Vidal vs Come Lec

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_206666_2015.html 1/16

TodayisMonday,May04,2015

Atty.AliciaRisosVidalv.COMELECandJosephEjercitoEstrada,G.R.No.206666,January21,2015Decision,LeonardodeCastro[J]SeparateOpinion,Brion[J]ConcurringOpinion,Mendoza[J]DissentingOpinion,Leonen[J]

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.206666January21,2015

ATTY.ALICIARISOSVIDAL,Petitioner,ALFREDOS.LIMPetitionerIntervenor,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandJOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA,Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:

Before theCourtare(1)aPetition forCertiorari filedunderRule64, inrelation toRule65,bothof theRevisedRules of Court, by Atty. Alicia RisosVidal (RisosVidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of thewrit ofcertiorari annulling and setting aside theApril 1, 20131 andApril 23, 20132 Resolutions of theCommission onElections(COMELEC),SecondDivisionandEnbane,respectively, inSPANo.13211(DC),entitled"Atty.AliciaRisosVidalv.JosephEjercitoEstrada"forhavingbeenrenderedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof jurisdictionand(2)aPetitioninIntervention3 filedbyAlfredoS.Lim(Lim),whereinhepraystobedeclared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent formerPresidentJosephEjercitoEstradas(formerPresidentEstrada)disqualificationtorunforandholdpublicoffice.

TheFacts

Thesalientfactsofthecaseareasfollows:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of theRepublicofthePhilippines,forthecrimeofplunderinCriminalCaseNo.26558,entitled"PeopleofthePhilippinesv.JosephEjercitoEstrada,etal."Thedispositivepartofthegraftcourtsdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,inviewofall theforegoing,judgmentisherebyrenderedinCriminalCaseNo.26558findingtheaccused,FormerPresidentJosephEjercitoEstrada,GUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofPLUNDER,definedinandpenalizedbyRepublicActNo.7080,asamended.Ontheotherhand,forfailureoftheprosecutiontoproveandestablishtheirguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt, theCourt findstheaccusedJose"Jinggoy"EstradaandAtty.EdwardS.SerapioNOTGUILTYofthecrimeofplunder,andaccordingly,theCourtherebyorderstheirACQUITTAL.

Thepenalty imposable for thecrimeofplunderunderRepublicActNo.7080,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, thelesserpenaltyshallbeappliedinaccordancewithArticle63oftheRevisedPenalCode.Accordingly,theaccusedFormerPresidentJosephEjercitoEstrada isherebysentenced tosuffer thepenaltyofReclusionPerpetuaandtheaccessorypenaltiesofcivilinterdictionduringtheperiodofsentenceandperpetualabsolutedisqualification.

TheperiodwithinwhichaccusedFormerPresident JosephEjercitoEstradahasbeenunderdetentionshall becreditedtohiminfullaslongasheagreesvoluntarilyinwritingtoabidebythesamedisciplinaryrulesimposeduponconvictedprisoners.

Moreover, inaccordancewithSection2ofRepublicActNo.7080,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.7659, theCourtherebydeclarestheforfeitureinfavorofthegovernmentofthefollowing:

(1) The total amount of FiveHundredForty[]TwoMillionSevenHundredNinety[]OneThousandPesos

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(P545,291,000.00),withinterestandincomeearned,inclusiveoftheamountofTwoHundredMillionPesos(P200,000,000.00),depositedinthenameandaccountoftheErapMuslimYouthFoundation.

(2)TheamountofOneHundredEighty[]NineMillionPesos(P189,000,000.00), inclusiveof interestsandincomeearned,depositedintheJoseVelardeaccount.

(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "BoracayMansion" located at #100 11thStreet,NewManila,QuezonCity.

The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby orderedcancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation of theoriginal receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures.Likewise, theholddepartureorders issuedagainst the saidaccusedarehereby recalledanddeclared functusoficio.4

OnOctober25,2007,however, formerPresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo (formerPresidentArroyo)extendedexecutiveclemency,bywayofpardon,toformerPresidentEstrada.Thefulltextofsaidpardonstates:

MALACAANPALACEMANILA

BythePresidentofthePhilippines

PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age ofseventy(70),

WHEREAS,JosephEjercitoEstradahasbeenunderdetentionforsixandahalfyears,

WHEREAS,JosephEjercitoEstradahaspubliclycommittedtonolongerseekanyelectivepositionoroffice,

INVIEWHEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred uponme by theConstitution, I herebygrant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan ofPlunderandimposedapenaltyofReclusionPerpetua.Heisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs andprocesses issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) heownedbeforehistenureasPresident.

UponacceptanceofthispardonbyJOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA,thispardonshalltakeeffect.

GivenundermyhandattheCityofManila,this25thDayofOctober,intheyearofOurLord,twothousandandseven.

GloriaM.Arroyo(sgd.)

BythePresident:

IGNACIOR.BUNYE(sgd.)ActingExecutiveSecretary5

OnOctober26,2007,at3:35p.m.,formerPresidentEstrada"receivedandaccepted"6thepardonbyaffixinghissignaturebesidehishandwrittennotationthereon.

OnNovember30,2009,formerPresidentEstradafiledaCertificateofCandidacy7 for thepositionofPresident.Duringthattime,hiscandidacyearnedthreeoppositionsintheCOMELEC:(1)SPANo.09024(DC),a"PetitiontoDenyDueCourseandCancelCertificateofCandidacy"filedbyRev.EllyVelezB.LaoPamatong,ESQ(2)SPANo.09028(DC),apetitionfor"DisqualificationasPresidentialCandidate"filedbyEvilioC.Pormento(Pormento)and(3)SPANo.09104(DC),a"PetitiontoDisqualifyEstradaEjercito,JosephM.fromRunningasPresidentduetoConstitutionalDisqualificationandCreatingConfusion to thePrejudiceofEstrada,MaryLouB" filedbyMaryLouEstrada.InseparateResolutions8datedJanuary20,2010bytheCOMELEC,SecondDivision,however,allthree petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription onreelection applies to a sitting president and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by formerPresidentArroyorestoredtheformersrighttovoteandbevotedforapublicoffice.ThesubsequentmotionsforreconsiderationtheretoweredeniedbytheCOMELECEnbanc.

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AftertheconductoftheMay10,2010synchronizedelections,however,formerPresidentEstradaonlymanagedtogarnerthesecondhighestnumberofvotes.

Of the threepetitioners abovementioned, onlyPormento sought recourse to thisCourt and filed a petition forcertiorari,whichwasdocketedasG.R.No.191988,entitled "Atty.EvilioC.Pormentov.Joseph ERAPEjercitoEstrada andCommission on Elections." But in a Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed theaforementionedpetitiononthegroundofmootnessconsideringthatformerPresidentEstradalosthispresidentialbid.

OnOctober2,2012,formerPresidentEstradaoncemoreventuredintothepoliticalarena,andfiledaCertificateofCandidacy,10thistimevyingforalocalelectivepost,thatoftheMayoroftheCityofManila.

