37).

Spee!h deli'ered at a meeting !alled y the(os!o) &ommittee* R.&.P. +,.- on the o!!asionof V. I. Lenins Fiftieth ,irthday

April 23, 1920


4fter the speeches and reminiscences 1e ha9e heard here$ 9ery little remains for me to say. 6 shouldlike only to mention one feature of Comrade Lenin=s of 1hich noody has yet spoken$ namely$ hismodesty and his courage in ackno1ledging mistakes.

6 recall t1o occasions 1hen Lenin$ that giant$ admitted that he had een in the 1rong.

The first episode relates to the decision on oycotting the Witte :uma$ taken in Tammerfors$ "inland$in :ecemer '82$ at the 4ll/>ussian 5olshe9ik Conference. 'The Fuestion of oycotting the Witte:uma had then to e decided. 4 group of se9en$ closely associated 1ith Comrade Lenin$ and on 1hom1e pro9incial delegates used to esto1 all kinds of epithets$ had assured us that 6lyich 1as opposed tooycotting the :uma and in fa9our of taking part in the elections. This$ as it turned out later$ 1asactually so. 5ut the deate opened$ and the pro/oycotters from the pro9inces$ from St. Petersurg$

Mosco1$ Sieria and the Caucasus 1ent into the attack$ and 1hat 1as our surprise 1hen$ after 1e hadspoken$ Lenin got up and declared that he had een in fa9our of taking part in the elections$ ut he sa1no1 that he had een 1rong and associated himself 1ith the delegates from the pro9inces. We 1ereastounded. 6t had the effect of an electric shock. We cheered him to the echo.

0ere is another episode of a similar character. 6n Septemer '''$ under erensky$ at the time 1hen the:emocratic Conference had een con9ened and the Men/she9iks and Socialist/>e9olutionaries 1erecontri9ing a ne1 institution$ the Pre/parliament$ 1hich 1as to pa9e the 1ay for a transition from theSo9iets to a Constituent 4ssemly$ at that moment 1e in the Central Committee in Petrograd decidednot to disperse the :emocratic Conference$ and to go ahead strengthening the So9iets$ to con9ene a
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Congress of So9iets$ start an uprising and proclaim the Congress of So9iets the organ of state po1er.6lyich$ 1ho at that time 1as li9ing in hiding outside Petrograd$ did not agree 1ith the CentralCommittee and 1rote that the scum (meaning the :emocratic Conference) should e dispersed andarrested right a1ay.

6t seemed to us that the matter 1as not Fuite so simple$ for 1e kne1 that a half$ or at least a third$ of thememers of the :emocratic Conference 1ere delegates from the front$ and that y arresting and

dispersing the Conference 1e might only spoil matters and damage our relations 1ith the front. Weconsidered that all the umps and pitfalls on our path 1ere clearer to us$ the practical 1orkers. 5ut6lyich 1as a great man* he 1as not afraid of umps and pitfalls$ he did not fear danger$ and said# @>iseand march straight to the goalE@ We$ the practical 1orkers$ on the other hand$ elie9ed that no goodcould come of acting in this 1ay at that time$ that the thing to do 1as to skirt around the ostacles inorder to take the ull y the horns later. 4nd despite all 6lyich=s insistence$ 1e did not listen to him and1ent on strengthening the So9iets$ and to such effect as to end up 1ith the Congress of So9iets ofDctoer 72 and the successful uprising. 6lyich 1as already in Petrograd y then. Smiling and glancingat us slyly$ he said# @Bes$ it seems you 1ere right.@ 4gain 1e 1ere astounded.

Comrade Lenin 1as not afraid of ackno1ledging his mistakes.

6t 1as this modesty and courage that particularly capti9ated us. ('11lause.)"irst pulished in the symposium$ The -i$tieth /irthday o$ Vladi!ir lyich Ulyanov2Lenin,Mosco1$'78

Notes

'.The Tammerfors ConferenceIthe first conference of the 5olshe9iks$ held :ecemer '7/'&$ '82. 6t1as at this conference that ,. 6. Lenin and +. ,. Stalin met for the first time* until then they hadmaintained contact y correspondence or through comrades.

