Vivek Issues n Options August 2013

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Intelligence Vs Investigations

Terror attack in Bodh Gaya Has China Upstaged India in Space Diplomacy?

Role of Caste in Indian Politics

and many more .Published By : Vivekananda International Foundation3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021, [email protected], www.vifindia.org
http://www.vifindia.org/http://www.vifindia.org/


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VIVEK :Issues and Options August2013 Issue: II No: VIII 2

Internal Security

Terror Attacks In Bodh Gaya: PreventioIs Better Than Cure

- Dr. N Manoharan

Portents Of Increased Terrorist Violen

In J&K Proactive Action Only Option

- Rohit Singh

MEDIA

Strategic Communication Planning -

Critical For Governance, Security

- Prof. B K Kuthiala

BOOK REVIEW

Kashmir: The Unwritten History

EVENTS

Seminar On Defence Procurement

Procedures 2013

Vimarsha: Institutional Subversion In

India Implications For The Nation & It

Security

EDITORS NOTE

VIEWPOINT

Uttarakhand Tragedy: Lessons Galore

CENTRE STAGE

ntelligence Vs. Investigation, Or CBI Vs. IB?

Dr M N Buch

DIPLOMACY

ndia-US Ties: Need For Clarity, Balance

Kanwal Sibal

Has China Upstaged India In Space

Diplomacy?

Radhakrishna Rao

Hard Power, The Only Currency That Works

n Afghanistan

Lt General (Retd) R K Sawhney & Sushant Sareen

POLITICS

Allahabad High Court Ban on Caste Rallies: AWake Up Call

K G Suresh

DEFENCE

ndias National Security Management Needs

Urgent Reform

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal

Contents

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http://www.vifindia.org/author/rohit-singhhttp://www.vifindia.org/author/rohit-singh


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VIVEK : Issues and Options August2013 Issue: II No: VIII 3

Editors Note

The recent controversy surrounding a serious confrontation between Indias

premier investigating agency, the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI), and thenations internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) , was not only in

bad taste but also detrimental to national interests.

Subversion of national institutions for vested political interests has become a normwith the present Government whether it be the CVC, CBI, CAG or even the NIA.

As Dr M N Buch, former Secretary to the Government of India, aptly puts in hisenlightening article, If IB starts hitting back, we may have a turf war in which

both national security and control over heinous crime will suffer devastating bodyblows. Government can no longer remain a silent spectator. The time for action isnow.

The terror attack in Bodh Gaya raised several questions, some of which have beendealt by Dr N Manoharan in his article while Rohit Singh has dealt with portents ofincreased terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Allahabad High Court order on caste based political rallies has reignited thedebate on the role of caste in Indian politics, which has been discussed extensivelyin the current issue.

Prof B K Kuthiala, Vice-Chancellor of Makhanlal Chaturvedi National University

of Journalism and Communication, has highlighted in his article the role of

strategic communication planning in governance and security matters

Review of books which contribute to the national discourse is a new section which

we have added to the website. We look forward to your contributions and

suggestions in this regard.

K G Suresh

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Uttarakhand Tragedy: Lessons Galore

he state of Uttarakhandfaced one of the worst

tragedies in recent memory.Several hundreds were killed andproperty worth thousands ofcrores was damaged by the floods.Man made problems turned anatural calamity into a nationaldisaster. If the armed forces onceagain won the hearts of millions ofcountrymen, by displaying

immense courage in the face ofadversity, the political class andthe bureaucracy let the peopledown.

Yatras and pilgrimages take placeacross India. What is required isto put in place logistics andinfrastructure to cope with the

rush and regulation of trafficwherever necessary. It is beyondcomprehension as to whypreventive and remedial stepswere not taken once the Met officehad made predictions of heavyrains. If pilgrim traffic to VaishnoDevi and Amarnath can beregulated, why was an

unmanageable number allowed toproceed to Kedarnath? A routineregistration process would havehelped in gathering accurate dataof casualties and missing persons.

The National DisasterManagement Authority (NDMA)

was set up in the wake of theTsunami to macro guide andholistically manage suchsituations rather than beingresponse centric. They weremandated to fill up the gaps ofother civilian agencies andcoordinate efforts includingrendering timely advice to the

state Governments concerned. It isapparent that it did not live up tothe desired level. It also needs tobe analysed whether this 1000troop strong agency was notallowed to function due to the turfbattles within the system.

The need for pre-locationing of

troops in the areas of possibleimpending disasters has beenemphasised time and again. Sucha step would not only allowagencies such as the NationalDisaster Response Force (NDRF)to familiarize themselves with thearea but also enable them to knowthe civilian Government personnel

for better coordination during anemergency. Similarly, ever sincethe Kosi floods in Bihar, there hasbeen a demand for setting up anational reserve of storesincluding hygiene and sanitarymaterial, medicine, tentage etc so

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that they can be readily availablein times of crisis.

Continuing deforestation, rampant

construction activity in blatantviolation of land use andenvironmental laws andregulations, reckless building ofdams and reservoirs in ecosensitive zones are matters ofserious concern, which need to befactored in while preparing aroadmap for the rehabilitation andreconstruction of the affectedareas.

While a political blame game doesnot help, fixing of responsibility isimportant to ensure that suchcriminal negligence does not recur.

The people of Uttarakhand areresilient by nature. It is for theGovernments at the Centre andthe state to heal their wounds andmake Uttarakhand a role modelfor sustainable development andrecovery.

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Intelligence Vs. Investigation, Or CBI Vs. IB?

- Dr M N Buch

he controversy surroundinga major confrontationbetween Indias premier

investigating agency, the CentralBureau of Investigations (CBI),and the nations internalintelligence agency, theIntelligence Bureau (IB), whichhas been aired in the media

emerges out of the Ishrat Jehancase of Gujarat in which thewoman and her companions wereshot dead by the Gujarat Police inwhat is claimed to be an encounterbetween a terrorist group of whichIshrat Jehan was a member,whose objective was to target theChief Minister of Gujarat

personally and the police whichtook counter measures. The sourceof information on the basis ofwhich action was taken is said tobe an intelligence report preparedby an IB officer in which theconnection between Ishrat Jehanand her companions with aPakistan based L-e-T terrorist

group was mentioned.

CBI is investigating the case onthe direction of the SupremeCourt. One of the suspects, whom

CBI wants to interrogate, is theSpecial Director, IntelligenceBureau. The subject ofinvestigation apart, let it beunderstood that CBI is exercisingpolice powers in this case, whereasIB is governed by its own mandatewhich is to do counter espionagework within India, neutralise

espionage by hostile powers withinthe country, obtain informationabout likely threats to law andorder, internal security and theintegrity of the country and tokeep a watch on all anti nationalactivity which can result in harmto India. In performing policefunctions, the CBI has to follow in

substance and in practice theprovisions of chapter XII, CriminalProcedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and forthe purpose of proving a case, ithas to function according to theprovisions of the Indian Evidence

Act. Anything that CBI does inthis behalf has to follow the rulesof evidence, including relevance

and admissibility of evidence andits credibility. Chapter XII,Cr.P.C. is very well drafted andany investigation carried outunder its provisions is bound to be

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* Dr M N Buch, Dean, Centre for Governance and Political Studies, VIF


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just and credible. If evidence isplanted or falsely generated, therules of evidence would expose thisand a trial court would reject the

evidence. Therefore, CBI is apolice force exercising the powersof investigation of the police whendealing with a criminal case. Thisgoverns the Ishrat Jehan casealso. The only duty of the CBI is toarrive at the truth, not to try andmould evidence to fulfil apredetermined theory of who is

guilty, in this case the GujaratPolice.

The IntelligenceBureau does nothave a mandate toinvestigateoffences. It is notgoverned by therules of evidence asprescribed by theIndian Evidence

Act, it does not have police powersand, therefore, does not have tofollow the procedure laid down inchapter XII, Cr.P.C. It has nopower to prosecute and, therefore,it has no interaction with courts.

At the same time, it has at itsdisposal agents who can obtainhuman intelligence, it haselectronic devices for intelligencecollection, it has friends and wellwishers and, perhaps, doubleagents to obtain information and it

has other sources, primary andsecondary, through whichinformation is collected whichmight be of interest to India. It is

the job of IB to sift through all thismatter and then identify thatwhich is of relevance formaintaining the security of India.There are many ways throughwhich intelligence is collected. Forexample, in Britain, SIS had awhole psychiatric andpsychological division during

Second World War, whose mainobjective was tostudy thepsychology ofenemy leaders,including Hitlerand thereon build aportrait whichwould enable the

Allies to predicthow Hitler andother leaders would react to agiven situation. The psychologicalwarfare division was thenrequired to suggest countermeasures which couldpsychologically neutralise theenemy. The work of an intelligenceorganisation, therefore, is todevelop sources of information,quite often totally informalsources, collate and analyse theinformation and then suggestalternative methods ofneutralising any adverse action

The Intelligence Bureau doesnot have a mandate toinvestigate offences. It is notgoverned by the rules ofevidence as prescribed by theIndian Evidence Act, it doesnot have police powers and,therefore, does not have tofollow the procedure laid down

in chapter XII, Cr.P.C.


