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Thesis Working Title:

Greening the Economy: Putting Theory into Practice in Aceh, Indonesia

Introduction

As evidence mounts of resource depletion, environmental degradation and climate change

(UNEP 2007; Hansen, Sato et al. 2008; Smith 2011), considerable attention is being devoted to

evolving best practice conservation1 strategies and policies. Current research stresses the

limitations of piecemeal, site-specific projects – whether they be directed through the

paradigms of protected areas (Wyckoff-Baird, Kaus et al. 2000; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008),

Integrated Conservation and Development Programmes (Wells, Guggenheim et al. 1999;

Ferraro 2003; McShane and Wells 2004), Community Based Natural Resource Management

(Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Oates 1999), or Payments for Environmental Services (Ferraro and

Kiss 2002; Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010; Tacconi, Mahanty et al. 2010) – and instead stresses

the importance of nesting such efforts into broad scale, landscape or green economy2

approaches to conservation (Ashley, Russell et al. 2006; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008; UNEP

2011). However, there are few examples where landscape scale green economy approaches

have been implemented. Theoretical issues concerning these concepts, and the opportunities

and complexities associated with their implementation, thus remain under researched.

It is especially disconcerting that there is no concrete evidence that suggests green economy

can counter the weaknesses of previous conservation initiatives. Academic literature has shown

that conservation efforts to-date have been severely impaired by a number of institutional,

relational and political factors – namely, poor governance (Bardhan 2005; Bourguignon and

Sundberg 2007), resistance to change at both elite and grass root levels (Ostrom 1990; Dixit

1996; Scott 2008), organisational deficiencies (Wells, McShane et al. 2004; Fisher, Maginnis et

1 Defined broadly here, including the sustainable management of natural resources as well as their protection and

restoration, rather than in a narrow sense of just preserving natural resources (Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008). 2 The aim of the green economy is to create new incentive structures that promote the production of goods and

services whose existence and consumption reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (UNEP 2011).

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al. 2008), a lack of participation (Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001; Maginnis, Jackson et al.

2004), and financing difficulties (Heller 2005; Collier 2007). The objective of the proposed

research is to examine these issues further in the context of a landscape scale green economy

program so as to understand the opportunities and complexities of this new approach,

especially regarding its ability to overcome the weaknesses of previous conservation efforts.

The aim is to draw on these insights to inform theoretical debates around the emerging green

economy concept. This goal is addressed through a political ecology analytical framework that

investigates the roles of the various actors and institutions engaged in the project across

multiple scales, focusing on the incentives, relationships and linkages, negotiation processes,

discourses, goals, and power dynamics that govern attempts to transition to a green economy

(Long and Long 1992; Layder 1998; Young 2002; Peet and Watts 2004; Underdal 2006; Leftwich

2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

The research will use ethnographic methodologies to glean insights from a case study in Aceh

Province, Indonesia. As one of the world’s first attempts to implement a landscape scale green

economy, the case study is of particular interest for exploring the opportunities and

complexities of putting a green economy approach into practice. Aceh shares characteristics

similar to other conservation and development contexts – namely, contestation over natural

resources, poor governance and a multitude of actors involved – thus enabling research

findings to have relevance to other settings.

The following sections provide the background, rationale and methodology for the proposed

research. Section 1 discusses the emergence of landscape scale green economy theory. Section

2 outlines the analytical framework of the proposed research, justifying the use of political

ecology and the focus on actors and institutions, power and multiple scales. Section 3 provides

a brief overview of the case study. These first three sections thus provide the rationale for the

research questions, which are outlined in section 4. Section 5 discusses the methodological

approach to the research. Sections 6 and 7 present the proposed outline of the thesis and the

schedule for the proposed research.

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Section 1: The emergence of landscape scale green economy

approaches to conservation

In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and development (UNCED) in Rio de

Janeiro captured the world’s attention with promises to achieve sustainable development

through combined efforts in economics, social development and the environment (commonly

referred to as the ‘three pillars’ of sustainable development). Ten years later, during the World

Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, the international community

reaffirmed that sustainable development was an international priority (Fisher, Maginnis et al.

2008). Achieving environmental sustainability has been weak, however, with net forest loss,

wetlands decline, fisheries collapse and water shortages continuing (UNEP 2011). How best to

address these issues through a green economy approach was the focal point of the Rio+20

United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) that took place in Brazil in

June 2012.

The following section provides an overview of how various conservation approaches have

attempted to address on-going environmental change. The analysis focuses on the shortfalls of

these past approaches to highlight why broader, non-site-specific conservation initiatives under

the concept of green economy are emerging as current best-practice.

1.1 The limitations of piecemeal, site-specific conservation initiatives

Much of the early conservation literature of the 1960s-70s focused on the importance of

establishing Protected Areas (PAs) and reserves that removed local communities from the area

to be conserved (Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008). Some 12.9% of the world’s land areas outside

Antarctica and 6.3% of the world’s territorial seas are now PAs – the largest deliberate decision

of resource use allocation in history (UNEP 2010). However, the establishment of PAs and

keeping them untainted from human intervention is often criticised for not meeting

conservation objectives as well as inducing negative social impacts. A study of protected forest

areas in 133 countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle-East, Asia and Eastern Europe

estimates that only one-third of the areas have been effectively protected (Strassburg and

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Creed 2009). The work of Fisher, Maginnis et al. (2008: 20), concludes that protectionist

approaches often do not meet environmental goals because they have been “self-defeating –

removing people from parks caused ecological simplification, and outside pressures eventually

impinged on protected areas”, in this sense the approach is based on “outmoded ecological

models that freeze the ecological status quo and ignore the dynamics of the wider and human

influenced landscapes of which ecosystems are ultimately a part” (see also Hayes 2006).

A vast quantity of research has documented that PAs have often failed to consider social costs –

including, gross violations of human rights and the economic and political marginalisation of

rural people (Brockington and Igoe 2006; Coad, Campbell et al. 2008). This approach is thus

heavily critiqued for creating and perpetuating inequity, which is at direct odds with the core

principles of sustainable development (Baker 2006).

By the 1980s, conservation and development literature increasingly accepted that it was

neither ethically justifiable nor politically feasible to exclude natural resource-dependent

people from protected areas without ensuring access to livelihood alternatives. (Brandon,

Redford et al. 1998) explain that rural people were no longer blamed as the principle agents of

environmental destruction, or if they were, more attention was dedicated to poverty related

issues, which were believed to force people into unsustainable practices. This led to a shift

towards more participatory and equitable approaches to conservation, with Integrated

Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) emerging as the dominant conservation

paradigm (Wells and Brandon 1992).

ICDPs are typically defined as conservation projects that incorporate rural development

components (Wells, Guggenheim et al. 1999; Ferraro and Kiss 2002). This approach attempts to

combine development and conservation goals within the framework of individual projects as a

means for tackling the challenges of sustainable development (McShane and Wells 2004). The

rationale behind ICDPs is that resource exploitation will decrease if local communities are lifted

out of poverty through the promotion of alternative environmentally friendly livelihood

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opportunities (Robinson and Redford 2004). It is also argued that poverty alleviation and

development would serve to increase community receptiveness to conservation by providing

communities with compensation for restricted resource access (Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010).

Published reviews conclude, however, that ICDP projects worldwide have had limited success at

achieving either conservation or development objectives due to a range of institutional and

organisational deficiencies (Larson, Freudenberger et al. 1998; Oates 1999; Wells, Guggenheim

et al. 1999; Barret, Brandon et al. 2001; Ferraro 2003; McShane and Wells 2004).

Some authors also point to a basic conceptual flaw in the underlying assumptions of trying to

address both conservation and development through the ICDP approach where the delivery of

new ‘environmentally friendly’ income sources are in fact more likely to incorporate new

sources of income as complements to existing environmentally harmful activities rather than as

substitutes. Win–win situations – where development and conservation goals are achieved at

the same site at the same time – are thus exceedingly rare (Sanjayan, Shen et al. 1997;

Terborgh 1999; Adams, Aveling et al. 2004). Instead, as noted by Barret and Brandon (2001:

500), the most common outcome of local development efforts is that “increased household

income, combined with little enforcement and few explicit links between the positive incentives

and the conservation project, simply fosters more rapid resource extraction”.

Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) emerged in parallel to the ICDP

approach. This strategy surfaced through discontent with the lack of attention to the principles

of community rights and empowerment under PA and ICDP approaches, and the realisation

that most areas considered important for conservation, particularly in the tropics, coincide with

long term human habitation (Lele, Wilshusen et al. 2010). The central precept of CBNRM is that

the locus of environmental management is focused at the local community level, where

conservation in undertaken by, for and with the local community (Ostrom 1990; Western and

Wright 1994). Its use has been promoted on the basis that the people who live closest to the

environmental resources are often in the best position to make decisions about their use based

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on local management systems and indigenous knowledge (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Ostrom,

Burger et al. 1999; Wyckoff-Baird, Kaus et al. 2000). Recent findings help to support this claim:

1. Hayes (2006) shows that conservation outcomes are largely influenced by the rules

made and acknowledged by local resource users.

2. Comparisons of forest cover change show that sites managed by local or indigenous

communities for the production of goods and services can be equally (if not more)

effective in maintaining forest cover than those managed under solely protection

objectives (Nepstad, Schwartzman et al. 2006; Bray, Duran et al. 2008; Porter-Bolland,

Ellis et al. 2011).

3. Ostrom (2009) provides a thorough investigation of empirical research to uncover a

large number of cases where communities have self-organised to develop solutions to

common-pool resource problems at a small to medium scale.

Despite such findings, strong disagreements remain about how realistic it is to achieve effective

CBNRM in a majority of cases. Robinson and Redford (2004) show that one of the main tools in

CBNRM is the establishment of rights to resources – where clearly defined rights provide an

incentive for active participation and sustainable use because they guarantee long term access

to, and control over, resources. de Soto (2000) demonstrates that clear and formal systems of

property rights are essential for poverty reduction and that presence of such formal systems is

a key component of entrepreneurship and economic development. The problem is that all too

often local rights to resources are not respected and weakly implemented (RRI 2012). Without

this power local groups often find it impossible to protect their resources from exploitation by

powerful outsiders (Wyckoff-Baird, Kaus et al. 2000). It is also argued that even in situations

where rights are legally recognised, a range of other issues often limit the effectiveness of

CBNRM – including, insufficient local capacity (Freese 1998; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008; WRI

2008), a lack of willingness to address environmental issues, especially where adverse impacts

are not incurred locally (Hayward 1995), and the adverse impacts produced by broader social,

political and market processes (Chhatre and Saberwal 2005).

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Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have received increasing attention from

conservationists in recent years (Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010). PES involves transactions where

buyers of environmental services, such as clean water, compensate the providers of those

services, such as upstream residents who keep waterways clean by avoiding deforestation and

other polluting activities (Wunder 2005). PES emerged after growing recognition of the

ineffectiveness of indirect approaches to conservation, namely ICDPs, which do not explicitly

link development assistance to conservation outcomes (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). PES attempts to

create a direct and conditional linkage between material benefit to people living close to the

resources and desired conservation outcomes. Ferraro and Kiss (2002: 1719) state that, “if we

want to get what we pay for, we must start tying our investments directly to our goals”. Like

ICDPs, PES also assumes that people will act in their own interest so if they receive more

benefits from conserving an area than from degrading it then they will protect it (Ferraro and

Kiss 2002). The central differentiating factor from previous conservation initiatives is that

payments to resource owners are conditional on the explicit achievement of certain

conservation goals (Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010).

Watershed protection has been the most developed sector for PES efforts to date. Carbon

sequestration initiatives are becoming increasingly popular, particularly through initiatives to

reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and conserve forest carbon stocks

(REDD+). Pollination and biodiversity conservation offer significant benefits but are in their

infancy in terms of design and implementation. Experiences of PES schemes have shown mixed

results regarding social, economic and environmental impacts (Cropper, Puri et al. 2001; Engel,

Pagiola et al. 2008; Porras, Grieg-Gran et al. 2008). Key issues to emerge relate to the difficulty

of clearly defining community rights to resources, and a lack of permanence due to the short

timeframe of financial incentives provided, including the unsustainability of alternative

employment opportunities (Angelsen 2008; Brown, Seymour et al. 2008; Peskett 2009; Tacconi,

Mahanty et al. 2010). The problem of financial limitations continues to play out in relation to

early REDD+ efforts as a serious bottleneck persists in the establishment of compliance carbon

markets and donor financing instruments (Böhm, Murtola et al. 2012).

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1.2 The rationale for a landscape scale green economy approach

There is a common theme of failure across all site-specific conservation initiatives discussed

above. A key insight that has emerged is that although local issues are important, factors

external to local interventions – such as government policy and broader social, political, market,

and legal frameworks – are key drivers of conservation and development outcomes (van Schaik

and Kramer 1997; Kremen, Niles et al. 2000; Geist and Lambin 2001; Ferraro and Kiss 2002;

McShane and Wells 2004; Chhatre and Saberwal 2005; WRI 2005; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008;

Angelsen 2009; Scoones 2009; Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010). For example, a recent study of

community forestry enterprises worldwide identified a long list of discriminatory taxes,

licensing systems, royalties, and legal limitations that routinely handicap the ability of small

forest management programs to compete against more powerful commercial interests

(Molnar, Liddle et al. 2007). In relation to PES, and especially emerging REDD+ schemes, a

number of authors argue that site-specific efforts must incorporate broader policy

interventions to remove the perverse direct and indirect subsidies supporting economic growth

strategies that encourage the loss of habitats and their biodiversity – namely, landscape scale

plantation expansion, population migration, and national infrastructure development (Myers

and Kent 1997; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Graham 2011; Oakes 2012; Sukhdevb, Prabhua et al.

2012). The limitations of site-specific efforts are summarised by Terborgh (1999: 169) who

argues that:

…local people are only minor players in a much larger theater. The lives of village

people are strongly influenced by decisions of the central government and

conditions determined by it: construction of roads; availability of rural credit,

subsidies, and tax incentives; inflation versus stability of the national currency;

raising or lowering trade barriers; laws governing labor practices; receptivity to

foreign capital; and so forth.

Sayer and Wells (2004) highlight that site-specific projects are intrinsically limited in space,

time, resources and numbers of beneficiaries, while the main cause of environmental

degradation is the loss, fragmentation, and degradation of habitat over large areas due to many

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different kinds of human activities, including the demand for timber and food products in far-

reaching parts of the word. Halting or at least mitigating environmental degradation requires

changing the behaviour of large numbers of people dispersed over large areas for long periods

of time. Site-specific projects are inherently unsuited to this.

An additional line of argument is that without broader consideration of social, political, and

economic issues, conservation gains achieved at specific sites will likely displace environmental

degradation to other areas (‘leakage’), and thus do not actually produce any net environmental

benefit (Ferraro 2001; Angelsen 2009; Costenbader 2011; Sukhdevb, Prabhua et al. 2012). The

impacts of climate change and shifting species ranges is a further reason for the paradigm shift

away from site-specific projects, for as (Hagerman, Dowlatabadi et al. 2010) note, traditional

project sites cannot conserve biodiversity effectively because due to the fact they are static,

fixed, and bounded entities.

Contemporary conservation literature promotes the need to nest site-specific conservation

projects within broader strategies that combine conservation priorities and conservation-

friendly economic policies at landscape scales. As Fisher, Maginnis et al. (2008: 95) aptly state:

“There is no point in trying to solve a problem at the site level if the immediate or underlying

causes of that problem are off-site or operate at another level”. Of particular relevance is the

emerging work around ‘landscape conservation’ and ‘green economy’ approaches.

