Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09RANGOON378 2009-06-19 05:05

2010-12-06 15:03

CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon

VZCZCXRO3931OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNHDE RUEHGO #0378/01 1700706ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 190706Z JUN 09FM AMEMBASSY RANGOONTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9139INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVERUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2975RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2332RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2076RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5253RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2177RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5550RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9146RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0807RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6724RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1843RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2221RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 0691RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HIRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDCRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2527RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4533RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDCRUEKJCS/DIA WASHDCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000378

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS PACOM FOR FPA TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC

EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019 TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM

SUBJECT: BURMA: UPDATE ON CRONY ZAW ZAW’S ACTIVITIES REF: A. 07 RANGOON 1107 B. RANGOON 298 C. RANGOON 355 D. RANGOON 330RANGOON 00000378 001.4 OF 004

Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary-------

¶1. (C) Regime crony Zaw Zaw continues to expand his businesses in Burma. In addition to Max Myanmar Group of Companies, Zaw Zaw owns a beverage bottling company, a cement plant, a trading company, a jade

mine in Phakhant, a rubber plantation in Mon State, and a professional soccer team. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC add Zaw Zaw’s additional companies and key management personnel (listed in paragraph 5) to the targeted sanctions list. End Summary.

Additional Business Ventures----------------------------

¶2. (C) Zaw Zaw, one of Burma’s up-and-coming cronies, continues to expand his businesses. His Max Myanmar Group of Companies, which overseas his construction and tourism operations, is already designated on the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions list (Ref A). We have confirmed Zaw Zaw also owns Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which produces beverages including Max Cola for the local market. Pinya Manufacturing began operating in 1998 with an initial investment of 12.5 million kyat (approximately USD 41,000 in 1998) and currently employs more than 70 workers. Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd. has 13 distribution branches throughout Burma.

¶3. (C) Embassy business contact XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Zaw Zaw is expanding his business ventures under the Max Myanmar umbrella, including construction of a cement factory in Nay Pyi Taw, which allegedly will provide cement to Steven Law for Asia World’s airport project (Ref B), a concrete block factory in Nay Pyi Taw, a jade mine in Phakhant, and a rubber plantation in Mon State. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Zaw Zaw operates the Lone Khin jade mine in conjunction with the Ministry of Mines and recently received an additional 50 acres of land in Phakhant for jade mine development. Zaw Zaw allegedly sold several lots of jade at the March 2009 government jade and gem auction, [name removed] noted.

¶4. (C) Zaw Zaw is currently Chairman of the Myanmar Football Federation, and he owns Delta United, one of the professional soccer teams in the new Myanmar Football National League (Ref C). Contacts confirm that Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe’s grandson to play on the team (Ref D). Zaw Zaw has also begun to develop plans for the construction of a new soccer stadium in Pathein, Irrawaddy Division, the future home of the Delta United team,XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated the stadium construction cost will be more than USD 1 million, and should be completed by 2011.

¶5. (SBU) Below is information on additional companies owned by Zaw Zaw.RANGOON 00000378 002.8 OF 004-- Delta United Football Club; Pathein, Irrawaddy Division. Listed owner and partner: U Zaw Win Shaine, owner of Ayeyar Hinta Co., Ltd.-- Lone Khin Jade Mine; Phakhant, Kachin State.-- Max Myanmar Cement Factory; near Taung Phila Limestone Deposit, Leiway Township, Nay Pyi Taw.-- Max Myanmar Concrete Block Factory; Nay Pyi Taw.-- Max Myanmar Rubber Plantation, Belin, Mon State.-- Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; 37/38 Baw Maw An Twin Wun Street, Industrial Zone 3, Hlainthaya, Rangoon; phone: 95-1-681-745, 95-1-685-75, 95-1-685-15; fax: 95-1-680-669. Managing Director: U Kyi Lwin, a.k.a. U Kyan Khinn.

