Treitler on Historical Criticism

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On Historical CriticismAuthor(s): Leo TreitlerSource: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr., 1967), pp. 188-205Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/741200

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ON HISTORICALCRITICISM

By LEOTREITLER

There s a rattlingof skeletons n the halls of humane learning.It is natural that in the conductof our daily work we avoid directand interferingcontactwith its fundamentals.But it is clear, too, thatthere must come times of reflectionabout the goals that are definedand the ways that are marked. If sharp attacks upon tradition aresymptomatic, hen this is sucha time.The most trenchantcriticismshave reached for thewidest audience:the wholesale denunciation of humanities and humanists in WilliamArrowsmith's essay The Shame of Our Graduate Schools' and theradical curativeproposals offeredby EricLarabee n his essay Savingthe Humanities2 "shatteringthe sanctity of jealously-guardeddepart-ment boundaries, strangling the Ph.D. octopus, punishing pointlessresearch,abolishingtenure, oweringinflatedsalaries...").In the field of musical scholarship acrid exchanges in the pages ofPerspectives of New Music and the Journal of the American Musicolog-ical Society3have been only the sharp edge of a-series that includes

'Harper's Magazine, March 1966, pp. 51-59. Symptomatichoughit may be, Arrowsmith'sbroadside is not altogether well informed. Thus his linking of classics and musicology as themost backwardof the humanisticdisciplinesis surely ill-advised,consideringthe enormousdif-ferencesn thebackgroundand current tate of the two.2Commentary,December1966, pp. 53-60.3CharlesRosen, TheProperStudy of Music, in Perspectives, (1962), 80-88; Joseph Ker-man, TheProperStudy of Music: A Reply,in Perspectives,II (1963), 151-59; Kerman,A Pro-

file for AmericanMusicology, in JAMS, XVIII (1965), 65-69; Edward E. Lowinsky,Characterand Purposesof AmericanMusicology;A Reply toJoseph Kerman, ibid., 222-34; Communica-tionfromKerman, bid.,426-27.

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OnHistoricalCriticismsome rather more reflectivewriting.4The field of art history has seensome serious theorizingin the work of James Ackerman,E. H. Gom-brich,ErwinPanofsky,and Meyer Schapiro.5A recurrenttheme in this new round of questioningand definingstems from a unique condition of historical studies in the arts. It isthat the centralobjectof study is an artifactborn into a special, thatis an esthetic, relationship with the cultureof which it is a part, andwhich continuesthroughits survival to be both a historical record andan objectof estheticperception.It is a work of art, and the historianis obliged to come to terms with it as such; "the curse and the bless-ing," Panofsky wrote, "of art history."6There is a repeatedshow ofconcern whether we have met that obligation, whetherour history issound from the standpoint of what is called "criticism."Ackerman,Arrowsmith,and Kerman, especially, have argued that a more prom-inent place for criticism in our methodologyis the most pressing need,and I shall take that assertion as a point of departure n the presentessay. But I shall suggest that the diagnosis on which it rests can bemisleading, that certainly in music-historical iteraturecritical assess-ments abound, and that the issue is not "how much?"or "how cen-tral?" but rather"what kind?"and "on whatpremises?"I shall offeran alternativeview, not that history and criticismare too widely sep-arated butthatthey have been,in a sense, too closely confounded.Thecry for criticismhas had something in it of the cranky, nagging childwho does not articulatewhat it is he wants. We need to know what acritical account of an art-work may be, or what it may seek to do;

4WarrenAllen,Philosophiesof MusicHistory,New York,1962; FrankL. Harrison, MantleHood, ClaudeV. Palisca, Musicology (The PrincetonStudies:Humanistic Scholarshipin Amer.ica), Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963; Lewis Lockwood's review of the latter in Perspectives,III(1964), 119-27; Harold S. Powers, review of Allan Merriam,TheAnthropology of Music, inPerspectives,V (1966), 161-71.

5Some principal writings: Ackerman,A Theory of Style, in Journal of Aestheticsand ArtCriticism,XX (1961), 227-37; Ackerman,withRhys Carpenter,Art and Archeology (The Prince-ton Studies;see note 4), 1963; Gombrich,Art and Illusion, 2nd ed., revised,New York, 1961;Gombrich,Meditationson a Hobby Horse and OtherEssays on the Theoryof Art, London,1963; Panofsky, Das Problem des Stils in der bildendenKunst, in Zeitschrift r Aesthetik,X(1915), 460-67; the discussion of the latter is continued in Der Begriffdes Kunstwollens, nZeitschriftir Aesthetik,XIV (1919-20), 21-39; Panofsky,Meaning in the VisualArts, Papers inand on Art History, New York, 1955; Schapiro,Style (reprinted n MorrisPhilipson, ed., Aes-thetics Today, New York, 1961, fromA. L.Kroeber,ed., Anthropology Today, Chicago, 1953);Schapiro, On Perfection,Coherence,and Unity of Form and Content, n Sidney Hook, ed., ArtandPhilosophy,New YorkUniversityInstituteof Philosophy,New York, 1966, pp. 3-15.

6DerBegriffdesKunstwollenssee note5).

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The MusicalQuarterlyand we needto know how it relatesto a historical account.I have raised the first of these questionselsewhereand attemptedanumber of formulations of the objectivesof criticism,as the basis fora series of arguments for the relevanceof the historian's evidence tothe interpretationof musical works.7 arguedtherethat in the analysisof art-workswe seek to distinguishthe fortuitousfrom the significant,and the uniquely significant from the conventional, and that the evi-dence of the historian is directlyrelevantto that task. This is the "his-torical point of view," in one sense of that expression.8My objecthereis to explore another sense by asking whetherthere is a special "his-torical account"of art-works.