1.2.1 Landscape Conservation

Landscape conservation provides a framework for helping stakeholders with different interests

to agree on how to balance conservation and development trade-offs in different parts of a

wider landscape, rather than trying to address all goals at a single site (Sanderson, Redford K.H.

et al. 2002; Angelstam, Mikusinski et al. 2003; McShane and Wells 2004; Ashley, Russell et al.

2006; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008). The concept encompasses a number of other terms that

essentially cover the same issues – including, ecosystem-based management, integrated

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natural resource management, watershed-based planning, landscape-scale planning, and

integrated coastal zone management (Ervin 2003).

Fisher, Maginnis et al. (2008: 94-97) argue that there is more potential for integrating

conservation and development at larger scales as there is increased area for protected areas,

sustainable use zones, and regions of development:

Although it may be difficult to achieve multiple use while increasing or maintaining

biodiversity at the site level, the landscape level will often provide far more

opportunities… The aim is to meet various objectives (such as food production,

income generation, maintenance of forest cover) for the landscape as a whole, not

for each specific site.

Maginnis, Jackson et al. (2004: 329) admit that this is a pragmatic approach, which “might mean

sacrificing the biodiversity of some areas to support development, while sacrificing some of the

economic potential of other areas to support conservation”. An attribute of landscape

conservation is that it promotes a holistic view to decisions regarding such trade-offs in that it

considers the values, functional properties, and inter-linkages across broad areas, as opposed

to previous management practices that focus on optimising the production or use of one or a

few natural resources in a particular area (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Recent

literature also argues that landscape conservation provides a realistic approach to ensuring

there is sufficient funding to cover conservation costs – for example, if a REDD+ project is solely

dependent on carbon sequestration for its revenue, a low price of carbon may destroy the

project, whereas a landscape approach could draw on multiple revenue streams from

additional investments that align with forest conservation objectives (Cranford, Parker et al.

2011; Oakes 2012).

An assessment of integrated landscape conservation programmes by Bennett and Mulongoy

(2006) show that the landscape approach is now moving into the mainstream of conservation

practice but its effectiveness at achieving sustainable development goals remains unclear as

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most programmes are in their infancy and it is too early for firm conclusions to be drawn.

Ashley, Russell et al. (2006: 666) argue that the lack of analysis is compounded by the fact that

even when landscape conservation is discussed, it is done so through “the lens of protected

area management, neglecting the many other policies, processes and programmes that shape

the use and extraction of resources in the landscape”. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

(2005) provides a theoretical critique of the concept arguing that it lacks an understanding of

necessary institutional arrangements, is vague on specific policies needed to balance

conservation and sustainable development, and it fails to consider the role of key actors such as

the private sector.

1.2.2 Green Economy

Building on the realisation that conservation efforts need to consider broader scales, a new

concept termed “green economy” is now receiving significant attention from multi-lateral

agencies and academics. This work incorporates the ideas of landscape conservation but goes

further in recommending specific policy prescriptions and institutional arrangements for

addressing environmental degradation.

The UNEP (2011) defines a green economy as one that results in improved human well-being

and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. The

aim of the green economy is to create new incentive structures that orientate public and

private investments towards economic growth strategies that produce products and services

whose existence and consumption reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and

resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Chapple 2008;

Khor 2011; Selin and Najam 2011; UNEP 2011). Green economy calls for the comprehensive

adoption of strategies at broader landscape scales so as to move away from systems of

production and consumption that are driving environmental degradation, to systems that

proactively address and prevent such destruction from happening (Khor 2011; Ocampo 2011).

Box 1 below provides an overview of proposed policies and programs that have been designed

to meet this goal.

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The concept places significant emphasis on the economy based on the assumption that unless

social and environmental issues are built into economic organisation there is little chance of

addressing social marginalisation and environmental destruction (Halle 2011). Selin and Najam

(2011: 77) state that this standpoint has emerged based on the realisation that, “much of the

world produces, buys, sells, and uses goods and services in ways that enhance injustice and

undermine the organic infrastructure that supports life on earth”. This is supported by the work

of the UNEP (2011: 1), which notes that green economy strategies are based on the premise

that the current economic system encourages a gross misallocation of capital:

During the last two decades, much capital was poured into property, fossil fuels and

structured financial assets with embedded derivatives, but relatively little in

comparison was invested in renewable energy, energy efficiency, public

transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, and

land and water conservation. Indeed, most economic development and growth

strategies encouraged rapid accumulation of physical, financial and human capital,

but at the expense of excessive depletion and degradation of natural capital, which

includes our endowment of natural resources and ecosystems.

Green economy theory holds that capital misallocation problems are being driven by existing

policies and market incentives that fail to take account of the full range of environmental and

social impacts incurred through economic activity – that is, negative and positive externalities

are ignored. Green economy approaches attempt to resolve this dilemma by re-orientating

market incentives so they align with social and environmental goals – for example, the

introduction of carbon taxes to reduce carbon emissions and pollution, new regulations that

promote the sustainable use of renewable resources, or public investments in research and

development to increase energy efficiency and agriculture productivity (Pearce and Barbier

2000; TEEB 2009; UNEP 2011).

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Box 1: Policies and programs proposed under a Green Economy

Public investment and spending. Public expenditure and investment can play an important role in enabling

markets to promote green economic activity. Three important focuses for public spending are: (1) the

promotion of innovation in new technologies and behaviours that are vital to green markets; (2) investment in

common infrastructure that is required for certain green innovations to flourish; and (3) fostering infant green

industries – through price support measures, tax incentives, direct grants and loan support – as part of a

strategy to build comparative advantage and drive long-term employment and growth.

Resource pricing. Supporting a green economic transition will require that governments address existing

market failures, including where markets are completely lacking, as is the case for many ecosystem services, or

when markets fail to account for the true costs and benefits of the economic activity. Unsustainable economic

activity often enjoys a price advantage when there is a negative externality; that is, where the production or

consumption of goods and services has negative spill-over effects on third parties, the cost of which is not fully

reflected in market prices. In essence, an externality means that the market price of an unsustainable good or

service is lower than its actual social costs, with the difference borne primarily by people other than the buyer

and seller. Internalising the costs of environmental degradation in the price of a good or service – via a

corrective tax, charge, levy, certification or tradable permit system – promotes green activities by ensuring a

more level playing field between them and their unsustainable competitors.

Subsidy reform. Factoring in environmental concerns in decisions around subsidies is required to drive

inefficiencies out of the economy by removing those firms and industries that only exist because of implicit

subsidies in under-priced resources. For example, a crucial area of concern is the energy sector where the

phasing out subsidies for fossil fuels and pricing in health and environmental externalities from fossil-fuel

combustion can speed up the transformation to more renewable and environmentally friendly energy sources.

Regulatory reform and enforcement. Certain regulatory reforms, such as those regarding property rights,

traditional environmental command and control regulations, and standards, as well as the effective

enforcement of these laws, can be important in driving green investment. A well-designed regulatory

framework can create rights and incentives that drive green economic activity, remove barriers to green

investments, and regulate the most harmful forms of unsustainable behaviour, either by creating minimum

standards or prohibiting certain activities entirely. Regulations provide the legal basis that government

authorities can rely on for monitoring and enforcing compliance. A well-designed regulatory framework can

reduce regulatory and business risks, and increase the confidence of investors and markets needed to drive a

green economy forward.

International frameworks. In addition to national laws, there are also a number of international and

multilateral mechanisms that regulate economic activity and can help play a role in the transition to a green

economy by regulating unsustainable economic activity with standards or prohibitions(Multilateral

Environmental Agreements),enabling or obstructing the flow of green goods, technologies and investments

(the international trading system), affecting the rights and obligations regarding foreign investments (the

international investment framework).

Information. Better information on the state of the environment, ecosystems and biodiversity is essential for

both private and public decision making that determines the allocation of natural capital for economic

development. Better understanding and quantitative measurement of biodiversity and ecosystem values to

support integrated policy assessments are a core part of the long-term solution.

(Pearce and Barbier 2000; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008; TEEB 2009; UNEP 2011).

