Citeas:Brogaard,B.(2013).ThePhenomenalUseofLook,PhilosophyCompass,(PeterPagin,ed),forthcoming

ThePhenomenalUseofLook

BeritBrogaard

January31,2013

Contents1.Introduction2.TheSemanticsofLook2.1.ChisholmsThreeUsesofLook2.2.LookasaSubjectRaisingVerb2.2.TheCopularVerbChallenge3.PhenomenalLooksandTheoriesofPerception3.1.ThePhenomenalLooksAccountofPerceptualExperience3.2.ObjectionstoArgumentsfromtheSemanticsofLook3.3.ArgumentsforRepresentationalViewsofPerception4.Conclusion

AbstractThearticleprovidesthestateoftheartonthedebateaboutwhetherthelogicalformoflookstatementscommitsustoanyparticulartheoryofperceptualexperience.ThedebatebeganwithFrankJacksons(1977)argumentthatlookstatementscommitustoasensedatumtheoryofperception.ThinkersfromdifferentcampshavesincethenofferedvariousrejoinderstoJacksonsargument.Othershaveprovidednovelargumentsfromconsiderationsofthesemanticsoflooktoparticulartheoriesofperception.Thearticlecloseswithanargumentofthissortforarepresentationaltheoryofperceptualexperience.

Keywords:comparativelooks,looksreports,lookstatements,perceptualcontent,perceptualexperience,phenomenallooks,representationaltheory,semanticsoflook,sensedatumtheory

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1.IntroductionInPerception:ARepresentativeTheory(1977)FrankJacksonmakesanargumentfortheviewthatperceptualexperienceisrepresentationalthatrestsonananalysisofthelogicalformoflookstatementsoutlinedbyRoderickChisholm(1957).Jacksonsparticularproposalisthatthelogicalformoflookstatementsofferssupportforthesensedatumtheory.Thesensedatumtheoryisarepresentationalviewinthesensethatitholdsthatthereisthereisnodirectlinkbetweentheperceiverandtheobjectsandfeaturesperceived.Instead,theperceiverstandsinaperceptualrelationtosensedatathatrepresentobjectsandfeaturesintheenvironment.

ThoughJacksonpresentshisargumentasanargumentforthesensedatumtheory,themainrepresentationaltheoryofthetime,theargumentdoesnot,infact,establishanyparticularrepresentationalview.Inanutshell,theargumentisthatphenomenallookstatementsshowthatthereisadifferencebetweenhowthingslookandhowthingsare.Asphenomenallookstatementsreflectthenatureofperceptualexperience,perceptualexperienceisrepresentational:thereisnodirectrelationbetweenourperceptualexperiencesandtheworldrepresentedbytheintermediaryentitiesweareperceptuallyacquaintedwith.

Theargumenthasbeenchallengedfromseveraldifferentcamps.Themaincounterargumentsseektoestablishtherearenogenuinephenomenallookstatementsthatreflectthenatureofperceptualexperience.HereIrevisitthesecounterargumentsafterlookingcloseratthesemanticsforlook.Ithenconsiderthetheorythatphenomenallooksareelementsofthecontentofperceptualexperience.Finally,Ilookatmorerecentargumentsfortheviewthatthesemanticsoflookcanofferinsightintothethenatureofperceptualexperienceandconcludewithanargumentofthissortinsupportofarepresentationaltheoryofperceptualexperience.

2.TheSemanticsofLook

2.1.ChisholmsThreeUsesofLookLookstatements(alsoknownaslooksreports)areutterancesofsentencesthatcontaintheperceptualverbtolook.Consider:

(1)(a)MacaulayCulkinlookspaleandfragile(b)ItlookslikethelinesegmentsintheMllerLyerillusionhavedifferentsizes(c)MichaelVickslooksreadytogo

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(d)Aprincessshouldalwayslooklikealady(e)RitaRosinaVerreoslooksasifsheissickofcoachingbeautypageants(f)Thislookslikeareallybaddeal(g)ItlooksasifBidenwon'twininDelaware(h)ItlookslikePresidentObamawonagain(i)Watson,ranked47,lookstohavethebetterdrawofthetwoBritishwomenasshestartsagainstRomania'sworldnumber89(BBC)

Onewayofdividinguplookstatementsisintermsofthementalstatetheyclaimtobebasedonintheconversationalcontext.Lookstatementsmayclaimtobeanchoredinperception,memory,introspectionorarmchairreasoning.Thefollowingaresomeillustrativeexamples:

Perceptual(2)(a)Thechairlookslikeitsonfire(b)Johnlookspaleandfeverish(c)Hisfearslooktohavebeenallayed

MemoryBased(3)(a)Thegirl,asIrememberher,lookedlikesomethingwaswrongwithher(b)Iwasonlytwo,andthegrownupslookedgigantic(c)Growmaylooklikeanactionverbbutitcanfunctionasbothanactionverbandalinkingverb

