ATENEO PONTIFICIO REGINA APOSTOLORUM

Faculty of Philosophy

Commentary on the semiotic triangle according to Aristotle’s On

Interpretation.

Professor: D. Alain Contat

Student: Fr. Adrián Canal, L.C.

N: 057026837

FP2003 Essere, Conoscere, Dire

Rome, January 8, 2008

I. The Semiotic Triangle

There are three levels of reality: that of being, that of knowing and that of saying. This work

will be focused on the third angle of the semiotic triangle, which is language. I’ll seek to explain

language as Aristotle presents it in his book On Interpretation and its relation to knowledge and

being. The sources of this research may be found in: On the soul, Metaphysics and On

Interpretation of the same author. I’ve also helped myself of complementary readings suggested by

Dr. Contat and class notes to deepen into the field of language.

1. Language: To Say.

I begin by quoting Aristotle himself on the beginning of “On Interpretation”:

Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of man kind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations, or likenesses, images, copies.1

In order to explain this text one must take into account that language pertains only to human

beings. Aristotle explaining the voice says it is only human because language is an affection of an

intelligent soul. Animals are able to express pleasure or pain by the use of sounds, but in order to

express a multitude of affections and communicate with other human beings intelligence is

necessary. To begin its building therefore language requires knowledge of sensible things, of real

things. Such is the experience of babies when they are learning how to speak. The first terms they

learn to use are those to which they relate more often: mama, or mom, or papa, daddy and so on.

Later on, as they become grown ups, they develop more abstract words because of the concepts they

begin deal with. Thus the theory of the intellect as “tam quam tabula rasa”2 is confirmed.

The next step is to clarify the terms of this definition from the text On Interpretation. It will

be divided into parts in order to analyse its roots and relate it to the other angles of the triangle. 1 ARISTOTLE, On Interpretation 16a 4-92

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Sounds of the voice are only proper to beings with imagination and intelligence.3 In fact man

is the most unprotected creature physically but it is the only being capable of learning and imitating.

Henceforth these sounds of the voice are intentioned to symbolize affections of the soul. These

sounds acquire the term word. Words may be divided into mere names or nouns which are

significant by convention; they are not dependent on time and make reference to the being or not-

being of something, whereas verbs express a temporal reference. There is an analogy of

proportionality between spoken words and written words. “Written words are to spoken words what

spoken words are to affections of the soul.”4 Thus these sounds by themselves are meaningless. In

fact in On Interpretation Aristotle explains the composition of words made by individual letters and

syllables. A letter or a syllable alone lacks sense, it is a mere sound yet once they complete a word

and it is said with the proper intention the word expresses a concept.

In conclusion words whether spoken or written recall thoughts. They are a reference to a

being, real or imaginary and there is always a determinate representation in the mind and in reality

as a base. Thought is the origin of language and of words and they are signs in so far as they recall

the mind which gives them meaning.

The term following is: affections of the soul (παθεματα). An author that studies this treatise

questions why does Aristotle use “affections” instead of using the word “notions”5 which would be

more appropriate in reference to the soul. The answer is that affection is generic while notion

(νοήματα) is more specific. Now being generic it becomes simpler and thus more universal. It is

also the same for all human beings and in these affections one may fit in a plurality of notions,

sensible experiences, and particular judgements. Their objects are things (πράγματα), with an

3 ARISTOTLE, On the soul, 420b 324 Cfr. GIANLUCA SADUN, Linguaggio e realtà in Aristotele 5 Cfr. Ivid.

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ontological base. Thus the foundation of linguistic expression has a determined representation

otherwise the word of it is senseless. Affections remain not only in the sensible but also in thought.

Thus they are affections of though. So words or names are signals of structures and universal

articulations of thought. Such affections are not conventional like the names in language but these

are universal. They are the same for all human beings.

Thus far we have analyzed names and affections of the soul. It is evident that the words of

each language differ from one another while affections remain the same. These affections become

concepts (λόγος). This word, concept, came into Latin expressing several meanings. As an act it

may be understood “concepire” which is to bring forth, bring to birth. Then as a noun it means the

result of an act: “conceptus” the fruit of “concepire”, what came forth. So the λόγος or concept is

the final result of the mind’s work when it knows an object. Concepts have their foundation on

reality (πράγματα) or in imaginary objects. These may be simple or compound. If they are simple

they remain concepts, if they are compound they become enunciates. These can be universal or

particular; contraries or contradictories; necessary or contingent. Since they have a correspondence

with reality, they express what a man perceives or thinks, for instance the sentence: “Plato is

sleeping”. This would be a sign of a correspondent affirmation of the soul in which the image of the

object is the sleeping Plato. The object is cause of the affection which is expressed in the sentence.

