Kant Affirmative

1AC – FrameworkI value morality because ought implies moral obligation. Rational beings cannot avoid making normative claims. Their self-consciousness requires them to choose among competing desires on the basis of reasons. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

Kant’s solution, here as everywhere else, is to substitute the idea of rational∂

practice for the idea of metaphysical (or teleological) knowledge. I will not try∂ to defend that claim in its most sweeping form, but I will try to show how it∂ works in the way Kant undertakes to establish the normative standing of∂

humanity and the legitimacy of legal rights. I think this is a moment when we∂ can see how radically different a Kantian view of the moral world is from that∂ presented by most moral theories. In Kant’s conception, the bridge-claim linking rational beings to normative personhood is exactly that: it is a claim.∂ That is to say, it is a claim in the practical sense: a demand, made by some rational being, either on himself, or on another rational being, or on the∂ members of his community, or on the community of rational beings at large.∂ That, after all, is what it means to believe, as Kant does, that ethics is a matter∂ of making laws—willing universal maxims for ourselves and each other. It∂ means that ethics is grounded not in some set of moral facts that we know∂ about and apply, but in something that we do. We make laws for ourselves and∂ each other, and in so doing, we claim the standing or authority to make them.∂ The philosophical worry about this kind of theory is of course that it will∂ render obligation arbitrary or contingent. After all, if legislating moral laws is∂

supposed to be something that we do, you might wonder what happens if we simply do not legislate moral laws, or if we legislate different ones than the ones∂ we are familiar with? Kant’s answer to this worry is to try to ground the story in an act that we must do, or in a claim that we must make, in virtue of our∂ rationality.22 In order to act rationally, the argument goes, we must treat∂ ourselves and demand that others treat us as moral and legal persons.∂ Before I can say why Kant thinks we must do this, I must fill in a little∂ background. We can begin the story from one of the more startling things Kant∂ says about human beings and the other animals. I have already quoted part of∂ it. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant says:∂ The fact that man can have the idea ‘I’ raises him infinitely above all the other beings∂ living on earth. By this he is a person; and by virtue of the unity of his consciousness,∂ through all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person – that is, a∂ being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals,∂ which we can dispose of as we please.23 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tells us that the importance of the idea ‘I’∂ rests in the fact that we must be able to attach an

‘I think’ to all of our∂ thoughts.24 As I have argued elsewhere—although Kant himself never quite∂ says this—a similar point holds for actions, to which we must be able to attach∂ an ‘I do’ or an ‘I will’ (in the volitional rather than the predictive sense of∂ ‘will’).25∂ A general way of describing the Kantian project is to say that he argues that∂ this in itself imposes certain limitations on what we can rationally think or do.∂ His view is that the demands of rationality arise from the kind of self consciousness that requires us to think of ourselves as the authors of our own∂ thoughts, beliefs, and actions. This makes us persons in Locke’s sense because∂ we must take responsibility for the things that we think and do. Not every∂ perception that tempts me to believe something leads to a belief I could legitimately attribute to myself, at least not considering myself as the subject of∂ a conception of the world with the status of knowledge. And not every desire that tempts me to do something leads to an action that I could legitimately attribute to myself as the subject of a will, that is, as the cause—the first∂ cause—of certain effects in the world. If I were going to try to tell the whole∂ Kantian story from the ground up, this would be the place where the idea of∂ making a claim would first come in. A self-conscious being, I would say, is one∂ who must lay claim to his beliefs and actions, and make them his own, and who∂ therefore must conform to whatever conditions are necessary to make that∂ possible.26∂

Obviously I’m not going to try to tell the whole Kantian story from the∂

ground up in this paper. Instead I will just say a brief word about why,∂

according to this account, we must make normative claims at all, and then turn∂ to the discussion of the two particular claims that Kant thinks are required for∂ rational action.∂ I have already said that the kind of self-consciousness that Kant thinks gives∂ rise to the demands of rationality requires us to claim our thoughts and actions∂ as our own. One thing that is necessary in order to do that is that we endorse the grounds of our beliefs and actions, where by ‘the grounds’ of our beliefs and actions I mean the contents of the mental representations that would directly cause our beliefs and actions if we did not have this form of self-consciousness. I cannot claim an action as my own if it is caused by the operation of a desire or an incentive whose influence I would reject if I were aware of it.27 As human beings, we are aware that we perceive certain things, want certain things, fear certain things, and we are also aware that we are tempted to believe and act on the basis of the contents of these attitudes. That means that we face a problem that the other animals presumably do not face:∂ we have to decide whether to believe and act as our perceptions and desires suggest. How we make those decisions is a long story, but when we have made∂ them, and arrived at an answer, then we say that what we have is a ‘reason’.∂ A reason is a ground of belief or action whose influence you can endorse.∂ Reasons are therefore the solution to a problem that is posed to us by our selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness forces us to act for reasons. That is why we must make normative claims.∂ I know that is

abstract, but I think it will be clearer when we look at some∂ concrete cases. So I now turn to Kant’s account of the two normative claims∂ that most concern us here: the claims to moral and legal personhood. My∂

reconstruction of Kant’s arguments cannot be complete, but I will describe the∂ two central arguments in Kant’s account of why a rational being must lay claim∂ to the status of moral and legal personhood in order to act rationally at all.∂ That is what I think Kant intended to show. I will also argue that in both cases,∂ Kant’s account suggests that we must lay claim to another, more basic form of∂ normative standing as well.

This requires us to make normative claims – we act for principles, not merely interests. Korsgaard 99 [(CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “SELF-CONSTITUTION IN THE ETHICS OF PLATO AND KANT”. The Journal of Ethics 1999, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 1-29] TDI

The first step is this: to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or repres- entative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.

Prefer this ground for morality because only reasons are inescapable.Velleman 6 [David. Self To Self. Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pg 18-19]

As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God?” And as we observed in the case of the desire to

punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.

To be moved by the pursuit of some end, you must judge your end to be “absolutely” good, or good from anyone’s perspective. But because your ends are only good for you, your ends are absolutely good not because the end itself is intrinsically valuable, but because whatever is good for you is absolutely good, which makes you an end in yourself. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

4. The Argument for the Formula of Humanity∂ In order to understand why Kant thinks we must claim moral personhood, we∂ must return to his argument for the Formula of Humanity, which, as∂ I understand it, it goes like this.28 Because we are rational, we cannot decide to pursue an end unless we take it to be good—that is, worth aiming at.∂

Importantly, Kant takes the judgment that an end is good to imply that there is∂ reason for any rational being to promote it. As he says in the Critique of Practical∂ Reason:∂ What we are to call good must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgment of every reasonable human being, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of∂ everyone ... 29∂ What he means is not that everyone must want the same things that I do for∂ themselves, but rather, that if my caring about an end gives me a genuine∂ reason for trying to make sure that I achieve it, then everyone else has a reason,∂ although of course not necessarily an overriding one, to try to make sure that∂ I achieve it as well.∂ Obviously, that part of the story—the claim that my choice, if its object is genuinely good, has normative implications for everyone

and not just for me—needs some further philosophical defence. If Kant assumed that whenever∂ I make a choice I make a law that claims to bind everyone, he would simply∂ be assuming that we claim the status of moral personhood whenever we∂ make a choice. He would not be explaining why we must make that claim.∂ So Kant must be able to give us some other reason why we must regard our∂ choices as having this kind of interpersonal normative force insofar as they are∂ rational.∂ Recall Kant’s emphasis, in the passage from the Anthropology, on the selfconscious subject being the same person over time ‘through all the changes∂ he may undergo’. Here is how that matters to what can count as a reason. If I am to take something as a reason either to believe or to act, even knowing that my perspective on the world is always changing, I must also think it is a∂ reason from perspectives other than the one that I occupy right now. We can∂

argue that this is true regardless of whether the change in perspective is a∂

change in perceptual experience resulting from, say, looking at an object from∂ another angle, or a change in what we might call ‘motivational perspective’∂ resulting from the ever-shifting configuration of one’s desires and fears. If I∂ am to believe that a perceptual experience gives me knowledge of the world,∂ I must believe that my other perceptual experiences will be consistent with∂ what it tells me. And this amounts to the same thing as believing that other∂ people’s perceptual experiences will, under the right conditions, be consistent∂ with it as well. The parallel point about action can most easily be seen if we∂ keep in mind that carrying out an action takes time.30 If I am to will an end, that is to commit myself to bringing it about, I must be able to commit∂ myself to pursuing it at a later moment when my general configuration of∂ motives and desires may be different than it is just now. That amounts to∂ thinking that it should appear as worthy of pursuit from any motivational∂ point of view. (I’ll make this clearer in an example shortly.) Call that being∂ ‘absolutely’ valuable.∂ Now many philosophers would conclude that this means that we can only∂ rationally pursue an end if we think it is in fact intrinsically, and therefore∂ absolutely, valuable. But this is where Kant reverses the argument, or rather∂ where he puts the idea of making a claim in place of the non-existent∂ metaphysical insight. Instead of arguing that our ends must be intrinsically∂ valuable, he argues that we can rationally pursue an end only if we are able to∂ demand that it be treated as having absolute value—as if it had intrinsic value,∂ one might say. And that amounts to saying that we are able to make a choice∂ only by claiming the standing of moral personhood in Kant’s sense of moral∂ personhood—the right to make a law for others so long as those others may reasonably be asked to conform to it. This reversal occurs because, as Kant observes, the ends that we choose are∂

simply the objects of our inclinations, and the objects of our inclinations are∂

not, considered just as such, absolutely or intrinsically valuable. As he puts it:∂ The ends that a rational being proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions... are∂ all only relative; for only their...relation to a specially

constituted faculty of desire∂ gives them their worth ...31∂ The objects of your own inclinations are only—or rather at most—relatively good, that is, good for you, that is, or good from your own point of view.32 As Kant thinks∂ of it, they are, usually, things that you like and that you think would make you∂ happy. Now it does not generally follow from the fact that something is good for∂ someone in particular that it is good absolutely, in the sense that anyone has∂ reason to promote it. If we pursue an end only if we take it to be good absolutely,∂ then we do not pursue the objects of our inclinations merely because we think∂ those objects are good for us. And yet we do pursue the objects of our inclinations,∂ and we often expect others to help us in small ways, or at least not to interfere∂ without some important reason for doing so. That suggests that we take it to be absolutely good that we should act as we choose and get the things that we think are good for us. So why do we do that? ∂ Kant’s answer is:∂

rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own∂ existence this way ...33∂ We ‘represent’ ourselves as ends in ourselves in the sense that we claim the status∂ of absolute goodness for the things that are good for us. We claim that they are

good just because they are good for us. I do not think that we should understand∂ Kant as saying that we make an epistemological claim. I think he means that we make a kind of practical demand to be treated as beings whose good is an∂ absolute good. It is as if whenever you make a choice, you said, ‘I take the things that are important to me to be important, period, important absolutely, because I take myself to be important’. So a claim to a certain normative standing is built right into the nature of rational choice. And this claim must be made by anyone∂ who has the descriptive qualifications for being a person—that is, anyone who, as∂ a rational being, must choose only those ends that he takes to be absolutely good.∂ The bridge-claim linking rationality in the factual sense of self-consciousness to moral personhood is therefore a claim that we make—a demand that we∂ make on ourselves and others. It is a demand that we must make if we are to∂ be able to view our choices as rational at all.

All frameworks must agree on the absoluteness of value because all values are derivative from the value of beings with interests. The interests of those beings are the ultimate end. Hill 91 [(Thomas Hill, Jr) “Self-regarding suicide: A modified Kantian view,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 102-103] TDI

The second argument is roughly this: Most valuable things have value only because valued by human beings. Their value is derivative from the fact that they serve our interests and desires. Even pleasure, which we value for its own sake, has only derivative value, that is, value dependent on the contingent fact that human beings want it. Now if

valuers confer derivative value on things by their preferences and choices, those valuers must themselves have value. In fact, they must have value independent of, and superior to, the derivative values which they create. The guiding analogy is how we treat ends. We value certain means because they serve intermediate ends, which in turn we value because they contribute to our ultimate ends, that is, what we value for its own sake. The value of the means and the intermediate means is derivative from the value of the ultimate ends; unless we value the ultimate end, the means and intermediate ends would be worthless to us. So, it seems, the source of derivative value must be valuable for its own sake. Since the ultimate source of the value of our contingent ends, such as health, wealth, and even pleasure, is their being valued by human beings, human beings, as valuers, must be valued for their own sakes.

