Undervisningsprogram i Teoretisk filosofi

Höstterminen 2018

Studentkonto, Registrering, Introduktion, Expedition och Studievägledning, Undervisning, Skrivningar, Seminarier, Filosofiska föreningen Kursfordringar

Teoretisk filosofi A Teoretisk filosofi B Teoretisk filosofi C Masterprogram

Schema över kursutbudet höstterminen 2018 Kursbeskrivningar

Kurser som ingår i Teoretisk filosofi A Kritiskt tänkande Kunskapsteori Verklighetens natur: en introduktion till metafysik Problem och paradoxer Vad är filosofi?

B-kurser Logik Inledning till vetenskapsteori Språkfilosofi Filosofins klassiker från Platon till Nietzsche

C- och Masterkurser Recent work on disagreement The Metaphysics of Margret Cavendish Personal identity Bioethics Philosophy of Law Taste, Fun, Beauty

Lärarlista

Filosofiska institutionen

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Välkommen till studier vid Filosofiska institutionen Studentkonto Som student vid Uppsala universitet behöver du ett studentkonto. Du kan då bl.a. registrera dig på kurser, anmäla dig till skrivningar och kontrollera studie-resultat. Du får också en egen e-postadress, tillgång till universitetets fasta och trådlösa nät, du kan lägga upp en egen hemsida, leta och beställa böcker hos universitetsbiblioteket och mycket mer. Kontot är gratis. Läs mer om hur man skaffar Studentkonto här. Registrering För att börja studera måste du registrera dig. Detta gör du på Studentportalen, för kurser som startar vecka 35 senast 23 augusti 2018 och för kurser som startar senare senast 19 september 2018. Se instruktioner på antagningsbeskedet. Har du inte tillgång till internet, kan du kontakta expeditionen på telefon 018-471 72 99. Vänligen var noga med att registrera dig i tid, annars kan du förlora din plats. Avhopp De som av olika skäl inte avser påbörja de studier de blivit antagna till bör snabbast möjligt, inte minst för att ge reserverna en chans, meddela detta till in-stitutionen. Du gör det enklast genom att skicka ett e–brev till kursadministratör Ulrika Valdeson ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.se. Introduktion Måndagen den 3 september har vi en informationsträff för alla nya studenter. Ihresalen, Engelska parken, hus 21 (Eng/21-0011) kl. 16:15. Expedition och studievägledning Vi finns på plan 2 i hus 2 i Engelska Parken. Gå till huvudentrén och följ skyl-tarna. Kursadministrationen sköts av Ulrika Valdeson, 018–471 72 99. Studievägled-ning sköts av studierektor Rysiek Sliwinski, 018–471 73 51. Man kan även nå per e–post (ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.se resp. rysiek.sliwinski@filosofi.uu.se ). Se även vår hemsida www.filosofi.uu.se Undervisning Undervisningen består av föreläsningar och seminarier. Möjligheten att klara av de olika kurserna minskar avsevärt om man inte följer den. Därför rekommende-rar vi starkt alla studenter att delta i så mycket undervisning som möjligt. Obser-vera att deltagandet i seminarierna är obligatoriskt.

https://konto.weblogin.uu.se/index.htmlmailto:ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.semailto:ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.semailto:rysiek.sliwinski@filosofi.uu.sehttp://www.filosofi.uu.se/

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Skrivningar Skrivningarna äger rum inom en vecka efter respektive momentets slut. En andra chans (omskrivning) ges också. Du måste anmäla dig till skrivningar via Studentportalen. Du kan se dina resultat på din hemsida på studentportalen. Seminarier Studerande som är intresserade är även välkomna att delta i de högre seminari-erna i praktisk och teoretisk filosofi samt i de övriga seminarierna. Filosofiska föreningen Filosofiska föreningen sammanträder minst fyra gånger per termin. Alla, även icke medlemmar, är välkomna till sammanträdena. Dessa inleds med ett före-drag. Efter föredragen anordnas en sexa, i vilken alla är välkomna att delta. Bli medlem i föreningen under ett läsår genom att betala in (endast) 50 kronor på postgiro 570360–8, så får du personliga kallelser till sammanträdena hem i brevlådan.