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against India which theinformation indicates.

The world of intelligence and

espionage is grey, hazy and alloutlines are blurred. The world ofinvestigation is aimed at bringinginto sharp focus facts which can beproved in a court of law, to createa realistic image of a criminal,bring the criminal to justice andby presenting proof of guilt, obtaina conviction. We now, therefore,have one world which is spookyand with blurred outlines, with acombination of fact, fiction andimagination and, throughanalysis, a course of action whichcan neutralise all adverseinfluences and factors. This is sovastly different from the world ofinvestigation that the two must bekept resolutely and definitivelyapart. Investigation has to live ina glare of public scrutiny in orderto prove its credibility, butintelligence must at all times beanonymous and secretive.

Intelligence is a matter ofprobabilities based on suchinformation inputs as are

available. An intelligence agencyhas to sift the probable options,but cannot ignore them, howeveroutlandish. Every time a terroriststrike takes place, whether inBombay on 8th November 2010, or

in Chhattisgarh on 25th May2013, whether a bomb blast takesplace or Pakistani intrusions arethere in border areas, the first cry

is that there is an intelligencefailure. Should intelligenceagencies, therefore, pass on everybit of unverified information andconstantly cry wolf? Or does theagency restrict itself to passing ononly that which is possible andmost likely probable, inviting thecriticism that for the time when

verification was being done theintelligence agency held backinformation which, if it had beenpassed on in time, could haveprevented an incident?

Because intelligence officers workin a grey area, because theiridentity and outline must be hazyso that individuals are notcompromised, all intelligenceagencies work in the backgroundand try and merge into it. Thepolice and CBI seem to delight indiscussing in public every stage ofinvestigation. An intelligenceagency by definition must remainin the dark, must not discuss itsoperations and must pass oninformation which can be actedupon. An intelligence agencyworks on the twin premise ofneed to know and deniability.This means that only those whoneed to know should be privy to


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information and at all timesintelligence operatives andagencies should be in a position tocredibly deny any statement

attributed to them. Under nocircumstance should anintelligence agency or anindividual officer reveal sourcesbecause a compromised source inthe world of intelligence is as goodas a dead source. That is why nointelligence agency everacknowledges as its own any of its

agents who have been caught andcharged with espionage. This is apart of the doctrineof deniability and itmust be respected.

In the Ishrat Jehancase, the CBI isattempting toquestion theSpecial Director ofIB, with a view to making him anaccused, on account of someintelligence report he is stated tohave given. By its very nature anintelligence report has to beconfidential and it is the job of IBand CBI to respect thisconfidentiality. Nor can such areport be used to incriminate anIB officer. This would be contraryto the provisions of Article 20 ofthe Constitution which prohibitsan accused person to be compelledto be a witness against himself,

which is what revelation of thecontents of an intelligence reportwould amount to. Such adocument is not a confessional

statement. It is not a document inthe public domain and it is not aconfession and in fact it is not adocument which can be admittedas evidence at all under the IndianEvidence Act. If there is a caseagainst the IB officer concerned itwould have to be proved byevidence other than the

intelligence report which hasallegedly been made by the officerconcerned. It iscertainly not apublic document asdefined by section74, IndianEvidence Act.

There are certainfundamental

questions which are a cause ofconcern. The Intelligence Bureauis charged with ensuring that thesecurity of the State and theintegrity of India is not

jeoparadised on account of theactions of anti national and antisocial elements. This can only bedone by penetrating anti nationalbodies and collecting intelligenceon the basis of which they can beneutralised. It is acknowledgedthat because this intelligence doesnot meet the test of proof as laid

In the Ishrat Jehan case, the

CBI is attempting to question

the Special Director of IB, with

a view to making him an

accused, on account of some

intelligence report he is stated

to have given.


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down in the Indian Evidence Act,a great deal of it may bemisinformation deliberatelyplanted by the enemy, information

which has an element of gossipand information which may bedated and, therefore, no longerrelevant. The Intelligence Bureauof course has to sieve out allquestionable information, but atno stage can it afford to ignore asource which may not prima facieappear to be credible. Information

which can be acted upon must bepassed on to operational agenciessuch as the police and theseagencies are required to act, albeitwith caution. Even over reaction isbetter than no reaction or noinformation. To let the blame beon an IB officer because onverification the information turned

out to be not very credible isridiculous because any operationalagency would be foolish if it paidno heed to intelligence reports.The report and the officer bothmust enjoy anonymity.

In the Ishrat Jehan case, the CBIis obviously under the twinpressure of a government hostileto Narendra Modi and theSupreme Court which picturesitself as St. George on a whitecharger out to slay the dragon ofcommunalism in Gujarat.Therefore, CBI seems to have been

swayed from the path of honestinvestigation as it is required to dounder chapter XII, Cr.P.C. andhas preferred to follow the trail of

red herrings drawn across itspath. This has led to directconfrontation between CBI and IB,which does not bode well for thefuture of Indias security.

How can the situation beremedied? The Supreme Courtinsists that government shouldhave nothing to do with CBI. Thelogic of this completely defeats mebecause whether the SupremeCourt and the so-called activistslike it or not, the CBI is a policeforce and is neither above norbelow any police force. In fact, inview of the Seventh Schedule ofthe Constitution, List 2 whichmakes police a State subject, eventhe existence of CBI as a legalentity is very much in doubt.Because the CBI is a police force,superintendence over it must vestin government and whereas it hasto enjoy complete legal autonomyin investigation of offences, itsaccountability has to be to thegovernment, which must have thepower to take action if suchaccountability is not properlydischarged. Superintendence cannever be passed on to anyoneother than to an executiveauthority. Under Article 227 of the


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Constitution, superintendenceover all courts vests in the HighCourt and this superintendencecannot be diluted. Under the

Indian Police Act and even theModel Police Act drafted by theSoli Sorabjee Committee,superintendence vests ingovernment. CBI cannot have aseparate provision because it is,when all is said and done, a policeforce. The parameters ofsuperintendence can be laid down

and in fact that is exactly what theSoli SorabjeeCommittee hassuggested. Theexercise of superiorpowers bygovernment has tobe as perprescribed laws,

rules andregulations andcannot be arbitrary, but theultimate accountability has to beto government and governmentmust be armed with powers toensure that not only is thereaccountability but there is actionfor failure to discharge it. It isbecause by variouspronouncements, the SupremeCourt has made the concept ofCBIs accountability somewhathazy that CBI is running riot byacting on the one hand as thehand maiden of the party in power

and on the other hand by misusingits police powers to harass ratherthan investigate. We must let theIntelligence Bureau perform its

function without fear or favourand under no circumstancesshould we either jeopardise thesource of information nor use thisinformation to incriminate IBofficers. This has to be made veryclear to CBI because if it continuesin its present attitude, thecountrys intelligence set up will

be damaged. Let government stepin immediately toprotect IB and toremind CBI of howit must function asa police force. Thisintervention mustbe effective andany officer who

defies governmentmust beimmediately sacked, even if it bethe Director, CBI himself.

The present anarchy that prevailsin CBI functioning is verydisturbing, especially in thecontext of federalism. In Britishdays, the Centre had very fewpolicemen to call its own. It hadthe Agency Police in the PrincelyStates to perform Railway Policefunctions and to enforce the writ ofthe Resident. It had a couple ofbattalions of the Crown

This has to be made very clearto CBI because if it continuesin its present attitude, thecountrys intelligence set upwill be damaged. Letgovernment step inimmediately to protect IB andto remind CBI of how it mustfunction as a police force.


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Representatives Police, the CRPFof today, to help the States tomaintain order, but for the rest,the executive force was the

Provincial Police. Because theobjective of government, Centraland Provincial, was the same, themaintenance of imperial rule,there was mutual trust. Todaythere is no trust between theCentre and the States and,therefore, we have huge numbersof Central Armed Police Forces

over whom the States have nocontrol, with the State PoliceForce being deliberately allowed torun down and become ineffective.If they are partisan,unfortunately, so are the CentralForces, with one ethos beingapplied to Gujarat and another to

Assam. The answer to mutual

distrust is not more centralisation.It is meaningful Federalism inwhich both the Centre and theStates feel part of a larger whole.It is what Babulal Gaur, then BJPChief Minister of Madhya Pradeshtold a somewhat discomfited Mrs.Sonia Gandhi when Arjun Singhtook him to meet her. Gaur said,Rest easy, Madam. I have notcome to in any way embarrass you,but to remind you that MadhyaPradesh is part of India.

