WEST PAPUA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTUREpapuaweb.org/dlib/baru/acfoa-2000-wp.pdf · WEST PAPUA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE ... The Jakarta Post, 13-11-99, ... The diplomatic strategy and the

WEST PAPUA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

ACFOA Development Issues Paper No 8 1


February 2000/Development Issues 8

ACFOA Indonesia Program




December 1 Merdeka?: the Prospects for West PapuanIndependence or autonomy in Wahids Indonesia...............................3

Dr Richard Chauvel ................................................................................3

Human Rights in West Papua................................................................9

Rex Rumakiek.........................................................................................9

West Papua After East Timor: The Options........................................14

Professor Sam Blay .............................................................................14

Current Trends in West Papua ............................................................20

James Elmslie ......................................................................................20

West Papua : Impressions from within the Evangelical ChristianChurch ..................................................................................................24

Joy Balazo ............................................................................................24

West Papua : Some Future Scenarios ................................................26

Otto Ondawame....................................................................................26

GLOSSARY..................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.



December 1 Merdeka?: theProspects for West PapuanIndependence or autonomy inWahids Indonesia

Dr Richard Chauvel*

Social change, even more so revolution, canthappen merely with a pamphlet or raising theMorning Star Flag. Also a political speech cantbe expected to make the Papuan people and nationindependent.1 Tifa Irian

Expressions of the West Papuan desire forindependence from Indonesia have been strong,widespread and have a history dating back intoDutch colonial times. The great challenge for WestPapuan leaders has been one of organisation andmobilising support for the struggle againstIndonesian control. Tifa Irians comments weremade in reference to a political gathering outsideJayapura on 12 November 1999 that had beenforeshadowed in the press as a demonstration ofWest Papuan demands for independence to matchthat of the Acehnese. Tens of thousands wereexpected, but only a few thousand materialised.2

Attendance at the gathering may have been less thanhoped for, but there was no lack of clarity about thefive demands made of the Jakarta Government:

The Indonesian Government must immediately: Recognise the independence of the West Papuan

people, who have been annexed for 36 years andimmediately return the right and sovereignty ofthe people and government of West Papua.

Reject the results of the 1969 Act of FreeChoice (Papera) that was engineered by theIndonesian Government and not in accordance

1 Tifa Irian, (Jayapura) 15-22 November 1999, p. 62 AFP (Jakarta), 12-11-99, quoted residents as saying about3000 attended the demonstration. Jayapuras police chiefthought the number was more like 300.www.KABAR-IRIAN.com. The Jakarta Post, 13-11-99,reported that a crowd of 10,000 attended.

with the principle of one man one vote, andrequest the United Nations to pressure theIndonesian Government to hold a referendumfor the people of West Papua.

Emphatically reject the partition of the provinceand the offer of regional autonomy.

Urge Theys Eluay and other Papuan leaders, inWest Papua and elsewhere, to work for thestationing of representatives of the UN, or otherinternational organisations, in West Papua.

Immediately arrange for the return ofadministrative responsibility from theIndonesian Government to the government ofWest Papua, under the supervision of the UN, inthe period between 12 November 1999 and 1May 2000.3

The gathering also issued a Declaration thatcalled for the withdrawal of the Indonesian militaryand police from West Papua and for the MorningStar flag to be flown throughout West Papua on 1December 1999 to mark the anniversary of the firstoccasion in 1961 when the flag was raised.4 1December 1961 is regarded by many contemporaryWest Papuan leaders as the date when the territorybecome independent and, hence the demand forindependence is phrased in terms of the return ofWest Papuan sovereignty and independence. Forexample in the Political Statement handed toPresident Habibie by the Team of 100 on 26February 1999: "We want independence in apolitical way, whatever the risk on our shoulders.We ask to return the political independence ofDecember 1, 1961.... We only ask recognition againof that independence, we don't demand newindependence."5

The 38th anniversary was marked in Jayapura with aflag raising of both the Morning Star and the

3 Tifa Irian, 15-22 November 1999, p. 6, Penyataan SikapPolitik, 12 November 19994 Tifa Irian, 15-22 November 1999, p. 6, Deklarasi, signedby Theys Hiyo Eluay, Drs. Ramimar, M. Kambu, YorysRaweyai, M.Y. Tanawani, M. Sayori, Yoboisembut andRumbrapuk.5 As cited in Kompas, 27-2-99



Merah-Putih (the Indonesian national flag) in thesame place as in 1961, outside the building thathoused the Dutch-established Dewan Papua (NewGuinea Council), ironically opposite the MerdekaSquare, where Indonesia built a monument to thoselost in a naval encounter against the Dutch inJanuary 1962. The flag raising took place inJayapura with little or no Indonesian militarypresence.6 Theys Eluay described the absence ofmilitary intervention as a miracle. He explainedthat both the Indonesian and Papuan flags had beenraised to demonstrate that "we are actingpeacefully"7

***

West Papuan politics are in a state of flux in thewake of Indonesias economic turmoil and politicaltransformation. As elsewhere in Indonesia wherethere are separatist movements and strong regionalidentities, political activity among West Papuansseeking independence from Indonesia has beenrevitalised. Not since the Dutch left in 1962 hasthere been such a prospect of West Papuansrealising their national aspirations. Yet, theopportunities created by a greatly weakenedgovernment in Jakarta are not without challengesand dangers, nor without ambiguous responses fromWest Papuans. Recent editions of Tifa Irian givesomething of the flavour of the complex andambiguous political circumstances. The Catholicweekly has carried numerous forthright articlesadvocating independence, but since WahidsCabinet was announced, it has been full ofadvertisements, including one from PT Freeport

6 Asia-Pacific, ABC Radio National, 1-12-99. The Resident ofHollandia (Jayapura) reported that the first raising of the flagtook place in the presence of the Governor, senior officials,members of the Dewan Papua and political party leaders.Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over deMaanden november en december 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, General State Archives, The Hague.7 Mark Worth, Banner day for strife-torn province, TheAustralian, 2-12-99; The Jakarta Post, 2-12-99, noted that: Police and soldiers, who in the past haveshot West Papuans for raising the flag which symbolises theseparatist cause, showed greater restraint.

Indonesia, congratulating the Governor, RearAdmiral Freddy Numberi, on his appointment as aMinister. Numberi is the first Irianese to beappointed to Cabinet since the territorysincorporation in Indonesia in 1963.8

The area of most significant change in post-Soeharto Indonesian politics in its impact onPapuan politics has been that of centre peripheryrelations. Understanding the dynamics of thischange is crucial to any assessment of the WestPapuan peoples prospects of resting greaterautonomy from Jakarta or securing independence.The Government in Jakarta has suffered asignificant loss of absolute power and control ofresources as a consequence of the economic crisis.To make a crude generalisation, the economic crisishas impacted on Jakarta and Java more severelythan it has on many of the outer islands, mostnotably the resource rich export revenue earningprovinces like Irian Jaya. Soeharto was mosteffective in the way he won the support of many inregional elites through the judicious allocation ofbusiness opportunities and official appointments.Habibie and Wahid have not had the resources tofollow their predecessors example.

Soeharto dominated decision making. UnderHabibie and Wahid power has been much morediffuse. During the East Timor crisis it has beendifficult to identify who, if anybody, has been incontrol within the Jakarta Government. The relativebalance of power between Jakarta and theprovinces, particularly the rebellious ones, haschanged in favour of the latter. This shift has beenachieved by the disintegration of central authorityrather than the increased power, improvedorganisation or greater support for the mainseparatist organisations. This seems particularly tobe the case in West Papua.

The remarkable, if sometimes halting and uneven,process of democratisation and the transformationof the Indonesian media has provided a supportiveenvironment for the assertion of provincial interests

8 See for example Tifa Irian, 1-5 November 1999



and identities. For the first time since the 1950s thelocal has become important in national politics.While much of the energy of the reformasimovement has been focused on the democratisationof national politics, the local, ethnic and religioushave been discussed with an openness unimaginablea couple of years ago. Tifa Irians open promotionof West Papuan national aspirations is a goodexample of this transformation.

The struggle against Jakartas control in East Timor,Aceh and West Papua have received varyingdegrees of media coverage in Indonesia andoverseas. Outside these provinces with well-established separatist movements there has beenstrong assertions of regional sentiments. Resource-rich Kalimantan and Riau are examples of regionswith little significant history of dissent, but sincethe economic crisis and the fall of Soeharto aredemanding greater control over their affairs andresources. In October students in Makassar revivedthe long dormant idea of an independent state ofEastern Indonesia.9 Presumably, West Papua wouldbe part of such a state.

