The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another

8/13/2019 The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another

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The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One AnotherAuthor(s): Wu XinboSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2000), pp. 296-310Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021134.

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THE SECURITYDIMENSIONOFSINO-JAPANESERELATIONSWarilyWatchingOne Another

Wu XinboSince the founding of the People's Republic of China(PRC) in 1949, Sino-Japaneserelations have gone through several differentperiods. In the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing and Tokyo relied upon economicdiplomacy,with tradeservingas a bridge in place of formal diplomaticrela-tions. Fromnormalizationn 1972 to JapaneseEmperorAkihito's visit to thePRC in 1992, the relationshipmay be characterizedas having been one ofgood-neighborly friendship marked by expanding economic links and fre-

quent exchanges of visits by political leaders. However, as a result ofchanges in both the international nvironmentandJapan'sdomestic politicalstructuresince 1992, Sino-Japaneserelations have entereda period of com-petitive coexistence. Although each state wishes to maintain stable andstrong links, the two governmentshave reached the limit of the presentrela-tionship. In particular,both are becoming increasinglyuncomfortablewiththe security aspects of their bilateral ties.

This article explores the stateof the Sino-Japanrelationship rom a secur-ity perspective. It first considers the security concerns thatChina has withrespect to Japan, then reverses perspective to show Japan's concerns overChina. It concludeswith some observationsregardingwhy each countryhasthe views it does of the otherand what factorsmay help ameliorateconcernsand maintainstabilityin the relationship.

Wu Xinbo is Professorat the Centerfor AmericanStudies,FudanUni-versity, Shanghai,China,andcurrentlyVisiting Fellow at the Centerfor NortheastAsian PolicyStudies,The Brookings Institution,Washington,D.C.Asian Survey, 40:2, pp. 296-310. ISSN: 0004-4687( 2000 by The Regents of the University of California/Society. All rightsreserved.Send Requests for Permission to Reprintto: Rights and Permissions, Universityof CaliforniaPress, JournalsDivision, 2000 CenterSt., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

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WU XINBO 297China's SecurityConcerns over Japan

In the 1990s, China's perceptionof Japanwas influencedby a chain of devel-opments there. These included growing conservatismin domestic politics;Japan's more active security policy, including the redefinitionof Japan-U.S.alliance; and the tougher stance, from the Chinese perspective, that Tokyotook in dealing with Beijing.

Since the end of the cold war, Japanesedomestic politics have shiftedin aconservative direction.1 There have been ever-loudervoices advocating arevision of Japan's postwar peace Constitution-so-called because Article 9forbids Japan from possessing a regular army and deprives it of the right todeclare war-that would enable the countryto exercise the right of collectivedefense. Conservativepoliticians have made more frequent efforts to denythe history of Japanese aggression leading up to and war crimes committedduring World War II and the continentalconflict that preceded it. On thematterof security issues, Tokyo has altered the low profile it had throughmuch of the postwar periodand takena more active postureboth unilaterallyand bilaterally (that is, within the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance).Spurredby the Persian Gulf Waranddrivenby the desire to become a majorglobal political power, Japan dispatched minesweepersto the Gulf in April1991. This constituted the first overseas operationsby the country's Mari-time Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in theirhistory,and the Peace-Keeping Op-eration(PKO)Bill passed by the Diet in June 1992 legitimized making suchoverseas dispatchesin the future. In addition,the reaffirmation f the Japan-U.S. security alliance in 1995-96 provided Tokyo with a framework forbuilding up its military capabilitiesandbecoming more actively involved inregional security affairs. Beijing has come to fear that the strengthenedalli-ance is largelyintended to constraina risingChina, given thatnumerousJap-anese politicians, academics, and members of the media have stirredup theidea of a Chinese threat. This leads to the final point, which is that since1994 Japan has moved away from dealing with the PRC in the conciliatorymanner t had adopted n the 1970s and 1980s. Tokyo toughenedits positionon such issues as the Taiwanquestionand Chinese nucleartests. This changehas led one observer to commentthat Japan'sChina policy has shifted fromcommercial iberalism to reluctantrealism. 2

China's currentsecurityconcerns withJapanare threefold: 1) thepossibil-ity that Japanmight become a majormilitarypower;(2) the hidden agenda ofU.S.-Japansecurity alliance, i.e., to constrainand,when necessary,containa

1. For a descriptionof the conservative trend in Japan's internalpolitics, see, amongothers,Wu Jinan,Japan: Standing at the Threshold o the 21st Century(Shanghai:ShanghaiEducationPress, 1998), pp. 61-65.

2. Michael Green and Benjamin Self, Japan's Changing China Policy: From CommercialLiberalism o Reluctant Realism, Survival 38:2 (Summer 1996).



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298 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL000rising China;and (3) the possibilitythat Taiwan might be incorporatedwithinthe scope of Japan-U.S. defense guidelines.

