Uneasy Giant the Challenges to American Predominance

UNEASY GIANT

THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICANPREDOMINANCE

PETER W. RODMAN

THE NIXON CENTER

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The Nixon Center is a non-partisan public policy institution established byformer President Richard Nixon shortly before his death in 1994.Committed to the analysis of policy challenges to the United Statesthrough the prism of the American national interest, the Center is asubstantively and programmatically independent division of the RichardNixon Library and Birthplace Foundation.

Major programs of the Nixon Center include the Chinese Studies Program,European Security Program, Immigration Program, National SecurityProgram, Regional Strategic Program, and U.S.-Russian RelationsProgram. Topics addressed by Center programs range from U.S. relationswith China and Russia to energy geopolitics in the Persian Gulf andCaspian Basin and European security issues. The Center is supported bythe Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation endowment as well as byfoundation, corporate, and individual donors.

Copyright 2000 The Nixon Center All Rights Reserved

Rodman, Peter W.Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance

by Peter W. Rodman

The Nixon Center1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1250Washington, DC 20036Phone: (202) 887-1000Fax: (202) 887-5222E-mail: [email protected]:www.nixoncenter.org

Prepared by: Meghan Bradley

Order from the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation1-800-USA-8865

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This monograph is the fifth in The Nixon Center’s series of annualstrategic assessments produced by Peter W. Rodman, our Director of NationalSecurity Programs. Unlike his most recent papers in this series, which focusedon particular strategic issues (China, Russia, Europe), this one surveysAmerica’s global position and the challenges to it. It is a broad yet conciseexamination of American strategy and an inquiry into the American nationalinterest in today’s new post-Cold War conditions. It is also a valuablecontribution to our national debate on foreign policy. Having served in keyforeign policy positions under four presidents – with responsibilities that gavehim a strategist’s global perspective – Peter Rodman is particularly well-qualified to undertake this task.

Forthcoming Nixon Center monographs will examine problems noless central to American foreign policy. This fall, we will release a newmonograph by Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs,reevaluating American policy in the Caspian Basin and the Middle East. InDecember, China Studies Director David M. Lampton and Center AssistantDirector Greg May will complete a study assessing the potential for a newarms race in East Asia and proposing U.S. policies to avoid that outcomewhile ensuring the defense of vital American interests in the region.

Dimitri K. Simes President The Nixon Center

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………..vii

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………1

I. HOW OTHERS ARE REACTING………………………………………5The Multipolarity BrigadeDesperately Seeking AutonomyA World “Unbalanced”Keeping Our Cool

II. THE HISTORICAL TREND………………………………………….19Theories of American DeclineHow Unipolar? And for How Long?Problems Nonetheless

III. OUR REAL VULNERABILITIES……………………………………27Military: Asymmetric ChallengesEconomic: Systemic WeaknessesPolitical: Centrifugal Forces

IV. STRATEGY FOR A SUPERPOWER…………………………………39National Interest Makes a ComebackA Grand StrategyThe Problem of American Unilateralism

CONCLUSION: A NEW GRAND BARGAIN?…………………………..53

NOTES………………………………………………………………..59

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………..69

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While Americans celebrate their “unipolar moment” in history, therest of the world seems not to be joining in the celebration. On the contrary,for the world’s other major powers (including our friends), the extraordinarypredominance that America now enjoys is a problem rather than a blessing.A main theme of their foreign policies today is to build counterweights toAmerican power. Americans seem strangely oblivious to this trend, and tothe need for a strategy to deal with it.

For many nations, “multipolarity” is the mantra; it is the explicitrejection of the idea that the world ought to be, or remain for long, unipolar.The Russians and Chinese have made this a central theme of their foreignpolicies. Our European allies, as well, see it as one of the main purposes ofthe growing European Union to be a counterweight to the United States andto reduce Europe’s dependence on us. A number of Third World countriesopenly declare their unhappiness with a world that is now “unbalanced”since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Most likely, this “unipolar moment” will last for a long time. There isno challenger that will be able to match the scale and range of America’sglobal predominance for the foreseeable future. But this does not exhaust theproblem of American foreign policy. In the real world, our predominantstrength is not enough by itself to ensure against a range of potentialdisasters. Whether America’s physical preponderance translates intopredominant influence over events depends, for one thing, on a variety ofintangibles – like political will and staying power, the credibility of ourcommitments, our perceived willingness or unwillingness to take risks, ourreputation for reliability and competence. All these depend on our actualperformance over time – and could be badly undermined by a policy fiasco(such as a failed military intervention).

Even if we remain Number One in the GDP standings for a long time,both we and the international system are more vulnerable than we seem torealize. In the military dimension, there are potential adversaries pursuing“asymmetric” strategies, attempting to zero in on our weaknesses. Some, forexample, are pursuing by either advanced conventional weapons or weaponsof mass destruction to raise the risk of American casualties and thereby todeter us from intervening against regional challenges. In the economicsphere, the Asian crisis was a warning of the fragility of the internationalfinancial system, and the present prosperity remains vulnerable to crisis. Inthe political realm, relations among all the world’s major powers are much

Uneasy Giantviii

more precarious than they were a decade ago in the first euphoric years afterthe Cold War.

The United States can defuse some international resentments by aforeign policy based on the American national interest, rather than aWilsonian mission of global improvement. Given the scale of Americanpredominance, our assertiveness in any cause, no matter how selfless weperceive it to be, is seen by others – including our friends – as an assertion ofour power. How else to explain the paradox that resentment of the UnitedStates seems to be so high in the time of an Administration so eager to bevirtuous, even to the point of apologizing for much of America’s postwarforeign policy? A policy grounded in the American national interest,paradoxically, implies less sweeping American claims and thus a greaterpossibility of fruitful collaboration with friendly countries.

Strategically, the United States is in a central, pivotal position. Allother powers either need us for something (protection; economic ties), or areafraid to cross us, or are afraid to leave us in bed with another power theyfear as a more immediate rival. In addition to maintaining our militarystrength and deterring major challenges to peace, therefore, this centralposition furnishes the essence of a political strategy for the Americansuperpower: It gives us flexibility and leverage, and the possibility of havingbetter relations with the world’s other powers than they have with each other.It will help us preserve our position of advantage over the long term.

Despite its predominant power, therefore, the United States would besmart to conduct itself as a good internationalist – helping maintain theworld economic system, meeting its responsibility to preserve the balance ofpower, working in concert with capable and like-minded nations andinternational institutions wherever possible. On security matters, too, weshould prefer to consult and work with allies. Building and leading aninternational consensus is a task at which the United States has demonstratedgreat skill over the postwar period.

Yet, all this being said, there are some important security issues onwhich we will not be able to sacrifice our freedom of action even if it meansbeing accused of “unilateralism.” If international pressures on us seem notbased on serious strategic analysis (e.g., to ban all land mines, or to easepressures on Iraq, or to constrain all missile defenses) we have aresponsibility to say no. Whether we will be indulged on this score by ourfriends, in return for our more dutiful internationalism on all the other issues– as a new “grand bargain” – remains to be seen.

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A sympathetic European observer, German official Karsten Voigt,has described in concise terms the unprecedented scale of America’spresent global preeminence – its superiority or overwhelming influencenot only in military but also in economic and cultural affairs:

The USA is the only remaining superpower and forthe first time in history has neither comparable opponentsnor rivals. It is the only country in the world which is inthe position to make lasting global projections of militarystrength. It has the strongest economy in the world. Onlythe USA is in the position to impose its own norms andstandards (take the Internet for example) on a worldwidescale. Many Europeans still harbor feelings of superiorityover the USA as far as culture is concerned; but the dayswhen this was justified are long gone. The USA has longbeen setting standards on a worldwide basis, not just for thegeneral populace, but has been leading the field in theclassic cultural spheres, for example in research andteaching, or film and modern art. Its global role is rooted ina hitherto unknown blend of economic power, the ability toset the global cultural agenda and military superiority.1

Voigt concludes with a pointed comment on the extraordinary freedom ofaction that this gives us:

Never before has American self-esteem had less reason touse benchmarks other than its own as the guiding principlefor worldwide action.2

The nervousness implicit in that last sentence speaks volumes about thereaction of other nations, even friendly nations, to American preeminencetoday. Arnold Toynbee once reportedly compared the United States to “alarge, friendly dog in a very small room – every time it wags its tail, itknocks over a chair.”3 And that was in the old days of bipolarity.

History has not been kind to dominant powers. In the last 500years, a number of powerful nations that enjoyed or aspired to imperiumhave exhausted themselves by overextension, or provoked a coalition ofother powers against them, or otherwise lost their position of advantage.4

Presumably the United States wishes to avoid such a fate. One thesis of

2 Uneasy Giant

this paper is that the United States is more likely to succeed if it makes thetask of preserving its preeminence a matter of conscious strategy, ratherthan leaving the matter to chance or to the usual array of ad hoc, reactivedecisions by which it habitually makes foreign policy.

Warren Christopher once declared that the United States did nothave an overall strategy and, moreover, was not going to get one duringhis tenure as Secretary of State. He had learned as a lawyer, he saidproudly, that it was best to handle issues case by case as they arose.5

National security adviser Samuel R. Berger has said the same thing,doubting whether anything as grand as “grand strategy” ever reallyexisted.6 This is, to be sure, thoroughly consistent with the pragmatictradition in American philosophy (as well as the equally venerabletradition of appointing lawyers to top national security posts). But thefluidity and turbulence of today’s world, as well as the cautionary lessonsof history, nonetheless argue for thinking in more coherent fashion (that is,strategically) about how our preeminence is to be maintained. Happyendings are not guaranteed, and the world is still a dangerous place.

Charles Krauthammer, a great coiner of apt phrases, was one of thefirst to speak of the “unipolar moment” – the extraordinary predominancethat suddenly fell to the United States when Soviet power collapsed. Hewrote this in 1990, when the Soviet Union still existed. But Krauthammerchose the word “moment” wisely. He did not doubt that this time, as sooften before in history, challenges would soon arise to this Americanpredominance and its duration could not be predicted.7

He did not have to wait long. Well before the decade was out,challenges began to appear. The unipolar moment that Americans soenjoy, it seems, is not universally celebrated elsewhere. The reason goesfar beyond Karsten Voigt’s polite expression of unease. Most of theworld’s other major powers have made it a central theme of their foreignpolicy to attempt to build counterweights to American power. This is, infact, one of the main trends in international politics today.

Americans seem strangely oblivious to this. There is, of course, ageneral apathy about foreign affairs among the American public. Butamong the foreign policy elite in this country, which presumably does careabout America’s international leadership, there must be other factors thatexplain it. An important one is the traditional Wilsonian bent of Americanpolicy: An America that sees itself as leading and acting in the name ofuniversal moral principles has a tendency to assume that its leadership iswelcomed by everyone else. Why shouldn’t it be, if we are not acting outof selfish national interests but in the general interest? Such an America isgenuinely puzzled by the idea that American assertiveness in the name of

Introduction 3

universal principles could sometimes be seen by others as a form ofAmerican unilateralism. Yet unilateralism is precisely one of the chargesbeing levied against this Wilsonian administration by many countries –including, again, some of our friends. Our assertiveness, in any cause, isperceived by others in present conditions as an assertion of ourpredominant power.

Therein lies the explanation not only for American obliviousnessto the world’s reaction, but for that reaction itself. How else to explain theparadox that international resentment of American power seems to be sohigh in the time of an Administration so eager to be virtuous and that hasmade it standard procedure to apologize for much of postwar Americanforeign policy? The fact is, the rest of the world is reacting to Americanpower in a thoroughly classical, un-Wilsonian, balance-of-power fashion.The Russians and Chinese, for the past five years, have made it acenterpiece of their foreign policies to restore what they call“multipolarity” to the international system. Our Western Europeanfriends, in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, committed themselves to astronger European Union not only in the economic and monetary field butalso in foreign and security policy; the Kosovo war of 1999, instead ofvindicating NATO and American leadership, as it was seen to do inAdministration eyes, had the result of accelerating efforts to build a newall-European defense organization so that Europe would not remain sodependent on the United States. Others are reacting similarly.

American military policies which we see as defensive andnecessary, whether on land mines or missile defense, prompt new chargesof unilateralism, which other nations seek to restrain through arms control.Sentiment is growing that the United Nations Security Council ought to berestored to the role of principal arbiter of international security that wasenvisioned in the UN Charter, and that military interventions are notlegitimate unless the Security Council authorizes them. One of the mainmotives for this elevation of the UN Security Council, too, is to restrainthe American superpower.

Before going any further, I should state some of my assumptionsup front. I believe it is in America’s interest to preserve its preeminentposition, without either vainglory or false modesty. It affords us theextraordinary luxury of a great influence over events, with which to serveand advance our interests. Nor are the costs excessive. In the turbulentnew global environment after the Cold War, moreover, Americanleadership still seems the most efficacious means of organizinginternational responses to serious challenges. Until the world evolves intoa more balanced and harmonious international system, American

4 Uneasy Giant

abdication is more serious a danger than American “hegemonism” (and Isuspect that most other friendly nations, when being honest, agree). Normust the United States renounce its own judgment or interests just becauseit encounters resentment. Much of the resistance to us is structural – theinevitable and natural reaction of others to a single power’s predominance.

Nonetheless, there are two basic questions we must try to address:

First, are we handling it right? While much of the resistance tous may be unavoidable, there are also legitimate issues of style as well assubstance that call for a genuine collaboration with others. There is asmart way to be a superpower and a dumb way. This will also bring usback to the basic question of whether there is a strategy for the UnitedStates that will best head off some of the challenges we will discuss.

The second key question is: What is our real vulnerability? Is itlong-term decline? Imperial “overstretch”? Counter-coalitions formingagainst us? Or (as I believe), something less theoretical and moremundane – namely, the risk of near-term policy failures?

In Chapter I, we will examine the challenges to Americanpredominance that are already evident in the reactions of much of theworld – China, Russia, Europe, and other significant international players– that are attempting to build counterweights to our power. How seriouslyshould we take all this?

Chapter II will attempt to put the problem in perspective and assessthe historical trend: What about the theories of American decline we heardso much about a few years ago? How inevitable is it that the American“unipolar moment” will end soon?

Chapter III will consider a range of more specific challenges to theAmerican position – military, economic, and political. Our overall powermay endure, but we are not invulnerable. What are those vulnerabilities?

Chapter IV will explore some broad issues of American strategy,suggesting an approach to mastering these challenges. It will examine,among other things, the problem of American “unilateralism.”

The Conclusion will offer specific recommendations.

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THE MULTIPOLARITY BRIGADE

In the summer of 1997, TIME reported on the G-7 Summit inDenver:

As soon as it happened, the incident became legend.Germans called it “the boots fiasco.” French commentatorssniggered over it. On June 21, as Bill Clinton was playinghost to world leaders in Denver, the guests were asked totrick themselves out for the banquet in jeans, cowboy hatsand boots. Though fancy dress was meant just to break theice, the idea went as wrong as a garden party at the O.K.Corral. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, who weighsin at Panzer proportions, balked at the whole rig, butespecially the boots. “We had a long discussion aboutboots, and Kohl said he would never wear them, absolutelynever,” Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi said later.President Jacques Chirac of France also refused. A manwho very rarely wears jeans, and has never been seen inany kind of hat, Chirac had made a solemn deal with Kohlto stick together on “the vestimentary question.”8

It was a trivial episode in the grand scheme of history, but therewas a wave of resentful media commentary in Europe. In European eyesit was of a piece with other aspects of the Denver Summit, such aswatching White House aides gleefully hand out charts contrasting the higheconomic growth in the United States with the weak performance ofEurope and Japan. All the triumphalism about the “American model” washard to take.9

Europeans also complain about peremptory American impositionsof policy – the insistence on only three new admittees to NATO in the firstround at the 1997 Madrid Summit after some allies had publiclycommitted themselves to five; the abrupt U.S. veto of Germany’s firstnominee for IMF director this year. Whatever the substantive merits ofthe U.S. position, the style rankles. The leftist German weekly DerSpiegel has complained:

6 Uneasy Giant

The Americans are acting, in the absence of limits put tothem by anybody or anything, as if they own a blank checkin their “McWorld.” Strengthened by the end ofcommunism and an economic boom, Washington seems tohave abandoned its self-doubts from the Vietnam trauma.America is now the Schwarzenegger of internationalpolitics: showing off muscles, obtrusive, intimidating.10

It is not hard to accumulate evidence for the proposition that muchof the rest of the world, and not only leftists, see American preponderanceas a problem, rather than a blessing. The mantra for this point of view is“multipolarity” – the explicit rejection of the idea that the world ought tobe, or remain for long, unipolar.