The tragedy is that gradually theCentre has taken over even

forensic investigation and left theState Police high and dry. As thepolices impartiality becomesdoubtful, so its capability declines,

so the Centre inflates CBI andcreates the National InvestigationAgency (NIA). The CBI of today isnot the Force of D.P. Kohli. Thedownfall of CBI was censured byD.Sen who, as Director during theEmergency, sank it to a depthwhich makes the Mindanao Deeplook like a shallow trench. The

same CBI, which became IndiraGandhis hatchet, then turned onthe Congress when Janata Dalcame to power. I am witness tothis because in 1978-79, when Iheaded the Delhi Development

Authority, my permission wassought to prosecute, amongstothers, Jagmohan, my

predecessor, along with SanjayGandhi, for demolitions atKapashera and Andheria Mod.The supervision note written bythe S.P. concerned read, Thepurpose of this investigation is tobring home offences under sections427, 442, 448, 145, 147, 34 and120B IPC against Sanjay Gandhi,Jagmohan, Ranbir Singh andothers. B.R. Tamta, theMunicipal Commissioner of Delhiat whose behest and as whoseagent DDA had carried outdemolitions, was spared becausehe had agreed to turn approver.


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This is not permitted to the policeunder chapter XII, Cr.P.C. Pardoncan only be granted by aMagistrate at the time of enquiry,

investigation or trial, but only in acase triable by a court of sessionwhere the minimum sentence isseven years imprisonment. Themaximum sentence under thesections with which the accusedwere charged in this case is threeyears and, therefore, Tamta couldnot have been pardoned. I,

therefore, refused permissionbecause the investigation wastainted and biased against SanjayGandhi and Jagmohan.

The CBI then, through its SpecialDirector, R.D. Singh, tried tobrowbeat me, going to the extentof threatening me. The lastingimpact on me was that the Forcehas degenerated to an extentwhere it needs to be disbandedand then reconstituted to become

an impartial, professionalinstrument for investigatingcomplex crimes, but always inpartnership with the State Police.

Today the CBI is targetingNarendra Modi. Will SoniaGandhi be the victim tomorrow?The case against the SpecialDirector, IB, is obviously only ameans of reaching Modi. This isdisgusting.

If IB starts hitting back, we mayhave a turf war in which bothnational security and control overheinous crime will sufferdevastating body blows.Government can no longer remaina silent spectator. The time foraction is now.

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India-US Ties: Need For Clarity, Balance

- Kanwal Sibal

oubts persist both in Indiaand the United States onthe substance of their

strategic partnership. High-sounding declarations about thepartnership being one of thedefining ones of the 21st century,or one between natural allies,have not erased uncertainties in

the two countries about thecapacity and willingness of eachside to meet the expectations ofthe other.

Growing India-U.S. convergenceon several issues has noteliminated significant divergencesemanating from huge disparity in

power, different priorities,conflicting regional interests anddiffering views on structures ofglobal governance. India hasmoved from distrust to positiveengagement and greateracceptance of basic U.S. goodwilltowards it. The U.S. is devotinghigher attention to India than everbefore in recognition of its growinginternational importance. But thisimproved atmosphere in bilateralrelations is not sufficient for

ironing out real differences.

Wide GapsWhile there is like-mindedness onissues of democracy, pluralism,human rights, economicliberalisation, terrorism, religiousextremism, non-proliferation andthe like, their treatment inconcrete situations exposes widegaps in the thinking of the twocountries. India notes the selectivemanner in which universalvalues are promoted, sparingfriends who spurn them andsanctioning adversaries for similarrepudiation. Even in the case ofterrorism, the conduct of some iscondoned while that of othersinvokes steps to bring aboutregime change.

On Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran,Syria, Climate Change, the DohaRound, sovereignty issues, globalgovernance, etc., India and theU.S. have different perspectives.

While differences between the U.S.and some of its allies on importantissues do not call into question thebasic assumptions about theirmutual relationship within an

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* Kanwal Sibal, Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF


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alliance system, in Indias case thestrategic relationship gets stress-tested in public opinion each timethe two countries are in discord.

Our strategic partnership with theU.S. cannot presume identity ofviews on contentious internationalissues or adjustment of Indianpolicies to suit Americanpreferences alone. Yet, when Indiaspeaks of strategic autonomy, U.S.votaries and Indian champions ofa strong India-U.S. friendshipdecry such thinking as mired inIndias defunctnonaligned credo.If the IndianParliament passesa nuclear liabilitylaw imposingsupplier liability onnuclear vendors,particularly after Fukushima, U.S.and Indian strategic affairsspecialists become petulant.Similarly, if U.S. companies areexcluded from defence contracts,there is interrogation about Indiascommitment to a strategicpartnership with the U.S.Elements in India characterisegenuine policy differences asfence-sitting, reluctance to acceptburden-sharing in upholding theinternational order and free-loading by India on the back ofthose powers who make hard

choices, sometimes at the cost oftheir own immediate interest, tomaintain peace and security.

Recurrent doubts in India aboutthe quality of its U.S. relationshipare fuelled by the inconsistency,lack of steadiness and eventransparency of U.S. policies. TheU.S. can change gears to suit itsinterests at a particular juncture,shaped by electoral considerationsor lobbying. It is adept at givingvarying spins to its policies ascircumstances demand. The U.S.

policy towardsPakistan, despiteits terroristaffiliations anddisruptive role in

Afghanistan,exemplifies this.

Washingtonsmilitary and economic aid toIslamabad continues despitePakistans complicity in shelteringOsama bin Laden.Notwithstanding Pakistansabetment of terrorism in India andthe strategic headaches it causesto the U.S., the Americantendency to equate India andPakistan resurfaces from time totime.

On Afghanistan, the U.S. firstquestioned Indias role there, thensupported it and is now

Our strategic partnership withthe U.S. cannot presumeidentity of views on contentiousinternational issues oradjustment of Indian policies tosuit American preferencesalone.


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disregarding Indias fundamentalstrategic doubts about politicallyrehabilitating the Taliban bydialoguing with it. The U.S. now

seems open even to the Haqqaninetworks participation in thepolitical end-game in Afghanistan.On China, the signals waver, withthe declaration of a pivot towards

Asia with Chinas rise in mind,which is then diluted to re-balancing detached from China-related fears and, finally, the

wisdom of any beefed-up Asia-Pacific policy is questioned by thewould-be U.S. Secretary of State.

US Secretary of State JohnKerrys visit in June for the fourthround of the strategic dialogueillustrated these cross-currentsmoulding the India-U.S. strategicpartnership. The joint statementissued on the occasion omits anymention of Pakistan, even in thecontext of the Mumbai attack. Thereferences to terrorism andviolent extremism and todismantling of terrorist safehavens in the region are worded toavoid finger-pointing at Pakistan.There being no risk of any otherpolitical force being excluded bydesign or choice, the reference toinclusive Presidential andProvincial elections in

Afghanistan in 2014 is puzzling,as it suggests that India too is

advocating the inclusion ofTaliban in these elections. Therhetoric about the reconciliationprocess being Afghan-led and

Afghan-owned sounds hollowerwith the U.S. decision to talkdirectly to the Taliban at Doha, asKabul will not dictate thenegotiating script to Washington.The red lines drawn by theinternational community for anydeal with the Taliban have beenblurred in the joint statement

which speaks in general termsabout preserving the historicpolitical, economic and socialprogress made over the lastdecade, though in Kerrys speechat the Habitat Centre these redlines are reiterated. It is not clearhow Indias External AffairsMinister Salman Khurshid could

say in his joint press conferencewith Kerry that the U.S. willensure that none of the concerns ofIndia is overlooked orundermined, when the very act oftalking to the Taliban underPakistan Army Chief General

Ashfaq Parvez Kayanis benignoversight subverts Indiasinterests.

The joint statement omits anymention of China, the South ChinaSea or U.S. re-balancing towards

Asia, though Kerry affirmed in hispress statement that the U.S.


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leadership considered India a keypart of such a re-balance. There isonly a general reference in theparagraph dealing with the Indian

Ocean and the Arctic Counciltomaritime security, unimpededcommerce and freedom ofnavigation! Iran and Syria areabsent from the statement. TheIndia-U.S. strategic dialogue thusignores or obfuscates key strategicissues.

Arm-TwistingKerry pushed India unreasonablyon the civiliannuclear front byunilaterallyaffirming in the

joint pressconference withKhurshid

beyond the joint statements non-committal language that thetwo sides had agreed that acommercial agreement betweenWestinghouse and the NuclearPower Corporation of India shouldbe reached by September thisyear. This is hardly possible whenhighly complex issues such as

capital investment, financialmechanisms and the per-unittariff rate have to be finalised,besides meeting other regulatoryrequirements. Is Kerry suggestingthat the full and timely

implementation of the civilnuclear deal requires India tohasten the finalisation of nuclearcontracts with U.S. firms,

irrespective of any consideration?Perhaps this arm-twisting isrelated to the Prime Ministersexpected visit to Washington inSeptember.