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Kursfordringar Ni som denna termin läser Teoretisk filosofi A ska läsa följande moment:

Kritiskt tänkande 7,5 hp. Kunskapsteori 7,5 hp Verklighetens natur: en introduktion till metafysik 7,5 hp Problem och paradoxer 7,5 hp eller Vad är filosofi? 7,5 hp

Valet mellan Problem och paradoxer och Vad är filosofi? ska ni göra första vecka i november. Vi kommer att skicka instruktioner om hur ni ska gå tillväga. Undervisning på varje moment består av föreläsningar och gruppseminarier. Seminarierna är obligatoriska. Ni som denna termin läser Teoretisk filosofi B ska läsa följande fem moment:

Logik 6 hp Inledning till vetenskapsteori 6 hp Språkfilosofi 6 hp Filosofins klassiker från Platon till Nietzsche 12 hp

Ni som denna termin läser Teoretisk filosofi C skall läsa följande moment: C–uppsats, 15 hp Observera att närvaro i C– & master–seminarierna (CM–seminarierna) är obli-gatorisk. Första sammankomst äger rum måndagen den 3 september kl. 13:15-15:00 i Eng22-0025. Valfri kurs 1, 7,5 hp Se utbudet på nästa sida. Valfri kurs 2, 5 poäng 7,5 hp Se utbudet på nästa sida. Ni som läser Masterprogram i humaniora inriktning teoretisk filosofi ska normalt läsa två masterkurser och arbeta med ert examensarbete på halvtid. Mer information kommer att skickas runt 20 augusti.

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KURSUTBUD I TEORETISK FILOSOFI HÖSTTERMINEN 2018

TEORETISK FILOSOFI A Kritiskt tänkande Maria Svedberg

Kunskapsteori Carl Montan

Verklighetens natur Nils Franzén

Problem och paradoxer Matti Eklund

Vad är filosofi? Olof Pettersson

TEORETISK FILOSOFI B

Logik Rysiek Sliwinski

Inledning till vetenskapsteori Sebastian Lutz

Språkfilosofi Jessica Pepp

Filosofins klas-siker, del 1 Alexander Stöpfgeshoff

Filosofins klassi-ker, del 2 Sharon Rider

KURSER PÅ C- OCH MASTERNIVÅ

Recent work on disagreement Folke Tersman och Don Loeb

Personal identity Jens Johansson

Philosophy of Law Patricia Mindus

The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish Jonathan Shaheen

Bioethics Andrew Reisner och Elena Prats

Taste, Fun, Beauty Andreas Stokke

CM–seminariet i teoretisk filosofi Matti Eklund

Högre seminariet i teoretisk filosofi Matti Eklund

Högre seminariet i kultur- och språkfilosofi Sharon Rider

CM–seminariet i filosofins historia Pauliina Remes och Tomas Ekenberg

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KURSBESKRIVNINGAR TEORETISK FILOSOFI A Kritiskt tänkande Lärare: Maria Svedberg, Anna Folland, Carl Montan, Simon Rosenqvist Kurslitteratur: Bowell, Tracy & Kemp, Gary, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide, 4th edition, Routledge, 2014.

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Kunskapsteori Lärare: Carl Montan och Kasper Kristensen Kurslitteratur

o Nagel, Jennifer, Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, OUP: 2014)

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Verklighetens natur: en introduktion till metafysik Lärare: Nils Franzén och Oda Tvedt Kurslitteratur: Earl Conee & Theodore Sider, Riddles of Existence, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2005.

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Problem och paradoxer Lärare: Matti Eklund Kurslitteratur: Sainsbury, R. M., Paradoxes. 3. Ed. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Vad är filosofi? Lärare: Olof Pettersson Kurslitteratur: ett antal artiklar som kommer att vara tillgängliga på Studentpor-talen.