The Russians and Chinese were the first to develop this theme.There is some irony here in that the Clinton Administration for a long timecongratulated itself on its “strategic partnerships” with both countries. A“strategic alliance with Russian reform” was how President Clinton oncecharacterized his policy towards Boris Yeltsin’s Russia.11 He couldvisualize, or so it seemed, a natural Wilsonian affinity between aprogressive American administration and a reformist Russian leadership.A “constructive strategic partnership” was also often said to be the aim ofAmerican policy toward China.12

Yet, if there has been any consistent theme in Russian foreignpolicy in the post-Cold War period, it is its categorical rejection ofAmerican leadership. Yevgenii Primakov, then Foreign Minister,expressed it this way in his address to the UN General Assembly inSeptember 1996. One of the basic conditions for achieving a durablepeace, as he saw it, was:

the emancipation from the mentality of “those who lead”and “those who are led.” Such a mentality draws onillusions that some countries emerged as winners from theCold War, while others lost it. But this is not the case.Peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain jointly got rid ofthe policy of confrontation. Meanwhile the mentality of“those who lead” and “those who are led” directly pavesthe way for a tendency to establish a unipolar world. Sucha world order is unacceptable to the overwhelming majorityof the international community.13

Boris Yeltsin often hailed the trend toward multipolarity that heprofessed to see gaining ground in the world. “This trend in universal

Chapter I: How Others Are Reacting 7

development has been formulated by Russia,” he boasted in May 1998.“Most of the countries have agreed with it.” And since, as Yeltsininsisted, attempts were still being made to foist the interests of one state orgroup of states on the world community, “[t]he time has come tounderstand that in the present-day world, particularly in the 21st century,no state, however strong, can impose its will on others.” Yeltsin describedRussia’s aim as a relationship of equality with the United States, but alsowithout “yielding” to American dictation:

Equal interaction with the United States is beingestablished after a period of certain illusions andextravagant expectations. Positive dynamics in relationswith the United States should be preserved, while thereshould be no yielding to the United States.14

“Striving for a multipolar world” is a main theme of VladimirPutin’s foreign policy line, as part of the continuity he has promised.15

There is nothing objectionable in such declarations. Russia’sindependence, and even its reemergence as a great power, are notintrinsically threatening to the United States. Nonetheless, Russo-American relations ought to be viewed by Americans without thesentimentality of the early post-Soviet years – just as they are now viewedby Russians. Whatever Wilsonian affinity the Clinton Administration mayhave been assuming it had with Russian “reform,” Russians themselveshave been thinking in more classical terms about how to define their ownnational interests in the extraordinary circumstances in which they nowfind themselves. Resisting American dominance seems clearly to be a partof that definition.

The Chinese have expressed the same passion for “multipolarity.”Liu Huaqiu, a Vice Foreign Minister serving as the chief national securityadviser to the President and Premier, expressed similar confidence in 1997that world trends were moving toward multipolarity, with China in theforefront:

A multipolar world has become the growing trend, andChina has developed into a main force.…The internationalstatus of socialist China has strengthened; its reputation hasgrown, and its influence has expanded. China will developinto an important role in the future multipolar world.16

Nor is it surprising that Russia and China have come together onthis theme. When Yeltsin visited Beijing in April 1996, the rhetoric on

8 Uneasy Giant

both the Russian and Chinese sides was extraordinary in its bluntness.The joint communiqué of that visit, signed by Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin,came close to branding the United States a threat to peace:

[T]he world is far from being tranquil. Hegemonism,power politics and repeated imposition of pressures onother countries have continued to occur. Bloc politics hastaken up new manifestations.17

Yeltsin in his own remarks in China warned of an attempt by certain othercountries to “dominate” and celebrated the fact that “Russia and China are[as] one in creation of a new world order, in which no one will aspire to amonopoly in world affairs.”18 When Chinese Premier Li Peng visitedYeltsin in Moscow at the end of December 1996, their joint communiquéstressed their strategic cooperation in the cause of multipolarity:

The sides are unanimous that….a partnership of equalrights and trust between Russia and China aimed atstrategic cooperation in the 21st century…promotes theformation of a multipolar world.19

The joint communiqué of Yeltsin’s last visit to Beijing, in December1999, offered more of the same, only updated after Kosovo:

[N]egative momentum in international relationscontinues to grow, and the following is becoming moreobvious: The forcing of the international community toaccept a unipolar world pattern and a single model ofculture, value concepts and ideology, and a weakening ofthe role of the United Nations and its Security Council; theseeking of excuses to give irresponsible explanations oramendment to the purposes and principles of the UNCharter; the reinforcing and expanding of military blocs;the replacing of international law with power politics oreven resorting to force; and the jeopardizing of thesovereignty of independent states using the concepts of“human rights are superior to sovereignty” and“humanitarian intervention.” 20

I, for one, take this Russian-Chinese collaboration seriously. Ifthere is any relationship that deserves the name “strategic partnership,” itis this one. It reflects a geopolitical convergence of view – contrary toours – on a wide range of issues, from missile defense and humanitarianintervention to Chechnya and Taiwan. It includes Russian arms sales toChina that already pose a danger to U.S. forces (see Chapter III below).


These arms sales reflect a kind of Gaullist strategic decision by Russia thatbuilding up China’s power is a good thing. “The stronger China becomes,the more peace and stability in the region will benefit,” YevgeniiPrimakov declared a few years ago.21

DESPERATELY SEEKING AUTONOMY

More surprising, and therefore perhaps more significant, is thedegree to which this reaction to American predominance is also a featureof some contemporary European attitudes. The dependence that markedthe last 50 years was the source of accumulating resentments on both sidesof the Atlantic, and the end of the Cold War danger has led our allies toseize the opportunity to expand their autonomy. The new European“identity,” of course, is also the product of a long-standing and thoroughlypositive project – that of European integration – which the United Stateshas supported from the beginning. This has produced historicreconciliations on the Continent, and enormous economic progress.Western statesmen after World War II were exceedingly wise to seek toavoid the political and economic debacle that followed the more punitivepeace after World War I. Yet, there is no mistaking that in presentconditions Europe is seeking to define its identity at least in part bydifferentiation from the United States. A common theme of Europeanrhetoric, even of the friendliest of our allies, is that it is time for Europe tobuild itself into an equal of the United States, to be a counterweight to theUnited States, to achieve greater autonomy from the United States, tolessen its dependence on the United States, and so on.

The French, as often, express this the most sharply. ForeignMinister Hubert Védrine has labeled the United States not only asuperpower but a “hyperpower,” for the unique range of its dominance inthe political, military, economic, and cultural realms. The need for Europeto counterbalance this power is, for France, a self-evident axiom. To aconference of French ambassadors in 1997, Védrine declared:

Today there is one sole great power – the United States ofAmerica. …When I speak of its power, I state afact…without acrimony. A fact is a fact. …But this powercarries in itself, to the extent that there is no counterweight,especially today, a unilateralist temptation … and the riskof hegemony.

France’s policy, he went on to say, was:

10 Uneasy Giant

to contribute….to the emergence of several poles in theworld capable of being a factor of equilibrium. …Europe is[such] an actor, a means of influence absolutely necessaryfor such a multipolar world to come about.22

In an interview in 1998, Védrine complained again that “a major factor inthe world today” was “the overriding predominance of the United States inall areas and the current lack of any counterweight.” He urged his fellowEuropeans to step up to the task of being that counterweight:

We have to have nerves of steel. We have to persevere.We have to methodically broaden the basis for agreementbetween Europeans. We have to coordinate with theUnited States all along the line on a basis agreed by allEuropean states, combining a friendly approach with theneed to be respected, and defending organizedmultilateralism and the requirements of the SecurityCouncil under all circumstances. Finally, we have to planpolitically, institutionally, and mentally for the time whenEurope has the courage to go farther.23

When President Jacques Chirac visited Beijing in May 1997, hejoined with Jiang Zemin in insisting on “multipolarity” in the globalsystem and in opposing “domination”:

Both parties [China and France] have decided to … fosterthe march towards multipolarity, to support efforts to createwealth and well-being on the basis of respecting pluralityand independence, …and to oppose any attempt atdomination in international affairs.24

Building “counterweights.” The “risk of hegemony.” Opposing“attempts at domination.” If anyone thought that the end of the Cold Warmeant the end of “old-fashioned” balance-of-power thinking, this is asclassical as one can get.

But the French are not the only Europeans to think in these terms.In the economic realm, the strengthened Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) brought about by the Maastricht Treaty had the explicit goal ofmaking the EU a stronger economic bloc in the competition with otherpowers. Helmut Kohl, no enemy of the United States, put it this way in aspeech in Louvain in 1990:

[W]e all need Europe to be competitive in theglobal market. Only together are we able to assert


ourselves against the trade blocs of the Far East and NorthAmerica, and with the Mercosur pact that Latin Americawill join as well.25

Joschka Fischer, now German Foreign Minister, summed up thesignificance of the EMU in an address to the European Parliament inJanuary 1999:

The introduction of a common currency is notprimarily an economic, but rather a sovereign and thuseminently political act. With the communitarization of itsmoney, Europe has also opted for an autonomous path inthe future and, in close collaboration with our transatlanticpartners, for an autonomous role in tomorrow’s world.26

Likewise Wim Kok, Dutch Prime Minister: “EMU can develop into acornerstone for Europe’s further political integration – forming thefoundation for Europe’s increased power in the world.”27

Making Europe into a “counterweight to the United States” (asWim Kok put it on yet another occasion) is even more evidently the goalof Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, also mandated byMaastricht.28 The Kosovo crisis only intensified this. In the early days ofthe Kosovo diplomacy, in late 1998, Tony Blair – perhaps America’sclosest friend among European leaders – cited Kosovo as a reason for theEuropean Union to develop a defense institution of its own. This was amajor reversal of British policy that had always insisted on NATO as theexclusive organization for Western security. In a speech in Edinburgh inNovember 1998, Blair complained that Europe had been “hesitant anddisunited” over Kosovo; it was time for Europe to develop a capacity forautonomous action so it would not always be so dependent on the UnitedStates.29

The Kosovo war in the spring of 1999, as already noted, onlyintensified this impulse in Europe. While the air campaign was aremarkable demonstration of transatlantic solidarity and a dramaticsuccess of an American-led Alliance operation, the breathtaking scale ofAmerican technological dominance had a paradoxical if not perverseeffect. For many European governments, particularly those of a center-leftcoloration, participation in any American-led war was political agony;governments were bitterly assaulted by anti-American leftists (andGaullist rightists in France), though the anti-Milosevic cause was enoughto sustain public support. The conclusion drawn by many Europeans,across the political spectrum, was that Europe needed to accelerate its own

12 Uneasy Giant

technological development and its creation of a European defenseinstitution, precisely in order that it not be in such a position again.

An official German account of the Bremen meeting of the WesternEuropean Union in May 1999 reported:

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Defense MinisterRudolf Scharping urge a rapid buildup of common EUforces to master crises and conflicts in Europe even withoutparticipation of the United States. The Kosovo conflictexpresses how urgent and indispensable this buildup will befor the future of Europe, declared Fischer….30

At the Helsinki summit of the EU last December, the Europeans decidedon the goal of fielding an all-European force of 50-60,000 men by 2003, tohandle middle-range military tasks of peacekeeping, crisis management,and humanitarian intervention. While the position of all the allies is thatthe North Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation of European security,German Greens have hailed the EU’s defense project as the beginning ofEurope’s “emancipation” from the United States. As they see it:

Especially in the context of the war in Kosovo, manyvoices have called for the emancipation of the Europeanstates from the USA, and the development of anindependent European security policy.31

Japan’s attitude to American preeminence is somewhat morecomplicated. While the end of the Soviet threat led many in Japan toquestion why the Americans were still around, the North Korean menaceand the emergence of China have supplied an answer to the question.Japan’s assertiveness on many issues has also probably been dampened bythe disappointment of its economic performance in recent years. Yet, theexperts agree that Japanese nationalism is also reemerging.

Japanese government officials now stress “autonomy” from theUnited States as a central theme. Japan “must paint its own self-portrait”in security relations with the United States, they argue.32 Other Japaneseare calling on their country to rewrite its American-drafted Constitution; toforge a new identity as a bridge between East and West, not just anappendage of the West; to seek a greater influence and empowerment vis-à-vis the United States by becoming more active in the United Nations;and to challenge U.S dominance of international economic policy.Kyofuku Fukushima of Nomura Research Institute, for example, hascomplained that “American control of the strategic decision-making inimportant international economic organizations” has given rise to a


“Market Fundamentalism and idealization of the Anglo-American typecapitalism” that is “dangerous and counterproductive.”33

In its own way, the debacle of the Seattle meeting of the WorldTrade Organization last December may have had some of the same impactin Japan as the Kosovo crisis had in Europe. “The failure poured coldwater on the overconfidence of the United States,” trumpeted AsahiShimbun in an editorial. “The conference was an occasion that the otherdeveloped countries and developing countries said no to the United States,which is selfish and over-proud of itself as the sole superpower of theworld.”34

A WORLD “UNBALANCED”

Many countries in the Third World, as well, see the emergence ofthe United States as the sole superpower as a mixed blessing. During theCold War, many of them had played off the two superpowers against eachother, or were able to claim much of the superpowers’ attention while thecompetition raged. (There was even a period, in the 1950s and ‘60s, whenWashington and Moscow seemed to believe the whole East-West conflictwould be decided in the Third World, though this panic gradually faded.)In any case, the Soviet collapse has left the international system too“unbalanced” for some countries’ taste.

Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amre Moussa, in a revealing 1996interview in Middle East Quarterly, let the cat out of the bag. There was a“lack of international balance,” he lamented, now that the Soviet Unionwas gone. The following exchange took place:

Interviewer: And the negative side [of the Soviet collapse]?Moussa: Its negative aspects center around the lack of internationalbalance.Interviewer: You’re telling us that the United States is too strong?Moussa: You can take it as you like.Interviewer: This is a remarkable comment; America’s foremostArab partner says it misses the balance provided by the SovietUnion!35

This was indeed a remarkable shift from the policy of Anwar Sadat, whohad expelled the Soviet presence from Egypt and thrown in Egypt’s lotwith the United States, calculating (even while the Soviet Union stillexisted) that America held “most of the cards” in the Middle East. Egyptnow tends to align itself, ironically enough, with its old adversary Syria, tocounterbalance what it sees as a U.S.-Israeli-Turkish-Jordanian axis.

14 Uneasy Giant

The conservative Mexican daily Ocho Columnas expressed itsresentment at U.S. domineering and presumption, due in part, according tothe newspaper, to the lack of a counterweight to U.S. power:

As the step before establishing the universal new worldorder and as a successor to manifest destiny…the U.S. hasrevoked international laws and now certifies other nationsin every possible area…from drug trafficking to internalpolitical affairs…. This happens for two reasons: Thecorrupt leaders of the developing nations, who fall prey tothe pressures of powerful U.S. interest groups, and becauseof the absence of balancing forces in the world to opposethe United States.36

A more passionate statement comes from Mahathir Mohamad,Prime Minister of Malaysia. Mahathir’s speech to the UN GeneralAssembly last September was a long diatribe to the effect that theinternational system was totally unbalanced without the Soviets. Now theWest was dominant and developing countries’ independence wasthreatened. Their economies were subject to capitalist diktat under thebanner of globalization; their internal affairs were the object of brazeninterference on human rights pretexts; and Western culture and civilizationwere to be imposed on everyone. This indictment is worth quoting atlength:

The destruction of the Eastern bloc was complete.It could never again militarily challenge the Western liberaldemocratic free marketeers. Now there would be only onechoice for the world and no defection would be possible forthe countries of the world, big or small. With this theliberal democratic free market capitalists see no more needto be gentle in spreading their systems or in profiting fromthem. No one would be allowed any other political oreconomic system except what is prescribed by the soledominant bloc. The true ugliness of Western capitalismrevealed itself, backed by the military might of capitalism’sgreatest proponent.