Embassy Recommendation----------------------

¶6. (C) Zaw Zaw is one of several mid-level cronies actively attempting to curry favor with the regime and to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. He, his family, and many of his companies are already listed on OFAC’s targeted sanctions list. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC also designate the above-mentioned companies and senior management under the JADE Act.DINGERRANGOON 00000378 003.2 OF 004

¶6. (SBU) The Burmese government usually releases a supplementary budget later in the fiscal year reflecting higher expenditures; its total annual deficits are thus greater than in the initial official budgets. For example, the FY08-09 supplementary appropriation added an additional 743.9 billion kyat (approximately USD 743 billion at current rates) to that year’s budget, raising expenditures by more than 15 percent over projected totals.

¶7. (SBU) As in previous years, “Government” received the largest allocation of additional funding (USD 282 million), approximately half of FY08-09’s supplemental appropriation. Businessmen explained that money likely funded ongoing construction costs in Nay Pyi Taw, as well as other government infrastructure projects. SOEs received the second largest amount - 185 billion kyat (USD 185 million), a 65 percent budget increase. The Ministry of Defense received an additional 9 billion kyat (USD 9 million) and the Ministry of Finance received 53 billion kyat (US 53 million). In response to Cyclone Nargis, the GOB allocated an additional 77 billion kyat (USD 77 million) to the Ministry of Agriculture while the Ministry of Social Welfare received 44 billion kyat (USD 44 million).

Weak Revenue Generation-----------------------

¶8. (SBU) During last year’s IMF Article IV consultations, IMF representatives highlighted the need for the Burmese Government to improve its tax administration and modify its widespread discretionary tax exemptions. According to IMF officials, the GOB replied that one of its goals is to reduce the budget deficit by addressing the main causes: weak revenue collection, losses from inefficient SOEs and SEEs, unrestrained government spending, and budget expenditures for non-productive uses, such as defense and construction. However, business contacts reported that the GOB did little to modify its tax structure in 2008, leading them to question the government’s prediction of a 27 percent increase in tax revenues in FY09-10.

¶9. (SBU) Over the past few years, authorities have attempted to increase revenues through stricter enforcement of income taxation and through an informal 2007 Customs valuation rate hike from 450 kyat/$1 to between 800 and 1200 kyat/$1, depending on the product and its origin. While GOB officials privately argue that this rate hike indicates an effort to reconcile the various exchange rates, it instead complicates Burma’s already complex informal exchange rate system.

¶10. (SBU) According to the FY09-10 budget data, most SOEs will operate at a loss. Even with extractive industries presumably posting sizable profits, the net SOE loss is predicted to be roughly 484 billion kyat

(USD 484 million) -- though this estimate could be too low. State-Owned Enterprises registered a loss of 601 million kyat in FY08-09, substantially more than GOB initial estimates of 450 billion kyat. According to budget publications, SOEs lost 800 billion kyat in FY07-08, 436 billion kyat in FY06-07, and 549 billion kyat in FY05-06.

¶11. (SBU) Corruption at all levels remains a problem in Burma, which affects the GOB’s ability to collect revenue.RANGOON 00000378 004.2 OF 004While the government cracked down on crooked Customs officials in 2006, the payment of bribes on the borders continues, according to business contacts. Corruption is also rife in other GOB agencies, including the Internal Revenue Department, Immigration, and the Yangon Central Development Committee.

Comment-------

¶12. (SBU) While the published budget provides a general guideline of how the GOB will allocate its funds, the lack of details in the document -- and the general unreliability of GOB statistics -- make it impossible to obtain an accurate picture of Burma’s fiscal situation. This problem is compounded by the lack of spending discipline by senior leaders, who will likely continue allocating money for pet projects with little oversight or regard for planned appropriations. Despite the GOB’s stated intention to reduce the budget deficit, another increase is far more likely due to uncontrolled spending, SOE losses, and the lack of tax reform. Burma’s economic future remains troubled.DINGER