How does the historian understand a work of art? To begin theinvestigation of this question I should like to set forth one point ofview about how it is to be answered, a point of view that has hadgreat influence on the discipline of musicology and relatedfields. Itdistinguishes,first, betweena commonplace meaning of "understand"that suggests a sense of empatheticor intuitive familiarity, and thescientificunderstandingof natural or historicalphenomena;"I under-stand how you feel," as against "Learn to understand the principlesof the internalcombustionengine." In the second of these meanings-and it is only the secondthat is relevant to the systematicstudy of any-thing, accordingto this point of view-to understand omething is tobe able to explain it, and to explain a thing is to give its causes.Briefly,understanding s knowledgeof causes.9

7MusicAnalysis in an Historical Context.CollegeMusicSocietySymposium,VI (1966).8This point of view has been newly representedby Edward.Lippman n The ProblemofMusical Hermeneutics:A Protestand Analysis, in Art and Philosophy (see note5), pp. 307-35.9This apparentlyinnocentdistinction n meanings for our word "understand"restson theancient epistemologicalsplit betweensubjectiveand objectiveknowledge,that is to say the dis-sociation of the knower fromwhatis known.It harbors issues of great importanceand ultimaterelevancethat must be mentionedhere, even though these remarksmay not appear to be im-mediatelybasic to theargument hat is to follow. Fromthe point of view that I have been sketch-ing above, statementsmust derive theirvalidity eitherfrom factual correctnessverifiability)orformalconsistency(as in a definitionor mathematical quation). "Subjective" tatementscall doneither,and are thereforedisqualifiedromthe status of knowledgeand relegatedto the category

of expressions that includes also cries of pain and ecstasy. The language of formal logic rep-resents,then, a distillationof the substantivecontentof rational,"objective"statements,and, bycorollary, statements that are not reducible o the notationof formal logic are not "objective."These remarksapply withequalforceto long-term ntellectualprocesses,such as experimentationand theory development,and, relevantto this discussion,causal explanation.This canon forms

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On Historical Criticism 191To complete the exposition of this point of view it is necessary to

clarify what is meant by causes. They are of two kinds: precipitatingconditions -conditions that must obtain in order for a given event tooccur-and general laws under which the given event must occurwhenever the specified conditions obtain. If I wish to explain somephenomenon, for example the production of ice cubes in my homefreezer, I must show that certain conditions prevail--the tray of waterhas been placed in an enclosure in which a temperature below 32 de-grees F. is maintained--and I must cite a general law that is in ef-fect-"At sea level the freezing-point of water is 32 degrees F." It fol-lows that the power to explain is tantamount to the power to predict,for, given the precipitating conditions, the general law tells us that theevent in question will ensue. If I can explain my ice cubes, I can alsopredict that whenever I place another tray of water in the same en-closure under the same conditions I shall have more ice cubes.'? Eachcase in which the same train of events is set in motion is covered bythe basis of the scientism o whichthe humanitiesand social scienceshave aspiredsince the 19thcentury,and it now informs a good deal of music-historicaland music-theoreticalwriting.Thatbeing the case, it is necessary o note at once that, as a model for rational discourse,this bipar-tite reduction of knowledge,with its methodologicalconsequences,has come to be widelyre-garded as an oversimplificationand even as a delusion.I quote MichaelPolanyi:"I start byrejecting he ideal of scientificdetachment.n the exact sciences,this false ideal is perhapsharm-less, for it is in factdisregarded hereby scientists.But we shall see that it exercisesa destructiveinfluencen biology, psychology, and sociology, and falsifiesour whole outlook far beyond thedomain of science."(Personal Knowledge,Chicago,1958, p. viii.) And on the principalsubjectof this discussion, Mario Bunge wrote:"The reductionof lawfulness orderliness]to causalityis a mistake in scientificmethodand, like other mistakesof this sort, it is liable to have noxiousconsequencesfor every general world outlook that claims to be based on science" Causality,Cambridge,1959, p. 262). The oppositionis voiced in diversefields-linguistic and analyticphilosophy, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of science,gestalt psychology, the theoryof art-and it is not coordinated.It is impossible to formulatealternativeviews in this space,but a numberof centralprinciplesshould be mentioned:1) Knowing is an active processof as-similation that incorporatesan act of appraisal. It is like skill and connoisseurship n beingpartly inarticulateand inarticulable. ) Theory-seen as interpretativeatternsor structures- isin effecta screen between the knower and the things known. We do not regard facts as beingtrue except as they have a place in some theoretical ramework.Particularsare meaninglessifwe lose sight of the patterntheyjointly constitute.Observationand theory are relatedin an in-terplay, not a hierarchyor a strictlyorderedtime-sequence. ) Verifiabilityas the measure oflawfulnessyields ground to intelligibility, oherence,potentialexplanatorypower.4) The knowerfinds himself within a continuous matrix that connectsthe world of "objective"reality, directlygiven throughexperienceand activity,with consciousness.5) Formal logic is not identical withmeaningfuldiscourse;t is one- highly specializedand selective- amongseveral varietiesthereof.