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1.3 Theoretical background and tensions in the Green Economy approach

1.3.1 Underlying theoretical paradigms and their implications

The theoretical groundwork for green economy draws on a mixture of paradigms. To a large

degree it is guided by neoliberalism theory in that it promises to protect rural communities by

guaranteeing property rights and promoting conservation by using markets to commoditise

nature and making it profitable for business to go green (Pearce and Barbier 2000; TEEB 2010;

UNEP 2011) – two of the key features of the neoliberal approach to conservation (Igoe and

Brockington 2007). Green economy, however, also conflicts with neoliberalism in that it calls

for a much larger role for the state through amplified government industrial engagement

(Barbier 2010; Khor 2011; Levy 2012) – an approach that aligns more closely with what (Harris

2009) describes as ‘expanded Keynesianism’. It remains to be seen if a balanced approach

between the two paradigms will be pursued in practice, or if one will dominate the other, and

what the implications will be. Unfortunately, analysis of how green economy transpires in

practice is particularly thin given that the concept is new and there are few mature case studies

to look at. Insights into the possible tensions that may emerge through a green economy

approach can, however be gained through an analysis of the impacts generated by the

paradigms underpinning green economy.

Sukhdevb, Prabhua et al. (2012) state that there is a gap in knowledge and evidence of how a

green economy approach will play out in practice and whether it will actually benefit the poor

and contribute to increased social equity. They argue that if strategies follow conventional

neoliberal tracks that rely on ‘trickle down’ benefits, socio-economic and ecological equity will

not be achieved. This standpoint is supported by previous experiences of neoliberal orientated

strategies – for example, Bebbington and Batterbury (2001) draw attention to the ways in

which marginality, environmental degradation, poverty and hunger have been produced in the

process of incorporating rural communities into market systems. A recent report by the UNEP

(2011) does little to calm such fear, highlighting that a reallocation of investments towards the

green economy may lead to slower economic growth for a few years, particularly in developing

countries heavily dependent on natural-resource intensive sectors as extraction of these

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resources is reduced to allow them to replenish – an effect that can be particularly strong in

some sectors, such as fisheries. Other authors have warned that a green economy approach

aligned with neoliberalism could restrict public access (especially for the poor) to basic

amenities and basic livelihood opportunities by putting a price on biomass, biodiversity and the

functions of the ecosystems – such as storing carbon, pollinating crops, or filtering water

(Dresner 2002).

The implications of conservation efforts becoming more aligned with market processes are not

clear cut, however, for as Igoe and Brockington (2007) note, neoliberalism opens up new spaces

in ways that can benefit as well as harm the environment, and in ways that can either present

opportunities or liabilities to local people. Khor (2011) argues that in the case of green

economy, principles of international cooperation and the promotion of social justice are at the

centre of the concept, thus, allowing significant opportunities for state and civil society actors

to play a key role in reducing the unequalising forces of past conservation and development

efforts. Furthermore, new market orientated approaches are currently being promoted that

have greater respect for issues related to social and environmental justice, notably the ‘social

business’ concept promoted by (Yunus 2010).

A key question is whether the optimism for green economy to incorporate equity concerns is

justified, especially in light of Li’s (2007) finding that winners and losers do not emerge

naturally, instead they are selected, setting the conditions for some sections of the population

to be dispossessed by more powerful actors. For example, critics of emerging carbon markets

point out that this threat is already coming to bear, highlighting the ineffectiveness and corrupt

nature of these markets, which are enriching Southern elites and making the lives of Southern

communities harder, particularly those living on subsistence incomes (Böhm, Murtola et al.

2012).

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1.3.2 Scale

Ongoing theoretical discussion on green economy also currently abounds in relation to issues of

scale. Ostrom (2009) argues that macro-level problem solving of green economy related issues

– for example, international agreement on carbon markets or national government removal of

subsidies for fossil fuels – takes too long and has not often proven successful in the past. Hence,

there needs to be more attention given to local community based interventions. Ostrom does

not ignore the need for progress at macro-scales but rather argues that there is a need to keep

focusing on all scales and not wait for the macro conditions to reach conclusion before offering

support for micro-level projects (see also Childs 2012).

This argument is tied to the concern that macro-level aspects of the green economy vision

might not actually materialise. Böhm, Murtola et al. (2012) note that the global financial and

economic crisis exposed the carbon market sector to the realities of demand and supply, which

are still predominantly governed by a fossil-fuel-led and hence carbon intensive hegemony that

is disinterested in carbon offsets, unless forced to care through regulation, which shows no sign

of becoming a reality in the near future.

1.3.3 Incompatible goals

Ocampo (2011: 19) notes that essential to the concept of green economy is:

the understanding that the benefits of environmental sustainability outweigh the

costs of investing in and protecting the ecosystems, so that it is possible to have a

win-win or ‘double dividend’ strategy of growth with environmental sustainability,

and even win-win-win or ‘triple dividend’ strategy that also includes poverty

eradication and broader improvements in social equity.

However, approaches focused on advancing development and industrialisation policies (even if

they are ‘green’) have been criticised on the basis that they fail to account for the increased

resource consumption needs of an increasingly wealthy and urbanised population, which will

continue to need increasing amounts of raw materials and waste disposal options (Brechin,

17

Wilshusen et al. 2002; Levy 2012). What is particularly problematic is that almost all human use

and exploitation of biological systems will lead to some change or loss in biodiversity (Hayward

1995; Robinson and Redford 2004).

Many authors argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to promote sustainable development

without involving trade-offs between the use and preservation of environmental resources

(McShane and Wells 2004; Hopwood, Mellor et al. 2005; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008). The

central debate related to this concern is whether natural capital can be drawn down and

technology used as a substitute, or whether there is such a thing as critical natural capital,

which cannot be replaced by technology and should be preserved absolutely (Simon and Kahn

1984; Pearce, Markandya et al. 1989). Some theorists also argue for intensive environmental

protection in line with the ‘precautionary principle’, which holds that ecosystems can collapse

abruptly, without much prior warning, and it is not known how, or to what extent,

environmental degradation will affect the ability of future generations to meet their needs

(Dobson 1996; Lovelock 2009).

The terms used in the UNEP’s (2011: 16) definition of green economy, particularly “reducing

environmental risks and ecological scarcities” suggest they are taking an anthropocentric view

of nature for human security, and not necessarily acknowledging the intrinsic elements of

nature promoted by those with ecocentric views (see Sylvan and Bennett 1994). Depending on

which of these varying perceptions underpins how green economy is taken forward will likely

have significant implications for future conservation goals and programmes.

18

Section 2: An analytical framework for analysing green economy

2.1 An investigation of implementation opportunities and complexities

Despite the recent push by some academics and multi-lateral organisations for a move towards

a landscape scale green economy approach to conservation, it is not certain how best to take it

forward, if at all, and how this new approach can improve upon previous conservation efforts.

There is a shortage of practical experiences showing what happens when the green economy

concept is put into practice. Further academic analysis around theoretical aspects of the green

economy approach is required and this needs to be informed through a better understanding of

the opportunities and complexities associated with its implementation. The importance of this

analysis is supported by a range of academic literature highlighting that there is often a gap

between anticipated project results derived from technical or policy-based predictions, and

actual effects, which are produced by contingent processes and local context (Lewis,

Bebbington et al. 2003; Quarles van Ufford and Kumar 2003; Mosse 2005). Crucial to an analysis

of a new policy or program is therefore an understanding of the opportunities and constraints

to its implementation (Bardhan 2005; Underdal 2006).

In addition to the on-going theoretical discussions about the appropriateness of the green

economy concept and how it should be progressed (as discussed in the previous section), it is

also reasonable to assume that implementation related difficulties may threaten the

effectiveness of this new approach when it is attempted in practice. Academic literature has

shown that previous efforts to implement sustainable development initiatives have been

severely impaired by a number of institutional and relational factors. It remains unclear if a

landscape scale green economy approach would alleviate or exacerbate these issues, especially:

Poor Governance

Poor governance in the form of weak accountability mechanisms, inadequate

management capacity, missed opportunities for cooperative problem solving, vested

interests, collusion and excessive profit taking have presented constant hindrances to

effective government led development programs, especially in developing countries

19

(Bardhan 2005; Tacconi 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). These issues could

significantly restrict the effectiveness of a green economy, especially given the increased

role envisioned for the state under this new approach.

