Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013 - IIEA in Chinese Leadership 2012 201… · Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013: Briefing, February 2012 ! 5! CMC wields

Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013: Briefing, February 2012

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The Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013.

The Institute of International and European Affairs Cathy Cullen

February 2012


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Introduction In 2012, China’s existing leaders will begin handing over power to the incoming fifth generation of leadership. This generational shift will entail the appointment of new individuals to top leadership positions across the entire Chinese political system, including the appointment of a new President and Premier, the replacement of the majority of the Standing Committee of the highly influential Politburo and the Central Military Commission, as well as the replacement of the wider Chinese government. This change in leadership is particularly salient as it takes place at a time when China is becoming an increasingly important player in global affairs and also occurs amidst wider changes in leadership across the globe, with potential administrative shifts taking place in the US in November 2012, as well as Germany and France in April and May 2012. Furthermore, retirement is mandatory at the age of 65 in China, which dictates an unprecedented number of changes within the Chinese political system, with seven of the current nine members of the Politburo and seven of the ten current members of the Central Military Commission stepping down from their position of leadership. Table 1 below shows the current members of the Politburo who are likely to retire after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Table 1: Politburo Members retiring after the 18th Party Congress in 20121

1 Source: Li, Cheng. 2010. China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 – Part 1: Provincial Chiefs’ in China Leadership Monitor (31). Available at: http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM31CL.pdf


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Xi Jinping is expected to replace President Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang will take over from Premier Wen Jiabao between October 2012 and March 2013. Details of the further prospective changes within the Politburo and the Central Military Commission are discussed in the subsequent sections. In China, there is no fixed process for the transition of leadership from one generation to the next. At present, the change in leadership is anticipated to take place in several stages. President Hu will first step down as General Secretary of China’s Communist Party; this is expected to take place at the party congress in October 2012. He will then step down as President in March 2013. The date on which he will hand over power as chairman of the Central Military Commission is less clear, as President Hu Jintao did not take over the position from his predecessor President Jiang Zemin until two years after he took up the Presidency. Nonetheless, it is expected that Xi Jinping, who was promoted to the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2010, will also take over this role when Hu Jintao steps down. Premier Wen Jiabao and the rest of the Chinese government are expected to end their terms in March 2013. Speaking at the IIEA on 8 March 2011, Dr Kerry Brown, leader of the European China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) and Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, highlighted the importance of monitoring the transition in Chinese leadership, which will introduce a new generation of ideas and beliefs into the key positions in Chinese policy circles. Dr Brown asserted that internal issues are likely to remain of paramount importance during this transition. Nonetheless, it could also impact on the Chinese Communist Party’s international strategy and the degree to which China undertakes a leadership role in the international arena, maintains a consensus position on global issues, engages with other countries or focuses on economic growth.

In preparation for the forthcoming transition in Chinese leadership this document provides an overview of some of the key institutions of the Chinese political system, the individuals who have been in power during the current fourth generation of Chinese leadership as well as the characteristics of the prospective fifth generation of leadership. Key differences between the incoming and outgoing generations are also noted.

Overview of Chinese Political Structure

The Chinese political system is essentially composed of two key branches, the state and the party. Although the Military branch, headed by the Central Military Commission (CMC), also plays a highly influential role. Theoretically there is both a state and party branch of the CMC, however in reality the membership of the two committees is identical and therefore they are commonly referred to as a single entity. The structure of the Chinese political system is illustrated below in Figure 1. The names of the individuals who occupy the various positions in the fourth generation of leadership can be found in Figure 2. The Party China is effectively a one party state controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). The CPC holds their National Party Congress (NPC) every five years for approximately fifteen days, which is convened by the Central Committee of the CPC in order to examine the report of the Central Committee and discuss major party issues. During this time, the NPC also elects the


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subsequent Central Committee. Constitutionally the NPC is the “highest organ of state power” and is the highest layer of a nationwide system of ‘people’s congresses’. The NPC is elected by the next lowest tier not popular election. The CPC Central Committee orchestrates all the work of the CPC for a five-year term, once elected by the NPC and once the NPC is no longer in session. It constitutes the core leadership of the party and is composed of about 300 high level party members. These members generally include high-level party officials, government ministers, senior military leaders, provincial governors, party chiefs and CEO’s of some of the most powerful state owned enterprises. The plenary session of the Central Committee elects the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the general secretary of the party and the members of the Central Military Commission.