We will find truth in those sentences in which the object outside of us has relation to an internal

mental image.

Concepts correspond in language to names and verbs in as much as these are not joined nor

separated from anything else. It is a relation of predication. There is a distinction between λόγος and

λεγέιν. Λόγος is a declaratory proposition while λεγέιν implies saying something about something

else. It is a relation of predication. There is another a distinction between λόγος and λέξις. The

difference between these is that λόγος is the representation of a thing in a more or less moderate

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way. The λέξις sets right proportion of the expressed content. It is used in poetry and has the

intention to cause an impact in its listeners. It seeks to overcome the conventionality of language.

Often times uses words which portrait the reality of the thing, for instance: shudder, which is a type

of shake or shriek which is a loud noise. Λέξις is the actual exercise of the quiddity, it may

condition the λόγος according to the way it is expressed, while λόγος is just significant, it has a

determinate value, a quiddity. The λόγος thus is simple, it is the first thing and it is the first action

of the mind when it comes in contact with reality.

So far language has been expressed, the next step is to analyze its relationship with the way

we know and then with the real thing which it expresses.

II. The Capacity of Knowing6

In Aristotle’s “On the Soul” he analyzes the way human beings are capable to know reality.

This is the second angle of the semiotic triangle by which language necessarily has to go through.

As it is said before the condition for language is the intention of the mind. It is its proper bridge

between the real thing outside of man and the linguistical representation.

Knowledge begins with sensations which are common to all animals. Men have five senses

and through them they have perception of objects according to these senses: men see, men feel and

so on. Yet human knowledge goes beyond that, it is able to think, to judge, to speculate. Now there

are two types of knowledge:

i) The intellection of indivisible objects. The known object exists in itself and it exists in

the mind of the one who knows. In such objects there can be no falsehood because they

are mere concepts of things. There begins to be truth or falsehood when the mind starts

6 ARISTOTLE, On the soul, III, 6

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mixing objects: “This man is white.” “That house is old.” Notice that the object is

indivisible, not in a quantitative way but because of its quality. This act of the mind is

also indivisible, it has no parts.

ii) The second type of knowledge is by composition and division. This happens when we

have a meaning of being which exists only inside the mind. This type of knowledge is

more perfect. The object is made present in the subject by means of a notion in act. It is

identification in act.

When the soul thinks it becomes one with the object it thinks. There is identification with

the thought object. The object has an identity. It happens just as the senses do with their proper

objects. For instance hearing is the act of hearing and the same sense of the ear. The action is that of

hearing and the potency is the sense which is in potency to hear sound. The senses adequate

themselves to their proper sensible objects as the intellect adequates itself to that which is

intelligible. Knowledge is the knowledgeable and sensation is the sensible.7 Clarifying this, it is not

that the soul or the senses become that which they come in contact with materially, rather they act

like the hand when employs its instruments. The soul, a form, employs the forms of things; the

senses perceive the forms of material things.

Now in reference to our theme on language these objects which are sensible or intelligible

are signified by words by means of concepts. Words signify such objects. The structure of the mind

is thus expressed in sounds of the voice. The terms used by Aristotle are: σεμαινειν which means to

denote or designate and συμβολειν which means to symbolize. By no means is to be understood that

the name gives a meaning to the object. The names denote the object as a whole, whereas the

definition explains the particular proprieties of the object. We actually find a correspondence

between the categories of reality, of substance, with those of grammar.

7 ARISTOTLE, De Anima, 3, 421b.

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-Predicative categories of substance -Grammatical categories of substance

-Categories of quality and quantity -Categories of objects

-Relation -Comparatives

-Time and space -Their proper adverbs

-State of being -Verbs in the Greek middle voice which express a disposition to something

-Having or possessing -Aspects of the Greek imperfect tense

-Action or passion -Active or passive tenses8

So with this is it is presented the relation of language with though.

III. Relation to Being9

Thus the next step is to present the foundation of language which is the real thing:

(πράγματα). Sounds of the voice are signs of affections of the soul and are substitutes as well as

likenesses of things. The relation (reference) between affections of the soul and things is not

conventional. In dialogue words substitute things. That makes the signifying word significant of a

concept and a substitute of the real thing. Now being is the first element in the process of language.