09RANGOON355 2009-06-12 04:04

2010-12-06 15:03

CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon

VZCZCXRO7411OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNHDE RUEHGO #0355/01 1630447ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 120447Z JUN 09 ZDKFM AMEMBASSY RANGOONTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9098INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVERUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2945RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2306RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2044RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5228RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2151RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5519RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9115RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0782RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6692RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1818RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2196RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 0666RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HIRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDCRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2495

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4502RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDCRUEKJCS/DIA WASHDCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000355

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS PACOM FOR FPA TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC

EO 12958 DECL: 06/12/2019 TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM

SUBJECT: BURMA: CRONIES LAUNCH NEW SOCCER LEAGUE

REF: RANGOON 330RANGOON 00000355 001.6 OF 003

Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary-------

¶1. (C) On the alleged order of Senior General Than Shwe, regime cronies and businessmen launched the new Myanmar National Football League (MNL) on May 16, 2009. To date, the MNL has been a huge success, with high attendance and wide national TV and radio coverage. It is unclear if there is any political motivation behind the MNL, although many Burmese businessmen speculate the regime is using it as a way to distract the populace from ongoing political and economic problems. End Summary.

Let the Games Begin-------------------

¶2. (C) The Myanmar Football Federation (MFF), chaired by regime crony Zaw Zaw, launched the Myanmar National Football League on May 16, 2009. The league, the first of its kind, has eight professional teams representing different states and divisions. During the May-July season, teams compete for the National Cup and title of Myanmar National League Champion. The teams are sponsored by regime cronies and businessmen (listed below). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Zaw Zaw and Than Shwe’s grandson created the idea of a professional soccer league more than a year ago but had to obtain the Senior General’s support first. One well-connected source reports that the grandson wanted Than Shwe to offer USD 1 billion for Manchester United. The Senior General thought that sort of expenditure could look bad, so he opted to create for Burma a league of its own. In January, Secretary-1 reportedly told select Burmese businessmen that Than Shwe had “chosen” them to be the owners of the new professional soccer teams. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the owners are responsible for paying all costs, including team salaries, housing and transportation, uniform costs, and advertising for the new league. In

addition, owners must build new stadiums in their respective regions by 2011, at an estimated cost of USD one million per stadium.

--------------------------------------------- ------ Myanmar National League 2009 Teams--------------------------------------------- ------ Team Owner and Company Sanctions Subject--------------------------------------------- ------

Kanbawza Aung Ko Win/Kanbawza Bank NoDelta United Zaw Win Shaine/Ayeyar Hintha No (financially backed by Zaw Zaw, owner of Max Myanmar YesMagway Steven Law/Asia World Co. YesOkkthar United Aung Kyaw Moe/Intl Brewery No Trading Co.RANGOON 00000355 002.2 OF 003Zayar Shwe Myay Win Myint/Chair, Myanmar No Chamber Of CommerceYangon United Tay Za/Htoo Trading YesSouthern Myanmar Htay Myint/Yuzana Co. YesYadanarbon Sai Sam Htun/Loi Hein Co. No (sole distributor of soft drinks produced by SOEs)

--------------------------------------------- ------

¶3. (C) The eight teams currently practice and play in Rangoon; by 2011, the MNL should have a nationwide presence, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. The teams have an average of 40 players and salaries range from between USD 500-2000 a month, depending on the caliber of the players. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Steven Law’s Magway team pays the highest salaries, spending USD 155,000 a month, while Win Myint’s Zayar Shwe Myay team only spends USD 52,200 a month on salaries. Tay Za, Aung Ko Win, and Steven Law also pay their players high signing bonuses, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Aung Ko Win, owner of the Kanbawza team, has budgeted USD 2 million for the 2009 season. Other owners will spend approximately the same amount, he noted.

¶4. (C) Several of the team owners have taken their obligations seriously, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. For example, Tay Za has hired five players from Africa; and Zaw Zaw, who financially backs the Delta United team despite being Chair of the MFF, recruited several Argentinean players. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Aung Kyaw Moe, owner of Okkthar United Team and the International Brewery Trade Co. (which produces Myanmar Beer and Grand Royal Whiskey), is currently sponsoring the July 2009 National Cup. Tay Za’s Air Bagan allegedly plans to host the next cup, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated.