The extraordinary emphasis onclimate change issues by Kerryduring his visit unnecessarilyrisks converting a complex globalissue into a contentious bilateralone. Kerry waxed eloquent on the

new energy marketbeing the biggestmarket ever seenon earth ... a $6trillion marketwith 4 billionusers, suggesting

powerful commercialconsiderations behind his push.The wisdom of creating a workinggroup headed by Kerry andKhurshid to intensify bilateralefforts to address forcefully thisurgent issue which meansincreasing the weight of non-technical foreign policyconsiderations into bilateraldiscussionsis questionable.

Positive features were, of course,not missing from Kerrys visit,given the much improved tenor of

The extraordinary emphasis onclimate change issues by Kerryduring his visit unnecessarilyrisks converting a complexglobal issue into a contentiousbilateral one.


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India-U.S. ties and theextraordinarily rich agenda ofbilateral cooperation which inmany unspectacular ways can be

productive for India. The shortpoint is that the cogs of thestrategic partnership still gratewith each other and the machine

is not adequately lubricated yet bythe diplomatic grease of coherence,clarity, balance of interests and asense of true partnership.

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Has China Upstaged India In Space

Diplomacy?

- Radhakrishna Rao

pace exploration, once apreserve of the advancedindustrialized countries, is

no more being viewed as an area ofesoteric research involving a hugeinvestment and complextechnological systems. Indeed,space technology has now becomean indispensable tool forimproving the quality of humanlife on earth in addition to helpingboost the war fighting capabilityin a substantial manner. And onthe international arena, spacecooperation has emerged as aplatform for furthering thediplomatic clout and politicalambitions besides helping projectsoft power.

And this is an area whereCommunist China has made rapidforays in expanding its influenceover many of the third worldcountries keen on entering thespace age. By making available

space servicesby way of buildingcustom made satellites followed bytheir in orbit-deliveryChina notonly stands to expand its business

interests but also seeks tostrengthen its diplomatic clout. Byarranging soft loans and providingknowhow and expertise forbuilding and launching satelliteson reasonable terms, China is allset to become a recognised playerin the multi- billion dollar globalspace market. Indeed, this dualoffer of technological support andfinancial assistance on reasonableterms has made China the mostsought after space partner forthe developing countries.

Against such a backdrop, thepossibility of Indias Himalayan

neighbour Nepal turning to Chinafor its satellite project is verymuch on the cards. Nepal which isnow examining the feasibility ofgetting its first satellite launchedbefore the middle of this decade ,has , however revealed that itwould look at launching thesatellite through a joint venture

of national and international firmsalong with the Government ofNepal. Further, the NepaleseGovernment sources in

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*Radhakrishna Rao, Visiting Fellow, VIF


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Kathmandu also stated that IfNepal is unable to entirely use thesatellite for its internalconsumption, it can be leased to

either China or India or both forcommercial purposes.

Given the aggressive pitch by theChina Great Wall IndustriesCorporation (CGWIC), thecommercial arm of the Chinesespace programme, the Nepalesesatellite project contract going theChinese way is considered astrong possibility.Rapidly expandingChinese influenceover this erstwhileHindu kingdomalong with therabid anti Indiastance of a sectionof the politicalspectrum in thecountry implies that in allprobability, Nepal will turn toChina for getting its satelliteproject off the ground.

There are no clear cut clues as ofnow on what steps India wouldinitiate to wean Nepal away from

China in the crucial area ofsatellite technology enterprise,. Ofcourse, India can offer Nepal a cobranded and co owned satellitethat both the countries couldshare. For the ground reality is

that Nepal may not need theentire capability of a satellite tomeet its needs. Here India shouldplay its card very shrewdly by

bringing in diplomatic finesse towin the confidence of Nepal.Moreover, India should offer aneconomically alluring andtechnologically superb package tomeet the Nepalese needs ofsatellite capability. As it is, theallotment of an orbital slot toNepal to position its satellite by

the Geneva based InternationalTelecommunications Union (ITU) willexpire by 2015.This implies thatKathmandu isrequired to launchthe satellite beforethis deadline.

As it is, Indiansecurity and intelligence agenciesare already perturbed over theinroads made by China in forgingspace cooperation with Sri Lankaand Maldives, the two IndianOcean island nations with whichIndia has had a long history ofcordial relations.Bangladesh too is known to bemoving closer to the Chinese offerto build and launch a dedicatedsatellite.

There are no clear cut clues asof now on what steps Indiawould initiate to wean Nepalaway from China in the crucialarea of satellite technologyenterprise,. Of course, Indiacan offer Nepal a co brandedand co owned satellite thatboth the countries could share.


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In fact, there is dismay in NewDelhi over Bangladesh, whoseemergence as an independentcountry owed much to the Indian

support, inviting CGWIC forrealizing its space plan. TheRequest for Proposal (RFP) floatedin 2011 by the telecom regulator ofBangladesh seeks to get adomestic communications satellitenamed Bangabandhu launched.

And the addition of Nepal to thecelestial orbit of China cannot

but be a disturbing developmentfor India with strong strategic,diplomatic and political overtones.

Indeed, Indias missedopportunities in terms ofstrengthening ties with itsimmediate neighbours throughspace cooperation has been thecentrepiece of reports recentlybrought out by Research and

Analysis Wing (R&AW).The thesisof R&AW is that China capitalisedon Indias indifference to the needsof the neighbouring countries.Indeed, an Inter-Ministerialmeeting held in February this yearstressed the need for Indian SpaceResearch Organisation (ISRO) toplay a pro active role in helpingMaldives and Sri Lanka realizetheir space dreams. It was feltthat India could offer some of itsvacant orbital slots for positioningof the proposed communications

satellites of Sri Lanka andMaldives.

According to ISRO, a mutually

beneficial cooperationarrangement for building satellitesand operating them with increasedcoverage areas over India can beworked out so that capabilities ofthe satellites can be used by Indiaand Sri Lanka. But this strategyis not likely to work. For SriLankas first partly ownedsatellite SupremeSAT which waslaunched by a Chinese LongMarch -1 rocket in November lasthas been hailed as a landmarkevent in Sino-Sri Lankan hightech collaboration. What does thisdevelopment imply for India? Isthis yet another addition to theString of Pearls strategy beingvigorously pursued by China? WillSino-Sri Lankan handshake inspace give a new edge to Chinasgeo political game plan in theIndian Ocean? This partly ownedsatellite perched up over theIndian Ocean region could prove atrump card for China in providinga boost to its commercial, strategicand military interests in theIndian Ocean region. For both SriLanka and China, this spaceendeavour representing a jointventure between Colombo basedregional satellite service providerSupremeSAT and CGWIC is a win


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win deal. 1 As part of this jointventure, a second SupremeSATsatellite is planned to be launchedsometime this year. Also a fully

owned Sri Lankan satellite will belaunched by 2015.2

Responding to the Indianconcerns, Sri Lankan Governmentsources in Colombo had made itclear that the satellite launch wasa private sector initiative bySupremesat which entered into anagreement with CGWIC for thesatellite launch.

From a largergeopoliticalperspective, itsends a message toIndia that acountry in its ownbackyard is cosying

up with Chinasays BrahmaChellany, an expert on strategicaffairs at the New Delhi basedCentre for Policy Research.

Of course, Indias strength inbuilding world class satellites haswidely been recognised but all said

and done, the Bangalore basedcommercial arm of the Indianspace programme, Antrix Corplacks the kind of resources andexpertise at the command ofCGWIC. In particular, India lacks

an operational launch vehiclepowerful enough to deliver acommunications satellite weighingover 2-tonne.

Also, India is yet to develop a baseresurgent enough to launch asatellite on commercial terms. Forthe Antrix Corp to grabinternational orders for buildingand launching satellites, theGovernment of India shouldincrease funding to strengthenand expand the infrastructure

good enough toaccomplish

commercial orders.

On the other hand,China has a soundtrack record ofbuilding and

launching

communicationssatellites on

turnkey basis for the developingcountries including Pakistan,Nigeria and Venezuela. CGWIChas also signed satellite andground systems export contractswith Bolivia and Laos.

China, which already boasts ofthree land locked launch centres,is now close to commissioning itsnew ultra modern coastal launchcomplex at Hainan Island whichalso happens to be the epicentre of

On the other hand, China hasa sound track record ofbuilding and launchingcommunications satellites onturnkey basis for thedeveloping countries includingPakistan, Nigeria and

Venezuela. CGWIC has alsosigned satellite and groundsystems export contracts withBolivia and Laos.


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the massive Chinese naval buildup. This launch station, besideshelping China launch its heavierclass launch vehicles, would help

attract more internationalcustomers for its commercial spacelaunch enterprise. In contrast,India boasts of a solitary launchcomplex in Sriharikota Island onthe eastern coast of the country.Though for quite sometime therehave been reports to suggest thatISRO is looking at setting up a

second launch centre, concrete,ground level action to realize thisseems to be lacking. A singleoperational launch pad makes fora poor strategic sense from theoperational point of view.