Growing Japanese MilitaryStrengthBeijing long has harbored trongsuspicions over the growth of Japan's mili-tary strength. Japanmaintainsa small but highly professionalforce equippedwith the most advancedconventionalweaponsin Asia. The SDF's naval andair capabilities far exceed those of the People's LiberationArmy (PLA).Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's defense expenditures haveranked the second highest in the world, behind only those of the U.S.Although Japanhas no nuclearweapons, long-rangemissiles, or nuclear sub-marines, ts strongtechnologybase would enable it to develop such weaponssystems rapidly should the political will arise. Chinese observersbelieve thatsince the end of the cold war, Japan'sconservativeshave been tryingto gen-erate the necessary will to turn the country into a major military powerthroughtheir advocacy of removing Article 9 from the Constitution,whichwould make Japana so-called normalcountry.

The PRCis particularly oncernedwith some recent developments. In Au-gust 1999, Japan's Diet passed a bill enshrining the Hinomaru flag and

Kimigayo anthem, both associated with past Japanesemilitarism, as thecountry's official symbols. In October,Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo indi-cated his governmentwantedto revise the relevant aws and allow the SDF toparticipatein broader U.N. PKOs. Chinese analysts suggest that Japan'sright-wingershave adopteda piecemeal approach o revisingthe Constitutionof which the above developmentsdemonstrate hatthey have quickenedtheirpace.3

TheJapan-U.S. SecurityAllianceRegardlessof the constraints mposed by the peace Constitution,Japanex-pertsin the PRC believe that the reaffirmedJapan-U.S.securityalliance hasalreadyprovidedJapanwith a basis for further trengtheningts militarymus-cle andpursuinga more active security policy. Following the joint declara-tion PresidentBill Clinton and Prime MinisterHashimotoRyutaromade inApril 1996, defense expertsfrom Washingtonand Tokyo engaged in intensediscussions over the revision of the U.S.-Japandefense cooperation guide-lines. The new guidelines, signed in September 1997, marked a significantadjustment n Japan's defense posture. The support Japanese forces were

3. Xin Bei, No-WarTenet Rocked, China Daily, August 14, 1999, p. 4; and Feng Yingzi,WhatLaw Does JapanWantto Revise? (in Chinese),Jiefang junbao (PLA daily), October31,

1999, p. 6. The 1992 PKO bill presently in force permits the SDF to participateonly in thehumanitarian nd logistical partsof such operations.



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WU XINBO 299committed to provide expanded from the exclusive defense of Japan to in-clude dealing with contingencies in areas surrounding t. Legislation wasinitiated to facilitate implementationof Japan's new obligations, namely, toassist U.S. troopsin a militaryconflict in the area aroundJapan. Both housesof the Diet passed the so-called related bills in the spring of 1999, thus mak-ing Japaneligible to help the U.S. police East Asia. Adoption of the relatedbills also gave a strong boost to the transformationof Japan's SDF into amore active and powerfulmilitary force and spurred he momentumof thosepushingfor revision of the Constitution.4

PRC analysts have noted that Japan's new defense policy-formed on thebasis of the New Defence ProgramOutlineand the Mid-Term(1996-2000)Defence Forces ReconstructionPlan, both worked out in 1995-will have asignificant impact on the SDF's futuredevelopment. First, the policy callsfor Japanto further mprove its defense technologies andmilitaryequipmentwhile reducing personnel. Second, the SDF's operationalparametershavebeen broadened;as a result, the SDF is seeking to develop bettercapabilitiesfor fighting conflicts in areas distantfrom the home islands. Given that Japanis a strong economic powerand possesses advancedtechnology, Chinese ana-lysts argue that the new policy will make it possible for Japan to become amajor military power in the Asia-Pacific region.5

Japanappears o be seizing every opportunity o take actions aimed at im-proving its defense capabilities. For instance, when a North Korean long-range missile flew over northernJapanin August 1998, Tokyo decided itneeded to launch its own reconnaissance satellite and join the U.S. in re-search anddevelopment(R&D) on a theatermissile defense (TMD) system.6Chinese analystsbelieve thatJapan's having its own reconnaissancesatellitewill reducethe country's dependenceon provision of intelligence datafromthe U.S. and greatly improve the country's own efforts to collect data onChina and North Korea. Furthermore, uch a satellite would also provideJapanwith early-warningcapabilities,an importantcomponentfor a TMDsystem.

Japanese participation n TMD R&D serves two purposes, Chinese ana-lysts believe. First, Japanwill gain a kindof strategicbalance with respecttothe PRC by using a TMD system to nullify the threat from China's limited4. Zhu Feng, Bills Related to the U.S.-JapanDefense CooperationGuidelines and Trends n

Japan's Policy, ContemporaryAsia-Pacific Studies, no. 9, 1999, pp. 14-15.5. Sun Cheng, Japan'sNew Defense Policy and Its Impact on Asia-Pacific Security, PacificJournal, no. 1, 1998, pp. 86-87.