In West Papua in early July 1998 the fall ofSoeharto was celebrated with demonstrations inJayapura, Sorong, Wamena and Biak demandingindependence from Indonesia. In Biak thedemonstrators occupied the district around theharbour for three days before the TNI cleared themout, killed some and pulled down the MorningStar Flag.10

The diplomatic strategy and the threat ofpartitionFlag raising and demonstrations followed bysuppression had long been the pattern of Papuanprotest and Indonesian response in urban areas of

9 Seruan Merdeka Indonesia Timur, Makassar, 21 Oktober1999, http://www.egroups.com/group/moluccas. The idea ofan independent state of Eastern Indonesia has not had muchcurrency since the suppression of Andi Azis Affair inMakassar in April 1950. See Richard Chauvel, Nationalists,Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands fromColonialism to Revolt, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1990.10 Republika, 12 Oct 1998

West Papua. President Habibies offer of autonomyor independence to East Timor seemed to suggestthat there was more flexibility in Jakartas policyand that other strategies were possible. A delegationof Papuan leaders the Team of 100 met withHabibie on 26 February 1999. The meeting markedthe beginning of what has been termed a NationalDialogue to supplement or replace urban protestsand the OPMs intermittent guerilla struggle. Asnoted above, the Team of 100 demandedindependence and the formation of a transitionaladministration under UN supervision.11 Habibieurged them to reconsider their demand ofindependence, and the West Papuans are stillawaiting a formal response from Jakarta. In thecontext of East Timors turbulent struggle in MayHabibie stated that Irian Jaya was an integral part ofIndonesia and that any attempt to separate would bemet by the full force of a united Indonesia. Theseparation of any region of Indonesia was notpossible, except for East Timor. The fate of EastTimor was under discussion with the UnitedNations and would be determined by the newParliament.12 To further contain the forces fordisintegration in Irian Jaya and elsewhere, just priorto the elections the old Soeharto-era Parliament(DPR) enacted legislation for greater regionalautonomy and a more equitable share of revenuebetween Jakarta and the provinces.

Indonesias economic and political turmoil creatednew opportunities for West Papuan nationalaspirations, but there were also dangers. In May,Habibie announced that after the June 1999elections the province would be divided intothree.13

Habibies threat to divide Irian Jaya into threeprovinces strikes at the heart of West Papuannationalism. The central dynamic of nationalism, asit emerged during the last decade and a half ofNetherlands New Guinea, had been to forge a sense

11 Kompas, 27-2-9912 Jakarta Post 5-5-99; Kompas, 4-5-9913 Suara Pembaruan, 5-5-99



of common identity from the mosaic of small anddisparate societies. That process was far fromcomplete when Indonesia assumed administrativecontrol in 1963. The strength of the identity forgedcan be seen by the continued use of the nationalsymbols created then, especially the West Papuanflag. The political discourse is conducted in termsof a West Papuan identity, not of its territorialcomponents. The Papuan response to partition hasnot been uniform, but the provincial parliament(DPRD I) and Papuan members of the newlyelected national parliament (DPR/MPR-RI) haveopposed it. One PDI Perjuangan MP, Drs LukasKarl Degey, argued that implementation of thelegislation for more equitable allocation of revenuebetween Jakarta and Irian Jaya would facilitatedevelopment more effectively than partition.14

The loss of East TimorThe loss of East Timor has heightened concernamong the Jakarta elite, especially the military,about the further disintegration of Indonesia. Itwould seem that his handling of the East Timorcrisis was one of the factors that doomed Habibieschances of re-election as President. Wahid waschosen in Habibies stead, in part because he wasthought capable of drawing the line in the sand afterEast Timor. The composition of Wahids Cabinet ofNational Unity reflects his inclusive intent. Asnoted above, his Ministers include an Irianese aswell as Acehnese and other outer islanders.

Historian Anhar Gonggong identified two principalchallenges for the Wahid-Mbak Mega Cabinet:firstly, the threat of disintegration of the nation andthe state and, secondly, the destruction of thecountrys economic structure. These two factorswere interrelated.15 Immediately upon his election,Wahid himself has identified national disintegrationas a high priority, taking upon himself the task ofsolving Aceh and delegating to his Vice-Presidentthe responsibility for Irian Jaya and Maluku.Although the Presidents subsequent handling of

14 Suara Pembaruan, 18-10-9915 Anhar Gonggong, Kabinet Baru: Kinerja dan Waktu,Suara Pembaruan, 1-11-99

Aceh has been less than clear and Wahid has beencautioned by his own Defence Minister and militaryspokesmen,16 it has been the first time in recentdecades that the Jakarta government has talkedabout political solutions for regional problems,rather than simply the application of military force.

While the magnitude of this transformation inJakarta politics should not be underestimated, somePapuans were cynical about the new Governmentscommitment to resolve the Aceh and Irian Jayaissues. One commentator asked whether thismeant that Papua was under some specialsupervision. Or was it merely a matter of sometechnical consideration, Wahid as a Kiyai is moresuited to clean up the bloody mess in Aceh, whileMegawati Cendrawasih, the daughter of Soekarno,is more appropriate to be delegated to the PromisedLand that was seized on the orders of her father.17

Any assessment of the prospects of greaterautonomy for Aceh and Irian Jaya within Indonesiaor the separation of these provinces from Indonesiamust start from the proposition that Aceh and IrianJaya are different from, more difficult and moreimportant for, the viability and maintenance of theIndonesian nation state than East Timor. This ispartly a matter of colonial history. Aceh and IrianJaya were part of the Netherlands Indies, EastTimor never was. Aceh and Irian Jaya are alsointegral parts of Indonesias national history. Acehwas the only region that remained under Indonesiancontrol for the entire struggle against the Dutch,1945-1949. Because of their 30 year-long struggleagainst the Dutch, the Acehnese constitute adisproportionate share of Indonesias nationalheroes. Indonesia struggled for twelve years toregain control of Irian Jaya. The struggle for IrianJaya was such a passionate nationalist campaign,inspired by Megawatis father, precisely becauseWest Papua was ethnically and culturally differentfrom most of the rest of Indonesia. To regain IrianJaya was to demonstrate that Indonesia was not

16 The Age, 24-11-9917 Thaha Moh Alhamid, Tanah Papua di tangan Megawati,Tifa Irian, 15-22 November 1999



based on a concept of common cultural, ethnic,religious or historical heritage. Rather Indonesiawas formed from a common colonial experienceand a common struggle against the Dutch. ForIndonesian nationalists there is no fall backposition. There is no nationalist rationale for alesser Indonesia minus Aceh, West Papua,Menado, West Timor, Ambon

It is not insignificant that both Irian Jaya and Acehare among Indonesias resource rich provinces.

The lessons West Papuans read into Indonesiasloss of East Timor were different from those inJakarta. The experience of East Timor has longbeen of interest. At one of the many West Papuandemonstrations in Hollandia (Jayapura) in 1962 attime of the negotiations of the New YorkAgreement there was a banner: RI: Waarom nietOost Timor?, meaning Indonesia why dont youtake East Timor instead of us. The loss of EastTimor has been read as a failure of Indonesiancolonialism and the discrediting of the concepts ofUnity in Diversity and idea of Indonesia as anarchipelagic state. In the opinion of one Papuancommentator, if East Timor, which is much closerto western Indonesia geographically, historically,culturally and ethnically, could free itself from theidea of Unity in Diversity and become a sovereignnation (bangsa yang berdaulat) rather than an ethnicgroup (suku bangsa), why not West Papua?18

There is also the sense that West Papua already hasits independence. West Papua is merely askingIndonesia to respect it and return its sovereignty.Indeed, it is argued, that Soekarno himselfrecognised West Papuan sovereignty when he gavehis famous (infamous?) Trikora speech on 19December 1961. His first command to his armedforces was to destroy the Dutch-created puppet stateof West Papua.19

18 Sanggenefa Max, Menyongsong Kemerdekaan PapuaBarat, Tifa Irian, 1-5 November 199919 Rakyat Minta Kebalikan Kedaulatan, Tifa Irian, 1-5November 1999

How can West Papuan national aspirationsbe advanced?The West Papuan members of the newly electedParliament (MPR/DPR) have continued thediplomatic strategy of a National Dialogue withJakarta. The MPRs formulation of the broadoutlines of national policy for the Wahid-MegaCabinet has been the opportunity for the MPs torepeat West Papuas demands for independence.However, in the Jayapura press the MPs have beensharply criticised for being less assertive than theirAcehnese colleagues.20

The best that either the West Papuans or theAcehnese have been offered is some, still ill-defined, special autonomy. To what extent this isacceptable is a matter of on-going debate. It appearsthat some of the MPs, church leaders and academicsare prepared to contemplate the offer of autonomy.However, some of the most prominent leaders,Thom Beanal and Theys Hiyo Eluay, have rejectedautonomy or a federal state. Thom Beanal arguedthat We Papuans dont need autonomy. What weneed is full independence. We will give autonomyto the provinces within a West Papuan state.Papuans do not ask for autonomy and we cannotimagine what sort of autonomy that might be. Imyself am confused about this special autonomy.What sort of animal is it?21