Resistance to Change

Even where all parties concerned are aware that existing practices and institutions are

ineffective, there can be significant resistance to change (Dixit 1996; Young 2002). It has

been shown that institutions are difficult to change because they carry the bias of

previous interactions, views, power relations and vested interests that obstruct or

hamper reforms (Ostrom 1990; Underdal 2006). Li (2007) highlights that elites often

have limited tolerance of interventions that might actually structure relations in favour

of the poor. Scott (2008) demonstrates that resistance to change can also come from

below where local communities do not adhere to the policies of the state.

Organisational Deficiencies

Organisational deficiencies are a key reason for the limited success of previous

conservation efforts (Wells, McShane et al. 2004; Fisher, Maginnis et al. 2008; Angelsen

2009). The inability of conservation agencies to implement viable commercial

enterprises is highlighted as a particular constraint (Wells and Brandon 1992; Ferraro

2001; McShane and Wells 2004). This background gives rise to concerns about whether

organisations working towards the adoption of a green economy will have the skills,

capacities or mind set to deliver on the array of complex tasks required. This is

especially pertinent under a green economy approach given that a constellation of

inputs – services, expertise, technologies, legal and regulatory regimes — is required for

an economy to move towards new sectors of activity (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003).

Furthermore, collaboration with other organisations that could help deliver on these

requirements has previously been weak, and projects have often been hindered by

participation, inter-organisational conflict and coordination problems (McShane and

Newby 2004; Blom, Sunderland et al. 2010).

20

Donor efforts to support effective conservation programs have also been heavily

critiqued. A key problem is that there is a disproportionate emphasis on planning at the

expense of implementation. Expatriate experts who will have no subsequent

involvement in implementation often prepare the detailed project plans but when

reality deviates from the plans there is insufficient management capacity or budget

flexibility to respond appropriately (Sayer and Wells 2004). Li (2007) also points out that

development agencies consistently fail to understand local social control and power

inequalities and as a result they do not address – indeed, may not acknowledge – the

contradictory forces with which they are engaged. Thus intervention attempts are often

chronically incomplete. It is yet to be seen how green economy initiatives will play out in

practice if these deficiencies persist.

Participation

Previous experience has shown that when different stakeholders negotiate over

resources and land use, it is common for some groups to be disadvantaged, especially

poor people in rural communities (Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001). As conservation

initiatives move towards broader scales under a green economy approach the process

of identifying options and negotiating land use trade-offs is likely to present a major

challenge. The question of who has the opportunity to influence these processes and

ultimately the decisions that are taken is critical and needs further attention. Fisher,

Maginnis et al. (2008) note that there are risks that broader, landscape conservation

could be used as a justification for centralised planning and an attempt to control the

ways in which objectives are balanced.

Financing

Academic literature points to a number of problems with previous financial flows

provided by donors, namely – volatility, fragmentation between donors, and the

multiplicity of donor objectives independent of government development strategies. All

of these can exact significant ‘compliance costs’ associated with financial flows –

21

including the capacity to manage and plan for the use of aid in recipient countries

(Heller 2005; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). The longevity of projects has also been

inadequate. Donors often implement projects for short periods, aiming to ameliorate

the detrimental impacts of reduced or controlled resource use in the short term rather

than providing more long-term sustainable resource management (Angelsen 2009).

Attracting additional capital flows from the private sector is also a major challenge for

many developing countries. Basic economic theory would suggest that in societies that

are short of capital, the returns on capital would be high, and this would attract an

inflow of private capital. However, in practice this frequently does not happen. Part of

the reason is that the perceived risk in many developing countries is too high to attract

significant investment. Collier (2007) states that the main drivers of such perceptions

are a lack of credibility due to poor governance or the possibility of conflict, for example.

Collier (2007: 89) also notes that an additional part of the answer is that many

developing countries are very small and the investment community knows virtually

nothing about them – “absorbing information is costly, if only in time, and these places

are simply not sufficiently important enough to bother with”.

The objective of the proposed research is to examine these issues further in the context of a

tangible landscape scale green economy program so as to analyse the opportunities and

complexities involved in the implementation of this new approach, especially in relation to how

it relates to the institutional and relational weaknesses of previous conservation efforts. These

insights will then be drawn on to help inform debates on the theoretical evolution of the green

economy concept. The analytical framework used to address this goal is aligned with the

general approach outlined in political ecology literature.

22

2.2 Political ecology

Political ecology studies examine the interrelationships between the environment and political

and economic processes. Its premise is that human-induced environmental change is the

product of politics (Peet and Watts 2004; Scoones 2009). It is noted by Robbins (2004) that this

viewpoint differs from apolitical ecological studies, which generally assert that efficient

solutions, determined in optimal economic terms, can create “win-win” outcomes where

economic growth can occur alongside environmental conservation, simply by getting the prices

and techniques right. Yet the apolitical approach is heavily critiqued, for as Peet and Watts

(2004) state, it tends to ignore the most fundamental problems in contemporary ecology by

removing the fulcrum of any nature-society study – the land manager – whose relationship to

nature must be considered in an historical, political and economic context. Acemoglu and

Robinson (2012: 79) show that when there is conflict over resource allocation decisions, what

happens “depends on which people or group wins out in the game of politics – who can get

more support, obtain additional resources and form more effective alliances. In short, who wins

depends on the distribution of political power in society”.

The use of political ecology as the analytical framework is a good fit for the practical orientation

of the proposed research as it is used to analyse how ideas, power and resources are

conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by different groups and different scales (Tanner

and Jeremy 2011) in an attempt to help understand and predict resulting implications for

project processes and outcomes (World Bank 2011). Robbins (2004) notes that political ecology

research tends to focus on topics such as degradation and marginalisation, environmental

conflict, conservation and control, and environmental identities and social movements with the

aim of trying to understand the political and economic obstacles to meaningful change. These

investigative aspects of political ecology are specifically aligned with the proposed research,

which tries to get to the root causes of the complexities and opportunities incurred when trying

to implement a green economy case study.

23

In general, political ecology literature has three key hallmarks (Bryant 1998; Adger,

Benjaminsen et al. 2001; Peet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2004; Brown and Purcell 2005;

Rocheleau 2008; World Bank 2010):

1. It investigates the role of actors and institutions.

2. It integrates power relations into social and biophysical analysis.

3. It looks at multiple-scales

2.2.1 Actors and Institutions

The proposed research draws on actor-oriented methods to focus on the roles of the various

actors involved, and the incentives, relationships and negotiation processes that govern the

implementation of new green economy initiatives and their outcomes. This approach is justified

by a number of findings showing that the micro-processes and essential determinants of

project implementation are revealed by examining the differing perspectives and strategies of

actors, the relationships or coalitions between actors, and the meanings and agendas that they

negotiate (Long and Van Der Ploeg 1989; Long and Long 1992; Grimble and Wellard 1997; Long

2001).

Numerous other authors concentrate on the overarching importance of institutional, or

structural, explanations instead of focusing on actors when evaluating the successes and

failures of social processes (Bardhan 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2006; Underdal 2006). It is

noted by Fisher, Maginnis et al. (2008) that structural orientated literature argues that

institutions provide a valuable conceptual tool for understanding the rules and agreements that

shape the incentives faced by individuals and mediate people’s interactions with each other

and the environment. But as Young (2002) notes, because institutions are not actors in their

own right, they can only affect the outcomes of interactive decision making by influencing the

behaviours of those who are actors. To draw conclusions based solely on institutional

frameworks assumes that individuals behave rationally, consistently and based on complete

information, which they are fully capable of interpreting (Tacconi 2000). Whereas behaviour

may in fact stem from a combination of motivations and context-specific factors; it cannot be

24

readily predicted according to one dimension (North 1990). Furthermore, to stress the

importance of institutions at the expense of agential factors fails to account for the role of

actors in the design, formation and maintenance of institutions and, more critically, whether

there are still prospects for new institutional arrangements to emerge (Leftwich 2010). It is

concluded by Cleaver (2007) that overreliance on institutions as the analytic lens through which

social processes are understood is limited as it does not adequately model the social, historical,

and political formation and location of individuals.

