TOPIC 7(Earnings Mgt)_Mac 2013

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    Accounting

    Theory & PracticeFAR 600

    EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (EM)

    By:

    Dr Suhaily Hasnan

    Faculty of Accountancy

    UiTM

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    Learning Objectives

    At the end of this lesson, students should beable to understand :

    Discuss the motivations for earnings management

    (EM)

    Describes the patterns of earnings management (EM)

    Discuss the advantages & disadvantages of earnings

    management (EM)

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    Earnings Management

    EMIs the choice by a manager of accounting policies, oractions affecting earnings, so as to achieve some specificobjective. (Scott, 2003, p.369)

    GAAP are not a set of rigid rules and procedures. They are

    standards and guidelines that are applied through the use ofprofessional judgment.

    Since not all firms are required to have the same accountingpolicies, each firm can manage its earnings through theaccounting policies that it chooses; i.e. straight-line vs. reducing

    balance amortization.

    Another way to manage earnings is by means of realvariables;i.e. R&D, maintenance, timing of purchases and disposal ofcapital assets. These devices maybe costly since such actions may

    compromise long term objectives.

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    Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)

    as an Extension of EM

    Although legal, the practice of EM can make the financialstatements difficult for investors and analysts to interpret.

    Management of earnings suggests tinkering with earnings toachieve a more favorable reporting outlook, but with apresumption that the financial results are not fraudulentlymisrepresented. However, tinkering may lead to cooking.

    Over time, this constraints within-GAAP EM options, and furtherEM crosses into non-GAAP reporting.

    FFR starts out small with no intent to deceive, but grows overtime as the pressures build until it is full-blown cooking thebooks.

    Accruals are comparatively high in most fraud cases in the years

    preceding fraud discovery.(Lee, Ingram & Howard, 1999)

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    Discuss the motivations for

    earnings management (EM)

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    Motivations for earnings management?

    1. Profit-based incentive compensation bonus

    purposes

    2. Avoid debt covenant violations

    3. Reduce political visibility4. Maximize proceeds from IPOs

    5. Taxation motivations

    6. Changes of CEO

    7. Communicate blocked inside information to

    investors

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    Profit-based incentive Compensation-

    Bonus Purposes

    Managers have incentive to select accounting methods

    and exercise discretions over accounting estimates to

    improve their compensation

    Studies by Dechow & Sloan (1991) showed that CEOs

    increase their compensation in their final years in

    office by cutting research & development (R&D)

    expenditures

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    Avoid Debt Covenant Violations

    Managements incentive to opportunistically manage

    earnings is driven by contractual agreements and/or

    change in economic environments

    Contractual agreements are in the form of management

    compensation or debt covenants

    Example: managers alter earnings to mask poor managerial

    performance & safeguard themselves from possibledismissals or managing earnings to maximize

    remunerations or increase personal wealth

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    Reduce Political Visibility

    Political process imposes costs on firms believed to be takingadvantage of the public & making excessive profits

    Political cost hypothesis predicts that managers of larger firms have

    greater incentives to reduce reported profits and hence reduce their

    perceived ability to bear political costs

    Political costs refers to wealth transfer away from a firm due to its

    political exposure. The amount of transfer depends on size &/or

    visibility of the firm. For example, employees may see an unusually

    high profits reported as an exploitation of their labor & hence theylobby for higher pay

    In other words, Managers of these firms have incentive to reduce

    reported earnings and lower their political risk.

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    Taxation Motivations

    Most obvious motivation

    Previous studies by Guenther et al., (1997) & Maydew (1997)

    suggested that firms choose accounting accruals to save tax costs

    Guenther et al., 1997 found that firms forces to switch from cash

    method to accrual method

    Maydew, 1997 found that firms with tax based incentives shifted

    income in order to maximize current net operating losses

    Nevertheless, firms opportunity to manipulate economic result

    reduced because taxation authorities tend to impose their own

    accounting rules for calculation of taxable income

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    Changes of CEO

    Variety of income management motivations among CEOs

    exists such as

    Bonus plan hypothesis predicts that CEOs approaching retirement

    would maximize income to increase their bonuses

    CEOs of poorly performing firms may maximize income to prevent

    or postpone from being fired

    DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner (1994) found that CEOs

    may take a bath so as to increase the probability of future

    earnings

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    Communicate Blocked Inside

    Information to Investors

    Managers might undertake income smoothing to convey

    inside information about the firms long run earnings

    potential.

    A simple announcement about the firms long run earnings

    potential maybe costly for investors to verify. EM (through

    income smoothing) would convey the information in acredible fashion.

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    Describes the patterns of earnings

    management (EM)

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    Patterns of

    Earnings

    Management

    Taking a bath

    write off assets show large losses

    Enhance probability

    of future reported

    profits

    Income

    Minimization used by politically visible

    firm during period of

    high probability

    e.gs., rapid writeoff of

    assets, expensing R&D,

    advertising

    IncomeSmoothing

    Income

    Maximization

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    The Advantages of EM

    EM provides room for managers to take steps to avoid technicalviolations of debt covenant.

    EM can be used as a device to convey blocked, inside information

    to the market. This enable share price to better reflect the firms

    future prospects.

    EM reveals goodwill component of firm value which provide

    better knowledge to investors of the value of goodwill & hence

    enable better estimates of firm value to investors.

    Market responds efficiently to discretionary accruals (proxy for

    EM).

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    The Disadvantages of EM

    Resulted from opportunistic manager behaviour.

    Opportunistic EM is bad as it reduces the reliability of FS

    information.

    Opportunistic EM involves manager selecting accounting

    policies to maximize his/her own self interest rather than the

    interest of the owners (e.g. bonus purposes).

    Opportunistic EM is aimed to hide real operating performance

    by creating artificial accounting entries or strecthing estimatesbeyond reasonableness.

    Only if the EM practices violated GAAP (Dechow, Sloan &

    Sweeney, 1996)

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    Summary

    EM is possible because GAAP provides managers choices of

    accounting policies and procedures.

    Managers accounting policy choices are motivated by strategic

    considerations such as

    Bonus purposes Reduce political visibility

    CEO motivations

    Maximize proceeds from IPOs

    Taxation motivations Unblock inside information

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