When West Papua was a focus of internationalconflict in the 1960s the international environmentwas very hostile to the realisation of the right ofself-determination for West Papuans. The dynamicsof the Cold War meant that the United States gavemuch higher priority to its relations with theGovernment in Jakarta, with the objective ofkeeping Indonesia out of the Soviet Bloc, than tothe interests of a distant, small and isolated territory.Australia also had an interest in keeping SoekarnosIndonesia non-communist. Sir Garfield Barwicks

20 Kemerdekaan Papua Barat, Terbuka Lebar, Tifa Irian, 1-5 November 199921 Otonomi Khusus Itu Binatang Apa Eeee, Tifa Irian, 1-5November 1999



reversal of Australian support of Netherlandssovereignty in West Papua was also argued on theproposition that it was not in Australias interest tosupport the right of self-determination for a state West Papua that he regarded as unviableeconomically, politically and militarily. Anindependent West Papua, in Sir Garfields view,would not be able to survive the animosity ofIndonesia. The Cold War is no longer an importantfactor in Southeast Asia, however the BarwickDoctrine is still alive and well in Canberra asAlexander Downers response to a question at theNational Press Club on 1 December suggests.Downer stated that:

the last thing we'd want to see is theBalkanisation of Indonesia. I mean theBalkanisation of the Balkans has been enormouslypainful and the East Timor exercise has been,whilst in my view necessary, nevertheless painful,but to see other parts of the country breaking upand breaking off I think would be verydestabilising for the region as a whole, and I thinkthat would be a view pretty much reflected rightaround the international community. It is, I'd put itto you this way. In Irian Jaya and especially inAceh, it is a very great challenge for theIndonesian Government to find a way throughwhich guarantees a peaceful settlement in thoseplaces and other parts of the country, yet, youknow, it is a very great challenge. They'reworking at it.22

The right of self-determination, as a strategy forraising international awareness about West Papuamay be useful. The 1969 Act of Free Choice wassuch an obvious facade and travesty of justice that itcan be the base of a strong moral argument and onein which the UNs own responsibility can beinvoked. Nevertheless, however powerful the moralargument might seem, the international environmentin the new millennium may not be much more

22 Australia at Year's End - Retrospect and Prospect -Questions and Answers, Alexander Downer MP, Minister forForeign Affairs at the National Press Club, Canberra, 1December 1999, www.dfat.gov.au

sympathetic than that which produced the NewYork Agreement and the Act of Free Choice.

Human rights, and the Indonesian transgressionsthereof, are an important part of Papuan politicaldiscourse. It is one of the potentially most effectivechannels of communication with Indonesians.Articulating West Papuan aspirations in humanrights terms is an effective way of raising awarenessof the issue in some sections of the Indonesianreformasi movement and thereby diluting some ofthe Indonesian nationalist response to the assertionof Papuan demands for independence. Timor andAceh have heightened sensitivity on military abusesand can be used to develop an understanding ofPapuan interests in the more liberal andinternationalist sections of the Indonesian elite.

For the reasons discussed above, it would be unwiseto underestimate the importance of Irian Jaya andAceh in the survival of the Indonesian nation state.

Indonesian offers of special autonomy havereceived a mixed reception from West Papuanleaders and have been rejected by some of the mostprominent. There are very real problems ofcredibility. However, given the difficultiesconfronting a successful campaign forindependence, greater autonomy within theIndonesian state may provide a more favourablepolitical and administrative environment to push forindependence than the present arrangements. Ifautonomy has no substance that will provide furtherevidence in support of independence as the onlyviable alternative. Independence would remain theobjective, but it would be part of a dual strategy ofmaking use of whatever autonomy can be squeezedout of Jakarta while continuing to work forindependence.

Dr. Richard Chauvel is Head of Department, Asianand International Studies, Victoria University ofTechnology.



Human Rights in West Papua

Rex Rumakiek

During my whole stay in West Irian, I never met asingle family which had not lost at least onemember because of torture or other acts of violenceby the Indonesians. In my opinion, and based on myown experience, the Indonesians are bringing notdevelopment, but systematic extermination.Theodore Frey, 1988

IntroductionWest Papua is the western half of the island of NewGuinea. Under the Dutch it was known asNederlands Nieuw Guinea and was called WestIrian when Indonesia annexed it in 1963. When itsmineral rich potential was established in 1973 withthe opening of Freeport gold and copper mine,Suharto baptised it with the current name Irian Jaya,which means glorious Irian. Our people share thesame cultural identity with the people of Papua NewGuinea and the other Melanesian islands to the East.The Melanesian population of West Papua is justover 1.2 million. But increased colonisation calledtransmigrasi and genocide in the past 35 years israpidly changing the demographic composition ofthe country. In the not too distant future we willbecome a minority on our own land.

The following material has been prepared to give ageneral picture of the extent of human rightsviolations in West Papua. The cases provided aretoo few and some of them may lack supportingevidence but they also give an understanding of thekind of life the West Papuan people have enduredunder Indonesia. It was only after Suharto wasforced out of office in May 1998 that the Churchesand NGOs began to record abuses in the country butit will take time and research to have more accuratedata on abuses in the society during 35 years ofsubjugation. However, existing reports on abusesgive a credible insight into the cruel system thatexisted in West Papua.

The preamble of the Universal declaration ofHuman Rights (December 10, 1948) states clearlythat, Recognition of the inherent dignity of allmembers of the human family is the foundation offreedom, justice and peace in the world. While it isassumed that all members will ab ide by thisdeclaration it sets out a warning in its last article(No 30), Nothing in this Declaration may beinterpreted as implying for any State, group orperson any right to engage in any activity or toperform any act aimed at the destruction of any ofthe rights and freedoms set forth herein. Perhaps itwas also assumed that all modern states aregoverned by the rule of law enshrined in a nationalconstitution with the responsibility to protect theircitizens and to govern for their common good.

Unfortunately, in West Papua the opposite has beenthe experience. Our people never had the protectionof the Indonesian state or the luxury of being treatedas equal citizens. Instead for over 35 years ourpeople have been condemned to acts of terror andannihilation by the state. All these violations weredirected primarily to force our people to acceptintegration. It failed, but the whole policy became apermanent activity of collective eradication orethnic cleansing designed through transmigration toalter the demographic balance in West Papua infavour of the Coloniser.

BackgroundThe tragedy of West Papua began in 1962 whenIndonesia claimed it because it formed part of theDutch East Indies which is now the Republic ofIndonesia. But the Dutch disagreed, claiming thatthe Papuan people are ethnically different andshould be afforded the same sovereign right as theIndonesians. After the Dutch granted Indonesia itsindependence in 1949, it also made efforts todecolonise West Papua. But Indonesia continued topursue its claim over the territory. All its attempts atthe United Nations failed. No one seemed willing toentertain colonial mandates of the 19th century in anera of decolonisation. Furthermore, the Japaneseoccupation during the Second World War hadforever decimated the Dutch Empire in South EastAsia. But most importantly, West Papua was



liberated from Japan by the Allied forces in April1944 long before Indonesia proclaimed itsindependence. It remained a non self-governingterritory and by 1960, it was already in the processof decolonisation. This status however, wasconditionally abrogated by the New YorkAgreement in 1962.

By 1960 the Dutch decided to speed up the processof decolonisation of West Papua by the election ofwhat was known as the New Guinea Council thatcould have become a Parliament if the Dutchremained. The election encouraged popularparticipation and the establishement of morepolitical parties such as the Peoples democraticParty (DVP, 1957) ad the National Party (PARNA,1960). Indonesia objected very strongly to theDutch plan and committed itself to invade theterritory in an attempt to stop the creation of a WestPapuan state. The Indonesian resolve was fullysupported by the former Soviet Union andCommunist China. The Dutch were also equallydetermined to defend West Papua making a breakout of war a real possibility. Indonesia increased itsarmed infiltrators to engage the Dutch forces inWest Papua. But the first real attempt of landing bya flotilla of fast patrol boats was repelled when theRoyal Dutch Navy sank the commanding patrolboat killing the Commander, Commodore JosSoedarso.

To prevent this risky war that could have expandedthe conflict in Vietnam right into the Pacific, theUnited States intervened by persuading the Dutch tosoften its position in order to allow for a negotiatedsettlement. In his confidential letter to the DuchPrime Minister Dr J De Quay, President John FKennedy wrote, such a conflict would haveadverse consequences out of all proportion to theissue at stake. This would be a war in which neitherthe Netherlands nor the West could win in any realsense. Whatever the outcome of particular militaryencounters, the entire free world position in Asiawould be seriously damaged. Only the Communistswould benefit from such a conflict. Consequently,West Papua was sold down the drain so that the rest

of the Pacific people could preserve the freedomand democracy that they all enjoy today.