For the small countries the demise of the Easternbloc is a major disaster. Now they are exposed to pressureswhich they cannot resist.…Soon their political freedom wasalso subverted and many had to accept political directionby the IMF or the loans would not be made available. Forpractical purposes there was no independence.…


[T]he principle that prevailed in the third quarter ofthe 20th Century was that no one should interfere in theinternal affairs of a nation. That in fact was the essence ofindependence. As long as the world was divided intoEastern and Western blocs this principle was respected.

But then a President decided that his country had aright and a duty to oversee that human rights are not abusedanywhere in the world irrespective of borders and theindependence of nations. No one conferred this right onthis crusading President. But small things like that was[sic] not going to stop him.

The claimed victory of the West in the Gulf Warwas regarded as a moral endorsement of the right of thepowerful to interference in any country’s internal affairs.…Soon it was not just human rights. Systems ofGovernment and the administration of justice, of thefinancial and commercial systems came under the scrutinyof the powerful countries. They insist that there must beonly one way of administering a country and that is theliberal democratic way. They insist that there can be onlyone economic system for the whole world and that is thefree market system.

For the poor and the weak, for the aspiring tigersand dragons of Asia, the 21st Century does not look verypromising. Everything will continue to be cooked in theWest. Just as Communism and Socialism came from theWest, liberal democracy, globalisation, a borderless world,deregulation, unfettered free flows of capital and theirflights to quality, the disciplining of Governments by themarket and by currency traders and a host of other ideas allcome from the West. And what is from the West isuniversal. Other values and cultures are superfluous andunnecessary. If they remain there will be a clash ofcivilisations. To avoid this there should be only onecivilisation in the world. Everything should bestandardised according to Western best practices.37

Mahathir is an extreme case, to be sure, but it is not so certain thatthese resentments on his part are an isolated phenomenon or whether hemerely says openly what other Third World leaders, perhaps in a less

16 Uneasy Giant

overwrought form, privately believe. Indeed, there is an echo ofMahathir’s diatribe against “globalization” in the more polite statementwith which the President of India greeted President Clinton in Delhi lastMarch. Mr. Clinton got an earful from President Narayanan about howAmerican dominance in the world required a strengthening of the UnitedNations:

[T]he other dominant fact is the emergence of the UnitedStates of America as the major economic, technologicaland military factor in the world. The USA holds atremendous responsibility for strengthening peace andstability in the world. For that purpose, the United Nationsorganization should be strengthened and made thecenterpiece of the new global architecture.

And about how India was determined to protect its identity andindependence from the “hegemonistic” forces of globalization:

But for us, globalization does not mean the end of historyand geography, and of the lively and exciting diversities ofthe world. As an African statesman has observed to us, thefact that the world is a global village does not mean that itwill have only one village headman.…

Globalization means that global societies should besustained by each unit – the nation states, groups, familiesand individuals who have their own inextinguishableidentities and unique characteristics.…In such a globalizedworld society, there would be no place for hegemonisticcontrols or cutthroat competition.38

KEEPING OUR COOL

Much of this reaction is inevitable, given the extraordinary degreeof American preponderance. In some contexts, there is even a healthyaspect to it.

For our allies, in particular, as suggested, it is an opportunity torestore some balance to a relationship of dependency. Relationships ofdependency are by their nature corrosive; they breed resentments on bothsides. A U.S. Congress that has been complaining for years aboutinequitable “burden-sharing” should be pleased if allies now seek a greaterself-reliance. The issue with the Europeans, then, becomes a narrowerone. The Atlantic Alliance remains important, and valued, on both sidesof the Atlantic. (Even the French avow this.) Therefore, the task of policy


is to develop the European Union’s new defense policy and structure in away that complements the Alliance and remains in its broad frameworkrather than disrupting Western unity.39 Assuming the anti-Americanrhetoric in Europe can be kept under control, the result could be positive –especially if the Europeans actually develop effective military capabilitiesfor handling a variety of crises and peacekeeping chores that theAmericans would be glad to pass on to them. With Japan, similarly,sufficient dangers exist to justify continuation of the security alliance, buta more equal strategic partnership would be healthy.

As for the general foreign complaint that the world is“unbalanced,” there is not much the United States can do about this, shortof collapsing or abdicating its international role. The demise of the SovietUnion did, alas, vindicate market economics and the idea of freedom; ifthis is painful for governments that would prefer to govern by contraryprinciples, then they have a problem we cannot solve for them. The lawsof economics apply to everyone, and we live in an age when everyauthoritarian regime faces a problem of legitimacy. We could not shieldothers from these forces even if we wanted to.

Some of the complaints about American imposition have a familiarring. It has often been the case that other countries’ leaders found itconvenient to use Uncle Sam as a scapegoat for problems created by theirown failings, or as an excuse for painful (and necessary) decisions. Infact, being a useful foil in this manner is a service we have provided forother countries for many decades.40

Yet, all this being said, the United States has a problem too.Americans need to understand that other countries will not allautomatically and happily fall into line under our tutelage. Europe is thecontinent where the balance of power was invented; for most nations thefact of a single predominant power triggers the reflex to buildcounterweights. We shouldn’t take it so personally; it is a survival instinctof smaller countries throughout history. It is a law of geopolitics –something that should be a surprise only to those who know notgeopolitics.

The first question we must now turn to is: How serious is thistrend, or aspiration, to build counterweights to American power? Is therea countercoalition forming, as Russia, China, Europe, and other keycountries find common cause in blocking U.S. predominance? Will this,in the end, mean a reduction of U.S. dominance and an end to the“unipolar” world?

II. TII. TII. TII. THE HE HE HE HHHHISTORICAL ISTORICAL ISTORICAL ISTORICAL TTTTRENDRENDRENDREND

Anyone writing about the durability of America’s preponderanceof power needs, first of all, to try to separate the ephemeral from thefundamental. Much of America’s seeming invincibility, no doubt, is afunction of its present, brilliantly successful economic performance. If so,one must ask: How dark a shadow over this picture would be cast by thenext economic downturn, or the next energy or financial crisis? Andwasn’t it Alan Greenspan who warned in 1996 that at least part of the U.S.economy’s current boom was fueled by “irrational exuberance” in thestock market?41

On the other hand, it is the same Alan Greenspan who has beenrepeatedly affirming his wonderment at the extraordinary phenomenon weare witnessing in the U.S. economy – several years of acceleratingincreases in productivity, the result of a technological revolution(particularly in information technology) which, he believes, may still be inits early stages.42 If that is the case, then the economic basis for Americanstrength would seem to have a robust future, regardless of temporaryfluctuations.

Which is the real Alan Greenspan, and what can one sensibly sayabout the basic trend of international power relations – about America’sabsolute, and relative, strength?

THEORIES OF AMERICAN DECLINE

Not long ago, the idea of “American decline” was very much infashion. An important influence was Paul Kennedy’s 1987 opus, The Riseand Fall of the Great Powers,43 which surveyed the past 500 years and theexperience of Habsburg Spain and Austria, the Netherlands, France underLouis XIV and Napoleon, Britain and Germany, among others. Thelesson Kennedy drew was that “imperial overstretch” doomed all thesepowers. Their military overextension eventually sapped the economicdynamism that had given rise to their imperial drive in the first place:

[W]ealth is usually needed to underpin military power, andmilitary power is usually needed to acquire and protectwealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the state’sresources is diverted from wealth creation and allocatedinstead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a

20 Uneasy Giant

weakening of national power over the longer term. In thesame way, if a state overextends itself strategically – by,say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging ofcostly wars – it runs the risk that the potential benefits fromexternal expansion may be outweighed by the greatexpense of it all – a dilemma which becomes acute if thenation concerned has entered a period of relative economicdecline.44

Kennedy was not shy about applying his analysis to the contemporaryUnited States. Writing during the heyday of the Reagan military buildup,when we were spending more than 6 percent of our GDP on defense,Kennedy was convinced the United States was weakening itself –especially vis-à-vis other powers (like Japan) whose relative economicdynamism, he thought, foreshadowed their eventual rise to superpowerstatus.45

History played a cruel trick on Professor Kennedy. Within a fewshort years of his publication came the Soviet collapse and Japan’seconomic crisis. In addition, even as he was writing, the InformationRevolution was transforming the technological base of the globaleconomy – and the United States was leading it. The good professorseems to have been guilty of some “intellectual overstretch” of his own.

Walt Rostow wrote a perceptive critique of the Kennedy thesisvery soon after it appeared. First of all, he criticized Kennedy for makingno distinction in his historical survey between powers that had hegemonialambitions (like Napoleonic France) and powers that merely pursued abalance-of-power policy to block other, would-be hegemons (e.g., 19th-century Britain). Rostow thought the American case was closer to theBritish model and that this was a much less exhausting role. Britain’simperial decline came from causes other than pursuit of a hegemonicdream in Europe. The gradual rise of other economic powers – anotherkey factor that eroded Britain’s preponderance – similarly, in Rostow’sview, had nothing to do with Britain’s “imperial overstretch.”46

Another important corrective came from Joseph Nye. In his 1990book, Bound to Lead, Nye demonstrated that America’s post-Cold Warproportion of the world’s gross domestic product – about 22 percent – wasin the same range as in the period between World Wars I and II. In otherwords, nothing had really changed in America’s global position over thecourse of the 20th century. What some misinterpreted as an American“decline” was really the world’s rebound from the immediate aftermath ofWorld War II, when the U.S. share of the world economy had reached anextraordinary one-third to one-half – due to the exhaustion of Europe and

Chapter II: The Historical Trend 21

Japan. Once they recovered, things went back to where they werebefore.47

Nor can it plausibly be argued that the “costs of empire” areexhausting to the United States. Its defense budget is now only 3 percentof GDP – the lowest since before Pearl Harbor. (For purposes ofcomparison, the figure averaged around 10 percent in the EisenhowerAdministration and around 9 percent in the Kennedy period.)48 Themodest recent increases notwithstanding, the country is still benefitingfrom the “peace dividend” provided by the Soviet collapse – a defensebudget 33 percent lower in real terms than the 1985 peak of the Reaganbuildup.49

HOW UNIPOLAR? AND FOR HOW LONG?

There are many who warn the United States against the sin ofhubris, and such warnings should always be taken to heart. ChristopherLayne, for example, has written:

In the real world,…this unilateral dominance – whatpolitical scientists call hegemony – is self-defeating. In thefirst place, hegemony cannot be sustained. Secondly,attempts to do so may ultimately prove more harmful thanbeneficial to American interests.

Careful students of world politics know thathegemony has never proven to be a winning strategy.When one state becomes too powerful, other states becomefearful and unite to “balance” against it.50

Who are the potential balancers? Who are the potential peercompetitors? Two in particular come to mind – China and the EuropeanUnion.

China has achieved an extraordinary explosion of economicgrowth since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms began in 1979. China’s GDPgrowth has averaged 8 percent a year since then – more than quadruplingthe size of its economy.51 In 1992, the then-chief economist of the WorldBank, Lawrence Summers (now U.S. Treasury Secretary) predicted thatChina’s GDP (measured by purchasing power parity) would exceed that ofthe United States by 2003.52 By 1996, to be sure, the World Bank wasmoderating its projections and deciding that China’s moment ofovertaking the United States was somewhere between 20 and 40 yearsoff.53 But the sheer size of China – harnessed to its economic dynamismand nationalistic energy – suggests this is not so fanciful. Not since early

22 Uneasy Giant

in the last century have we Americans even had to conceive of anothercountry with an economy the same size as ours. China’s vast scale makesit, too, an 800-pound gorilla in the world trading system; it is also atransforming factor in the regional order. By that definition, it is anemerging superpower.54 “The size of China’s displacement of the worldbalance,” Lee Kuan Yew observed in 1993, “is such that the world mustfind a new balance in 30 to 40 years. It’s not possible to pretend that thisis just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history ofman.”55

Chinese strategists, as it happens, have shown an eager if notmorbid fascination with the subject of American decline, encouraged byPaul Kennedy’s book. It has become a sub-genre of Chinese strategicanalysis. Writers in Beijing are looking hard for American militaryvulnerabilities; they are convinced that America’s relative predominanceis bound to erode as other powers gain in strength; they believe our allieswill gradually distance themselves from us; they see our social illsmounting at home. “A dying camel always thinks it’s stronger than ahorse,” some Chinese like to crack.56

But even the Chinese do not seriously see U.S. decline asimminent. Especially in light of our recent economic performance, theygive us a good 50-year run or so, before history catches up with us.57 Inthe meantime, they make do with what they can achieve diplomatically tofoster “multipolarity” in the international system.

The European Union is already an $8 trillion economy, on a parwith the United States. The advent of Economic and Monetary Union in1999 – the new common currency – has further consolidated its unity andits capability as an economic competitor to the United States. Similarly,its new aspiration to develop a common foreign and security policy andthe institutions to go with it. Measured by ability to marshal resources,range of cultural influence, and experience of global policy, in addition tomilitary and technological sophistication, Europe should probably beviewed as the candidate with the greatest potential to be a global peercompetitor (China having a more regional impact).58 If the EU had thepolitical will to establish a more unified decision-making and to developits military strength, then it would indeed increase its global influence. Itis very far from this at the moment, however.

The fact is, despite Christopher Layne’s warnings againstAmerican hubris, the trend of the last ten years has been to revise upward,in the common view, the assessment of the relative American position.Henry Kissinger, writing in 1993-1994, saw the world in political and


economic terms as re-acquiring the classical characteristics of a multipolarsystem:

The end of the Cold War has created what some observershave called a “unipolar” or “one-superpower” world. Butthe United States is actually in no better position to dictatethe global agenda unilaterally than it was at the beginningof the Cold War. America is more preponderant than it wasten years ago, yet, ironically, power has also become morediffuse. Thus, America’s ability to employ it to shape therest of the world has actually decreased. …

America will be the greatest and most powerfulnation, but a nation with peers; the primus inter pares butnonetheless a nation like others….Americans should notview this as a humbling of America or as a symptom ofnational decline. For most of its history, the United Stateswas in fact a nation among others, not a preponderatesuperpower. The rise of other power centers – in WesternEurope, Japan, and China – should not alarm Americans.After all, sharing the world’s resources and thedevelopment of other societies and economies has been apeculiarly American objective ever since the MarshallPlan.59

As the last decade progressed, however, observers seemed tochange their view of how durable the American ascendancy would be.Samuel Huntington, in a 1998 lecture, described the emerging world asneither unipolar nor multipolar but still in some sort of transition from oneto the other – a hybrid which he termed “uni-multipolar”:

A uni-multipolar world…is one in which resolution of keyinternational issues requires action by the singlesuperpower plus some combination of other major states,and in which the single superpower is able to veto action bya combination of other states.

My central thesis this evening is that global politicshas now moved from a brief unipolar moment at the end ofthe cold war into one or perhaps more uni-multipolardecades on its way toward a multipolar twenty-firstcentury.60

24 Uneasy Giant

Another distinguished scholar, Coral Bell, writing even morerecently, put even more emphasis on the American ascendancy. Herrecommendations for U.S. policy are similar to Huntington’s andKissinger’s – namely, that the United States would be smart not to throwits weight around and to act in concert with other like-minded big powersand international institutions – but she has no doubt about calling thereality “unipolar.”61

Perhaps the definitive word on the question of the durability ofAmerican preeminence, however, comes from William C. Wohlforth, whoanalyzes the subject in depth in the journal International Security in thesummer of 1999. Wohlforth surveys the historical and theoreticalliterature and finds a widespread scholarly consensus that the presentworld is not really and truly unipolar; that a unipolar system is inevitablyunstable if not dangerous, because of the inevitability of challenges to it;and that it cannot last in any case.62 Wohlforth refutes the consensus onall these points:

• In a nutshell, he sees the United States as too strong to becounterbalanced. By a variety of military, economic, andtechnological measurements and historical comparisons, heconcludes: “The U.S. combination of quantitative andqualitative material advantages is unprecedented, and ittranslates into a unique geopolitical position.”63

• Second, he argues that a unipolar system, if it is asunambiguous as the present situation, discourages major-power challenges and is therefore a stable rather than unstablearrangement.

• Third, he points out how difficult it actually is to form counter-coalitions when the unipolar leader is in a position to frustratethem by its rich repertoire of carrots and sticks.

• In addition, the power of many would-be rivals is moreconstrained by their own regional competitors than is thepower of the unipolar leader. These regional balances ofpower are likely to kick in, heading off a regional would-behegemon, before anyone is in a position to tackle the UnitedStates.