The proposal of the MaldivianDefence Ministry to seek Chineseassistance for realizing its spaceambition is a sign that thisIndian Ocean island nation isedging closer to China. Chinese ITand telecom companies havealready established a strongpresence in Maldives. In thecontext of the growing anti Indiafeelings in Maldives following theexit of the Indian infrastructureenterprise GMR group from thecountry, China has become afavoured partner for many of theinfrastructure projects in thecountry.

Moreover, the Indian side had notresponded to the MaldivianGovernments tender for asatellite. Though six aerospace

outfits from across the worldresponded to the Maldiviantender, the Government at Maleresponded positively to theChinese offer. In fact, sometimeback, the Maldivian Governmentsources had said that India hadnot sent any proposal for thesatellite project. But China which

has already dug deep in thedevelopmental landscapeofMaldives, is making all out effortsto bag the satellite project order.

The view in New Delhi is thatISRO could send a delegation toMaldives to impress upon thepolitical leadership of the countryon the feasibility of the Indianoffer to build and launch asatellite. Whether this approachwould help India win Maldivianconfidence, only time will tell.

Indeed, China views its spaceforays as a pathway for itstechnological excellence andstrategic supremacy. For China,

space ascendancy is a major steptowards its emergence as a globalmilitary power at par with US. Nowonder then that Chinas politicalleadership has a strong convictionthat its forays in space provides it


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with a spring board to boost itsnational prestige, showcase itstechnological prowess, further itsmilitary and strategic goals,

strengthen its diplomatic andpolitical clout and expand itsbusiness interests by offeringassistance to the third worldcountries keen on entering thespace age. In contrast, Indiaspolitical leadership seems to belong way off from nurturing such avision.

Notes1. SupremeSat Chairman

R.M.Manivannan has saidthat Indian Space ResearchOrganisation (ISRO) is coolto his offer of makingavailable the Supremesat-1capability to the users in

India. ISRO is the nodalagency for providing leased

satellite capability to users--mainly in broadcasting andtelecommunications sectors--in India. Incidentally, India

is experiencing an acuteshortage of satellite capacityin the context for thephenomenal expansion oftelecom and broadcastingservices in the country.

2. SupremeSat has inked aUS$215-million deal withChina Great Wall Industries

Corporation(CGWIC) for thein-orbit delivery ofSupremeSat-2 satellite. Asper the contract,SupremeSat-2 will belaunched by means of aChinese Long March Vehiclein mid-2016.

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Hard Power, The Only Currency That

Works In Afghanistan

- Lt General (Retd) R K Sawhney & Sushant Sareen

he so-called Afghanendgame is really nothingmore than the US endgame

in Afghanistan. For the Afghans,there is unlikely to be anyendgame. Even the Americanssuspect, even fear, that their exit

from, nay abandonment of,Afghanistan will most likelyembroil the hapless Afghans in adeadly and brutal battle forsurvival. But the exigencies ofdomestic politics and economics,and the dwindling diplomatic andmilitary support from its effeteNATO allies, have created

circumstances in which theAmericans dont want to exercisetheir will or expend their wealthin taking the War on Terror to itslogical conclusion. Worse, theyhave no coherent policy or strategyagainst Jihad Inc. questions areeven being raised about theirintent to fight Islamist terror

given their tacit understanding, ifnot cooperation, with Al Qaedaaffiliates in places like Syria certainly not in the Afpak region

which is really the epicentre ofjihadist terrorism.

Under the mistaken notion thatappeasing and accommodating themedieval Taliban will halt thespread of Islamic radicalism, the

US seems to have bought intoPakistan's con-game inAfghanistan, which holds out thetantalising prospect of ahonourable withdrawal for thesole superpower. Of course, thereis nothing very honourable in awithdrawal which seeks to bringback into power, albeit through anegotiated settlement (surrenderis a more appropriate term) theforces of evil against whom thewar was fought. The US plan todeclare victory before exiting onlyinvites sniggers, if not outrightcontempt, among its well-wishersas well as its enemies who haveconspired, connived andcontributed materially, morallyand monetarily, in inflicting ahumiliating defeat on it.

Even more outrageous is the

T

DIPLOM

*Lt General (Retd) R K Sawhney, Distinguished Fellow, VIF

*Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/july/23/hard-power-the-only-currency-that-works-in-afghanistanhttp://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/july/23/hard-power-the-only-currency-that-works-in-afghanistanhttp://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/july/23/hard-power-the-only-currency-that-works-in-afghanistanhttp://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/july/23/hard-power-the-only-currency-that-works-in-afghanistan


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thinly disguised plan to outsourceAfghanistan to Pakistan, in effectthrowing the Afghans before theproverbial wolves. The Afghan

anger and suspicion of theapparent US strategy of makingPakistan the pivot of their Afghanpolicy is, therefore, entirelyunderstandable. Although thePakistanis insist that they back anAfghan-driven, Afghan-owned and

Afghan-led peace process, only theTaliban qualify as Afghans for the

Pakistanis. It is of course quiteanother matterthat this disastrouspolicy of restoringpeace and stabilityin the Afpak regionwill severelydestabilise not justfor Afghanistan but

also for Pakistanand rest of theregion.

The simple paradox aboutAfghanistan is that if the waragainst Taliban and their AlQaeda associates and affiliates isnot won, the peace will be lost.Capitulation before the forces ofIslamic radicalism and terrorismis, however, being given the spin ofreconciliation. For their part, theTaliban have given no indicationthat they sincerely desire any sortof reconciliation. Nor is there

anything to suggest that they areready for peaceful co-existencewith those who do not subscribe totheir medieval mindset. At least

the Americans should know bynow that the Taliban wouldntremain the Taliban if they werereconcilable.

The US clearly has a lot, in facteverything, riding on thisreconciliation plank hoping thatit will bring the Taliban on board.What happens after the Taliban

come on boardhasnt quite beenthought through.Worse, the

Americans donthave any Plan B.Essentially, the USpolicy in

Afghanistan isbased on a hope

and a prayer. They believe thatthe huge economic and politicalstakes that people have developedin the Afghan system and the newfreedoms and empowerment thathave been experienced by theordinary Afghans will ensure thatthe Taliban wont get a walkover ifthey refuse to reconcile. In otherwords, as far as the US isconcerned, if Plan A doesnt work,the best case scenario in

Afghanistan is either a civil war tokeep the Taliban and their Al

The US clearly has a lot, in facteverything, riding on thisreconciliation plank hopingthat it will bring the Taliban onboard. What happens after theTaliban come on board hasntquite been thought through.Worse, the Americans donthave any Plan B.


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Qaeda allies at bay. The worstcase scenario is a Talibantakeover, which ironically isprecisely what a successful

reconciliation of the sorts beingtried in Doha i.e. Plan A, will leadto.

While the US will do what itthinks is in its best interest, andperhaps can live with theconsequences of its ill-thought outstrategy, the Indian governmentseems to be totally at sea on itsoptions on Afghanistan. What istouted as Indias policy is really aclumsy rehash of the US policy.From a time when India wasdeeply sceptical about, if notcompletely opposed to, thereconciliation process, the Indianposition has now regressed to apoint where it is now open to adialogue even with the Taliban.Clearly, the Ministry of External

Affairs (and perhaps the entireIndian establishment, if at allthere is such a thing anymore)hasnt quite understood theorganic links between Pakistanand the Taliban, summed up bythe former Pakistani militarydictator Gen Pervez Musharrafwho called the Taliban Pakistan'sstrategic reserve that can beunleashed in tens of thousandsagainst India whenever Pakistanwanted.

Indias problem with the Talibanis two-fold: one, the Talibanepitomise a barbaric, medieval andradical version of Islam which is

antithetical to the very idea ofIndia; two, the Taliban are notindependent agents and as long asthey are clients and proxies ofPakistan, there is practically noway India can engage with them.This means India can stayrelevant in Afghanistan not bybeing a bystander but by actively

bolstering the anti-Taliban forcesmonetarily, militarily andpolitically. To do this, India willhave to combine its considerablesoft power with smart use of itshard power. Without putting bootson ground, hard power can beexercised by building allianceswith other regional countries,

pooling together diplomatic andpolitical resources with thesecountries to campaign against theTaliban, and coordinating withthem to support the anti-Talibanforces militarily. Even if suchcooperation is not forthcoming,India should bring its ownnational power to play in supportthe anti-Taliban forces in everypossible way. What Indiashouldnt do is bank on things likeUN-mandated internationalsecurity force or a regional treatyforswearing interference in

Afghanistan that are being


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peddled either by people who dontunderstand the play of forces in

Afghanistan or by people whowant to obfuscate and obstruct

any meaningful measure to stallthe onslaught of the Taliban andtheir sponsors across the DurandLine. This will be a mugs game.