On the 15th of August 1962, Indonesia and theNetherlands signed a US mediated New YorkAgreement for the transfer of control over WestPapua to Indonesia. The Indonesian control wasonly temporary pending a referendum in 1969where the Papuan people would decide whetherthey should become part of Indonesia or separatethemselves from it meaning, independence. In 1969,instead of a referendum to allow for the 800 000West Papuans to cast their votes, Indonesiaconducted a consultation with 1025 carefullyselected delegates. Absurdly they called this an actof free choice. The military government ofSoeharto made it abundantly clear that the exercisewas only to confirm Indonesias sovereignty overthe territory. Our people called this fraudulentexercise an act of no choice. The hand picked,screened and even terrorised 1025 people decidedthat West Papua should become part of Indonesia.This is what one of the electors, a highly respectedChurch leader had to say when interviewed byDutch Journalist, Link van Bruggen: The man whototally destroyed my self-respect was BrigadierGeneral Ali Murtopo, publicly acknowledged asbeing the chief brainwasher. For two hours, thisspecial envoy of President Suharto spoke to us. Hebegan by pointing out that Indonesia as thestrongest military power in South East Asia, is ableto strike fear into any country. Jakarta was notinterested in us as Papuans, but in West Irian. If wewant to be independent, he said, laughingscornfully, we had better ask god if he could createan island in the Pacific for us to immigrate there.We could also write to the Americans. They hadalready set foot on the moon and perhaps theywould be good enough to find a place for us there.This was not all. General Murtopo impressed uponus that 115 million Indonesians had fought for WestIrian for years. They had made many sacrifices inthis struggle, and they would not therefore allowtheir national aspirations to be crossed by a handfulof Papuans. Short shrift would be made of thosewho voted against Indonesia. Their accursedtongues would be torn out, their evil mouths



wretched open. Upon them would fall thevengeance of the Indonesian people, among themGeneral Murtopo who would himself shoot thePapuans on the spot.

Despite all the evidence of gross human rightsviolations and non compliance with the New YorkAgreement as reported also by Dr Ortiz Sanz, theUN Secretary Generals Envoy, the SecretaryGeneral himself did not make a specificrepresentation on behalf of the Papuan people. TheSecretary General failed to uphold the integrity ofhis office by participating in a fraudulent exercise ofself-determination. The UN General Assemblyaccepted a resolution by Indonesia and theNetherlands to end their conflict but our peoplesright to self-determination was not given anyconsideration. The same as the Secretary General,the Netherlands, also failed our people by notdefending the New York agreement it signed orinsisting on the proper conduct of the act of self-determination. The 1969 so called act of freechoice was a sham from start to end. It was a cleartravesty of natural justice to the 800 000 people ofWest Papua and a blot on the record of the UNSecretary General. The irregularities of the processwere questioned by 20 African countries led byGhana. They were not convinced that the WestPapuan people had exercised their right of self-determination. Quoting the Indonesian report, theyargued that if indeed the Papuan people were soprimitive as reported by Indonesia, then the act offree choice was not the solution but what shouldhave been provided was accelerated developmentleading to a genuine act of self-determination, to beorganised by the United Nations. Before WestPapua, the apartheid regime of South Africaconducted a similar sham act of self-determinationwhere representatives of South West Africa, nowNamibia, decided in a similar fraudulent conductthat they wanted to be part of South Africa. TheUnited Nations rejected that sham act of self-determination.

Our people never accepted the conduct and theresult of the 1969 act of free choice. On July 1,1971 the West Papuan national liberation movement

the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or the FreePapua Movement) denounced the act of freechoice and pledged to resist the Indonesianoccupation. That stand still remains today.

Patterns of human rights violationsHuman rights violations in West Papua wereplanned and carried out by the military as an officialpolicy to reverse the process of decolonisation thatwas already under way by 1960. The priority of thispolicy since occupation in 1963 was directed at theremoval of the educated elites, politicians anddemocratic institutions created when the Dutchprepared the Papuan people for independence. Byway of Presidential Decree (No 8, 1963) thegovernment banned all political parties andremoved all the freedoms and rights includingfreedom of assembly or freedom to organise. Thiswas done in complete disregard for the New YorkAgreement which protects all these rights andfreedoms. The destruction of democratic institutionsand the removal of elected leaders was thenextended to include the whole society which addeda new element which is collective elimination ofdissent. All the violations were conducted officiallyby the security forces under a mandate byPresidential Decree No 11, 1963, known as the AntiSubversion Act. The recorded patterns of violationsinclude intimidation, detention without trial, torture,rape, destruction of property including churches,summary executions including mutilation,disappearance, aerial bombardment, sterilisationand institutional discrimination. There is muchevidence of the security forces attempting toconceal their crimes by burning the bodies,disfiguring them, hiding them, chopping them up ordumping them at sea. Prominent leaders eitherdisappear without a trace or go to a military hospitalfor a minor complaint and return home in a coffin.These seem to suggest that all the crimes committedby the security forces are carefully planned andexecuted. The only evidence which ever came tolight about this genocide activity was contained in asecret instruction by the Chief of Intelligence inWest Papua, Dr Soedjoko which stated in part, theexecutions must be carried out in complete secrecy.For every case, a strict precaution must be taken not



to arouse suspicions among the people. (AlgemeneDagblad, February 6, 1967). However, there werealso instances where public execution was appliedas an example for those who dared to resist theIndonesian Government.

Human rights violations in West Papua underSoeharto was widespread but the information is notshared because of the fear of retribution. The strictcontrol of the media maintained a complete blanketof silence and made the whole saga of humanmisery disguised in peoples smiles as serene or eveninnocent. You have to actually live in the countryfor some time in order to gain an understanding ofthe real life of the people. Such was the experienceof Missionary Pilot, Theodore Fray when he stated(1988): During my whole stay in West Irian/WestPapua, I never met a single family which had notlost at least one member because of torture or otheracts of violence by the Indonesians. In my opinion,and based on my own experience theIndonesians are bringing not development, butsystematic extermination.

Under President Habibie, restrictions were liftedallowing the NGOs and Churches to record abusesand at the same time educate the public abouthuman rights and citizens responsibilities in a civilsociety. Before 1998, reports did come out fromtime to time but confirmation could not be made orwas very slow for fear of endangering those in thecountry.

Reporting on Indonesia in 1991, AmnestyInternational (AI) stated:

There are currently about 130 political prisonersfrom Irian Jaya serving sentences up to lifeimprisonment, the majority of whom wereconvicted under Indonesias sweeping Anti-Subversion Law of 1963. Amnesty Internationalbelieves that at least 80 of these may be prisonersof conscience people imprisoned for their nonviolent political activies or beliefs. They included37 people sentenced to prison terms of up to 20years for their involvement in a peaceful flag-raising ceremony in December 1988 flag-raisingone year later. One of those imprisoned was apolice officer accused of distributing copies of a

patriotic song to high-school students; he wassentenced to 13 years jail. Four others, who hadsought asylum at the Papua New GuineanConsulate a few weeks before their arrest, weresentenced to terms of between 6 and 12 years. (AI 1991)

On August 3, 1995, Catholic Bishop Mgr H MMunninghoff of Jayapura disclosed a report onatrocities committed by the military against landowners of the Freeport copper and gold mine area inthe Timika Sub-District of Fak Fak. This is a newdevelopment, because in West Papua, it has been anestablished fact that NGOs never go public on suchmatters involving the military. Acting on theirbehalf, ACFOA (the Australian Council ForOverseas Aid) disclosed the full details of the reportwhich revealed a systematic campaign of terroragainst the traditional land owners. The reportattracted official response from both the Australianand the Indonesian governments. Investigations byIndonesias Human Rights Commission and visitsby the Australian Ambassador confirmed theexistence of the atrocities, involving 22 peoplemassacred and another four disappeared, feareddead. If it was not for the Bishops report andsupport by ACFOA the whole incident could havebeen ignored or regarded as OPM propaganda (likemany other cases before Timika).

In 1996 a number of European and Indonesianhostages were taken by OPM guerillas under theleadership of Kelly Kwalik, demanding negotiationon the issue of self-determination.

At Kelly Kwaliks request, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross assisted innegotiations, but instead of arranging directnegotiations with governments, the ICRC took onthe negotiations themselves. This led to a deadlockclosely followed by a shooting of villagers from ahelicopter marked with the Red Cross symbol.

The recent ABC documentary, Blood on the Crossimplies that the ICRC was negligent in this situationand reveals that British and South Africanmercenaries may have been invovled in the hostage



crisis and massacre. It also revealed to the world thebloodshed which the people of West Papua endured.

When Suharto was forced out of office in May1998, many people hoped that things would changefor the better. But in West Papua the killingcontinued. In July 1998, inspired by the changes inJakarta, young people in several towns and districtsraised the West Papuan national flag, the MorningStar. Their demand was nothing less thanindependence. The military responded ruthlesslycausing many deaths.

Which way forward?Amid all the expectations and hopes for ademocratic Indonesia after Suharto, the localChurches have added their voices to a chorus ofpleas by many organisations including the WorldCouncil of Churches and a number of USCongressmen for justice to the West Papuan people.President Habibie responded by inviting 100 WestPapuan leaders for a dialogue on 26th February1999. President Habibie wanted to hear direct fromthese leaders the aspirations and the wishes of thePapuan people.