The agenda of the conference 1as as follo1s# ') >eports from the local organi?ations* 7) >eport on thecurrent situation* 3) Drgani?ational report of the C.C.* -) Merging of the t1o sections of the >.S.:.L.P.*2) >e/organi?ation of the Party* ) The agrarian Fuestion* &) The State :uma.

The reports on the current situation and on the agrarian Fuestion 1ere deli9ered y ,. 6. Lenin$ 1hoalso spoke on the attitude to1ards the Witte :uma. +. ,. Stalin reported on the acti9ities of theTranscaucasian 5olshe9ik organi?ation and spoke in support of Lenin=s tactics of acti9ely oycottingthe :uma. The conference adopted a decision on the re/unification of the Party$ 1hich 1as 9irtuallysplit into t1o separate parties$ and appro9ed ,. 6. Lenin=s resolution on the agrarian Fuestion. +. ,.Stalin and ,. 6. Lenin 1ere memers of the commission 1hich drafted the resolution on the attitudeto1ards the :uma. The resolution called upon the Party and the 1orking class to oycott the :uma andrecommended all the Party organi?ations to make 1ide use of the election meetings for the purpose of

e;tending the re9olutionary organi?ation of the proletariat and for conducting agitation among allsections of the people in fa9our of an armed uprising.

Telegram to V. I. Lenin

June 25, 1920
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>e9ishin$ a front/line general$ 1ho 1as taken prisoner y our forces on the Crimean "ront on +une '8$has stated in my presence# a) Wrangel=s army is getting its clothing$ guns$ rifles$ tanks and sareschiefly from the 5ritish$ and also from the "rench* ) Wrangel is eing aided from the sea y ig5ritish ships and small "rench ships* c) Wrangel is getting fuel (liFuid) from 5atum (this means that5aku must not supply fuel to Tiflis$ 1hich can sell it to 5atum)* d) Aeneral e9ishin=s testimony on 5ritish and "rench aid to Wrangel is eing stenographed and a copysigned y him 1ill e sent you as material for Chicherin.

Stalin

+une 72$ '78

/ Letter to V. I. Lenin

March 1921

Source # Works$ ,ol. 2$ '7' / '73

Pulisher # "oreign Languages Pulishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '2-TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788Pulic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788). Bou may freely copy$ distriute$ display andperform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet4rchi9e@ as your source.

Comrade Lenin$

:uring the last three days 6 ha9e had the opportunity to read the symposium# ' Plan $or the4lectri$ication o$ Russia. 'My illness made this possile (it is an ill 1ind that lo1s noody any

goodE). 4n e;cellent$ 1ell/compiled ook. 4 masterly draft of a really sinle and really state economicplan$ not in uotation !arks. The only Mar;ist attempt in our time to place the So9iet superstructure ofeconomically ack1ard >ussia on a really practical technical and production asis$ the only possileone under present conditions.

Bou rememer Trotsky=s @plan@ (his theses) of last year for the @economic re9i9al@ of >ussia on theasis of the mass application of the laour of unskilled 1easant/1orker masses (the laour army) to theremnants of pre/1ar industry. 0o1 1retched$ ho1 ack1ard$ compared 1ith the Aoelro planE 4medie9al handicraftsman 1ho imagines he is an 6sen hero called to @sa9e@ >ussia y an ancient saga. .. . 4nd of 1hat 9alue are the do?ens of @single plans@ 1hich to our shame appear from time to time in
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our pressIthe childish prattle of preparatory/school pupils. . . . Dr again$ the philistine @realism@ (infactanilovis!)of >yko9$ 1ho continues to @criticise@ the Aoelro and is immersed to his ears inroutine. . . .

6n my opinion#

') %ot a single minute more must e 1asted on idle talk aout the plan.