OnJanuary24,2013,RisosVidal, thepetitioner in this case, filedaPetition forDisqualificationagainst formerPresident Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13211 (DC). Risos Vidalanchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public OfficebecauseofhisConvictionforPlunderbytheSandiganbayaninCriminalCaseNo.26558entitledPeopleofthePhilippinesvs.JosephEjercitoEstradaSentencingHimtoSufferthePenaltyofReclusionPerpetuawithPerpetualAbsoluteDisqualification."11ShereliedonSection40oftheLocalGovernmentCode(LGC),inrelationtoSection12oftheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC),whichstaterespectively,that:

Sec.40,LocalGovernmentCode:

SECTION40.Disqualifications.Thefollowingpersonsaredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition:

(a)Thosesentencedbyfinaljudgmentforanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeorforanoffensepunishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonment,withintwo(2)yearsafterservingsentence(b)Thoseremovedfromofficeasaresultofanadministrativecase

(c)ThoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentforviolatingtheoathofallegiancetotheRepublic

(d)Thosewithdualcitizenship

(e)Fugitivesfromjusticeincriminalornonpoliticalcaseshereorabroad

(f)Permanent residents in a foreign country or thosewhohaveacquired the right to reside abroadandcontinuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCodeand

(g)Theinsaneorfeebleminded.(Emphasissupplied.)

Sec.12,OmnibusElectionCode:

Section12.Disqualifications.Anypersonwhohasbeendeclaredbycompetentauthorityinsaneorincompetent,orhasbeensentencedbyfinaljudgmentforsubversion,insurrection,rebellion,orforanyoffenseforwhichhehasbeen sentenced to a penalty ofmore than eighteenmonths or for a crime involvingmoral turpitude, shall bedisqualifiedtobeacandidateandtoholdanypublicoffice,unlesshehasbeengivenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty.(Emphasessupplied.)

InaResolutiondatedApril1,2013,theCOMELEC,SecondDivision,dismissedthepetitionfordisqualification,thefalloofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theinstantpetitionisherebyDISMISSEDforutterlackofmerit.12

TheCOMELEC,SecondDivision,opinedthat"[h]avingtakenjudicialcognizanceoftheconsolidatedresolutionforSPA No. 09028 (DC) and SPA No. 09104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, thisCommission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso, [RisosVidal] failed to present cogent proofsufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [formerPresidentEstradas] right toseekpublicofficehasbeeneffectively restoredby thepardonvesteduponhimbyformer President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage indisquisitionsofasettledmatterlestindulgedinwastageofgovernmentresources."13

ThesubsequentmotionforreconsiderationfiledbyRisosVidalwasdeniedinaResolutiondatedApril23,2013.

OnApril 30,2013,RisosVidal invoked theCourts jurisdictionby filing thepresentpetition.Shepresented fiveissuesfortheCourtsresolution,towit:

I.RESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKOREXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADAS PARDON WAS NOTCONDITIONAL

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II.RESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKOREXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TORUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FORHAVINGBEENCONVICTEDOFPLUNDER,ANOFFENSEINVOLVINGMORALTURPITUDE

III.RESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKOREXCESSOFJURISDICTIONINDISMISSINGTHEPETITIONFORDISQUALIFICATIONONTHEGROUNDTHATTHECASEINVOLVESTHESAMEORSIMILARISSUESITALREADYRESOLVEDINTHECASESOF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFYESTRADAEJERCITO,JOSEPHM.FROMRUNNINGASPRESIDENT,ETC.,"SPANO.09104(DC)

IV.RESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKOREXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADAS PARDON NEITHERRESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTEDISQUALIFICATIONFROMSEEKINGPUBLICOFFICEand

V.RESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKOREXCESSOFJURISDICTIONINNOTHAVINGEXERCISEDITSPOWERTOMOTUPROPRIODISQUALIFYRESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLICOFFICEBECAUSEOFHISPERPETUALANDABSOLUTEDISQUALIFICATIONTOSEEKPUBLICOFFICEANDTOVOTERESULTINGFROMHISCRIMINALCONVICTIONFORPLUNDER.14

While thiscasewaspendingbeforetheCourt,oronMay13,2013, theelectionswereconductedasscheduledandformerPresidentEstradawasvotedintoofficewith349,770votescast inhisfavor.Thenextday,thelocalboardofcanvassersproclaimedhimasthedulyelectedMayoroftheCityofManila.

OnJune7,2013,Lim,oneofformerPresidentEstradasopponentsforthepositionofMayor,movedforleavetointerveneinthiscase.HismotionwasgrantedbytheCourtinaResolution15datedJune25,2013.LimsubscribedtoRisosVidalstheorythatformerPresidentEstradaisdisqualifiedtorunforandholdpublicofficeasthepardongranted to the latter failed toexpressly remithisperpetualdisqualification.Further,given that formerPresidentEstrada is disqualified to run for andhold public office, all the votesobtainedby the latter should bedeclaredstray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightfulwinningcandidateforthepositionofMayoroftheCityofManila.

TheIssue

Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed byRisosVidal actually presentsonlyoneessentialquestion for resolutionby theCourt, that is,whetherornot theCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninrulingthatformerPresidentEstradaisqualifiedtovoteandbevotedforinpublicofficeasaresultofthepardongrantedtohimbyformerPresidentArroyo.

In her petition, RisosVidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted to former PresidentEstradawasconditionalasevidencedbythelattersexpressacceptancethereof.The"acceptance,"sheclaims,isan indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the thirdWhereasClause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, JosephEjercitoEstrada has publicly committed to no longer seek anyelectivepositionoroffice."SheexplainsthattheaforementionedcommitmentwaswhatimpelledformerPresidentArroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it, the clemencywould not have been extended. And anybreachthereof,thatis,whenformerPresidentEstradafiledhisCertificateofCandidacyforPresidentandMayoroftheCity ofManila, he breached the condition of the pardon hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison toservetheunexpiredportionofhissentencexxxanddisqualifieshimasacandidateforthemayoralty[position]ofManila."16

Nonetheless, RisosVidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former President Estrada mustbedisqualifiedfromrunningforandholdingpublicelectiveofficeisactuallytheproscriptionfoundinSection40oftheLGC,inrelationtoSection12oftheOEC.Shearguesthatthecrimeofplunderisbothanoffensepunishablebyimprisonment of one year ormore and involvingmoral turpitude such that former President Estradamust bedisqualifiedtorunforandholdpublicelectiveoffice.

Evenwith the pardon granted to formerPresidentEstrada, however,RisosVidal insists that the same did notoperatetomakeavailabletoformerPresidentEstradatheexceptionprovidedunderSection12oftheOEC,thepardon being merely conditional and not absolute or plenary. Moreover, RisosVidal puts a premium on theostensiblerequirementsprovidedunderArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode,towit:

ART.36.Pardonitseffects.Apardonshallnotworktherestorationoftherighttoholdpublicoffice,ortherightofsuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbeexpresslyrestoredbythetermsofthepardon.