Introspective(4)(a)Itlookslikemyfearisalmostgone(b)Myvisualimagedoesntlooklikeithasanyboundaries(c)Itlookslikemyheadacheisgettingworse

Intellectual(5)(a)Thetheoryofsuperstringslookstrue(b)Thatpremisedoesntlookright(c)Afterreflectingontheevidence,itlookslikeBrowncommittedthecrime

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Chisholmdrewadistinctionamongthreeusesofappearwordsperceptualverbssuchasseem,appearandlookthatcutsacrosstheaforementionedusesoflook(Chisholm1957:chap.4).Hedistinguishedamongepistemic,comparativeandnoncomparativeusesofappearwords.Jackson(1977)dubsChisholmsnoncomparativeusethephenomenaluse.Thethreeusesarenotmutuallyexclusive.Somebutnotallcomparativeusesareepistemic(Brogaard2013a).Wecancallcomparativenonepistemicusesaswellasphenomenaluses(inJacksonssense)perceptual.

Thesurfacegrammaroflookstatementsrevealswhetherthestatementisgrammaticallycomparativeornoncomparative.Forexample,Johnlookedpaleisgrammaticallynoncomparative,whereasJohnlookedlikeaghostiscomparative.However,grammardoesnotrevealwhetherthemeaning,orsemanticvalue,ofalookstatementiscomparativeornoncomparative(Jackson1977:33Thau2002:230Byrne2009Brogaard2010). Consider:1

(6)MichaelVicklooksunwellbutreadytogo

Although(6)isgrammaticallynoncomparative,itsmeaningmaywellbecomparative.Suppose,forinstance,thatMichaelVicklookspaleandhismusclesshrunkenbutthathesdressedinateamuniform.Inthesecircumstances,(6)maybesayingthatMichaelVickslookslikesomeonewhoissickandlookslikesomeonewhoisreadytoplayagame.(6)thenissemanticallycomparativeeventhoughitsgrammaticallynoncomparative.

Semanticallynoncomparative(i.e.phenomenal)lookstatementsarealwaysperceptual,whereassemanticallycomparativestatementscanbeeitherperceptualorepistemic.Consider:

(7)(a)MichaelVickslookspale(noncomparative,perceptual)(b)MichaelVickslookslikeacancerpatient(comparative,perceptual)(c)AdriantoldmeMichaelVicksisreallysick.So,itlookslikehewillbeunabletoplay(comparative,epistemic)

Whenlookisusedepistemically,thesentenceconveyswhatissubjectivelyprobableconditionalon(total,totalinner,totalrelevant,totalrelevantpresentedsofar,...)evidence.

1Iusemeaningandsemanticvalueheretomeanwhateverlinguisticnoncontextualistsmeanbywhatspragmaticallyimplied.

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Forexample,ifIhearontheradiothattherewillbefloodinginourarea,ImightsayItlookslikeweoughttoevacuateinordertoconveythatweprobablyoughttoevacuate.

Wecantakeittobeadefinitivemarkofepistemiclooksisthattheygoawayinthepresenceofadefeateriftheagentisrational.Forexample,ifaNPRreporterannouncesthattheearlierfloodingannouncementwasahoax,itnolongerwilllooktomeasifweoughttoevacuate.IntheMllerLyerillusion,ontheotherhand,thelinesegmentswillcontinuetolookunequal,evenifIknowtheyarenot.

Asgrammaticallycomparativelookstatementshaveadistinctlycomparativestructure,itislikelythattheyarestructurallyrelatedtomorefamiliarcomparativesentences.Consider:

(8)(a)TheKVLYTVmastistallerthananyotherstructureintheUnitedStates(b)Tomisassillyashismotherwaswhenshewasakid(c)JohndancesalmostlikeMichaelJackson(d)Billeatslikeahorseandbehaveslikemonkey

Ononeplausibleviewofcomparatives,comparativesentencescontainsemanticallyvacuouswhitemsinthesentencestructure(Heim2006).8(a),forexample,canbereadas:TheKVLYTVmastistallerthananyotherstructureiswh,whichhasthetruthcondition:

Foreverystructurex(notidenticaltotheKVLYTVmast),thereisaheightysuchthatthemast'sheightisgreaterthany

Grammaticallycomparativelookstatementscanbeanalyzedinasimilarway.JohnlookslikeMichaelJackson,forexample,canbetreatedascontainingtheimplicitwhclausewh1[MichaelJacksonlookst1],whichtakeswidescope.Soweget:

[wh1[MichaelJacksonlookst1]]2[Johnlookst2]

Thishasthetruthcondition:

ThereisanxsuchthatxishowMichaelJacksonlooks,andJohnlooksx

Asthisanalysisofcomparativelookstatementsmakesunreducedappealtothenotionoflookx,itisnotmeanttoprovideacompleteanswertothequestionofhowtoassigntruthconditionstotheunderlyinglinguisticforms.Becauselookxcanbeperceptualor

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epistemic,thetruthconditionsforgrammaticallycomparativelookstatementsareparasiticonthetruthconditionsforgrammaticallynoncomparativeperceptualandepistemiclookstatements.