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TEORETISK FILOSOFI B Logik Lärare: Rysiek Sliwinski och Nils Franzén Kurslitteratur

o DAG PRAWITZ: ABC i symbolisk logik, Thales, Stockholm, 2001. Vad är det som gör vissa resonemang följdriktiga, och andra felaktiga? Går det att uppställa regler och metoder för korrekt tänkande, och hur skulle dessa i så fall se ut? Vad betyder egentligen ord som ’eller’, ’inte’, ’alla’? En viss förtro-genhet med sådana frågeställningar, och med de formella språk som används för att studera dem, är en förutsättning för förståelsen av mycket av de senaste hundra årens filosofi. Kursen behandlar klassisk sats– och predikatlogik ur bevisteoretisk och semantisk synvinkel. Undervisningen består dels av föreläsningar, dels av prak-tiska övningar.

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Inledning till vetenskapsteori Lärare: Sebastian Lutz Kurslitteratur: Johansson, Lars-Göran: Introduktion till vetenskapsteorin, Thales, 2000. Innehåll: Om begreppet kunskap; veta att- och veta hur-kunskap. Argument kring olika former av relativism Om vetenskap; vetenskapens utveckling i västerlandet. Jämförelse med andra kulturer. Vetenskap kontra pseudovetenskap Hypotetisk-Deduktiv Metod. Hjälp-hypoteser, ad hoc-hypoteser Data och observationer, observationssatser, fakta, observationers teoriberoende Orsaker och korrelationer Vetenskapliga förklaringar Tolkning, mening förståelse, intentionalitet. Kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder – likheter och skillnader Teorier om vetenskapens utveckling; induktivism, falsifikationism, forsknings-program, vetenskapliga revolutioner.

• termer, generella termer • Övningar i predikatlogisk formalisering

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Språkfilosofi Lärare: Jessica Pepp Kurslitteratur:

o Morris, Michael, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language Cam-bridge University Press, 2006.

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Filosofins klassiker från Platon till Nietzsche Lärare: Alexander Stöpfgeshoff (del 1) och Sharon Rider (del 2). Kurslitteratur del 1

o Adamson, Peter, Classical Philosophy: A history of philosophy without any gaps, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 2014.

o Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). 2nd edition, 2000.

Kurslitteratur del 2

o Kenny, Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy. Clarendon 2012, o Descartes, Valda skrifter, Bokförlaget Daidalos.

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VALFRIA KURSER PÅ C- OCH MASTERNIVÅ C- OCH MASTERKURSER Recent work on disagreement

Instructors: Folke Tersman och Don Loeb

Disagreement is a central concept in many philosophical discussions. It provides the point of departure of a familiar argument against the idea that moral judg-ments can be objectively true, but similar arguments have been advanced in oth-er philosophical areas also. Disagreement is taken to generate philosophical im-plications partly because it is supposed to motivate doubts about, or reduced confidence in, those of our convictions that are contested, at least insofar as our opponents are not less well equipped than us in terms of availability of evidence, reasoning skills, and so on. The purpose of the course is to examine various ar-guments to that effect, as well as the more fundamental views about knowledge, truth and epistemic justification upon which those arguments rely. We shall spe-cifically focus on ideas, positions, and arguments that have emerged in recent discussions. To illustrate the various arguments and positions that are to be ex-amined we shall use example both from philosophical and from non-philosophical contexts. Assessment Class participation and a 7,500-word essay (a 10,000-word essay for PhD-students) on a topic approved by the teachers. Due October 1st 2018. Students may be asked to initiate the discussion at a lecture by giving a short presentation of relevant text(s). Schedule and venues

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Themes and literature The list of readings may be slightly revised before the course begins. A final list will be provided one week ahead of the first lecture. The readings are, with a few exceptions, available through the library’s e-resources (the exceptions will be distributed during the course). If you have problems in finding any of them please contact the teachers. Theme 1: Introduction. Lectures 1 & 2 will be spent on giving an overview about the aspects of the recent debate about disagreement that we plan to cover. We shall indicate the various arguments and positions that the discussion re-volves around, the problems those arguments and positions are facing, and how they are related to other issues and views in epistemology and metaphysics. The overview is meant to provide a background for the subsequent discussions. Literature: Machuca, D. 2017. “Moral Skepticism. An Introduction and Overview”. In Ma-

chuca, ed., Moral Skepticism: New Essays, London: Routledge, 1-32. Matheson, J. 2015. “Disagreement and Epistemic Peers,” Oxford Handbooks

