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THE RUN-UP TO THE THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EURO II: EMU/EU EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Week 6 Ch.7 Ch.7

THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

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Page 1: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

THE RUN-UP TO THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: THE EURO II:

EMU/EU EMU/EU ENLARGEMENTENLARGEMENT

Week 6Week 6

Ch.7Ch.7

Page 2: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• Additional Material:• Gros, D. “The Maastricht Criteria after

Enlargement: Old Rules for New Members?”

• Material for individual / group presentations• Convergence reports material (more later)

Page 3: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

WHICH FLOOR ARE WE WHICH FLOOR ARE WE ENLARGING?!ENLARGING?!

• EU is a three-floors building:• First floor: Customs Union (1957)• Second floor: Economic Union / Single Market (1993)• Third floor: Monetary Union (1999)

• Countries joining the EU actually join the first and the second floor.

• To be more precise, they join the first floor way before joining the second (Association agreements, and so on).

• EU enlargement = enlargement of the single market

Page 4: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

The waves of enlargementsThe waves of enlargements

• 1957: Italy, Germany, France and BENELUX countries.

• 1973: Uk,Ireland and Denmark• 1986: Spain, Portugal and Greece (1981)• 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden • 2004-2007: former communist countries + Malta

and Cyprus

• If Maastrich criteria regulate the entry into the third floor (EMU), what supervises the accession to the second one (EU) ?

Page 5: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

The Copenaghen criteriaThe Copenaghen criteria

• 1) The political criterion: stable institutions able to guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights and tolerance towards minorities.

• 2) The economic critierion: an established market economy able to cope with market forces and competitive pressure inside the Economic Union

• 3) The “acquis communitarie” criterion: the country must be able and ready to accept and implement all the obligations deriving from membership (harmonization of law and regulations, and so on).

• The European Council opens the negotiations if and only if criterion 1 is met, and the country becomes Candidate State.

Page 6: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

The EU accession situation todayThe EU accession situation today

• There are 2 and a half Candidate States…..• Croatia: Candidate State since 2004• Macedonia: Candidate State since 2005• Turkey: negotiations opened in December 2004

but interrupted two years later mainly because of situation in Cyprus• There are 4 and a half Potential Candidate

States…• Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia

and Kosovo.

Page 7: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

……what about other European states?!what about other European states?!

• Switzerland: referendum rejected EU membership in 1992

• Norway: negative vote in 1972 and 1994• Iceland: member of European Free Trade Area

(asked for EMU membership last month after going bankrupt)

• Among the many former Soviet Republics, only Ukraine might maybe have a reasonable chance to become one day EU member.

Page 8: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

A LOOK AT EU-27: GDPA LOOK AT EU-27: GDP

NATIONAL SHARES OF EU-27 PIL

GERMANY

UK

FRANCE

ITALY

SPAIN

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

SWEDEN

AUSTRIA

POLAND

Page 9: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

POPULATIONPOPULATION

NATIONAL SHARES OF EU-27 POPULATION

GERMANY

FRANCE

UK

ITALY

SPAIN

POLAND

ROMANIA

NETHERLANDS

GREECE

Page 10: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• Germany, France, Uk and Italy represent:• - 65,4% of EU-27 economy• - 53,5% of EU-27 population

• If we also include Spain, then:• - 73,7% “ “ “• - 62,3% “ “ “

Page 11: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

ONE WORD ON EU ACCESSIONONE WORD ON EU ACCESSION

• Beginning of the 90s: former communist European nations begin their journey to market economy

• How long did the journey had to be?!• Shock therapy: instantaneous. (Poland, Czech

Republic and Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia)• Gradualism: (Romania, Hungary, Lithuania)• Shock therapy countries had a rapid output growth

and quicker transition, but more inequality and unemployment.

• Gradualist countries recovery was much slower, but with a lower degree of inequality and unemployment.

Page 12: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• Anyway, they all are into EU now with different economic situation (Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia a step ahead of others, Bulgaria and Romania still lagging behind).

• Four of them (Slovenia, Cyprus,Malta and Slovakia) already joined the Euro in 2007,2008 and 2009.

What about the remaining eight? When will they take the steps to the third floor ?

• Let alone the fact that they are obliged to (they signed up the obligations when entering EU), let’s verify that it is in their best interest anyway.

Page 13: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

ONE LESSON WE KNOWONE LESSON WE KNOW• If there is free capital movement• If countries are very integrated • if they want to maintain exchange rate stability• …the most appropriate thing is to share a common

currency.• IF’s check:

• 1) It is part of their membership in the single market.

• 2) Look at table 1, pag.3, Gros paper.• 3) Sure they do. Too much volatility and uncertainty

in the value of their currency might jeopardize their catch-up process.

• ….anyway, what exchange rate systems (“monetary regime”) do they have at the moment?

Page 14: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia: EMS II• Czech Rep, Romania, Poland: floating exchange

rates• Bulgaria and Hungary: fixed or semi-fixed

exchange rates

• How different were their macroeconomic performances so far (BEFORE THE CRISIS)?

• Floaters = low inflation, balanced current account, high public debt.