Wohlforth acknowledges that the end of the Cold War hasloosened the U.S. alliance system and thus seemingly attenuated U.S.influence. But this does not, in his view, change the structural essence ofthe matter:


The fact that some important states have more room to maneuvernow than they did under bipolarity does not mean that unipolarityis already giving way to some new form of multipolarity. The endof the bipolar order has decreased the security interdependence ofregions and increased the latitude of some regional powers. Butpolarity does not refer to the existence of merely regional powers.When the world was bipolar, Washington and Moscow had tothink strategically whenever they contemplated taking actionanywhere within the system. Today there is no other power whosereaction greatly influences U.S. action across multiple theaters.China’s reaction, for example, may matter in East Asia, but not forU.S. policy in the Middle East, Africa, or Europe. However, allmajor regional powers do share one item on their political agenda:how to deal with U.S. power. Until these states are capable ofproducing a counterpoise to the United States, the system isunipolar.64

PROBLEMS NONETHELESS

Wohlforth’s is a convincing analysis. Structurally speaking,America’s position of unipolar preponderance seems impregnable for theforeseeable future. But that, alas, does not exhaust the problem ofAmerican foreign policy.

It cannot be pleasant or healthy, first of all, to conduct Americanforeign policy in an environment in which all other countries are driven bytheir resentments into a posture of distancing themselves from us oractively blocking American initiatives. One does not have to be aWilsonian zealot to note that American internationalism since World WarII has been an extraordinary exercise in coalition-building and institution-building. We have identified our national interest in expansive terms ofglobal responsibility, and we have not been merely self-serving in doingso. In the new, post-Cold War environment, when the American peopleare less eager than before to “bear every burden,” there is probably aneven greater premium on acting in concert with others if we wish topromote progress and peace in accordance with our interests.65

Thus, a world in which American leadership is resisted more thanit is followed, while not an immediate threat to America’s globalpreponderance, would be a very different world – almost unrecognizable,in fact – and probably one much more turbulent and disordered than today.It cannot be welcome. How the United States can conduct itself to head

26 Uneasy Giant

off such an evolution is the large question of strategy to be discussedbelow in Chapter IV.

In the meantime, there is yet one more foreign policy problem thatis not allowed for in Wohlforth’s analysis. That is, in a word, the kind ofvulnerability that can come from failed performance.

Policy ineptitude is capable of making American power much lessimpressive. Whether our physical preponderance translates intopredominant influence over events depends on a variety of intangibles –like our political will and staying power; the credibility of ourcommitments; our perceived willingness or unwillingness to take risks;our reputation for reliability and competence. All these depend on ouractual performance over time. They could be badly weakened by a majorpolicy fiasco (such as a failed military intervention) or by a significantturning inward (as after Vietnam, or in an economic recession). Our topposition in the GDP rankings would remain unmatched. But in suchcircumstances, nevertheless, we might discover that other countries’impulse to distance themselves from us could graduate from the merelyrhetorical to something of serious practical consequence. Our influencecould erode.

What might be the challenges that could precipitate such a policydebacle? To that question we now turn.

III. OIII. OIII. OIII. OUR UR UR UR RRRREAL EAL EAL EAL VVVVULNERABILITIESULNERABILITIESULNERABILITIESULNERABILITIES

Speaking concretely, the vulnerabilities of American power comein three areas – military, economic, and political. We will take these inturn.

MILITARY: ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGES

This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of the flaws inthe U.S. force posture. But there are a few broad categories ofvulnerability that come to mind.

One is the concept that the Pentagon refers to as “asymmetricstrategies” – that is, strategies by which the weaker can aspire to defeat thestronger. It can attempt this by exploiting its own comparative advantageswhile zeroing in on the vulnerabilities of the stronger power. This is aclassic principle of warfare going back to Sun Tzu, not to mentionAchilles and his heel. Having recently commemorated the 25th

anniversary of the fall of Indochina, Americans can recall the frustrationsof attempting to counter a guerrilla insurgency that exploited itsadvantages of mobility, dispersal, and ability to blend in among thepopulation. In the post-Cold War world, the challenge may take the formof terrorism – even, conceivably, terrorism against the Americanhomeland and involving chemical or biological weapons of massdestruction. As one military expert puts it:

In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to allwarfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetricalwarfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived asunconventional or nontraditional methodologies.

For most potential adversaries, attacking the United Statesasymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they mightreasonably consider for the foreseeable future.66

Unconventional means are not the only possible asymmetricalmeans. Given the vital importance of power projection in U.S. strategy,this too is a vulnerability in a new era when advanced conventionalweapons are also proliferating. Our dominance of the air; our dependenceon the sea lanes and on forward bases; our increasing reliance on spaceand cyberspace – all are subject to challenge by adversaries fielding

28 Uneasy Giant

advanced but all-too-widely accessible new technologies. Theindependent National Defense Panel in 1997 listed the various kinds ofthings a resourceful adversary could attempt to do:

• Employ military tactics that cause high casualties amongU.S. forces and civilians to raise the cost and possibly deterU.S. involvement;

• Turn to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic andcruise missiles to neutralize forward ports, bases, andprepositioned assets and to inflict heavy casualties on usand our allies;

• Attack our information systems, seeking to debilitate them;

• Counter our control of the sea by seeding key straits andlittorals with large numbers of mines and by subjecting anyforces therein to missile salvos;

• Counter our control of the air with speed-of-light weaponsand extensive anti-aircraft systems;

• Target fixed installations and massed formations within therange of their weapons and seek greater stand-off abilitywith those systems;

• Attack the underlying support structures – both physicaland psychological – that enable our military operations;

• Deny us access to key regions and facilities;

• Use terror as a weapon to attack our will and the will of ourallies, and to cause us to divert assets to protect criticalinstallations, infrastructures, and populations.67

Chinese strategists, for example, have devoted a considerableamount of time to analyzing the 1991 Gulf War and looking for theweaknesses of the U.S. strategy in that conflict. Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, VicePresident of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, has pointed outthe following:

U.S. Armed Forces revealed many weak points. Forexample, the combat consumption was too great, and itcould not last long. There was great reliance on the allied

Chapter III: Our Real Vulnerabilities 29

countries. The high-tech equipment was intensive and itskey links rather weak; once they were damaged, combateffectiveness was greatly reduced. Also, if the adversary ofthe United States was not Iraq, if the battle was not foughton the flat desert, if the Iraq armed forces struck first duringthe phase when U.S. Armed Forces were still assembling,or if Iraq armed forces withdrew suddenly before the U.S.Armed Forces struck, then the outcome of the war mighthave been quite different.68

The Chinese are also looking for the Achilles heel in the Americanreliance on advanced computer and telecommunications technology –what the Pentagon calls the “Revolution in Military Affairs.” The Chineseknow they are generations behind the United States in this technology, andtherefore cannot match us in any foreseeable period. But they can look forvulnerabilities – ways to cripple an opponent’s information systemsthrough viruses, jamming, and electromagnetic pulses; weapons to attacksatellite communications systems; radar techniques that might detectstealth, etc. The Chinese have research and development programs in allthese areas.69

It is also likely, as a general rule, that many potential challengersare looking at nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons as a great“equalizer.” Even a rudimentary arsenal of such weapons could have – forIraq, or North Korea, or Iran – a powerful benefit. As was the case in theclassical era of nuclear deterrence, a challenger’s mere possession of sucha capability could make the world safe for conventional aggression.Should a local crisis arise, the United States would be deterred fromintervening, or might well be. This is clearly Saddam Hussein’scalculation as he goes all-out to build chemical or biological weapons andthe means to deliver them, shielding his plans from the prying eyes ofinternational inspectors.

There is no doubt that the Chinese too have this in mind as theyseek, by both nuclear and conventional means, to raise the potential coststo the United States of intervening in a future Taiwan crisis. Being able toblow the U.S. Seventh Fleet out of the Pacific is not the standard that theChinese must meet. Already, with their new acquisition of advancedRussian anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, they are in a position to increasethe risk of American casualties and thereby to increase the inhibitions ofan American President who contemplates such an intervention. This is asignificant shift in the regional balance.

30 Uneasy Giant

The United States is attempting in various ways to prepare itselffor asymmetrical challenges. Independent experts are placing newimportance on protecting the American homeland against new-eraunconventional threats like terrorism, possibly including weapons of massdestruction.70 The U.S. Secretary of Defense is calling for redoubledefforts to build a versatile “full spectrum” force that can counterasymmetrical military threats.71

The problem of asymmetrical challenges, however, is not solely amatter of military structure. It is also built into the structure ofinternational politics. Given American preponderance, almost everychallenge will be by definition asymmetric. And given the scope ofAmerican interests and commitments abroad, these challenges are likely tobe many in number.

Nor should anyone doubt how serious such a challenge could be,or how precarious our ability to defeat it. Part of the problem ispsychological. In most of these potential crises – say, Iraq, North Korea,Taiwan – the local challenger is counting on the fact that the issue indispute is of much more intense interest to him than to the United States,for whom all these issues are part of a generic responsibility forinternational security. If the threat of weapons of mass destruction can bebrought to bear against us (even a rudimentary capability), as alreadynoted, a potential crisis could be a doozy. It will not suffice for us to wavea copy of International Security in Saddam’s face and insist that the worldis still unipolar.

It boils down to intangibles of political will. Will we have it insufficient degree? Deterrence depends on a reputation for beingformidable. And that depends on credibility. In practice, no matter howsecure our Number-One ranking in the GDP tables, our influence in agiven case will depend on whether our challengers believe our warningsand whether our allies believe our assurances. A Western unwillingness torisk casualties is thought by Edward Luttwak to be a distinguishing featureof a new era of conflict, given social, demographic, and cultural changes.72

And the American unwillingness to risk casualties – as allegedlydemonstrated by the outcomes in both Indochina (1975) and Lebanon(1984) – was precisely what Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadersconstantly invoked before the Gulf War as reasons not to believeAmerican warnings.73 Credibility, once lost, had to be re-earned the hardway – by going to war again, and winning.

In recent years, both Iraq and North Korea have outmaneuvered us– Iraq by shutting down the effective and vitally important UN inspectionsystem, and North Korea by blackmailing us into an agreement that gives


us no direct restraint on its clandestine nuclear weapons program (or itsmissile program). These are bad omens. A new military fiasco of somekind could have a serious, perhaps disproportionate, political impact. Itcould accelerate whatever trend there might be among other countries todistance themselves from us or attempt to organize against us. Allchallengers would be emboldened. All our military problems couldbecome simultaneously more complicated and more acute, and our abilityto remedy them by new technology and new doctrine could take years.Powerful as we are, it is not clear how much margin for error we reallyhave.

ECONOMIC: SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES

Other factors that could deflate the current euphoria are economic.Again, the long-term, underlying forces of U.S. technological innovationand growth seem strong. Yet, a brief economic downturn could bringAmericans down to earth as well as generate a number of foreign policyproblems for the United States.

Alan Greenspan’s caution about the “irrational exuberance” of thestock market has been noted at the beginning of Chapter II. Yet, manyeconomic experts have commented on how the “wealth effect” of thesestock market gains is playing an unusually large role in sustainingconsumer and investor confidence in present circumstances. Robert J.Samuelson has pointed out how many of the features of today’s “NewEconomy” are unprecedented and poorly understood – the new importanceof the stock market in economic growth; the durability of technologicaladvance and productivity gains; the relation between growth,unemployment, and inflation; globalization and the impact of foreigneconomic developments on the U.S. economy. The economic experts“(and we) don’t know whether, in the long run, these forces make theeconomy more or less stable. But not one admits this,” Samuelson says.74

For our purposes here, the implications are manifold. Theextraordinary performance of the U.S. economy over the last 18 years –not only its growth but its technological innovativeness – underlies muchof this country’s present formidableness as the sole superpower; arecession, even if short-lived, could dampen some of the euphoria. Therecent spike in energy prices may be the omen of a new long-term trend asglobal demand builds. The Asian financial crisis revealed theinterconnectedness of the new global economy and the ease with whichfinancial crises can spread; though the United States escaped the contagionthe last time, the international system is not so well understood that we canbe sure of such good fortune the next time around. Thus, the vulnerability

32 Uneasy Giant

of the American economy only compounds, and is compounded by, thevulnerability of the international economic system.

A recession could reduce Americans’ willingness to carryinternational burdens. It would dampen Congressional enthusiasm formuch-needed increases in the defense budget. It would strengthenprotectionist forces in domestic battles over trade policy (e.g., "fast-track"legislation) that are remarkably bitter even in these good times. Arecession here that spreads abroad (as it inevitably would) woulddemoralize allies, destabilize a number of weaker economies, and addgenerally to international turbulence and tensions.

The breakup of last November’s Seattle meeting of the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) pointed to serious divisions among the world’seconomic powers. Developing nations, led by India and China, resistedwhat they saw as dictation by the advanced industrial countries. Theyparticularly objected to the American attempt to link further tradeliberalization to improvements in labor and environmental standards in theThird World, viewing this as a protectionist ploy. The WTO meeting wasalso a forum for developing countries to display continuing resistance towhat they see as Western imposition of market-oriented reforms in thename of globalization (as we saw in Chapter I). There were also the usualtrade policy divisions between the United States and the European Union,especially over agriculture. Thus the Seattle meeting was a missedopportunity to organize the world community around a positive agenda oftrade liberalization and reform. And that was the fiasco occurring insidethe hall.

Outside the hall, the radical demonstrations in Seattle (and later atthe April World Bank/IMF meeting in Washington) were a symptom of adeeper political malaise beneath the surface of the current prosperity. Onone level, it is a rebellion of classical protectionist forces against anythingthat smacks of trade liberalization. But there is also, inchoate, anideological challenge reemerging – against capitalism, againstmultinational corporations, against international financial institutions, andagainst everything that is known as globalization, for their allegedindifference to the fate of poorer countries and the environment.75

The intellectual incoherence of this neo-Leftism is no barrier to itsspread. Protectionism is extremely regressive in its effects. Economicgrowth in the Third World is a precondition for environmentalimprovement there. The World Bank and IMF have been promoting (notalways effectively, to be sure) the structural reforms without whichdeveloping countries have no hope of progress at all. The streetdemonstrations were a mixture of frivolousness and nihilism. All this may


be true – yet the psychological rebellion against economic change is real.Globalization, even as it makes possible unprecedented prosperity,inevitably produces economic and social dislocations; it also produces aprofound political unease given that national governments – which arepolitically accountable – have less and less control over these forces thataffect their peoples’ well-being so powerfully.76 Since much of theinnovation originates in the United States, much of the resentment isdirected at the United States. All this will take even more virulent form ifa global economic downturn should occur.

Reforming and ensuring the stability of the international economicsystem in the new era of globalization is an urgent task for the industrialdemocracies, and an opportunity for a creative American contribution.

POLITICAL: CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

Even more than the economic trends, the political vulnerabilitiesthat are relevant to this discussion are not so much vulnerabilities of theUnited States as vulnerabilities of the international system. It is a simplefact that the end of the Cold War has resulted in a number of structuralchanges in international politics. To the extent that the United States andSoviet Union imposed a sort of discipline over their clients in the ThirdWorld, for example, and that the dangers of that competition also imposeda certain cohesion in the Western alliance system, that discipline andcohesion have eroded. Friendly countries, friendly as they may continueto be, now have more “space” to themselves, safe from any overridingdanger and usually eager to reclaim some freedom of action.

One of the most important phenomena of the current period is theprecariousness of relations among the world’s major powers. We havecome a long way from 1990-1991, when the Gulf crisis saw anextraordinary harmony in the UN Security Council – a Russia (still thenSoviet Union) that endorsed a U.S.-led coalition; a China quiescent in itspost-Tiananmen funk. It was that remarkable great-power harmony thatinspired hopes of a benign and lasting “new world order.” Today, thatharmony is badly frayed. We saw this in Chapter I. The point to makehere, though, is not the counterbalancing against the United States but theweakening of the international structure.