The Politburo and its Standing Committee are effectively the most powerful policy and decision-making institutions in China. Both are elected at the plenary session of the Central Committee and carry out all functions and powers of the Central Committee when it is not in session. The President of the CPC is also party general secretary and therefore head of the Politburo and the Central Committee. The Secretariat of the Central Committee carries out all administrative duties of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Although China is a one party state, a factional divide exists within the CPC between the ‘populist’ and ‘elitist coalition’ camps. The ‘populist’ faction is associated with current President Hu Jintao and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and favours balanced economic development in conjunction with the improvement of conditions for the poor and disenfranchised in society. The latter ‘elitist coalition’ faction is affiliated with former President Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai clique, which advocates rapid economic development that nurtures China’s growing capitalist and middle class populations at the expense of wider social issues. Many members of the ‘elitist coalition’ are also ‘princelings’, individuals who rose to leadership via family connections. The State According to the Chinese constitution the State Council is the highest government body of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The State Council is essentially the cabinet of the PRC government and is composed of the premier, vice premiers, state councillors, the State Council secretary general, state ministers, the governor of the People’s Bank of China and the auditor general of the National Audit Office. The official head of the State Council is the premier.

The State Council Standing Committee (SCSC) carries out the daily administration of the government. The SCSC meets twice a week and includes the premier, four vice premiers, five state councillors and the State Council general secretary.

China’s government ministries are subordinate to both the State Council and the CPC. However, they play a key role in interpreting, implementing and overseeing Chinese policy. At present there are 22 government ministries that are listed in Figure 1. The Military The military, headed by the Central Military Commission, also plays a crucial role in Chinese politics. The CMC is elected by the Standing Committee of the Politburo and is not under the control of the Ministry of Defence, which is considered to be a weaker authoritative body. The


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CMC wields control over the People’s Liberation Army and is responsible for all air, land and sea forces. In theory the CMC has both a party and government branch, but the membership of both boards is identical and therefore they are considered to be a single institution. As in the Politburo, the forthcoming transition in leadership will see substantive changes to the composition of the CMC. The prospective members of the fifth generation of military leadership, after the 18th Party Congress in 2012, are listed in Table 2 below. Dr Cheng Li2 notes that six of the fourteen candidates are ‘princelings’ and that it is reasonable to expect that there will be more ‘princelings’ in the new CMC than under current leadership, which contains only two. He further notes that a dominance of ‘princelings’ within the CMC could prove to be crucial in the case that the factional divide within the CPC becomes more prominent. However, Dr Li elaborates that the Chinese authorities tend to be sensitive to the potential danger of revealing a factional divide within the military and therefore ideological ties and affiliations are often less evident in the military.

Table 23: Prospective Military Leadership 2012 (in addition to Xi Jinping / Hu Jintao)

Chang Wanquan Current Title: CMC member, director, General Armament Dept Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC Vice Chair, Politburo member

Wu Shengli Current Title: CMC member, commander, Navy. Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC Vice Chair, Politburo member. Faction: Princeling

Xu Qiliang Current Title: CMC member, commander, Air Force Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC Vice Chair, Politburo member.

Ma Xiaotian Current Title: Deputy Chief of the General Staff Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Commander of Air Forces. Faction: Princeling

2 Source: Li, Cheng. 2010. China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 – Part 3: Military Leaders’ in China Leadership Monitor (33). Available at: http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-‐leadership-‐monitor/article/35466 3 Source: Li, Cheng. 2010. China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 – Part 3: Military Leaders’ in China Leadership Monitor (33). Available at: http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-‐leadership-‐monitor/article/35466


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Zhang Haiyang Current Title: Commissar, 2nd Artillery Corps Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Director, General Political Dept. Faction: Princeling

No Photo Available

Deng Changyou Current Title: Commissar, Air Force Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Director, General Political Dept.