6. In August 1999, Japan and the U.S. signed a memorandumof understandingon researchfor a sea-based system that uses satellites to pinpoint ncoming missiles and shoot them down. A

basic outline of the research had already been established. U.S., Japan OK Anti-MissileDeal, Xinhua News Agency, Tokyo bureau, August 17, 1999.



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300 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL000strategic forces. Presently, Japan s ahead of China in terms of conventionalcapabilities, yet it feels vulnerable in the face of China's strategic weapons.A TMD system, once proven technologically effective and deployed, couldminimize the PRC's strategic deterrencethreat, which certainly would rein-force Tokyo's position vis-a-vis Beijing. Second, a TMD R&D effort wouldraise the level of Japan's defense technologies and enhance its military capa-bilities. The U.S. hopes that by involving Japanin the TMD project it willnot only get Japanto share the expected high development costs but also beable to drawupon Japan'shigh-tech capabilities. In return or contributingothe project, Japanwill reap the researchresults, both technologically and mil-itarily. Furthermore,while TMD is defensive in nature, the technology be-hind it can be used to develop offensive weapons systems.

It is important o keep in perspective China's concernwith Japan's devel-opment into a major military power. For historic reasons compounded byJapan's reluctanceto seek a genuine reconciliationwith the PRCon the mat-ter of World War II history,the Chinese public views Japanas a countryofuncertainties. In Germany,Nazism was completely liquidatedafter WorldWarII, but in Japan he same did not takeplace with respectto militarism. Itstill has some currencywith a tiny portionof the populationeven today. Thefrequent efforts by some conservativepoliticiansto deny Japan's aggressionagainstAsian countriesareinterpretedn the PRC as proof of Japan'sfailureto provide a correct view of history to its people. Moreover, remarksbysome political figures that the Japan-U.S.alliance shouldcover Taiwan havealarmed he Chinese, who strongly believe that a handful of Japaneseremainaddictedto its aggressive past. For instance,on August 17, 1997, then-Cabi-net SecretaryKajiyamaSeiroku said on a television program hatthe alliancewould not surviveif Japandid not assist U.S. forces shouldthey get involvedin an armed conflict between China and Taiwan. Ozawa Ichiro,chief of theLiberal Party, made similar comments on January 14, 1999.7 Meanwhile,Japan'senormous economic might and advanced technological capabilitiesprovidea strongmaterialbasis for the revivalof militarism. All these factorssuggest that under certain circumstances,Japancould attemptto turnitselfinto a major military power that would pose a threat to its neighbors.Yet, despite these indicatorsmost policy and academicelites in China donot embrace the idea that Japanwill become remilitarizedand aggressive.On the one hand, they share the public's concern over the growthin Japan'smilitary strengthand the possibility that the country will become a majormilitarypower. Some even argue that, given Japan's huge defense expendi-

7. Zhang Guocheng, JapaneseCabinet SecretaryTalks Wildly, Claimingthat Japan-U.S.Al-liance Covers Taiwan, People's Daily, August 19, 1997, p. 6; and Yu Qing, JapaneseLiberalParty Chief Talks Wildly, Claiming that 'The SurroundingAreas of Japan' Includes China,People's Daily, January16, 1999, p. 3.



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WU XINBO 301tures and the sophisticatedweaponry of its forces, it already is one.8 On theother hand, these same elites believe that in light of the opposition of variousAsian countriesand the U.S. to Japanbecoming such a power, the constraintsof the peace Constitution, he pacifist tendency among Japan' general popu-lace, and the country's multiparty democratic system, militarism-thoughstill attractive o a tiny segment of the population-is unlikely to be revived.9What really concerns Chinese elites is that the increase in Japan's militarycapabilities will shift the balance of power in Japan's favor. A militarilypowerful Japan s more likely to invoke its alliancewith the U.S. to interveneshould a military conflict arise in the Taiwan Strait.

China also is concerned that an enhanced Japanese military would con-straina rising China and produce a security architecture or East Asia that isjointly dominatedby the U.S. and Japan.10To be sure,both countries claimthat the redefinitionof the bilateral security alliance was spurredby the Per-sian Gulf War as well as the 1994 NorthKoreannuclearcrisis. But the Chi-nese believe to the contrary. They arguethat the alliance is a relic of the coldwar; now that it is over and the regional security environment has beengreatly relaxed, there is no reason for the alliance to be strengthened. Chi-nese analysts noticed that the alliance's redefinitionoccurredat a time whenpeople both in the U.S. and Japan were airing concerns about a potentialChinese threat. For example, in October 1995, then-ForeignMinister KonoYohei told the Diet that China's military modernizationand territorialpoli-cies could be a source of instabilityin Asia. Commentingon the reaffirma-tion of the Japan-U.S.alliance, Kono noted franklythat the China factorwasquite significantfrom the viewpoints of Japanese security, the U.S.-Japansecurity regime, and the future of Asia, 1while in March 1996, then-PrimeMinister Hashimotoexpressedhis concernthat Chinesepolicies in the region

mightbe heading in the wrong direction. 12 As for the U.S, the period of1994-95 was also an eventful time for PRC-U.S. relations. Beijing andWashington continually quarrelledover humanrights, armssales, trade,andTaiwan. Sino-U.S. relations reached their nadirat this time when Taiwaneseleader Lee Teng-huivisited Cornell University in June 1995. The constant