With his senior Ministers including the DefenceForce Commander General Wiranto in attendance,they told him that the Papuan people have sufferedfor 35 years, they can not take it any more, theywant their independence. Astonished, Habibie putaside the speech he had prepared for the meeting.He told the 100 representatives to ponder the issueagain well. Back in West papua, with theassistance of the Churches they conducted Seminarsand meetings throughout the country where theissues of independence and autonomy werediscussed. On 23 and 24 July 1999, representatvesfrom the whole country came together in the capital,Jayapura, and concluded the 5 months consultationas requested by the President. The conclusion wasthe same, there are no other alternatives toindependence. In a public statement before leavingfor Jakarta they stated, we want to leave theRepublic of Indonesa and create our own, meaningan independent state of West Papua. By the secondweek of August, there was still no confirmation

from the Presidents office for a meeting. The onlyreason given was that the President was toopreoccupied with the problem of East Timor.Nevertheless it is public knowledge that the WestPapuan people would not ask for anything less thanindependence. How President Habibie or hissuccessor would proceed on this issue is up toJakarta. As a West Papuan leader put it, the ball isin their corner.

Considering the involvement of other countries inthe process that facilitated the take over of WestPapua, one cannot entirely put the blame onIndonesia alone. The whole human tragedy in WestPapua was in effect permitted to take place by anumber of countries, namely, the United States,Australia, the Netherlands and of course the officeof the UN Secretary General. It is the responsibilityof these countries and the office of the UNSecretary General to rectify their policies towardsWest Papua. Thirty-five years of subjugation didnot change Papuans into Indonesians; and the issuewill not go away.

Rex Rumakiek is a well-known West Papuan activistbased in Sydney. He observed the Act of FreeChoice in 1969 and was subsequently forced intoexile in Vanuatu. He attended the WCC assembly inZimbabwe in December 1998 and the Hague PeaceConference this year.



West Papua After East Timor: TheOptions

Professor Sam Blay

The West Papua issue is "a matter of graveinternational concern [which] if not rectified wouldthrow doubt on the integrity of the United Nationsand its Committee on decolonisation especially inits dealings with the remaining list of colonisedterritories". Melanesian Council of ChurchesStatement of Concern to the UN DecolonisationCommittee, Port Moresby (1985)

Background to the WestRecent events in East Timor and the continuingtensions in the Indonesian provinces of Maluku andAceh have highlighted some of the difficulties anddangers associated with the failure of centralauthorities to take account of popular expressionsfor self determination. What is remarkable aboutthese developments is the deafening silence onWest Papua. For all practical purposes, West Papuais the forgotten East Timor

West Papua is the oldest self-determination issue inIndonesia since independence. Duringdecolonisation negotiations in 1949, the Dutch didnot hand over this part of the former NetherlandsEast Indies to what is now the Republic ofIndonesia. Between 1949 and 1962, the question ofsovereignty over West Papua became a critical issuein Dutch-Indonesian relations. Indonesia demandedsovereignty over West Papua on two grounds: that it succeeded to Dutch sovereignty over the

whole of the Netherlands East Indies, includingWest Papua;

that there were historical ties between the rest ofIndonesia and West Papua before the colonialera that warranted the integration of the territorywith the rest of Indonesia

In 1962, Indonesia and the Netherlands reachedagreement over West Papua under what came to becalled the New York Agreement. The Netherlands

transferred sovereignty over West Papua toIndonesia, with an interim administration by theUnited Nations Temporary Executive Authority(UNTEA). UNTEA administered West Papua fromOctober 1962 to May 1963, when Indonesiaassumed total control and responsibility.

Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua was to betentative. Under Article XVIII of the agreement,Indonesia undertook to 'make arrangements with theassistance and participation of the United NationsRepresentative and his staff, to give the people ofthe territory the opportunity to exercise freedom ofchoice' to determine whether they wanted to remainpart of Indonesia or to form an independent state.This consultation, the Act of Free Choice, tookplace in July 1969.

Right from the outset, considerable sections of theWest Papuan population opposed the incorporation.Activists formed the Organisasi Papua Merdeka(OPM) in 1970. The movement aimed atindependence for West Papua by way of armedstruggle. In July 1972, the OPM enacted aprovisional constitution and declared West Papua arepublic. While an independent West Papua is farfrom being a reality, the seeds of separatist activismstarted by the OPM continues today.

The demandsThe principal claim of West Papuan separatists isthat the 1969 consultation process was not properlyconducted and was therefore not valid. WestPapuans demand the conduct of fresh consultations,as was the case in East Timor. Central to thedemands is the plea for the United NationsDecolonisation Committee to re-list West Papua asa colonial territory or at very least, to investigate theconduct of the 1969 Act of Free Choice.

OPM organisations argue that a consultation is nowmore urgent than ever because of continuous andincreasingly gross human rights violations byIndonesia, and because Indonesia has attempted tochange the population balance in West Papuathrough the transmigration of 'mainland'Indonesians. A series of petitions to the UN on



these human rights violations, and pleas for the UNDecolonisation Committee have all so far failed.

The OPM, which once provided the vanguard forWest Papuan rights, is now fragmented. Too poorlyarmed to mount any credible guerilla campaign andwith no effective strategy, it relies mostly on non-governmental organisations. It lacks any realpolitical support even in the South Pacific. In spiteof these difficulties, the events in East Timor andthe current focus on self-determination in Indonesiaprovide some optimism for West Papua's future.International political support is crucial to whathappens to the future of West Papua. However suchinternational support would in part depend on thelegal merits of their claims in international law.

The legal meritsAs a rule, self-determination can be exercised inone of the following three ways:the establishment of an independent state;the association of the beneficiary territory with anexisting state;or the integration of the beneficiary territory into anexisting state.

Whatever the choice, democratic consultations arethe necessary precondition for a valid exercise ofthe right.

The 1969 consultations indicated that West Papuansopted for integration, but the issue is whether theoption was validly exercised.

To the extent that self-determination by integrationallows an existing state to absorb a beneficiaryterritory, the United Nations' rules on integrationare quite strict. For a valid exercise of self-determination by integration, two essentialconditions must be satisfied: the integrated territory should have attained an

advanced stage of self-government with freepolitical institutions, so that its people wouldhave the capacity to make a responsible choicethrough informed and democratic processes;

the integration should be the result of the freelyexpressed wishes of the territory's peoples

acting with full knowledge of the change in theirstatus, their wishes having been expressedthrough informed and democratic processes,conducted impartially and based on universaladult suffrage.

It is very doubtful whether the West Papuanintegration in 1969 met these conditions. Before theAct of Free Choice, Indonesian authorities hadmade it quite clear that the consultations were onlyto be a formality. Indonesia indeed indicated that itwas 'going through the motions of the act of freechoice because of [its] obligations under the NewYork Agreement... But West [Papua] is Indonesianand must remain Indonesian. [Indonesia] cannotaccept any alternative'. From the Indonesian pointof view, the outcome of any consultation wasirrelevant - integration was a foregone conclusion.

Under the New York Agreement, Indonesia and theNetherlands agreed that:

Indonesia will make arrangements with theassistance and participation of the Representativeof the United Nations Secretary General and hisstaff, to give to the people of the territory (WestPapua) the opportunity to exercise freedom ofchoice. Such arrangements will include:

Consultations (Musyawarah) with therepresentative Councils on procedures andappropriate methods to be followed forascertaining the freely expressed will of thepopulation. The determination of the actual dateof the exercise of free choice. Formulation of thequestions in such a way as to permit theinhabitants to decide (i) whether they wish toremain with Indonesia:(ii) whether they wish tosever their ties with Indonesia.(emphasis added)

The eligibility of all adults, male and female, notforeign nationals, to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance withinternational practice.

When the time came for a decision on the method tobe used, the representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral in West Papua suggested that the'democratic, orthodox and universally accepted"one-man-one-vote" method would be mostappropriate'. However, he qualified this by saying,



'the geographical and human realities in some partsof the territory required the application of a realisticcriterion.' Consequently, he proposed a normal adultsuffrage for the urban areas, and a form of tribalconsultation for the rural areas. Indonesia rejectedthe suggestion and adopted instead the tribalmusyawarah system throughout the territory.

The musyawarah system involved consultationswith tribal council representatives, who in turn werepresumed to have had consultations with theirtribesmen. Arguably, the system may have been auseful democratic machinery for tribaladministration, but it was certainly not inconformity with the essential requirements of theUnited Nations prescriptions on self-determinationby integration. By employing the musyawarahsystem throughout the territory, it would seem thatIndonesia breached one of its obligations under theNew York Agreement, and indeed, internationallaw.

Indonesia itself admitted that the musyawarahsystem fell short of the UN requirement, but itjustified the use of the system with the argumentthat 'in West [Papua] there exists one of the mostprimitive and underdeveloped communities in theworld', and that it was unrealistic to apply normaldemocratic methods to ascertain their wishes. Thiswas a rather significant admission. If according tothe Indonesian administration the West Papuanswere so primitive that a single one man one voteadult suffrage was not appropriate for them, it maybe argued that they were not sufficiently advancedto appreciate the complex implications ofintegration.