A dramatic case is the European Union. It was the MaastrichtTreaty that launched the EU on the course of a stronger Economic andMonetary Union as well as in the direction of a common foreign andsecurity policy. That Maastricht was signed in 1992 was not acoincidence. We saw in Chapter I that much of its motivation was to

34 Uneasy Giant

make Europe more of a counterweight to the United States in the post-Cold War world and to carve out more autonomy from the United States.The 1999 war in Kosovo only accelerated this; while this war was acommon enterprise, the Europeans chafed at the scale and extent ofAmerica’s military/technological superiority and at the degree ofdependence it implied.77

The North Atlantic Alliance had sought in 1996 to create astructure for the European members of the Alliance to take military actionautonomously, in the NATO framework. But by 1998 and 1999, theEuropeans had decided to pursue this instead in the EU framework. In ahistoric reversal of British policy, which had hitherto stressed the primacyof NATO in the security sphere, Prime Minister Tony Blair took theinitiative in late 1998 to promote the idea of an EU defense organization.If the EU aegis inspires the Europeans to do more on defense, all to thegood. Both the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress haveexpressed a general support for this EU enterprise, coupled, however, witha concern that it not be pursued in a way that complicates NATOcohesion.78

There are those in the United States who are less concerned thatthis EU project will disrupt NATO, mainly on the grounds that theEuropeans, in the end, are unlikely to spend the money or the effort to givethemselves a truly modern military capability. But the danger is that wecould end up with the worst of both worlds – an independent EU defenseorganization that provides no effective new capabilities but that disruptsNATO decisionmaking and the unity of the West.

The centrifugal forces at work in the world are hardly limited toAtlantic relations. U.S. relations with Russia and China have alsodeteriorated over the past decade.

Russia’s post-Communist transition has been a painful one. Itsevolution toward a modern market economy and normal democraticpolitics has been far less smooth than those in Central Europe. This is areflection of Russia’s different historical circumstances and its erraticleadership. But, whatever the uncertain course of Russia’s internalevolution, the direction of its foreign policy seems already clear: It is aclassical Russian nationalism, stressing a recovery of Russianpreeminence in its immediate sphere and (as we saw in Chapter I) a“multipolar” international environment that reduces American dominance.This is how Russia now defines its national interest.

Vladimir Putin promises a more vigorous and tenacious version ofthis policy. It is not necessarily hostile to the United States, especially


given Russia’s present weakness. But neither is there the emotionalaffinity for the United States that seemed evident in the first few years ofthe Yeltsin era. In a multitude of areas – selling arms to China and Iran;cultivating former clients in Iraq; attempting to constrain U.S. missiledefenses; objecting to NATO’s enlargement and to NATO policies in theBalkans – Russia perceives its national interest in terms that conflict, oftensharply, with U.S policies.

Relations with China have deteriorated most of all over the pastdecade. While there have been policy blunders on both sides, theunderlying problem is, as usual, structural. The Soviet menace thatpropelled China and the United States together three decades ago is nomore. Indeed, China and Russia have enjoyed a significantrapprochement, dating back to Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in1989. The Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 dealt a blow to U.S.-Chinarelations from which they have not yet recovered. Taiwan’sdemocratization has enormously strengthened American public andCongressional support for Taiwan, even while the population on Taiwangives voice to a diminishing interest in reunification with the mainland –all of which exacerbates the relationship across the Taiwan Strait as wellas the U.S.-China relationship. Finally, China’s emergence as a potentialsuperpower in its own right puts it on somewhat of a collision course witha United States that remains committed to the protection of millions ofpeople around China’s periphery who are increasingly worried aboutChinese regional dominance.

These U.S.-China tensions are manageable, by a combination ofdeterrence and engagement. The relationship remains precarious,however, and highly vulnerable to crisis.

Amid these centrifugal forces among the major powers, there hasbeen an international effort in the past decade to build a consensus onnorms of behavior. This is reflected in the increasing activism of theUnited Nations and a new effort to develop the corpus of internationallaw. Remarkably, nearly 40 percent of all the UN Security Councilresolutions since 1945 have occurred in the Clinton Administration.79 Thecause of human rights has led to a new conviction – at least in the West –that national sovereignty can no longer provide a protective shield overgross violations of human rights.

The road to this new international order has proved a rocky one,however. The attempt to construct a new international criminal law, forexample, has run up against a number of obstacles, in particular from theAmerican perspective. A new International Criminal Court, as negotiated

36 Uneasy Giant

by an international conference in Rome in 1998, went beyond what eventhe Clinton Administration could tolerate. The Court’s sweeping assertionof “universal jurisdiction” even over countries not parties to the treatywould overturn hundreds of years of treaty law; its prosecutor would havebroad discretion to indict without the restraint of Security Councilauthorization. The Administration was legitimately concerned that U.S.military personnel – already covered by the U.S. Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice – could be subjected to politically motivated prosecution.

Similarly, the fiasco of the indictment and attempted extradition ofAugusto Pinochet illustrated the need for political accountability; initiatedby an individual Spanish judge, the process in the UK threatened toundermine Chile’s fragile democratic consensus and to complicaterelations among a number of countries involved. The cause ofinternational criminal law did itself yet another disservice when the chiefUN war crimes prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, let it be known she wasreviewing NATO’s 1999 air campaign against Serbia for possible warcrimes charges;80 the uproar was immediate.

One of the most important themes of this new order is the need toelevate the UN Security Council to the role of principal arbiter ofinternational peace and security as envisioned by the framers of theCharter. The Russians and Chinese have made this a central theme oftheir common policy. On Boris Yeltsin’s last summit trip to Beijing lastDecember, in the aftermath of NATO’s Kosovo war, the Russian-Chinesejoint communiqué stressed:

that one diplomatic priority for both China and Russia issafeguarding the authoritative role of the United Nations(UN) in international affairs….Also, the two sides believethat the UN Security Council takes prime responsibility forsafeguarding international peace and security, so that itsstatus and function should not be doubted or lessened underany circumstance.81

But it is not only Russia and China that were upset at NATO’sbypassing of the UN Security Council in the Kosovo conflict. For ourEuropean allies, too, this was a source of much anguish and guilt, even asthey went along with an “emergency exception” because of the enormityof Serbian violations of human rights. The Social Democratic/Greencoalition that governs Germany found it particularly troublesome. ForeignMinister Joschka Fischer told the UN General Assembly:

A practice of “humanitarian interventions” could evolve outsidethe UN system. This would be a very problematic development.


The intervention in Kosovo, which took place in a situation wherethe Security Council had tied its own hands after all efforts to finda peaceful solution had failed, was intended to provide emergencyassistance and, ultimately, to protect the displaced KosovoAlbanians. The unity of the European states and the WesternAlliance, as well as various Security Council resolutions, were ofcrucial significance here. However, this step, only justified in thisspecial situation, must not set a precedent for weakening the UNSecurity Council’s monopoly on authorizing the use of legalinternational force. Nor must it become a license to use externalforce under the pretext of humanitarian assistance. This wouldopen the door to the arbitrary use of power and anarchy, and throwthe world back to the 19th century.82

The unease about bypassing the Security Council is not due only toan abstract devotion to international order. In the post-Cold Warenvironment, it is almost certainly a response to the Americanpredominance. In a passage quoted in Chapter I, the President of Indiatold President Clinton openly last March that it was the preeminent powerof the United States that required the strengthening of the United Nations.Because we were so strong, he said, we had a “tremendous responsibility”– which we could best fulfill by making the UN “the centerpiece of thenew global architecture.”83

If, for most of the world, the most important way to bring order toa disordered planet is to rein in the United States, then we (by “we” I don’tmean only the United States) have a major problem. This brings us backto where this essay began. The world’s concept of the requirements ofinternational order may not coincide with Americans’. An America thatwishes to remain an international leader – and to have followers – willhave to cut through these contradictions. Centrifugal forces among themajor powers are a source of danger for the international system. YetAmerica’s ability to lead others is turning out to be more complicated thanone would have expected in the “unipolar” era.

In the next chapter, we will come to some conclusions aboutAmerican strategy.

IV. SIV. SIV. SIV. STRATEGY FOR A TRATEGY FOR A TRATEGY FOR A TRATEGY FOR A SSSSUPERPOWERUPERPOWERUPERPOWERUPERPOWER

The problem for American foreign policy can be summarized asfollows: Our political strength is unequaled, and will be for some time, butits exercise seems also a source of increasing resentment. In the absenceof an overriding threat, the protective umbrella we have provided is nolonger sufficient incentive to allies and friends to accept Americanleadership as (relatively) unquestioningly as they once did. On thecontrary, they see a long-awaited opportunity to assert their independence.The international system, rather than being totally dominated by a paxAmericana, is being pulled apart by centrifugal political forces even as itseconomic foundations are also increasingly vulnerable. Adversaries westill have, who are probing for our weaknesses even in the militarydimension in which our superiority is most assumed.

Meanwhile, the American public seems not all that interested inexercising the hegemonic domination of which their country is accused.The result is an American policy that is erratic, capable of unilateral action(because others cannot stop it), but less effective at leadership – leadershipbeing something quite different from possessing overwhelming power.The American ability to shape an international consensus or leadcoalitions seems in question. (Kosovo may look like a successful U.S.-ledcoalition, except that the allied reaction has the air of “never again.”)

The appropriate American response to this is, in part, a question ofstyle. Someone once defined “style” in this context as the deference thatconfidence pays to uncertainty, or the capacity to speak with convictionwhile listening sincerely to the views of others.84 A little subtletywouldn’t hurt us – a little less official crowing about being the“indispensable nation” or our ability to “stand taller and see farther” thanothers.85

This is not a new idea. Theodore Roosevelt, after all, suggestedthat we “speak softly” while wielding our power. Shakespeare advised us:

O, it is excellentTo have a giant’s strength; but it is tyrannousTo use it like a giant.86

Arrogance does not suit the kind of leadership that we Americans havealways thought of ourselves as providing. And it is avoidable.

40 Uneasy Giant

But a big part of the problem is not avoidable; it is the naturalreaction of others to our disproportionate strength. Nor can we defer toothers on every issue of importance. This problem requires of us not justmore politesse but a more systematic approach to sustaining our centralposition. There is a way, as we shall see, for a power in our situation tohead off mischievous organizing against us and otherwise to deflect (if notdefuse) resentments.

As we consider an appropriate American response, we start with anobservation about the home front. The domestic debate in this country hastaken an interesting turn.

NATIONAL INTEREST MAKES A COMEBACK

The Clinton Administration has embodied a version of Wilsonianliberal internationalism, aspiring to base world affairs on moral principlesrather than geopolitics, and with a heavy emphasis on what WalterMcDougall calls “global meliorism” – that is, an agenda for political,economic, social, and cultural improvement.87 Promotion of democracy,economic development, human rights, and other American values in theworld is an important part of the Clinton Administration’s ideologicalmakeup. “Enlargement of the democratic world” was a major theme of itsearly public statements,88 and its activism expressed itself in a long seriesof humanitarian interventions from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia andKosovo to East Timor. Functional issues – support for internationalinstitutions and international law; the environment; multilateral armscontrol – have also been high on its agenda.89 This is classicWilsonianism.

The Administration’s performance has been weaker, however, onclassical hard-ball geopolitical challenges like those from Iraq and NorthKorea, and in the handling of big-power relations with Russia and China.The President was reported by Jim Hoagland to dismiss narrow emphasison geopolitics and strategic interests as “Old Think.”90

The moral component of this enthusiasm is ironically shared withthe neoconservatives on the other side of the political spectrum. Theneoconservatives represent, in fact, a Reaganite variant of Wilsonianism.They share the liberals’ ideological enthusiasm for the promotion ofdemocracy and human rights and for humanitarian interventions led by theUnited States. On the other hand, they combine this ideological outlookwith a more muscular strategic view – wanting a powerful military, forexample, and being more comfortable about using it – and with anunapologetic advocacy of a benign American hegemony.91 The liberalsfeel guilty about American power; the neocons are enthusiastic about it.

Chapter IV: Strategy for a Superpower 41

For better or worse, however, neither Congress nor the countryexhibits a great eagerness right now for indiscriminate humanitarianism.This is an important feature of the current American mood. TheAdministration’s early stumbling in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti in 1993forfeited credibility, and it has been on the defensive on these issues ofintervention ever since. The more expansive definition of America’smoral mission in the world has not taken root. The Clinton interventionshave led Americans to ask: What is our national interest in this? SamDonaldson of ABC News, whom I take as vox populi on these issues,insisted: “That’s the main [argument] – self-interest,” during a 1995discussion of the arguments for and against U.S. intervention in Bosnia.92

And during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, Donaldson said:

The United States national interest ought to be involved.The President has asserted this by talking about a wider warand the need to contain it. But he should make that thenumber-one reason for being there. Otherwise, whyweren’t we in Rwanda? Why weren’t we in all the otherplaces?…. So if our idea is that we will go and stop killingwhere we find it, I’m for that, but at what price? Andwhere’s the national interest?93

In none of these Clinton-era humanitarian interventions – Somalia,Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor – was the military action backed by aCongressional resolution of support. Congress did not thwart them, butdid not endorse them (or purport to “authorize” them under the terms ofthe 1973 War Powers Resolution) as it had done for the 1991 Gulf War.This is an important measure of the thinness of the domestic support forthese kinds of intervention. In the conflict over Kosovo in 1999,moreover, President Clinton’s fear of permitting even one Americancasualty was the clearest possible indicator of how thin even he judged thepublic support to be.

Whether the American people will tolerate the risk of casualties ina conflict is impossible to answer in the abstract. It is worth recalling,however, that before the Gulf War there was an exaggerated expectationof how costly that war would be, and yet the public was clearly persuadedthat the stakes were high enough for the United States to warrant the risk.One ingredient missing in the later cases, it would seem, was a persuasiveshowing of the American national interest.

Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, in an important nationalsecurity speech in January, outlined an internationalist position on a

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variety of issues, including free trade, maintaining U.S. military andintelligence capabilities, and combating terrorism and drugs. But the useof U.S. military power, he stressed, needed to be guided by the standard ofthe national interest:

When we, as Republicans, ask the President to explain to uswhy intervention is in our national interest – why suchintervention is necessary to protect our freedom and ourway of life – those are not the questions of isolationists.Rather they are the voices of commonsense Americans. Itis a legitimate question that is fully consistent withtraditional American thinking.94

More recently, a bipartisan commission established by Congress toexamine American long-term strategy declared the following:

Strategy and policy must be grounded in the nationalinterest. The national interest has many strands – political,economic, security, and humanitarian. National interestsare nevertheless the most durable basis for assuring policyconsistency. Gaining and sustaining public support forU.S. policy is best achieved, too, when American principlesare coupled with clearly visible national interests.95

The commission was chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and WarrenRudman and included such diverse figures as Newt Gingrich, LeeHamilton, James Schlesinger, Leslie Gelb, and Andrew Young.

Additional evidence of the new mood can be found in theCongress’s treatment of foreign aid. In the 1970s, during the anguish overVietnam, a liberal Congress began insisting that U.S. economic andespecially military assistance be given only to countries with a goodrecord in human rights, and humanitarian purposes were preferred overgeopolitical ones.∗ Today, the priorities are reversed. U.S. foreignassistance has been sharply reduced, but Congress clearly prefers to give itto countries in which we have a more concrete stake – Israel, Egypt,Jordan, Ukraine, Colombia, Peru, and the like.

∗ That is when the annual State Department reports on human rightsbegan: They began as report cards on the moral worthiness of recipients of U.S.aid. This had a certain tendentious impact – our ally South Korea was lambastedwithout any reference to North Korea – so this was later “cured” by includingeveryone else.


Realism, in other words, is making a comeback. There is someirony here. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to educate thecountry in a more classical and less moralistic approach to internationalaffairs; in a period buffeted by Vietnam and Watergate passions, thisattempt failed (indeed spawning the resurgence of Wilsonianism that wasreflected, in different ways, in both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan).But now Bill Clinton’s misadventures have triggered a reaction toWilsonianism. The pendulum is swinging back.

For our purposes here, the point is not to dwell on the historicalirony but to note one of the possible implications of the renewed emphasison national interest. The idea of the national interest may, in the commonperception, have a connotation of national egoism and strategic self-aggrandizement. But in this context, and properly conceived, it isparadoxically a principle of restraint. Wilsonianism is an ideology, a setof moral principles assumed to be universal, whose application is thoughtto be universal and therefore constitutes the agenda for a global Americanmission. Like any ideology, it makes absolute claims; in theory, at least, itrecognizes no limits. In practice, of course, we have ended up makingdistinctions between the Kosovos and the Rwandas and the Chechnyas,but only inviting accusations of hypocrisy and “double standard” in theprocess. The result is an exuberant unpredictability.