8. See, for instance,Yan Shi, Japan'sSDF Expands Vigorously, Global Times,October 1,1999, p. 21.

9. Wu Jinan, Japan. Standing at the Threshold to the 21st Century, pp. 248-52; and PanZhengqiangand Xia Liping, WorldMilitary Trends(Beijing: National Defense University Press,1994), pp. 278-80.

10. Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, Against U.S. or with U.S.? The Chinese Perspective ofAmerica's Alliances with Japan and Korea, Asia/Pacific Research Center (A/PARC) ProjectWorkingPaper (Stanford:StanfordUniversity, A/PARC, May 1999), pp. 31-32.

11. Asahi shinbun, October 27, 1995 (evening edition).12. Tokyoshinbun,March2, 1996.



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302 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL,NO.2, MARCH/APRIL000frictions aroused hot debate in the U.S. about its China policy and contain-ment frequently was recommendedas an option.

Such statementscoming from Japanandthe U.S. lent support o Beijing'sinterpretation f Tokyo's and Washington's motives for redefining the bilat-eral securityalliance. The Chinesepolicy elites assume that both wanted tostrengthen he ties so as to better cope with any potential challenges posed bythe PRC. In a word, it is believed that the reaffirmationof the Japan-U.S.alliance contains a strong anti-Chinarationale. From the Chinese perspec-tive, this is indicative of a significantproblem in the PRC's securityenviron-ment that will impose great strategic pressuresupon it. Moreover,a strongJapan-U.S. relationshipalso curtails China's influence in regional politicaland securityaffairs.Another Chinese concern is that the alliance's redefinition will serveAmerican and Japanese ntentions to establish an Asia-Pacific security archi-tecture based on the bilateralrelationship. This would result in joint Japan-U.S. domination of the regional security order. The regional security land-scape duringthe cold war was shapedlargely along ideological lines. Withthe Soviet Union's collapse, the U.S. saw a chance to reshapethe securityorder and enhanceits leadershiprole. The bilateralalliance holds the key tofulfilling that objective. Some Chinese analysts suggest that by reaffirmingits security ties with Tokyo and maintaining its bilateral security arrange-ments with South Korea, Thailand, and Australia,Washingtonis attemptingto replicate a securitystructure ike thatof the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organi-zation in Asia. Such a developmentwould presentthe PRC with a difficultchoice: either join a U.S.-led security framework or confront it alone.Neitheroption is attractive. What's more, arguethe Chinese, the attempttoestablish a U.S.-Japancondominium over the regional security architecturealso runs against the ongoing multipolarizationprocess in the Asia-Pacificand makes it difficult to cultivate mutualtrustandpromote cooperativesecur-ity in NortheastAsia.

Althoughthe Chinese have expressedstrong disapprovalover the redefini-tion of the Japan-U.S. alliance, it is not their intentionthat the relationshipshould immediatelycease to exist. Some analysts suggest that the alliancedoes have a positive impacton regionalsecurity. 3 For one thing,it putsa lidon the growthof Japan'smilitarycapabilities. Even thoughthe U.S. has beenurging Japanto play a more positive role in regional securityand the rede-fined allianceprovides Japanwith a legitimateexcuse to further trengthentsmilitary might, the alliancealso imposes a limit on how farJapancan go. Ina sense, the strongties assure the region thatJapanremainspacifistand will

13. See, for instance, Wang Hongbin and Ni Feng, U.S.-JapanAlliance and Security n Asia-Pacific Area, ContemporaryAsia-Pacific Studies, no. 3, 1998, p. 7.



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WU XINBO 303not become a militarypower that poses a threat o its neighbors. The alliancehas also proved useful in dealing with some regional crises; for instance, toget North Korea to quit its nuclear program,Tokyo joined Washington andSeoul to help build two light-water reactors for Pyongyang. On the whole,Beijing sees the alliance as a relationshipwhose functions should be strictlybilateraland not target any thirdparty (i.e., China)or serve as a means fordominatingregional securityaffairs.14

The Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines and TaiwanThe Taiwan issue stands as the most importantproblem in Sino-Japaneserelations. Because of Japan's colonization of Taiwan from 1895-1945,China is very sensitive to Japan's interactionswith the island. For example,Beijing protested stronglyin 1994 when Japaninvited TaiwaneseVice-Pre-mier Hsu Li-teh to attend the opening ceremonies of the Asian Games inHiroshima. Many Chinese believe that Japan does not want to see Taiwanreturnto China for both historical and pragmaticreasons. These Chinesebelieve that, having colonized Taiwan for a half-century, he Japaneseharbora special feeling aboutthe island and at the bottom of their hearts want it toremainseparate rom the mainland. From a realpolitikperspective,if Taiwanreunites with China, the PRC will become much strongerand the balance ofpower between Chinaand Japanwill tilt to the former. More over, unifica-tion also would renderJapan'smaritime ines of communication n the west-ern Pacific subjectto Beijing's control.