However, the capacity to make rational choices and choose your ends requires you also to assert the right to property, because it is the means required to achieve your ends. This requires you to assert a universal agreement assuring your property, as well as your participation in that universal agreement, or your legal personhood. Only those actions consistent with that universal agreement, or the General Will, are right. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

6. The Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights∂ I now turn to Kant’s account of legal rights. Even more explicitly than the∂ argument for the Formula of Humanity, Kant’s account of why we have rights∂ is a story about why we must be able to claim rights as against one another.∂ The general story goes like this: without the institution of rights, Kant thinks, we cannot free our relationships from the unilateral domination of some∂ individuals by others. The problem is not, or not merely, that the strong are∂ likely to impose their will on the weak. Even if the strong were scrupulous about not interfering with the possessions and actions of the weak, still, without rights, the weak would be able to act as they choose only on the sufferance of the strong—they would be subject to the will of the strong. Since Kant

defines freedom as independence from being constrained by the will of others,38 this means that he thinks freedom cannot exist in the state of nature. ∂ Until the institution of actual mechanisms for the coercive enforcement of rights, people cannot be free. And since Kant also supposes that every human being has an innate right to freedom,39 Kant thinks it is a duty, and not just a convenience, to

introduce a political state in which every human being’s rights will be upheld.40∂ A full defence of this account in my terms would require explaining why∂ the thesis that everyone has an innate right to freedom is best understood not∂ as a metaphysical claim, but in terms of the idea that each of us must claim a∂ right to freedom in order to act rationally. I cannot provide that full defence∂ here, but will try to illustrate the idea by explaining why we must claim∂ property rights.∂ Like others in the social contract tradition, Kant envisions a state of nature in which people lay claim to parts of the commons for their own private use. If it were not possible to claim objects as our own, Kant argues, we could not use∂ them without being subject to the will of others, and therefore could not effectively use them to pursue our projects at all. I cannot effectively grow∂ wheat on my land if you might move in at any time and plant beans there, and∂ I cannot do so freely if the only way I can do it is to get your permission. In∂ order to make free use of the land I must be able to claim a right to it. A piece∂ of property is therefore a kind of extension of one’s freedom. So to deny the∂ possibility of claiming things in this way would be to place an arbitrary∂ restriction on freedom.41 Therefore, we must concede that such claims—claims∂ of property right—are possible. Kant calls this the Postulate of Practical Reason∂ with Regard to Rights.42∂ Now a legal right is an authorization to use coercion. To say that you have a legal right to some piece of property is therefore to say that if someone attempts to use it without your permission, you may legitimately use force to prevent him from doing so. But coercion is legitimate only when it is consistent with freedom: rights are coercively enforceable only because they are essential to freedom. So the legitimacy of the use of coercion to defend a possession depends upon the consistency of that use of coercion with the freedom of everyone else (just as the moral legitimacy of your choice depends on its∂ consistency with the autonomy of everyone else). A use of coercion is consistent with the freedom of everyone only if it is consistent with a universal agreement—∂ a General Will, as Kant calls it, borrowing the idea from Rousseau—that the thing whose possession you are defending should be reserved to your use and∂ control. In other words, your defence of your possession is legitimate only if a law made by the General Will says that the thing is to be your own.∂ What this means is that in the case of original acquisition—when you claim a right in the state of nature, you are in effect claiming to act in the name of the General Will, and so with the force of law. Even if political society does not exist yet, you are claiming to act in its name. In other words, a claim of the right to legislate for everyone, so long as your legislation is consistent with the∂ freedom of everyone else, is built into the very structure of original acquisition.∂ A claim to legal personhood is built directly into our use of an object as means to our end. This exactly mirrors the way a claim of the right to moral∂ personhood is built into the very structure of rationally choosing to pursue the∂ end itself. To say ‘this is mine’, like to

say ‘this is good’, is to lay down the law∂ for everyone, and makes a claim to your standing to do that.∂ Notice what happens when we put these two arguments together. In order to∂ act rationally, you must choose an end, and you must pursue it using means. The argument for the Formula of Humanity shows us why a claim to moral personhood is involved in the choice of an end, and the argument for the∂ Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights shows us why a claim to legal personhood is involved in the use of means. In order to act rationally,∂

then, we must lay claim to both moral and legal personhood.

Therefore, the standard is Consistency with the General Will.I advocate that the United States ought to grant legal personhood to natural ecosystems.

1AC – Absolute GoodsContention 1 – Absolute GoodsAbsolute goods are not absolute because you are a rational being, but simply because you are the type of being for whom things can be good or bad. Any being for whom things can be good or bad, therefore, is an end in itself. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

I believe that this argument has an additional implication, one that Kant did∂

not see. Obviously, it is only rational beings, in the descriptive sense, who need ∂ to claim a normative standing in order to act. But it does not follow that your ∂ claim to normative standing is made only on behalf of yourself considered as a ∂ rational being. The content of the claim is not automatically given by the fact∂ that it is rational beings who make it. This becomes clear when we realize that∂ there are two different senses in which, to put it in Kant’s language, we ∂ ‘represent ourselves’ as ends in ourselves when we make choices. We represent ∂ ourselves as ends in ourselves insofar as we take the things that are good for us ∂ or from our point of view to be good absolutely, and we represent ourselves as ∂ ends in ourselves insofar as we take our choices to have the status of laws for ∂ others. The two ideas are very close, for to demand that an end be treated as∂ absolutely good is just to demand that everyone treat it as giving them reasons,∂ and in that sense to make a law for others. But there is still a difference, which∂ shows up when we consider how these claims operate on ourselves as well as on∂ others.∂ Suppose I choose to pursue some ordinary object of inclination, something∂ that I want. In making this choice I make a demand on others. They should ∂ respect my autonomy, my status as a legislator in the Kingdom of Ends, by ∂ respecting my choice. They should not interfere with my acting as I choose,∂ and, many other things equal, they should help me to promote my end if I am∂ in need. But all of those restrictions operate, as it were, after the choice is ∂ made. And if Kant is right—if insofar as I am rational, I must choose∂ something absolutely good, and yet the objects of my desires are only relatively∂ good—then I also claim to be an end in myself simply by taking the objects of∂ my desires to be absolutely good. When I act on the thought that ‘what matters∂ to me matters absolutely’ I make a claim that is addressed in the first instance∂ to myself.∂ This demand cannot be understood as a demand that my autonomy should∂ be respected, that is, that I should respect my own standing as a lawmaker. The∂ natural way to understand the idea that I respect my own autonomy is to∂ suppose that I conform to a law simply because I myself have made it. Kant∂ certainly does think that whenever I make a choice I make a kind of law for∂ myself, as well as for other people, and the idea is not without content. In fact,∂ it is the essential

difference between choosing or willing something and merely∂ wanting it. Wanting something, which is just a passive state, does not include a∂

commitment to continuing to want it, but willing something, which is an active∂ state, does include a commitment to continuing to will it, when everything else∂ is equal.∂ For example, if I choose (or ‘will’, in Kant’s language) to grow vegetables in∂ my garden, knowing that this will require me to weed it on a regular basis, then∂ I commit myself to weeding my garden at certain intervals in the future even∂ should it happen that I do not feel like doing so. This is not to say that I decide∂ that I will weed my garden no matter what—though the heavens fall, as it were. But it is to say that when I take something as the object of my will or choice, it∂ follows that any good reason I have for abandoning this object must come from∂ other laws that I have made or other commitments that I have undertaken∂ or have decided to undertake, and not merely from a change in my desires.∂ Having willed to grow vegetables in my garden, I can decide not to weed it if∂ I need to rush to the bedside of an ailing friend, for instance. But I have not∂ really decided, or willed, to grow vegetables in my garden if I leave it open that∂ I will not weed my garden if I just do not happen to feel like it. For if all that I have decided when I decide I will keep my garden weeded is that I will weed it if I do happen to feel like it when the time comes, then I have not actually∂ decided anything at all.34 So when I choose to grow vegetables as my end,∂ I bind my future self to a project of regular weeding by a law that is not∂ conditional on my future self’s desires. In that sense, I have legislated a∂ categorical imperative for her. But my future self in turn also binds me, for it is∂ essential that if she is going to do the necessary weeding, I must now buy some∂ pads to protect her knees, and the tools for her to weed with—and I must also∂ do that whether I feel like it or not. In this simple sense, whenever I make a∂ choice, I impose obligations on myself—I create reasons for myself.35 When∂ I act on those reasons, you could say that I am respecting my own autonomy,∂

by obeying the law that I myself have made. But my own original decision to choose or will some desired end is not motivated by respect for my own autonomy in that sense. I cannot respect my own choice or do what is necessary to carry it out until after I have made that choice. So the sense in which I ‘represent myself’ as an end in itself when I make the original choice is not captured by the idea that I respect my own autonomy, in the sense of taking my choice to be a law. Respect for my autonomy does not explain the content of my choice. When I make the original choice, I have no other ground for taking my end to be absolutely good, than that it is good for me. That’s good for me, I say, and therefore it is good. This suggests that the pertinent fact about me—the ground on which I claim normative standing—is simply that I am the sort of being for whom , or from whose point of view, things can be good or bad. Of course, someone might insist that I respect my own autonomy in a different sense: not in the sense that I treat a choice of my own as a law, but in the sense that I claim that what is

good for autonomous rational beings, and only for autonomous rational beings, is to be treated as good absolutely. But that conclusion is not driven by the argument: there is no reason to think that because it is only autonomous rational beings who must make the normative claim, the normative claim is only about, or rather made on behalf of, autonomous rational beings . Notice, too, that many of the things that I take to be good for me are not good for me merely insofar as I am an autonomous rational being. Food, sex, comfort, freedom from pain and fear, are all things that are good for me insofar as I am an animate and sentient being. So it is more natural to think that the normative claim involved in rational choice is that the things that are good for beings for whom things can be good or bad are to be treated as good or bad absolutely. We might put the point this way. As rational beings, we need to justify our actions, to think there are reasons for them. That requires us to suppose that some ends are worth pursuing—they are absolutely good. Without metaphysical insight into a realm of intrinsic values, all we have to go on is that some things are certainly good or bad for us.36 That then is the starting point from which we build up our system of values—we take those things to be good or bad absolutely, we claim the authority to legislate that they are so—and in doing that we are taking ourselves to be ends in ourselves. But we are not the only beings for whom things can be good or bad ; the other animals are no different from us in that respect. So it seems natural to suppose we make this claim on behalf of our animal nature: not as autonomous beings whose choices must be respected, but simply as beings for whom things can be good or bad.

This means all beings with interests also have an absolute right to the land they stand on. Legal personhood is the basis for this right because claiming to own the land implies the standing to make such a claim in a legal system. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

When we looked more closely at the decision to choose an end, we saw that∂

there were two claims at work: a claim on both others and yourself that your∂ choice should be respected, and a claim primarily on yourself that what is good∂ for you should be treated as good absolutely. When we look more closely at the∂ context of original acquisition, we again see that there is a double claim. In∂ order to bring this out, let me first ask a question. What is there in the∂ argument as I have described it so far that gives human beings the right to∂ claim property in the other animals, or rather, what in general determines∂ which things can count as property?∂ In the traditional

doctrines of rights developed in the seventeenth and∂ eighteenth centuries, especially in the theory of Locke, it is perfectly clear what∂ makes it possible for people to claim property in the other animals. It is a view,∂ derived from Genesis, to the effect that God gave the world and everything that∂ is in it to humanity to hold in common.43 Like Locke, Kant insists on the∂ essential role of this idea in his theory. He tells us that:∂ The real definition of a right would have to go like this: a right to a thing is a right to the private use of a thing of which I am in ... possession in common with all others. For this possession in common is the only condition under which it is possible for me to exclude every other possessor from the private use of a thing ... , since, unless such a possession in common is assumed, it is inconceivable how I, who am not in possession of the thing, could still be wronged by others who are in possession of it∂ and are using it.44 The passage is rather opaque, but here is what I think is going on. Kant’s∂ assumption is slightly less extravagant than an assumption of common ownership, because Kant distinguishes possession from ownership properly speaking, and∂ it is common possession that he posits. When something is in my physical∂ possession, anyone—that is, anyone who is not its rightful owner—who tries to∂ use it without my permission wrongs me, because he has to use physical force or∂ coercion to get it away from me. When I own something, someone who uses it∂ without my permission wrongs me even when I am not in physical possession of∂ it. It seems what the assumption of common possession amounts to is the assumption that no one has a prior right that would make it legitimate for him to exclude human beings from being in the world and using its resources, and therefore to exclude human beings from claiming it as property. But this common∂ possession is taken to imply something normatively positive: that we do have the∂ right to claim parts of the world as our own. The role of the assumption, whether∂

of common ownership or of common possession, is to answer an obvious∂

question: how could our agreement to divide the world up into objects of private property have any authority, if we had no right to the world in the first place? Despite its explicitly religious formulation, the idea that God gave us the world in common captures something that goes right to the heart of the∂ moral outlook, and that can be formulated in secular terms. It is the thought∂ that others have just as good a claim on the resources of the world as we do,∂ and that it behoves us to limit our own claims with that in mind. But the idea∂ of the world as owned or possessed in common by humanity also represents the∂ world, and everything in it, including the other animals, as one big piece of∂ property. This is important, because it shows that the legal bifurcation is not∂ based on some principled argument that proves that everything that is not a∂ person is properly regarded as property. Instead, the traditional theory of rights∂ simply starts from the unargued assumption that every thing in the world∂ except people, including non-human animals, is a possible piece of property.∂ But what is the status of the assumption of common possession, or rather, of∂ our participation in it? Can this assumption be reconfigured as a claim to∂ normative standing that we

must make in order to act rationally?∂ In this case, Kant seems pretty explicitly to claim that it can. He says:∂ All human beings are originally (i.e. prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in a∂ possession of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever∂

nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them. ... The possession by all∂ human beings on the earth which precedes any act of theirs that would establish∂ rights... is an original possession in common ... , the concept of which is not empirical ...∂ Original possession is, rather, a practical rational concept which contains a priori the∂ principle in accordance with which alone people can use a place on the earth in∂ accordance with principles of right.45 Before there are any other rights, before we start dividing up the world for our purposes, each of us must claim a right to be where he or she is, to be∂ wherever ‘nature or chance’ has placed us. And we must claim this in order to rightly use the resources of the earth. What exactly is the content of this astonishing right? What does it mean to∂ have a right to be where you are? The right to be where you are could be taken∂ to be an aspect of your right to control over your own body, since it means that∂ in the absence of prior claims to the ownership of land, no one has a right to∂ force you to move on. A right to be where you are could be taken as a right not∂ to be killed, since someone who is killed is forced to move on with a vengeance.∂ Since a right to be on the earth, for Kant, goes with a right to use its resources∂ for your support, that means that in the absence of prior claims, each of us has∂ a right to take what he or she needs in order to live. In other words, we are thrown into the world, and having no choice but to live here, and to use the land and its resources in order to support and maintain ourselves, we claim that we have the right to do all of these things. But the right to be where you are is not merely the right to claim a share of∂ the earth’s resources against its other possessors, so that you may pursue your∂ projects unconstrained by the will of others. It is not merely the right to act∂

unconstrained by the will of others. It is the right to act, period: the right to∂ pursue your ends in the world in which you find yourself. When you act on the∂ thought that you have the right to be here, you make a claim that is addressed∂ in the first instance to yourself.