The actor-oriented approach does not disregard the role of institutions in affecting the

incentives that help define the strategies and behaviour of particular actors. Instead, it

considers the behaviour and interactions of actors in process-oriented terms, as a question to

be investigated contextually. From this post-structuralist perspective, institutions are analysed

as processes in which actors engage, rather than structures that determine behaviour (Gibson-

Graham 2000; Underdal 2006). This is supported by Cleaver (2002: 15) who discusses the

notion of ‘institutional bricolage’, which describes a process of institutional evolution that is

‘more ad hoc, approximate and shaped by social life and culture than is implied by concepts of

[institutional] design and crafting’.

The key areas of focus in the proposed analytical framework strike a balance between an

analysis of institutional arrangements that frame the context of the intervention, while also

addressing the agential factors at play so as to understand incentives and motivation

contextually and the role of negotiations, knowledge creation and relationships in driving social

processes. This approach is in line with Layder (1998) who accepts the existence of systemic

phenomena beyond individual experience as well as the role of human agency in bringing these

to life.

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2.2.2 Power

The distribution of power3 between different groups and individuals, and the processes that

create, sustain and transform their relationships over time is a major component of political

ecology (World Bank 2010). Scoones (2009) justifies the necessity of this approach in that

numerous studies have shown power to mediate individual and collective struggles over access

to resources. This is supported by Igoe and Brockington (2007) who note that a more detailed

understanding of conflict over access to, and the use of, environmental resources is to be found

in the analysis of unequal power relations.

A critical analysis of power issues related to environmental management often draws on the

theory of discourse, which demands that the politics of meaning and the construction of

knowledge be taken seriously (Neumann 2008). The underlying assumption of this theory is

that power is implicit in knowledge production, and embedded within the processes of making

facts, producing subjects and simplifying complexity (Milne 2009). Indeed, discourse theory

holds that development and ecological processes are as much struggles over meaning as they

are battles over material practices, thus an important research focus is the manner in which

power relations may be reflected in conflicting perceptions, discourses and knowledge (Bryant

1998). Milne (2009) concludes that discourse analysis is a useful tool to examine the political

strategies of both powerful and marginalised actors, at multiple scales and in multiple realms.

It should be noted that there are alternative sources and forms of power beyond discursive,

including political, economic, coercive, symbolic and real violence (Li 2007; Poteete and Ribot

2010). In practice, actors often hold bundles of power, which they mobilise to gain, maintain, or

control access to tangible and intangible things (Ribot and Peluso 2003). It should also be

recognised that contestation for power is not static but part of the on-going production and

reproduction of hierarchy. Hence, as Poteete and Ribot (2010) note, researchers need to

observe power in practice and these practices must be followed as they shift and reconfigure. Li

3 Power is reflected in the ability of one actor to control the environment of another (Bryant 1998).

26

(2007) advises that an analysis of particular histories, landscapes, memories, and embedded

cultural ideas is required to better understand how power is lived, produced, and contested.

2.2.3 Scale

A central and long-standing claim of political ecology is that any explanation of resource

management issues needs to consider multiple scales (Brown and Purcell 2005). For as

Bebbington and Batterbury (2001) point out, scalar opportunities often provide either

constraints or opportunities to actors wanting to further their own objectives. Long (2001: 50)

argues that cross-scalar analysis often reveals relationships between actors that

“interpenetrate various social, symbolic and geographical spaces”. Research must therefore

understand issues at many levels as actors’ decisions taken at a local level are often influenced

by regional policies, which can in turn be directed by global politics and economics (Robbins

2004).

A key insight from the literature is that it is the political strategies of actors that determine the

composition and relevance of scalar arrangements to social and ecological outcomes (Brown

and Purcell 2005). Hence, as Peet and Watts (2004) conclude, locality studies cannot assume

the characteristics of scalar arrangements a priori, and must instead engage in multi-layered

analyses pitched at a variety of scales to get an understanding of the opportunities and

constraints facing actors in that particular setting.

27

Section 3: The case study of Aceh Green

After Aceh’s (see figure 1) historic gubernatorial elections in December 2006 and his

inauguration as the first democratically elected Governor in February 2007, Irwandi Yusuf

developed a vision for a comprehensive, holistic strategy to rebuild the economy of Aceh in the

aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami and the three decade-long civil conflict. Governor

Irwandi realised that for Aceh’s peace process and post-tsunami reconstruction efforts to

succeed, policies and programs of the Government of Aceh must soon generate employment

and income opportunities for all citizens of Aceh, with a particular focus on poor people and ex-

combatants. At the same time, he was dedicated to ensuring the protection and preservation of

Aceh’s natural resources – particularly its extensive inland forests, watersheds and marine

reserves – as key resources for sustainable economic development available for future

generations (Aceh Green Secretariat 2007). As a result, Governor Irwandi outlined a strategy

termed the Green Economic Development and Investment Strategy for Aceh, or ‘Aceh Green’.

The strategy was built around the principles of pro-poor economic development and

environmental conservation with the aim to balance livelihoods and job creation with forest

conservation and sustainable natural resource management.

Figure 1: Aceh Province location in Southeast Asia

28

An Aceh Green Fund was proposed to finance public-private partnerships dealing with clean

energy, creation of biofuel feedstock, an integrated land use program in tropical commodities,

reforestation and avoided deforestation. These efforts consisted of eight main components

spread among three priority categories (Aceh Green Secretariat 2007):

1. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forest (LULUCF) Management

Component 1: Primary Forest Protection and Management

Component 2: Reforestation and Forest Restoration

Component 3: Community Forestry and Agroforestry Development

2. Sustainable Economic Development

Component 4: Smallholder and Private Estate Crop Development

Component 5: Public Infrastructure Development

Component 6: Aquaculture and Fisheries Development

3. Renewable Energy Development

Component 7: Geothermal Energy

Component 8: Hydropower Development

Figure 2 outlines the land use changes proposed by Aceh Green.

Aceh Green Land Use (ha)

1. Eternal Forest (existing) 3,101,960

2. Eternal Forest (replanting) 250,000

3. Community Forest 350,000

4. Land Reform (smallholder plantation) 250,000

5. Existing Plantation, 200,000

5. Agriculture, Settlements, Urban 1,468,000

Total ±5,619,960

Existing Land Use (ha)

Eternal Forest 3,101,960

Degraded Land 804,550

Plantation 209,703

Agriculture, Settlements, Urban 1,504,112

Total 5,620,325

Figure 2: Proposed land use changes under Aceh Green

29

As one of the world’s first attempts to implement a landscape scale green economy, the Aceh

Green case study is of particular interest for exploring the opportunities and complexities of

putting green economy theory into practice. There are however, a number of contextual issues

relating to Aceh that must be considered if insights from the field work are going to be relevant

to other localities. Aceh was devastated by the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami,

which killed over 130,000 people, left 93,000 missing, and displaced over 500,000 across Aceh

Province. The tsunami drove seawater and debris up to five kilometres inland, ripping up roads,

destroying water and electricity services, crushing buildings and obliterating land parcels and

other personal property (Bappenas 2005). The Government of Indonesia, international

community and local civil society organisations all piled into Aceh immediately following the

tsunami. This large inflow of donor money and foreign expertise was a major factor in creating

the necessary political space and opportunities regarding funding and technical assistance that

enabled a green economy approach to be pursued in Aceh.