The aforementionedconcerns on Beijing's part explain why it urged To-kyo to state that Taiwan was not included in the operationalparametersofrevisedJapan-U.S.defense guidelines. However, Japan ntentionallytook anambiguous position on this issue, saying that the areassurroundingJapanconceptused in the guidelineswas a scenario-specificrather hangeographicformulation. Thatsaid, some conservativeJapanesepoliticianshave claimedopenly that Taiwan certainlyis covered by the guidelines. This worries thePRCin two respects: (1) militarily,it must be prepared o cope with a poten-tialjoint U.S.-Japanintervention n the case of a militaryconflict across theTaiwan Strait; and (2) any hint of incorporatingTaiwaninto the guidelines'operationalparametersmay abet the secessionist momentumon Taiwan andmake it even harder to secure a peaceful unification. It is therefore under-standable hat China continuespressing Japanon the coverage issue; so longas Tokyo rejects makingsuch a statement,Taiwanwill remaina sensitive anddifficultissue in Beijing-Tokyo relations.

Nonetheless, Beijing does understand he limits of what adjustmentsarepossiblein Tokyo's Taiwan policy. Japan's booming trade with and invest-14. Xu Yang, Cui Urges Japan:Be Prudent, China Daily, June 11, 1997, p. 1.



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304 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL,NO.2, MARCH/APRIL000mentin the Chinese mainland,as well as the steady growthof China's mate-rial strength,mean it is unlikely to jeopardize relations with the PRC forTaiwan's sake. Also, Japanusually looks to the U.S. for the orientationof itsTaiwan policy. If Washingtondecides to heighten relations with Taipei, To-kyo may feel encouraged to do the same; if Washington behaves circum-spectly on the Taiwan issue, Tokyo is unlikely to take bold steps in its ownrelations with the island. Therefore, while China will continue to watchclosely Japan's interactionswith Taiwan, Beijing will still consider the U.S.to be the breakwaterand accordingly maintainits pressureon Washington.

Japan's Security Concerns over ChinaSeveral developmentshave shaped Japan's perceptions of the PRC in thepost-cold war era. First and foremost was the demise of the Soviet threat,which dominated Japan's security concerns throughoutthe cold war years.Tokyo is now able to think about other sources of threat,real or potential, n adifferentsecurityenvironment. Second,there is the strongdesirefor Japan obecome a normal country n the post-cold warera. This has changed Japan'spostwar neoliberalist way of thinking and led its policy makers to partiallyacceptrealistlogic. As a result,concerns over balanceof power,geopoliticalcompetition,and military-strategic ivalry constantlyinform Tokyo's think-ing about the PRC. Third, China's rapid economic growth and pursuit ofdefense modernizationraises some questionsfor both Japaneseelites and thepublic: what are the implicationsof a strongPRC for Japan? How will Bei-jing exercise its growing materialstrength? Since Japanhas long been accus-tomed to living with weakerneighbors,the prospectof Chinaemergingas astrong power poses a new challenge.

Thereare in fact two possible scenariosthatJapanmust considerwith re-spect to its security concerns over China:one in which China is strongbutalso one in which it is weak. Regardingthe first scenario, Japan'sbiggestconcern is over the PRC's rising military capabilities. Some Japaneseob-servershave noted thatChina's military spendinghas increased at a double-digit rate since 1989. Chinese nuclear tests conducted between 1990 and1996 drew strong opposition from the Japanese public, and in August 1995theJapanesegovernmentdecidedto suspend grantassistanceto Chinato pro-test the continuedtesting. Moreover,the PRC's spring 1996 ballistic missileexercises in the Taiwan Straitalarmed he Japaneseandaggravated heir con-cerns over Chinesemilitarypower. While Tokyo is not greatlyworriedaboutBeijing's conventionalforces, it does monitor China'sprogram o upgrade tsnuclear and missile weaponry. And Japan'sdecision to join the U.S. in de-veloping a TMD system, allegedly aimed at coping with the North Koreanmissile threat, s in fact a reactionto China'sattempts o modernizeits strate-gic arsenal. Thatsaid, Japan's ntellectualelites arenot as alarmedat China's