'?This is one of the most vulnerablepoints in this view of explhnation.It has been arguedthat, although explanationand predictionmay show parallel formal structures, hey do not al-ways turn outto be reversible.The basis for the argumentis the assertionthat each of the terms"cause," "law," "explanation,"and "prediction"n factcovers a widerrange of referrents han


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The Musical Quarterlythe same general law, and this paradigm for explanation is thereforeknown as the "covering law model."The general viewpoint that I have briefly outlined here is known asthe Neo-Positivist position. Its central thesis is that scientific studymeans systematic investigation of causes, in the sense of the coveringlaw model for explanation. While this doctrine took form earliest inthe context of the natural sciences, its wider application to all fields ofknowledge is the subject of continuing and urgent discussion. For thestudy of history the central Neo-Positivist document is Carl Hempel'swell-knownessay The Function of GeneralLaws in History.1 In hisaddress to the New York meeting of the International MusicologicalSociety in 1961, Arthur Mendel affirmed the correctness of Hempel'sposition and formally extended its application to the discipline ofmusicology.l2 In the course of his exposition Mendel distinguished, interms of levels of generality, between two phases of the musicologist'swork: his establishing of lower-order facts, such as the date and placeof birth of some composer, and the relating of higher-order facts, suchas musical styles. The first has to do with the treatment of evidence,the second with what I shall call, rather loosely for the moment, thewriting of narrative history.For the remainder of this essay I shall confine myself to the secondof these subjects, and I shall raise these fundamental questions:

1) Does causal explanation according to the covering law model

is recognizedby the coveringlaw model. See William Dray, Laws and Explanationin History,London, 1957, Chap. III (pp. 58-85) and Bunge, op. cit., pp. 307-32. A minuteexample:thestatement"Lions are fierce"providesthe basis for a predictionon which one's life may depend,but it would not explain a single manifestationof a particular ion's fierceness.I shall want toconsider hestatus of such"explanations"n musichistory furtheron.As studentsof music especially, we should not be surprisedby this lack of symmetrybe-tween explanation and prediction.The analysis of music, even as the analysis of narrativeordramatic fiction, comes down very much to a detaileddemonstrationof the way in whichtheeventsof the workare motivated.Beingconvincedby such a demonstrationwe do not, however,go on to claim that it was all predictable.On the contrary,we would say that it is just withinthisgap between xplanationand predictionhat artisticexcellence s located.

'Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), reprinted n Feigl and Sellars, eds., Readingsin Phil-osophical Analysis, New York, 1949, and PatrickGardiner, Theoriesof History, New York,1959."Evidence and Explanation, in InternationalMusicological Society Reportof the EighthCongress, New York 1961, Kassel, 1962, pp. 3-18. The reader will find therea far more de-tailedand thoughtful xpositionof thispointof view than space allows here.

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On HistoricalCriticismadequately representwhat historians do when they explain his-toricalphenomena?132) What are the consequencesof theplacementof causal knowledgeat the centerof music-historicalstudy?

It might be well to reflectfirston the special problemsthat may beencounteredwhen the historical facts we seek to explain are art-worksor classes of art-works. If we wish to explain how it happened, say,that Haydn composed twelve symphonies for performance n London,we can readily referto a chain of events and conditions that lead upto the fact in question. But suppose we seek to explain why it is thatin the next-last of those symphonies(No. 103) there is a return nearthe conclusion of the first movement to the tempo and music of theintroduction. Now we seem to enter a differentrealm, for it is hardlypossible to imagiae such an explanation in terms of precipitatingcon-ditions and covering laws. This would suggest that there are at leasttwo kinds of explaining of art-works:explaining the causes, but alsoexplainingthe quality of theirbeing.In music history we often explainone workor style by reference oanother, antecedentwork or style. The establishingof the relationshipof antecedence s a necessary and illuminatingpartof history writing,

3This questionis not raised here for the first time. The following briefreviewincorporatessome of my own arguments,but it owes much to the selections from a very extensiveliteraturethat I list hereand citespecificallyn the contextof my discussion.H. Butterfield,The WhigInterpretationf History, London,1931.Arthur Child, Thoughts on the Historiology of Neo-Positivism,in Journal of Philosophy,LVII 1960), 665.BenedettoCroce,Historical Determinismand Philosophy of History, reprinted n Gardiner,Theories.Alan Donagan, Explanationin History, in Gardiner,Theories.William Dray, Laws and Explanations in History(see note10), Explaining What,in Gard-iner, Theories,and Explanatory Narrative in History, in PhilosophicalQuarterly 1954), pp.15-27.CharlesFrankel,Explanationand Interpretationn History, in Gardiner,Theories.PatrickGardiner,TheNatureofHistoricalExplanation, London,1952.MichaelScriven, Truismsas the Groundsor HistoricalExplanation, in Gardiner,Theories.W. H. Walsh, TheIntelligibilityof History, in Philosophy (1942), pp. 129-43.Mendel supports Hempel's thesis, and in rejecting he argumentspresentedby the latter'sopponentshe showsthat the conditionsof historythat are alleged to stand in the way of a scien-tific methodology-e.g. the uniquenessof historicalevents, the elusiveness of causal laws-ob-tain in scienceas well. Indeedthe following argumentsare not intendedto supportthe doctrinethat history is sui generis in its methods.But then the generalconclusionmust be that "it is de-sirable to dispense with a nomenclatureattachedto an outdatedphilosophy of science,namelythat assertingthe coextensivenessof scienceand causality" (Bunge, op. cit., p. 277). This is tosay that the identificationof all knowledgeas causal is as unsatisfactory n scienceas it is inhistory.