Howshouldweclassifymemoryderived,introspectiveandintellectualusesoflook?Thereisgoodreasontothinkthattheymaybeeitherperceptualorepistemic,dependingontheconversationalcontext.Consideradialoguebetweenacounselorandherclient.

Counselor:Whenyourecallthatepisodefromyourchildhood,whatareyouseeing?Client:Iamseeingalittlegirlwalkdownthestairs.Shelooksunhappy.

Despitetheintrospectiveormemoryderivednatureofthereport,shelooksunhappyhereappearstobeusedperceptually(infact,phenomenally).If,ontheotherhand,youtellmeIjustsawyourstudentevaluations.Itlookslikeyouareapopularteacher,theuseoflookprobablyisbothmemoryderivedandepistemic.Evenintellectualusesoflookcanbeusedperceptually.SupposearationalagentuttersthefollowingMooresentences:

(9)(a) Premise1istruebutitdoesntlookthatwaytome(b) EventhoughNewtonstheoryofgravityisincorrect,itlooksfinetomostpeople

UnlikeanalogousMooresentenceswithbelieveandknowthesentencesin(9)areperfectlyfine.Butthepropositionsexpressedbytheinitialconjunctsaredefeatersoftheoperantclauseofthesecondconjunct.Soiftheuseswereepistemic,weshouldexpect9(a)and9(b)tobeawkwardsounding.Thefactthattheyarenotawkwardsoundingsuggeststhattheuseshereareperceptual,despitebeingintellectual.Compare:

(10)(a) Itlookslikeweoughttoevacuatebutweoughtnotevacuate(b) Itlookslikeyouareagoodteacherbutyouarenot.

IfIutter10(a)immediatelyafterhearingonNPRthattherewillbefloodinginmyarea,thenmyutterancewouldbeawkwardsounding.Likewise,10(b)wouldbeoddifalltheevidenceIhavesupportsthepropositionthatyouareagoodteacher.Thisisbecausemyusesoflookinthesecontextsareepistemicandallmyevidencesupportstheembeddedclauseinthefirstconjunct.Therearecontextsthatwouldrenderthesesentencesfelicitous.Forexample,Imighthaveevidencethatsupportstheembeddedclauseinthefirstconjunctbut

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overrulingevidencethatsupportsthesecondconjunct.

2.2.LookasaSubjectRaisingVerbAppearwords,suchastoappear,toseemandtofeel,uncontroversiallyfunctionsemanticallyinthesamewayastoprove,toturnout,tostrike(me),whicharesubjectraisingverbs(Postal1974).Aswewillseebelow,thereissomereasontothinkthatlookfunctionsinthisway,too.Subjectraisingverbs,likecopularverbs(e.g.,tobeandtobecome),jointhesentencesubjectwithanadjectivalorinfinitivecomplement,asin:

(11)(a)Deenaseemedpleased(b)Tomturnedouttobealiar(c)Publishinginthetopjournalsprovedtobedifficult(d)Ronsstudentsfeltgoodabouttheirpapers

Somesubjectraisingverbsalsofunctionastransitiveverbs,asin:

(12)(a)John(eagerly)provedthetheorem(b)Erin(enthusiastically)tastedthesoup

Whentheseverbsfunctionastransitiveverbs,theydescribeactsoractionsofthereferentofthesemanticsubject.Whentheyfunctionasintransitiveraisingverbs,theydescribeapassiveexperientialorepistemicstateofanimplicitlyorexplicitlymentionedperceiver.Consider:

(13)(a)Elinorseemsaggravated(b)Thetomatoappearstoberotten

Thesentencesin(13)describeapassiveexperientialorepistemicstateofthespeaker.

Subjectraisingverbsarefollowedbyadjectivesorinfinitiveclausesratherthanadverbs,ascanbeseenfromthefactthatthetobeoftheinfinitiveclauses,whenincluded,takesanadjectivalcomplementratherthananadverbialcomplement:

(14)

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(a)Johnwasfound(tobe)missing(b)Susanturnedout(tobe)guilty

Hence,whilethecomplementsofraisingverbscanbemodifiedbyadverbs,asinextremelybeautiful,theycannotthemselvesbeadverbsortobeplusadverbialclauses.