Online. Theme 2: Conciliationism and steadfastness. Conciliationism is a position that has emerged within the peer disagreement debate. It entails, as an initial approx-imation, that we should reduce our confidence in the truth of a claim we accept if we find that it is rejected by an epistemic peer. Conciliationism is challenged by various philosophers who advocate “steadfastness” in the face of such oppo-sition. Lectures 3 & 4 will be devoted to the recent discussion about these com-peting positions. We shall distinguish between different versions of them, ex-plore their implications, and also discuss how they are related to the various ep-istemic principles that are employed by traditional arguments from disagree-ment. Literature: Christensen, D. 2011. “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-

Criticism,” Philosophers’ Imprint 11. Elga, A. 2007. “Reflection and Disagreement,” Nous 41, 478–502. Kelly, T. 2005. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies

in Epistemology 1. Kornblith, H. 2010. “Belief in the face of controversy,” in Feldman, R. &

Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford: OUP. Theme 3: Permissivism and uniqueness. One might try to avoid having to draw skeptical conclusions from the occurrence of disagreement by adopting some form of epistemological relativism, to the effect that people could be justified in having conflicting beliefs even when they share evidence. That view is congen-ial with a position known as “permissivism”. Permissivism challenges the so-

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called “uniqueness thesis,” which, roughly, is the view that there is a unique ra-tional response to a given body of evidence. In lectures 5 & 6, we shall address the debate between permissivists and “impermissivists” and discuss how it re-lates to the discussions about disagreement and skepticism. Literature Christensen, D. 2016. “Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” Noûs

50, no. 3, 584–603. Feldman, R. 2007. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers without God, Antony, L., ed., Oxford University Press. Schoenfield, M. 2014, “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and

What it Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief,” Noûs 48, 193-218. White, R. 2005. “Epistemic Permissivism,” Philosophical Perspectives 19, 445-

59. Theme 4: Explaining the epistemic significance of disagreement. The epistemic assumptions that arguments from disagreement invoke (such as assumptions to the effect that the proper response to peer disagreement is to revise ones confi-dence about the disputed claim) are sometimes simply taken for granted or sup-ported with intuitions about imagined cases. In other cases, however, philoso-phers try to explain why disagreement generates skeptical implications with ref-erence to more fundamental principles about what justification and knowledge require. According to one such principle, the justification of a belief depends on the evidence we have for it. The idea is that disagreement constitutes a type of evidence that is relevant to the assessment of a belief. That is one of the possibil-ities that we shall address in lectures 7 & 8. We shall also explore the relevance of modal requirements on knowledge, such as those according to which knowledge requires “sensitivity,” “safety,” and “adherence”. Literature: Christensen, D. 2010. “Higher-Order Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomeno-

logical Research, 81, 185-215. Kelly, T. 2010. “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” In R. Feldman

& T. A. Warfield, eds., Disagreement. Oxford: OUP. Risberg, O. and Tersman, F. “Disagreement and Skepticism: A Novel Ap-

proach” (unpublished ms). Theme 5: Overgeneralization and self-defeat. Arguments for moral skepticism that appeal to moral disagreement are sometimes criticized on the ground that they overgeneralize and can be extended also to other areas, both within and outside of philosophy. After all, disagreement is a phenomenon that does not on-ly occur in ethics but in many if not all areas as well. The (alleged) fact that skeptical arguments from moral disagreement can be applied (mutatis mutandis) also to other areas is supposed to reduce the urgency of these arguments, partly

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because skepticism is not thought to be a viable position in some of those areas. We shall address these worries in lectures 9 & 10. One type of criticism that is connected to the overgeneralization worries concerns the coherence of arguments from disagreement. Such arguments gen-erally invoke epistemic principles to the effect that the proper response to disa-greement of certain types is to reduce one’s confidence in the disputed claim or to drop one’s verdicts about it. Those principles, however, are in turn the object of disagreement, which is thought to make the arguments vulnerable to the criti-cism that they are self-defeating in a problematic sense. This type of criticism will also be explored in lectures 9 & 10. Literature: Matheson, J. 2015. “Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating,”