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The MusicalQuarterlybut as causal explanation it can, in most cases, hope to rely only onthe thinpaste ofpost hoc ergopropterhoc.

Anotherform of explanationfrequently ncounteredn musichistoryis that in which an individual work is identifiedwith a class or typeabout which some general characteristic s alleged. As an example wemay take the following sentence:"Four-partwritingwas of course nonoveltyc. 1300...; butits appearance n severalEnglish compositions...,when consideredtogetherwith the attemptat six-partwriting in Sumeris icumen in...seems to show a predilectionon the part of the Englishfor greaterfullness of sound..."14Associations of this type increase ourpowerof understandingparticulars.As soon as we are able to say thatthe particularin question s a such-and-such,we have taken hold of it.But we have by no meansgiven a causal explanation of it.Among the criticisms that have been raisedagainst Hempel's thesis,some do not questionthehistorian's interest n causes, but neverthelessdeny both the possibility of collectingenough information about thecircumstancesunder which his events took place and the possibility offormulating satisfactory general laws.'5With respectto conditions, inorder to make a scientific xplanationof Napoleon's decision to invadeRussia thehistorianwouldneedto knowfar more about the Emperor'spublic and private life than he could ever hope to learn (more, nodoubt, than Napoleon himselfknew). And with respect o laws in his-tory, they must be of such generalityas to be trivial, or of such spe-cificityas to apply to only a singlecase.We may take as an examplethestatement"Louis XIV was unpop-ular because his policy was detrimental o France."16 he general lawon which this explanation rests might take this unimpressiveform:"Rulers whose policies are detrimentalto their countries become un-popular." Or we mightfill out thestatementof the law with a complexof factors including Louis's expansionist foreign policy, his heavy tax-ation, and his religious persecutions.But as it gains in explanatorypower it narrows in its applicability,until theconditions it specifiesaremet only by the case of Louis XIV. Then it might resemblegenerallaws in form, but it would be, in fact, an explicationof the particular

"4FromGustaveReese,Musicin the MiddleAges, New York, 1940, p. 403."This is Donagan's thesis, although most criticsexpressthe same concernin one form oranother."Theexample s fromDray, Lawsand Explanations, p. 39 ff.

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OnHistoricalCriticismcase. And herein lies the thrust of an altogetherdifferentnotion of ex-planation.17 n this view the explanations that satisfy historians areindeed explications, detailedunfoldingsof thecase underconsideration,in the context of all that can be discoveredabout the attendantcir-cumstances. These may be relatedthrough an interpretativeransfor-mation of facts, so that theymanifesta recognizablepatternor theme.In this view explaining is a kind of ordering process, like explainingthefunctioningof a sentence.To be sure,somewhere n the backgroundthere are ultimate regularitiesand correlationson which it all depends,but they are of an extremely general and fundamentalsort, like thebroadest generalizations about human behavior. It is not from thesethat the explanation derives its power.It is, rather, from the coherenceof the pattern that the historian has recognized. He is credited,notwith discovering that a particularphenomenonfalls under a generallaw, but for finding that a number of elementsmay be brought to-gether into a single patternin such a way as to be made intelligiblein terms of one another. This view rejects he ultimateartificiality,thebelief in the separability in practice of observation and theory--asTaine had it, "Apres la collectiondes faits, la recherchedes causes."'8

These criticisms are made on logical grounds and from reflectionabout what historians in fact do. Othersstem from consideration,notof the truth, but of the usefulness of the covering law hypothesis. It isuseful to the pure scientist,for he is principally interested n the lawsthemselves;he values them for the fact that they explain. It is usefulto the applied scientist, for his chief business is making predictions.And it is useful to the geologist, say, or to the musicologistworkingwith his evidence, for both are concerned n reasoning from presentevidence through laws to past facts. But none of these statementsde-scribesthe principal purpose of thehistorianwritingnarrativehistory,for his objective is to establish connectionsamong facts of which heis alreadyin possession.19The question of value may be approachedfrom still another direc-tion. The covering law hypothesis, and indeed the general movement

"Walsh, Child, Butterfield,Dray, Explaining What;(Gardiner, TheNature of HistoricalExplanation,Chap.2."'Quotedby Croce,p. 239. As an antidote o Taine's maxim I referthe reader to NorwoodHanson's Patternsof Discovery,CambridgeUniv. Press,1958."Child, p. 665; Butterfield, . 22; Frankel,p. 411.

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TheMusicalQuarterlytowards "scientific"procedure in historical studies of which that hy-pothesis is a late and quintessentialmanifestation,answereda pressingneed. It was the need to bring to light the assumptionsthat are, asHempel wrote, "buried under the gravestones 'hence', 'therefore', be-cause', and the like," and to erect a standard against which it wouldbe possible to show that explanations thus offered are often "poorlyfounded or downright unacceptable."20t was to affirm that the re-sponsibility for logical, deductive reasoning, to the limits of the evi-dence,was not to be circumventedby recourse o "intuitiveconviction"and "historical sensitivity." I believe that Hempel's argumentis bestinterpreted n that light, and not as a demand for strict adherencetothe letterof thecoveringlaw model. ForHempel himself recognizedtheimpossibility of meeting such a demand in history; thus he spoke of"explanation sketches," as others have spoken of "loose laws" and"probability hypotheses."2lWith this interpretation, hen, thecoveringlaw model is but a maximal formulation for the sort of reasoning towhich the historian is obligated, and for his recognitionthat eventsare orderly rather than capricious. The need for such an orientationis hardly to be denied.