Things are in themselves per se and thus they present themselves to us. Reality precedes thought

and determinates it. Now language is able to express such reality in the ways that man perceives it.

Accordingly there are four ways of expressing being.

i) The first way isolated from the rest is being said per accidens. This happens according to the

effect that the predicate causes on being. When predicates are necessarily said of being this is

no longer per accidens but per se. For instance: Plato is a man. This is per se because it is

necessary that Plato be a man, it cannot be in another way. Yet when the matter of the

8 FORMICARI LIA, 9 GILSON, Being and some Philosophers. Pg. 49. For Aristotle being is what he sees, and what he can touch: this man, this tree, this piece of wood. Whatever other name it may bear, reality always is for him a particular and actually existing thing, that is distinct ontological unit which is able to subsist in itself and can be defined in itself.

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predicate is contingent then it applies per accidens. Such predicates appertain to a thing that is.

They are attributes belonging to what is. They themselves never become being. For instance

three examples: A musician is just; the man is a player, the player is a man.10

ii) The second way is per se. This is divided into substance with its ten categories and being as

true or false.

a) According to the ten categories means all the applications that the predicate imposes on the

subject. These categories are modes in which the predicate modifies the subject. For example:

quality, quantity, relation and others. This type is present in the thing itself. Substance has

absolute priority over the other categories. This is possible because one of the first meanings

of being is its essence which indicates the substance. The other meanings make reference to an

individual substance. Substance is called prime by time because it comes before any other

category, in fact without substance none of the others may subsist; by notion: in any category

the notion of substance is implied; finally according to knowledge: we come to know the

essence before any of the categories. Substance may belong to simple or compound bodies.

Substance sets the limits of the bodies. Only substances are sensible, not that all substances

are sensible but later on, in book Λ Aristotle demonstrates and explains the existence of non

sensible substances and arrives to the conclusion that there must be a substance whose essence

is act itself and this substance is God.

b) According to true or false. Not as the categorical this type is valid for the connection of

concepts in the mind, it is all about affirming and denying. Being is true, not-being is false.

Things are always independent of what man may think of them.

iii) The fourth type is according to potency and act. This type is present in the previous three but

is different and it goes beyond them.

10 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, V, 7, 1037

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The first thing to take into account is the manifold meaning of act. There are two

main ones εν εργεια and εν τελεχεια. The first one denotes exercise, some type of motion,

these are actions which have an end, and they seek a goal: for example to loose weight. It is a

continuous Movement. This movement is imperfect. The second type applies to those actions

that have their end while they are doing it, such as learning, seeing and so on. These are

activities. The eye sees and has seen in one act. This activity is perfect. Being in act is an

activity therefore it is perfect.

Things can be in act in two ways: Firstly those that depend on reason. They pass on

from being in potency to being in act. For example this written work was in potency when all

the ideas where everywhere and came to be in act when they were gathered, reflected on and

put onto paper. The second way is those things which have in themselves the principle of

generation. They are in potency by their own virtue. For instance the sperm that fecundates the

egg is a man in potency. The child who has the potency of becoming man may come to be: a

teacher, a passenger, a philosopher.

Act has priority over potency in the same way substance has priority over its

categories, that is by time, notion and substance.

Finally all things that have potency must have a previous being that has put them into

act. That which is in potency does not become in act by itself. Thus it is necessary that there

be Substance which is a first mover for motion. Without this first mover nothing would be in

act. This mover has to be a principle whose substance is act itself deprived of matter and

potency, otherwise it would be corruptible. It is a first cause for motion. The qualities of this

substance are: it must be the greatest good, the greatest beauty and the greatest truth, because

these are the most desirable objects and have to be present in the first mover. Henceforth he is

thought per se. The object of his thought is the most perfect thought which is himself, thus He

perceives himself as intelligible. He is intelligible and is in contemplative activity, the most

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pleasing. This Being is God. He is life, optimum and eternal life. He is indivisible and

unalterable.11

This being so perfect is unperceivable to human senses. So it cannot be expressed in

human language because there are no concepts sublime enough to express it. Yet the other

types of being may be represented by the mind and by language.

IV Judgement

“All men desire by nature to know.”12 Aristotle tried with such great intellect to penetrate the

depths of reality arriving to the first principles and causes. His quest is an honest and sincere one.