Aceh is also a semi-autonomous, post-conflict region. When the tsunami hit, a secessionist

conflict between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan

Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) had already had a profound impact on Aceh’s institutional and social

capital. The conflict – which had lasted almost thirty years – had resulted in nearly 15,000

deaths, displaced over 35,000 households and left deep reservoirs of fear and mistrust in the

Acehnese people. However, the devastation caused by the tsunami and the outpour of

international attention and resources as a result, as well as a desire for cooperation among the

many different stakeholders, created a unique window of opportunity to resolve the conflict

through negotiation rather than violence. A series of peace talks in the month following the

disaster lead to a ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the GoI and the Free Aceh

Movement’, signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. The Helsinki MoU put a formal end to the

conflict and paved the way for a new Law on Aceh (LoGA), which was passed by the Indonesian

House of Representatives on 11 July 2006 and signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudiyono on

1 August 2006. Under the LoGA, Aceh stands to receive up to 75 per cent of revenues from

natural resources and will also receive an additional 2 per cent from the Central Government’s

30

General Allocation Fund (DAU) for the next 20 years, an enormous increase in fiscal resources

(International Crisis Group 2005).

Any attempts to argue that insights from the case study are relevant to other settings will need

to give careful consideration to the unique circumstances faced in Aceh – notably, the

additional international and domestic budgetary support received as a result of post-tsunami,

post-conflict dynamics, and also the institutional, social and political complications generated

by the destructiveness of the tsunami, the 30 years of conflict, and post-tsunami international

engagement. Even in the face of these issues, it was decided that Aceh Green was still a

worthwhile case study given that it is particularly hard to find other green economy initiatives

to investigate, and also, I have had personal involvement with Aceh Green, thus allowing for

more detailed insights of, and access to, the actors involved.

To ensure that the findings from the proposed research are as relevant as possible, insights will

also be gathered from additional case studies in Indonesia – most likely the ‘Green Economy

Corridor’ in Papua Province. This will allow comparisons to be made between the two cases,

which will provide a more nuanced assessment of the opportunities and complexities of

implementing a green economy approach. Preliminary research on the Papua case study has

not yet been undertaken.

31

Section 4: Research objectives, aim and questions

The proposed research will engage with discussions on the emerging concept of green

economy. The objective is to gather political ecology insights from the Aceh Green case study,

particularly the opportunities and complexities related to implementation. The aim is to

identify and understand what is driving or constraining change, and what the implications of

this are. Specific attention is given to these issues in relation to how they either alleviate or

exacerbate the weaknesses of previous conservation efforts. The hope is that the proposed

research will contribute to scholarly progress by relating the practical implications of green

economy interventions to the ongoing theoretical debates around this new approach to

conservation.

The analytical framework to be used in the proposed research will focus on three key aspects of

the political ecology of Aceh Green: (i) an analysis of the role of actors and institutional

arrangements in affecting social processes; ii) an analysis of the political dynamics and power

relations that underscore these findings; and, iii) an investigation of these issues across multiple

scales. This work will seek to answer the following research question, and associated sub-

questions:

What opportunities and complexities does the green economy approach present for

overcoming the institutional and relational deficiencies of past conservation initiatives?

1. What are the contextual (sociocultural, historical and political) influences and

complexities in which Aceh Green is embedded?

2. Who are the key actors involved in, and affected by, Aceh Green?

3. What are the processes whereby actors discuss, negotiate, and collaborate on

developing Aceh Green? And how do relationships, discourses, networks and power

dynamics drive these processes?

4. How do the institutions related to Aceh Green shape the incentives of the various actors

involved?

32

Section 5: Research methodology

5.1 An ethnographic approach

An ethnographic methodology is predominantly used to address the research questions.

Ethnographic research is a mode of investigation focused on gathering qualitative insights from

case study and field research by studying social life as it unfolds in the practices of day-to-day

life (LeCompte and Goetz 1982; Kees van Dong 2006). It offers a method for critical reflection; a

means to understand in individual cases how theories actually play out in reality (Mosse 2005;

Kees van Dong 2006). This methodology is particularly relevant to the proposed research as it is

well suited for assessing actors’ interrelations and motivations concerning particular events,

interactions and activities (Markowitz 2001). The ethnographic tradition of conducting research

that is relatively open-ended and exploratory in nature is also applicable as it helps capture the

unique perspectives of the actors involved (Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Hammersley and Atkinson

2007).

Ethnographic research provides qualitative insights distinct from the quantitative data

produced by positivist approaches. There is particular value in these insights for as (Bryman and

Burgess 1994) note, qualitative techniques reveal the processes, perspectives and influences of

those actually affected by the researched situations, which according to Winchester (2000: 6) is

important due to the fact that:

Individuals experience the same events and places differently. Giving voice to

individuals allows viewpoints to be heard which otherwise might be silenced or

excluded.

However, research focusing solely on the collection of qualitative data is often criticised on the

basis that it inhibits the ability of findings to be generalised and applied to other settings

(Stoecker 1991). A common complaint from economists about qualitative methods is that

researchers spend forever in the field but never bring back any properly tested hypotheses

(Bardhan and Ray 2008). Yet, on the other hand, Donovan (1988) warns that quantitative

33

research is void of concern for the subject matter and does not necessarily reflect the

experiences of the people under study. Additionally, Sarantakos (1993: 42) stresses that:

Over emphasis on quantitative measurement is wrong and unjustifiable for it cannot

capture the real meanings of social behaviour. Quantification often results in

meanings that are closer to the beliefs of the recorders than to those of the

respondents.

The proposed research uses a mixed methodology, which gathers qualitative insights that are

supplemented by quantitative data. Bryman and Burgess (1994) note that this technique can

improve the effectiveness of research where the qualitative phase reveals processes and the

perspectives of those actually involved, and the quantitative component maps out general

patterns. This form of ‘hybrid’ research, involving both qualitative and quantitative methods, is

common to political ecology research (Rocheleau 2008). The proposed research mainly draws

on an ethnographic methodology to gather qualitative insights but data enabling quantitative

assessment will also be gathered where possible, particularly from secondary sources such as

surveys, program budgets, timelines, and outcomes. More extensive efforts to gather primary

quantitative data is not pursued due to time and resource constraints.

5.2 Case study research

The case study is an empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth

within its real life context, focusing on understanding the dynamics present within either single

or multiple cases, and enabling numerous levels of analysis (Yin 1984; Yin 2009). A case study

approach is utilised in the proposed research as it aims to analyse the opportunities and

complexities associated with trying to implement a theoretical concept. This strategy is

supported by Yin (1994) who asserts that case studies can be useful for understanding

contemporary phenomena within their real-life context. Furthermore, Yin (1994: 6) also notes

that case studies are a useful approach for understanding complex “individual, organisational,

social and political phenomena”, such as the Aceh Green initiative. Furthermore, Hubermann

and Miles (2002) argue that given the independence of case studies from prior literature or past

34

empirical observation, they are particularly well suited to new research areas or research areas

for which existing theory seems inadequate or lacking. A case study approach is therefore

particularly relevant to the proposed research questions, which focus on implementation

orientated issues related to the emerging green economy concept, which has not yet been

extensively researched.

The challenge for case study research is to move beyond context specific findings to produce

generalisations that are relevant to a wider group than which has been specifically researched

(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Strong criticism is provided by Bulmer (1983) who argues

that it is difficult to draw useful conclusions about a total population based on case study

evidence only. However, Yin (2009) argues that while case studies are not generalizable to

populations or universal principles, useful generalisations can be made regarding theoretical

propositions. This is supported by arguments made by Kees van Dong (2006) who state that it is

wrong to conclude that case studies have no wider significance as a good case study involves in-

depth, systematic analysis, which allows us to perceive similar or contrasting patterns in other

situations. The proposed research is aware of these contrasting arguments about the ability to

generalise from case studies and will thus place great emphasis on qualifying all findings and

insights.