So What’s In it for The Owners?-------------------------------

¶5. (C) When asked why the owners would participate in such an expensive endeavor, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that they had little choice. “When the Senior General asks someone to do something, you do it with no complaints,” he stated. He then added that several of the businessmen will receive incentives from the regime, such as construction contracts, new gem and jade mines, and import permits, which will more than offset their costs. Sponsorship may also bring its own benefits. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that due to advertising associated with the MNL, several owners, including Sai Sam Htun who owns Alpine Water, have seen an

immediate increase in business revenue. Several owners have plans to sell team merchandise. As the league expands, business should boom, although it will take a few years, he concluded.

Early Success-------------

¶6. (C) The MNL to date has been quite successful. Tickets are relatively expensive by Burmese standards, ranging from USD .50 to USD 1, which can be as much as half a day’s salary for the average Burmese. Nevertheless, there has been heavy attendance at most of the games, with several games sold out. Reportedly though, owners paid up to USD 3 per head to entice fans to the first games, when it looked like ticketRANGOON 00000355 003.2 OF 003sales were lagging. Proceeds from the MNL are used to support the MFF. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that for the more popular teams, such as Yadanarbon and Magway, scalpers are able to sell tickets for up to USD 1.50. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that given the continued political and economic repression of the people, he understands why they want to spend their money on something enjoyable. For those who cannot afford to attend the games, MRTV (the GOB’s television network) shows the games live. During Saturdays and Sundays at 4pm, local teashops are filled with Burmese watching the games. Additionally, the matches are broadcast on the radio.

MNL: A Distraction or Just Good Fun?-------------------------------------

¶7. (C) While admitting that the MNL is “just good fun,” a number of our contacts question the regime’s motivation behind creating the league. Several have commented that it may be a way for the regime to distract the people from ongoing political and economic problems, or to divert their attention from criticism of the upcoming 2010 elections. Many speculate that the regime will suspend the 2010 MNL cup, should it fall close to the election date, as the government may not want large crowds of people to gather. That remains to be seen. Whatever the reason, the MNL is proving an early success, and something for the Burmese to talk about without threatening the regime.DINGER

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09KUALALUMPUR752 2009-09-11 09:09

2010-12-05 21:09

SECRET Embassy Kuala Lumpur

Appears in these articles:http://www.spiegel.deVZCZCXRO3219PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNHDE RUEHKL #0752/01 2540945ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 110945Z SEP 09FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPURTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3187INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000752

SENSITIVESIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, DEPT FOR ISN, DEPT FOR NEA, DEPT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019TAGS: EFIN ETTC KNNP IR PINR PTER MYSUBJECT: BANK MELLAT/FEEB DEMARCH DELIVERED TO BANK NEGARA

REF: A. SECSTATE 90063B KUALA LUMPUR 739

Classified By: Economic Counselor Matthew J. Matthews, reason 1.4(b and d).

¶1. (S) Econcouns delivered ref A demarche on FEEB xxxxxxxxxxxx emphasizedthat BN and LOFSA took their supervisory role seriously, andthat Malaysia approved the FEEB license and would allow it tooperate as long as there was no evidence that FEEB was incontravention of any relevant law and was not sanctioned bythe UN. In an effort to establish that BN did in fact takeits supervisory role seriously, Zamaini had his LOFSA DeputyDirector read the four restrictions which LOFSA placed on theFEEB license and noted that FEEB had only processed onetransaction in its first six months of operation. Econcounsreiterated core USG points several times, emphasizing thatFEEB represented substantial reputational risk to Malaysiaand that revocation of the license would be the prudent thingto do. xxxxxxxxxxxx made it clear that BN did not intend to revokeFEEB,s license unless the UN decided to sanction FEEB orproof was provided that activity by FEEB that contravenedMalaysia,s laws. End Summary.