Some African states that opposed the Indonesianmethod summed up the general sentiment at thetime with the observation that 'no society could beso primitive... in the modern world that the vitalexercise of democratic government could beindefinitely denied to its peoples'. Some UNmembers also held the view that if the WestPapuans were that primitive, the way to ensure theirright to self-determination was not through themusyawarah system but through an accelerated

economic development of the territory under theauspices of the UN to bring them up to a level thatcould enable them to exercise their right to self-determination meaningfully. Even though thesecriticisms and suggestions were ignored, theyunderscored the anomalies associated with WestPapua's integration.

The Act of Free Choice had other defects. Under theUN regulations, consultations for integration mustnot only be by adult suffrage, but must also beconducted impartially, and where the UN deems itnecessary, under its own supervision. However, inline with Indonesia's position that West Papuabelonged to it in any case and that the consultationswere only a formality to rubber-stamp its claims,Indonesia maintained tight controls over all aspectsof the consultations. In fact Indonesia allowed atoken UN supervision in only 195 of the 1,000consultative assemblies. The required impartiality,and the appropriate explanations to West Papuansas to other options for self-determination availableto them, were arguably absent in the consultations.The UN representative to West Papua furtherattested to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in hisobservation that 'the act of free choice wasobviously stage-managed from start to finish ...[Indonesia] exercised at all times a tight controlover the population.'

Secret documents recently released by theAustralian Department of Foreign Affairs and Tradeprovide significant evidence that further brings thevalidity of the Act of Free Choice into question. Forinstance the documents reveal that from Junethrough to August 1969, Australian authoritiesdetained two leading West Papuan nationalists inthe Trust Territory of PNG who were seeking totravel to New York to present a petition to theUnited Nations in an attempt demonstrate the manyshort comings of the Prepera and to oppose theintegration. Available evidence also suggests thatthe Netherlands as the colonial power refused themen travel documents to enable them travel to NewYork. Much more disturbing is the revelationthrough these documents that Australian and Dutchofficials intentionally discouraged the travel of



these men to new York with the express intention tostifle any debate at the United Nations or the DuctParliament that may undermine the acceptance ofthe Act of Free Choice.

Australian diplomatic dispatches indicate that asearly as October 1968 Australia and the UnitedStates had conceded that there was 'little likelihoodof Suharto agreeing to any form of regionalautonomy, (let alone independence) given, amongstother things, the government's fear that a precedentmight be established for action by other regions ofIndonesia. Some slight movement could beenvisaged, for instance, in the further integration ofPapuans into the structure of government, but anyprogress would have to be within the frame work ofIndonesia's unified government system. (emphasisadded)

Australian intelligence reports on the Act of FreeChoice and the general situation in West Papuaprovided extensive evidence of human rights abusesin the territory preceding the Act. Furtherintelligence reports on the Act Free Choice alsonoted that: United Nations experts could not advise as

provided for in [the] 1962 agreement becausefor a period up to August 1968 Indonesia hadnot co-operated with the UN;

(Ortiz-Sanz the United Nations representative)had to carry out in a few months what had beenagreed by experts should be carried out in 5years;

rights of free speech, freedom of movement andof assembly were not fully implemented; and

that a precondition for 'one-person-one-vote tobe used to the maximum extent possible asproposed by Ortiz-Sanz , and his offer to help todiscuss a method of collective consultations hadall been rejected by Indonesia.

The evidence available today indicates thatAustralia the Netherlands, United States and theUnited Nations itself assisted Indonesia to secure itscontrol over West Papua, even where it was clearthat there were serious defects with the procedurefor integration.

In the frenzy of decolonisation in the 1960s, ThirdWorld states at the UN were eager to terminateDutch colonialism in West Papua. Indonesiaenjoyed considerable support at the UN in its claimsagainst the Netherlands for West Papua. Quite apartfrom its diplomatic advantage, Indonesia had alsobeen preparing a military invasion of West Papua.In the face of these difficulties, the Netherlandssigned the New York Agreement. It was a face-saving measure that enabled the Netherlands towithdraw 'honourably'. For Indonesia, theAgreement had been a great diplomatic victory.After the signing, West Papua became a de factointegral part of Indonesia, despite the requirementof the so-called Act of Free Choice. At the UN, theincorporation seemed a fait accompli.

The options for West PapuaThe NetherlandsAs the colonial power in charge of West Papua, theNetherlands had specific responsibilities for theterritory in international law. Under the UnitedNations Charter, the Netherlands was obliged to:

ensure with due respect for the culture of thepeoples (of West Papua) their political,economic, social and educational advancement,their just treatment, and their protection againstabuses

to develop self-government, to take due accountof the political aspirations of the (WestPapuans) and to assist them in their progressivedevelopment of their political institutions,according to the particular circumstances ofeach territory and its peoples and their varyingstages of advancement.

Under the Charter of the United Nations theNetherlands accepts the 'principle that the interest ofthe inhabitants of (West Papua) are paramount, andaccepts as a sacred trust the obligation to promote tothe utmost, within the system of international peaceand security the well being of the inhabitants of(West Papua)'.



The Netherlands breached this sacred trust and itsobligations to protect the interest of the people ofWest Papua by its failure to monitor the Act of FeeChoice and to ensure that it was consistent with theterms of the New York Agreement. Its failure tonotify the United Nations and to take up the issue ofthe several defects of the Act of Free Choice alsoconstituted breaches of its obligations under theUnited Nations Charter.

The Nauru Case easily indicates that a colonialpower can be held accountable for breaches of itsduties to a colonial territory well afterdecolonisation. Further The Northern CamerounsCase suggests that the International Court of Justicemay be willing to revisit the issues in adecolonisation case if the objectives for the requestto revisit the issue are well articulated. Howeverthese cases do not assist West Papua in dealing withthe Netherlands for breaches of its duties becausethese were all cases between states. As a matter oflaw, only states can be parties to a dispute beforethe International Court of Justice.

The absence of any clear avenue for legal actionagainst the Netherlands should in itself be anobstacle to the search for a solution for West Papua.What is critical for West Papua is not so much as towhether it can mount a legal action. It is whetherWest Papuans can at least establish sufficientfactual evidence to show that the Netherlandsbreached sacred trust under the UN Charter and forit can be held morally accountable. In the fight forself-determination the case of East Timor easilydemonstrates the force of moral accountability.Portugal played a critical role in the developmentsat the United Nations that eventually led to thereferendum in East Timor. The important lessonfrom East Timor is that to secure a solution for theterritory it needed the colonial administrator as apolitical with ally a moral liability and not anadversary with legal defences.

The Netherlands has a moral responsibility to comeclean on the issue. While the issues raised byNetherlands' breaches of its obligations may notcome within the jurisdiction of any of the

institutions of the European Union, the members ofthe Union can and should encourage theNetherlands to take up the issue with theDecolonisation Committee just as Portugal did forEast Timor.

AustraliaAs a regional power Australia was influential in thedevelopments that led to the incorporation of WestPapua into Indonesia and the Indonesian take overof East Timor in 1975. In 1999, Australia's positionwas even more crucial in the East Timorreferendum. Like the Netherlands, Australia carriesa degree of moral responsibility for the events thatled to the integration of West Papua.

One must however overlook the obvious politicaldifficulties that confront Australia with respect toWest Papua. Having contributed actively to the EastTimor referendum to the point of straining relationswith Indonesia, Australia would understandablyloathe any suggestion to assist West Papua orindeed any Indonesian province to seekindependence. Thus for West Papua East Timor isboth a blessing and a curse. On the other hand theargument should be made that in matters of self-determination each case must be determined on itsown merits. Australian can therefore play a role tobringing the issue to the Decolonisation Committee

The Decolonisation CommitteeUltimately the question is whether the UnitedNations Decolonisation Committee can bepersuaded to investigate the Act of Free Choice.Established in 1961, the United NationsDecolonisation Committee oversees the process ofself-determination for colonial territories. As part ofits functions, the Committee maintains a list ofterritories for which self-determination isconsidered an issue. The Committee's List is theonly mechanism by which colonised nations can beplaced on the UN agenda. This enables the UN toprovide ongoing scrutiny of the politicaldevelopments in the territory, to contributediplomatic activity, send special missions anddelegations, meet local representatives and discussthe progress towards decolonisation. And it requires



the colonising power to provide regular informationto the UN on progress.

To succeed in its claims, it is critical for WestPapua to be listed with the Committee. West Papuawould need all the international political support itcan get. It is important to note that time is of theessence in this regard because in 1988, the UNdeclared the International Decade for theEradication of Colonialism. It was envisaged at thetime that the Decolonisation Committee would endcolonialism everywhere by 2000. A number ofstates, France, Britain and the US, in particular,have called for an end to the Committee's work,arguing that there is no longer enough work towarrant its cost. Under pressure, and in view of thebudgetary constraints, the UN is consideringabolishing the Decolonisation Committee. Legallythere is no barrier for a re-examination of the issues.However as is usually the case in international law,the absence of legal barriers may not be enough.West Papua needs political support for theDecolonisation Committee to accept to investigatethe case. Time is of the essence. The UN intends todisestablish the Decolonisation Committee by theyear 2001.