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WU XINBO 305growing military muscle as the Japanesemay be in a general sense. As SatoHideo puts it, few are worried about Chinese military power itself or a Chi-nese security threat n the narrowmilitary-strategic ense of the term (i.e., aPRC invasion of or missile attack on Japan). In the opinion of these elites,the main problems are the lack of transparencyn China's military spendingand uncertainpolitical conditionsthat contribute o the country's image as apotential security threat.15 On the whole, it is fair to say that while Japandoes not view the PRCas an imminentandserious militarythreat,Japandoesharbor concerns over improvementsto China's military capabilities, espe-cially its nuclear and missile prowess.Another security concern is Beijing's stance on disputed territories. InFebruary1992, the PRC promulgateda law on territorialwaters and contigu-ous zones. In it, Beijing claimed sovereigntyover the Diaoyu (also claimedby Japan as the Senkaku Islands) and the Nansha Islands (the Spratlys, asdisputed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines,and Brunei). In the 1970sand 1980s, Beijing had suggested shelving its territorialdisputesover the twoisland chains. As a consequence, its promulgationof the 1992 law was seenby Tokyo as an importantdeparture rom the earlier position and the Japa-nese began to worry about Chinese territorial ambitions. In early 1995,Chinabroughtundercontrol Mischief Reef (also claimedby the Philippines),which is partof the Nansha chain. To Japaneseeyes, this was not an isolatedincident;rather, t was seen as part of a Chinese strategyto gain control overall the islands in dispute.16The Taiwan issue also features prominently n Japan's security concernsover China. From a geopolitical perspective,Japandoes not reallyfavor Tai-wan's reunificationwith the Chinese mainland. Tokyo has airedits anxietythatthe PRC might use force to resolve the issue. A militaryconflict in theTaiwan Straitcertainlywould have an impact on Japan's security environ-ment; furthermore,f the PRC chose to blockade Taiwanor a militaryconflictacrossthe Straitturnedout to be a protractedone, Japan'slines of communi-cation throughthe channel would be jeopardized. Moreover,if a war brokeout between Beijing and Taipei, no matterwho provokedit the U.S. wouldlikely intervene. In such a case, Washingtonin turn would ask Tokyo toprovide assistanceto U.S. troopsas the terms of the bilateralalliance oblige.This would put Japan n a very difficultposition:if it agreedto provide sup-port,it would run the risk of joining a fightagainst China, which, needless to

15. Hideo Sato, Japan's China Perceptionsand Its Policies in the Alliance with the U.S.(paper prepared or conference on America's Alliances with Japanand Korea in a ChangingNortheastAsia, A/PARC, StanfordUniversity, August 1997), p. 12.

16. YoshihideSoeya, NormativeConstraintversus Structural mperatives n Asian SecurityPractice: Materialand IdeationalInfluences,ed. MuthiahAlagappa(Stanford:StanfordUniver-sity Press, 1998), p. 204.



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306 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL,NO.2, MARCH/APRIL000say, would have a catastrophic mpacton Sino-Japaneserelations. But if Ja-pan did not agree to assist the U.S., the bilateral security alliance would bedamaged greatly, perhapsbeyond repair.

To address Japan's concerns over the Taiwan issue, Hisahiko Okazaki,aformer Japanesediplomat, suggested revising the Constitution o allow Japanthe right of collective self-defense. This, he argued, would permit Japan tojoin the U.S. in military action on a contingency basis in the Taiwan Straitand would effectively deter China from using force even if Taiwan declaredindependence.17 The implications of Okazaki's position are that opening theprospect of Japanjoining the U.S. in a fight against the PRC over Taiwanwill make certain that (a) Taiwan will never be reunified with the PRC and(b) China will dare not use force against the island. The questions that re-main, however, are whetherit is politically possible for Okazaki's proposedconstitutional revision to be achieved and whether China would be intimi-datedon the Taiwan issue even in the face of possible U.S.-Japan oint mili-tary support for Taipei. For one thing, Okazaki may be underestimatingBeijing's resolve in its quest for achieving nationalunity.The greatest and most fundamentalof Japan's security concerns vis-a'-visChina is the latter's rise and the resultantshift in the balanceof powerin EastAsia. Japan fears that the steady growth of China's material strengthwillchallenge Japan's long-held superiorposition in the region. Furthermore,againstthe backdropof China's emergenceand Japan's aspirations o play abigger role in regional and internationalaffairs, some Japanese policy andintellectual elites believe that a period of political and strategic competitionbetween Beijing and Tokyo has commenced.18 Such a contest will have along-term impact on not only bilateral relations but also the broader EastAsian strategic andscape. Under these circumstances, he realist's option inTokyo's strategic calculations is to preserve the Japan-U.S. alliance, for itwill constitute an effective counterpoiseto rising Chinese power and narrowChina'sstrategicspace. As Okazakiwrites, Whenthe Japan-U.S.allianceisfirm,China'sstrategicchoices are extremelylimited. 19To extendhis logic,a strong PRC not only would abstain from challenging U.S. and Japaneseinterests but also might follow the course of developmentthat Washingtonand Tokyo desire.The other security scenarioover which Japan s concernedis one in whichBeijing fails to addressa wide rangeof internal ssues thatcould arise in theprocess of its rapideconomic growthand social transformation.Forinstance,

17. HisahikoOkazaki, China:Functionof Japan-U.S.Alliance, Daily Yomiuri,August 28,1995.

18. This analysisdrawson discussions with some JapaneseChina specialists during a visit toJapan by the author in March 1999.