But you are not the only being that needs the use of land—ecosystems, too, must use the land, which allows us to assert legal personhood on their behalf. Korsgaard 13 [(Christine, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1–20, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt028] TDI

But we are not the only beings thrown into the world, who have no choice∂ but to live here , and to use the land and its resources to get through life as∂ best as we may. We are not the only agents. Of course it is true that rational∂ beings are the only animals who must conceive of

our situation in these∂ normative and moral terms, and therefore the only beings who must claim∂ that we have a right to act in the world in which we find ourselves. But again,∂ the fact that it is rational beings who must make these claims does not show that the claims are made only on behalf of rational beings. And just as it is not merely out of respect for our own autonomy that we treat what is good for us as if it were good absolutely, so it is not merely in the name of our political liberty that we claim a right to regard ourselves as among the possessors of the earth. The right to be where you are reflects a normative standing we must claim for ourselves simply as beings who find themselves∂ alive on the planet, faced with the tasks of living our lives in the only world that we have. Just as our claim that our ends are absolutely good is based on nothing more than the fact that they are good for us, so our claim that we have the right to use the resources of the earth is based on nothing more than the fact that we are here and need to use them. If that is right, it suggests the other animals should share our standing as among the rightful possessors of the earth.

This implies legal personhood for ecosystemsKoon 08 [(Judith, PROFESSOR OF LAW, Barry University) “Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral Value of Nature” Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 263, Summer 2008] TDI

To shift into consideration of natural matter - or nature that is not animal and not "alive" - what qualities does natural matter evince that may affect moral consideration? n300 In many accounts, [*304] nonliving natural objects are∂ denied moral standing because they are considered to lack any interests that are capable of being harmed or benefitted.∂ n301 That natural entities may not currently hold cognizable legal interests should not be confused with moral interests.∂ n302 And, while things in nature may not have preferences or capacity to express preferences, they may have interests ∂ not currently appreciated by human beings, who may be smuggling human preferences into moral valuing. n303 To∂ apply Goodpaster's framework, moral considerableness for things in nature may exist as a regulatory matter, despite the∂ inability (or moral insensitivity) of humans to perceive it. n304∂ Things in nature have interests in being. n305 A lake has an interest in existing as a healthy part of the Earth community and, consequently, in "whether it is clear and full of fish or muddy and lifeless." n306 To those who object that∂ such formulation derives value from fact, in violation of Hume's invocation, n307 I agree that the ways of nature (the∂ "is") do not "translate so directly or easily into the 'ought' of human ethical norms." n308 In addition, I offer an approach of Thomas Berry: While the nonliving world does not have a living soul as a principle of life, each member of the nonliving world does∂ have the equivalent as its inner principle of

being. This is an inner form that communicates a power, an enduring quality, and a majesty that even the living world cannot convey. In a more intimate way the nonliving world provides the∂ mysterious substance that transforms into life. n309∂ This kind of thinking challenges the dualisms of spirit vs. matter, subject vs. object, and culture vs. nature that have∂

constructed ethical, theological, and philosophical barriers between human beings and the rest of nature. n310∂ Without doubt, natural matter has the capacity to organize itself. n311 There is observable continuity between living and nonliving matter, as the same atoms are passed back and forth between animate and inanimate states. n312 Furthermore, matter may also have attributes of consciousness, by also operating as a wave at a sub-atomic level. n313 Finally, and from a different perspective, even if an entity is held to lack "interests," that should not foreclose the entity∂ from moral consideration. n314

Even if there is a right to property, it cannot justify the unlimited use of a resource because it would abridge the future use of that property and would thus be self-contradictory. Coercion is a legitimate means to protect the system of property that undergirds freedom. Ataner 12 [(ATTILA ATANER, B.A., J.D. McMaster University MASTER OF ARTS) Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy). “KANT ON FREEDOM, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.” PhD Thesis, 2012] TDI

But why, for Hegel, would persons, as it were, seek to use and own things in the first place? At its simplest, the answer is that, because freedom is meaningless apart from active engagement in, with and through the (external) world, including engagement and interaction with other persons. Autonomous agents, even construed in the narrower sense as agents capable of “self-mastery” or “independence” (in Ripstein’s idiom), must overcome their initial isolation as subjects with “inner” lives; they must assert themselves in the external world, and must demarcate areas of the world within which they may effectively pursue their purposes. The capacity to freely choose among ends cannot be sustained in a vacuum , or in circumstances wherein any, or all, choices fail to be actualized, made real, or “objectified”. Put differently, freedom is nothing if it cannot be given effect in time and space. Or, as Waldron puts it, individuals “need to ‘embody’ the freedom of their personalities in external objects so that their conceptions of themselves as persons cease to be purely subjective and become concrete and recognizable to themselves and others in a public and external world.”127 To put it in potentially derogatory and controversial terms, the free will requires lebensraum.128 (Although this latter term entails difficult, undoubtedly controversial associations, I hope it helps to remind us that Kant and Hegel’s entire line of reasoning in these

passages is thoroughly and decisively anthropocentric; I am certain environmental ethicists of a more “radical” critical bent would have no qualms in using even more contentious, perhaps even contemptuous, terminology.)129 Hegel’s own way of putting it is that “the rationale of property lies in the suppression of the pure subjectivity of personality” (PR §41A). We may sum up as follows: for Hegel, being free and conscious persons possessed of inner lives, we directly experience ourselves as such, i.e., as beings capable of freely, consciously and spontaneously positing some purpose or other, some goal or other, or of choosing this end rather than another; but, our freedom would be radically inhibited if our inwardly generated objectives could never be realized in the world; indeed, “pure consciousness is pure nonsense”, as Hegel puts it, so that we can truly be persons only if our capacity to choose has material effect, i.e., if our purposes are realized, or if they at least have a chance of being realized. We must transcend the limits of our inner, subjective lives if we are to be free in actuality; and, this also means that our attachment to, and interaction with, the external world is not merely contingent from the standpoint of Right; we must, and we must have a right to, as it were, force our (otherwise subjective) purposes upon the world. Hegel believes this is the core rationale of property. This is why, for Hegel, “Right is in the first place the immediate embodiment which freedom gives itself in an immediate way, i.e., (a) possession, which is property- ownership.” (PR §40)∂ (b) Positive Implications for the Environmentalist Agenda∂ The general tenor of the preceding discussion is palpably anthropocentric. This, however, should not discourage us . Recall that our question is: what acts of freedom are permissible in accordance with the requirements of freedom and practical reason as it governs our external comportment generally? Our concern, recall, is with freedom as a self-limiting concept. As such, if we can establish that our comportment, i.e., our free agency, vis-a-vis the natural environment is limited by the idea of freedom itself, then the need to establish limitations on that comportment with reference to the purportedly “intrinsic value” of nature is, at least to some extent, alleviated. Certain elementary limits on our activities in connection with our environment can be justified from within an anthropocentric paradigm , so long as that paradigm does not comprehend freedom in absolutist terms. The resulting limits and restrictions may not satisfy a full-blown eco- centrist; however, they are at least a start, with the added advantage that, per Kantian Right, they carry a built in authorization to coerce. In this regard, what the preceding discussion clearly establishes is that the possibility of our exercising freedom rightfully, for both Kant and Hegel, entails not just that we must relate to others under certain constraints (i.e., with due respect exhibited towards those with whom we co-exist as identically free persons), but also that we must establish certain relations pertaining to, or with respect to, the material environment. Indeed, we have seen that there is a

sense in which the latter is more primordial than the former: in order to have effective presence in the world in the first place, beyond the limited freedoms available to us merely as embodied agents130 (which fall under “innate right”, a topic I will return to further below), we must acquire (as property) and make use of objects in our environment. Put differently, there are indispensable material pre-requisites to freedom as such or, as Kant might be willing to put it, freedom is (also) limited by material conditions in conformity with the idea of it.∂ The main question is whether our freedoms in making use of acquired objects are inherently limited, whether certain forms of use are contrary to freedom. In this respect, I wish to introduce a further passage in Kant, drawn from his admittedly non-political (or not immediately political) Lectures on Ethics, which further bolsters my overall condition when read in conjunction with the Juridical Postulate:∂ [Freedom] has to be restricted, not, though, by other properties and faculties, but by itself. Its supreme rule is: In all self-regarding actions, so to behave that any use of powers is compatible with the greatest use of them. For example, if I have drunk too much today, I am incapable of making use of my freedom and my powers; or if I do away with myself, I likewise deprive myself of the ability to use them. So this conflicts with the greatest use of freedom, that it abolishes itself, and all use of it, as the highest principium of life. Only under certain conditions can freedom be consistent with itself; otherwise it comes into collision with itself . If there were no order in nature, everything would come to an end, and so it is, too, with unbridled freedom. Thee are doubtless evils in nature, but the true wickedness, vice, resides solely in freedom. ... The conditions under which alone the greatest use of freedom is possible, and under which it can be self- consistent, are the essential ends of mankind. With these, freedom must agree. The principium of all duties is thus the conformity of the use of freedom with the essential ends of mankind. (VE 27: 346 [emphasis added])∂

If we extract this passage from its intended context, namely Kant’s discussion of the prohibition on suicide, and join it with the Juridical Postulate, we can clearly extrapolate a rule pertinent to the environmentalist agenda: the use of our choice with respect to objects of choice (i.e., ostensibly usable objects, including natural resources) is restricted to conditions under which their use is compatible with “greatest use of freedom”, lest freedom, in unbridled form, “abolishes itself and all use of” it as the highest principium of life and essential end of mankind.∂ Now, at this stage I reiterate my basic claim, per the environmentalist agenda, which is that the destruction of owned objects is outside the scope of owners’ legitimate freedoms. My rationale for this claim is as follows. As we have seen, Kant (along with Hegel) insists that property ownership must be possible as a matter of Right; otherwise our freedom, our capacity to act effectively in the world, would be radically inhibited. This simply follows from the Juridical Postulate, pursuant to which any unowned object (res nullius) must be available for acquisition. But if property is so utterly crucial to freedom, if the rightful use of