Apardonshall innocaseexempt theculprit from thepaymentof thecivil indemnity imposeduponhimby the

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sentence.

xxxx

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusionperpetuaandreclusiontemporalshallcarrywith themthatofcivil interdictionfor lifeorduringtheperiodof thesentenceasthecasemaybe,andthatofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationwhichtheoffendershallsuffereventhoughpardonedastotheprincipalpenalty,unlessthesameshallhavebeenexpresslyremittedinthepardon.(Emphasessupplied.)

She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a generalstatementthatsuchpardoncarrieswithittherestorationofcivilandpoliticalrights.ByvirtueofArticles36and41,a pardon restoring civil and political rightswithout categoricallymakingmentionwhat specific civil and politicalrightsarerestored"shallnotworktorestoretherighttoholdpublicoffice,ortherightofsuffragenorshallitremitthe accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties ofreclusionperpetuaandreclusiontemporal."17Inotherwords,sheconsiderstheaboveconstraintsasmandatoryrequirementsthatshunageneralorimpliedrestorationofcivilandpoliticalrightsinpardons.

RisosVidalcitestheconcurringopinionsofAssociateJusticesTeodoroR.PadillaandFlorentinoP.FelicianoinMonsantov.Factoran,Jr.18toendorseherpositionthat"[t]herestorationoftherighttoholdpublicofficetoonewhohaslostsuchrightbyreasonofconvictioninacriminalcase,butsubsequentlypardoned,cannotbelefttoinference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express, explicit, positive and specificlanguage."

Applying Monsantoto former President Estradas case, RisosVidal reckons that "such express restoration isfurtherdemandedbytheexistenceoftheconditioninthe[third][W]hereas[C]lauseofthepardonxxxindubitablyindicatingthattheprivilegetoholdpublicofficewasnotrestoredtohim."19

Ontheotherhand,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)forpublicrespondentCOMELEC,maintainsthat"theissueofwhetherornotthepardonextendedto[formerPresidentEstrada]restoredhisrighttorunforpublicofficehadalreadybeenpasseduponbypublicrespondentCOMELECwaybackin2010viaitsrulingsinSPANos.09024, 09028 and 09104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare[formerPresidentEstrada]disqualifiedtorunandbevotedasmayoroftheCityofManilaintheabsenceofanynewargument thatwouldwarrant its reversal.Tobesure,public respondentCOMELECcorrectlyexercised itsdiscretion in taking judicial cognizanceof the aforesaid rulingswhich are known toit andwhich canbe verifiedfrom itsownrecords, inaccordancewithSection2,Rule129of theRulesofCourton thecourtsdiscretionarypower to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionabledemonstration,oroughttobeknowntothembecauseoftheirjudicialfunctions."20

Further,theOSGcontendsthat"[w]hileatfirstglance,it isapparentthat[formerPresidentEstradas]convictionforplunderdisqualifieshimfromrunningasmayorofManilaunderSection40ofthe[LGC],thesubsequentgrantofpardontohim,however,effectivelyrestoredhisrighttorunforanypublicoffice."21Therestorationofhisrightto run foranypublicoffice is theexception to theprohibitionunderSection40of theLGC,asprovidedunderSection12oftheOEC.AstotheseemingrequirementofArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode,i.e.,theexpressrestoration/remissionofaparticularrighttobestatedinthepardon,theOSGassertsthat"anairtightandrigidinterpretationofArticle36andArticle41ofthe[RPC]xxxwouldbestretchingtoomuchtheclearandplainmeaningoftheaforesaidprovisions."22Lastly, taking intoconsiderationthethirdWhereasClauseof thepardongrantedtoformerPresidentEstrada,theOSGsupportsthepositionthatit"isnotanintegralpartofthedecreeofthepardonandcannotthereforeservetorestrictitseffectivity."23

Thus, theOSGconcludes that the "COMELECdid not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcessofjurisdictioninissuingtheassailedResolutions."24

Forhispart, formerPresidentEstradapresents the followingsignificantarguments todefendhisstay inoffice:that "the factual findings of public respondentCOMELEC, theConstitutional bodymandated to administer andenforceall laws relative to theconductof theelections, [relative to theabsolutenessof thepardon, theeffectsthereof,andtheeligibilityofformerPresidentEstradatoseekpublicelectiveoffice]arebinding[andconclusive]onthisHonorableSupremeCourt"thathe"wasgrantedanabsolutepardonandtherebyrestoredtohisfullcivilandpoliticalrights,includingtherighttoseekpublicelectiveofficesuchasthemayoral(sic)positionintheCityofManila"that"themajoritydecisioninthecaseofSalvacionA.Monsantov.FulgencioS.Factoran,Jr.,whichwaserroneouslycitedbybothVidalandLimasauthority for their respectiveclaims,xxx reveal that therewasnodiscussionwhatsoeverintheratiodecidendioftheMonsantocaseastotheallegednecessityforanexpressedrestorationoftherighttoholdpublicofficeinthepardonasalegalprerequisitetoremovethesubjectperpetualspecialdisqualification" thatmoreover, the"principalquestionraised in thisMonsantocase iswhetherornotapublicofficer,whohasbeengrantedanabsolutepardonbytheChiefExecutive,isentitledtoreinstatementtoherformerpositionwithoutneedofanewappointment"thathis"expressedacceptance[ofthepardon]isnotproofthat the pardon extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute" that this case is a mere rehash of the

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casesfiled against him during his candidacy for President back in 20092010 that Articles 36 and 41 of theRevisedPenalCode"cannotabridgeordiminishthepardoningpowerofthePresidentexpresslygrantedbytheConstitution" that the textof thepardongranted tohimsubstantially, ifnot fully,compliedwith therequirementposedbyArticle36of theRevisedPenalCodeas itwascategoricallystated in thesaiddocument thathewas"restored tohiscivilandpolitical rights" thatsincepardon isanactofgrace, itmustbeconstrued favorably infavorof thegrantee25and thathisdisqualificationwill result inmassivedisenfranchisementof thehundredsofthousandsofManileoswhovotedforhim.26

TheCourt'sRuling

Thepetitionforcertiorarilacksmerit.

FormerPresidentEstradawasgrantedanabsolutepardonthatfullyrestoredallhiscivilandpoliticalrights,whichnaturally includes the right toseekpublicelectiveoffice, the focalpointof thiscontroversy.Thewordingof thepardonextendedtoformerPresidentEstradaiscomplete,unambiguous,andunqualified.ItislikewiseunfetteredbyArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.Theonlyreasonable,objective,andconstitutionalinterpretationofthelanguageofthepardonisthatthesameinfactconformstoArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.RecallthatthepetitionfordisqualificationfiledbyRisosVidalagainstformerPresidentEstrada,docketedasSPANo.13211(DC),wasanchoredonSection40of theLGC, inrelation toSection12of theOEC, that is,havingbeenconvictedofacrimepunishablebyimprisonmentofoneyearormore,andinvolvingmoralturpitude,formerPresidentEstradamustbedisqualifiedtorunforandholdpublicelectiveofficenotwithstandingthefactthatheisagranteeofapardonthatincludesastatementexpressing"[h]eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights."RisosVidaltheorizesthatformerPresidentEstradaisdisqualifiedfromrunningforMayorofManilaintheMay13,2013Elections,andremainsdisqualifiedtoholdanylocalelectivepostdespitethepresidentialpardonextendedto him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for theremissionofthepenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualification,particularlytherestorationofhis(formerPresidentEstrada) right tovoteandbevotedupon forpublicoffice.She invokesArticles36and41of theRevisedPenalCodeasthefoundationsofhertheory.