A policy grounded in a sense of the national interest, properlyunderstood, deals in finite criteria and thereby allows foracknowledgement of the national interests of others. A little more honestyis possible about distinctions that have to be made. Business can beconducted among states if no one is making absolute claims.Compromises become more possible if less weighed down by imputationsof moral betrayal. Steadiness and reliability are enhanced. This principleof classical diplomacy was stated by Hans Morgenthau:

For minds not beclouded by the crusading zeal of a politicalreligion and capable of viewing the national interests ofboth sides with objectivity, the delimitation of these vitalinterests should not prove too difficult….A nation can onlytake a rational view of its national interests after it hasparted company with the crusading spirit of a politicalcreed. A nation is able to consider the national interests ofthe other side with objectivity only after it has becomesecure in what it considers its own national interests.96

This may be part of the answer to the paradox mentioned in theIntroduction to this essay: that other countries’ resentment of American

44 Uneasy Giant

power is so high during an Administration that desperately insists on itsvirtuous intentions, even to the point of apologizing for much of postwarU.S. foreign policy. Its Wilsonian idealism not only leaves it naked tocharges of hypocrisy on the margin; its motivation comes across as self-righteousness rather than humility, as an assertion of an unlimited mandatefor forcing global improvement. Given the fact of America’soverwhelming power, the reaction of others to this assertiveness is boundto include an element of trepidation, at the very least, whatever thepurported selflessness of the American motivation.

A more strategic-minded approach, which unapologeticallydefined U.S. geopolitical interests, would inevitably embrace suchprinciples as the need to maintain alliances and to manage, vigilantly butcoolly, relations with potential rivals. And the need to lead. Butparadoxically such an approach would imply more modest Americanclaims, even if it also included a more muscular and unrepentant defenseof them. Other nations, themselves schooled in the classical tradition ofinternational politics, would understand better what they were dealingwith. Wilsonian Presidents drive them crazy – and have done ever sinceWoodrow Wilson.

A GRAND STRATEGY

When absolutely forced by events, Americans have not done badlyat grand strategy, as when we adopted “containment” as a strategy forwaging the Cold War. Today, however, there is no similarly obvious andcompelling circumstance, and this seeming ultra-permissiveness of theinternational environment is one of the factors that conspire, in JosefJoffe’s view, to discourage systematic strategic thinking in the UnitedStates.97 Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter III, we are hardly free ofdangers. Policy disasters could render American power much lessformidable and produce, rather quickly, a deterioration in American globalinfluence and in the health of the international environment moregenerally.

A more positive way of saying this is that the United States has avital interest in the health of the international system, and in those aspectsof it that underlie both global well-being and our own.98 Systematicthinking about all this is certainly called for.

History offers two models for an American grand strategy, Joffesuggests. One is the model of 18th_ and 19th_century Britain, which playeda “balancing” role in Europe. Britain could stay aloof from Europeanalignments for much of the time, but intervened to redress the balance of


power on the Continent whenever some would-be hegemonial powerthreatened to upset it. Whether against Philip II of Spain, or Louis XIV ofFrance, or Napoleon, or Kaiser Wilhelm, or Hitler, Britain’s tradition wasto join in a coalition with the weaker powers to defeat the stronger. Overthe centuries, the adversaries would change; Britain’s definition of itsstrategic interest would not.99

This is often cited as the model for the United States. In WorldWars I and II, and in the Cold War, it is a good explanation of what we, infact, did. And perhaps it is an apt model to follow today in the particularmatter of military intervention. Given the unadventurous public mood,and the reasonable desire not to exhaust ourselves by indiscriminatehumanitarian interventions, some principle of selectivity is essential.What the British example provides is a criterion of fundamental strategicinterest, a principle that U.S. intervention is truly called for when the basiccondition of the international structure is at issue, such as if a hegemonicthreat should arise in some vital region (Europe, East Asia, the Gulf).Other interventions are electives; these are the compulsories.

Joffe argues, however, that there is a more relevant model forAmerican policy overall, namely Bismarck’s Germany. Because ofGermany’s vulnerable central location in Europe, it did not have theoption, as Britain had, of only intermittent engagement in the Europeanbalance of power. Bismarck’s response was to engage all the otherpowers in a complex network of political-military alliances – oftenmutually contradictory, but serving the purpose of keeping Europeanalignments continuously confused and avoiding what he called the“nightmare of coalitions.” The United States, says Joffe, is more likeGermany than like Britain – doomed to permanent engagement with allthe other powers and therefore obliged to have a strategy for managingthose relations:

Briefly, the key issue for the United States is not balancingagainst rivals real or latent but bandwagoning with them infavor of the status quo. There is no clear and presentdanger; there are only ambiguous and potential challengesto America’s exalted position. And these are best tackledby forestalling them now, rather than combating them later,by undercutting ex ante both the motives and opportunitiesfor confrontation. The point is insurance rather thanintrusion.100

46 Uneasy Giant

Joffe’s metaphor for such an international structure is the hub of a wheeland the spokes: The United States is in the central position; the spokes areits links with the other powers.

Obviously there are historical differences between Bismarck’sGermany and the present-day United States, especially the degree towhich Bismarck’s unification of Germany unbalanced Europe and createdthe problem that Bismarck was struggling to solve. But the analogy withBismarck’s diplomacy is instructive. Operationally, it means that theUnited States enjoys (or is in a position to achieve) better relations with allthe other powers than they have with each other. Each of them needs usfor something (protection; economic ties), or is afraid of us, or is afraid ofleaving us in bed with one of the other powers that it fears as animmediate rival. (Recall William Wohlforth’s point in Chapter II thatbefore any new potential hegemon achieved a position from which it couldthreaten us, a regional balance of power would kick in in the form of itsregional rivals organizing to stop it.)

In Asia, China and Japan fear each other. Each one looks to us forsome reassurance that the other will not threaten it. Similarly, to somedegree, China and India. Russia and China currently flaunt theiralignment against us, but many Russians worry about China’s growingpower and don’t want to lose their Western option. The Russians are alsodependent on Western economic aid, and China, while nominallyCommunist, is much more dependent on its integration into the globaleconomy (and on the U.S. market) than the Soviet Union ever was.

In Europe, for all Europe’s vaunted new independence, the U.S.military presence provides a necessary hedge against the possibleresurgence of a Russia that still disposes of over 20,000 nuclear weapons.The U.S. presence continues to provide a certain reassurance withinWestern Europe as well, as a disproportionately strong Germany begins toassert its own national interest more forcefully. (European integration isone part of the solution to the German problem, but the peace of mindprovided by the U.S. security presence has always been another.) Nor isEurope yet able by itself to handle serious military conflicts in turbulentregions of the Continent like the Balkans.

In other pivotal regions (the Gulf; Northeast Asia) where othermajor powers have a major stake and where conflict could easily breakout, the only country in a position to assure stability or organize a responseto crisis is the United States. To use the current jargon of internationalrelations theory, our maintenance of the balance in these places is one ofthe “public goods” we provide, on which the international system depends.


This central position we occupy in the international system ofsecurity and prosperity, moreover, embodies our extraordinary politicalleverage over all the other major powers. It is an important reason whythe persistent efforts of others to build counterweights to U.S.predominance (which we saw in Chapter I) have not made much headway.“[T]he game does not work,” Joffe concludes.101 As Anwar Sadat said,America holds most of the cards.

To take another example: A few years ago, there was talk ofRussia’s organizing a bloc with China and India as another counterweightto the United States. It never amounted to anything, in large part becauseof depth of the Sino-Indian rivalry.102 But the Indians were also reluctantto lose their links to the United States. The Hindu newspaper hadexplained the Indian perspective:

The quest for a “multipolar world” has a great appeal inIndia. But the particular consequences of a deepeningalliance between China and Russia may not turn out in itsfavor….India, Russia and China are…all looking forgreater freedom of action in dealing with the solesuperpower, the U.S. …. Even as India deepens its politicalengagement with Russia and China, [however,] it mustrecognize the importance of a continuous strategic dialoguewith the U.S. and Japan on the Asian strategic scenario.103

Bismarck’s entangling alignments are the order of the day. And we arethe pivot of most of them.

This is a brilliant position to be in. But its benefits don’t comeautomatically. On the contrary, it imposes certain requirements. It is, firstof all, a classical “realist” kind of strategy: It aims at maintaining a certaingeopolitical balance, not at ideological uniformity or moral improvement.It also means that the United States needs to maintain its political,economic, and other links with the other powers so that they havesomething to lose. Pure deterrence of hegemonial ambition is necessarybut not sufficient under this strategy; it is a more subtle mix of deterrencewith maintenance of positive links as well. In other words, it will workbetter as a conscious strategy than if left to the reactive improvisation thatusually characterizes American policy.

The hard case at the moment is China, which some Americans seeas a looming danger. But the premise of the strategy is that China’sforeign policy is no longer that of a revolutionary state driven by ideologyto overthrow the existing order, but of a classical new power emerging on

48 Uneasy Giant

the global stage driven by old-fashioned nationalism. In this light, it is amanageable problem. This is an accurate description of the case. If thereis ideology in the present U.S.-China rivalry, it comes from an Americandiscomfort at sharing the planet with the last great Communist autocracy.

In any case, the “hub-and-spokes” strategy is a rationale formaintaining normal U.S. diplomatic and economic relations with China,such as granting it WTO membership and Permanent Normal TradeRelations status in the United States. In a major crisis precipitated byChina, of course, all bets would be off. But, short of that, our real (andgrowing) security concerns can be dealt with by classical means – bymaintaining our own military primacy in the Western Pacific, the vigor ofour alliances, and the credibility of our commitments in the region; we canpresent China with both incentives for a constructive evolution anddisincentives for attempting to upset the regional status quo by force(including in Taiwan). Whatever its ambitions, it is China that alreadyconfronts a number of counterweights to its power in the region – Japan,India, Russia, an expanding ASEAN, as well as the U.S. presence. TheUnited States and its Asia/Pacific friends and allies are in an advantageousposition to shape the regional environment into which China is emergingand to which it will have to adapt.104

A similar analysis is offered by the Australian scholar Coral Bell.She sees the world as essentially unipolar, but she takes note of thepersistent efforts of other powers to resist U.S. dominance. In her view,the smart American response is to preserve and strengthen our existingalliances with Europe and Japan, to seek to draw Russia into the Westerncommunity, and to manage the China problem in the classical mannerroughly as I have suggested. In other words, her recommendation for U.S.strategy is that “the unipolar world should be run as if it were a concert ofpowers.”105 We should do what we can to preserve valuable institutionsof Western solidarity like the North Atlantic Alliance and the G-7; shesees merit also in multilateral institutions like the United Nations, theWTO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.These mechanisms, in new conditions, suit our purposes in networks thatlink others to us and help defuse opposition to U.S. leadership.

This is, Bell concludes, the formula for extending the presentunipolarity for many, many decades into the future.

THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN UNILATERALISM

Such a strategy, as noted earlier, implies American restraint,discipline, and subtlety; it eschews hectoring or ideological crusading. Itassumes a degree of American acceptance of the fact that other powers


will not follow American dictation – the Europeans and Japanese aspiringto more autonomy, Russia and China in a more nationalistic phase as theygo through their difficult transitions. While we will seek to preserve ouralliances, they are bound to be a little looser. The United States is topreserve its position less by imposing its will and more by managing aconcert of nations.

These are all virtuous principles, which I endorse. There is oneparticular problem, however, that will not so easily be wished away – theproblem of American unilateralism. For many in the world these days,including our allies, this is one of America’s principal sins. Karsten Voigtdescribes it as follows:

Primarily the USA itself is to decide when, with whatmeans and with the help of which institutions it will furtherthe global breakthrough of its self-defined values andinterests of universal application.…[T]here has beengrowing acceptance for the idea that America can alsolegitimately use its power without the support of itspartners or even without their agreement, should nationalinterests require it. The awareness of unique moral andmilitary superiority reinforces this reflex.106

Sometimes the complaint is about Executive Branch action:Europeans remember the Carter Administration’s boycott of the MoscowOlympics or the Reagan Administration’s attempt to block a Soviet gaspipeline to Europe. More often recently, the complaint is about U.S.policies imposed by Congress, like the 1996 attempts to impose sanctionson European companies for doing business with Iran, Libya, or Cuba; orthe refusal to pay arrearages in dues owed to the United Nations. TheSenate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the U.S.refusal to join the International Criminal Court or the convention banninganti-personnel land mines, are other examples cited of the United Statesbeing out of step with the world. The prospect of U.S. deployment ofdefenses against ballistic missiles and possible withdrawal from the ABMTreaty is seen by some as a case of American high-handedness in ignoringthe concerns of others. To prove that it is capable of being a true partner,says Hubert Védrine, the United States will have to “give up unilateralismfor multilateralism.”107

The danger for the United States, some say, is the risk of isolation.As the United States heads toward deployment of ballistic missiledefenses, a recent UN conference supposedly devoted to reviewing thestatus of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty turned into a forum

50 Uneasy Giant

for mass denunciations of the United States.108 William Hartung of theliberal World Policy Institute declared: “I have never seen a momentwhere the U.S. seemed so isolated from the mainstream of internationalopinion on the nuclear weapons issue.”109

There is, alas, a major dilemma here for the United States, and if Ihad to guess I would say that this problem will get worse.

For one thing, a more precise vocabulary is called for. It is not soeasy to “isolate” the United States; that may not be the most accurateword. If we are the 800-pound gorilla, as everyone says, we can perhapsbe outvoted in some forums, widely criticized, diplomatically lonely, etc.,but we cannot be deprived of our freedom of action. Our leadership rolemay pay some price, as has been suggested. But the United States remainsessentially free to decide whether and when it is worth the price.

And – especially on security issues – the purported preferences ofthe world community are not always intellectually compelling. The mostegregious recent example was the international convention banning anti-personnel land mines. The United States still relies on land mines as ameans of defense in certain circumstances, especially along the deadlyKorean DMZ. During the negotiation the United States therefore askedfor certain exemptions, or for a seven-year delay before the ban went intoeffect. These requests were simply dismissed out of hand.

It happens that the United States uses only land mines that self-destruct after a limited period; it scrupulously follows the rules of war thatrequire mapping of mine fields so they can be cleared after a conflict isover. The United States is in the forefront of developing better technologyfor mine-detection and mine-clearing. (We even cleared the mines we laidin North Vietnam, as part of the 1973 Paris Agreement.) The land minesripping the limbs off the world’s children are therefore not Americanmines. At the same time, it is our country’s armed forces to whicheveryone turns, and on which everyone relies, when there is serioustrouble. Whenever a major threat or emergency arises, we are asked to dothe heavy military lifting. And yet our judgment of what we needed tofulfill these responsibilities was given short shrift in an international forumdriven by unaccountable advocacy groups and celebrities like the Princessof Wales. This cannot be taken seriously.

More recently, as noted earlier, a UN conference devoted toreviewing the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty turned into aforum for denouncing the United States – for its failure (along withRussia) to disarm itself and for its plans to deploy missile defenses. “Havethe nuclear-weapons States party to the Treaty indeed fulfilled their


commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons, prevented their proliferationor helped non-nuclear States harness nuclear power to peaceful purposes?”asked the Syrian delegate in a complaining tone.110

These arguments, too, must be taken with a grain of salt. It cannotbe seriously believed that India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, North Korea, Iran,and any other new seekers after nuclear weapons are affected one iota bythe state of U.S.-Russian strategic arms control. India’s nuclear programis driven by fear of China, Pakistan’s by fear of India, Israel’s by theexistential threats it still faces in its region, Iran’s and Iraq’s by fear ofeach other and aspirations for regional dominance, and North Korea’s byparanoia about regime survival. The last decade in U.S.-Russian relationshas seen the most drastic reductions in central strategic arsenals in all ofhuman history. Yet the same period saw the India-Pakistan nuclear blastsand the serious weakening of restraints on the rogue states mentioned.The argument that an inadequate big-power commitment to arms control isa cause of or justification for Third World proliferation is specious, andalways was. It is trotted out in international forums (like the NPT ReviewConference) to play on the guilt of gullible Westerners, particularlyAmericans.