Onthefaceofit,sentenceswithsubjectraisingverbshavethesamegrammaticalstructureassentencescontainingintensionalverbssuchaswant,hopeandwish,asinJohnwantstobehappy.However,uponfurtherscrutiny,thesimilarstructureofthesesentencesisanartifactofsurfacegrammar.Thewantandseemsentencesinquestionhavetheunderlyingforms:

Johnwants[Johntobehappy]Seems[Johntobehappy]

InJohnseemshappythesubjectJohnisthesurfacegrammaticalsubjectofseemsbutitisthesemanticsubjectoftobehappy.InthetransformationofdeepgrammarintosurfacegrammarJohnbecomesraisedtobecomethesubjectofseems.Thesubjectsofraisingverbsthushavenosemanticrelationtotheraisingverbs.Rather,theyareassociatedwiththeinfinitivepredicateortheverboftheembeddedclause.Forexample,intheappleseemsredthesubjecttheappleisassociatedwithredandinJohnseemstopreferredwinethesubjectJohnisassociatedwiththeverbprefer.

2.3.TheCopularVerbChallengeInpreviousworkIhavearguedthatseem,lookandappearallfunctionassubjectraisingverbs(seee.g.Brogaard2013b).BenjHellie(2013)offerssomeconsiderationsagainstthisclaim.AccordingtoHellie,theappearwordslook,feel,taste,smellandsoundarecopularverbsjustlikebeandbecome.Theseverbstakeanadjectivalpredicateasitssyntacticcomplement,asin:

(15)(a) Andreais/becomes/lookstall(b) Kimis/becomes/lookssimilartoacat(c) Lukeis/becomes/lookslikeadog

Theperceptualcopularverbs,Helliepointsout,resisttakingthatclausesastheircomplementsandonlyreluctantlytakenonfiniteverbphrases(e.g.,tohavehadagoodtime)astheircomplements.Inthisrespecttheybehavedifferentlyfromsubjectraising

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verbs,Hellieargues,witness:

(16)(a) Itappears/seemsthatSamisrunningforoffice(b) #ItlooksthatSamisrunningforoffice(c) Myshoesseemtohavebeenleftoutintherain(d) ?Myshoeslooktohavebeenleftoutintherain

Hellietakesthistosuggestthattheperceptualcopularverbsdonotoperatesyntacticallyonclausesbutonpredicates,whichmeansthattheydonotoperatesemanticallyonpropositionsbutonproperties.

Hellieisright,ofcourse,thatlookdoesnottakethatclausesasitscomplement.However,thisobservationneednotsupportdifferentsemanticaltreatmentsoflookandseem.Onecouldtreatthisbehavioroflookasanirregularityoftheverb.

Themainreasonsforthinkingthatseem,lookandappearbelongtothesamewordclasscanbesummarizedasfollows:

(i)Etymology:Seemoriginatedfromtheolderbeseon,whichmeansbeseen.Beseonfunctionsasasubjectraisingverb.Lookoriginatedfromlocian,whichoccurredinthesamesyntacticpositionsasbeseon.Thissuggeststhatlookandseembelongtothesamewordclass(Brogaard2013b).

(ii)TransitiveForms:Aswehaveseen,look,likemostuncontroversialsubjectraisingverbs,canalsofunctionasatransitiveverb.Consider:

(17)(a) Johnlooked(shy,shyly)atMary(b) Jane(reluctantly)tastedthecurry(c) Adrian(enthusiastically)believedeverythingMathiassaid(d) Matt(willingly)provedhimguilty

Unlikesubjectraisingverbs,quintessentialcopularverbs,suchasbeandbecome,donotsplitupintotransitiveandintransitiveverbs.

(iii)Unraisedforms:Initsunraisedformlookoccurssyntacticallyinmanyofthesamepositionsasseemandappear.Consider:

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(18)(a) Itlooks/seems/appearsasifGerardDepardieuwillbeabletolivein

Franceafterall(b) Itlooks/seems/appearslikeShakirasbabycouldarriveanydaynow

ThesuggestionthatweshouldntgivetoomuchweighttotheirregularitiesoflookthatHelliecitesisatleastpartiallysupportedbytheobservationthatseemandappeardontfunctionexactlylikemostothersubjectraisingverbseither.Compare:

(19)(a) Karenstrikesmeasguilty(Postal1974:358)(b) AMacbookwasreportedstolen(c) Patrickwasassumeddead(d) Some85percentofthechildrens'writingwasdeemedoutstanding.(e) Angiewasexpectedtoarriveontime(f) KateisbelievedtohavestolentwoIpods(g) Frankwasseeneatingaburrito

(20)(a) Karenseemedguilty(b) Frankappearedtohavebeeneatingaburrito

Intheraisedformsin19(b)(g),acopularverbprecedesthesubjectraisingverb.Thisisnotsointheraisedformsin(20).Strikefunctionsdifferentlyfrommostotherraisingverbs.Irregularitieslikethesearetobeexpectedinalanguagethatconstantlydevelopsandadoptswordsfromotherlanguages.

