US FOREIGN POLICY POLITICS

MATHILDE FAGE KJELDSEN –

AMERICAN POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 2014 (WEEK 8)

MAIN TOPIC OF THE PRESENTATION

The main topic of the presentation is US foreign policy politics – not US foreign policy.

US foreign policy politics refers to the question of which institutions and actors within the American political system that play what roles and have how much influence they have (Jentleson, 2010)

The United States is a political system of separate institutions sharing powers. Also, there are many policy and decision-making processes taking place within the executive branch.

This makes it relevant to discuss both inter-branch as well as intra-branch power relations in regard to the making of US foreign policy.

Inter-branch relations involves the role of the US Congress vis-à-vis the executive branch.

Intra-branch relations involves the role of the Department of State vis-à-vis other governmental actors e.g. the Department of Defense and National Security Council.

INTER-BRANCH POWER RELATIONS

‘THE CONSTITUTION IS AN INVITATION TO STRUGGLE FOR PRIVILEGE OF DIRECTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY’ (EDWARD S. CORWIN)

The United States Constitution divides foreign policy powers between the President and the Congress. The executive and legislative branch plays different roles that often – and intentionally so - overlap.

Article II of the U.S. Constitution names the president Commander in chief of the armed forces and designates the president as the nation’s chief diplomat. This role has expanded and carried new weight as the US became a global power during the twentieth century.

Article I of the U.S. Constitution names that it is only the U.S. Congress that can declare war. Furthermore, congressional approval is needed for spending (the power of the purse) and its consent is required for finalizing trade agreements.

The actual war powers are disputed. The Constitution designates the president as Commander in chief, but gives Congress the power to declare war. This was the intention of the Founding Fathers: They wanted an energetic president that could make effective government, but they did not wanted to place all power in the hands of one person.

Where does this leave US foreign policy politics?

STATISTICS ABOUT WAR POWERS

In favor of the presidency’s overwhelming dominance:

• Of the more than two hundred times that the US has used military force, only five e.g. World War I (1917–19), and World War II (1941–45) - have been through congressional declarations of war. Another eighty-five or ninety (e.g., the 2001 Afghanistan war, and the 2003 Iraq war) have been through other legislative authority. Others have been by presidents acting on their own.

• Also, vetoes on foreign policy legislation have been overridden only twice: Nixon’s veto of the 1973 War Powers Resolution and Reagan’s veto of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act against South Africa.

In defense of the US Congress’ war powers:

• Many of the cases of presidential action only involved minor military incidents, where it legitimately can be seen as the proper role of the Commander in Chief.

• One should put less emphasis on the overall numbers of cases than on key cases like Vietnam and Iraq, in which undeclared war had major consequences for the presidency (e.g. the War Powers Clause).

The President or the executive branch can make foreign policy through:• Response to foreign events.• Proposes legislation• Negotiate international agreements• Make policy statements• Carry our policy implementation

Congress can support or seek to change the above actions. In most cases Congress supports the President, but often with significant modifications in the process of approving them .

Congress can make foreign policy through:• Congressional resolutions and policy statements.• Legislative directives• Legislative pressure or informal advice• Legislative restrictions/funding denials – power of the purse. • Congressional oversight.

The executive branch can support or seek to change congressional policies as it interprets and carries out legislative directives and restrictions, and decides to adopt proposals and advice.

US FOREIGN POLICY

The relationship between the presidency and Congress in the realm of foreign policy politics have been characterized by four patterns:

1. Cooperation, when Congress has either concurred with or deferred to the president and a coordinated policy has been pursued

2. Constructive compromise, when the two branches have bridged conflicts and come to a policy that proved better than either’s original position.

3. Institutional competition, in which the conflicts have been less over the substance of policy than over institutional prerogatives and the balance between the need for executive accountability and congressional oversight

4. Confrontation, in which the policy positions have been in substantial conflict and the relationship has been characterized by great tensions.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERHIP: THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

In the wake of World War II, and in the beginning of the Cold War, US foreign policy politics was dominated by what was called the ‘Cold War Consensus’. Some fundamental components in the consensus:

• There must be presidential dominance over Congress in the making of foreign policy, as strong leadership is needed to stand strong against the communists, and in the role of global leadership. The Cold War added to presidential authority in the making of foreign policy politics by encouraging the president to act energetically and decisively.

• This naturally led to an expansion of the executive-branch foreign and defense policy bureaucracy.

TWO MAIN FACTORS IN PRESIDENTIAL DOMINANCE AFTER WWII

1. The organizational or institutional capacity. - The communist threat and the overhanging danger of nuclear war were seen

as the functional and moral equivalents of war. The presidency had – or was seen to have - greater institutional capacity to conduct foreign affairs in such an environment. The institutional setting of the presidency more closely resembles a unitary actor capable of swift and energetic decision making. The presidency could act with needed speed and decisiveness in important cases. Congress was seen as too slow and unwieldy in its procedures to respond with the necessary dispatch.