Chi Wanchun Current Title: Commissar, General Armament Dept Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC Vice Chair

No Photo Available

Fan Changlong Current Title: Commander, Jinan MR Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Director, General Armament Dept

Zhang Qinsheng Current Title: Deputy chief of the General Staff Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Chief of the General Staff Faction: Princeling

No Photo Available

Sun Jianguo Current Title: Deputy chief of the General Staff Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Commander of Navy.

No Photo Available

Liu Xiaojiang Current Title: Commissar, Navy Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Director, General Political Dept.


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Faction: Princeling

Zhang Youxia Current Title: Commander, Shenyang MR Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Director, General Logistic Dept. Faction: Princeling

Fang Fenghui

Current Title: Commander, Beijing MR Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Chief of the General Staff

No Photo Available

Wei Fenghe Current Title: Chief of Staff, 2nd Artillery Corp Prospective Title: Promoted to CMC member, Commander, 2nd Artillery


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Figure 1 Chinese Political Structure

Current (Fourth Generation) Chinese Leadership


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Figure 2 Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership4

4 Source: Compiled from the government website of the People’s Republic of China Available at: http://english.gov.cn/


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Candidates for the Fifth Generation of Chinese Leadership Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are the only two members of the established politburo who are expected to remain in power during the fifth generation of leadership. Xi Jinping is expected to take over from President Hu Jintao as President, General Secretary of the CPC and head of the CMC. Li Keqiang will replace Premier Wen Jiabao. President Xi Jinping Xi Jinping is currently Vice President, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee as well as Vice Chair of the CMC. He is also Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee and has been a member of the CPC since January 1974.

Mr Xi is 58 and was born in 1953, he is of Han ethnicity and is a native of Fuping in the Shaanxi Province. He graduated from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in Tsinghua University, where he majored in Marxist theory.

Mr Xi is associated with the ‘princelings’ and the Jiang Zemin/Shanghai or ‘elitist’ clique. He is the son of Xi Zhongxun, who was an early communist revolutionary, former deputy prime minister and ally of the previous President, Deng Xiaoping. His family are considered high nobility in China. Nonetheless, Mr Xi is also popular with the wider public and is admired for the time he spent as a rural worker during the Cultural Revolution and therefore is the most likely candidate to act as a bridge between the factions in the politburo. Mr Xi has made a number of official visits and appearances in recent months. On the 11 January 2012, he met with US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, alongside Vice Premier Li Keqiang, to discuss US demands for sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. Within the Asian region, Mr Xi met with the Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam, Nguyen Sinh Hung on the 21 December 2011 to promote good neighbourly cooperation. Previous to this date, on the 7 December 2011, he received former treasury secretary of the United States, Henry Paulson and called for the US to “curb its tendency on politicising economic issues” in order to improve the environment for bilateral trade between the two countries. On the same day, he also met with the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Raisa Bogatyryova, and pledged to cement a strategic partnership with the Ukraine in order to enhance bilateral security cooperation between the two nations. In further efforts to improve China’s bilateral relationships, Mr Xi has also met with Heng Samrin, President of the Cambodian National Assembly, on the 6 December 2011; former Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chreteinn on 21 November 2011; and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe on the 16 November 2011.