7) 41ractical start on the 1ork !ust %e !adeimmediately.3) To this startmust e de9oted at least one/third of our 1ork (t1o/thirds 1ill e reFuired for @current@needs) in transporting materials and men$ restoring enterprises$ distriuting laour forces$ deli9eringfoodstuffs$ organising supply ases and supply itself$ and so on.

-) Since the staff of the Aoelro$ for all their e;cellent Fualities$ lack a sound practical outlook (aprofessorial impotence can e detected in the articles)$ 1e must 1ithout fail include in the planningcommission li9e practical men 1ho act on the principle I @>eport the fulfilment$@ @"ulfil on time$@etc.

2)Pravda, 5vestia,and especially4kono!icheskaya 6hi5n 7must e instructed to popularise the Planfor the


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Pulic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788). Bou may freely copy$ distriute$ display andperform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet4rchi9e@ as your source.

6t seems to me that it 1ould not e fitting no1 to 1rite of @Comrade Lenin on ,acation$@ 1hen the

9acation is coming to an end and Comrade Lenin 1ill soon return to 1ork. 5esides$ my impressions areso many and so precious that it is not Fuite e;pedient to 1rite aout them in a rief note$ as the editorialoard ofPravdareFuests. 0o1e9er$ 6 must 1rite$ for the editorial oard insists on it.

6 had occasion to meet at the front 9eteran fighters 1ho$ after fighting continuously for se9eral days @onend$@ 1ithout sleep or rest$ 1ould come ack from the firing line looking like shado1s and drop likelogs$ ut after ha9ing @slept the clock round@ they 1ould rise refreshed and eager for ne1 attles$1ithout 1hich they @cannot li9e.@ When 6 first 9isited Comrade Lenin in +uly$ not ha9ing seen him forsi; 1eeks$ that 1as Just the impression he made on meIthat of a 9eteran fighter 1ho had managed toget some rest after incessant and e;hausting attles$ and 1ho had een refreshed y his rest. 0e lookedfresh and recuperated$ ut still ore traces of o9er1ork and fatigue.

@6 am not allo1ed to read the ne1spapers$@ Comrade Lenin remarked ironically$ @and 6 must not talkpolitics. 6 carefully a9oid e9ery scrap of paper lying on the tale$ lest it turn out to e a ne1spaper andlead to a reach of discipline.@

6 laughed heartily and praised him to the skies for his oedience to discipline. We proceeded to makemerry o9er the doctors$ 1ho cannot understand that 1hen professional men of politics get together theycannot help talking politics.

What struck one in Comrade Lenin 1as his thirst for information and his cra9ing$ his insuperalecra9ing for 1ork. 6t is clear that he had een famished. The trial of the Socialist/>e9olutionaries$ 'Aenoa and The 0ague$ 7the har9est prospects$ industry and finance all these Fuestions came up ins1ift succession. 0e 1as in no hurry to e;press his opinion$ complaining that he 1as out of touch 1ithe9ents* for the most part he asked Fuestions and took silent note. 0e ecame 9ery cheerful on learning

that the har9est prospects 1ere good.

6 found an entirely different picture a month later. This time Comrade Lenin 1as surrounded y stacksof ooks and ne1spapers (he had een gi9en permission to read and talk politics to his heart=s content).There 1as no longer any trace of fatigue$ of o9er1ork. There 1as no sign of that ner9ous cra9ing for1orkI he 1as no longer famished. Calmness and self/assurance had fully returned. This 1as our oldLenin$ scre1ing up his eyes and ga?ing shre1dly at his interlocutor....

4nd this time our talk$ too$ 1as of a more li9ely character.

0ome affairs ... the har9est ... the state of industry ... the rate of e;change of the rule ... the udget. ...

@The situation is difficult. 5ut the 1orst is o9er. The har9est 1ill make a fundamental difference. 6t is

ound to e follo1ed y an impro9ement in industry and finance. The thing no1 is to relie9e the stateof unnecessary e;penditure y retrenchment in our institutions and enterprises and y impro9ing them.We must e particularly firm in this matter$ and 1e shall sFuee?e through$ 1e shall most certainlysFuee?e through.@

"oreign affairs ... the


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1ithout yielding to either flattery or intimidation.@

The Socialist/>e9olutionaries and Menshe9iks$ and their raid agitation against So9iet >ussia . ...