evidently usable things is so very vital to our ability to have actual presence and effective agency in the world, then the destruction of evidently usable things (even where they are already owned) would appear to contradict the core logic, the underlying rationale, of property, for the simple reason that destruction renders usable things no longer usable. The logic of freedom (the “laws of freedom”) as applied to property rights suggests that ownership of things is supposed to enhance the freedom of owners; otherwise, as Ripstein notes, they would have rightful use only of their own bodies, which in itself is a severely limited means of effecting one’s purposes. In this vein, the destruction of one’s own finite, non-renewable resources is patently self- contradictory: for example, it is simply not rational for a land-owner to destroy (for example, to permanently poison or flood or irradiate) the land he inhabits. Would not such a land-owner, to use Kant’s own language, “be putting usable objects [namely his own land] beyond any possibility of being used” and would he not, in other words, “annihilate [it, the land] in a practical respect and make them into res nullius”?∂ We can also make our point with a series of questions: If “[f]reedom requires that you be able to have usable things fully at your disposal, to use as you see fit, and so to decide which purposes to pursue with them”,131 then is not the destruction of usable things in contradiction with the requirements of freedom? How are you supposed to pursue any further purposes if you have made it your purpose to destroy the things within which you pursue your purposes? Clearly, given the Kantain perspective on the meaning of property, the (permanent) destruction of finite, non-renewable natural resources, such as land, is incoherent: one simply cannot invoke the right of property, or the freedoms that it is supposed to enable, to justify destroying such resources. Similarly, suppose Hegel is right to say that property permits the suppression of the “pure subjectivity of personality”, or that in possessing property I become “an actual will”, or that property “gives my will existence”, such that “not until he has property does the person exist as reason”. In that case, wouldn’t the destruction of property result in a failed actualization of the will? Suppose, again, we have a land-owner who wishes to poison his lands, rendering them unfit for future use: is such a person actualizing his will freely and effectively, or is he undercutting his own (future) ability to act freely and effectively? I maintain that, for both Kant and Hegel, the destruction of property holdings, especially of finite depletable resources, is fundamentally incompatible with the core rationale of property as a freedom-maximizing institution. Put differently, the destructive, dissipating or non-sustainable use of finite, depletable natural resources, especially land, constitutes a transgression of freedom because such use is radically inconsistent with the conditions under which alone “the greatest use of freedom” is possible. That is, Kant’s core tenet regarding the necessity of property acquisition as a function of our extended freedom in the world dictates that the character of usable things as usable, as

means fit for the realization of human purposes, must be maintained in perpetuity. ∂ Otherwise, freedom would be systematically depriving itself of the use of objects of choice. Indeed, if, within a Kantian system of property, the annihilation of a portion of a finite resource were permissible in a particular instance, then its annihilation as a whole would be have to be universally permissible, for the simple reason that, in the thought of Kant (even just in terms of its general tenor in insisting that maxims of action must conform to universal laws, whether “internal” or “external”), all rights of property must be held consistently and uniformly among proprietors. But this would mean that if a right to destroy were included among those rights, then the property system itself would in principle allow the total dissipation of the finite resource through continued non- sustainable use; the system itself would permit a previously available resource to become entirely unavailable. But a system that tolerates circumstances where a means previously at our disposal becomes no longer suitable to our ends can hardly be called a system that enhances human freedom. And, suppose the resource in question is land: the potential outcome inherent in a system that permits the destruction of land by landowners – the outcome being a “permanently mutilated planet” resulting from aggregate destructive acts, albeit rightfully undertaken in particular instances – is, suffice it to say, inimical to Kantian Right, even if such an outcome is a possibility only in principle. As such, the use of natural resources pursuant to the tenets of Blackstonean absolutism is impermissible from a Kantian perspective. Finally, any destructive form of use with respect to such resources is subject to legitimate coercion because it constitutes an act of freedom that contradicts the tenets of freedom itself: the destruction of the underlying material (pre)conditions of freedom just is a hindrance of freedom that can be rightfully counteracted. Our hypothetical land-owner, for instance, can be legitimately forced to curtail his destructive activities vis-a-vis his own holdings or, put differently, he can be duly burdened with preservationist duties. (I set aside the more difficult question as to whether or not he can be punished for engaging in destructive activities, since the question concerning the connection between legitimate coercion and punishment with Kant’s framework is a rather difficult one; however, it would presumably follow that if the land-owner proceeds, undeterred by the juridical rationale of inherently limited property rights, pursuant to which he enjoys his holdings in the first place, then some form of legal sanction ought to be applied.)

1AC – TelosContention 2 – The Instrumental Value of NatureThe rational nature of humanity requires us to apprehend the value of natural ecosystems as supporting our ends, and to prevent ecological destruction. Wood 98 [(Allen, philosopher) “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, Volume LXXII (1998)] TDI

I now want to leave behind Kant’s arguments about our duties regarding particular nonrational creatures, such as animals, and turn to what Kantian ethics says about the larger question about our duties regarding the natural environment as a whole. Perhaps the most natural charge here is the charge that by uniquely privileging rational beings in its scheme of values, Kantian ethics leads to a monstrously megalomaniacal view of the world in which human beings regard themselves as the lords of nature, and think of nature as a whole as existing only for their sake. ∂ I won’t deny that logocentrism does involve a view of that kind. In Kant, moreover, it is quite explicit. In the critique of teleological judgment, Kant argues that in order to unify our cognitions of the natural world, we should try to see the whole of nature as a single teleological system. Just as Aristotle does in the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics, Kant thinks a teleological system can be unified only through the subordination of some ends to others in hierarchical fashion, until finally the entire system is united by being ordered to one ‘ultimate end’ (letzter Zweck) (KU 5: 425-434). For otherwise the system, even if all its parts somehow were ordered purposively to others, would lack finality: each part might be there for the sake of something, but the series of ends would run on endlessly, and the whole would be purposeless. ∂ Kant does insist that there be an ultimate end of nature: and this end he locates in human beings. He considers here the objection of Linnaeus, that human beings are no more exempt than anything else in nature from serving as means to other living things or the stability of purposive systems (as we do when, like brave Hotspur, we become food for worms ) (KU 5:427). Kant accepts the point that in nature we are means as well as ends, but notes that if this argument proved that human beings are not the ultimate end of nature, it would also thereby prove that nature could have no ultimate end, and hence – contrary to an indispensable regulative principle of reflective judgment – that nature cannot be conceived as a finally unified teleological system (KU 5:428). ∂

Kant’s ground for holding that of all the beings interconnected as means and ends within nature, human beings alone can be thought of as the ultimate end because they alone can form the concept of ends and organize the mere aggregate of such ends into a system (KU 5:426-427). His argument here parallels the argument that rational nature has supreme worth or dignity as an end in itself, since in both cases it turns on

the idea that the pivotal place in a system of objective values (norms or ends) must be occupied by beings having the capacity to make objective judgments about such values. ∂ Kant’s view that human beings are the ultimate end of nature is, however, emphatically not a view of nature which sees it merely as a tool or raw material for human beings to do with as they please. It is instead another way of looking at the dignity of rational nature, regarded as something we have a duty to live up to. When we regard ourselves as the ultimate end of nature, we look at nature as a unified and harmonious teleological system – the term for it today would be ‘ecosystem’ – and we undertake the responsibility of shaping our ends in such a way that they provide this system with its crowning unity and harmony. Far from putting nonrational nature at our arbitrary disposal, this orientation toward nature imposes on us the responsibility both of making sense of nature as a purposive system and then of acting as preservers and guarantors of that system. ∂ Clearly we do not do this when we exploit parts of nature for our arbitrary ends, giving no thought to the long term consequences of what we do. Nor do we do it when we destabilize the existing system of natural ends, leading to the destruction of entire living species and even of entire natural environments within which alone the survival of whole systems of species remains possible. Rather, we do it only insofar as we make the effort to understand nature as a system of ends, and then act toward it in such a way that our own ends harmonize with that system. This involves simultaneously a theoretical and a practical responsibility – which is why we find it brought out explicitly in the Critique of Judgment, where Kant is chiefly concerned with the unification of the standpoints of theoretical and practical reason.

Continued biodiversity loss will cause extinctionCarrington 10/29 [(Damian, the Guardian's Environment editor) "Humanity has wiped out 60% of a animal populations since 1970, report finds," The Guardian, 10/29/18] TDI

Humanity has wiped out 60% of mammals, birds, fish and reptiles since 1970, leading the world’s foremost experts to warn that the annihilation of wildlife is now an emergency that threatens civilisation . The new estimate of the massacre of wildlife is made in a major report produced by WWF and involving 59 scientists from across the globe. It finds that the vast and growing consumption of food and resources by the global population is destroying the web of life , billions of years in the making, upon which human society ultimately depends for clean air, water and everything else.“We are sleepwalking towards the edge of a cliff” said Mike Barrett, executive director of science and conservation at WWF. “If there was a 60% decline in the human population, that would be equivalent to emptying North America, South America, Africa, Europe, China and Oceania. That is the scale of what we have done.”

“This is far more than just being about losing the wonders of nature, desperately sad though that is,” he

said. “This is actually now jeopardising the future of people . Nature is not a ‘nice to have’ – it is our life-support system .”

“We are rapidly running out of time ,” said Prof Johan Rockström, a global

sustainability expert at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany. “Only by addressing both ecosystems and climate do we stand a chance of safeguarding a stable planet for humanity’s future on Earth.”

Many scientists believe the world has begun a sixth mass extinction , the first to be caused by a species – Homo sapiens. Other recent analyses have revealed that humankind has destroyed 83% of all mammals and half of plants since the dawn of civilisation and that, even if the destruction were to end now, it would take 5-7 million years for the natural world to recover.

The Living Planet Index, produced for WWF by the Zoological Society of London, uses data on 16,704 populations of mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and amphibians, representing more than 4,000 species, to track the decline of wildlife. Between 1970 and 2014, the latest data available, populations fell by an average of 60%. Four years ago, the decline was 52%. The “shocking truth”, said Barrett, is that the wildlife crash is continuing unabated.

Wildlife and the ecosystems are vital to human life, said Prof Bob Watson, one of the world’s most eminent environmental scientists and currently chair of an intergovernmental panel on biodiversity that

said in March that the destruction of nature is as dangerous as climate change .

“Nature contributes to human wellbeing culturally and spiritually, as well as through the critical production of food, clean water, and energy, and through regulating the Earth’s climate, pollution, pollination and floods,” he said. “The Living Planet report clearly demonstrates that human activities are destroying nature at an unacceptable rate, threatening the wellbeing of current and future generations.”

The biggest cause of wildlife losses is the destruction of natural habitats, much of it to create farmland. Three-quarters of all land on Earth is now significantly affected by human activities. Killing for food is the next biggest cause – 300 mammal species are being eaten into extinction – while the oceans are massively overfished, with more than half now being industrially fished.

Chemical pollution is also significant: half the world’s killer whale populations are now doomed to die from PCB contamination. Global trade introduces invasive species and disease, with amphibians decimated by a fungal disease thought to be spread by the pet trade.

The worst affected region is South and Central America, which has seen an 89% drop in vertebrate populations, largely driven by the felling of vast areas of wildlife-rich forest. In the tropical savannah called cerrado, an area the size of Greater London is cleared every two months, said Barrett.

“It is a classic example of where the disappearance is the result of our own consumption, because the deforestation is being driven by ever expanding agriculture producing soy, which is being exported to countries including the UK to feed pigs and chickens,” he said. The UK itself has lost much of its wildlife, ranking 189th for biodiversity loss out of 218 nations in 2016.

The habitats suffering the greatest damage are rivers and lakes , where wildlife populations have fallen 83%, due to the enormous thirst of agriculture and the large number of dams. “Again there is this direct link between the food system and the depletion of wildlife,” said Barrett. Eating less meat is an essential part of reversing losses, he said.

The Living Planet Index has been criticised as being too broad a measure of wildlife losses and smoothing over crucial details. But all indicators, from extinction rates to intactness of ecosystems, show colossal losses. “They all tell you the same story,” said Barrett.

Conservation efforts can work , with tiger numbers having risen 20% in India in six years as habitat is protected. Giant pandas in China and otters in the UK have also been doing well.

But Marco Lambertini, director general of WWF International, said the fundamental issue was consumption: “We can no longer ignore the impact of current unsustainable production models and wasteful lifestyles.”

The world’s nations are working towards a crunch meeting of the UN’s Convention on Biological Diversity in 2020, when new commitments for the protection of nature will be made. “We need a new global deal for nature and people and we have this narrow window of less than two years to get it,” said Barrett. “This really is the last chance. We have to get it right this time.”

Tanya Steele, chief executive at WWF, said: “We are the first generation to know we are destroying our planet and the last one that can do anything about it

1AR

A2 Property RightsThe purely negative reading of property rights fails to capture the material dimension of freedom. Ataner 12 [(ATTILA ATANER, B.A., J.D. McMaster University MASTER OF ARTS) Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy). “KANT ON FREEDOM, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.” PhD Thesis, 2012] TDI

I disagree, and my position is that the most rudimentary principles of Kantian Right are not concerned exclusively with the harmonization of mutually independent wills. That is, Kant’s most basic starting point is not just a plurality of persons possessing an identical, strictly formal capacity for free choice – or a capacity and entitlement to be “one’s own master”, in Ripstein’s terminology. While it may be accurate to say that his system primarily addresses the “harmonization” problem (namely, on what terms is the consistent, mutually reciprocal exercise of (the equally held) right to freedom possible among a plurality of interacting persons?), this basic problem does not exhaust the content of the Kantian system of Right. While the inter-personal and “contrastive” dimension of freedom is, of course, crucial from the standpoint of Right, there is also, inescapably, a material dimension to freedom, which entails the relation between persons and things, and between the will (or “ego”) and its body.90 That is, I claim that Right, for Kant (as well as for Hegel), is also crucially concerned with how freedom is possible for an agent situated in the material world (in “space and time”).∂ This is most clearly evident in how Kant articulates the necessity of the right to property: he does not, contrary to Ripstein’s interpretation, say that property rights (rights to the exclusive use of things) arise just in light of the plurality of mutually independent persons, but rather that such rights are necessary in order for persons to be free individuals (agents freely and effectively acting in the world) in the first place. In order to be free or “independent” at all, it is absolutely necessary that we possess and use (“master”), first, our own bodies and, then, various objects in the environment within which we are situated. Innate and acquired rights, in a broad sense, protect individual agents’ possession and use, first, of their bodies and, then, of external objects, in the context of a plurality of agents, but as we shall see the original impetus for property rights follows from the bare need of agents to be effectively present in the world (through their bodies and through their interactions with the environment). Put simply, while there is an obvious person-to-person dimension to property rights, there is also an indispensable person-to-thing relation. (Many commentators emphasize the contrastive dimension in property rights as a relation among persons, but they sometimes neglect the fact that, accurately put, property rights entail relations among persons with respect to things; absent the reference to “things”, the concept of property is incomplete and largely meaningless.)