It is insistedthat,sincea textualexaminationof thepardongiventoandacceptedbyformerPresidentEstradadoesnotactuallyspecifywhichpoliticalrightisrestored,itcouldbeinferredthatformerPresidentArroyodidnotdeliberatelyintendtorestoreformerPresidentEstradasrightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice,ortootherwiseremitthepenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualification.Evenifherintentionwasthecontrary,thesamecannotbeupheldbasedonthepardonstext.

ThepardoningpowerofthePresidentcannotbelimitedbylegislativeaction.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IXC, provides that thePresidentofthePhilippinespossessesthepowertograntpardons,alongwithotheractsofexecutiveclemency,towit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in thisConstitution, thePresidentmaygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of amajority of all theMembers of theCongress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationoftheCommission.

It isapparentfromtheforegoingconstitutionalprovisionsthattheonlyinstancesinwhichthePresidentmaynotextendpardonremaintobein:(1)impeachmentcases(2)casesthathavenotyetresultedinafinalconvictionand (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorablerecommendationcoming from theCOMELEC.Therefore, it canbeargued thatanyactofCongressbywayofstatutecannotoperatetodelimitthepardoningpowerofthePresident.

InCristobalv.Labrador27andPelobellov.Palatino,28whichweredecidedunderthe1935Constitution,whereintheprovisiongrantingpardoningpowertothePresidentsharedsimilarphraseologywithwhatisfoundinthepresent1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by theConstitution, thepardoningpowercannotbe restrictedor controlledby legislativeaction."TheCourt reiteratedthispronouncement inMonsantov.Factoran,Jr.29 therebyestablishing that,under thepresentConstitution, "apardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it isunmistakablythelongstandingpositionofthisCourtthattheexerciseofthepardoningpowerisdiscretionaryinthePresidentandmaynotbe interferedwithbyCongressor theCourt,exceptonlywhen itexceeds the limitsprovidedforbytheConstitution.

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This doctrine of nondiminution or nonimpairment of the Presidents power of pardon by acts of Congress,specificallythroughlegislation,wasstronglyadheredtobyanoverwhelmingmajorityoftheframersofthe1987Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of thePresident in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined byCongress through the enactment of a law. The following is the pertinent portion lifted from theRecord of theCommission(Vol.II):

MR.ROMULO.IaskthatCommissionerTanberecognizedtointroduceanamendmentonthesamesection.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerTanisrecognized.

SR.TAN.MadamPresident,lines7to9state:

However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices laws may be limited bylegislation.

I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt practicesmay include a very littleoffense likestealingP10 second,which I think ismore important, I get the impression, rightlyorwrongly, thatsubconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the premise that all our future Presidents will bebad anddishonest and, consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to contributetowards the creation of an antiPresident Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but nocorrespondingpowerexcepttodeclaremartiallaw.Therefore,Irequestthattheselinesbedeleted.

MR.REGALADO.MadamPresident,maytheCommitteereacttothat?

THEPRESIDENT.Yes,please.

MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner Davide because of the fact thatsimilar to theprovisionson theCommissiononElections, the recommendationof thatCommission is requiredbeforeexecutiveclemency isgrantedbecauseviolationsof theelection lawsgo into theverypolitical lifeof thecountry.

WithrespecttoviolationsofourCorruptPracticesLaw,wefeltthatitisalsonecessarytohavethatsubjectedtothesameconditionbecauseviolationofourCorruptPracticesLawmaybeofsuchmagnitudeastoaffecttheveryeconomicsystemof thecountry.Nevertheless,asacompromise,weprovidedhere that itwill be theCongressthatwillprovidefor theclassificationastowhichconvictionswillstill requirepriorrecommendationafterall, theCongresscouldtakeintoaccountwhetherornottheviolationoftheCorruptPracticesLawisofsuchmagnitudeastoaffecttheeconomiclifeofthecountry,ifitisinthemillionsorbillionsofdollars.ButIassumetheCongressinitscollectivewisdomwillexcludethosepettycrimesofcorruptionasnottorequireanyfurtherstrictureontheexerciseofexecutiveclemencybecause,ofcourse, there isawhaleofadifference ifweconsidera lowlyclerkcommitting malversation of government property or funds involving one hundred pesos. But then, we alsoanticipate the possibility that the corrupt practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have virtuallydrainedasubstantialportionofthetreasury,andthenhegoesthroughallthejudicialprocessesandlateron,aPresidentwhomayhavecloseconnectionswithhimoroutofimprovidentcompassionmaygrantclemencyundersuch conditions. That is whywe left it to Congress to provide andmake a classification based on substantialdistinctionsbetweenaminoractofcorruptionoranactofsubstantialproportions.SR.TAN.So,whydowenotjustinsertthewordGROSSorGRAVEbeforetheword"violations"?

MR.REGALADO.We feel thatCongress canmakea better distinction because "GRAVE"or "GROSS" canbemisconstruedbyputtingitpurelyasapolicy.

MR.RODRIGO.MadamPresident.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerRodrigoisrecognized.

MR.RODRIGO.MayIspeakinfavoroftheproposedamendment?

THEPRESIDENT.Pleaseproceed.

MR.RODRIGO.Thepower tograntexecutiveclemency isessentiallyanexecutivepower,andthat ispreciselywhyitiscalledexecutiveclemency.Inthissentence,whichtheamendmentseekstodelete,anexceptionisbeingmade.Congress,whichisthelegislativearm,isallowedtointrudeintothisprerogativeoftheexecutive.Thenitlimits thepowerofCongress to subtract from thisprerogativeof thePresident tograntexecutive clemencybylimiting thepowerofCongress toonlycorruptpractices laws.Therearemanyothercrimesmoreserious thanthese.Underthisamendment,Congresscannotlimitthepowerofexecutiveclemencyincasesofdrugaddictionand drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger the State also, rape with murder,kidnappingandtreason.AsidefromthefactthatitisaderogationofthepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemency,itisalsodefectiveinthatitsinglesoutjustonekindofcrime.Therearefarmoreseriouscrimeswhich

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arenotincluded.

MR.REGALADO. Iwill justmake one observation on that.We admit that the pardoning power is anexecutivepower.ButevenintheprovisionsontheCOMELEC,onewillnoticethatconstitutionally,itisrequiredthattherebeafavorablerecommendationbytheCommissiononElectionsforanyviolationofelectionlaws.

Atany rate,CommissionerDavide,as theprincipalproponentof thatandasamemberof theCommittee,hasexplainedinthecommitteemeetingswehadwhyhesoughttheinclusionofthisparticularprovision.MaywecallonCommissionerDavidetostatehisposition.