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Premier Li Keqiang Li Keqiang is currently Vice Premier of the State Council as well as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the CPC Central Committee. Mr Li is also Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress. He joined the CPC in May 1976, rising through the Communist Party Youth League, and is former Top Secretary of the CCYL. In 1998, Mr Li became China’s youngest ever governor when he was appointed to run the rural province of Henan. Mr Li is affiliated with Hu Jintao’s ‘populist’ faction and the CCYL clique. Mr Li is 56 and was born in July 1955; he is of Han ethnicity and is a native of Dingyuan in the Anhui Province. He graduated from the School of Economics at Peking University and majored in Economics, he also has a law degree from the same university. His father was a local official in the relatively poor rural district of Anhui. Vice Premier Li has also made a number of public appearances and statements in the lead up to his expected appointment as premier. He met with US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, alongside Vice President Xi, on the 11 January 2012. Prior to this, on the 13 December 2011, Mr Li met with members of the China-Russia Friendship, Peace and Development Commission at its ninth plenary session in the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing. At this meeting, he stated “we will unswervingly push forward the China-Russia comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership (established in 1997) regardless of changes in both the international and domestic situations” and noted that the two countries have become each other’s most important strategic partners. The previous day, 12 December 2011, he met with Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond at the central government offices in Beijing and expressed his confidence in Europe’s ability to overcome the euro zone debt crisis as well as discussing the establishment of greater business and cultural links between China and Scotland, particularly in the area of wind technology. Mr Li also met with former Treasury Secretary of the US, Henry Paulson, on the same day as Mr Xi, and similarly urged the US to lift existing trade restrictions in order to further bilateral trade relations. Politburo Bo Xilai Mr Bo’s current position is Party Secretary of Chongqing. He is also a member of the Politburo and the CMC as well as Minister of Commerce and Secretary of the Leading Party Member’s Group in the Ministry of Commerce. He joined the CPC in October 1980. Mr Bo is affiliated with the ‘princeling’ and ‘elitist’ factions. Mr Bo was born in 1949; he is of Han ethnicity and is a native of Dingxiang in the Shanxi Province. He is a graduate from Peking


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University and is married to a prominent lawyer in China. His father is Bo Yibo, a Long March5 veteran who later opposed Mao over the Great Leap Forward6. During the Cultural Revolution the elder Bo was tortured and Mr Bo’s mother was beaten to death. The elder Bo was subsequently one of the most senior generals in the People’s Liberation Arm (PLA) and one of the ‘eight immortals’ who were an essential support base for previous President Deng Xiaoping.

Mr Bo met with his fellow candidate for the politburo, Wang Yang on the 11 December 2011 in order to sign an agreement to enhance regional cooperation between Chongqing and Guangdong, their respective provinces. Mr Bo and Mr Wang are known political rivals, differing substantially on their policy positions; therefore their open praise of one another’s policies was a particularly striking feature of this meeting. Mr Bo advances populism and urban reconstruction in Chongqing, where as Mr Wang has called for the government to take responsibility for enhancing social well being in Guangdong and wants to divert the focus from political elitism and pure infrastructural development. Wang Yang

Mr Wang is currently Party Secretary of Guangdong. He is also a member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee and Chairman of the Chongqing Municipal People’s Congress. He joined the CPC in August 1975 and is associated with the ‘populist’ faction. He was born in March 1955 and is a native of Suzhou in the Anhui Province. Mr Wang graduated from the Party School of the CPC Central Committee with a Masters in Engineering. As provincial chief, Mr Wang has been extensively involved in the management of the uprisings in Wukan that have been ongoing since September 2011 in reaction to local land seizures and speculation of local corruption. In December 2011, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, ‘people’s daily’ praised the actions of Mr Wang when he chose to listen to the demands of 13,000 residents who barricaded themselves into the village and evicted their leaders, acknowledging they had merit, rather than dealing with the situation through armed force. Another notable event in Mr Wang’s recent political activity includes his meeting with candidate Bo on the 11 December 2011, as outlined above, which was marked as an unusual display of cooperation between known political rivals.

5 The long march was a large-scale military retreat undertaken by the red army of the Communist Party of China to evade the pursuit of the Kuomintang army. 6 The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social campaign of the CPC, which aimed to use China’s vast population to transform the country into a modern communist society through rapid industrialisation and collectivisation.