Social Epistemology 29, 145-59. Pittard, J. 2015. “Resolute Conciliationism,” Philosophical Quarterly 65, 442-

63. Tersman, F. and Loeb, D. (unpublished ms). “Evidence of Peerhood and Moral

Disagreement”. Vavova, K. 2014. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism,” Philosophical

Perspectives 28, 302-33. Additional readings (not compulsory): Ballantyne, N. and Coffman, E.(2011. “Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality,”

Philosophers’ Imprint 11 no. 18, 1–13. Brueckner, A. and Bundy, A. 2012. “On Epistemic Permissiveness,” Synthese

188 no. 2, 165-77. Christensen, D. 2007. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Phil-

osophical Review 116, 187–217. Christensen, D. 2009. "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Con-

troversy," Philosophy Compass 4, 1-11.
 Christensen, D. 2013. “Epistemic Modesty Defended,” in Christensen, D. and Lackey, J. eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford

University Press, 77-97. Elga, A. 2010. “How to Disagree About How to Disagree,” in Feldman, R. and

Warfield, T., Disagreement, Oxford University Press. Enoch, D. 2010. “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not

Too Seriously) in cases of Peer Disagreement,” Mind 119 no. 476, 953-97. Feldman, R. 2006. “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement,” in Episte-

mology Futures, Hetherington, S., ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 216–36.

Frances, B. and Matheson, J. 2018. Disagreement," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E., ed., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/

Fumerton, R. (2010). “You Can’t Trust a Philosopher,” in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., Disagreement, Oxford University Press.

https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=1066https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/

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Goldman, A. 2010. “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement,” in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford University Press.

Greco, D. and Hedden, B. 2016. “Uniqueness and Metaepistemology,” Journal of Philosophy 113 no. 8, 365-95. Horowitz, S. 2014. “Immoderately rational,” Philosophical Studies 167 no. 1,

41-56. Kelly, T. 2013. “Evidence Can Be Permissive,” in Steup, M., Turri, J., and Sosa,

E., eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2d ed., 298-311. King, N. 2008. “Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief,”

Philosophy Compass 3. no. 4, 830–53. King, N. 2012. “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to

Find,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 no. 2, 249-72. Kopek, M. and Titelbaum, M. 2005. “The Uniqueness Thesis,” Philosophy

Compass 11, 189-200. Lackey, J. 2010. “What should we do when we disagree?” in Gendler, T., and

Hawthorne, J., eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3, 274-93. Lackey, J. 2010. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Signifi-

cance,” in Haddock, A., Millar, A., and Pritchard, D., eds., Social Episte-mology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lackey, J. 2013. “Disagreement and Belief Dependence.” in Lackey, J. and Christensen, D., eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Ox-ford University Press.

Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2014. “Higher Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat,”

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 no. 2, 314-45. Levinstein, B. 2017. “Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity,” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 94 no. 2, 342-70. Meacham, C. 2013. “Impermissive Bayesianism,” Erkenntnis (S6) 1-33. Oppy, G. 2010. “Disagreement,” International Journal of Philosophy of Reli-

gion 68, 183-99. Pettit, P. 2006. “When to Defer to Majority Testimony – and When Not,” Analy-

sis 66, 179–87. Sosa, E. 2010. “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” in Armchair Philosophy,

Princeton: Princeton University Press. Steel, R. (forthcoming). “Anticipating Failure and Avoiding It,” Philosophical

Imprint, available at https://www.robertjsteel.com/papers.html. Strevens 2017. “Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” (unpublished ms),

available at http://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf. van Inwagen, P. 1996. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to

Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence,” in Faith, Freedom, and Ra-tionality, Jordan, J. and Howard-Snyder, D., eds., Hanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 137–54.

Wedgwood, R. 2010. “The Moral Evil Demons,” in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford University Press.

https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=570https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=799https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=319https://www.robertjsteel.com/papers.htmlhttp://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf

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Weatherson, B. 2013. “Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise,” in Lack-ey, J. and Christensen, D., eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press.