After all, if Pakistan and Talibancould defy arguably the strongestmilitary force on the planet, whatare the chances of success of thesewell-meaning but woolly-headed

ideas?Unfortunately, whether out ofnaivety, or sheerpusillanimity oreven a self-cultivated, if alsoself-defeating,image of being theperpetual nice guys(an image that Indias adversarieshave no use for and which Indiasfriends find frustrating), India hasdecided to limit its assistance tobuilding hospitals, roads, power

plants, schools etc. but notsupplying the much neededmilitary assistance and supportthat will strengthen the anti-

Taliban forces. India needs torealise that all its investment insocial goods and infrastructure in

Afghanistan will turn to dust ifthe Taliban gain control of

Afghanistan.

Unless India is ready to use itshard power, it should be ready toonce again lock up the Indianembassy in Kabul and withdrawfrom Afghanistan, at least until

the Afghan War 2.0that will becomeinevitable afterIslamist groups use

Afghan soil to startspreading terroraround the world.

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After all, if Pakistan andTaliban could defy arguably thestrongest military force on theplanet, what are the chances ofsuccess of these well-meaningbut woolly-headed ideas?


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Allahabad High Court Ban On Caste

Rallies: A Wake Up Call

- K G Suresh

he recent Allahabad HighCourt verdict banning castebased political rallies in

Uttar Pradesh has reignited thedebate on the role of caste inIndian politics. The reactions tothe court order were on expectedlines with the national partieswelcoming it and most of theregional parties, particularly withstrong caste affiliations,expressing their strongreservations about it.

However, notwithstanding thedenials by political parties, castecontinues to remain a crucial

factor in electoral politics. If mostof the regional partiesunabashedly exhibit their castepreferences, the national politicalparties too are equally guilty ofperpetuating the caste factor,whether it be in the matter ofselection of candidates orprojecting party leaders at the

regional level. Of course, theyoften indulge in it under the garbof winnability, an euphemism forpracticing caste and communal

politics.

Even those regional Satraps whoclaim to possess a national visionhave never shied away fromplaying the caste card, whether itbe former Prime Minister H DDeve Gowda, who wears his

Vokkaliga preferences on hissleeves or the new champion ofsecularism Nitish Kumar.Though Kumar often slams hisarch rival and RJD Supremo LaluPrasad Yadav as a politicianpreoccupied with caste, he himselfwas one of the first politicians inBihar to organise a caste-based

Kurmi rally in early 1992.

Though they cry hoarse from theroof tops that their utopianideology does not believe in eithercaste or religion, the Communists,including the ultra left Maoists,have often identified caste withclass and such class wars have

often ended up in Caste Wars, aswas widely seen in Bihar.

The importance some of thenational political parties attach to

T

POLITI

* K G Suresh, Senior Fellow & Editor, VIF


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the caste factor can be gaugedfrom the fact that barely a weekbefore the High Court order, theruling Congress party

had sought a break-up of variouscastes in all the 543 Lok Sabhaconstituencies from its state unitsin preparation for the cominggeneral elections.

According to media reports, in aconfidential communication to allstate party Presidents, the HighCommand asked them to submitpopulation figuresand caste break-upalong with thecomplete details ofsitting candidatesand aspirants aswell.

In the words of

Noted SociologistAndre Beteille themost important factor contributingto the caste systems continuationin India is not the traditions ofmatrimony or occupation or ritualpractices of purity, but politics.

Delivering a special lecture at the

Gujarat University recently, thePadma awardee identified caste asthe most important political toolfor the mobilisation of theelectorate.

While caste has for long remaineda divisive factor in the Indiansociety, it was the British who laidthe foundations of caste politics in

the country.

Over eight decades back, the thenBritish Prime Minister RamsayMacdonald announced theCommunal Award grantingseparate electorates to minoritycommunities including Muslims,Sikhs, Christians, Anglo Indians,Europeans and Dalits, then

identified as thedepressed classesor untouchables.

The depressedclasses wereallocated a numberof seats to be filledby election from

specialconstituencies in

which voters belonging to thedepressed classes only could vote.The highly controversial move wasopposed tooth and nail byMahatma Gandhi on the groundsthat it would disintegrate theHindu society. However, it was

supported by leaders such as Dr BR Ambedkar, with whom Gandhiheld prolonged negotiations,leading up to the Poona Pact. The1932 agreement envisaged thatthe Depressed Classes shall have

According to media reports, ina confidential communicationto all state party Presidents,the High Command askedthem to submit populationfigures and caste break-upalong with the complete detailsof sitting candidates andaspirants as well.


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seats reserved within the Generalelectorate.

Following the countrys

independence, the nationsfounding fathers chose theParliamentary system ofdemocracy based on an electoralsystem which unfortunatelytended to reinforce casteconsciousness, instead ofeliminating it and bringing aboutan egalitarian social order.

In the words of CPI (M) leaderSitaram Yechury, Instead ofguaranteeing equality,irrespective of caste, the electoralsystem, itself, nurtured theperpetuation of casteconsciousness in terms of choice ofcandidates and the appeal to theelectorate.

The implementation of the MandalCommission report in 1989 by thethen V P Singh Government wasyet another landmark in Indiascaste politics. Regional Satrapssuch as Mulayam Singh Yadav,Lalu Prasad Yadav and DeveGowda rode the Mandal wave to

electoral glory.

In his book, Caste in IndianPolitics, sociologist Rajni Kothariargued that the process of politicsis one of identifying andmanipulating existing structures

in order to mobilise support andconsolidate positions. Where thecaste structure provides one of themost important organisational

clusters in which the population isfound to live, politics must striveto organise through such astructure."

Unfortunately, the appeal of suchcaste leaders to their followingwas not to strengthen the commonstruggle to remove theinadequacies in the existing socio-economic system. The appeal wasand continues to be to elect theirfellow caste men to power.

While it did bring about limitedpolitical empowerment, someassertiveness and a sense of prideamong the Dalit and backwardclasses, nothing substantial in

improving their socio-economicconditions including the muchneeded land reforms have takenplace in any of the states wheresuch caste leaders have acquiredpower and continue to wield wideinfluence.

Thus for their self interests, these

parties and leaders have sustainedand nurtured the exploitativecaste system, in the processpreserving and perpetuating theexploitative order.


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The vehement opposition thesecaste leaders have shown to anyrethink on reservation is aimed atnot only protecting their vote

banks but also preventing anyunity among the poor for acommon cause.

The decision to go for a castebased census in 2011, followingdemands by leaders of the rulingUPA and the Opposition parties,was yet another milestone in thecountrys caste politics.

To quote ProfBeteille, It is okayif sociologistsinclude caste intheir surveys. Butthe governmentshould not give itsofficial sanction, its

official stamp tothis presentation of Indiansociety.

Even the Communist parties, whosupport the quota system, havegone on record stating that castebased reservation cannot be alasting solution to the socio-

economic disparities. In fact,Yechuri had stated once that,Enough statistics can be adducedto show that despite reservations,the plight of these sections havenot substantially improved.

Ironically, the only instance of acaste count in post-independentIndia was carried out in Kerala in1968 by the Communist

Government led by E M SNamboodiripad.

While the intention of the HighCourt in banning caste basedrallies is indeed laudable, it isunlikely to have much impact oncurbing the role of caste in Indianpolitics in the existing scenario.

It would be nave to expect thecountrys politicalparties to take alead in the matter.

Here, it ispertinent tomention the case ofthe State of

Odisha, wherecaste has never been the criterionfor popular choice. Whether it isdue to the impact of the universalJagannath cult or the role playedby visionary leaders such asPandit Gopabandhu Das, BijuPattanaik or Nandini Satapthy,the politically enlightened

electorate have time and againshown their preferences tocandidates based on performanceand not caste.

Though the Patel communitycontinues to play a key role in the

The decision to go for a castebased census in 2011, followingdemands by leaders of theruling UPA and the Oppositionparties, was yet anothermilestone in the countrys castepolitics.


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BJPs success in Gujarat, theoverwhelming and repeatedsupport to the Chief Minister, whobelongs to a minority caste, is

reflective of the changingorientation of the voters in favourof good governance vis a vis castefactors.

Apart from an enlightened choiceon the part of voters and goodgovernance on the part of rulingparties, it is also high time toconsider whether a system basedon proportional representation can

be an antidote to caste politics inthe country.

Under this system, people would

have to vote for parties and notindividuals, thereby minimizingappeals on casteist, communal orparochial lines.

The Allahabad High Court rulinghas to be taken as a wake up callin national interest.

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Indias National Security Management

Needs Urgent Reform

- Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal

he Ministry of Defence(MoD) appears to haverejected the proposal of the

Naresh Chandra Committee onDefence Reforms to appoint apermanent Chairman of the Chiefsof Staff Committee (CoSC).