MR.DAVIDE.MadamPresident.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerDavideisrecognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just approved the Article onAccountabilityofPublicOfficers.Underit, it ismandatedthatapublicofficeisapublictrust,andallgovernmentofficersareunderobligationtoobservetheutmostofresponsibility,integrity,loyaltyandefficiency,toleadmodestlivesandtoactwithpatriotismandjustice.

Inallcases, therefore,whichwouldgo into theverycoreof theconcept thatapublicoffice isapublic trust, theviolationisitselfaviolationnotonlyoftheeconomybutthemoralfabricofpublicofficials.AndthatisthereasonwenowwantthatifthereisanyconvictionfortheviolationoftheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,which,ineffect,isaviolationofthepublictrustcharacterofthepublicoffice,nopardonshallbeextendedtotheoffender,unlesssomelimitationsareimposed.

Originally,my limitationwas, itshouldbewith theconcurrenceof theconvictingcourt,but theCommittee left itentirely to the legislature to formulate themechanicsat trying,probably, todistinguishbetweengraveand lessgraveorseriouscasesofviolationoftheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct.Perhapsthisisnowthebesttime,sincewehavestrengthenedtheArticleonAccountabilityofPublicOfficers,toaccompanyitwithamandatethatthePresidents right to grant executive clemency for offendersor violators of laws relating to the concept of apublicofficemaybelimitedbyCongressitself.

MR.SARMIENTO.MadamPresident.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerSarmientoisrecognized.

MR.SARMIENTO.MayIbrieflyspeakinfavoroftheamendmentbydeletion.

MadamPresident,overandoveragain,wehavebeensayingandarguingbeforethisConstitutionalCommissionthatweareemasculatingthepowersofthepresidency,andthisprovisiontomeisanotherclearexampleofthat.So, I speak against this provision. Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind ofprovision.

IamsupportingtheamendmentbydeletionofCommissionerTan.

MR.ROMULO.CommissionerTingsonwouldliketoberecognized.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerTingsonisrecognized.

MR.TINGSON.MadamPresident, Iamalso in favorof theamendmentbydeletionbecause Iam insympathywiththestandofCommissionerFrancisco"Soc"Rodrigo.IdobelieveandweshouldrememberthatabovealltheelectedorappointedofficersofourRepublic,theleaderisthePresident.IbelievethatthecountrywillbeasthePresidentis,andifwesystematicallyemasculatethepowerofthispresidency,thetimemaycomewhenhewillbealsohandcuffedthathewillnolongerbeabletoactlikeheshouldbeacting.

So,MadamPresident,Iaminfavorofthedeletionofthisparticularline.

MR.ROMULO.CommissionerColaycowouldliketoberecognized.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerColaycoisrecognized.

MR.COLAYCO.Thankyouverymuch,MadamPresident.

Iseldomriseheretoobjecttoortocommendortorecommendtheapprovalofproposals,butnowIfindthattheproposalofCommissionerTanisworthyofapprovalofthisbody.

Whyarewesinglingout this particular offense?Thereareother crimeswhich cast abiggerblot on themoralcharacterofthepublicofficials.

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Finally,thisbodyshouldnotbethefirstonetolimitthealmostabsolutepowerofourChiefExecutiveindecidingwhethertopardon,toreprieveortocommutethesentencerenderedbythecourt.

Ithankyou.

THEPRESIDENT.Arewereadytovotenow?

MR.ROMULO.CommissionerPadillawouldliketoberecognized,andafterhimwillbeCommissionerNatividad.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerPadillaisrecognized.

MR.PADILLA.Onlyonesentence,MadamPresident.TheSandiganbayanhasbeencalledtheAntiGraftCourt,soifthisisallowedtostay,itwouldmeanthatthePresidentspowertograntpardonorreprievewillbelimitedtothecasesdecidedbytheAntiGraftCourt,whenasalreadystated,therearemanyprovisionsintheRevisedPenalCodethatpenalizemoreseriousoffenses.

Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the consideration of the exercise ofexecutiveclemency,usuallyunderArticleVoftheRevisedPenalCodethejudgewillrecommendsuchexerciseofclemency.Andso, Iam in favorof theamendmentproposedbyCommissionerTan for thedeletionof this lastsentenceinSection17.

THEPRESIDENT.Arewereadytovotenow,Mr.FloorLeader?

MR.NATIVIDAD.Justonemore.

THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerNatividadisrecognized.

MR.NATIVIDAD.IamalsoagainstthisprovisionwhichwillagainchipmorepowersfromthePresident.Incaseofothercriminalsconvictedinoursociety,weextendprobationtothemwhileinthiscase,theyhavealreadybeenconvicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemencyextended to themby thePresident. Ifwestill close thisavenue to them, theywouldbeprejudicedevenworsethan themurderersand themoreviciouskillers inoursociety. Idonot think theydeserve thisopprobriumandpunishmentunderthenewConstitution.

IaminfavoroftheproposedamendmentofCommissionerTan.

MR.ROMULO.Wearereadytovote,MadamPresident.

THEPRESIDENT.IsthisacceptedbytheCommittee?

MR.REGALADO.TheCommittee,MadamPresident,preferstosubmitthistothefloorandalsobecauseoftheobjectionof themainproponent,CommissionerDavide.Sowefeel that theCommissionersshouldvoteon thisquestion.

VOTING

THEPRESIDENT.AsmanyasareinfavoroftheproposedamendmentofCommissionerTantodeletethelastsentenceofSection17appearingon lines7, 8 and9, please raise their hand. (SeveralMembers raised theirhand.)

Asmanyasareagainst,pleaseraisetheirhand.(FewMembersraisedtheirhand.)

Theresultsshow34votesinfavorand4votesagainsttheamendmentisapproved.30(Emphasessupplied.)

TheproperinterpretationofArticles

36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.

The foregoingpronouncementssolidify the thesis thatArticles36and41of theRevisedPenalCodecannot, inanyway,serve toabridgeordiminish theexclusivepowerandprerogativeof thePresident topardonpersonsconvictedofviolatingpenalstatutes.

TheCourtcannotsubscribetoRisosVidalsinterpretationthatthesaidArticlescontainspecifictextualcommandswhich must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualificationsspecificallyprescribedbythem.

Again,Articles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovides:

ART.36.Pardonitseffects.Apardonshallnotworktherestorationoftherighttoholdpublicoffice,ortheright

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ofsuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbeexpresslyrestoredbythetermsofthepardon.

Apardonshall innocaseexempt theculprit from thepaymentof thecivil indemnity imposeduponhimby thesentence.

xxxx

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusionperpetuaandreclusiontemporalshallcarrywith themthatofcivil interdictionfor lifeorduringtheperiodof thesentenceasthecasemaybe,andthatofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationwhichtheoffendershallsuffereventhoughpardonedastotheprincipalpenalty,unlessthesameshallhavebeenexpresslyremittedinthepardon.(Emphasessupplied.)

A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by RisosVidal, is unwarranted,especiallysoifitwilldefeatorundulyrestrictthepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemency.