3.PhenomenalLooksandTheoriesofPerception

3.1.ObjectionstoArgumentsFromSemanticsInPerception:ARepresentativeTheory(1977)Jacksonarguesthatattentiontothelogicalformoflooksreportsoffersevidencefortheviewthatperceptualexperienceisfundamentallyrepresentational.Jacksonsargumentfromthesemanticsoflooktotheoriesofperceptualexperiencerequiresthefollowingpremise(Travis2004:69):

(i)Lookstatementsreflectthecontentofperception

MichaelThau(2002),MikeMartin(2010),CharlesTravis(2004,2013),AlexByrne(2009)

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andothershavearguedthatthispremiseisfalse.Hence,thereisnoeasyroutefromthesemanticsoflooktoparticulartheoriesofperception.

Themainargumentagainstpremise(i)isthatthereisnogenuinelyphenomenaluseoflook.Martin(2010)arguesthatlooksarestatesthatobjectshavethatweassociatewithtypesofobjects.Likewise,Travis(2013)arguesthathowthingsoughttolookcanbedeterminedonlybyrationaldiscussion.Bothassumethatthereissuchathingasanobjectivelook,whichdoesnotreducetothewaythingsappeartoindividualperceivers.However,asByrne(2009)argues,ifthereisanobjectivelooks,awayathingoughttolook,thenthereisawaythatthethinglookstoindividualperceivers.

WhatMartinandTravisaresaying,however,probablyshouldbeunderstoodalongthelinesofThaus(2002)position(seeTravis2004:7075):Allusesoflookareimplicitlysemanticallycomparative,eveniftheyaregrammaticallynoncomparative. SupposePias2Porsche,whichhasbeenpaintedchromeyellow,iscoveredinbakedonbeigemud.IfsomeoneasksWhatdoesPiasPorschelooklike?,Yellow.wouldseemtobeagoodanswer.Porschespaintedchromeyellowlookthewayacertaintypeofobjectlooks,viz.theclassofobjectspaintedchromeyellow.

Oneargumentforasemanticallynoncomparative(phenomenal)useoflookcanbefoundinChisholm(1957).Iflookyellowisgivenacomparativereading,yellowthingslookyellowindaylightisananalytictruth.Itsaysthingsthatareyellowlookthewaythingsthatareyellowlook,whichistriviallytrue.If,ontheotherhand,lookyellowisgivenanoncomparativereading,thenyellowthingslookyellowindaylightisasynthetictruth.EvenbeforeshestartedstudyingneuroscienceandphysicsFrankJacksonsMaryknewthatindaylightyellowthingslookthewayyellowthingslook.Butshedidntknowthatyellowthingslookednoncomparativelyyellow.Thisargumentofferssomesupportforasemanticallynoncomparative,phenomenaluseoflook.Butifthereissuchause,thenthestandardargumentagainstpremise(i)inJacksonsargumentisunsound.Byrne(2009)arguesinreplytothosewhorejectpremise(i)thatevenifthereisnosemanticallynoncomparativeusesoflook,thisdoesntshowthatlookstatementsareirrelevanttothenatureofperception.Lookstatementsmayconveyhowthingslookinaconversationalcontext.Forexample,PeterlooksScandinavianmayconveythatPeterhasthestereotypicalScandinavianbodilyfeatures(tallandstraightstature,straightblondhair,smallnose,paleskin,etc.).Thatis,alookstatementmayconveynoncomparative

2Byrne(2009)comesclosetoholdingthisviewbutremainsnoncommittalaboutwhether,say,lookScandinavianandlookyellowshouldbegiventhesameanalysis:somethingcanbeasitnoncomparativelylookswhenitnoncomparativelylooksScandinavian/yellowwithoutbeingScandinavian/yellow.

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looks.

ThoughByrnerejectstheviewthatthereisaphenomenaluseoflook,whathesaysaboutthenoncomparativelooksthatmaybeconveyedbylookstatementscouldbeturnedintoanargumentforaphenomenaluseoflook.Surely,wecanexpressatleastsomeofthepropositionsconveyedbylookstatementsusingthelocutionlook.Forexample,PeterlooksScandinavianmayconveythepropositionthathisskinlookspale.Butthelookinlookspaleisusedphenomenallyhere.

3.2.ThePhenomenalLooksAccountofPerceptualExperienceKathrinGler(2009,2013)arguesthatperceptualexperiencesarespecialkindsofbeliefswhosecontentsarephenomenallooks.GlersviewisakintotheTheoryofAppearing,theviewthatperceptualexperiencefundamentallyconsistsinoneormoreobjectsappearingacertainwaytothesubject(seee.g.,Langsam,1997andAlston,1999). However,there3aredifferences.DefendersoftheTheoryofAppearingtakeperceptiontobedirectedatobjectsanddonotallowthatperceptioncanhaveapropositionasitscontent.Glertreatslookasanoperatoronpropositionalcontent,whichiscorrect,giventhatlookisasubjectraisingverbandhencefunctionssemanticallyasalogicaloperator.Gleralsotakesperceptualexperiencestobebeliefs.