¶2. (S) Econ Counselor Matthews, accompanied by Econoff andvisiting Embassy Singapore Treasury Attache Seth Bleiweis,conveyed reftel (a) points and non-paper on First East ExportBank (FEEB) to Bank Negara (BN) Deputy Governor Zamani, BNLegal Director Jeremy Lee, Labuan Offshore Financial ServicesAuthority (LOFSA) Deputy Governor Danial Mah Abdullah, andothers on September 10. This follows on delivery of demarcheand non-paper to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PM,soffice on September 4 (Ref B). Econcouns highlighted toxxxxxxxxxxxx the key points of the non-paper for xxxxxxxxxxxx, notingspecifically the new information on Bank Mellat proliferationfinance activities and warned that if the GOM did not committo revoking the FEEB license the U.S. would proceed withsanctioning FEEB under U.S. law.

¶3. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx responded that BN performed significant duediligence and gave great consideration prior to allowingLOFSA to issue the FEEB license. To counter possibleproliferation activities, LOFSA issued the FEEB license with

four significant operating conditions, the first conditionedbank license ever issued in Malaysia, xxxxxxxxxxxx said. LOFSA,sAbdullah orally read out the conditions which included: FEEBmay not do business with any UN sanctioned entity; FEEB isrequired to adhere to all Malaysian anti-money laundering andanti-terror financing laws; FEEB must comply with all LOFSAregulations and directives; and FEEB shareholders may not besanctioned by the UN. Breach of any of the listedconditions, he noted, would be cause for immediate licenserevocation. Abdullah also said that Bank Melli and BankSaderat had previously applied for bank licenses from LOFSA,but were denied.

¶4. (S) Lee shared BN concerns that if BN were to revoke theFEEB license it would trigger law suits against the GOM byFEEB shareholders. He continued that after repeated BNrequests, the USG has yet to provide any concrete or specificevidence of FEEB or Bank Mellat wrongdoing that could be usedin court by the GOM to defend a suit against BN for wrongfulaction against FEEB. xxxxxxxxxxxx added that U.S. &suspicions8were not always accurate. Lee also queried on U.S.designation actions on other Bank Mellat foreign subsidiariesin Seoul, London, Ankara and other locations and asked whyMalaysia was being singled out for immediate action.Abdullah noted that BN recently inspected FEEB and found thebank had consummated only one Euro 400,000 letter of creditfor the import of oil and gas-related equipment from Iran inits first six months of operation. BN officials argued thatthey could supervise a low-activity Bank Mellat subsidiary aswell as those other countries where the US is not preparingto implement sanctions.

¶5. (S) Econcouns countered that the U.S. will unilaterallydesignate FEEB in order to protect our financial system andwarn other financial institutions away from a bank owned bywhat we believe is a provider of financing for proliferationitems. He added that Iran had used its banks, such asSaderat and Melli, to finance proliferation items from otherimportant trading partners and those banks are nowsanctioned. Our information indicates Iran is now usingMellat for the same purpose. FEEB could be next, potentiallycausing significant embarrassment to Malaysia. Econcounstold xxxxxxxxxxxx that the US was offering BN pre-notification and

Kuala lump 00000752 002 of 002

the release of our intelligence as a good faith gesture sothat the GOM could prudently manage the risks to Malaysia,sfinancial system and its reputation in the global financialmarket by revoking FEEB,s license prior to a proliferationfinance incident.

¶6. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx acknowledged the importance of this issue tothe United States, but gave no indication that the GOM wouldrevoke FEEB,s license. Econcouns nevertheless encouragedprompt revocation action by BN.