Accordingly, we are free not just in relation to other persons, but also in relation to material things, and the idea of Right as articulated by Kant (and Hegel) does, or indeed must, recognize this.91 As such, our treatment of material things, including our material bodies, is not a matter of indifference to Right: whether or not we destroy those things that make the exercise of freedom possible in the first place matters from the standpoint of Kantian Right.∂ In this vein, in order to establish my point (and to further clarify my point of disagreement with Ripstein), I propose that we must take great care in reading what Kant actually states in the passages, cited above, regarding the connection between freedom and the authorization to coerce: it would seem that what matters is whether “a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom”, and “that freedom is limited to those conditions in conformity with the idea of it [where this latter “it” in question just is “freedom” itself]. Here, it is imperative that we ask: what, precisely, is meant by “freedom” in these key passages? What sense, what conception, of freedom does Kant have in mind here, exactly? Note that Kant does not qualify his claims by saying that a use of freedom is wrongful (only) if it hinders the (external) freedom of some person in particular, or only if it hampers another’s self-mastery. Instead, he claims that freedom is limited by, and is thus rightfully curtailed in the name of, the conditions that are in conformity with the idea of it, i.e., with the idea of freedom – presumably, in my view, with the idea of freedom in general. ∂ But what exactly are the conditions that conform with the idea of freedom, violations of which are rightfully subject to coercion? Is it possible that the conditions of the idea of freedom could be violated, transgressed or otherwise undermined even where no particular person’s (formal, external) freedoms or choices have been infringed or negatively affected; even if no given person’s choices (or means, or ends) are “subordinated” to the choice of another? I maintain that it is. Further, I claim that the “sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with another” do not pertain exclusively to contrastive inter-personal relations. Simply put, Kantian Right is not exhausted by considerations pertaining to inter-personal relations. Rather, while it is no doubt correct, per Ripstein’s interpretation, that the Universal Principle of Right regulates inter-personal external interactions, I maintain it also encompasses the conditions of freedom as a self-limiting concept; most importantly for our purposes, Right must also be responsive to acts that undermine the material (pre)conditions of freedom, in general – that is, Right is engaged not just with acts by one that undermine the material standing of another, but also with acts by any given person that undermine anybody’s, or indeed everybody’s, material capacity to have effective presence in the world, including, of course, that person’s own material standing. The most important material pre-conditions of freedom for our purposes are (a) secure possession of our bodies (pursuant to Kantain innate right), and (b) secure access to land92 (pursuant to Kantian acquired right): given that both are fundamental pre-requisites to any possible exercise of

freedom in the external world (in “space and time”), and given that both are inherently vulnerable, i.e., are capable of being destroyed, in so far as they are necessarily finite, their security and integrity simply cannot be a matter of indifference from the standpoint of Right. In any event, my claim is that violations of Right from a Kantian standpoint are not, indeed cannot be, exclusively a function of defective inter-personal, contrastive relations, as Ripstein would seem to insist.

A2 AnthroIntrinsic values cannot ground an environmental ethic.Hill 91 [(Thomas Hill, Jr) “Self-regarding suicide: A modified Kantian view,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 102-103] TDI

Early in this century, due largely to the influence of G. E. Moore, another point of view developed which some may find promising. Moore introduced, or at least made popular, the idea that certain states of affairs are intrinsically valuable – not just valued, but valuable, and not necessarily because of their effects on sentient beings. Admittedly Moore came to believe that in fact the only intrinsically valuable things were conscious experiences of various sorts, but this restriction was not inherent in the idea of intrinsic value. The intrinsic goodness of something, he thought, was an objective, nonrelational property of the thing, like its texture or color, but not a property perceivable by sense perception or detectable by scientific instruments. In theory at least, a single tree thriving alone in a universe without sentient beings, and even without God, could be intrinsically valuable. Since, according to Moore, our duty is to maximize intrinsic value, his theory could obviously be used to argue that we have reason not to destroy natural environments independently of how they affect human beings and animals. The survival of a forest might have worth beyond its worth to sentient beings. This approach, like the religious one, may appeal to some but is infested with problems . There are, first, the familiar objections to intuitionism, on which the theory depends. Metaphysical and epistemological doubts about non-natural, intuited properties are hard to suppress, and many have argued tha the theory rests on a misunderstanding of the words good, valuable, and the like. Second, even if we try to set aside these objections and think in Moore’s terms, it is far from obvious that everyone would agree that the existence of forests, etc., is intrinsically valuable. The test, says Moore, is what we would say when we imagine a universe with just the thing in question, without any effects or accompaniments, and then we ask, “would its existence be better than its nonexistence?” be careful, Moore would remind us, not to construe this question as, “Would you prefer the existence of that universe to its nonexistence?” The question is, “would its existence have the objective, nonrelational property, intrinsic goodness?” Now, even among those who have no worries about whether this really makes sense, we might well get a diversity of answers. Those prone to destroy natural environments will doubles give one answer and nature lovers will likely give another. When an issue is as controversial as the one at hand, intuition is a poor arbiter.

Logocentric justifications for respect for nature are the soundest approach. Alternatives embody misology which can’t solve environmental destruction and sanctions fundamentalism. Wood 98 [(Allen, philosopher) “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, Volume LXXII (1998)] TDI

An ethical viewpoint of this kind, in my view, is the one which stands the best chance of making theoretical sense of the attitude intelligent and morally sensitive people already take toward our duties regarding the natural environment. Such people think that we should try to understand the delicate balance of natural ecosystems and take care not to upset them. But the very concep tion of an ‘ecosystem’ – as well as of the ‘beauty’ and ‘balance’ found in it and the value of its preservation and that of the species of living things which belong to it – these are always products of our rational reflection on nature and our attempts to maximize unity and harmony in what we find. Both our cognitive and our practical interests must be engaged for nature to appear to us at all in this way , and it is only to beings with rational ends that nature could appear as a system requiring to be fostered or preserved. ∂ This does not mean, of course, that only a logocentric or Kantian ethics could see nature as a system which is to be valued in such a way. The harmonious system of nature might be valued, for example, as God’s creation, or as the embodiment of some other kind of value, religious or aesthetic – as it is by many contemporary views which at least nominally reject logocentrism in any form. But some of these views turn out to be committed to logocentrism when their presuppositions are thought through consistently, however stubbornly their proponents may assert the contrary. For example, if we honor creation for God’s sake, then what we are doing implicitly relies on some account of the goodness of God. God’s goodness has usually been understood as the supreme perfection of will, to which our rational capacities stand as an image or lesser imitation. It is hard to make sense of this account of God’s goodness except by treating it as a form of logocentrism. More resolute attempts to reject logocentrism in recent times usually involve talk about reverence for nameless mysteries or for otherness in the abstract – in other words, to schemes of value which are utterly opaque or even openly paradoxical, typically backed by attitudes of blame or condescension directed toward anyone who refuses to embrace the paradoxes spontaneously and uncritically. As Romantic, existentialist and postmodernist thought all amply illustrate, it is far easier to disavow logocentrism in words than to articulate an intelligible alternative to it. ∂ Some may think that the value of nature is to be apprehended not by reason but by some higher faculty, aesthetic or religious, which operates through special feelings or intuitions of which, as Pascal says,

reason knows nothing. But they have the problem of getting the rest of humanity to share these intuitions, and (having abjured reason) they cannot hope to do so by appealing to evidence or argument. They seem to be excluded by the nature of the case from explaining to anyone who does not share their feelings why they too should value the preservation of natural species and ecosystems. The problems posed by human conduct toward nature, whatever else they may be, are massive problems of co-ordination, whose solution requires successful rational communication and concerted effort. If these problems could be solved merely at the level of shared feelings or intuitions, then surely we would not be confronting them the first place. To propose in the face of them that we abandon reason in favor of something more immediate and less corrupt is not to suggest a new solution but only to express the wish (as vain as it is pious) that we should never have brought our present predicament upon ourselves at all. ∂ In this way of thinking there is a good deal of what Kant called ‘misology’ or hatred of reason. Such hatred, Kant thought, is a natural consequence of gaining insight into two important truths, both probably associated most closely with the name of Rousseau, but which Kant himself insisted on as emphatically as anyone. The first is that from what human history shows us, reason turns out not to be a good instrument for making rational beings happy or contented. It complicates their lives, generating new desires and creating new and more complicated circumstances in which people must devise ways of satisfying them. The second truth is that the development of reason also arouses a profoundly vicious side of human nature – self-conceited, self-centered, insatiably greedy and prone to all kinds of pernicious errors and delusions -- which can easily make humanity appear to itself not as the ultimate end of nature but on the contrary as nature’s most deformed and dangerous mistake (R 6:26-39). ∂ Kant thinks that misology, like discontent and vice, is a by-product precisely of the development of reason. In fact, it is merely another aspect of the discontent with themselves which Kant takes to be the peculiar fate of finite rational beings. He views this discontent as itself part of the system of natural teleology, since it serves the function of inciting rational creatures to employ their reason in the further development of their capacities. For reason involves above all the capacity to which Rousseau gave the name ‘perfectibility’ – the capacity to adopt new and varied ways of life, and to develop varied abilities and modes of behavior in response to new situations and new needs.∂ One characteristic delusion of human misology is the sweet dream of an earlier, less troubled, more innocent age – a Golden Age or Garden of Eden, or the fantasies which more developed cultures project on earlier stages of their own history or else on foreign peoples, whom (in their imperfect comprehension of other ways of life) they often fancy to correspond to a happier and less corrupted version of themselves (MA 8:122-123). The hatred of reason then

sometimes takes the form of a wish to return to this more innocent state. This is of course a deeply deluded wish, not only because the condition they imagine never did and never could exist in the form they imagine it, but also because the natural function of such imaginings is exactly the opposite of what is projected in the wish. For that function is to make us discontented with our present condition and prod us to develop our capacities further, making our lives more rational. Only in this way, moreover, in Kant’s view, do we have any prospect of overcoming the vice and misery brought on by our reason in its present condition, which is still merely in the early stages of its development and has far to go in perfecting itself.∂ There is a grave danger in such imaginings, however, which is that people may really try to actualize their impossible delusions of a lost past, precisely by suppressing reason and divesting themselves of its achievements. In this respect, misology -- even in the relatively benign forms which take themselves to be trying merely to save us from the catastrophes to which the excessive arrogance of our reason may lead us -- has more in common than it wants to acknowledge with the characteristically modern cultural phenomenon we know as fundamentalism. Every fundamentalism is a superstition which has lost its innocence, an idea which, through the advance of reason, has lost its authority over the human mind and now seeks to reclaim its former position by wreaking vengeance upon reason -- especially on its capacity for openness and self-criticism (since fundamentalism correctly perceives that they are chiefly to blame for depriving old superstitions of their ancient rights). Those who like to think in terms of catastrophes (ecological or otherwise) will be well occupied in contemplating the possible triumph of this most common and virulent form of misology. ∂ In response to misology in all its forms, Kant’s logocentric thought is that although the only reason we have is limited, imperfect and even corrupt, the only cure for the ills it brings upon us is more reason, a better developed and perfected reason applied more consistently and resolutely. Since there is no a priori assurance that the progress of reason will ultimately be victorious over the evil in human nature that accompanies it, this is not a comforting or consoling thought. But it is the only thought that orients us in such a way that we may still hope to avert the catastrophes we have most reason to fear.