• Fixers = high inflation, high current account deficit, low public debt.

• Who tells me why?

Page 15: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

Here’s why….Here’s why….• Fixers must somehow keep the interest rate at the

same level of the economy they fixed their currency to (euro).

• EU interest rates have been low, and thus does not fit the macroconditions of those economy which, being in the middle of their catching-up process, are experiencing high growth.

• Hence: higher growth, higher inflation, higher current account deficit (because of inflation and growth), lower debt (because of inflation).

• Although appealing for some features (debt and growth), sooner or later it contrasts the first and most important Maastricht crtieria.

• In fact, for instance, Lettonia failed EMU accession in 2007 because of inflation.

Page 16: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

HOW IS THE CRISIS CHANGING ALL HOW IS THE CRISIS CHANGING ALL THAT?THAT?

• In the last 3 months we have been observing huge depreciations of Easter European members of EU (and non-EU-members)

• Poland = - 23.2%• Russia = -24.2%• Hungary= -13%• Czech Rep= -13.9%• Romania= -11.8%• Ukraine =-27.2%

• What’ s happening?!

Page 17: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

Something similar to 1997 Far East crisisSomething similar to 1997 Far East crisis

• Private and public sector has heavily indebted in foreign currency:

- private sector: mortgages were more convenient abroad (especially in Sweden)

- public sector: current account deficit (on average around 10% of GDP; in Bulgaria 25%).

In other word: internal savings were not enough to cover the needed (private and public) investment.

Page 18: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

- The crisis has triggered capital outflows (headquarters are withdrawing funds).

- Depreciation of the currency - Nominal value of the debt increases (because

it is denominated in foreign currency, whose value has increased, following depreciation of national currency)

- Rating agencies (Moody’s and Standard and Poor) are downgrading sovereing rating

- This, in turn, increases interest rate on debt issuing (countries’risk profile has worsened).

- This is exactly what happened in one recent (regional) financial crisis: July 2th 1997, originated in Thailand.

Page 19: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

Differences and consequencesDifferences and consequences• Most of debt is towards EMU banks. Some

economists are beginning to call this situation “the European subprime”.

• Austria: credits towards those countries are equivalent to 70% of national GDP (Belgium 25%, Sweden 20%, Italy 10%).

• This danger is maybe over-emphasized.• Possible solution: speed-up EMU membership (so

to curb self-fulfilling depreciation expectations).• But in order to do that we need to soften the third

Maastricht criterion (two years “waiting room” into EMS II).

Page 20: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

Are Maastricht criteria still adequate Are Maastricht criteria still adequate after 17 years (1992-2009)?after 17 years (1992-2009)?

Criterion on interest rate: Yes. Preventing arbitrage opportunities after

exchange rates are locked is a ever-lasting need.• Criterion on debt/deficit: Past (and future) discussion on the 3% and 60%

figures. See also Gros paper (pages 10-17).

What about exchange rates and inflation?Let’s work out a framework which helps us

rationalize the situation.

Page 21: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

Balassa-Samuelson effectBalassa-Samuelson effect

• Are in for some more math….?

(1 )( )E NE

E NE E A A

Page 22: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• If ANE > AE :• - if E = 0 -- NE > E

• - if NE =E - E --- new comers’ currency

• must appreciate

• You can’t have both.• Hungary last year. In order to allow inflation to go

down, they abandoned any form of limitations to the exchange rate.

Page 23: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

However…(there is always an However…(there is always an “however” in economics….)“however” in economics….)

• 1) Maastricht does not actually bind NE =E

• There is a spread of 1.5% of tolerance.• It means that the productivity growth differential

can be as big as 2.1%.

• ANE > AE = 1.5 / (1-α)

Page 24: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

• 2) E is not actually = 0• There are bands of fluctuations.

• How large do this bands have to be?!• a) Large enough to accomodate for productivity

growth differentials (considered that inflation rate cannot diverge that much)

• b) Large enough to be credible (don’t repeat the mistake of EMS I….they set too narrow bands for Italy and Uk and they dropped out, with a loss of credibility of the whole system)

Page 25: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

So….So….• The application of Maastricht criteria to new

member states actually presents some new problem:

• 1) On the inflation-exchange rate side.• 2) On the public finance side.

• 1), we have seen, is not as bad as might seem at first glance

• 2) …probably is more of a problem for those who are already in the EMU…..and we’ll talk about that next week (SGP and reform).

Page 26: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

PresentationsPresentations

• European Commission Convergence Report – December 2006 – PLEASE LOOK FOR MORE UPDATED VERSIONS.

ON THE ADMISSION TO EMU – 7 countries (Czech Rep, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary,Poland, Sweden).

Page 27: THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO II: EMU/EU ENLARGEMENT Week 6 Ch.7

You will be assessed on:You will be assessed on:• How clearly you present the

countries’situation to a non-economist.• How you infer the future pespectives for

EMU accession• How you elaborate on the data you had

been analysing, and the way you make your own remarks and draw your own conclusions.

• Each presentation cannot exceed 30 minutes, including five minutes for discussion.

• Timing….?