Keith

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09BANGKOK1998 2009-08-13 09:09

2010-12-01 23:11

SECRET Embassy Bangkok

VZCZCXRO1498OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHMDE RUEHBK #1998/01 2250918ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 130918Z AUG 09FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOKTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7869INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATERUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0839RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3439RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN IMMEDIATE 0009RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0029RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 0171RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1633RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5442RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATES E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001998

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER

EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2019 TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH, RS, CO SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN THE WAKE OF LOWER COURT DEFEATREF: BANGKOK 385 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary and comment. The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling against the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal reasoning, requires a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process. The lead judge’s foray into foreign policy, rejecting the terrorism label and in effect embracing the FARC’s activities as purely political in nature, not criminal or acts of terrorism, has implications for Thailand. His confusion of the “dual criminality” concept with jurisdictional issues similarly raises questions for efforts by Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to face justice. The Embassy is working with Thai authorities to file an appeal of the lower court’s ruling and to press home the implications of the court ruling were Bout to walk free. In the early afternoon on August 13, we were assured that the notice of intention to appeal has been filed.

¶2. (C) At the same time, the Embassy recommends the State Department, Attorney General Holder, and the US Mission to the UN in New York engage the Thai Ambassador in Washington and the Thai PermRep in New York in parallel. In addition, the Department should seriously consider asking Belgium, which issued an arrest warrant for Bout in 2002 for money laundering and conspiracy, Colombia, in the case of the FARC, and African countries which have suffered greatly from Bout’s arms trade in the past to weigh in with the RTG. Finally, we recommend consideration of laying down a marker in Moscow about Bout, looking forward to the possibility that Bout may end up back in Russia were the appeal of the Lower Court ruling might not succeed. End Summary and comment.

Thai Lower Court rules against Bout extradition--------------------------------------------- --

¶3. (C) On August 11, the judge in the Viktor Bout extradition case ruled against U.S. and Thai government efforts to extradite Bout to the United States. Two key elements of his reasoning were: that the FARC in Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send weapons, was a political rather than a terrorist group; and that the “dual criminality” standard of our extradition treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not be prosecuted in Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S. In our view, the judge was wrong on both counts.

¶4. (C) After the verdict, as the Department has seen, the DCM spoke on the record to press outside the court room and expressed disappointment and mystification over the ruling and stated that we would fully support RTG efforts to appeal the decision. We have continued the same themes in subsequent interactions with the press.

Engaging the Thai immediately-----------------------------

¶5. (C) The Ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit immediately after the verdict on August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, noting that the verdict was not justified on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. He reminded Kasit that over the past year and a half since Bout’s arrest in Bangkok, the USG had repeatedly underlined the importance of the case, all the way up to the Secretary of State and POTUS levels. In the short-term, the Ambassador told Kasit, we need the Foreign Ministry to do its part in forwarding the necessary documentation to the Attorney-General’s office so that the intent to appeal can be filed in the requisite forty-eight hours. (Note: Although the court’s ruling and a new extradition law specify that the appeal must be filed within 72 hours, the applicable extradition law sets forth the shorter time frame, which we have followed.) Kasit assured the Ambassador that he had already instructed his legal department to do so. The Ambassador also told Kasit that weBANGKOK 00001998 002 OF 004expected Bout would remain in detention during the appeals process. The MFA’s Legal and Treaties Department faxed the Attorney General’s office late evening August 11 supporting the appeal; at the request of the Office of the Attorney General, the Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA and the OAG on August 13 requesting that the RTG appeal the lower court verdict prior to the forty-eight hour deadline (note: the RTG was closed August 12 for a National Holiday, the Queen’s Birthday.)

At approximately 1:25 p.m. on August 13, the MFA and OAG advised the Embassy that the requisite notice of intention to appeal had been filed and received by the court.

Next steps----------

¶6. (C) The Embassy’s “Bout team” met August 13 to review next steps that will help us prevail on appeal. Our immediate priority was to ensure that the notice of intent to appeal was filed on time (within 48 hours of the verdict) and that the appeal itself is filed within thirty days of the verdict.