Anthro isn’t the root cause of environmental destructionBurchett 14 [(Kyle, Department of Philosophy, Univ of KY) “Anthropocentrism and Nature: An Attempt at Reconciliation” TEORIA 34(2) 119-137] TDI

When environmental philosophy emerged, its founders assumed that∂ the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie humanity’s∂ ecological predicament. Animal philosophers have likewise historically∂ denigrated human-centered worldviews. Although their aims

differ significantly, animal thinkers and environmentalists have generally been∂ united in condemning anthropocentrism and its variants – speciesism,∂

human chauvinism, and so on. The immediate appeal of their assumptions is understandable, given that traditional worldviews in the West set∂ up a bifurcation between humanity and nature. Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, for example, can be accused of reinforcing questionable assumptions that go back at least to the ancient Greeks. Predominant worldviews∂ since ancient times have held that humans have a kind of incomparably absolute value that justifies humanity’s exploitation of the natural world1:∂ As the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set voluntary∂ ends for himself, [man] is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a teleological system, then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of∂ nature (Kant 2000: 298).∂ Because our species’ most extensive ecological degradations since the∂ industrial revolution have been inordinately influenced by consumers in∂ societies whose intellectual founders took humans to be the measure or∂ measurers of all things, many environmentalists have taken it for granted∂ that ecological degradation is an inevitable side effect of anthropocentrism. However, if an anthropocentric axiology genuinely values humanity∂ as such (and not merely the individual human), why would societies under∂ its sway ever permit policies and legislations that are foreseeably detrimental to the long-term satisfaction of basic and vital human interests? If∂ anthropocentrism were impartially concerned with the good of current as∂ well as future humans, it could not condone behaviors such as the widespread, frivolous overexploitation and commodification of toxic and limited resources. Besides, those who directly benefit from ecological irresponsibility and degradation represent a very small portion of humanity. Unless ∂ anthropocentrism is necessarily equated with an attitude that condones ∂ policies favoring the short-term interests of the few over the long-term interests of the many, it is not exactly obvious why being human-centered is ∂ so toxic to the environment. As Tim Hayward points out:∂ A cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a lamentable lack of interest in the wellbeing of other humans. Moreover, even when it is∂ not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to suggest that those doing the harm ∂ are being “human-centred”. To see this, one only has to consider some typical∂ practices which are appropriately criticised. […] In the case of hunting a species∂ to extinction, this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as “anthropocentrism” since it typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by ∂ (probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as serving human ∂ interests in general, but the interests of one quite narrowly-defined group, such as∂

poachers or whalers. A similar point can be made regarding the destruction of the∂ forest – for those who derive economic benefit from the destruction

oppose not only the human interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed, but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such∂ forests produce (Hayward 1997: 57-58).∂ The anthropocentrism that has been vilified by various thinkers must∂ therefore represent a variety of human-centeredness that fails to value humanity as such or that fails to acknowledge humanity’s dependence and∂ influence upon nature. Accordingly, those who consider themselves∂ nonanthropocentrists should revise their critiques if they are to accurately ∂ identify worldviews that can be coherently blamed for humanity’s inimical ∂ impact on our planet’s biosphere. 2. Naturalizing Value∂ Environmental and animal philosophers who consider their views to be∂ nonanthropocentric typically assert that anthropocentrism is most blameworthy for hierarchically valuing humanity above nonhumanity2. Favoritism extended by humans toward humans is rejected as a form of prejudice along the lines of racism or sexism. According to common critiques,∂ anthropocentric axiologies are hazardous to the environment because they∂ intrinsically value humanity but only instrumentally value nonhumanity.∂ Intrinsic value is generally considered necessary for full moral status or∂ membership in a moral community. To deem a thing intrinsically valuable∂ is to consider it necessarily valuable in itself or for itself, whereas to deem∂ it instrumentally valuable is to consider it contingently valuable for some∂ other thing that has intrinsic value. When it comes to anthropocentric∂ policies, intrinsic value presumably affords humanity existential rights, ∂ privileges, and protections that are denied to Earth’s less fortunate nonhumanity. Nonanthropocentrists conclude that humans living in societies∂ under the influence of anthropocentrism will remain indifferent to the harms incurred by nonhumanity as a result of anthropogenic mass extinction, invasional meltdown, global warming, and so on. They further presume that Homo sapiens would not be facing its current ecological ∂ predicament if humans also intrinsically valued the rest of nature. However, such criticisms are misplaced if directed at genuine, or ecological,∂ forms of anthropocentrism.∂ Although any form of anthropocentrism preferentially values humanity,∂ ecological anthropocentrism does so at the species level. This entails simultaneously valuing the ecosystems and nonhumans that enable human∂ societies to persist. Even if ecosystems and nonhumans are thereby only instrumentally valued according to whether or not they promote long-term∂ human interests, such valuation certainly should not entail policies that lead to ecological degradation. Rather, it should entail policies favoring the perpetual preservation or conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity, and ∂ so on, which are of obvious benefit to humanity. Furthermore, both intrinsic and instrumental value can be expressed along a continuum, and those things considered only instrumentally valuable are sometimes afforded greater rights, privileges, and protections than things that are purportedly intrinsically valuable. It should be noted that if

individuals in carbon-heavy societies such as the United States intrinsically valued all humans ∂ and merely valued nonhumans instrumentally, it is not likely that they ∂ would expend more resources on sustaining the lives of their pets rather ∂ than on sustaining the lives of fellow humans who happen to be strangers.∂

However, as research by Sena De Silva and Giovanni Turchini suggests,∂

consumers in the West expend a tremendous amount of resources on their∂

pets that would instead be spent on fellow humans if human-centeredness∂

truly accounted for their behavior:∂ The market for pet food and pet care products has been reported to be growing∂ at an annual average rate of 4% in value terms and reached US$49 billion in∂ 2003, with pet food representing about 80% of the global pet industry market∂ (Combelles 2004a). Recent market research also reported that the pet food market∂ has been experiencing a trend towards premium and super-premium products∂

(Combelles 2004b). It has been hypothesized that pet owners are treating their∂ companions progressively more as a family member, and consequently, expenditure on pet food is growing. Premium and super-premium cat food often include∂ high content of chopped or whole forage fish such as pilchard and sardines, and in∂ some instances even tuna (De Silva and Turchini 2008: 460-461).∂ The central issue is not an advocacy of pets versus aquaculture or other agricultural/animal husbandry activities, but the need for a more objective and a pragmatic approach to the use of a limited and a decreasing biological resource, for human benefit (De Silva and Turchini 2008: 465).

1NC

1NC – FrameworkPersonal identity does not exist. Harris and Hood 12 [(Sam Harris, philosopher; Bruce Hood, Director of the Bristol Cognitive Development Centre at the University of Bristol) THE ILLUSION OF THE SELF An Interview with Bruce Hood May 22, 2012] TDI

In what sense is the self an illusion?∂ For me, an illusion is a subjective experience that is not what it seems. Illusions are experiences in the mind, but they are not out there in nature. Rather, they are events generated by the brain. Most of us have an experience of a self. I certainly have one, and I do not doubt that others do as well – an autonomous individual with a coherent identity and sense of free will. But that experience is an illusion – it does not exist independently of the person having the experience, and it is certainly not what it seems. That’s not to say that the illusion is pointless. Experiencing a self illusion may have tangible functional benefits in the way we think and act, but that does not mean that it exists as an entity. ∂ If the self is not what it seems, then what is it?∂ For most of us, the sense of our self is as an integrated individual inhabiting a body. I think it is helpful to distinguish between the two ways of thinking about the self that William James talked about. There is conscious awareness of the present moment that he called the “I,” but there is also a self that reflects upon who we are in terms of our history, our current activities and our future plans. James called this aspect of the self, “me” which most of us would recognize as our personal identity—who we think we are. However, I think that both the “I” and the “me” are actually ever-changing narratives generated by our brain to provide a coherent framework to organize the output of all the factors that contribute to our thoughts and behaviors.∂ I think it helps to compare the experience of self to subjective contours – illusions such as the Kanizsa pattern where you see an invisible shape that is really defined entirely by the surrounding context. People understand that it is a trick of the mind but what they may not appreciate is that the brain is actually generating the neural activation as if the illusory shape was really there. In other words, the brain is hallucinating the experience. There are now many studies revealing that illusions generate brain activity as if they existed. They are not real but the brain treats them as if they were.∂ Now that line of reasoning could be applied to all perception except that not all perception is an illusion. There are real shapes out there in the world and other physical regularities that generate reliable states in the minds of others. The reason that the status of reality cannot be applied to the self, is that it does not exist independently of my brain alone that is having the experience. It may appear to have a consistency of regularity and stability that makes it seem real, but those properties alone do not make it so.∂ Similar ideas about the self can be found in Buddhism and the writings of Hume and Spinoza. The difference is that

there is now good psychological and physiological evidence to support these ideas that I cover in the book in a way that I hope is accessible for the general reader.∂ Many readers might wonder where these narratives come from, and who interprets them, if not a self?∂ I do not think there are many cognitive scientists who would doubt that the experience of I is constructed from a multitude of unconscious mechanisms and processes. Me is similarly constructed, though we may be more aware of the events that have shaped it over our lifetime. But neither is cast in stone and both are open to all manner of reinterpretation. As artists, illusionists, movie makers, and more recently experimental psychologists have repeatedly shown, conscious experience is highly manipulatable and context dependent. Our memories are also largely abstracted reinterpretations of events – we all hold distorted memories of past experiences.∂ In the book, I emphasize the developmental processes that shape our brains from infancy onwards to create our identities as well as the systematic biases that distort the content of our identity to form a consistent narrative. I believe much of that distortion and bias is socially relevant in terms of how we would like to be seen by others. We all think we would act and behave in a certain way, but the reality is that we are often mistaken.∂

Answering the question of who is experiencing the illusion or interpreting the story is much more problematic. This is partly a conceptual problem and partly a problem of dualism. It is almost impossible to discuss the self without a referent in the same way that is difficult to think about a play without any players. Second, as the philosopher Gilbert Ryle pointed out, in searching for the self, one cannot simultaneously be the hunter and the hunted, and I think that is a dualistic problem if we think we can objectively examine our own minds independently, because our mind and self are both generated by the brain. So while the self illusion suggests an illogical tautology, I think this is only a superficial problem.

1NC – ContentionA libertarian reading of Kant is most consistent. It is contradictory to will that the state should be capable of restricting your property rights, even to protect external ends. Otteson 9 [JAMES R. OTTESON. “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism.” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009, ISSN 1086–1653, Copyright © 2009, pp. 389–409.] TDI

Kant expressly draws this conclusion in his 1793 essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’”: Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law). And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows. (1991, 73, emphasis in original) Kant insists on the protection of a sphere of liberty for each individual to self-legislate under universalizable laws of rationality, consistent with the formulation of the cat- egorical imperative requiring the treatment of others “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (1981, 36). This formulation of the categorical imperative might even logically entail the position Kant articulates about “right,”

“public right,” and “freedom.” Persons do not lose their personhood when they join a civil community, so they cannot rationally endorse a state that will be destructive of that personhood; on the contrary, according to Kant, a person enters civil society rationally willing that the society will protect both his own agency and that of others. Robert B. Pippen rightly says that for Kant “political duties are a subset of moral

duties” (1985, 107–42), but the argument here puts it slightly differently: political rights, or “dignities,” derive from moral rights, which for Kant are determined by one’s moral agency. Thus, the only “coercive laws” to which individuals may rationally allow themselves to be subject in civil

society are those that require respect for each others’ moral agency (and provide for the punishment of infractions thereof) (see Pippen 1985, 121). When Kant comes to state his own moral justification for the state in the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals,

this claim is exactly the one he makes: the state is necessary for securing the conditions of “Right”—in other words, the conditions under which persons can exercise their autonomous agency (see 1991, 132–35). Consistent with this interpretation, Kant elsewhere endorses free trade and open markets on grounds that make his concern for “harmony” in the preceding passage reminiscent of Adam Smithian invisible-hand arguments. In his 1784 essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Kant writes: “Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest” (1991, 41). This statement is similar to Smith’s statement of the invisible-hand

argument.2 Kant proceeds to endorse some of the same laissez-faire economic policies that Smith advocated—for example, in his discussion in his 1786 work “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” of

the benefits of “mutual exchange” and in his claim that “there can be no wealth-producing activity without freedom” (1991, 230–31, emphasis in original), as well as in his claim in the 1795 Perpetual Peace that “the spirit of commerce” is motivated by people’s “mutual self-interest” and thus “cannot exist side by side with war” (1991, 114, emphasis in original).3 Finally, although Kant argues that we cannot know exactly what direction hu- man progress will take, he believes we can nevertheless be confident that mankind is progressing.4 Thus, in “Universal History” he writes: The highest purpose of nature—i.e. the development of all natural capaci- ties—can be fulfilled for mankind only in society, and nature intends that man should accomplish this, and indeed all his appointed ends, by his own

efforts. This purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise

specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force , in other words

of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution. (1991, 45–46, emphasis in original) Kant’s argument in this essay runs as follows: human progress is possible, but only in conditions of a civil society whose design allows this progress; because the progress is possible only as individuals become enlightened, and individual enlightenment is in turn possible only when individuals are free from improper coercion and paternal- ism, human progress is therefore possible only under a state that defends individual freedom. Kant believes that individuals have the best chance to be happy under a

limited civil government, and he therefore argues that even such a laudable goal as increasing human happiness is not a justifiable role of the state: “But the whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings,

and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e.

the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end. And thus the latter end must on no account interfere as a determinant

with the laws governing external right” (“Theory and Practice,” 1991, 73, emphasis in original). The Kantian state is hence limited on the principled grounds of respecting agency; the fact that this limitation in his

view provides the conditions enabling enlightenment, progress, and ultimately happiness is a great but ancillary benefit. Thus, the positions Kant takes on nonpolitical issues would seem to suggest a libertarian political position. And Kant explicitly avows such a state. In “Universal History,” he writes: Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its external relations will also de- cline. . . . If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. For this reason, restrictions placed upon personal activities are in- creasingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted. And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times, enlightenment gradually arises. (1991, 50–51, emphasis in original) In “Theory and Practice,” Kant writes that “the public welfare which demands first consideration lies precisely in that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law, so that each remains free to seek his happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large” and that “[n]o-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law” (1991, 80, emphasis in original, and 74). In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He

concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis

in original).5 This stipulation becomes for Kant the grounding justification for the existence of a state, its raison d’etre, and the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum

freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that the state may—indeed, must—secure this condition of freedom, but undertake to do nothing else because any other state activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’

agency. In his argument, individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in

morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive. Kant argues even more strongly that

although frustration of a person’s ability to effect his will damages or corrupts his will if fate, bad luck, or some other impersonal source is responsible, this frustration counts as immoral disrespect if it arises

from interposition by other persons. His view seems to be that a good will requires exercise and that systematic thwarting results ultimately in atrophy. On this basis, his endorse- ment of strict limits on state power is both consistent with and implied by his con- ception of individual moral agency as contained in his notion of a “person.” This endorsement is thus not a consequence of accidental features about Kant—for ex- ample, his natural disposition, his religious beliefs, or the times in which he lived (as Howard Williams suggests [1983, 194])—nor is it merely a “mirage” produced by a smattering of unconnected or misinterpreted passages (as Allen Rosen claims [1993, 197]). Rather, for Kant, moral agency both entails a minimal state and explains why he repeatedly takes a strong stance against anything beyond a minimal state.