Lately, as noted, the fashionable villain is U.S. missile defense.UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan charged that this “is jeopardizing theABM Treaty – which has been called the ‘cornerstone of strategicstability’ – and could well lead to a new arms race, setbacks for nucleardisarmament and non-proliferation, and create new incentives for missileproliferation.”111 While there are legitimate questions that arise forstrategic relations, especially among the major powers, the relevance ofthis to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review is remote – except to the extentthat proliferating ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in thehands of Third World states are the main reason we need missile defense!

Iraq is another example: The United States is said to beincreasingly isolated with respect to the policy of containing Iraq orseeking to change its regime. The British have been with us in various airstrikes that attempted to salvage the UN inspection system or otherwiseprevent Iraq from breaking out of its post-Gulf War constraints. Butothers (including allies) are critical of this U.S. policy and unwilling to goalong with it. Some of them point out, with some justice, that the ClintonAdministration’s military actions have not been of the kind that promisesany decisive impact. On the other hand (and there is a long history of thisgoing back to the problem of Libyan terrorism), the allies more oftenmake this argument as an excuse for blocking action than as a proposal forsomething more decisive.

52 Uneasy Giant

The point here is that the pressures on the United States to abandonits “unilateralism” over Iraq are, in effect, pressures on us to relaxpressures on Saddam. How this will make the Middle East more secure isnot obvious. In fact, these pressures on us flow from weariness rather thanstrategic analysis. Domestic politics in the Arab world are also a factor.For us to yield to these importunings would be irresponsibility of thehighest order.

Furthermore, while we are speaking of Iraq, it is worth recallingthat in 1990-1991, the evident American readiness to proceed unilaterallyhad a galvanizing effect on the international consensus. It gave courage towaverers and led some doubters to join us if only to be in a position toinfluence us. The search for consensus should not be allowed to become asubstitute for action or an excuse for paralysis.112

In the last chapter, we saw how vulnerable the international systemis to deadly new security threats – how precarious is the margin of safetythat we all take for granted. In this environment, if the pleas for American“multilateralism” are simply a cover for strategic escapism (as in Iraq), orif life-and-death issues of U.S. national security policy are being dictatedby the likes of the Princess of Wales, then it should not be surprising ifserious Americans say no.

CCCCONCLUSIONONCLUSIONONCLUSIONONCLUSION: A N: A N: A N: A NEW EW EW EW GGGGRAND RAND RAND RAND BBBBARGAINARGAINARGAINARGAIN????

These are the contradictory desiderata of American policy. Theworld is reacting badly to American predominance, but we are still askedto provide a benevolent internationalist leadership. The United States isadvised to show more restraint and to work in concert with others, yetunilateralism cannot be excluded. It is urged to pay more attention tonurturing the international system, yet it faces many hard-ball dangers thatthe international system cannot effectively avert. How do we sort thisout?

These contradictions and dilemmas of American policy areinherent. Any plausible blueprint for long-term policy, therefore, won’t beneat, and it probably will not satisfy either our complaining allies or ourexuberant Wilsonians at home. But it is possible to sketch out theprinciples of a strategy that offers our allies and friends some considerablereassurance of an internationalist American leadership, one that theyshould find largely compatible with their own interests and well-being. Atthe same time, the strategy will include some basic principles (particularlyon security) that the United States would be well advised not tocompromise.

The first point – prediction as much as prescription – is that theUnited States is fully prepared to remain permanently engaged in keyregions such as Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to bolsterinternational security. Despite the surface resentments, this fundamentalstrategic assurance is still desired by other friendly countries, and theAmerican people show every sign of accepting the responsibility. Theoverwhelming Senate vote in 1998 on NATO enlargement (80-19) was notthe expression of an isolationist Congress, and it was accompanied by aringing endorsement of the U.S. commitment to Europe.113 A similarbipartisan consensus underpins the commitment to allies and friends in theEast Asia/Pacific region and in the Middle East.

This contribution to global stability is one of the “public goods”we provide. It is in our own geopolitical interest, not simply a favor we dofor others. Thus we must continue to provide it, even if we find some ofits other beneficiaries ungrateful or even annoying.

A second principle, we have seen, is that a policy grounded in theAmerican national interest would reduce some of this country’sexposure to resentment and resistance on the part of others. This may

54 Uneasy Giant

be where the country is heading. Paradoxical as it may seem to us, ourWilsonian enthusiasm and passion to improve the world sometimes comeacross as overbearing. Our values do have universal meaning, but in thereal world they will be better advanced by an evolving internationalconsensus than by a perceived American imposition. Some Americanrestraint in future humanitarian interventions would be relevant here. Lastyear’s intervention in East Timor was not diplomatically contentious, for anumber of reasons, including China’s interest in a stable Indonesia and theconsensus on a Security Council mandate. But another reason, I suspect,was that the United States took a background role.

Third, the United States has a crucial responsibility – and apowerful self-interest – in ensuring the health of the internationaleconomic system. The United States must continue to be internationaliston trade, for example. And indeed it has been. The much-malignedRepublican Congress has just come through again on two trade issues –trade preferences for Africa and the Caribbean, as well as PermanentNormal Trade Relations for China – bailing out an Administration unableto deliver many members of its own party in thrall to the reactionary Left.As on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and theoriginal World Trade Organization (WTO) treaty, the Congress has shownits enduring commitment to trade liberalization. This improves theprospects down the road for “fast-track” legislation that will make futurenegotiations on trade liberalization possible, with the rest of the WesternHemisphere and with the European Union and Japan.

The Administration deserves credit for its leadership in the Asianfinancial crisis. At the same time, the United States has a stake in keyinstitutions of cooperation with the other leading economic powers – mostimportantly the G-7, which was created, indeed, as a kind of political andeconomic directorate of the industrial democracies.114

This brings us to the next point – the value of working in concertwith others. In the economic realm, we have partners whose economicclout is as great as ours, and the formula for managing the internationaleconomic system is collaboration with them. This has been a bipartisanpolicy and it, too, will undoubtedly continue. Concretely, doing it rightprobably means refraining from actions like punitive economic sanctionsdirected extraterritorially at third countries (especially our allies) even ifwe feel strongly on the merits. In my view, the policy of maintainingpressures on Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, etc., is the right one; the Europeansare wrong. Yet, we pay a big price for attempting to bully them, and, alas,experience shows it is not sustainable.

Conclusion: A New Grand Bargain? 55

Another dimension of this principle is to be more willing to shareresponsibility for economic leadership. Early in the Asian financial crisis,Japan offered an initiative for multilateral assistance to Southeast Asia –the so-called Miyazawa Plan, the brainchild of one of Japan’s mostrespected leaders, including a promise of $30 billion in aid. The ClintonAdministration dismissed it abruptly, which seems a political blunderwhatever the technical details.

In the security dimension, as well, it makes sense for the UnitedStates to cut its allies some slack and encourage them to take on greater,even if more autonomous, responsibility. The EU’s new experiment indefense policy could enable Europe to deal with a greater range ofproblems (like Balkan problems) on its own – provided it spends themoney on building real military capabilities. The United States shouldencourage it – provided it remains closely linked to NATO.

A corollary is that, when our allies do take on a difficultassignment, we refrain from publicly sniping at them from afar. In Bosniain 1993-1994, our European allies were taking casualties on the ground,and the United States, with none of its people at risk, was taking potshotsat the alleged moral inadequacy of the European efforts at diplomacy. TheEuropeans’ military and diplomatic efforts at that time won no particularprizes for genius, but the American sniping provoked a bitterness inEurope that had not been seen in decades. They had a point.

The need for consultation with allies deserves a plug here. Itshould be real two-way consultation in advance, not just an ex post factorequest for ratification of an American decision. In 1998, for example, theUnited States negotiated with North Korea after North Korea’s firing of amedium-range missile over Japan; Washington then declared itselfsatisfied and decided that funding for North Korea’s civilian nuclearreactors should resume. The Japanese were not included in thenegotiations, despite their obvious security stake and the fact that morethan 80 percent of the funding for the reactors came from them. “Theywere absolutely furious,” recounted scholar Michael Green.115

Many U.S. administrations have been guilty of violating thisprinciple. (Remember the “Nixon shocks.”) Sometimes, diplomaticsensitivity leads us to hold a matter close to our chest. Other times, ourown bureaucratic and Congressional processes are so cumbersome,painful, and exhausting that, once they yield a result, the naturalpsychological impulse here is to yearn for an end to the matter. But if wetruly want other capable and like-minded countries to share

56 Uneasy Giant

responsibilities in a new era, we need to take this principle seriously. Theissue of missile defense would be a good candidate.

More broadly, in a variety of areas, including humanitarianinterventions, if the United States is not willing to bear every burden,then it has a responsibility to help build and support internationalsystems to handle the problems.116 It would be in the American interest,for example, to establish better procedures to facilitate the UN’s ability toorganize peacekeeping operations, or its capacity to exercise“conservatorships” over failed states.117 Americans also have a growingstake in international cooperation in public health, law enforcement(especially against drug trafficking and corruption), and environmentalprotection. International law has been an American cause for a century,and, within proper limits discussed in Chapter III, it can continue to servecommon purposes that serve American interests. Also in the security field– constraining arms proliferation, protecting freedom of the seas – thereare realistic and useful multilateral measures that command U.S. support.

It is also time to put the UN dues controversy behind us. Congresshas written a check for $926 million, payable on the implementation ofpreviously agreed reforms including a fairer calculation of the U.S.share.118 The political stalemate on this in Washington is close to beingbroken.∗ In any event, the strategy of withholding dues as leverage forreform was succumbing to diminishing returns. The United States, in anyadministration, will want the UN to be more effective than it is, and willwant to have influence in its forums; at this point, non-payment hasbecome more an obstacle than a help to those objectives.

All the foregoing are prescriptions for American good behavior, asit is defined by many who now criticize American “hegemonism” and“unilateralism.” They are prescriptions I endorse. At the same time, weare left with a series of security matters on which it would be a gravemistake for the United States to relinquish its freedom of action.Whether we will be indulged on this score by our allies, in exchange forour more dutiful internationalism on the other issues – as part of a new“grand bargain” – remains to be seen.

∗ It is not generally realized, but for the last two years the Congressionalleadership was ready to compromise on the abortion issue with which the UNdues payment was entangled; it offered waiver provisions and diluted thelanguage. The President’s priorities were elsewhere, however. Probably due tothe Lewinsky scandal, he refused any compromise on the abortion language untilearly this year.

Conclusion: A New Grand Bargain? 57

If others are conscious of our immense power, we are obliged to beconscious of our vulnerabilities. In an era of asymmetric securitychallenges, as we saw in Chapter III, American military dominance is notas invincible as many imagine. (In fact, some who complain loudest ofour “hegemonism” are looking the most eagerly for our vulnerabilities.)Our allies and friends, especially, have a stake in this. Contrary to theexperience of the land mines convention or the International CriminalCourt, it would behoove countries that still rely on U.S. military strengthas the mainstay of international security to give occasional considerationto American concerns. And the standard of seriousness about variousregional dangers – from Iraq and North Korea, for example – needs to behigher in international discussions. If not, then the future will see a lotmore American unilateralism.

This is not the place for a complete discussion of the debate overU.S. missile defenses. There are legitimate concerns on both sides of theAtlantic, and in Russia. But the emotionalism of the current debate isuncalled-for, and the self-serving quality of many of the criticisms(including from China, which is expanding its ballistic-missile arsenal at arapid rate)119 deserves more notice. Similar hysteria greeted U.S. missile-defense programs initiated by both President Nixon and President Reagan,and both Presidents managed to translate these programs into usefulbargaining leverage. World War III did not result, and the risks are evensmaller now.

Meanwhile, the dangers of the global proliferation of ballisticmissiles are clear and present, as documented definitively by the bipartisanRumsfeld Commission.120 Our allies and friends in the Asia/Pacificregion, feeling directly threatened, have been conspicuously absent fromthe chorus of critics. To say that someone is “wedded to Cold Warthinking” is one of the fashionable put-downs in intellectual circles thesedays; yet nothing is more anachronistic than to cling to strategic models ofmutual vulnerability left over from the era of bipolarity (like the 1972ABM Treaty). Missile defense is another area in which strategic escapismamong the critics will not be persuasive to serious Americans.

In sum, there are no easy formulas for a superpower that yearns tobe loved as well as respected. Henry Kissinger has written that the test ofhistory will be whether the United States can turn its predominant powerinto international consensus and its own principles into widely acceptednorms. This was the greatness achieved by the Roman and Britishempires in their time.121 But the spread of our moral and political valuescannot be by fiat, nor can it achieve instant results. To an extraordinarydegree it is already happening. The idea of freedom has more power today

58 Uneasy Giant

than ever before, as it sweeps through the extraordinary globalmarketplace of ideas now opened up by mass media and the Internet.There are no barriers of authoritarianism that the Information Age willleave intact. If mass culture and the idea of liberty have the universalappeal that we assume (and some fear), then we know the outcome.Americans should have more confidence in this process, as well as greatersensitivity to the historical and cultural circumstances of some societiesthat will not evolve overnight simply because we insist.

Meanwhile, there is an immediate agenda of safeguarding securityand prosperity that the world faces, and on which American leadership isstill genuinely valued. Organizing international consensus and sometimesnew institutions is a skill of which we have shown great mastery since the1940s; it was never a matter of imposition. That is our opportunity now.

Others’ resentment can partly be cured by a less domineering style.But much of it comes with the territory. That, too, will require a certainself-confidence on our part: There will be times we feel compelled to buckthe international consensus. If we know what we are doing, and knowhow to accomplish our objective, then we will find vindication in theoutcome. That, too, is our opportunity.

Being the sole superpower is not a job for the timid.

NNNNOTESOTESOTESOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Karsten D. Voigt, “The Discussion of a European Security and DefensePolicy: Labor Pains of a New Atlanticism,” speech at a seminar of theWashington Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, March 8, 2000, p.1.

2 Ibid.

3 Arnold Toynbee quoted in Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land,Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 6.

4 This is the thesis of Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the GreatPowers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York:Random House, 1987). But see the critique of Kennedy’s historical analysis inW.W. Rostow, “Beware of Historians Bearing False Analogies,” Foreign Affairs,Spring 1988, and the discussion in Chapter II below.

5 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, response to a question at theSecretary’s Open Forum, Department of State, reported in Center for SecurityPolicy, Decision Brief No. 94-D27, March 11, 1994, p. 4.

6 Samuel R. Berger quoted in R. W. Apple. Jr., “A Domestic Sort withGlobal Worries,” New York Times, August 25, 1999.

7 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No. 1 (America and the World 1990/91), p. 23-33. See, more recently,Charles Krauthammer, "A Second American Century?" TIME, December 27,1999, p.186.

CHAPTER I: HOW OTHERS ARE REACTING

8 James Walsh et al., “America the Brazen,” TIME (Atlantic ed.), August4, 1997, p. 22.

9 Ibid.

10 Der Spiegel quoted in William Drozdiak, “Even Allies Resent U.S.Dominance; America Accused of Bullying World,” Washington Post, November4, 1997, p. A1.

60 Uneasy Giant

11 E.g., President Bill Clinton, “Strategic Alliance with Russian Reform,”address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, MD, April 1,1993.

12 E.g., President Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a NewCentury (Washington: The White House, October 1998), p. 43.

13 Yevgenii Primakov, statement to the 51st Session of the United NationsGeneral Assembly, September 24, 1996, Embassy of the Russian FederationPress Release #27 (September 25, 1996), p. 4.

14 Boris Yeltsin, address to the collegium of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Moscow, May 12, 1998, reported by ITAR-TASS and Interfax, in FBIS-SOV-98-132, 12 May 1998.

15 Remarks by new Acting President Vladimir Putin to an extended sessionof the Russian Security Council, December 31, 1999, as reported by Interfax, inFBIS-SOV-1999-1231, 31 December 1999.

16 Liu Huaqiu, “China Will Always Pursue a Peaceful Foreign Policy ofIndependence and Self-Determination,” Qiushi (Beijing), No. 23, 1 December1997, in FBIS-CHI-98-078, 19 March 1998.

17 Joint Russian-Chinese communiqué, Beijing, April 25, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-081, 25 April 1996, p. 15.

18 Yeltsin quoted by M. Dmitriyev, “China’s ‘Western Impromptu’?”Zavtra, May 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-125-S, 27 June 1996, p. 5.