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Wang Qishan Wang Qishan is currently Vice Premier under Wen Jiabao, in charge of economics and finance. He is also a member of the Politburo, but not it’s standing committee, as well as a member of the CPC Central Committee. Previously, Mr Wang was also Deputy Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, Mayor of Beijing as well as Executive Chairman of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad. He joined the CPC in February 1983 and is associated with the ‘princelings’ and the ‘elitist’ faction. Mr Wang is also former President of the China Construction Bank and deputy governor of the nation’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China. He is also accredited with organising the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Mr Wang was born in July 1948 which suggests that he will only be able to serve a single five-year term before reaching the mandatory retirement age. He is of Han ethnicity and is a native of Tianzhen in the Shanxi Province. Mr Wang graduated from the Department of History of Northwestern University and majored in history. In his capacity as Vice Premier, in charge of economics and finance, he met with US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on the 10 January 2012 to discuss closer economic cooperation between the two nations. Other high profile appearances include a meeting with Vice President of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, on 28 December 2011. Li Yuanchao Mr Li’s current title is Director of the CPC Organization Department. He is also a member of the Politburo, the CPC Central Committee, and the Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Previously he was also Secretary of the CPC Jiangsu Provincial Committee as well as Chairman of the Jiangsu Provincial People’s Congress. He joined the CPC in March 1978 and is associated with Hu Jintao’s ‘populist’ faction as well as the CCYL clique. Mr Li was born in November 1950 and is of Han ethnicity. He is a native of Lianshui in the Jiangsu Province. Mr Li is a graduate of Fudan and Peking University and has a postgraduate education from the Central Party School. Mr Li is currently, in January 2012, leading a delegation of 22 Government officials within Africa in order to promote China-African relations. High level meetings have included a meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on the 15 January 2012; with President of the Republic of South Sudan, H.E. Salva Kiir Mayaridt on the 13 January 2012; and with President Kagame on the 10 January 2012 in Rwanda.


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Zhang Dejang Mr Zhang’s current title is that of Vice Premier. He is also a member of the Politburo and the CPC Central Committee as well as Secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee. He joined the CPC in January 1971 and is associated with the Jiang Zemin/Shanghai clique, also known as the ‘elitist’ faction. Mr Zhang was born in November 1946. He is of Han ethnicity and is a native of Tai'an in the Liaoning Province. He graduated from the Department of Economics at Kim Il Sung University, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Liu Yunshan Mr Liu is currently Director of the CPC Propaganda Department. He is also a member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. He joined the CPC in April 1971 and is associated with the Jiang Zemin/Shanghai clique, also known as the ‘elitist’ faction. Mr Liu Yunshan was born in July 1947 and is of Han ethnicity. He is a native of Xinzhou in the Shanxi Province. Mr Liu is a graduate from the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. Yu Zhengsheng

Mr Yu is current Shanghai Party Boss and is being proposed by former General Secretary Jiang Zemin. He is also a member of the Politburo and the CPC Central Committee. Previously he was also Secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee. He joined the CPC in November 1964.

Mr Yu was born in April 1945 and is of Han ethnicity. He is a native of Shaoxing in the Zhejiang Province.

He is a graduate from the Department of Missile Engineering in the Harbin Military Engineering Institute and majored in automatic control of ballistic missiles.


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Key differences between the Fourth and Fifth Generation of Chinese Leadership Each of the leading generations in China’s recent history has been shaped by their historical background. It is therefore notable that the incoming fifth generation of leaders will be the first generation that does not have first hand experience of a time prior to the foundation of the People’s Republic. The characteristics of the fifth generation have been shaped during the Cultural Revolution in China between 1967 and 1977, a period of deep social and political upheaval. As can be seen from an overview of the likely candidates, the individuals that will now take power were offered a much fuller range of educational opportunities and therefore the incoming generation has an educational background that stretches across a wide range of studies from lawyers to economists to social sciences. The fourth generation Politburo is currently balanced between the ‘populist’ and ‘elitist’ coalitions. It appears that this will remain the case for the incoming generation, although the Politburo Standing Committee may gravitate slightly towards the ‘elitist’ faction due to Xi Jinping's position at the helm. It is also worth noting that the incoming fifth generation has more cross-regional experience, as provincial chiefs, than any previous generation of leadership. At present, commentators suggest that the transition in Chinese leadership will proceed more smoothly than the transfer of power between previous generations. The level of public appearances and statements by the candidates for the fifth generation in leadership is unprecedented in the transition from one government to the next in China. The extensive number of high level visits and meetings by all candidates, in particular Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, indicate that the forthcoming leaders are already engaged in a concerted effort to enhance bilateral relationships with other international leaders. This trend is likely to continue over the coming months as we move closer to the official transition in power, starting at the National Party Congress in October 2012.

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Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013 - IIEA in Chinese Leadership 2012 201… · Transition in Chinese Leadership 2012 – 2013: Briefing, February 2012 ! 5! CMC wields