It is in theleap fromthatemphasisto the centralplacementof caus-al knowledgein historicalinquirythat thedifficultiesare to be located!And now I have returned o my principal subject.For it seems tome that in the practiceof musicology theexplaining "what" has beenheavily prejudicedby a preoccupationwith explaining "why." Thehistorian's account of what the work is, is conditionedby his habit ofinquiring how it came to be. This is the second "historicalpoint ofview." The historical fact is understoodprincipallythrough its ante-cedentsand consequences,and thesequenceof historicalfacts is linkedin a geneological chain of cause and effect.This view is supported,aswe have seen, by the Neo-Positivistapproachto explanation. But it isalso reinforcedby a number of inherited beliefs about the nature ofhistorical change and historical necessity that come, paradoxically,from another directionaltogether.It is to thosethat I turn now.We may begin by consideringGuidoAdler'spropaedeuticpostulatefor musicology, given in his Methode der Musikgeschichte: The task

20 p. cit.21Dray, Laws and Explanation, pp. 25-31.

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OnHistoricalCriticismof musichistory is the investigationand thesetting forth of the develop-mental paths of music."22 he ShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary offerstwo families of meaning for the word "develop";as technical term inmathematics,photography, and warfare,and then this group:"To un-fold or unroll, to unfurl, to unveil, to disclose, to bring out all that iscontained in, to bring forth from a latent or elementarycondition, tocause to grow what exists in the germ, to grow into a fuller, higher,or more mature condition." These definitionshave in common the no-tion, either of disclosure of what is already present,or of realizationof a stored potential. In eithercase a process is suggestedfor whichthe course is charted,and the end-pointdetermined.Now the contextfor these definitionsis largely biological, and we shall probably objectthat no such determinist deas underlie our notions of development nhistory. Yet in the history of art, and in political and social history,there s a strongtraditionforjust such a concept.It goes back, in any case, to Aristotle. He wrote, in the Physics,"Those things are naturalwhichby a continuousmovementoriginatedby an internal principle arrive at some completion"and "Each stepin the series is for thesake of the next." In the Poetics he wrote, of thedevelopment of tragedy, "It was in fact only after a long series ofchanges that the movementof Tragedy stopped on its attaining to itsnaturalform."23From Leo Schrade'sessay Renaissance,theHistorical Conceptionofan Epoch,24we learn of the schemeof culturaldevelopment n termsof which the menof the 15th and 16th centuriessaw their age. Writersin all disciplines rejoiced in their participation in a "restoration,""renovation," "return to the light," "rebirth."The original, or model,was, of course, antiquity, in some versions together with the earlyChristian era. The two epochs--the original and the rebirth--hadbeen separatedby an "immenseinterval," a "lacuna," an "exile," an"abyss," a "dark ignorance," or "middle age." The rebirth was fol-lowed by a period of growth that, as Schradeobserved, "stimulatedthe assumption of the biologic process of passing through the phasesof infancy or youth, maturemanhood, and old age. It seems but natu-

22Leipzig,919, p. 9."QuotedfromtheOxfordtranslation,editedby W.D. Ross. Physics: Bk. II, Ch. 8, p. 199b,11. 15-19;p. 199a, 11. 15-16. Poetics:Ch.4, p. 1449a, 11. 14-15.24 nternationalMusicological Society, Report of the 5th Congress, Utrecht,1952, Kassel,1953, pp. 19-32.

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The MusicalQuarterlyral that the biological idea of an organic growth toward fullestripe-ness suggested the principlesof progressivenessand perfection o thesummitof potentialities."This schemeof historyagain held acentralposition in the self imageof 18th-centuryartists and scholars. Immanuel Kant wrote in 1784:

All the capacities implanted in a creatureby natureare destinedto unfold them-selves, completelyand conformably to theirend, in the course of time...Inman, asthe only rational creatureon earth,thosenaturalcapacitieswhich are directed owardthe use of his reason could be completelydeveloped only in the speciesand not inthe individual, for reason requiresthe productionof an almost inconceivableseriesof generationsin order that Nature'sgerms, as implantedin our species, may be atlast unfolded to that stage of developmentwhich is completelyconformable o herinherentdesign.2(Hegel, not long after, took the same doctrine,and nearly the samelanguage, as a central enetof his philosophyof history:"The principleof developmentinvolves the existence of a latent germ of being-acapacity or potentiality striving to realize itself.")26n a work begunalso in 1784, Johann GottfriedHerderput it this way: "As a botanistcannot obtain a completeknowledgeof a plantunless he follow it fromthe seed through its germination, blossoming, and decay, such is Gre-cian history to us."27That this doctrineshould find expressionwithinthe contextof a discussionof Greekcivilization s, of course, especiallymeaningful.For once again that civilization, at its height, representedto the men of the secondhalf of the 18th centurya perfection,a stand-ard that was to be emulated.All this is explicit in theworkof the influentialarcheologist JohannJoachim Winckelmann.In his monumentalHistory of Ancient Art,published 1764, he distinguishedthree stages:"The arts which are de-pendent on drawing have, like all inventions, commencedwith thenecessary; the next objectof researchwas beauty;and finally the su-perfluous followed."Here is his summary of the course of Greekart:

The'earliestattempts, speciallyin thedrawingof figures, represented,not the man-ner in which a man appears to us, but what he is; not a view of his body, but the2Kant, Idea of a UniversalHistoryfrom a CosmopolitanPoint of View,reprinted rom thetranslationof W. Hastiein Gardiner,Theories,pp.22-34.