2. Information advantage:

– The presidency – because of the Cabinet and advisors - possessed the information and expertise necessary for understanding foreign affairs. Congress was seen as too parochial to pay sufficient attention to world affairs, and too amateur to understand the. This ill-faith of Congress was even expressed by senators themselves. Senator Fulbright declared that “the source of an effective foreign policy under our system is Presidential power”.

LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND INFORMATION

5 shortcomings of the US Congress

when it comes to make or participate in (effective) foreign policy politics

(1) Power in Congress is diffuse.

Although technically a single institutional entity, Congress embraces many different centers of power and authority. This ranges from the House and Senate leadership to different coalitions both within and across different committees and subcommittees.

Earlier, it was – because of a more hierarchical system based on especially seniority – easier to gather a few leaders. Today, members are younger, more sophisticated, more active, more diverse, more independent and less respect-ful of traditional patterns of authority. There is no single person or group of people that the executive branch can consult with and conclude that it has gained congressional support.

(2) Congress is often not open to discussion or consultation.

There has been seen a tendency in Congress that it wants to be briefed by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State, as well as an unwillingness to hear from lower-ranking officials.

Congress is often poorly informed about foreign policy. Most Members focus mainly on domestic issues because of the interests of their constituencies, and many of them give little thought to foreign affairs except when a vote is pending or a crisis breaks.

This lack of sustained interest in foreign policy makes it more difficult for an administration to consult or for Congress itself to take up issues.

(3) Congress tends to be heavily influenced by special interests in the short run.

This is especially in regard to prominent ethnic groups in the Member’s districts. Moreover, they are mostly interested in reaching short-term objectives.

This narrow perspective can complicate an administration's efforts to develop long-term policies that offer no immediate political benefits.

(4) Partisanship in Congress can weaken effectiveness and openness

Early in the Clinton presidency, House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R) refused to consult with the Clinton administration while Democrats were present. Divided government, a prevalent feature – and a proud product of the Constitution – can be an obstacle in the way of an influential Congress in the making of US foreign policy.

This can become a even more pronounced problem in the future as there a trend toward ideological polarization between the parties. As such, to set aside party identification becomes less likely.

(5) Congress can leak sensitive information.

Executive branch fear of leaks of information can discourage officials from sharing information with Congress.

However, this can just as well go the other way around, and many administration officials are skillful at leaking information to Congress and the public to advance their own agendas.

CONTEMPORARY US FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

• After the Vietnam war, the Cold War Consensus was shattered, and many – both the media, the public, and certainly also Congress - felt that the presidency had gained to much power in foreign policy making.

• This was reflected in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and in the congressional override of President Nixon’s veto of the resolution. The clause can be seen as a piece of procedural foreign policy politics, as it was an effort to restructure how decisions on the use of military force are made.

• But the pre-Vietnam presidencies had, in effort to exercise the expanded power, already established a both stronger and more numerous executive branch with many new departments and agencies, which could not easily be rolled back.

• Many scholars have pointed to the fact that the Post-Vietnam syndrome; the strengthening of Congress as well as the post-Cold War changes in the international environment have not lessened the president’s centrality and dominance in the realm of foreign policy decision-making (Hastedt & Eksterowicz, 1999).

Historical events have not resolved the question of which branch originates or

finally determines policy. Post-Vietnam presidents have not established a

procedural consensus about the proper roles of Congress and the executive branch.

The roles and relative influence of the two branches in making foreign policy

differ according to many different parameters:

• The historical time – the both international and domestic climate (Cold War

Consensus)

• Recent success or failure in the realm of foreign policy (Vietnam or Iraq).

• The personalities of the President, advisors, and members of Congress.

• The degree of consensus on policy.

Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of presidential

and congressional dominance in making foreign policy.

INTRA-BRANCH POWER RELATIONS

‘Perhaps the greatest difficulties of understanding US foreign policy arises when the process itself is left out of consideration’ (Rubin, 2012)

• Earlier, the thinking about US foreign policy politics did not include considerations of executive branch politics. Foreign policy politics was seen as an inter-branch phenomenon.

• This way of thinking is found through-out the literature especially in regard to the legislature, which is often treated as a unified actor.

• The same could be said about the executive branch, which was not seen as being composed of many different – and often opposing – departments.

• The roots of this way of thinking about US foreign policy politics can be found in the revolutionary work “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” (1971) by the American political scientist Allison Graham.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The power of the executive branch is vested in the President, who also acts as head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

The president is responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws written by Congress and, to that end, appoints heads of the federal agencies, inclu-ding the Cabinet.

The Cabinet and independent federal agencies are responsible for the day-to-day enforcement and administration of federal laws.

The Cabinet is an advisory body made up of the heads of the executive departments. Appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the members of the Cabinet are often the President's closest confidants.

After World War II, the powers of the executive branch was expanded.