¶7. (C) We will make clear to the RTG that we expect Bout to remain incarcerated during the appeals process, as specified under Thai law and the August 11 court ruling. Given that the same judge will rule on any bail motions brought by Bout (we expect Bout’s attorneys to push hard on bail), however, his custody status during the pendency of the appeal is a genuine concern. We also intend to make clear to the Thai government (the Ambassador is seeking to call FM Kasit, in Malaysia August 13-14 on a working visit, and will engage the highest available MFA official in Bangkok) that we expect this deficient ruling to receive a comprehensive and meaningful review by the appellate court. Moreover, the Ambassador plans to tell Kasit and other senior Thai officials that, given that the Thai government arrested Bout and sought his extradition to the U.S., the Thai government should be as alarmed by the judge’s ruling as we are. Therefore, we would encourage the RTG to issue a public statement expressing disappointment in the judge’s decision, its intention to win on appeal, and a reiteration of Thailand’s commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and to its extensive law enforcement relationship with the United States. The Ambassador intends to make similar points to newly appointed NSC Secretary General Tawee and to key figures at the Palace. Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the relationship.

¶8. (C) At the same time, however, we believe it is important to remember that our partners in the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Royal Thai Navy, largely did everything we asked them to do on the Bout case, including going the extra mile to facilitate our requests. Our posture and actions thus should make clear that we are disappointed with the judge’s ruling but not with Thai government cooperation in the Bout case.

¶9. (C) That said, coming on the heels of the September 2008 Thai appellate ruling affirming a lower court’s denial of our request to extradite Iranian Jamshid Ghassemi, who was in Thailand to procure controlled technology in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the question has to be asked whether we can count on the Thai courts to do the right thing on high-profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand’s relations with third countries (we continue to have a perfect record on routine extraditions from Thailand to the United States). Our reluctant conclusion is that we cannot.

¶10. (S) The Department will recall that in February of this year, after significant indications that the Russians were trying to use bribes to influence the outcome of the case, the Ambassador made representations

to Prime Minister Abhisit (reftel) that we expected the process to be free of inappropriate influence and Abhisit undertook to do so. TheBANGKOK 00001998 003 OF 004Ambassador also intervened at the same time with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and the Royal Thai Naval Commander Khamtorn Pumhiran to insist that false testimony by xxxxxxxxx (that Bout had been in Thailand as part of a routine naval procurement) be rebutted. The Thai Navy subsequently issued a letter to that effect. We will remind the Thais of their commitment to a clean process and ask that they assure us again on the front.

What We are Doing here/What We Suggest Washington Do--------------------------------------------- -------

¶11. (C) Given the above, we are undertaking the following steps here in Bangkok, most of which should also be reflected when the Department calls in Thai Ambassador Don Pramuwinai, a move we fully support: -- The Ambassador will immediately seek a meeting with Foreign Minister Kasit and other appropriate senior Thai officials to make clear that, while we appreciate the cooperation on Bout over the past year and a half, we are disappointed and mystified by the judge’s ruling, which is flawed on several key points. -- In particular, the judge’s characterization of the FARC as a legitimate political actor would suggest that insurgent groups in southern Thailand are likewise political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand’s new counterterrorism laws. The ruling also suggests that anyone seeking to send them arms from a third country could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds. -- Moreover, the judge’s misguided analysis of the “dual criminality” standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both countries. This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related charges; the judge’s ruling would also seem to undermine RTG positions in their Thaksin extradition effort. -- Therefore, we expect that the AG’s office will vigorously pursue the appeal of the ruling and that Bout will remain incarcerated during the pendency of the appeal. -- We seek assurances that the case will be afforded a comprehensive and meaningful appellate review, presumably handled by serious, experienced Thai judges. (Note: Appeals are normally handled by a panel of three judges. End Note.) -- We ask that the Thai government issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge’s ruling and reiterating its commitment to the fight against international terrorism and to the law enforcement relationship with the U.S. -- We will continue to make our points to the press and we are pulling together a “FARC fact sheet” for public distribution that we will send in to Washington for comment and clearance today.