Itiswellentrenchedinthisjurisdictionthatwherethewordsofastatuteareclear,plain,andfreefromambiguity,itmustbegivenitsliteralmeaningandappliedwithoutattemptedinterpretation.Verbalegisnonestrecedendum.From thewords of a statute there should be no departure.31 It is thisCourts firm view that the phrase in thepresidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil andpoliticalrights"substantiallycomplieswiththerequirementofexpressrestoration.

TheDissentofJusticeMarvicM.V.F.LeonenagreedwithRisosVidalthattherewasnoexpressremissionand/orrestorationoftherightsofsuffrageand/ortoholdpublicofficeinthepardongrantedtoformerPresidentEstrada,asrequiredbyArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.

JusticeLeonenpositsinhisDissentthattheaforementionedcodalprovisionsmustbefollowedbythePresident,astheydonotabridgeordiminishthePresidentspowertoextendclemency.HeopinesthattheydonotreducethecoverageofthePresidentspardoningpower.Particularly,hestates:

Articles36and41referonlytorequirementsofconventionorform.Theyonlyprovideaproceduralprescription.TheyarenotconcernedwithareaswhereortheinstanceswhenthePresidentmaygrantpardontheyareonlyconcernedwithhowheorsheistoexercisesuchpowersothatnoothergovernmentalinstrumentalityneedstointervenetogiveitfulleffect.

AllthatArticles36and41doisprescribethat,ifthePresidentwishestoincludeinthepardontherestorationofthe rightsofsuffrageand toholdpublicoffice,or the remissionof theaccessorypenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualification,heorsheshoulddosoexpressly.Articles36and41onlyaskthatthePresidentstatehisorherintentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains thepower tomakesuch restorationor remission,subject toaprescriptionon themannerbywhichheorshe is tostateit.32

Withdue respect, I disagreewith theoverbroadstatement thatCongressmaydictateas tohow thePresidentmayexercisehis/herpowerofexecutiveclemency.TheformormannerbywhichthePresident,orCongressforthat matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered withunless it is soprovided in theConstitution.This is theessenceof theprincipleof separationofpowersdeeplyingrainedinoursystemofgovernmentwhich"ordainsthateachofthethreegreatbranchesofgovernmenthasexclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere."33Moreso,thisfundamentalprinciplemustbeobservedifnoncompliancewiththeformimposedbyonebranchonacoequalandcoordinatebranchwillresultintothediminutionofanexclusiveConstitutionalprerogative.

For this reason,Articles36and41of theRevisedPenalCodeshouldbeconstrued inaway thatwill give fulleffect to theexecutiveclemencygrantedby thePresident, insteadof indulging inanoverly strict interpretationthatmayserve to impairordiminish the importof thepardonwhichemanated fromtheOfficeof thePresidentanddulysignedbytheChiefExecutivehimself/herself.Thesaidcodalprovisionsmustbeconstruedtoharmonizethe power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of thePresidenttograntexecutiveclemency.Allthatthesaidprovisionsimpartisthatthepardonoftheprincipalpenaltydoes notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes saidaccessorypenaltiesinthepardon.ItstillrecognizesthePresidentialprerogativetograntexecutiveclemencyand,specifically, todecide topardon theprincipalpenaltywhileexcluding itsaccessorypenaltiesor topardonboth.Thus,Articles36and41onlyclarifytheeffectofthepardonsodecideduponbythePresidentonthepenaltiesimposedinaccordancewithlaw.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principalpenaltyofreclusionperpetuaanditsaccessorypenaltiesareincludedinthepardon.Thefirstsentencereferstothe executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan ofplunderandimposedapenaltyofreclusionperpetua.Thelatteristheprincipalpenaltypardonedwhichrelieved

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himofimprisonment.Thesentencethatfollowed,whichstatesthat"(h)eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.Hence,evenifweapplyArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode,itisindubitablefromthetextofthepardonthat the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualificationwere expressly remittedtogetherwiththeprincipalpenaltyofreclusionperpetua.

Inthisjurisdiction,therighttoseekpublicelectiveofficeisrecognizedbylawasfallingunderthewholegamutofcivilandpoliticalrights.

Section 5 ofRepublicActNo. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "CitizenshipRetention andReacquisition Act of2003,"readsasfollows:

Section5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisAct shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities underexistinglawsofthePhilippinesandthefollowingconditions:(1)Thoseintendingtoexercisetheirrightofsuffragemust meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwiseknownas"TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003"andotherexistinglaws

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding suchpublicofficeasrequiredbytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy,makeapersonalandswornrenunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeranoath

(3)ThoseappointedtoanypublicofficeshallsubscribeandswearanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesand itsdulyconstitutedauthoritiesprior to theirassumptionofoffice:Provided,That theyrenouncetheiroathofallegiancetothecountrywheretheytookthatoath(4)ThoseintendingtopracticetheirprofessioninthePhilippinesshallapplywiththeproperauthorityforalicenseorpermittoengageinsuchpracticeand

(5)ThatrighttovoteorbeelectedorappointedtoanypublicofficeinthePhilippinescannotbeexercisedby,orextendedto,thosewho:

(a)arecandidatesfororareoccupyinganypublicofficeinthecountryofwhichtheyarenaturalizedcitizensand/or

(b)are inactiveserviceascommissionedornoncommissionedofficers in thearmedforcesof thecountrywhichtheyarenaturalizedcitizens.(Emphasessupplied.)

No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a signatory,acknowledgestheexistenceofsaidright.Article25(b)oftheConventionstates:Article25

Everycitizenshallhave the rightand theopportunity,withoutanyof thedistinctionsmentioned inArticle2andwithoutunreasonablerestrictions:

xxxx

(b)Tovoteand tobeelectedatgenuineperiodicelectionswhichshall bebyuniversalandequal suffrageandshallbeheldbysecretballot,guaranteeingthefreeexpressionofthewilloftheelectors[.](Emphasissupplied.)

Recently,inSobejanaCondonv.CommissiononElections,35theCourtunequivocallyreferredtotherighttoseekpublicelectiveofficeasapoliticalright,towit:

Stateddifferently,itisanadditionalqualificationforelectiveofficespecificonlytoFilipinocitizenswhoreacquiretheircitizenshipunderSection3ofR.A.No.9225.Itistheoperativeactthatrestorestheirrighttorunforpublicoffice. The petitioners failure to comply there with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, renderedineffectual theDeclaration ofRenunciation of AustralianCitizenship she executed onSeptember 18, 2006. Assuch,she isyet toregainherpoliticalright toseekelectiveoffice.UnlesssheexecutesaswornrenunciationofherAustralian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in thePhilippines. (Emphasissupplied.)

Thus, fromboth lawand jurisprudence, the right toseekpublicelectiveoffice isunequivocallyconsideredasapolitical right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former PresidentEstradaadmitsnootherinterpretationotherthantomeanthat,uponacceptanceofthepardongrantedtohim,heregainedhisFULLcivilandpoliticalrightsincludingtherighttoseekelectiveoffice.