'Hegel, Lectureson thePhilosophy of History, excerptedn J. Ioewenberg,ed., Hegel Selec-tions,New York,1929, p. 409."Ideas Toward a Philosophy of the History o Man, reprinted rom the translationof T.Churchilln Gardiner,Theories,pp. 35-51.

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On Historical Criticismoutline of his shadow. From this simplicity of shape the artist next proceeded to ex-amine proportions. This inquiry taught exactness (and) gave confidence and successto his endeavours after grandeur, and at last gradually raised art among the Greeksto the highest beauty. After all the parts constituting grandeur and beauty were united,the artist, in seeking to embellish them, fell into the error of profuseness; art conse-quently lost its grandeur, and the loss was finally followed by its utter downfall.28

This evaluation is important, for it shows that "dread of corrup-tion," as Gombrichrecently ermed t,29hroughwhichthe new "classic-ism" of the 18th centurywas to be purified.It implied an appeal forthe perpetuationof ideal forms that Winckelmannhad already madeexplicit in his Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Paintingand Sculpture,publishedin 1755.30The economyand incisivenessthatare asked for here became and have remained,as we know, synony-mous with both thenotion of"perfection"and the concept"Classical."Just as our conceptionof the "Renaissance" as a historical epochfollows, and continuesto reinforce,theself image of Renaissancemen,so our continueddesignation of the second half of the 18th centuryasthe era of "Classicism"restsultimatelyupon, and preserves,ideals thatwere given expression at the time. And a single view of history-thedevelopmentalview-underlies both cases.The active role that this theory of history plays in the practiceofmusicology is most apparentin textbooks of music history, althoughthese do not by any means constitute its only sphere of influence.Ishall cite a characteristicpassage, and let it evoke others like it. Andby way of preface to all the quotations that follow, I should like tomake it quite clear that it is not my purpose to take issue with themor their authors directly,but ratherto relate them to a frameworkoftheory.

Here, then, is a passage from a widelyread introductorytextbook:"When Emma's spectralfuneral music...announced n its transforma-tion at the end of the opera [Euryanthe] that the sinner is redeemed,the seed was planted from which, at Wagner's hands, the whole formof Music Drama was to grow."3'We may read this sort of language28Thequotationsarefromthetranslationof G. Henry Lodge, Boston, 1873, pp. 191-92.29Publicecture,Philosophiesof Historyand theirImpacton Art,I. Platonismand the Dreadof Corrupton. Universityof Chicago,1966.0Gedanken iber die Nachahmung der griechischenWerke n der Malerei und Bildhauer-kunst,availableto me in theeditionof B. Seuffert,Heilbronn,1855.

3"AlfredEinstein,A Short History of Music, 4th Americaned., revised,New York, 1956,p. 164.

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TheMusicalQuarterlyas literary gift wrapping, enclosing less theoreticalmeaning than ap-pears on the surface. But then here is a less picturesquestatementbya differentauthor which is, nevertheless, nformedby the same doc-trine:"Instrumentalmusic in the early 17thcenturywas in a differentstage of developmentfrom vocal music.Vocal musichad to assimilatethe new techniqueof monody...; but instrumentalmusic for the mostparthad only to continuealong thepaththat had already been markedout before the end of theRenaissance."32 ere is the same view again,expressedin one of our most recent extbooks of history, and this timestated quite explicitly as theory:"Musical materials have to be 'usedup', their potential fully exploited,beforestylecan move ahead on thelong line of history. As in a developmentsection by Beethoven,thematerialalready introducedhas to be shreddeddown to its constituentfibers, all its meaning extracted,beforenew meaning will seem mean-ingful. "33

There can be no questionthat thedevelopmentaldoctrineis a prom-inent feature in the philosophicalbackgroundof historicalmusicology.Before asking how it manifests tselfin the evaluation of musical worksI shall needto makeone final digression.The concept of historical developmentfalls squarely in the field ofa fundamental and recurringphilosophical controversy, that betweenthe positions of "Nominalism" and "Realism." To the Nominalist,categories of particularsare constructs:artificial,arbitrary, and prac-tical. The general terms by which we designatethem are names only,and the study of categoriesamountsto thestudy of the linguisticrulesthat govern the use of the terms that represent hem. For the Realistparticularsaregrouped togetherbecauseof propertiesheld in common,and general terms derive their meanings from the real features of theobjectsto whichtheyrefer- not theotherway about. For the Nominal-ist categories are hypothetical and are valued for their usefulness inthe managementof data. For the Realist the common features of par-ticulars by whichtheyare setoff in categories are independently"true"and are to be discovered. Whethera particularbelongs to a certaincategory is for the Nominalist a formal question of definition,of theuse of thetermsin thecase, butnot so for the Realist.

3Donald Jay Grout,A Historyof WesternMusic, New York, 1960, p. 297."Richard Crocker, A History of Musical Style, New York, 1966, p. 525.