We are able to appreciate a man who is a seeker of truth and comes into dialogue with the men of

his time, those searching for the truth like Plato or the sophists who pursued their own interests at

the expense of others and of philosophy. He proves himself able to present principles and causes

and arrive to the zenith of demonstrating the existence of God and his qualities. Now he is able to

arrive to these causes and the first principles parting from reality, that reality which he observed on

the daily bases. He is able to part from the phenomenon to its foundation.

Now what is the use of this explanation? First of all Aristotle is a philosopher who dialogues

with other philosophers and those previous to him elaborated theories regarding the semiotic

triangle. Their explanations were necessary but in a sense they were incomplete. For instance

Parmenides reduced everything to one immanent being and thus all of reality became univocal,

immovable and inexpressible. Multiplicity and change were left behind, unexplained. Plato came

closer but his system was not realistic because it was founded on ideas and real things are what we

find daily. Aristotle respected reality with its multiplicity and its change. That is what we find in his

explanation of the semiotic triangle.

11 Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 11. 612 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics I. A 980, a 22…

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Make sure to include the principle of abstraction and the possibility of man to interpret being in its

different positions in reality and also the capacity for sciences.

Theological usefulness

I. Preparation for revelation

It seems Providential that Aristotle lived around three hundred years before Christ. Such

time gave the minds of men of that period to sink down those teachings and thus enable them to

receive revelation with a prepared mind. First of all it offered them a gnoseological theory in which

the mind is able to know the simple truth of being. It is neither an ephemeral knowledge nor a

capacity so weak it is unable to know any certainty. It is a strong capacity. Such capacity is proved

to arrive, naturally, that is without the aid of revelation, to the knowledge of the existence of God

and his attributes. Secondly, language is the capability to express in words the contents of the mind:

simple as well as compound realities, material and abstract. Language proved to be a faithful

instrument for the transmission of the revealed word. Finally, being was set as the ultimate

foundation of reality. Being, which is act, and the first mover as the cause for all reality in as much

as it is in act.

II. The semiotic triangle and the Trinity

There seems to be a remote analogy between the semiotic triangle and the Trinity; firstly

God the Father as pure act and the first mover. He is the uncaused act and the origin of all other acts

which have potencies. He is a substance. He is one because being and one are the same. He is

supreme God and he is life, the source of all life. Then the Holy Spirit as presented in revelation is

Knowledge of all created things. He is divine wisdom and is the supreme thought; the mind in

which all creation received its origin, the simple mind containing all essences. Finally comes the

Son as the λόγος through which God brought all things into being. It is the word which became

flesh and which came to Earth to reveal, with human words, the hidden truths about God. He came

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to put into words what our minds may not have come to know, that is that God is not just

contemplating himself as a perfect object but that he is a loving Father and a Shepherd. This is the

very word present even today in the liturgy.13

Conclusion

This Aristotelian theory of the semiotic triangle has proved itself to be authentic perennial

philosophy. Many of Aristotle’s theories became obsolete, especially those regarding physics and

other treatises. It is perennial because it has resisted the time barrier and it still enriches many

through its reflections and it is one of the most accurate ones. Certainly authors years after enriched

it and gave it a further development as St. Thomas Aquinas and other recent philosophers. In this

relation of being to language is a reference, of language to knowledge is significance and from

being to knowledge is intention. It keeps a balance between each of them and becomes a solid

foundation upon which revelation may express its contents. The church has thus been able to offer

man its doctrine built on this firm edifice of philosophy.

13 Cfr. RATZINGER JOSEPH, The Spirit of the Liturgy

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BIBLIOGRAFIA

ARISTOTLE, On interpretation, Loeb Classical Library, St. Edmundsbury Pres. Ltd, Bury St. Edmund’s, Suffolk 1989ARISTOTLE, On the soul, Loeb Classical Library, St. Edmundsbury Pres. Ltd, Bury St. Edmund’s, Suffolk 1989ARISTOTELE, Metafisica, a cura de Giovanni Reale, Bompiani, Testi a fronte, Libri S.p.A. Milano aprile 2000.SADUN BORDONI GIANLUCA, Linguaggio e realta in Aristotele, Roma-Bari, Biblioteca di Cultura moderna Laterza, 1994.BRENTANO FRANZ, Sui molteplici significati dell’essere secondo Aristotele, a cura di Giovanni Reale. Edizione Italiana, 1995 Vita e pensiero- Largo A. Gemelli, 1, 20123 Milano.GILSON ETIENNE, Being and some philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Medieval studies. Toronto, 1949FORMICARI LIA, Linguaggio, Storia delle teorie

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