AccordingtoGler,tosaythatperceptualexperiencesarebeliefsisnotsaythattherearenodifferencesbetweenperceptualexperiencesandotherbeliefs.Perceptualexperienceshaveadistinctivesensoryphenomenology.So,perceptualexperienceshaveaphenomenologythatisnotablydifferentfromthephenomenologyofbeliefsthatarenotperceptualexperiences.

Onedifficultyfortheviewthatperceptualexperienceisbeliefistoexplaincasesinwhichwedontbelievewhatweexperience.Whenweimmerseastickinwateranditlooksbent,wedontcometobelievethatitsbent.Weknowthatitsnot.AlexByrne(2009)hasarguedthatperceptualexperiencesareprimitivebeliefs.Accordingtohim,wedoindeedbelievethatthestickisbentonaveryprimitivelevel.Butonamorerationallevel,wedonotbelievethestickisbent.

Glersviewimpliesthatperceptualexperiencesandotherbeliefshavedifferentcontents.Whenwehaveaperceptualexperience,thingslooksacertainwaytous.Glertakesthese

3Langsamarguesthatnothingappearsinacertainwaytothesubjectinthecaseofhallucinations.Alstonsaysthatamentalimageappearsacertainwayinhallucinations.

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lookstoconstitutethecontentofperceptualexperience.IfIamlookingatabluecar,andthecarlooksbluetome,thenthecontentofmyperceptualexperienceisLook(thecarisblue),wherelookisanoperatorontheembeddedmaterial.WhenIlookatthestickinthewater,IcometobelievethatitlooksbentbutIdontcometobelievethatitsbent.

Glerconsidersandrepliestoapotentialproblemforherappearanceaccountofperceptualexperiences.Thecounterargumenttothissortofviewisthis.Thephenomenalnotionoflookcannotbeusedtospecifytheverycontentofvisualexperiencebecauselookisapropositionalattitudeoperatorandthuscannotoccurinthecontentofanyfirstorderpropositionalattitude.GlercallsthistheAttitudeOperatorArgument.Theargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:

TheAttitudeOperatorArgument1.Perceptualexperienceisafirstorderpropositionalattitude2.Ifperceptualcontentscontainlookoperators,thenperceptualexperienceisnotafirstorderpropositionalattitudeConclusion:perceptualcontentsdonotcontainlookoperators.

Premise1iswidelyheldtobetrue:secondorderpropositionalattitudesarenottypicallyconsideredperceptualstates.Forexample,mostviewsofperceptionwouldholdthatyoucannotperceptuallyexperiencehavingabelieforadesire.Thatprocesswouldcountasintrospection,notperception.Glerrejectspremise2.Look,sheargues,isnotapropositionalattitudeoperator.So,perceptualcontentscanbefirstorder,eveniftheycontainalookoperator.Thereason,sheargues,issimple:Propositionalattitudeoperatorscreatehyperintensionalcontexts.Lookdoesnot.So,lookisnotapropositionalattitudeoperator:

GlersCounterargument1.Ifisapropositionalattitudeoperator,thenitcreatesahyperintentionalcontext2.LookdoesnotcreateahyperintentionalcontextConclusion:Lookisnotapropositionalattitudeoperator

ThefirstpremiseinGlersreplyisrelativelyuncontroversial:ifanoperatorisapropositionalattitudeoperator,itgenerateshyperintensionalcontexts(e.g.,LoisLanedesiresSupermanbutnotClarkKent).Thepremiseinneedofjustificationisthesecondone,viz.thepremisethatlookdoesnotcreatehyperintensionalcontexts.Itisatleastinitiallyplausiblethatlookdoeselicithyperintensionalcontexts.Consider:

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(21)(a)ItlookstoLanaLangasifSupermanisflyingby(b)ItlookstoLanaLangasifClarkKentisflyingby

SupermanandClarkKentarecoreferentialbutsubstitutingonefortheotherappearstoelicitachangeintruthvalue.Thisindicatesthatlookgeneratesahyperintensionalcontext.However,Glerthinksthisappearanceisillusory.Looksatisfiesthefollowingprinciple:

SubstitutionPrincipleCophenomenalexpressionscanbesubstitutedsalvaveritateinlookcontexts.

TheSubstitutionPrincipleimpliesthatiftwoexpressionsarenotcophenomenal,thensubstitutingonefortheotherwillchangethetruthvalueofsentence.GlernotesthattheSupermanlookisverydifferentfromtheClarkKentlook.So,SupermanandClarkKent,thoughcoreferential,arenotcophenomenal.Glerthenarguesthatitfollowsfromthisthatlookcontextsarenothyperintensional.

Onecouldquestionthislatterinference.Ordinarily,anoperatorisdefinedhyperintensionaljustincasesubstitutinganexpressionforalogically(ormetaphysically)equivalentexpressionundertheoperatorchangesthetruthvalueofthewhole.Ifthisisalsothecriterionforconsideringlookhyperintensionalornot,thenlookishyperintensionaldespitesatisfyingtheSubstitutionPrinciple.