19. Okazaki, China.



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WUXINBO 307the PRC's remarkableongoing socioeconomic progresswill force Beijing toundertake political reform, sooner or later. However, it remains an openquestion as to how a democratic system can be smoothly established in acountry as populous as China. Some Japanese observershave cited the fail-ure of political democratization n Japanin the 1920s as demonstrating hehigh risk of political change in a rapidly modernizingsociety.20 On the eco-nomic side, even though China has enjoyed a high rate of growth for twodecades, this does not mean thatBeijing can expect anothertwo decades ofsuch. In fact, the PRC's problematic financial system, money-losing state-owned enterprises,mismanagedmacroeconomicpolicy, and poor transporta-tion and other infrastructural eficiencies are undermining he prospectsforrapid and sustainableeconomic growth in the years to come. On the societallevel, widening income disparitiesbetween the coastal and interiorareas andamong individuals from different walks of life, widespread corruption, n-creasing peasantunrestagainstlocal authoritiesover the collection of unrea-sonable fees, the uncontrolled low of surplus aborfrom ruralareas to majoreconomic hubs, the growing numberof laid-off workers,and otherproblemshave created great pressureon social stability. Japan'sChina Watcherswarnthatif the PRC fails to cope with these challenges, it will experience seriousdomestic conflict and possibly even political disintegration, a result thatcould send millions of refugees to neighboringcountries, including Japan.21

Concerns over the strongand fragile China scenarios coexist in Japan,butthey attractvarying degreesof attention n differentperiods. In the earlyandmid-1990s, Japan appearedprimarilyanxious over the prospectof a strongChina; after 1997, as China's economic growth slowed and its reform ofstate-ownedenterprisesentered a crucialperiod, Japanbecame more worriedabout its fragility. If Beijing succeeds in reformingits state-owned enter-prises and the financial system and regains momentumfor economic growth,the image of an ever more powerful China will once again loom large inJapan's perceptions.

Some ObservationsIn considering these various mutual security concerns, the question arises:why is there such strong suspicionbetween these two Asian giants? For thePRC, its perceptionsof Japanare still strongly affected by the memory ofJapan's aggression againstChina from 1895-1945. The difficulty Japanhashadin sincerely and adequatelyaddressing he historyissue consolidatessuchnegative perceptions. Moreover,the Chinese seem to hold a negativeview of

20. This also draws on the author'sdiscussion with some Japaneseexperts of internationalstudies in March 1999.

21. Sato, Japan'sChina Perceptions, p. 14.



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308 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL,NO. 2, MARCHIAPRIL000Japan's national character,which they view as exclusivist and resistant toexternal pressure. They believe that,although Japanhas changed much bothpolitically andeconomically since the end of World War II, the prewarchar-acteristicsthat led Japanto grow into an aggressive power survived the hugeandvisible transformation f Japanesesociety. Such a belief, correct or not,has contributed o China's mistrustof Japan. Moreimportantly,China seemsnot yet ready to accepta normal apan. Beijing has long been accustomedto Japanbeing a mainly economic power that avoids taking an active role inpolitical and security affairs abroad and deals with the PRC basically in aconciliatory manner. But it also has long suspected thatJapan,after becom-ing an economic power, would seek to turnitself into a political and militaryone. As a result, should Japan try to walk out of the shadow cast by WorldWarII and seek normalcywithouthaving to come to termswith its war rec-ord,or should Japanesenationalismariseand Tokyo adopt an assertive stancevis-a-vis the PRC, Beijing would be deeply upset and seriously concernedabout the role Japan might play in China's future.Fortheirpart,the Japanesesuspect that China still embraces the traditionalMiddle Kingdom mentality (chuka shiso), a kind of Sino-centric viewabout East Asian relations thatassumes a central position for China and as-signs an inferiorone to Japan. The Japanesealso believe thatChina adopts agreat-powerapproach o foreign policy and practices realpolitik n the inter-national arena, again to Japan's detriment. Regarding the history question,some Japanesefeel thatthe PRCplays this card to take advantageof Japan'swar guilt and keep it in an inferiorposition. Such individualsfeel Japanhasbeen made to apologize for too long and thatChina treatsJapanunfairlyonthis issue.22 These views, combined with such other factors as the PRC'spolitical system and the lack of transparency ver its militarymodernizationdrive, have sustainedJapanesemistrust of China. Moreover, Japanremainsanxiousabout how to deal with a Chinathat continuesto get strongerandisat a loss over how to managerelations with a power that had (and has) beenthe focus of the regionfor centuries. And Japan' lack of self-confidence hasmade it skepticalof Beijing's intentions and strategyin East Asia.Seen in broadcontext, the absence of a regional mechanism that encom-passes both the PRC and Japanis another mportantreasonthatthe mistrustbetween the two Asian giants stubbornly persists. In the case of postwarFranco-Germanelations,Paris and Bonn built their mutual trustin the pro-cess of WesternEuropean ntegration,which increasinglyhas intertwined heinterests of these two historic rivals and forced them to learn to work with

22. With regard to China-Japanbickering over the history issue, see, for instance,Beijing-Tokyo negotiations n preparationsor Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin's visit to Japan n Novem-ber 1998. Seiichiro Takagi, In Search of a SustainableEqual Partnership: apan-ChinaRela-tions in the Post-Cold-WarEra, Japan Review of InternationalAffairs 13:1 (Spring 1999).