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On Historical CriticismFor a concrete example from music history of the approach to asingle problem from theseopposed pointsof view we may consider the

controversy over the status of theconcept"Baroque."The Nominalistposition was represented by John Mueller in his essay, characteristi-cally entitled Baroque-Is it Datum, Hypothesis, or Tautology?34 Inanswering the rhetoricalquestion of his title Muellertreatedthe style-category "Baroque" as an invention of historians,therebydenying thefirst of his alternatives,and then challengedits soundness because, heargued, the integrity of the category could not be demonstrated.ButManfred Bukofzer claimed for the Baroquethe status of "period in itsown right"--not a construct, but a collection of real attributes.35nthe following statementby Paul Henry Lang the Realist position istaken a step further,in that the particularsbelonging to the categoryowe their characteristics o the circumstanceof theirhaving been borninto the category: "TheBaroquestandsvividly beforeus for its powerto mold all the arts accordingto its own eloquentspirit."36Here "Ba-roque" is no longer a designation for the common attributesof Ba-roque art-works;it denotes a distillation of these attributes n idealform, a generative principle,an essence.Baroqueworks are no longerparticulars that share certainproperties; hey are individual embodi-ments of a single essence. In the light of that distinctionKarl Popperhas introduced the term "Essentialism" for this extremeform of theRealistdoctrine.37The historical theory in which the causes of events are sought indevelopmental processes is an Essentialist theory. For at the core ofeach process of development-whether it is of a genre, of a school, orof a technique--there must be somethingthat is recognizablythe sameeven while it changes with respectto its outer form. We affirm this inour willingnessto name what it is that is undergoing development-"music drama" and "instrumentalmusic," in the textbook passagesthat I cited above. Those names referto essences or universals, andto trace the developmentof such genresis to follow the successiveem-bodiments of their essences. But the study of individual embodiments

4Journalof Aethetics nd ArtCriticism,XII (1954), 421-37.35The Baroque in Music History, in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XIV (1955),

152-56.3Music in WesternCivilization,New York,1941, p. 529.3 ThePoverty of Historicism,3d ed., New York,1961, pp. 26-34.

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The Musical Quarterlyis undertaken as means, not as end, for they reveal the different formsthat the essence may take; i.e. they reveal its potentials. Indeed, anessence may be regarded as the sum of its potential forms, and toreally know an essence we must follow it through all of those forms.This is the sense, once again, of Herder's figure: "The botanist cannotobtain a complete knowledge of a plant unless he follow it from theseed through its germination, blossoming, and decay." From this pointof view the study of anything is necessarily historical.Goethe warned once: "Too much inquiring after thesources of thingsis dangerous. We should rather concentrate on phenomena as givenrealities."38 What a curious and unexpected thing it is that an Idealistposition-"All knowledge is historical"-and one that arises from aPositivist orientation-"All knowledge is causal knowledge"-shouldcome together in the doctrine of historicism that is the antithesis ofGoethe's meaning!

We can anticipate three characteristics in the approach to the mu-sical work from the developmental point of view. It will be regarded asthe embodiment of an essence; it will be understood in terms of itsantecedents and consequences; and it will be seen in the context of aprocess that culminates in the fulfillment or perfection of the essencethat it informs. The following selections of music-historical writing areall taken from a single field of inquiry, the study of music of the Clas-sic era. This is done in the interest of maintaining a consistent frame-work, not because that field is unique in its theoretical bearing. Andthis time I quote, not from general textbooks but from scholarly publi-cations intended for a professional audience.First, passages from an article on The Symphonies of Padre Mar-tini39(the title is significant, for its form suggests that the author meansto give a general account of his repertory). Martini's works are re-peatedly considered in terms of their embodiment of the Baroque andClassic styles. Thus, "The first book of Sonatas marked Martini's fare-well to the Baroque," and "The Symphony 2 illustrates Martini's ap-proach to the new [i.e. Classic] style." In the following passages theevaluation of musical works depends upon a comparison with past

38"Allzuvielesragennach den Ursachenseigefahrlich;mansolle lieber an die Erscheinun-gen als gegebeneTatsachehalten."Quotedby H. J. Moser in Zur Methodik der musikalischenGeschichtschreibung,n Zeltschrzftfur esthetik,XIV (1920), 130-45.9By HowardBrofsky,in TheMusicalQuarterly,LI(1965), 649-73.

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On Historical Criticismand/or future counterparts: the slow movement of Symphony 22 is"retrospective, for it begins with the Baroque chromatic descendingtetrachord in the bass," and "Oddly enough, Martini reverts in thelate symphonies to the descending chromatic tetrachord," or "Martinidisappoints us, for while the symphony dated 1736 is au courant withthe conventions of the day his later stylistic progress is small, and doesnot keep pace with the important changes taking place around him."Finally, in the polarity of a "nascent Classical style" on one hand, anda "full-fledged Classical style" on the other, we have the familiar imageof birth and development to maturity.Next I quote passages from an encyclopedia article on the sym-phony.40 Regarding the music of Florian Gassmann, "his orchestraltreatment...points to the future," and that of Mozart, "Although Mozartdid not consciously seek new and surprising effects, he was a pioneerwith respect to the greater independence of the winds." "Massoneau'sSymphonie la Tempete et la Calme (1794) may be regarded as pre-paring the way for the Pastoral Symphony." These passages, again,make their reports in terms of past and future. Characteristic too isthe tendency to make no distinction betweenforerunner and progenitor,i.e. to require no further evidence that forerunner is progenitor. Thistendency seems always to carry with it the attributing of the greatestsignificance to the earliest occurrence of a phenomenon or trait.The growth image is projected in this passage: "In the early yearsof the [18th] century the overture is important as the cradle of the newClassic tone language...With composers of the first generation the so-nata form of the first movement is only rudimentary...The second gen-eration of overture composers shows greater mastery of sonata form."In this last passage, too, it must be plain that "sonata form" is anideal, an essence. For how is it otherwise possible to speak in termsof degrees of mastery of a technique that has nowhere yet been fullydefined or worked out? Of course we know the experience of the con-scious quest for the solution of an intellectual or artistic problem. Weare unable to specify the solution while we seek it, but we recognize itonce it is presented to us. What I wish to observe here is the tendencyto assume such a structure for all historical processes, and to derivefrom it every judgment about works of art.