The task for West Papuan activists must not beunderestimated. As compared to East Timor, theattempts to list the territory with the DecolonisationCommittee will be an uphill battle with the resultsfar from certain. The East Timor case had a numberof distinct advantages which West Papua lacks. Inthe case of East Timor: the United Nations specifically rejected the

Indonesian take-over as long ago as 1977; the Decolonisation Committee kept the territory

on its list; with the exception of Australia, no state

expressly accepted Indonesian sovereignty; Fretelin was a much more effective guerilla

force that was able to make the East Timor casea military issue;

it had and still has a very extensive internationalnetwork of political support;

Portugal as the colonial administrator waswilling to provide the diplomatic and legalsupport.

In the Case of West Papua, unlike East Timor: the United Nations endorsed the act of self-

determination; the territory has generally been accepted as part

of Indonesia with hardly any exceptions; the OPM lacks the arms and the organisation to

mount a credible guerilla campaign that couldbe used as leverage in any diplomaticnegotiations;

the OPMs network of international support israther minimal;

as a movement the OPM does not seem to haveany specific coordinating strategy to pursue itsgoals; and much more importantly

the Netherlands as the formal colonial power iseither unwilling or unable to provide thepolitical support.

ConclusionIt is beyond doubt that the people of West Papuawere denied their right to self-determination. Littlenoticed, separatist agitation in West Papua haspersisted for over three decades. Every indication isthat it will persist into the new century. After EastTimor, the conditions appear right to re-examine theissue to help protect West Papuan's rights.

Dr. Sam Blay is Professor of Law at the University ofTechnology, Sydney, New South Wales.



Current Trends in West Papua

James Elmslie

Today I would like to talk about the currentsituation inside West Papua. I have focused on threetrends that seem to be driving events in theprovince: increasing West Papuan nationalism rapid economic growth and its consequence

increased migration growing instability within Indonesia itself which

is producing devolutionary forces.

I will set the trends against several constant factorssuch as the continuing ruthlessness of theIndonesian military and the problems the WestPapuans have in organising an effectiverepresentative body. I will conclude with myobservations on the situation in Irian Jaya over theperiod of the Indonesian elections in June this year.

NationalismThe first trend is the growing strength of WestPapuan nationalism and desire for an independentstate. Whereas West Papuan Nationalism and itsphysical manifestation the OPM (or OrganisasiPapua Merdeka the Free West Papua movement) was widely perceived to be in decline in the late1980s and early 1990s, events of recent years haveclearly proved this perception wrong.

From the early 1990s increased OPM activitybegan to be reported around the Freeport CopperMine. This was in response to a dramatic expansionof Freeports concession area from 10 000 ha to 2.5million ha. The local Amungme and Nduga peopleclearly felt threatened and responded by increasingseparatist activities such as ceremonial flag raisingsin support of independence. The Indonesian militaryresponded by harassing local villages and shootingand torturing people believed to be associated withthe local OPM commander Kelly Kwalik.

Kwalik, in turn responded by kidnapping a group ofEuropean scientists and holding them hostage forover four months. This resulted in intenseinternational media coverage which, beyondfollowing the hostage crisis, also publicised theplight of the West Papuan people and placed theOPM in the context of a repressed peopleresponding in the only way they could by armedrevolt. The kidnappings and associated increasedmilitary presence raised tensions throughout theprovince and led to major riots and anti-governmentdemonstrations in many cities and towns includingTimika, Biak and Jayapura. Clearly the issue of anindependent West Papua had not died. Tensionsremained high in Irian Jaya as students in Jakartaand elsewhere took up their campaign againstformer president Suharto. When Suharto was forcedto resign in May 1998, people across thearchipelago thought that a major shift in Indonesianpolitics had occurred.

In Irian Jaya, the West Papuans took Suhartos fallas a window of opportunity through which theycould seize their own independence. Flag raisingceremonies were undertook across the province onJuly 1 1998. In Jayapura and elsewhere severalthousand protestors confronted the armed forces.The military responded by making an example ofthe protesting West Papuan independence activistson Biak island. There, 700 odd protestors hadrallied for several days under a water tower in Biaktown. Troops attacked in the early hours of May 6with maximum force, resulting in scores of deathsand the imprisonment of many others. It was a rudeawakening to the West Papuans that, while thePresident had changed, the system had not. News ofthe Biak massacre spread widely throughout IrianJaya where death tolls as high as 300 have beenquoted to me.

In the wake of the Biak massacre, the concept of aNational Dialogue emerged. For the WestPapuans, this meant discussions over independence.For the Habibie government, it referred to arearranging of economic relations between Jakartaand Irian Jaya and talks over a limited form ofautonomy. To negotiate on behalf of the West



Papuans, a team of 100 was formed ofrepresentatives from across West Papua includingcommunity leaders and church groups. WhenHabibie had not visited Jayapura by January thisyear, the team Tim Seratus as it is known flewto Jakarta to meet Habibie. The meeting inMerdeka Palace on the 26th February was verybrief. As the meeting began, Tom Benal, anAmungme leader from Timika in the south,presented a signed declaration to the Presidentdemanding immediate independence for WestPapua. Habibies response was to break down intears and to urge the West Papuans to return homeand reconsider their options.

Tim Ratus returned to Irian Jaya elated, believingthat independence was at hand. However, the wholeprocess of the National Dialogue stalled as thegovernment and Habibie were not prepared to eventalk about the concept of independence. But themeeting was of huge significance because it broughtWest Papuan nationalism out into the open. Nownot only was it obvious that the vast majority ofWest Papuans wanted their independence but it alsobecame apparent that many believed they wereabout to receive it. This trend of increasing WestPapuan nationalism is continuing.

Economic factorsThe second trend dictating events in Irian Jaya isthe rapid economic growth of the province.In 1995 1996, the regional GDP grew by over12% following growth of over 20% the previousyear. Most of this growth can be attributed to theexpansion in production of the Freeport CopperMine, but other resource industries also performedwell as the collapsing rupiah resulted in higherreturns for exported commodities. For instance,minor gold rushes occurred as migrants flocked tothe province to pan for gold. While Java languishedin economic recession, Irian Jaya boomed, insulatedas it was from the worst of the Asian Flu. Theflood of migrants to Irian Jaya seemed to confirmPapuan fears of being minoritised within their owncountry. Extrapolating on 1996 population figuresthere are at most 1.5 million Papuans in Irian Jayaand at least 750 000 non-Papuans. Yet, given the

huge influx of migrants in the last two years aninflux that has been largely unrecorded there maybe many more non-Papuans; possibly over amillion. As a consequence, the Papuans feel thatthey are being swamped by migrants who areforeign to them racially and have a different religionand different notions of land ownership. ThePapuan fear is that they will be marginalised anddispossessed by the newcomers and that theirfuture existence will be in question if this trendcontinues.

These fears are exacerbated by feelings of economicexploitation. There is a wide perception amongst theWest Papuans that their resources are being rippedoff for the benefit of others this perception is, infact, quite correct. While per capita average GDP inIrian Jaya is over $US1700 per annum, average percapita consumption was only $US312 in 1996.Benefits of at least two billion US dollars accrue tothe rest of Indonesia by retaining its province ofIrian Jaya. So economic growth and itsconsequences increased migrant inflow haveonly strengthened West Papuan nationalism andhardened the resolve of the Papuans in their questfor independence.

InstabilityThe third trend I would like to examine the hugeloss of prestige that the central government and themilitary have suffered since the fall of Suharto. Thevacuum of power created by Suhartos resignationhas caused devolutionary forces across thearchipelago. These forces have been strongest in theprovinces of East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya. Theclearest case is obviously East Timor whereindependence has been achieved with astonishingrapidity but at a horrifying cost.

The second case of Aceh is unfolding as we speak.It now appears beyond the capacity of the militaryto regain control of the province short of applyingthe scorched earth policy pursued in East Timor; apolicy that would be entirely opposed by therecently elected president Abdurrahman Wahid.These devolutionary forces are certainly impactingon the West Papuan situation, confirming to the



West Papuans that independence the oneimpossible dream can be achieved if only thestruggle is pursued.

Against these three trends are several constantfactors.

Firstly, ABRI has shown in East Timor, once again,just how ruthlessly and brutally they are prepared toact to defend what the military perceive to be in thenations, or their own interests. The military still seetheir major duty as the unity of the nation at anycost. They are, therefore, totally opposed to theconcept of an independent West Papua.