19 Joint Russian-Chinese communiqué, Moscow, December 28, 1996, inFBIS-SOV-96-251, 28 December 1996.

20 Joint Russian-Chinese communiqué, Beijing, December 10, 1999, inFBIS-CHI-1999-1210.

21 Primakov quoted by Xinhua, November 18, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-224,18 November 1996.

22 Hubert Védrine, remarks to a conference of French Ambassadors, Paris,August 28, 1997.

23 Jacques Amalric and Pierre Haski, “Védrine: ‘The Era of Symbolism isOver,’” interview in Liberation, November 24, 1998, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-WEU-98-328, 24 November 1998.

24 Joint Sino-French Declaration, Beijing, May 16, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-095, 16 May 1997.

Notes 61

25 Helmut Kohl, address at Catholic University, Louvain, Belgium,February 2, 1996, excerpted in Internationale Politik, vol. 51, no. 8 (August1996), p. 82.

26 Joschka Fischer, speech in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, January12, 1999.

27 Wim Kok, “Euro is Crowning Glory of Long Process,” lecture atUniversity of Leiden, March 9, 1998, excerpted in NRC Handelsblad(Rotterdam), March 9, 1998, in FBIS-WEU-98-070, 11 March 1998.

28 Wim Kok quoted in Der Standard (Vienna), October 27, 1998, p.2.

29 Tony Blair, address to the North Atlantic Assembly, Edinburgh,November 13, 1998.

30 Fischer and Scharping quoted at the Bremen meeting of the WEU, May10, 1999, cited in Bundespresseamt bulletin, May 11, 1999.

31 Heinrich Boell Foundation, “A New Foreign and Security Policy forEurope?” conference brochure, 1-2 December 1999, Berlin. I am grateful toJeffrey Gedmin for calling this to my attention.

32 Masaharu Honda, “Japan’s Autonomy Questioned on the 40th

Anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2000. Forthis and other source material on Japan, I am indebted to Michael J. Green andthe manuscript of his forthcoming book on Japan’s search for strategy andidentity.

33 Kyofuku Fukushima, Corporate Governance: An Aspect of Asia’sCurrency Crisis and Its Implications, Nomura Research Institute, June 1999, p.11, also cited by Green.

34 Asahi quoted in Hong Kong AFP dispatch, December 5, 1999, in FBIS-EAS-1999-1205, 5 December 1999.

35 Amre Moussa, “A Nationalist Vision for Egypt,” interview in MiddleEast Quarterly, September 1996, p. 62.

36 Ocho Columnas, April 14, 1997, quoted in U.S. Department of State,Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “U.S. Image in a ‘Unipolar’ World: ForeignMedia Perspectives,” Issue Focus, May 1, 1997, p. 13.

37 Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, address to the 54th session of theUN General Assembly, September 29, 1999.

62 Uneasy Giant

38 Remarks by President Clinton and President Narayanan of India in anExchange of Toasts, Rashtrapati Bhavan, Delhi, India, March 21, 2000 (WhiteHouse Press Release).

39 For a fuller discussion, see Peter W. Rodman, Drifting Apart: Trends inU.S.-European Relations (Washington: The Nixon Center, June 1999).

40 This point is well made by Victoria Nuland in a recent paper, “Fear andLoathing in the Unipolar World,” written for the Council on Foreign Relations,draft of February 18, 2000, p. 9.

CHAPTER II: THE HISTORICAL TREND

41 Remarks by Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan at theannual dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute,Washington, December 5, 1996.

42 Chairman Alan Greenspan, testimony on the Federal Reserve’ssemiannual report on the economy and monetary policy, before the Committeeon Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 17,2000.

43 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: EconomicChange and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House,1987).

44 Ibid., p.xvi.

45 Ibid., esp. pp.532-533.

46 W.W. Rostow, “Beware of Historians Bearing False Analogies,” ForeignAffairs, Spring 1988, pp. 863-868.

47 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of AmericanPower (New York: Basic Books, 1990). See also Henry R. Nau, The Myth ofAmerica’s Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (New York:Oxford University Press, 1990)

48 See Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2001,Historical Tables, Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2005, pp. 42-49.

49 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the Presidentand the Congress: 2000 (Washington: Department of Defense, 2000), AppendixB, Budget Table B-1 (comparing FY2001 with FY1985).

50 Christopher Layne, “What’s Built Up Must Come Down,” WashingtonPost, November 14, 1999, p.31.

Notes 63

51 “Survey of China,” The Economist, April 8, 2000, p. 14.

52 Summers quoted in “How poor is China?” The Economist, October 12,1996, p. 35.

53 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

54 Paul Bracken, “Will China Be Number 1?” TIME, May 22, 2000, pp.104-105.

55 Lee Kuan Yew, remarks at a news conference in Beijing, May 18, 1993,quoted in Han Fook Kwang, “SM calls for a new security arrangement,” TheStraits Times (Singapore), May 19, 1993, p. 1.

56 This proverb was quoted to me with a smile by a Chinese strategist at aBeijing think-tank associated with the defense establishment, on a visit of mineto Beijing in August 1997.

57 See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment(Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), Chapter 2.

58 Coral Bell, “American Ascendancy and the Pretense of Concert,” TheNational Interest, Fall 1999, pp. 58-59.

59 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp.809-810.

60 Samuel P. Huntington, Bradley Lecture, American Enterprise Institute,May 11, 1998, excerpted in AEI Newsletter, July 1998 (emphasis in original).See also Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs,March/April 1999, pp. 35-36.

61 Bell, loc. cit., pp. 55-63.

62 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,”International Security, Summer 1999, pp. 5-41.

63 Ibid., p.17.

64 Ibid., p.36.

65 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a NationalStrategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom(Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15,2000), pp. 6, 10-13.

64 Uneasy Giant

CHAPTER III: OUR REAL VULNERABILITIES

66 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Preliminary Observations: AsymmetricalWarfare and the Western Mindset,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., Challenging theUnited States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July1998), p. 1.

67 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the21st Century (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December 1997), pp. 11-12.

68 Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, “Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy,”excerpted from his book Military Theory and Conflict (Beijing: Academy ofMilitary Science Press, 1994), translated in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Viewsof Future Warfare (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997), p.227. See additional sources collected in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates theFuture Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press,2000), pp. 76-83.

69 Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Part Four; Maj. Mark A.Stokes, “China’s Military Modernization: Implications for U.S. NationalSecurity,” paper for the Project for the New American Century (Washington:Project for the New American Century, n.d. [1999]).

70 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a NationalSecurity Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom(Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15,2000), pp. 8-9, 14-15.

71 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the Presidentand the Congress: 2000 (Washington: Department of Defense, 2000), pp. 19-21.

72 Edward N. Luttwak, “Where Are the Great Powers?” Foreign Affairs,July/August 1994, pp. 23-28.

73 See Saddam’s conversation with American Ambassador April Glaspie,July 25, 1990, as printed in the New York Times, September 23, 1990, p. 10;Saddam’s speech to the Arab Cooperation Council summit, Amman, February24, 1990, in FBIS-NES-90-039, 27 February 1990, p.5; Lawrence Freedman andEfraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the NewWorld Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 276-285; BarryRubin, “The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War,” in AmatziaBaram and Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq’s Road to War (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1993), p. 264; H.D. S. Greenway, “How the War Was Won, Mostly,” New YorkTimes Book Review, January 24, 1993, p. 2.

Notes 65

74 Robert J. Samuelson, “What Greenspan Doesn’t Know…” Newsweek,May 1, 2000, p. 78.

75 Francis Fukuyama, “Will Socialism Make a Comeback?” TIME, May 22,2000, pp. 110-112.

76 Henry A. Kissinger, “Making a Go of Globalization,” Washington Post,December 20, 1999.

77 For an elaboration of this analysis, see Peter W. Rodman, DriftingApart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations (Washington: The Nixon Center, June1999).

78 Ibid., pp. 35-36. For the Congressional reaction, see H. Res. 59 (byReps. Bereuter, Bliley, Boehlert, and Lantos), passed by 278-133 on November2, 1999, and S. Res. 208 (by Senators Roth, Lugar, Biden, Kyl, Hagel, Smith,Lieberman, and Helms), passed by unanimous consent on November 8, 1999.

79 When the Clinton Administration took office in January 1993, thenumber of UN Security Council resolutions stood at 801. At this writing, thenumber is up to 1301.

80 Associated Press dispatch, “U.N. Tribunal Investigating NATO’s War InYugoslavia,” New York Times, December 29, 1999. See also the report of DelPonte’s retreat, in Barbara Crossette, “U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor Declines toInvestigate NATO,” New York Times, June 3, 2000, p. A4.

81 Joint Russian-Chinese communiqué, Beijing, December 10, 1999, inFBIS-CHI-1999-210, 10 December 1999.

82 Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, address to the 54th sessionof the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 22, 1999.

83 Remarks by President Clinton and President Narayanan of India in anExchange of Toasts, Rashtrapati Bhavan, Delhi, India, March 21, 2000 (WhiteHouse Press Release).

CHAPTER IV – STRATEGY FOR A SUPERPOWER

84 Fritz Ermarth brought these observations to my attention.

85 E.g., comments by Secretary of State Madeline Albright on ABC News,“Nightline,” from Columbus, Ohio, February 18, 1998 (State Department PressRelease).

66 Uneasy Giant

86 Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2. For this reference, I am gratefulto the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a NationalStrategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom(Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, April 15,2000), p. 15.

87 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The AmericanEncounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997),Chapters Six, Eight.

88 E.g., President Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagementand Enlargement (Washington: The White House, July 1994), pp. 1, 18-20.

89 This stress on “New Age” functional issues is evident, for example, inPresident Clinton’s remarks at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s 119th

commencement, New London, CT, May 17, 2000.

90 Jim Hoagland, “Russia Into the Vacuum,” Washington Post, November21, 1997, p. A27.

91 E.g., Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, Summer1998.

92 ABC News, “This Week,” November 5, 1995, Federal News Servicetranscript, p. 18.

93 ABC News, "This Week,” March 28, 1999, ABC News transcript #909,pp. 10, 12.

94 Speaker Dennis J. Hastert, “Securing America’s Future,” address beforethe Mid-America Committee, Chicago, January 10, 2000, p. 2.

95 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, op. cit., p. 6.

96 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Powerand Peace, 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 563-564.

97 Josef Joffe, “ ‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American GrandStrategy after Bipolarity,” International Security, Spring 1995, pp. 98-101.

98 Joseph S. Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs,July/August 1999, pp. 28-30.

99 Joffe, loc. cit., pp. 102-105.

100 Ibid., p. 110.

Notes 67

101 Josef Joffe, “How America Does It,” Foreign Affairs,September/October 1997, p. 22.

102 There is also doubt whether Moscow ever intended it as a seriousinitiative. The idea originated in a casual response by Prime Minister YevgeniiPrimakov to a news conference question in New Delhi. See ITAR-TASS WorldService reportage, December 21, 1998, in FBIS-SOV-98-355, 21 December1998, and K.K Katyal, “The concept of a ‘strategic triangle,’” The Hindu,December 29, 1998.

103 The Hindu, May 1, 1997, quoted in U.S. Department of State, Bureau ofIntelligence and Research, “U.S. Image in a ‘Unipolar’ World: Foreign MediaPerspectives,” Issue Focus, May 1, 1997, p. 10.

104 See Peter W. Rodman, Between Friendship and Rivalry: China andAmerica in the 21st Century (Washington: The Nixon Center, June 1998).

105 Coral Bell, “American Ascendancy and the Pretense of Concert,” TheNational Interest, Fall 1999, p. 60 (emphasis in original).

106 Karsten D. Voigt, “The Discussion of a European Security and DefensePolicy: Labor Pains of a New Atlanticism,” speech at a seminar of theWashington Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, March 8, 2000, p. 10.

107 Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine, address at the opening of theconference “Into the 21st” of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales,Paris, November 3, 1999.

108 Colum Lynch, “U.S. Arms Policy Is Criticized at U.N.,” WashingtonPost, April 25, 2000, p. A18.

109 William Hartung quoted in Jonathan Alter, “Swords vs. Shields,”Newsweek, May 8, 2000, p. 44.

110 Statement of Mikhail Wehbe (Syria) to the 2000 Review Conference ofthe Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, UnitedNations, New York, April 26, 2000 (United Nations Press Release DC/2698, 26April 2000), p. 3.

111 Statement of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the 2000 ReviewConference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, United Nations, New York, April 24, 2000 (United Nations PressRelease SG/SM/7367, 24 April 2000, p. 2.

112 See Victoria Nuland, “Fear and Loathing in the Unipolar World,” paperwritten for the Council on Foreign Relations, draft of February 18, 2000, p. 11.

68 Uneasy Giant

CONCLUSION: A NEW GRAND BARGAIN?113 See the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accessionof Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, May 4, 1998, in Cong. Rec., May4, 1998, pp. S4217-4220, esp. Sec. 3(A).

114 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster,1999), Chapter 22, esp. pp. 692-697.

115 Green quoted in Tyler Marshall and Jim Mann, “Goodwill Toward U.S.Is Dwindling Globally,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2000.

116 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a NationalStrategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom(Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15,2000), pp. 6, 13; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Redefining the National Interest,” ForeignAffairs, July/August 1999, pp. 28-30.

117 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” ForeignPolicy, Winter 1992.

118 Sen. Jesse Helms, address before the UN Security Council, New York,January 20, 2000.

119 China may build as many as 1,000 new ballistic missiles in the comingdecade, mostly of short and medium ranges. See Mark A. Stokes, “Weapons ofPrecise Destruction: PLA Space and Theater Missile Development,” in CentralIntelligence Agency/National Intelligence Council and Library ofCongress/Federal Research Division, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction:Implications for the United States, Conference Report CR-99-05, November 5,1999 (Washington: National Intelligence Council, April 2000), p. 194.

120 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,Report pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Executive Summary(Washington: July 15, 1998).

121 Henry Kissinger, “Our Nearsighted World Vision,” Washington Post,January 10, 2000.

69

AAAACKNOWLEDGMENTSCKNOWLEDGMENTSCKNOWLEDGMENTSCKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, theGerman Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Lockheed MartinCorporation for their generous support of The Nixon Center’s nationalsecurity programs, including this monograph.

Meghan Bradley, as usual, provided expert, patient, and invaluableeditorial and production assistance. Daniel Davenport and Ashley Neesewere exceptionally able research assistants.

A number of colleagues and friends contributed wise advice andideas during the course of this project. I am particularly grateful toDimitri K. Simes, Robert Ellsworth, Henry Kissinger, Josef Joffe, andCharles Krauthammer for their comments on the manuscript. I alsobenefited from a discussion of these issues at a Nixon Center workshop onMarch 17, 2000, whose participants included Josef Joffe, FrançoisHeisbourg, Charles Krauthammer, Singapore Ambassador to the UnitedStates Heng-Chee Chan, Robert Ellsworth, Dimitri K. Simes, BruceJackson, and Geoffrey Kemp. None of these individuals can be heldresponsible for, or be assumed to agree with, the final content, which ismy own and my own responsibility.

I must also thank The National Interest, and its editor OwenHarries and executive editor Lawrence Kaplan, for printing an adaptationof Chapter I in the journal’s Summer 2000 issue.

Peter W. RodmanWashington, DCJune 2000

NNNNIXON IXON IXON IXON CCCCENTER ENTER ENTER ENTER MMMMONOGRAPHSONOGRAPHSONOGRAPHSONOGRAPHS

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT SERIES

Peter W. Rodman, America Adrift: A Strategic Assessment,foreword by Henry A. Kissinger, 1996.

Peter W. Rodman, Broken Triangle: China, Russia, and Americaafter 25 Years, foreword by Senator John McCain, 1997

Peter W. Rodman, Between Friendship and Rivalry: China andAmerica in the 21st Century, foreword by Dimitri K. Simes, June 1998.

Peter W. Rodman, Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-EuropeanRelations, foreword by Robert F. Ellsworth, June 1999.

OTHERS

Geoffrey Kemp, Energy Superbowl: Strategic Politics in thePersian Gulf and Caspian Basin, foreword by Lionel H. Olmer, 1997.

Geoffrey Kemp, America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism,1998.

David M. Lampton and Gregory C. May, Managing U.S.-ChinaRelations In The Twenty-First Century, September 1999.

Dmitriy Ryurikov, Russia Survives, foreword by Robert F.Ellsworth, December 1999.

Dov S. Zakheim, Congress and National Security in the post-ColdWar Era, October 1998.

The Paris Agreement on Vietnam: Twenty-five Years Later:Conference Transcript, April 1998.

Documents

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