GlercouldofferadifferenttypeofcounterargumentagainstthesecondpremiseoftheAttitudeOperatorArgument:

Premise2Ifperceptualcontentscontainlookoperators,thenperceptualexperienceisnotafirstorderpropositionalattitude

Premise2oftheAttitudeOperatorArgumentmayseemtorestontheassumptionthathyperintensionaloperatorsarepropositionalattitudeoperators.Thislatterassumption,however,isquestionable.Fictionaloperators,suchasaccordingtotheSherlockHolmesstories',arehyperintensionalyettheyarenotpropositionalattitudeoperators.So,itmayseemthatpremise2isfalse.

Thereis,however,adifferentsortofdefenseonemightofferinfavorofthesecondpremiseintheAttitudeOperatorArgument(Brogaard2013b).Whilenotallhyperintensionaloperatorsarepropositionalattitudeoperators,thefollowingassumptionis

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true:

HyperintensionalmentalstateoperatorsHyperintensionalmentalstateoperatorsarepropositionalattitudeoperators

Ifphenomenallooksarestatesofthemind,lookisamentalstateoperator.Asitshyperintensional,itsapropositionalattitudeoperator.TogetherwiththefirstpremiseintheAttitudeOperatorArgument,itappearstofollowthatlookoperatorsdonotoccurinthecontentsofperceptualexperience.TheAttitudeOperatorArgumentthusseemstocastsomedoubtonGlersposition.

3.3.ArgumentsforRepresentationalViewsofPerceptionEvenifitsgrantedthattherearenononcomparativephenomenalusesoflook,asarguedbyByrneandothers,thereisnoguaranteethatphenomenallooksareaspectsofperceptualexperience.Butififtheyarenot,thereisnoeasyroutefromthesemanticsoflookstatementstoparticulartheoriesofperceptualexperience.

Therearethreewaysphenomenallookscouldbeaspectsofperceptualexperiences.Theycouldbe(i)aspectsofthecontentofperceptualexperience,asarguedbyGler(cf.Travis2004:63),(ii)aspectsofthephenomenalcharacterofperceptualexperienceor(iii)amongtherepresentationalpropertiesoftheexperience.Thereissomereasontodoubt(i)(iii)(seeBrogaard2013b).Anargumentagainst(i)waspresentedabove.(ii)isbestconstruedasacaseinwhichexperienceshavepropertiesoftheformbeingaphenomenallookasifp.Onthisview,aperceptualexperienceofaripetomatomayhavethepropertyofbeingaphenomenallookasifthatisred,round,etc.Theexperiencemayalsohavethepropertyofrepresentingthatp.Thefirstproperty,onecouldhold,isanonrepresentationalphenomenalproperty,whereasthesecondisarepresentationalphenomenalproperty(seeChalmers2004fordiscussionofthisdistinction).

Theproblemwiththismoveisthatitentailsthatperceptualexperiencesjustarephenomenallooks.Butthereisasimpleargumentagainstthis:

HyperintensionalityArgument1.Phenomenallooksreatehyperintensionalcontexts2.PerceptualexperiencesdonotgeneratehyperintensionalcontextsConclusion:perceptualexperiencesarenotphenomenallooks

Thefirstpremiseisinneedofjustification.Consider:

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(22)(a)ItlookstoLanaLangasifSupermanisflyingby(b)ItlookstoLanaLangasifClarkKentisflyingby(c)LanaLanghasaperceptualexperienceofSupermanflyingby(d)LanaLanghasaperceptualexperienceofClarkKentflyingby

Only22(b)appearstobefalse,whichsuggeststhatlookintroduceshyperintensionalcontexts,whereasperceptualexperiencedoesnot.Sophenomenallooksarenotidenticaltoperceptualexperiences,whichistosay,phenomenallooksarenotaspectsofphenomenalcharacter.

Ifitisdeniedthatperceptualcontentsareobjectdependent,wecanusedifferentcasestomakethepoint.Considerachessnovicewhocanrecognizeachessboardbutwhodoesntknowtheexactnumberofalternatingblackandwhitesquares(cf.Sosa2009).

(23)(a) Itlookstothenoviceasifthatsastandardchessboardwithalternating

blackandwhitesquares(b) Itlookstothenoviceasifthatsastandardchessboardwith64

alternatingblackandwhitesquares(c) Thenovicehasaperceptualexperienceofastandardchessboardwith

alternatingblackandwhitesquares.(d) Thenovicehasaperceptualexperienceofastandardchessboardwith

64alternatingblackandwhitesquares.

Standardchessboardwithalternatingblackandwhitesquaresandstandardchessboardwith64alternatingblackandwhitesquaresarelogicallyequivalent.Butonly23(b)isfalse.Giventhestandarddefinitionofhyperintensionality,thisseemstoshowthatlookintroduceshyperintensionalcontexts,whereasperceptualexperiencedoesnot.