@Bes$ they ha9e made it their aim to defame So9iet >ussia. They are facilitating the imperialists= fightagainst So9iet >ussia. They ha9e een caught in the mire of capitalism$ and are sliding into an ayss.Let them flounder. They ha9e long een dead as far as the 1orking class is concerned.@

The 1hiteguard press ... the emigres ... the incredile fairy/tales aout Lenin=s death$ 1ith fulldetails . ...

Comrade Lenin smiled and remarked# @Let them lie if it is any consolation to them* one should not rothe dying of their last consolation.@

&o!rade Lenin on Vacation,6llustrated supplement toPravda$ %o. 7'2$ Septemer 7-$ '77

Notes

'.The trial of the Socialist/>e9olutionaries y the Supreme >e9olutionary Triunal took place inMosco1$ in '77$ from +une to 4ugust &. Df the 3- accused$ '' 1ere memers of the CentralCommittee of the Socialist/>e9olutionary Party. The trial estalished that from the 9ery first days ofthe Dctoer Socialist >e9olution$ the Socialist/>e9olutionary Party had fought against the So9ietpo1er$ had organised armed re9olts and conspiracies$ had supported the foreign inter9entionists andhad committed terroristic acts against leaders of the 5olshe9ik Party and the So9iet Ao9ernment.

7.. This refers to the international economic conferences held in Aenoa (4pril '8/May '$ '77) and atThe 0ague (+une '2/ +uly 78$ '77). The Aenoa Conference 1as called for the purpose of determiningthe relations et1een the capitalist 1orld and So9iet >ussia. The conference 1as attended$ on the oneside$ y representati9es of Areat 5ritain$ "rame$ 6taly$ +apan and of other capitalist states$ and$ on the

other side$ y representati9es of So9iet >ussia. The representati9es of the capitalist countries presentedthe So9iet delegation 1ith demands 1hich$ if conceded$ 1ould ha9e meant transforming the land ofSo9iets into a colony of West/


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TranscriptionHMarkup# 5rian >eidPulic :omain# Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788). Bou may freely copy$ distriute$ display and performthis 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit NMar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9eOas your source.

Comrades$ 6 am told that you ha9e arranged a Lenin memorial meeting here this e9ening and that 6ha9e een in9ited as one of the speakers. 6 do not think there is any need for me to deli9er a set speechon Lenins acti9ities. 6t 1ould e etter$ 6 think$ to confine myself to a fe1 facts to ring out certain ofLenins characteristics as a man and a leader. There may$ perhaps$ e no inherent connection et1eenthese facts$ ut that is not of 9ital importance as far as gaining a general idea of Lenin is concerned. 4tany rate$ 6 am unale on this occasion to do more than 1hat 6 ha9e Just promised.

The (o#ntain 5agle

6 first ecame acFuainted 1ith Lenin in '83. True$ it 1as not a personal acFuaintance$ ut 1as y