This is a retrograde step as theproposal itself is a watered downversion of the originalrecommendation of the Group ofMinisters (GoM) of 2001 to appointa Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

For many decades, defenceplanning in India has beenmarked by knee jerk reactions toemerging situations andhaphazard single-Service growth.The absence of a clearlyenunciated national securitystrategy, poor civil-militaryrelations, the lack of firmcommitment of funds formodernisation beyond the current

financial year and sub-optimalinter-service prioritisation, havehandicapped defence planning.Consequently, the defence

planning process has failed toproduce the most effective forcestructure and force mix based oncarefully drawn up long-termpriorities. With projectedexpenditure of US$ 100 billion onmilitary modernisation over the

next 10 years, it is now beingrealised that force structures mustbe configured on a tri-Service,long-term basis to meet futurethreats and challenges.

In 1999, the Kargil ReviewCommittee headed by the late Mr.K Subrahmanyam had been askedto review the events leading upto the Pakistani aggression in theKargil District of Ladakh inJammu & Kashmir; and, torecommend such measures as areconsidered necessary to safeguardnational security against sucharmed intrusions." Though it hadbeen given a very narrow andlimited charter, the committeelooked holistically at the threatsand challenges and examined theloopholes in the management ofnational security. The committee

T

DEFEN

* Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Visiting Fellow, VIF


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was of the view that the political,bureaucratic, military andintelligence establishments appearto have developed a vested interest

in the status quo.'' It made farreaching recommendations on thedevelopment of Indias nucleardeterrence, higher defenceorganisations, intelligencereforms, border management, thedefence budget, the use of airpower, counter-insurgencyoperations, integrated manpower

policy, defence research anddevelopment, and media relations.The committees report was tabledin Parliament onFebruary 23, 2000.

The CabinetCommittee onSecurity appointeda GoM to study theKargil Review Committee reportand recommend measures forimplementation. The GoM washeaded by the then Home MinisterL K Advani and, in turn, set upfour task forces on intelligencereforms, internal security, bordermanagement and defencemanagement to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets ofthe management of nationalsecurity.

The GoM recommended sweepingreforms to the existing national

security management system. OnMay 11, 2001, the CCS acceptedall its recommendations, includingone for the establishment of the

post of the Chief of Defence Staff(CDS) which has still not beenimplemented. The CCS approvedthe following key measures:

Headquarters IntegratedDefence Staff (IDS) wasestablished withrepresentation from all theServices. The DG DPS wasmerged in it.

The post of Chief of DefenceStaff (CDS), whosetasks include inter-

Servicesprioritisation ofdefence plans andimprovement in

jointmanshipamong the three Services,was approved. However, aCDS is yet to be appointed.

A tri-Service Andaman andNicobar Command and aStrategic Forces Commandwere established.

The tri-Service DefenceIntelligence Agency (DIA)was established under theCOSC for strategic threatassessments.

Speedy decision making,enhanced transparency andaccountability were sought to

The Cabinet Committee onSecurity appointed a GoM tostudy the Kargil ReviewCommittee report andrecommend measures forimplementation.


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be brought into defenceacquisitions. Approval of theDefence ProcurementProcedure (DPP 2002) was

formally announced. The DPP constituted the

Defence Acquisition Council(DAC) and the DefenceTechnology Board, bothheaded by the DefenceMinister.

Implementation of thedecisions of the DAC was

assigned to the DefenceProcurement Board (DPB). The National Technical

Research Organisation(NTRO) was set up.

The CCS also issued adirective that Indias borderswith different countries bemanaged by a single agency

one border, one force andnominated the CRPF asIndias primary force forcounter-insurgencyoperations.

Decision making is graduallybecoming more streamlined. Thenew Defence Planning Guidelineshave laid down three inter-linkedstages in the planning process:

15 years Long TermIntegrated Perspective Plan(LTIPP), to be drawn up byHQ IDS in consultation with

the Services HQ andapproved by the DAC.

Five Years Defence Plans forthe Services (current plan:

2007-12), including 5-yearsServices Capital AcquisitionPlan (SCAP), to be drawn upby HQ IDS in consultationwith the Services HQ andapproved by the DAC.

Annual Acquisition Plan(AAP), to be drawn up by HQIDS approved by the DPB.

Budgetary allocations forensuing the financial year(ending March) are made onthe basis of the AAP.

Ten years later, many lacunae stillremain in the management ofnational security. The lack ofinter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination onissues like border managementand centre-state disagreementsover the handling of internalsecurity are particularly alarming.In order to review the progress ofimplementation of the proposalsapproved by the CCS in 2001, thegovernment appointed a TaskForce on National Security led byMr. Naresh Chandra, formerCabinet Secretary. The task forcehas submitted its report, whichhas been sent for inter-ministerialconsultations.


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ConclusionA fluid strategic environment,rapid advances in defence

technology, the need for judiciousallocation of scarce budgetaryresources, long lead times requiredfor creating futuristic forces andthe requirement of synergisingplans for defence anddevelopment, make long-termdefence planning a demandingexercise. The lack of a cohesivenational security strategy anddefence policy has resulted ininadequate political directionregarding politico-militaryobjectives and military strategy.Consequently, defence planning inIndia had till recently beenmarked by ad hoc decision makingto tide over immediate nationalsecurity challenges and long-termplanning was neglected. This isnow being gradually corrected andnew measures have beeninstituted to improve long-termplanning.

It is now being increasinglyrealised that a Defence Plan mustbe prepared on the basis of a 15-

year perspective plan. The firstfive years of the plan should bevery firm (Definitive Plan), thesecond five years may be relatively

less firm but should be clear indirection (Indicative Plan), and thelast five years should be tentative(Vision Plan). A reasonably firm

allocation of financial resources forthe first five years and anindicative allocation for thesubsequent period is a pre-requisite.

Perspective planning is graduallybecoming tri-Service in approach.It is now undertaken in HQ IDS,where military, technical andR&D experts take an integratedview of future threats andchallenges based on a forecast ofthe future battlefield milieu,evaluation of strategic options andanalysis of potential technologicaland industrial capabilities. Issueslike intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance, air defence,electronic warfare and amphibiousoperations, which are common toall the Services, are now gettingadequate attention. However,unless a CDS is appointed to guideintegrated operational planning, itwill continue to be mostly single-Service oriented in its conceptualframework.

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Terror Attacks In Bodh Gaya: Prevention

Is Better Than Cure

- Dr. N Manoharan

hen serial blasts rockedMahabodhi temple atBodh Gaya on 07 July

2013, it was for the first time thata Buddhist holy spot was targetedin India. Ten of the 13 bombsplanted at the temple were indeed

of low intensity, but theirpsychological impact was huge.Though no group or individual hasclaimed responsibility so far,fingers are being pointed at fourdifferent directions as possibleperpetrators.

Was there a political motive?

Congress General SecretaryDigvijaya Singh tried to connectthe timing of the blasts withGujarat Chief Minister and BJPleader Narendra Modis advice tothe party workers to teach BiharChief Minister Nitish Kumar alesson. What Digvijay Singh wastrying to suggest was that the BJPwould be interested in projectingBihars law and order situation ina poor light, especially after JDU-BJP split in the state. Thespeculation has no value other

than to gain cheap publicity.

There were also conjectures on thepossible involvement of Tamilextremist groups to express theirresentment against SinhalaBuddhists for the latters

treatment towards their ethnicbrethren in Sri Lanka. TwoBuddhist monks were attacked inTamil Nadu in March this year;and, in January 2011, theMahabodhi Society Temple inChennai was attacked. But, theTamil groups involved in thoseattacks clearly lack the capability

of carrying out terror attacks, thattoo using bombs. They have nowherewithal to strike a targetmore than 2000 kilometers away.

Were Maoists behind the attacks?Gaya is indeed a hotbed of theMaoists, but when it comes to apossible motive, it is difficult toestablish their involvement.

Mahabodhi temple was neither astate symbol nor a camp forsecurity/police forces. Maoistswould not bother otherwise. There

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were doubts whether they did theattack on behalf of any jihadistorganisation. There areopportunistic linkages between

Maoists and jihadist terror groupslike Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT).However, such linkages have sofar not been so deep as to extendto the outsourcing of terrorattacks.

The final possibility is theinvolvement of the IndianMujahideen (IM). There have beenalerts from the IntelligenceBureau overMahabodi Templeas one of the primetargets of terrorgroups like theIndian Mujahideen.The Delhi Policehad also soundedout BodhgayaTemple as one of the targets basedon interrogation of IM militants inits custody. The NationalInvestigation Agency (NIA) thathas been investigating the casehas established IM hands in theblasts. What does the IM haveagainst a Buddhist target? Twobroad motives can be established.