¶12. (C) We suggest that Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S. commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources around the world. A senior DEA official might also wish to sit in to highlight the massive DEA commitment to Thailand.

(Note: Our DOJ Attache who has led our legal efforts on Bout here will be in Washington on August 20-21. End Note.) -- Discussion of a POTUS telcon to PM Abhisit has been under way for some time; they have not spoken in the seven months both have been in office. We suggest that the call be accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement on Bout would have significant effect here. -- We suggest Washington engage the Colombian government onBANGKOK 00001998 004 OF 004the implications of the Bout verdict. We suggest inquiring whether Colombia considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization, whether it would be willing to submit a brief in the appeals process, and also make public statements to that effect. We also suggest exploring whether Colombia would be willing to ask Thailand for Bout’s extradition while he (hopefully) is still in detention during the appeals process. (Note: There is no Colombian Embassy in Bangkok; the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur covers Thailand. We understand the Thais cover Colombia from their Embassy in Lima. End note.) It would be useful if the Government of Colombia also raised its concerns in Moscow. -- We also suggest exploring the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne the bloody results of Bout’s activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the verdict and whether any affected government would be willing to ask for his extradition. -- While the Bout focus is now on Thailand, this is at heart a U.S.-Russian matter. The Department may wish to make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout’s activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he walks here in Thailand. At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so. -- The Thai ruling seems inconsistent with several United Nations determinations on Bout’s nature over the years (see below). We suggest our USUN call in the Thai Permrep and lay out how we view the issues in terms of Thailand’s standing with the United Nations. Better yet would be for the appropriate UN official to call in the Thai Permrep and seek an explanation of how the verdict can be justified in light of Thailand’s support of relevant UN resolutions: - UNSCR 1521 (2003) - Liberia - UNSCR 1343 (March 2001) - Liberia - Report of Experts Panel under 1343 - Final Monitoring Report on Angola Sanctions (2000)-- Finally, despite the listing by the US and EU of the FARC as a terrorist organization, we understand that the FARC is not listed as such by the UN. A move to have the FARC listed formally by the UN would assist the effort to keep Bout in custody. JOHN

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09SINGAPORE529 2009-06-04 09:09

2010-11-29 21:09

SECRET Embassy Singapore

R 040908Z JUN 09FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORETO SECSTATE WASHDC 6790INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVEThursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529 EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029 TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,

KN SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEWClassified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).¶1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.¶2. (SBU) Participants:United States------------- The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)SINGAPORE--------- Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA¶3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.China and North Korea--------------------- ¶4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.¶5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of

course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.¶6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.¶7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.¶8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is “nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.Chinese Economy--------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.¶10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine

reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.Taiwan------ ¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.¶12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ‘92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.¶13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.Xi Jinping---------- ¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.Wang Qishan----------- ¶15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of

Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.China’s Rise------------ ¶16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.¶17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.Build Ties with Young Chinese----------------------------- ¶18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.¶19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfmSHIELDS

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

08KUALALUMPUR317 2008-04-24 09:09

2010-11-30 21:09

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Embassy Kuala Lumpur

VZCZCXRO6644OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNHDE RUEHKL #0317 1150901ZNR UUUUU ZZHO 240901Z APR 08FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPURTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0892INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1067RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVERUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2451RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2533RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0014RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0202RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2513RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0555RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0227RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1567Thursday, 24 April 2008, 09:01UNCLAS KUALA LUMPUR 000317 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, IO, DRL/MLGA EO 12958 N/A TAGS PREL, PHUM, UNGA, MY SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: US-EU PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE DECLARATION REF: STATE 40380 (SBU) Poloff delivered reftel demarche and nonpaper to Adi Mohammed of the of the MFA Multilateral Political Affairs directorate on April 21 and urged that Malaysia cosponsor the declaration. Mohammed promised to review the issue with the relevant MFA officials but to date we have been unable to elicit any further response from MFA.KEITH