White, R. 2009. “On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers,” Episteme 6, 233-50.

White, R. 2013. “Evidence Cannot Be Permissive,” in Steup, M., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2d ed., 312-23.

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The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish Lärare: Jonathan Shaheen Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium – mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen.

Personal identity Lärare: Jens Johansson Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium – mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen.

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Bioethics Lärare: Andrew Reisner och Elena Prats Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium – mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen.

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Philosophy of Law

Lärare: Patricia Mindus, Tommaso Braida, Elena Prats och Sebastian Andres Reyes Molina. Kurslitteratur:

o Wacks, Raymond, Understanding Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Le-gal Theory, Oxford University Press 2012.

o Freeman, Michael, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet & Max-well, London 2011 (8th ed.)

See also info at Studentportalen (home page for the course)

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Taste, Fun, Beauty: Predicates of Personal Taste Teacher Andreas Stokke andreas.stokke@filosofi.uu.se Interested students should email me to be included in future announcements about the course. Course Description This course will be concerned with predicates of personal taste, such “tasty,” “funny,” and “beautiful.” Suppose you like broccoli, and your friend doesn’t. You say, “Broccoli is tasty!” but your friend replies, “No! Broccoli is disgust-ing.” There’s a strong sense that the debate you are having is different in some important way from debates you might have where one of you says, “Napoleon was born on Malta,” and the other one says, “No, he wasn't.” Intuitively, in your debate over Napoleon, we think one of you must be right. But in the former case, there’s a sense in which we think that “Broccoli is tasty” and “Broccoli isn’t tasty” can both be right, depending on who is saying or judging these statements. Within philosophy of language and other areas of philosophy this, and other is-sues surrounding predicates like “tasty,” has spawned a range of discussion over how such discourse is to be understood within different frameworks for theoriz-ing about the relation between language, world, mind, and context. Should we think that there are definite conditions for when something is tasty or not and that “Broccoli is tasty” is simply true or false depending on certain facts about broccoli, or should we think that “Broccoli is tasty” hides more content than meets the eye. Alternatively, perhaps there’s a way of making sense of the idea that “Broccoli is tasty” is true for some people but not for others. We will study debates mainly within philosophy of language, but will also con-sider issues that connect to aesthetics, metaethics, and other areas of philosophy. A major part of this course will be the opposition between so-called contextual-ism and relativism about evaluative discourse. We will look at the central de-bates over how to understand disagreement over things like taste, fun, and beau-ty. The course will be conducted in English. The course will not assume any technical background in semantics or pragmat-ics.

mailto:andreas.stokke@filosofi.uu.se

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Timetable

Sessions and Readings The plan for the sessions with required readings is as follows. The plan may change during the course, depending on the interests of the participants. Session 1. Course Introduction Cappelen, H. & Dever, J. (2016) Context and Communication, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, §§4.1-4.4, §§5.1-5.3 Cappelen, H. & Huvenes, T. “Relative Truth”, forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Truth, available at http://www.huvenes.net/papers/RelativeTruth.pdf Stojanovic, I. “Relativism”, forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, available at https://philpapers.org/archive/STOR-14.pdf Sessions 2 & 3. Truth, Propositions, and Objectivism Cappelen & Dever (2016, §§4.1-4.4, §§5.1-5.3) MacFarlane, J. (2014) Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applica-tions, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, §1.1 Cappelen, J. & Hawthorne, J. (2009) Relativism and Monadic Truth, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-10 Sessions 4 & 5. Contextualism MacFarlane (2014, §1.2, 141-47) Huvenes, T. (2011) “Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Marques, T. (2015) "Disagreeing in Context”, Frontiers in Psychology 6: 1-12. Sessions 6 & 7. Relativism MacFarlane (2014, §1.4, ch. 2-3) MacFarlane, J. (2007) “Relativism and Disagreement”, Philosophical Stud-ies 132: 17-31

http://www.huvenes.net/papers/RelativeTruth.pdfhttps://philpapers.org/archive/STOR-14.pdf