Property rights are absolute, irrespective of the gain provided. Ripstein 9 [(Arthur Ripstein, philosopher) Force and Freedom. Harvard University Press, 2009, p.67] TDI

Again, the fact that some other person needs or wants what you have more than you do, could

use it more effectively than you, or could gain from using it more than you would lose is of no significance. The simplest wrong against property is using what belongs to another without the owner’s permission. Kant’s account explains why this is a wrong without inquiring into the magnitude of the loss (if any) suffered by the owner, or the benefits the tres- passer hoped to gain. Any account that focuses on specific uses—the mat- ter of choice—must regard such a rule as wasteful, since it forbids a transaction that makes one party better off and the other no worse off. In the vocabulary of economic theory, a harmless trespass is a Pareto improvement: one person is made better off, and no other person is made worse off.8 Perhaps a material analysis, focusing on need or wish, could generate a rule against trespass by reference to secondary problems about the resources people would waste in protecting their property, and so conclude that there are grounds for a general rule that sometimes prohib- its people from doing harmless and even worthwhile things.9 Kant’s ap- proach is

different: the reason harmless trespasses are prohibited is that they violate the owner’s right to determine how his or her property will be used.

1NC – Humanism LinkKantian moral philosophy is anthropocentric and replicates the sovereign division between those inside and outside the sphere of moral concern. It fails to ground moral obligations to animals capable of suffering. Shields 15 [(Christopher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) “In the Shadows of Dominion: Anthropocentrism and the Continuance of a Culture of Oppression” Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2474. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/2474] TDI

Immanuel Kant, too, carries on the philosophical tradition of anthropocentrism through∂ his ethical theory of deontology. Kant contends that for one to constitute a moral obligation or be a recipient of it, they must qualify as a person.∂ 27 On Kant’s perspective, Steiner contends, “A person is a being ‘whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws. To be a ground of determinate laws is to be capable∂ of adducing and contemplating the moral law for oneself; it is to be capable of legislating the law∂ of respect and following the law that one has legislated.”28 Because the nonhuman animal lack∂ the capabilities to adduce and contemplate moral law, Kant deems them a “thing,” that therefore∂ can be used as a means to human desire.∂ 29 Kant’s perspective essentially objectified the animal∂ self and confirmed a belief system that appropriated the nonhuman animal as object and the∂ human animal as subject. Although Kant distances himself from a theological discourse, he uses∂ capacities to distinguish and divide humans from animals. Perhaps no other belief system contributed more to the nonhuman animal’s lowered∂ status than the pre-Enlightenment ideology of Cartesian dualism.30 Dualism holds that the∂ separation between mind and body differentiate humans and animals. Dualism has also been∂ crucial in justifying dominion for some groups of people and excusing the oppression of the∂ other. Cartesian dualism or Descartes’ substance dualism is a modern version of the ancient∂ philosophical conceptions of dualism.31 Substance dualism holds that there are two kinds of∂ substance: physical matter and mind. Howard Robinson explains,∂ Descartes believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential∂ property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it∂

thinks. . . . Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the∂ properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except∂ where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own∂ right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling∂ levers' in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation.32∂ Using the idea of substance dualism, Descartes concluded that while humans possessed both∂ types of matter, the mechanical body as well as the mind to

control it, the mind was absent in the∂ nonhuman animal. The perceived absence of the mind in the animal led him to the conclusion∂ that animals were mere matter, only mechanical bodies.∂ Strachan Donnelley’s article on organic existence provides an explanation of human∂ knowledge that essentially led to the factory farm and the overall depreciation of nature due to∂ Cartesian dualism. Donnelley contends that Cartesian assumptions have little viability in∂ differentiating the animal and human. According to Donnelley, “Research centered on organic∂ existence and individuality employs a methodology that merges science and philosophy,∂ pertinent in differentiating animals and human beings, or substantiating whether or not animals∂ should be ethically considered. Almost every ethical perspective is built on the foundation of the∂ individual or self.”33∂ Every ethical theory, Donnelley contends, is contingent on individual action and the∂ perspectives that govern those actions. If human obligation to animals is indeed warranted,∂ several aspects of the human and animal need to be understood. The first is that human animals,∂ in common with non-human animals, are individual organisms.34 According to Donnelley, “To∂ bring together and to elucidate our ethical responsibilities to humans, animals, and animate∂

nature, we need a common philosophic understanding of ‘organic individuality:’ its nature and ethical significance.”35 Cartesian dualism provides an interpretation of organic individuality in∂ relation to metaphysics. Descartes’ division of mind and body stood as two self-regulating∂ elements of world reality, thus setting a fixed point that formed a knowledge base contributing to∂ philosophical and scientific thinking alike.36 In dualism, reality consists of the mind and the∂ body, which is only an extension of the mind.∂ 37 Essentially, dualism contends that animals are∂

just a body, a shell; the individual then implies mind and thought.38 In this sense, dualism∂ deemphasizes nature and with it nonhuman animals, as well as some humans historically labeled∂ as unevolved or as a species different from white humans. According to Donnelley, “Nature was∂ rendered a mere dynamic, causal, mechanistic, and material affair, ‘mere matter in motion.”39∂ This viewpoint on nature contributed to a major separation of human and animal that created a∂ hierarchy of perspectives, and allowed for the continued marginalization of animals through the∂ justification of their use to satisfy the desires of humans. Obviously, such an outlook remains∂ prevalent in Western culture with the practices of factory farming and vivisection, relatively∂ modern institutions of animal oppression.

Countering the philosophy of Cartesian dualism is the idea of organic individualism ,∂ which points to the presence of a connection between an animal’s body and their ontology of∂ existence.40 Donnelley contends that it is the fragility and finiteness of the living organic form∂ (the body) that constitutes the existence of self, identity, and individuality.41 This notion is∂ contingent on what humans acknowledge as the state of being.42 “Being” would seem to imply∂ action of one who is

alive recognizing the life of another, as well as consciousness or selfawareness from one’s own ontological perspective.∂ 43 To clarify this idea, when humans see a∂ nonhuman animal, they recognize this state of being within the animal self as a reflection of their∂ own “beingness.” According to Donnelley,∂ We know what it means to be self-concerned or "internally related" to ourselves: to have∂ our own individual being as an insistent practical issue, which must be decided by our∂ own activity in the world (for example, in breathing, eating, seeking shelter, or avoiding∂ enemies). These primordial existential and worldly experiences natively equip us with the experiential means or epistemic arsenal to judge the quick from the dead , the animate∂ from the inanimate.44∂ Organic existence implies a certain criterion, an active merger between body and mind, where∂ self, the organic living, is manifested through the physical body in possession with the inanimate∂ mind; only through a conversion of both, is organic existence possible.45 Organic existence∂ implies two major ideas that are relevant in an examination of the factory farm. First, it rejects∂ the philosophy of dualism. Although factory farming is a modern embodiment of dualist thought∂ that relegates the animal to status of “thing”, animals are not merely mechanical objects to be∂ used as humans wish. The entire concept of organic individuality elevates the presence of∂ animal awareness. When animals suffers through pain or stress, an awareness exists of their∂ circumstances within their self. Organic individuality posits a connection between human and∂ nonhuman animals in both the recognition of the animate in each other and in the shared∂ recognition of finiteness. To understand the extent of suffering initiated by the practice of ∂ factory farming and, indeed, to compare it to human suffering aids in better appreciating the ∂ suffering of another. Understanding the practices that cause such suffering as well as an ethical ∂ standard in regard to animals is necessary. Should humans care about animal suffering because∂ nonhuman animals, like human animals, should be attributed certain rights, or should concern for∂

animal suffering derive simply because animals, too, can suffer?∂

Philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan differ from one another in establishing the∂ moral status of animals. Singer applies a utilitarian ethical theory in his moral consideration of∂ animals, but Tom Regan utilizes rights theory to lessen the moral divide between human and∂ nonhuman animals. In explicating Singer’s position, an explanation of the basic assumptions of∂

utilitarian theory is necessary. Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, was an early∂ proponent of animal welfare and accepted a consequentialist ethical perspective to confront the∂ moral status of animals. In An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham∂ discussed his theory of utilitarianism, promoting it as one that valued both humans and animals.∂ His belief that humans have an obligation to consider animal welfare is evidenced in the∂ following passage. According to Bentham,∂ Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the∂

insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of thing. . . . The day has∂ been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the∂ species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated. . . .upon the same footing∂ as. . . .animals are still. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of the∂ legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally∂ insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should∂

trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse?∂ But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more∂ conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose∂ the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor,∂ Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?46∂ In the above passage, Bentham makes a significant claim regarding the ethical consideration for∂ animals: limited rationality should not exclude animals from ethical consideration. This notable∂ claim relies on the foundation of suffering as the principal criterion for ethical consideration. Bentham questions the assertion that only beings of reason are entitled to ethical consideration;∂ his strongest point, however, is that lack of rationality alone should not exclude a being from∂ having moral status, but that, instead, the ability to suffer is of concern. For the utilitarian, pain∂ and pleasure are of equal importance in measuring utility, the foundation of utilitarian∂ ethics. Instances of pleasure are valued positively, contributing to an increase in utility, while∂ instances of pain are valued negatively, subtracting from the net value of an action’s∂

consequences. Because nonhuman animals can experience pain and suffering, utilitarianism as∂ Bentham envisioned, extends ethical consideration to nonhuman animals.47∂ Like Bentham, philosopher John Stuart Mill was a prominent contributor to utilitarian∂ theory. In Utilitarianism, Mill expands on Bentham’s ideas, clarifying utilitarian theory.∂ According to Mill, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ as the∂ ‘greatest-happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote∂ happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended∂ pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.”48∂