correspondence. 5ut it made an indelile impression upon me$ one 1hich has ne9er left me throughoutall my 1ork in the Party. 6 1as in e;ile in Sieria at the time. My kno1ledge of Lenins re9olutionaryacti9ities since the end of the nineties$ and especially after '8'$ after the appearance ofskra$'hadcon9inced me that in Lenin 1e had a man of e;traordinary calire. 4t that time 6 did not regard himmerely as a leader of the Party$ ut as its actual founder$ for he alone understood the inner essence andurgent needs of our Party. When 6 compared him 1ith the other leaders of our Party$ it al1ays seemedto me that he 1as head and shoulders ao9e his colleaguesIPlekhano9$ Marto9$ 4;elrod and theothers* that$ compared 1ith them$ Lenin 1as not Just one of the leaders$ ut a leader of the highest rank$a mountain eagle$ 1ho kne1 no fear in the struggle$ and 1ho oldly led the Party for1ard along theune;plored paths of the >ussian re9olutionary mo9ement. This impression took such a deep hold of methat 6 felt impelled to 1rite aout it to a close friend of mine 1ho 1as li9ing as a political e;ile aroad$reFuesting him to gi9e me his opinion. Some time later$ 1hen 6 1as already in e;ile in SieriaIthis1as at the end of '83I6 recei9ed an enthusiastic reply from my friend and a simple$ ut profoundlye;pressi9e letter from Lenin$ to 1hom$ it turned out$ my friend had sho1n my letter. Lenins note 1ascomparati9ely short$ ut it contained a old and fearless criticism of the practical 1ork of our Party$and a remarkaly clear and concise account of the entire plan of 1ork of the Party in the immediatefuture. Dnly Lenin could 1rite of the most intricate things so simply and clearly$ so concisely andoldly$ that e9ery sentence did not so much speak as ring out like a rifle shot. This simple and oldletter still further strengthened me in my opinion that Lenin 1as the mountain eagle of our Party. 6cannot forgi9e myself for ha9ing$ from the hait of an old underground 1orker$ consigned this letter ofLenins$ like many other letters$ to the flames.

My acFuaintance 1ith Lenin dates from that time.

(odesty

6 first met Lenin in :ecemer '82 at the 5olshe9ik conference in Tammerfors ("inland). 6 1as hopingto see the mountain eagle of our Party$ the great man$ great not only politically$ ut$ if you 1ill$physically$ ecause in my imagination 6 had pictured Lenin as a giant$ stately and imposing. What$then$ 1as my disappointment to see a most ordinary/looking man$ elo1 a9erage height$ in no 1ay$literally in no 1ay$ distinguishale from ordinary mortals. . . .
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6t is accepted as the usual thing for a Ngreat manO to come late to meetings so that the assemly maya1ait$ his appearance 1ith ated reath* and then$ Just efore the Ngreat manO enters$ the 1arning1hisper goes up# N0ushE . . . SilenceE . . . hes coming.O This ritual did not seem to me superfluous$ecause it creates an impression$ inspires respect. What$ then$ 1as my disappointment to learn thatLenin had arri9ed at the conference efore the delegates$ had settled himself some1here in a corner$and 1as unassumingly carrying on a con9ersation$ a most ordinary con9ersation 1ith the most ordinary

delegates at the conference. 6 1ill not conceal from you that at that time this seemed to me to esomething of a 9iolation of certain essential rules.

Dnly later did 6 realise that this simplicity and modesty$ this stri9ing to remain unoser9ed$ or$ at least$not to make himself conspicuous and not to emphasise his high position$ this feature 1as one of Leninsstrongest points as the ne1 leader of the ne1 masses$ of the simple and ordinary masses of the Nrankand fileO of humanity.

For!e of Logi!

The t1o speeches Lenin deli9ered at this conference 1ere remarkale# one 1as on the current situation

and the other on the agrarian Fuestion. Gnfortunately$ they ha9e not een preser9ed. They 1ereinspired$ and they roused the 1hole conference to a pitch of stormy enthusiasm. The e;traordinarypo1er of con9iction$ the simplicity and clarity of argument$ the rief and easily understood sentences$the asence of affectation$ of di??ying gestures and theatrical phrases aiming at effectIall this madeLenins speeches a fa9ourale contrast to the speeches of the usual NparliamentaryO orators.

5ut 1hat capti9ated me at the time 1as not this aspect of Lenins speeches. 6 1as capti9ated y thatirresistile force of logic in them 1hich$ although some1hat terse$ gained a firm hold on his audience$gradually electrified it$ and then$ as one might say$ completely o9erpo1ered it. 6 rememer that manyof the delegates said# NThe logic of Lenins speeches is like a mighty tentacle 1hich t1ines all roundy

Documents

Work of the Stalin in English (3 Tematicas)