On the other hand, the theory of RisosVidal goes beyond the plain meaning of said penal provisions andprescribesaformalrequirementthat isnotonlyunnecessarybut, if insistedupon,couldbeinderogationoftheconstitutional prohibition relative to theprinciple that theexercise of presidential pardon cannot beaffectedby

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legislativeaction.

RisosVidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to justify herargumentthatanabsolutepardonmustexpresslystatethattherighttoholdpublicofficehasbeenrestored,andthatthepenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationhasbeenremitted.

Thisisincorrect.

Herrelianceonsaidopinionsisutterlymisplaced.AlthoughthelearnedviewsofJusticesTeodoroR.PadillaandFlorentinoP.Felicianoaretoberespected,theydonotformpartofthecontrollingdoctrinenortobeconsideredpartofthelawoftheland.Onthecontrary,acarefulreadingofthemajorityopinioninMonsanto,pennedbynolessthanChiefJusticeMarceloB.Fernan,revealsnostatementthatdenotesadherencetoastringentandoverlynuancedapplicationofArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCodethatwillineffectrequirethePresidenttousea statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President canotherwisebededucedfromthetextorwordsusedinthepardon.Furthermore,asexplainedabove,thepardonhereisconsistentwith,andnotcontraryto,theprovisionsofArticles36and41.

ThedisqualificationofformerPresidentEstradaunderSection40oftheLGCinrelationtoSection12oftheOECwasremovedbyhisacceptanceoftheabsolutepardongrantedtohim.

Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position. RisosVidalarguesthatformerPresidentEstradaisdisqualifiedunderitem(a),towit:

(a)Thosesentencedby final judgment foranoffense involvingmoral turpitudeor foranoffensepunishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonment,withintwo(2)yearsafterservingsentence[.](Emphasissupplied.)

Likewise,Section12oftheOECprovidesforsimilarprohibitions,butitprovidesforanexception,towit:

Section12.Disqualifications.xxxunlesshehasbeengivenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty. (Emphasissupplied.)

As earlier stated, RisosVidal maintains that former President Estradas conviction for plunder disqualifies himfrom running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC.However, the subsequentabsolutepardongranted to formerPresidentEstradaeffectively restoredhis right toseekpublicelectiveoffice.ThisismadepossiblebyreadingSection40(a)oftheLGCinrelationtoSection12oftheOEC.

WhileitmaybeapparentthattheproscriptioninSection40(a)oftheLGCiswordedinabsoluteterms,Section12oftheOECprovidesalegalescapefromtheprohibitionaplenarypardonoramnesty.Inotherwords,thelatterprovisionallowsanypersonwhohasbeengrantedplenarypardonoramnestyafterconvictionbyfinaljudgmentofanoffenseinvolvingmoral turpitude, interalia, torunforandholdanypublicoffice,whether localornationalposition.

TakenoticethattheapplicabilityofSection12oftheOECtocandidatesrunningforlocalelectivepositionsisnotunprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court acknowledged the aforementionedprovisionasoneofthelegalremediesthatmaybeavailedoftodisqualifyacandidateinalocalelectionfiledanyday after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.38 ThepertinentrulingintheJalosjoscaseisquotedasfollows:

WhatisindisputablyclearisthatfalsematerialrepresentationofJalosjosisagroundforapetitionunderSection78.However,since the falsematerial representationarises fromacrimepenalizedbyprisionmayor,apetitionunderSection12oftheOmnibusElectionCodeorSection40oftheLocalGovernmentCodecanalsobeproperlyfiled. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of theOmnibusElectionCode,oronSection40of theLocalGovernmentCode.The lawexpresslyprovidesmultiple remediesandthechoiceofwhichremedytoadoptbelongstopetitioner.39(Emphasissupplied.)

Thethirdpreambularclauseofthepardondidnotoperatetomakethepardonconditional.

ContrarytoRisosVidalsdeclaration,thethirdpreambularclauseofthepardon,i.e.,"[w]hereas,JosephEjercitoEstrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardonconditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seekpublicelectiveofficehavebeenrestored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering theunqualifieduseoftheterm"civilandpoliticalrights"asbeingrestored.Jurisprudenceeducatesthatapreambleisnot an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for theenactment,usuallyintroducedbytheword"whereas."40Whereasclausesdonotformpartofastatutebecause,strictlyspeaking,theyarenotpartoftheoperativelanguageofthestatute.41Inthiscase,thewhereasclauseat

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issueisnotanintegralpartofthedecreeofthepardon,andtherefore,doesnotbyitselfaloneoperatetomakethepardonconditionalortomakeitseffectivitycontingentuponthefulfilmentoftheaforementionedcommitmentnortolimitthescopeofthepardon.

On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner Maria GraciaPadacasseparateconcurringopinion in theassailedApril1,2013Resolutionof theCOMELECinSPANo.13211(DC),whichcapturedtheessenceofthelegaleffectofpreambularparagraphs/whereasclauses,viz:

Thepresentdisputedoesnotraiseanythingwhichthe20January2010Resolutiondidnotconcludeupon.Here,Petitioner RisosVidal raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambularparagraphof thedecreeofpardon. It states that "JosephEjercitoEstradahaspubliclycommitted tono longerseekanyelectivepositionoroffice."Onthiscontention,theundersignedreiteratestherulingoftheCommissionthatthe3rdpreambularparagraphdoesnothaveanylegalorbindingeffectontheabsolutenatureofthepardonextended by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional andcustomaryusageofpreambularparagraphs.InthecaseofEchegarayv.SecretaryofJustice,theSupremeCourtruledonthelegaleffectofpreambularparagraphsorwhereasclausesonstatutes.TheCourtstated,viz.:

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent orpurposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear andunambiguous,thepreamblecanneitherexpandnorrestrictitsoperationmuchlessprevailoveritstext.

If formerPresidentArroyo intended for thepardon tobeconditionalonRespondentspromisenever toseekapublicofficeagain,theformeroughttohaveexplicitlystatedthesameinthetextofthepardonitself.SinceformerPresidentArroyodidnotmakethisanintegralpartofthedecreeofpardon,theCommissionisconstrainedtorulethatthe3rdpreambularclausecannotbeinterpretedasaconditiontothepardonextendedtoformerPresidentEstrada.42(Emphasissupplied.)

Absentanycontraryevidence,formerPresidentArroyossilenceonformerPresidentEstradasdecisiontorunforPresidentintheMay2010electionsagainst,amongothers,thecandidateofthepoliticalpartyofformerPresidentArroyo,afterthelattersreceiptandacceptanceofthepardonspeaksvolumeofherintentiontorestorehimtohisrightstosuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.

WherethescopeandimportoftheexecutiveclemencyextendedbythePresidentisinissue,theCourtmustturntotheonlyevidenceavailabletoit,andthatisthepardonitself.Fromadetailedreviewofthefourcornersofsaiddocument,nothingthereingivesaniotaofintimationthatthethirdWhereasClauseisactuallyalimitation,proviso,stipulationorconditiononthegrantofthepardon,suchthatthebreachofthementionedcommitmentnottoseekpublicofficewillresultinarevocationorcancellationofsaidpardon.TotheCourt,whatitissimplyisastatementoffactortheprevailingsituationatthetimetheexecutiveclemencywasgranted.Itwasnotusedasaconditiontotheefficacyortodelimitthescopeofthepardon.