There is an apparent difference between these last quotations and thepassages about Padre Martini. Those were phrased in a heavily value-40MGG, rticleSymphonie.

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The Musical Quarterlyladen language; these seem objective and noncommittal. We might saythat the first are interpretative, the second descriptive. But herein liesan issue of the first importance. The single criterion of value for theinterpretative statements is the same developmental framework thatgives form to the descriptive statements. The question is whether adescriptive statement on these lines can ever be bare of value conno-tations. Can we say "ripe Classical style" without implying a higherorder of musical achievement than is suggested by "nascent Classicalstyle"? Surely not, for all statements of this type are supported by atheory of history that imposes a hierarchy on their subjects. Everystage in a developmental process is a step nearer to the realization ofpotentials, hence what is is an improvement over what was. That isthe spirit in which Hegel could write "The real world is as it oughtto be" (italics mine).41 The only difference between the passages onMartini and those on the symphony is in the degree to which their as-sessments are made explicit.Let us return to the encyclopedia article: in the treatment of PhilippEmanuel Bach the interpenetration of historical position and artisticposition is complete:

Although he was among the most respected and influential personalities of the 18thcentury both as theoretician and composer, he did not always succeed in coordinatingall the musical factors in the full Classical sense...A conflict arises from Bach's breadthof background in the traditions of the past, which is coupled with a striking futuristictendency. He combined Baroque, Classic, and Romantic characteristics in a mixturethat rarely resulted in a satisfying synthesis. In Bach's symphonies sensitive andstriking details often interrupt the flow and balance of the over-all conception, whichis evidence of the basic opposition between Empfindsamkeit and ripe Classicism.The assessment of the man's position as an artist is truly indistinguish-able from his location on the historical continuum. If his music is un-successful, it is because he occupies an awkward position historically.(We know of other composers, of course, whose mark of artistic achieve-ment is their position not between, but in advance of, scheduled his-torical developments. )42

4Lectures on the Philosophy of History, transl. from the 3d German ed. by J. Sibree, Lon-don, 1894. The passage quoted is from the author's introduction.

42OswaldSpenglermarked thebeginningof the declineof Westernmusic with Beethoven,ongrounds very like those laid downby Winckelmann: rofusionand the consequentdisruptionofform.AlfredEinsteinarguedthat,onthecontrary,Beethovenrepresentsa peak in that he broughtabout the full realizationof the potentialsof sonata form. They assess their man differently,butonly becausehe occupiesdifferent ositionsin theirrespectiveschemesof development. Spengler,The Decline of the West,authorizedransl.by CharlesF. Atkinson,New York, 1926 and 1928,I, 291 ff.; Einstein, Oswald Spenglerund die Alusikgeschichte,n Zeitschriftur Musikwissen-schapft,II[1920], 30-32.)

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OnHistoricalCriticismFinally I quote from a monograph on The Symphonies ofJosephHaydn.4 Once again, measurement s taken in terms of the past andfuture:"Thus, the Salomon Symphonies sum up and synthesizeall[Haydn] has achieved in the field, and at the same time look far for-ward into the future,to the orchestralworld of Beethovenand Schu-bert, of Mendelssohn and Schumann."44Definedgoals are achievedthrough a gradual development:"The firstsix [Salomon Symphonies]show a steady progress in the directionof the 'English Taste'."45Andwhat lies at the end of the development s the perfectionof the form,the full realization of its potentials;"last" is "best":"As the London

period progresses, this tendency[ i.e. the dramaticfunctionof the slowintroduction]emergesever moreclearly,and by 1794-95 [ Symphonies102-104] the formal and emotional necessityof the introductoryslowsections is quite apparent. In no. 104 the profundityof the introduc-tion reaches its height."4 Giventhenow familiartheoreticalframeworkwe might have anticipatedthat judgment, if not its paradoxical word-ing.In this philosophy art is a collective, mpersonalenterprise; racingsof the passage of time, now more,now less distinct,now leading, nowtrailing behind. Artworks are but manifestationsof an Idea, like theshadows in Plato'scave, whosevalue is measuredby the closeness withwhich they approximate their models, and whose necessities are im-posed fromwithout.In our quest for the sources of artwe neglect its quality. We do soto thedisadvantageof our facultyforjudgingart works, for our stand-ards of judgment have little to do with the ways in which we appre-hend works. Then we are left with a history in which estheticsandhermeneuticsplay no significantpart.But it may yet be that the sameobsession with causality that yields such a curiouslyone-sidedhistoryis responsiblealso for distortionsin the narrativefor which so muchis sacrificed;that our categorical prejudgmentseffectnot only the in-terpretationand assessmentof art works, but even those mattersthatwe take to be open to "objective,""scientific" reatment: he readingof art works and the attributionof authorship,chronology, and prov-enance. That is a questionfor furtherinquiry.

43ByH. C. RobbinsLandon, London,1955.45Ibid., p. 552. '6Ibid.,p. 573.

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44Ibid.,p. 552.

Documents

Treitler on Historical Criticism