The primary aim was to avengeatrocities against Muslims inMyanmar by the Buddhistmajority. For quite some time,

Pakistan-based terror groups likethe LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed(JeM) and Bangladesh-basedHarkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI)

and Jamaat-e-Mujahideen ofBangladesh (JMB) have beentrying to establish a firm footholdin Mayanmar, especially in theMuslim-inhabited Arakan area.They have links with local radicalgroups like Rohingya SolidarityOrganization (RSO), Jammat-ul-

Arakan, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami

Arakan and Difa-e-MusalmanArakan. These Myanmaresegroups havetraining camps in

neighbouringBangladesh. BodhGaya is one of thepopular pilgrimagedestinations for the

BurmeseBuddhists.

The second motivation wasobviously anti-India. The IndianMujahideen is part of ISIs grandstrategy of destabilisation bytaking subversion and terrorism tothe heartland of India usingviolent non-state actors. Thus,IMs hand is evident in most of theterror attacks in Indiashinterland since the mid-2000s.

The serial blasts clearlyestablished a serious security

The final possibility is theinvolvement of the IndianMujahideen (IM). There havebeen alerts from theIntelligence Bureau overMahabodi Temple as one of theprime targets of terror groupslike the Indian Mujahideen.


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lapse at various levels. It is notclear why the IB alerts were nottaken seriously. It is also beyondcomprehension why such a high-

profile target was not guardedproperly. The outer ring wasmanned by the state police, butwith scant presence. Ironically,the security inside the templepremises was entrusted to privatesecurity personnel. The fact that13 bombs were placed at diverseplaces to go off serially in a span of

half-an-hour shows the level ofincompetence of the security netaround the Mahabodhi temple.This lacuna should be addressedon a priority basis.

An old adage an ounce ofprevention is worth a pound ofcure applies to internal securitymanagement. Two importantpreventive measures, amongothers, are suggested:

1. There should be adequatetarget-hardening aroundthe temple. It includes aprofessional security coverthat should be in a positionto deter prospective

attackers. Given theimportance of the place (aUNESCO heritage site andone of the holiest Buddhistshrines in the world), theidea of deploying a central

security force at the outerring should be explored. Theother measures that requireattention under target-

hardening include functionalmetal detectors, properfrisking, situationalawareness, effectivesurveillance cameras, andcheck points at all approachroads. The objective is tomake the environment asunfriendly and as difficult as

possible for the terrorists tocommit any subversive act.2.Also, the key to success in

fighting terrorism effectivelylies in obtaining accurateand reliable intelligenceabout impending attacks andneutralisation of terroristmodules well in advance.

Intelligence gathering inIndia, especially preventiveaspects of intelligence, needssubstantial improvement.Terrorist attacks occur eitherdue to absence ofprecise/actionableintelligence or, more often,lack of follow-up action evenwhen such intelligence isavailable. Specificintelligence should reach theconcerned agency in realtime. Cohesion amongstintelligence agencies andsharing of intelligence in a


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far more integrated manneris an operational necessity.What is required isintelligence convergence

more than intelligence

coordination, of both menand material

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Portents Of Increased Terrorist Violence

In J&K Proactive Action Only Option

- Rohit Singh

ometime during the autumnof 2012, security forceshomed on to a

communication between a terroristcommander in the valley with hishandler based in PakistanOccupiued Kashmir (POK). Theagitated handler was egging thecommander to carry out someaction on security forces and eventhreatened to block financialsupport to his men who had failedto launch any significant attack.This came in the backdrop of thevalley passing through twosuccessive summers without anycivilian unrest and tourist footfalltouching the figure of 13 lakhswhich was the highest since theoutbreak of insurgency in 1989.The year 2012 was also the mostpeaceful in terms of casualtiesinflicted on security forces andcivilians by terrorists.

On 19 October 2012, two to three

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists,under pressure to pacify theirhandler across the LoC, appearedin front of an Army convoy at

Pantha Chowk near the BadamiBagh Cantonment and fired on thewindscreen of a moving Armyvehicle. They, however, soonpanicked and failed to inflict anycasualty on the army men butkilled two civilians in theadjoining Hotel Silver Star beforemaking good their escape. Yet, theaudacious nature of the attacksurprised many as the ability ofthe terrorists to initiate directattacks on security forces (withthe exception of grenade lobbing)had been greatly eroded in thepast several years. J&K hadwitnessed only two fidayeenattacks since 2008 and incidents ofstand-off fire, ambushes, IEDblasts, etc had almost come to anaught. On their part, handlersbased in Pakistan stepped upinfiltration into J&K and inNovember, two large groups wereintercepted in Kupwara districtresulting in the elimination of sixinfiltrators.

The Pakistan Army also startedescalating tensions along the Line

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of Control (LoC) and there was amarked increase in incidents ofceasefire violations in Poonch andRampur sectors since September

2012. The beheading of two Indiansoldiers in Krishna Ghati sector inJanuary this year and mortarshelling in Uri in October 2012,which killed three civilians, werepart of its design to one, create adiversion to facilitate successfulinfiltrations by terrorists and two,to raise their fledgling morale by

signaling its renewed support tothem.

Meanwhile in thevalley, there werestrong murmursthat the nextsummer could see arevival of violence.Houseboat and shikara owners inthe Dal Lake were on an overdriveto cash in on the steady stream oftourists who were flocking the hotspots of Gulmarg and Sonamargeven late into October andNovember 2012. The shutdownsand curfews witnessed in theaftermath of Parliament attackconvict Afzal Gurus hanging inFebruary revived fears that theoncoming summer could see areturn of street violence andeconomic disruptions. But thevalley soon limped back to normal

and there is no major decline intourist arrivals.

However, the first few months of

2013 has witnessed a steep rise incasualty figures of security forceswhen compared to thecorresponding period in the lastfew years. A total of 35 securityforces personnel and 12 civilianshave been killed in over 32terrorist initiated incidents in theyear (till 13 July 2013). Thirty twosecurity personnel and 14 civilianssuffered non-fatal injuries in theseincidents including those that

occurred on theLoC. In contrast,17 securitypersonnel and 16civilians werekilled throughout

the year in 2012. The onset ofsummer has seen a sharp increasein the number of infiltrationattempts by terrorists andconservative estimates of theirtotal strength in the state hasbeen pegged at around 350-400. Atleast 10 major infiltrationattempts and an equal number ofcease fire violations have beendetected since May. On 18 May, aJunior Commissioned Officer waskilled and a jawan injured whilefoiling an infiltration bid inMachal sector. In a highlyprovocative action, Pakistani

A total of 35 security forcespersonnel and 12 civilians havebeen killed in over 32 terroristinitiated incidents in the year(till 13 July 2013).


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troops opened small arms andmortar fire on a forward Indianpost in Naugam sector of Kupwaraon 24 May during the visit of the

local brigade commander whoreceived superficial splinterinjuries from a mortar shell.Intermittent exchange of smallarms fire between the two sidescontinued for one week and on 01June, three infiltrating terroristswere killed in that sector. Morerecently, on 09 July, five terrorists

belonging to a joint infiltratinggroup composed of more than 10LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)cadres were killed in the Keransector.

On 19 June, in a major escalation,Pakistani troops had firedsimultaneously on several Indianposts in Mandi, Poonch andKrishna Ghati sectors of Poonchwhere joint border action teams ofPakistan Army and terrorists areplanting IEDs and anti-personnelmines on foot tracks on Indianside of the LoC. In the past oneweek, two Army soldiers wereinjured in IED blasts on the LoCin Naushera and Poonch sectors.On 01 July, a lone terrorist wasshot dead while infiltrating intothe Indian side in Saujian belt ofPoonch. The premature detonationof an IED strapped to his body ledto suspicions that the terrorist

may have been a suicide bomberwho was heading towards anIndian picket to inflict maximumcasualties on the troops. Frequent

violation of the ceasefire byPakistani troops have becomecommon in this sector where thesituation was described as tenseby the Indian Corps Commanderof Jammu division. On 08 July,one civilian porter was killed andthree others were injured when aborder action team detonated an

IED when they were moving fromone forward post to another,carrying supplies. Earlier in June,terrorists had intruded in thesame area and threatened theporters to stop working for theIndian Army. In the valley, one

Army soldier was killed inRampur sector on 09 July in a

suspected border action.In the hinterland, the attack on an

Army truck at Hyderpora inSrinagar on the eve of the PrimeMinisters visit to the city on 24June brought back focus on thevalley but the situation could havebeen worse had the Army notexercised restraint and opened fireto engage the terrorists on thebusy national highway whichcould have caused collateraldamage. Eight Army soldiers werekilled and nine injured in theattack. The fleeing terrorists also


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fired at a picket few kilometersfrom the attack spot injuring twopolice personnel. Two dayspreceding this attack, terrorists

had killed two policemen at HariSingh High Street in the heart ofSrinagar city. In fact, theHyderpora attack was the seventhterrori

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Vivek Issues n Options August 2013