Utilitarian theory focuses on the consequences of an action, rather than the motivation for it.∂ This means utilitarianism focuses on the product of an action (whether an action produces∂ pleasure or pain). The right (moral) action, then, is the one that produces the greatest amount of∂ happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number.∂ The idea of right action brings up a very important question, one that is central to the∂ consideration of the treatment of animals. If right action produces the greatest happiness and∂ least suffering for the greatest number, does this apply to nonhuman animals or only to people?∂ Although Mill and Bentham differ on several key features of utilitarianism, according to Mark Timmons, “Both accepted the following two claims: Welfare is identical with happiness and∂ happiness is identical with pleasure and the absence of pain.”49 If a utilitarian were to base∂ ethical decision making on choices that maximize utility, he/she would

need to be able to∂ measure pleasure and the absence of pain. For this, Bentham developed what he called felicific∂ calculus, a system to measure specific instances of pleasure and pain. The system calculates∂ utility by evaluating seven features for which pleasure and pain are measured.50 Bentham’s∂ calculus consisted of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent. Of∂ his seven features, Bentham put the greatest emphasis on intensity and duration and thus viewed∂ instances of pleasure or pain through the quantity of the intensity and duration of the sensation.51∂ Bentham’s felicific calculus could be implemented by using the established quantity-based∂ criteria and assigning a numerical value to instances of pleasure and pain, to thus institute a∂ uniform value-based measurement system. Theoretically, Bentham’s felicific calculus could∂

distinguish actions that promote the highest degree of utility even in situations where an action∂ could affect a great number of people differently.52 What makes utilitarianism such a good∂ ethical theory in regard to animals and the factory farm is its concept of hedonism, which is the∂ foundation of utilitarian theory. Hedonism prescribes that pleasure, happiness, and welfare are∂ all essentially the same and that pain and suffering negatively affect them. Therefore,∂ utilitarianism promotes actions that maximize pleasure for the greatest number of those who can∂

experience pleasure and minimize pain for those who can experience pain. Bentham’s emphasis∂ on duration and intensity as measurements of pleasure and pain provides strong evidence that∂ utilitarianism is an ethical theory that includes any species that can suffer. ∂ Expanding on many of the same ideas Bentham developed, Peter Singer provides an even∂ more convincing case for the elevated status of nonhuman animals. Singer contends that animals∂ are not due only ethical consideration, but also equal consideration in interests. Singer’s∂ Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, in essence, stands as a modern form of∂ consequentialism. According to Singer, “The essence of the principle . . . is that we give equal∂ weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions. This∂

means that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act, and if X stands to lose more than∂ Y stands to gain, it is better not to do the act.”53 Singer’s principle gains emphasis when applied∂ to the factory farm, animals, and the human beneficiaries of the practice. Factory farmers raise∂ animals for their flesh, to satisfy consumers’ demand for low-cost meat and increased profits for∂ the producer. Animals becomes victims of factory farming’s dependency on space and cost.∂ Animals in the factory farm are forced into confinement for most of their lives in dirty and dark∂ places and consume unnatural food injected with growth hormones to spur exceedingly fast∂

maturation. Concerning Singer’s principle, the human gain is consistent with the pleasure of∂ taste from the meat and the cost effectiveness that allows humans to indulge their tastes. The∂ losses for the animals, however, are consistent with a life of suffering and eventual death. In∂ regard for Singer’s principle, do animals stand to lose more than humans stand to gain through∂ the practice of factory farming? If animals are indeed worth equal consideration, then their∂ losses definitively outweigh the trivial human

gains. The assessment of gains and losses from∂ factory farming become evident when considering the veal calves who live a short life of∂ suffering (losses) in order to satisfy the pleasure of taste (gains) for humans. Singer’s principle∂ weighs the interests of both parties and establishes that the losses in this situation outweigh the∂ gains. The validity of Singer’s principle lies in his contention that animal interests warrant equal∂ consideration to human interests. To validate this claim, Singer must show that animals are due∂

equal consideration of interests. According to Singer, “If [sic] humans are to be regarded as∂ equal only to one another, we need some sense of ‘equal’ that does not require any actual,∂ descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities.”54 Essentially, Singer’s argument is∂ this: If all humans and only humans deserve complete and equal moral status, then there has to∂ be some attribute that all humans and only humans possess. Any attribute that only humans∂ have, some humans lack, and any attribute that all humans possess, most, and at least some,∂ animals possess. An opponent of equal consideration for humans and animals might argue that∂ equal consideration is not warranted because animals cannot reason or possess morals, as do∂ humans. Singer contests this counter claim because some humans cannot reason or some possess∂ few morals. He, like Bentham, points to infants or humans with severe mental defects (e.g.,∂ humans in a vegetative state, those afflicted by severe mental illness, or mentally handicapped∂ humans) as examples.55 In both cases, however, the potential of the human animal remains∂ unacknowledged. What should be said of the potential capacities that the irrational infant will∂ have as he/she matures? In accounting for human potential, Singer highlights the permanently∂ mentally handicapped human as someone who has never, and will never, possess these human∂ specific attributes. According to Singer,∂ Philosophers who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other∂ animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans by lumping them in∂ with the other animals. It is easy to see why they do not. To take this line without∂ rethinking our attitudes to other animals would entail that we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that∂ we had the right to rear and kill these humans for food.56∂ What Singer claims is that humans marginalize and use other animals as they see fit, because∂ they see them as inferior due to their assumed lack of reason and rationality; however, they do∂ not hold this same position in regard to humans who lack these same skills. Moreover, Singer∂ further refutes claims against equal consideration on the basis of the possession of traits such as∂ reasoning or moral awareness, because such assertions would allow humans to justify giving∂ higher consideration to certain groups of humans, such as those who are highly intelligent in∂ preference to those of low intelligence.∂ 57∂ Regan, who prefers a rights discourse to utilitarianism in positioning the moral status of∂

animals, challenges Singer’s Equal Consideration of Interests Principle on the basis of flaws in∂ utilitarian theory. Regan’s argument against Singer’s principle of equal interests provides a∂ sound examination of Singer’s theory and its relationship to factory farming. His counter∂ argument directly

attacks the validity of utilitarianism as an ethical theory in considering∂

animals. According to Regan,∂ It is unclear how, as a utilitarian, he can argue that we have a moral obligation to stop∂ supporting the practice of raising animals intensively (henceforth symbolized as p)∂ because of some statement about the purpose of p. The question the utilitarian must∂ answer is not, (a) what is the purpose of p [factory farming]? It is, (b) All things∂ considered, what are the consequences of p [factory farming], and how do they compare∂

to the value of the consequences that would result if alternatives to p were adopted and∂ supported?”58 Regan’s criticism of Singer’s principle contends: First, utilitarianism does not give animals’∂ intrinsic value in and of themselves. Instead, as Regan notes, even if alternatives are adopted∂

replacing factory farming, animals could still be used for human consumption. An example of∂ this would be “free-range” animals slaughtered for human consumption. Singer must also∂ confront Regan’s assertion that despite the principle’s grounding in utilitarian thought, it does∂ not follow the approach of consequentialism.59 As Regan contends, although the purpose (a) of∂ factory farming (p) is substantiated, a utilitarian must account for (b) the consideration of all∂ entities involved as well as the potential consequences of factory farming (p) and how they∂ compare in value to the consequences that would result if alternatives to factory farming (p) were∂ adopted and supported.60 Arguing from the perspective of a utilitarian, Regan analyzes the∂ consequences that could result if the factory farm was replaced by another practice. According∂ to Regan, “His [Singer’s] characterization also leaves out much which, from a utilitarian point of∂ view must be judged to be highly relevant to determining the morality of p.”61 Regan argues,∂ essentially, that Singer fails to account for all the consequences and interests involved in factory∂ farming. According to Regan, “There are, first and most obviously, those who actually raise and∂

sell the animals; but there are many others…whose lives revolve around the success or failure of∂ the animal industry.”62 Regan also acknowledges the family members of workers employed in∂ the industry who would be affected if intensive farming practices were abandoned. Regan∂ writes, “Now, the interests which these persons have in ‘business-as-usual,’ in raising animals∂

intensively, go well beyond pleasures of taste and are far from trivial.63 Regan is correct in his∂ assumption that if Singer’s principle is justified on the grounds of utilitarianism, then all the consequences to the action of abandoning factory farming must be considered. But this is only∂ one reason why Regan supports a rights discourse.∂ Regan’s assessment that all consequences must be considered in Singer’s principle of∂ equal interests is valid; however, in considering all the consequences, Singer can still maintain∂ his original perspective that his principle would deem factory farming as a wrong action. Regan∂ acknowledges that a utilitarian must investigate fully all the consequences and all entities∂ affected by an action.64 My response to Regan’s criticism of Singer is that he misses a crucial∂ point within Singer’s principle. If utilitarianism defines right action as the one that produces the∂ greatest amount of happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number, Singer’s∂ principle is still satisfactory as

an argument against factory farming. Regan’s assessment that∂ Singer does not consider all the consequences of ending factory farming for all the humans∂ involved does not matter. When examining the figures presented earlier in this chapter, in 2009∂ alone, nine billion animals in the United States endured some degree of suffering before being∂ slaughtered for human consumption and 98 percent were products of factory farms.65 Based on∂ Singer’s principle, even if every single American suffers negative effects by ending factory∂ farming, the number would still pale in comparison to the substantial number of animals who∂ suffer and are killed every year in the factory farm and slaughterhouse. Given the emphasis on∂ utility as a significant component of utilitarian theory, Singer’s principle works well, both as a∂ theory for the ethical consideration of animals and as a valid utilitarian argument.∂ In regard to factory farming and other instances of episodic animal oppression, there are∂ many more animals who stand to lose than humans stand to gain, even with every American∂ human being considered. But what if one applies Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests outside of factory farming to, for example, vivisection, that is, medical experimentation∂ on animals? Vivisection is still an oppressive practice, yet in considering future generations of∂ humans who might benefit from a medical breakthrough, based, at least in part, on animal∂

experimentation and suffering, under Singer’s principle vivisection could be morally justified. It∂ is for circumstances such as this that Regan prefers a rights discourse regarding the treatment of∂ animals. Although Singer maintains a direct duty view, a position that asserts humans have at∂ least some direct duties to animals, it falls short of giving them rights.66∂ In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan offers his argument on the superiority of a rights∂ discourse over other ethical approaches in elevating the moral status of animals. Regan’s∂ principal claim is that animals as moral agents possess certain basic moral rights.67 According to∂ Regan,∂ To say that these individuals possess certain rights independently of anyone’s voluntary∂ acts, either their own or those of others, and independently of the position they happen to∂ occupy in any given institutional arrangement; these rights are universal—that is, they are∂ possessed by all relevantly similar individuals. . .all who possess these rights possess∂ them equally. . . The principal basic moral right possessed by all moral agents and∂ patients is the right to respectful treatment. . . All moral agents and patients must always∂

be treated in ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of∂ value of this kind.68∂ Regan’s position predicates the moral status of animals on a basis similar to that of humans.∂ Both possess certain basic rights that protect them against the violation of these rights by others.∂

This means that violation of rights cannot be morally justified and is, indeed, a morally wrong∂ action. Regan’s position also establishes that moral agents who possess these basic rights are∂ inherently valuable, meaning that moral agents who share this value “must always be treated in ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of value of this kind.”69∂ This differs from Singer’s position in that his principle of equal consideration of interests,∂ consistent with utilitarian theory, affords animals

intrinsic value founded on the pleasure∂ principle. The problem Regan has with this claim is that with their value deriving from the∂ pleasure principle, animals have no value in and of themselves.70 This is problematic because∂

certain circumstances might negate the utility of pleasure and promote pain and suffering in∂ favor of higher order pleasures.∂ 71 Some cases of vivisection that benefit human animals could∂ morally justify the suffering of nonhuman animals.∂ Rights discourse, however, is not without its own contradictions. The most glaring ∂ problem the animal rights position must confront is that it is guilty of the problems it attempts to ∂ remedy. One such difficulty is that rights discourse is inherently speciesist even though it claims∂ not be so. The reason for this contradiction rests on the extension of rights. Should rights be∂ extended to what is considered lower ordered animals, such as mice? To insects? To amoebas?∂

At some point, a line has to be drawn, favoring some species over others. There is obviously a∂ significant degree of difference between primates and insects, but without differentiating∂ between the two, how can rights discourse effectively value one species over the other? Unlike∂ Singer, who uses the existence of pain and suffering as the catalyst to extend his principle of∂ equal consideration of interests, Regan and other rights-based philosophers must draw an imaginary line within the animal kingdom separating species who are attributed rights and those ∂ who are not. Is this not the same methodology grounded within anthropocentric ideology, which∂ draws an imaginary line dividing the status of humans and other animals?72∂ In his book History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence, Dominick LaCapra∂ questions the human—animal divide and in doing so, the shortcomings of rights discourse.∂ In his call for a new paradigm that departs from anthropocentrism, LaCapra points out the∂ inadequacies of attributing rights to certain groups, but not to others. Rights discourse is understood as a fundamental claim where sovereignty has no bearing or is indeed outside of sovereignty. 73 So, if nonhuman animals are attributed certain rights or claims, they are outside∂ of human dominion and, therefore, their rights should not be infringed upon. Yet, as LaCapra∂

specifies, rights discourse has its limits. According to the author,∂ Whatever the strategic necessity of an appeal to rights in the current context of law and ethical debate, the limitations of ‘rights discourse’ suggest that one rethink the entire issue and displace the notion of rights in the direction of competing claims, in good part∂ to take distance from predictable, conventional expectations, such as the requirement of a∂ mutual implication or even a strict reciprocity of right and duty or obligation that prompts∂ the question—often the rhetorical question—of whether a dog or a cat can have∂ obligations to counterbalance putative ‘rights’.74∂ LaCapra details a significant conundrum of rights discourse, that of mutuality. Rights essentially can be honored or reciprocated by some beings who are attributed rights, but others beings, including some humans and animals, cannot recognize these rights or cannot share in an obligation to respect them. How can a certain set of rights transcend

species, ability, age, and so∂ on, yet be applied to each and all mutually if an obligation to maintain these rights does not exist in all entities? The lack of mutuality limits rights discourse and makes applying rights,∂

especially to those who may not possess obligation, a convoluted, if not impossible, endeavor.∂ Such glaring errors in rights discourse confound the problem of the human—animal divide and∂ although Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is not without its own problems,∂ reliance on a shared vulnerability (that is, suffering) unites human and animal at the core of∂ being.