EveniftheCourtweretosubscribetotheviewthatthethirdWhereasClausewasoneofthereasonstograntthepardon,thepardonitselfdoesnotprovidefortheattendantconsequenceofthebreachthereof.ThisCourtwillbehardputtodiscerntheresultanteffectofaneventualinfringement.JustlikeitwillbehardputtodeterminewhichcivilorpoliticalrightswererestorediftheCourtweretotaketheroadsuggestedbyRisosVidalthatthestatement"[h]eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights"excludestherestorationofformerPresidentEstradasrightstosuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.TheaforequotedtextoftheexecutiveclemencygranteddoesnotprovidetheCourtwithanyguideastohowandwheretodrawthelinebetweentheincludedandexcludedpoliticalrights.

JusticeLeonenemphasizesthepointthattheultimateissueforresolutionisnotwhetherthepardoniscontingentontheconditionthatformerPresidentEstradawillnotseekjanotherelectivepublicoffice,butitactuallyconcernsthecoverageof thepardonwhether thepardongranted to formerPresidentEstradawassoexpansiveas tohaverestoredallhispoliticalrights,inclusiveoftherightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.JusticeLeonenisofthe view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that formerPresidentEstradais"herebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights,"thatis,theforegoingstatementrestoredtoformerPresidentEstradaallhiscivilandpoliticalrightsexcepttherightsdeniedtohimbytheunremittedpenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationmadeupof,amongothers, therightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.HeaddsthathadthePresidentchosentobesoexpansiveastoincludetherightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice,sheshouldhavebeenmoreclearonherintentions.

However,thestatement"[h]eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights,"tothemindoftheCourt,iscrystalclearthepardongrantedto formerPresidentEstradawasabsolute,meaning, itwasnotonlyunconditional, itwas unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has asettledmeaninginlawandjurisprudence.

With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word "full" can beconstruedasexcludingtherestorationoftherightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.Thereappearstobenodistinctionastothecoverageoftheterm"fullpoliticalrights"andtheterm"politicalrights"usedalonewithoutany

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qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies onesunderstanding.More so, it will be extremely difficult to identifywhich of the political rights are restored by thepardon,whenthetextofthelatterissilentonthismatter.Exceptionstothegrantofpardoncannotbepresumedfromtheabsenceof thequalifyingword"full"whenthepardonrestoredthe"politicalrights"of formerPresidentEstradawithoutanyexclusionorreservation.

Therefore,therecanbenootherconclusionbuttosaythatthepardongrantedtoformerPresidentEstradawasabsoluteintheabsenceofaclear,unequivocalandconcretefactualbasisuponwhichtoanchororsupportthePresidentialintenttograntalimitedpardon.

Toreiterate,insofarasitscoverageisconcerned,thetextofthepardoncanwithstandclosescrutinyevenundertheprovisionsofArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.

TheCOMELECdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninissuingtheassailedResolutions.

Inlightoftheforegoing,contrarytotheassertionsofRisosVidal,theCOMELECdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninissuingtheassailedResolutions.

TheCourthasconsistentlyheld thatapetition forcertiorariagainstactionsof theCOMELECisconfinedonly toinstancesof graveabuseof discretionamounting topatentand substantial denial of dueprocess, because theCOMELECispresumedtobemostcompetentinmattersfallingwithinitsdomain.43

Assettledinjurisprudence,graveabuseofdiscretionisthearbitraryexerciseofpowerduetopassion,prejudiceorpersonalhostilityor thewhimsical,arbitrary,or capriciousexerciseofpower thatamounts toanevasionorrefusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to becondemnedashavingbeendonewithgraveabuseofdiscretion,suchanabusemustbepatentandgross.44

TheargumentsforwardedbyRisosVidalfailtoadequatelydemonstrateanyfactualorlegalbasestoprovethattheassailedCOMELECResolutionswere issued ina "whimsical, arbitraryor capriciousexerciseofpower thatamountstoanevasionorrefusaltoperformapositivedutyenjoinedbylaw"orwereso"patentandgross"astoconstitutegraveabuseofdiscretion.

Ontheforegoingpremisesandconclusions,thisCourtfindsitunnecessarytoseparatelydiscussLim'spetitioninintervention,whichsubstantiallypresentedthesameargumentsasRisosVidal'spetition.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariandpetitionininterventionareDISMISSED.TheResolutiondatedApril1,2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of theCommissiononElections,Enbane,bothinSPANo.13211(DC),areAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRION*AssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTAAssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMINAssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZAssociateJustice

JOSECATRALMENDOZAAssociateJustice

BIENVENIDOL.REYESAssociateJustice

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ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABEAssociateJustice

MARVICM.V.F.LEONENAssociateJustice

FRANCISH.JARDELEZA**AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toArticleVIII,Section13of theConstitution, I certify that the conclusions in theaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOChiefJustice

Footnotes*Onofficialleave.**Nopart.1Rollo(Vol.I),pp.3946.2Id.at4950.3Id.at395414.4Id.at260262.5Id.at265.6Id.7Rollo(Vol.II),p.615.8Id.at509533and534572.9Pormentov.Estrada,G.R.No.191988,August31,2010,629SCRA530.10Rollo(Vol.I),p.266.11Id.at271.12Id.at43.13Id.14Id.at1011.15Id.at438.16Id.at1215.17Id.at25.18252Phil.192,207(1989).19Rollo(Vol.I),p.29.20Rollo(Vol.II),p.498.21Id.at498499.22Id.at502.23Id.at503.24Id.at505.

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25Id.at582596.26Id.at607.2771Phil.34,38(1940).2872Phil.441,442(1941).29Supranote18at202.30RecordsoftheConstitutionalCommissionof1986(Vol.II),July31,1986,pp.524526.31Republicv.Camacho,G.R.No.185604,June13,2013,698SCRA380,398.32DissentingOpinion(JusticeMarvicM.V.F.Leonen),p.42.33BureauofCustomsEmployeesAssociation(BOCEA)v.Teves,G.R.No.181704,December6,2011,661SCRA589,604.34 An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,AmendingforthePurposeCommonwealthActNo.63,asamended,andforOtherPurposes.35G.R.No.198742,August10,2012,678SCRA267,292.36Supranote18.37G.R.Nos.193237and193536,October9,2012,683SCRA1.38CommissiononElectionsResolutionNo.9523,Rule25,Section3.39Jalosjos,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,supranote37at3031.40Peoplev.Balasa,356Phil.362,396(1998).41Llamadov.CourtofAppeals,256Phil.328,339(1989).42Rollo(Vol.I),p.46.43Navalv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.207851,July8,2014.44Hayudiniv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.207900,April22,2014.

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Vidal vs Come Lec