THE BIG FOUR IN US (INTERBRANCH) FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Three cabinet (maybe four) departments take center stage in American foreign policy:

The Secretary of State The National Security advisor

The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Homeland Security

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Within the executive branch, the Department of State is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, and the Secretary of State is the President's principal adviser.

The Department of State plays the leading role in both developing and implemen-ting foreign policy. Some of the major responsibilities include the United States representation abroad, foreign assistance, foreign military training programs, countering international crime, and a wide assortment of services to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals seeking entrance to the U.S.

The U.S. maintains diplomatic relations with approximately 180 countries — each posted by civilian U.S. Foreign Service employees — as well as with international organizations. At home, more than 5,000 civil employees carry out the mission of the Department.

The Secretary of State oversees 30,000 employees and a budget of approximately $35 billion.

OTHER ACTORS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

After World War II, the United States found itself faced with a new global order – and with the leadership of this new order. From this came many new responsibilities and challenges. To the political leaders in Washington, it became clear that major institutional changes and a rewriting of political practices were needed.

In the wake of the war, in 1947-1949, the National Security Council (NSC), The Department of Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established.

From this point of the Department of State was no longer the sole principal advisor to the President. It had competition.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The original purpose of the NSC was to be a formal mechanism for bringing together the president’s most important foreign policy advisers. The NSC had only a small staff, and the national security adviser was a low-profile position. The position as National Security Advisor does not need the approval of Congress.

Peaking with Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration, the national security adviser became more and more powerful, and has according to many become more prominent than the Secretary of State in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Today, the National Security Council (NSC) is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. A lot of the Council’s power rest in it’s ability of handling crisis in ‘real time’, which is needed in an era of simultaneity and instantaneity in events around the world.

The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

In 1949, the US Department of Defense was established.

According to White House, the mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the US. The department's headquarters is at the Pentagon.

The DoD was the combination of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as many agencies, offices, and commands, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The DoD occupies the vast majority of the Pentagon building.

The Department of Defense is the largest government agency, with more than 1.3 million on active duty, nearly 700,000 civilian personnel, and 1.1 million citizens who serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was also created during the same period as the US Department of Defense.

THE NEWEST ADDITION:THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Being the third largest department, The Department of Homeland Security was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to 9/11.

The new department includes 22 executive branch agencies, including the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The Department employs some 216,000 people in its mission to patrol borders, protect travelers and our transportation infrastructure, enforce immigration laws, and respond to disasters and emergencies. The agency also promotes preparedness and emergency prevention among citizens. Policy is coordinated by the Homeland Security Council at the White House, in cooperation with other defense and intelligence agencies.

• The State Department is a powerful institution. The bureaucracy includes both diplomats and staff members who are shaping US foreign policy every day. But the State Department must face regular competition for influence with other departments and agencies. Especially, it struggles with NSC to influence the presidents’ view on foreign policy. The NSC is close in psychical proximity to the president, and has profound influence.

• There has always been a struggle between the career diplomats of the State Department and the military officers of the Pentagon. This has especially between magnified in handling the war against terrorism. The State Department had been the centre of counter terrorism, but its competence came under question after 9/11. The DoD supported Bush’ inclination to pursue a global war on terrorism with military power. State Department under the leadership of Colin Powell wanted Bush’ to pursue diplomatic channels instead.

INTERBRANCH COMPETION

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE OF A INTRABRANCH DISPUTE BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE

In 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed the House Foreign Relations Committee that she had requested 129 military employees to fill State Department positions in support of the President’s new Iraq plan. Officials at the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, opposed the request, and insisting that they had personnel shortages of their own.

This may appear to be just another incident of bureaucratic turf battles, but beneath this tussle lies a national security policy dilemma: What should the division of labor be? And how should manpower and funding resources be distributed? Which belief system should dominate?

The Departments of Defense and State are each other’s opponent. The State Department is event driven, and attached to big-picture concepts and subtle progress. The Department of Defense is guided by principles on operational effectiveness. These characteristics have caused policy makers both in the executive Branch and in Congress to assign more and more national security responsibility to the Pentagon.

DISCUSSION

• Do you think it would be desirable for United States to change their foreign policy making process in the direction of a more consultative Congress?

• What would the Founding Fathers prefer: A imperial presidency in the realm of foreign policy politics or a less energetic presidency, which was completely dependent upon Congress.

• Would the United States be able to keep it global leadership role if the president consulted more with Congress?

LITERATURE

• http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm• http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm• http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Secrets-of-

State.pdf• http://www.cfr.org/congresses-parliaments-national-legislatures/backseat-d

riving-role-congress-american-diplomacy/p31903.

• http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Secrets-of-State.pdf.

• US Foreign Policy in Action: An Innovative Teaching Text•  Af Jeffrey S. Lanti• http://fpif.org/unbalanced_security_the_divide_between_state_and_defens

e/

• http://www.centeroncongress.org/foreign-policy-consultation-between-president-and-congress