5.3 Data collection and analysis

Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) note that ethnographic research generally involves the

researcher participating in people’s daily lives, watching, listening, asking questions through

informal and formal interviews, and collecting documents. Milne (2009) states that this

approach allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the everyday activities of the project,

both in the office and the field, and to make detailed observations of actors’ interactions and

practices, thus enabling an investigation of the processes and impacts of an intervention from

the perspectives of those involved.

35

It is a useful advantage to get an ‘inside’ view of actor and institutional issues, as it provides a

deeper analysis than is afforded by observations from ‘the outside’ by allowing, for example,

greater participant observation and access to interviewees (Markowitz 2001). Gaining an inside

view, however, is no easy feat. For as Mosse (2005: 12) explains:

…agencies operate within a nexus of evaluation and external funding which means

that effective mechanisms for filtering and regulating the flow of information and

stabilising representations are necessary for survival. Here, information is a private

good rather than a public asset.

Kees van Dong (2006) note that an appropriate ‘fit’ is also important as it enables the

researcher to gain the confidence of the people to be studied. This often requires getting

acquainted with another language and time to achieve systematic observations of behavior. I

am well placed to fulfill these requirements in that I worked for five years on the Aceh Green

initiative, gathering important insights through this process and developing close relationships

with a number of key actors from government, local and international NGOs and the private

sector.

The specific data collection methods to be used in the proposed research combine secondary

texts, interviews, and participant observation, as discussed in more detail below. This approach

is in line with the suggestions of Yin (2009) who notes that case study research relies on several

sources of data allowing crosschecking of collected data and analytical statements in a

triangulating fashion (see also Denzin and Lincoln 1998) .

5.3.1 Secondary Texts

Li (2007) explains that secondary texts allows the researcher to understand what change the

program in question was trying to achieve, the techniques devised, the relationships

established, the underlying assumptions used, and a baseline between what was originally

proposed, how this evolved, and what was delivered. The World Bank (2010) note that these

36

documents set the scene and provide context from which more in-depth analysis can be

conducted.

Secondary texts will be drawn on through the proposed research so as to understand the wider

context in which the Aceh Green program has emerged. Program documents and academic,

policy and legal literature regarding economic, environmental, social and political issues in

Aceh, and in Indonesia more broadly, will be analysed in detail. However, caution will be

applied for as Scheyvens and Storey (2003: 42) note there are numerous examples of

publications that are, “deliberately false, selective or distorted in order to support a particular

policy or point of view”. This research will seek to address these limitations by triangulating

data and crosschecking information with the other forms of data collection mentioned below.

Special attention will be given to project design documents related to Aceh Green, including

organisational position papers on the project. The aim is to understand the social relations that

produced them, the future contests they anticipate, and wider ‘discourse coalitions’ such texts

are intended to encourage (Fairhead and Leach 2002). However, the proposed research draws

on the advice of Mosse (2005: 15) who recommends:

…avoid the sort of discursive determinism that results from giving pre-eminence to

texts as representations of discourse… Texts are important, but they cannot read at

face value without reference to the arguments, interests and divergent points of

view that they encode and to which they allude.

5.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews

Interviewing is a method to obtain rich data about people’s perspectives, experiences,

aspirations, attitudes, and reactions to an intervention (Milne 2009). Semi-structured

interviews form a crucial part of the data collection process. The goal is to take an open

approach into interviews but use a checklist of key themes Yin (2009) that are guided by the

prior development of theoretical propositions discussed in sections 1 and 2 above. The framing

of particular, detailed questions will be avoided. The purpose of interaction with informants is

37

to elicit responses rather than get answers to particular questions (Kees van Dong 2006). The

aim here will be to interview key informants from various levels of government, the private

sector, multi-lateral organisations, NGOs, and community groups to gain their perspectives on

key issues related to the research questions – that is, the actors and institutions and power

dynamics across multiple scales that are driving or constraining the implementation of Aceh

Green. This information lies embedded in the knowledge of the actors involved in the Aceh

Green program, hence the reason why the interview process is of paramount importance.

5.3.3 Participant Observation

Personal insights will be drawn on to inform research findings. This method includes watching,

listening, questioning, learning, and taking notes and photos about situations. This method

forms an important component of the ethnographer’s tool kit as it helps to discover the

intricacies of project implementation, particularly the perspectives and strategies used by

actors in response to interventions (Punch 1998). This approach is common to political ecology

scholars who have often situated themselves as critical participants and/or observers to various

sustainable development programs (Rocheleau 2008).

In this case I have been an observing participant actively involved in the Aceh Green program

for 5 years and I am thus well placed to provide personal observations on key issues – for

example, the engagement of government, donor, NGO, and private sector actors in the

strategizing, negotiation and implementation of Aceh Green (the ethical implications of this are

covered in a separate document).

5.4 Reflections on the methodology: cross-culture, subjectivity and positionality

A researcher’s ability to understand and represent the perspectives of respondents who are

from a different cultural background is hotly contested within the literature. Wolf (1996: 13)

writes that some authors have suggested that “only those who are of a particular race or ethnic

group can study or understand others in a similar situation, or that only those who are women

38

of color [sic] or lesbian can generate antiracist or antihomophobic insights”. Furthermore,

Herod (1999: 314), states:

It is often assumed that a researcher who conducts interviews with members of

different nationalities is automatically at a disadvantage because they could never

hope to understand the cultural complexities of that which they are not.

Such insights however, have also been heavily criticised. Scheyvens and Storey (2003) argue

that it is excessively romantic to conceive that only local people are competent to speak on the

social issues affecting their countries. Reinharz (1992) believes cross-cultural research helps us

to understand complicated problems which surround interdependent development issues.

Similarly, Potter (1993: 294) states that:

The value of Third World research should be clear for all to see in an interdependent

world in which rich and poor, rural and urban, formal and informal are the opposite

sides of the same coin … there is vast potential for outside research.

A key theme which has emerged from the literature is that all research has a subjective

dimension and its output relates to the positionality of the researcher, whether they are of the

same race or ethnicity as their respondents or not (Bulmer 1983; Reinharz 1992; Herod 1999;

Hay 2000; Skelton 2001; Scheyvens and Storey 2003). Cross-culture research can, therefore, be

valuable as long as researchers think reflexively about how issues of subjectivity and

positionality might affect research results and also program processes and outcomes (Madge

1993).

While ethnographic research draws on the insights of other actors it is the researcher’s

experience, values and interpretations, self-critical judgments, and narrative that becomes the

meta-narrative (Mosse 2005). The proposed research will be an interested interpretation, not a

scientific judgment; it adds interpretations to those actors whose experiences I share (Mosse

2005), especially given the historical sense derived from my being actively involved in the Aceh

Green project.

39

In attempting to address these issues of subjectivity and positionality, researchers have often

outlined underlying concepts, values and experiences in the subject area concerned (Guba

1990; Limb 2001). Another option involves maximising the capacity of actors to object to what

is said about them to ensure the researcher makes every effort to verify and clarify key findings

in the analysis (Latour 2000). Undoubtedly, findings from the proposed research will remain

subjective but attempts will be made to cultivate objectivity as much as possible.

Section 6: Proposed thesis outline

Introduction

Research questions and significance

1. Theoretical background

Emergence of Green Economy theory and on-going theoretical tensions

Background on conservation issues in Indonesia and Aceh

2. Methodology

Political Ecology theory

Data collection methods

3. Case study analysis on Ulu Masen and Leuser Ecosystem programs

4. Case study analysis on Sustainable Plantations and Agro-forestry

5. Case study analysis on Renewable Energy

6. Comparative insights

Conclusion

40

Section 7: Schedule

Table 1: Schedule of Proposed Research

Year Date Activity

Year 1 – 2012 August Present research proposal

August – October Undertake ethics approval process

October – December Field research – Aceh, Indonesia

Year 2 – 2013 January – February Field research – Europe (interview key government

advisors who previously worked on Aceh Green)

March – December Field research – Aceh

Year 3 – 2014 January – March Compile research findings

April Present initial research findings

May – December Draft PhD chapters

Year 4 - 2015 April Complete PhD thesis

41

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