A second constant is that Irian Jaya remains animportant psychological element of Indonesiansociety representing the final defeat of the Dutchcolonists and the unifying of the Republic ofIndonesia. So, while most Indonesians would likean end to human rights abuses by the military and amore open and democratic society, they also do notwant to see Irian Jaya become an independent WestPapua. This would confirm the fragmentation ofIndonesia, an outcome viewed with dread byIndonesian people fearful of their own future.

The third constant is the lack of political unityamongst the West Papuans and the OPM. Whilevery united in their goal an independent WestPapua they are fractured on how that goal is to beachieved. They have been unable to establish anumbrella organisation that talks for all West Papuangroups. Partly, of course, this has been due to thepolitical repression within Irian Jaya as well asdifficulties with communication and personal andethnic differences. Talks of any kind, whether ofindependence or autonomy, can only proceed whensome form of umbrella organisation is eventuallyformed. The increasing pressure on the WestPapuans may well have that result sooner ratherthan later.

To the three trends and three constants I havementioned must be added two major recentdevelopments. Firstly, independence for EastTimor. Besides being a precedent for an

independent West Papua, an independent EastTimor has also resulted in an increase in TNI troopsin Irian Jaya, an increase in migrants (this time EastTimorese refugees, possibly under force) and ofcourse an increased tension between the WestPapuans and the non-Papuan population, themilitary and the government. And secondly, therecent election of President Wahid. This hasdramatically transformed the situation in Aceh.Wahid has stated his own, personal view that thereshould be a referendum on independence for Aceh.As he said: If East Timor has a referendum, whynot Aceh?While Indonesias military and political elite arevehemently opposed to this concept, they may notbe able to say it. The cat is now out of the bag andthe Achenese have responded with massivedemonstrations. Clearly, the West Papuans aresaying: If Timor has a referendum, why not WestPapua?

Which leaves us with the situation in Irian Jayawhere, at the risk of oversimplification, two forcesare in profound conflict. One force is the Indonesianmilitary which is totally opposed to independenceand has shown to what lengths it will go to tosuppress independence movements. The other forceis the West Papuans who are pursuing a goal ofindependence, a goal to which the majority aredeeply committed because they feel that withoutindependence, the very future of the Papuan peoplesand their traditional lands are in doubt. Many feelthey are either facing independence or extinction.

In summary, the three trends of: (a) growing WestPapuan nationalism; (b) economic expansion inIrian Jaya; and (c) increasing devolutionary forcesand political instability within Indonesia itself,taken together result in a chaotic, confusing, verytense and indeed, highly explosive situation.

I saw this situation for myself in June this yearwhen I travelled to West Papua to observe theIndonesian elections. The elections were prettymuch a sideshow because the main issue for theWest Papuans independence was not on theagenda. While 48 parties participated in the



elections, not one represented the aspirations of theWest Papuans. Instead, I was told, demonstrationswould take place once the dust from the electionshad settled. From the newspaper reports of today,we can see that is what is happening.

On election day itself, Saturday June 7, I visitedChief Theys Eluay, the self-proclaimed President ofthe Independent State of West Papua. He was underhouse arrest, unable to travel and routinely visitedby soldiers and police. The Chief seemed to typifythe whole West Papuan struggle; a man who wasforced to vote in the Act of Free Choice in 1969 atgunpoint, who had tried to work within theIndonesian system as a parliamentarian until he hadfinally become totally disillusioned by that systemand revolted against it. He is pursuing independencein an absolutely dedicated manner and is preparedto put his life on the line. How it is to be achievedand what political structure might emerge are issuesvery much secondary to the main goal of freedom.He is, therefore, highly representative of the manyWest Papuan people I talked to.

Feelings in the streets of Jayapura over the electionperiod were very tense, indeed at times supercharged with emotion and dangers. Since then, withthe events in East Timor and Aceh, this situationhas only deteriorated. Under such circumstancesviolent confrontation seems inevitable.

Jim Elmslie is researching Economic Developmentand West Papua Nationalism for a PhD.



West Papua : Impressions fromwithin the Evangelical ChristianChurch

Joy Balazo

The Evangelical Christian Church (GKI) is thelargest in Irian Jaya with 506,000 members. Theseare drawn from every layer of society, including themanagement (of mining companies, the military andthe regional government), and from those oppressedin the villages.

The wide-ranging nature of the GKI membershipenables it to expose the real situation of the people.This it shares with its partners, such as the UnitingChurch of Australia.

Particularly graphic impressions are emerging of thesituation around the Freeport Copper mine. Theservice township of Timika is located in mountainsof unimaginable beauty, waterfalls, and freshmountain air. The homes for executives arebeautiful. There are big supermarkets, wide pavedroads, telephones, restaurants, cinemas, video andcoffee shops, and take away food outlets staffed byChinese. Timika is a piece of Europe grafted ontoWest Papua where lots of Europeans, Canadians,some Filipinos, and Americans wander in shorts,very relaxed. It is like another planet, whencompared to the situation of West Papuans.

Down the hill are the houses of the Amungmepeople working in the mine. They are tiny, set likematchboxes in rows, with unpaved roads. Thechildren have big, bulging tummies and doubtfulhealth.

Further down are the bush material villages of theAmungme. Life here, according to the women,resembles a strategic hamlet. Dislocated from theirland because of the Freeport copper mine, the menhave gone, and the movements of the women andchildren are controlled by the military. One motherhas three children out of constant rapes, whilst

another two had been raped whilst working in theirgardens. Their pain as they shared their stories wasdeep and is constantly exacerbated by the awarenessthat there is nothing that they can do to protect theirchildren, who are also abused by the military.

The contrast between the situation of the Amungmepeople, blocked from the wealth of their own land,driven away and disempowered, and that of thewealthy Freeport settlement, is stark.

Graphic impressions are also emerging fromgovernment-sponsored transmigration projects:people of different ethnic backgrounds and differentreligious backgrounds (usually Islam) settle ontribal lands, cut down their forests and push thePapuans further into the jungle. Newcomersdominate positions in secondary and tertiaryeducation, where the teachers are Indonesians.

Other transmigrants control the economy and mostof the public service, as they rather than Papuans,are given the available jobs. The Papuans havebecome the underdogs. Conscious of the culturaldivide, transmigrants do not integrate into Papuansociety, preferring to live apart. There is little inter-racial marriage.

Repression and the destruction of indigenoussociety continues, an outcome of so-calleddevelopments like mining, timber and plantations,such as palm oil, and olive. These activities areprotected by the Indonesian Army, who areinvolved in the constant intimidation andharassment of local people.

The military are a dominant presence everywhere,but especially in Jayapura, in Timika , exposing thePapuans constantly to surveillance, arbitrarydetention, indiscriminate shootings and summaryexecutions. Incidents occur daily. The events onBiak Island in July 1998 are well documented. Atleast eight people were killed and 37 injured, whentroops opened fire on unarmed civilians as theyraised the West Papuan flag. Around this time, 32bodies were recovered from the sea: men, womenand children, who had been tortured and mutilated.



With the current political situation in Jakarta,people are taking advantage of the relative space toexpress their desire for freedom from oppression,for justice and fairness. Their stories of humanrights abuses embody a great agony and an intensedesire for an end to suffering.

There is a steady growth in the peoples movementfor independence and the churches are playing asignificant role. In February 1999, they facilitatedthe travel of 100 representatives (Tim 100) fromWest Papua to Jakarta, to meet President Habibie,as part of the national dialogue. The Team bravelyasked for independence. On their return, a numberwere subjected to intimidation, including thestoning of their houses. Five are black-listed by theGovernment under a directive indicating that, forreasons of national security, travel overseas is notpermitted. Three of these people are church leaders;one, the Deputy Moderator of the GKI.

At provincial level, the GKI, together with otherchurches and groups, have urged the Indonesiangovernment to allow an international team toinvestigate human rights abuses. The churches,prominent in exposing these, sent an extremelystrong joint letter to the Assembly of the WorldCouncil of Churches in December 1998.

At more local level, since the Tim 100 returned toWest Papua, discussion groups in social gatheringshave been conducted in various places, to givepeople an avenue to voice their aspirations. A neworganisation, FORERI, set up by various institutionsincluding the churches, gathers these aspirationsand promotes dialogue with local, regional andnational governments, and with the Muslims, whohave lived in West Papua for a long time.

There is an impression that people are now workingco-operatively for change. There is much anger,particularly in the young, which is potentiallydestructive. It is therefore important to coordinate,to plan, and to channel deep feelings intoconstructive activity and the GKI is involved in this.The West Papuans know the risks they are taking,

but feel they have suffered long enough, and believenow is the time for independence and the control oftheir own destiny.

Joy Balazo is the Secretary for InternationalHuman Rights with the Uniting Church inAustralia, in Sydney. This is an abridged version ofher presentation.



West Papua : Some Future Scenarios

John Otto Ondawame

At

Documents

WEST PAPUA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTUREpapuaweb.org/dlib/baru/acfoa-2000-wp.pdf · WEST PAPUA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE ... The Jakarta Post, 13-11-99, ... The diplomatic strategy and the