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Marques, T. (2018) “Retractions”, Synthese 195 (8): 3335-3359 Sessions 8 & 9. Expressivism & Aquiantance (with guest lecture by Nils Franzén) MacFarlane (2014, §1.3) Franzén, N. (2018) “Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experi-ence”, Australasian Journal of Philoso-phy Online https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1425729 Ninan, D. (2014) "Taste Predicates and the Acquaintance Inference", Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24: 290–309. Robson, J. (2012) "Aesthetic Testimony", Philosophy Compass 7/1: 1–10. Session 10. Tba Examination The exam for the course will be a paper of 3000-5000 words on a freely chosen topic related to those of the course. The exam paper will be due 10 January 2019. Secondary Readings Baghramian & Carter, “Relativism”, SEP, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ Richard, M. (2004) “Contextualism and Relativism” Philosophical Studies 119: 215-42 Richard, M. (2008) When Truth Gives Out, Oxford and New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press Other Resources Video Mark Schroeder & Jamie Dreier: “Moral Relativism, Expressivism & Contextu-alism” https://goo.gl/F7cQqi Crispin Wright: “Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement” https://goo.gl/axfFfz Audio "Kieran Setiya discusses moral disagreement” Elucidations. Pod-cast. https://goo.gl/5tebEv "Robert Stalnaker discusses conversational context” Elucidations. Pod-cast. https://goo.gl/YiRzYJ “Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann on Disagreement about Taste” Philosophy Bites. Podcast. https://goo.gl/TW7L8g “Relativism” In Our Time. BBC. Podcast. https://goo.gl/Symqsg On Doing Philosophy

https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1425729https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/https://goo.gl/F7cQqihttps://goo.gl/axfFfzhttps://goo.gl/5tebEvhttps://goo.gl/YiRzYJhttps://goo.gl/TW7L8ghttps://goo.gl/Symqsg

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Kagan, S. ”How to Write a Philosophy Paper”, available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/1614655/KaganHowToWriteA.pdf Pryor, J. ”Philosophical Terms and Metods”, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/index.html Pryor, J. ”How To Read a Philosophy Pa-per”, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html Pryor, J. ”Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Pa-per”, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/1614655/KaganHowToWriteA.pdfhttp://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/index.htmlhttp://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.htmlhttp://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html

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Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala universitet Postadress: Box 627, 751 26 Uppsala Besöksadress: Engelska parken, Humanistiskt centrum, Thunbergsvägen 3 H, hus 2. Hemsida http://www.filosofi.uu.se Prefekt Matti Eklund 018–471 73 56

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Studierektor grundutbildning Rysiek Sliwinski 018 – 471 73 51

Studierektor forskarutbildning Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann 018 – 471 73 50

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ANDERSSON, Emil BRAIDA Tommaso, CARLSON, Erik DAMMANN, Guy EKENBERG, Tomas EKLUND, Matti ENTZENBERG, Claes FELKA, Katharina, FORSBERG, Maria, FRANZÉN, Nils, JOHANSSON, Jens KRISTENSEN, Kasper LAMARQUE, Peter, LOEB, Don, LUTZ, Sebastian MARTINEZ MARIN, Irene MARQUES PEDRO, Guilherme, MINDUS, Patricia PAGE, Jeremy PEPP, Jessica PETTERSSON, Olof PRATS, Elena REISNER, Andrew

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REMES, Pauliina REYES MOLINA, Sebastian RIDER, Sharon ROSENQVIST, Simon SCHELLEKENS DAMMANN, Elisabeth

SHAHEEN, Jonathan SLIWINSKI, Rysiek STOKKE, Andreas STÖPFGESHOFF, Alexander SVEDBERG, Maria TERSMAN, Folke TVEDT, Oda WALLBANK, Rebecca WIKBLOM, Andreas

Taste, Fun, Beautyo Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). 2nd edition, 2000.o Descartes, Valda skrifter, Bokförlaget Daidalos.Kelly, T. 2013. “Evidence Can Be Permissive,” in Steup, M., Turri, J., and Sosa, E., eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2d ed., 298-311.