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WU XINBO 309each other. In East Asia, however, a process of meaningful political andeconomic integrationhas not yet really started and there does not exist aninstitutionakin to the EuropeanUnion. As a result, Beijing and Tokyo haveinteractedwith one anotherpredominantly n a bilateralcontext. They lack amultilateralmechanism through which they can examine their relationshipfrom different perspectives and build some degree of mutual trust on a newbasis.

With respect to the relationship's security dimension, there is both badnews and good. The bad news is that each side has strong security concernsabout the other and those concerns, well-founded or not, have affected per-ceptions and public opinion in both countries,informedpolicy-making pro-cess in both capitals, and produced tension in the relationship at certainjunctures. The good news is thatmost of these concerns are based on specu-lation over possible developmentson the other side rather hanbeing rootedin hard facts. In other words, they reflectworries on what may happen, noton what has already taken place. Strictly speaking, there does not exist atpresent a real conflict of security interests between China and Japan. Someworrisome scenarios may never become reality, while others, even if theydevelop, may have their negative impactminimizedif bilateral ties arewell-managed. Security factorsin the Sino-Japanrelationshipdo not operatein avacuum. They interactwith and are constrainedby bilateral and multilateralvariables, one of the most importantof which is the growing economic linkbetweenthe two countries. Japan s China' largest tradingpartneras well asa major source of foreign direct investment, while the PRC ranks secondamong Japan'stradepartners. Strongeconomic ties have deepenedthe twocountries' mutual interdependenceand caused Beijing and Tokyo to take apragmatic attitude toward bilateral relations. The growing benefits issuingfrom reciprocal economic interactions also provide the relationshipwith akind of grease that can smoothany frictions thatmay ariseover political andsecurity issues. Furthermore, he incipient military exchanges and regularsecurity dialogue between China and Japanwill help reduce suspicion andbuild mutualtrust,thus enablingeach side to view the otherthrougha moreaccurateand objective lens.

The U.S. is another mportant actoraffecting Sino-Japaneserelations. Inthe post-cold war era, Beijing, Tokyo, and Washingtonhave dealt with eachother more and more in a trilateralcontext. When China considers its rela-tions with Japan, t has to take into account both the U.S. and the Japan-U.S.alliance. Likewise, as Japanpondersties with the PRC, it keeps one eye onboth the U.S. and Sino-U.S. ties. Washington's posture of constraint anddeterrencevis-a'-visChinacan help alleviateTokyo's concerns over Beijing'sgrowing strengthon the one hand;on the other,the U.S.-Japan securityalli-ance can, in Beijing's eyes, prevent Japanfrom becoming a full-fledged,in-



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310 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL000dependent military power. Also, so long as the U.S. maintains its militarypresence in East Asia and thus preserves its paramount nfluencein regionalpolitical and security affairs, Sino-Japanese political-strategiccompetitionwill be tempered. The U.S. role in Sino-Japaneserelationsfunctions like atwo-sidedcoin: while it can stirup Chinesesuspicionsof Japan-as has beenthe case with respect to the redefinitionof the Japan-U.S.alliance-it alsocan mitigate the distrust and curb competition between Beijing and Tokyo.The burgeoningmultilateralsecurity mechanism in East Asia also helps inthis regard. The Association for SoutheastAsian Nations' Regional Forum(ARF)-in which both China and Japan now participate-urges all partici-pantsto undertake onfidence-buildingmeasures(CBMs)with respect to mil-itary matters (such as increasing transparencyover defense capabilities) andseek to resolve territorialdisputes by peaceful means. With its goals of pro-moting preventive diplomacyand conflict resolution as well as CBMs, ARFcan exercise some constrainton the behavior of the major powers. At thesame time, other security forums, such as the Council on Security Coopera-tion in the Asia-Pacific and the track two level China-U.S.-Japan rilateralsecurity dialogue, may also prove useful in reducing misperceptions andbuilding mutual trust. In the long term, as the neoliberalist school wouldargue, such cooperative security initiativesin East Asia will help address thesecurity concerns that exist between Beijing and Tokyo and may create anatmosphere n which these two Asian giants can live with one anotheron apragmatic, stable, and reciprocally respectful basis.

Documents

The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another