Thisleavesuswith(iii):Phenomenallooksmaybeaspectsoftherepresentationalpropertiesofperceptualexperiences:amannerofrepresentation(seeChalmers2004).Onthisview,myvisualexperienceofabluecarhasthepropertyofrepresentingacarasbluelookwise(orlookly).Mythoughtofabluecar,ontheotherhand,hasthepropertyofrepresentingacarasblue,butitdoesnothavethepropertyofrepresentingacarasbluelookwise.

Themainproblemwiththisproposalisthatittreatslookasamanneradverbial.Manner

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adverbialsareadverbialsthatoccurinfinalpositionanddescribethemanneroftheactivitypickedoutbytheverb.Consider:

(24)(a)Johnspilledthebeansclumsily(b)Johndancesclumsily

24(a)meansJohnspilledthebeansinaclumsymanner,and24(b)meansJohndancesinaclumsymanner.Ignoringtense,24(a)(b)canbeassignedthefollowingtruthconditionsusingDavidsonianeventsemantics:

e[spill(e,John,beans)&clumsily(e)e[dance(e,John)&clumsily(e)

Seem,lookandappearclearlyarenotadverbs,theyareverbs.Evenifthesemanticsofappearwordsdontreflectthesemanticsofthecorrespondingmentalitemsperfectly,itwouldbeoddifwordsthatfunctionasverbslinguisticallycorrespondtoadverbsmentally.

Whatsmore,perceptualverbsarenotneededtodescribethedifferentwaysinwhichmentalstatesrepresent.Ifwewanttodistinguishbetweentherepresentationalpropertiesofperceptualexperiencesandthoughtsintermsofamannerofrepresentation,wecansaythatvisualexperienceshavethepropertyofvisuallyrepresentingtheircontents,whereasthoughtsdonothavethepropertyofvisuallyrepresentingtheircontents.Phenomenallooksarenotneededtoperformthisrole.

Phenomenallooksthusdonotappeartobeaspectsofperceptualexperiences.Butifphenomenallooksarementalstatesentirelydistinctfromperceptualexperiences,thenthesemanticsoflookstatementswouldappeartobeirrelevanttothenatureofperceptualexperience.

Thereis,however,otherpossibleroutesfromthesemanticsoflookstatementstoparticulartheoriesofperceptualexperiencethatdonotrestontheassumptionthatphenomenallooksareaspectsofperceptualexperience.Hereisonesuchargument:

GroundingArgument(1)Somephenomenallooksaregroundedinperceptualexperience(2)Ifaphenomenallookisgroundedinperceptualexperience,thentheperceptualexperiencehascontentConclusion:perceptualexperiencehascontent

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Wecandefinecontentinaminimalsenseasfollows(cf.Siegel2010):

WeakContentViewExperienceehasthepropositionpasacontentiffitphenomenallylooksasifptothesubjectofe,andnecessarilyifeisaccurate,thenpistrue.

Wecandefinegroundingasfollows:

GroundingPhenomenallookLisgroundedinperceptualexperienceeiffLarosefrome,andnecessarily,ifeisaccurate,thenLisaccurate

Somelooksarenotgroundedinperceptualexperience.Forexample,ifIhaveaperceptualexperienceofabarnfacade,andthiscausesthelookthatthatisabarn,thenthelookisnotgroundedintheexperience.Theexperiencemaybeaccuratebutthelookisnot.

Butarguably,phenomenallooksaregroundedintheexperiencesfromwhichtheyarose.SupposeIhaveaperceptualexperienceasofthatbeingbright,andthatthisgivesrisetothephenomenallookthatthatisbright.Then,itisnecessarilythecasethatifmyexperienceisaccurate,thenthephenomenallookisaccurate.So,premise1intheGroundingArgumentistrue.Butintheenvisagedscenario,therighthandsideoftheWeakContentViewistrue.So,thelefthandsideistrue:myexperiencehasthepropositionp(thatisbright)asacontent.

ThereisafurtherpossibleroutefromtheWeakContentViewtoaRepresentationalContentView.TheRepresentationalContentviewsaysthatitsafundamentalfeatureofperceptualexperiencethatithasrepresentationalcontent,i.e,contentthatissuitabletoserveasthecontentofapropositionalattitude(Searle1983:43Peacocke1983:5cf.Byrne2009,Siegel2010).

RepresentationalContentViewExperienceehasthepropositionpasacontentiffitsafundamentalfeatureofperceptualexperiencetorepresenttheenvironmentasbeingacertainway.

OneargumentfortheRepresentationalViewrunsasfollows(Brogaard2013b):

TheArgumentfromEpistemicRole

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(1)Ifanaspectoftheepistemicroleofperceptualexperiencerequiresthatexperiencerepresentstheenvironmentasbeingacertainway,thentheRepresentationalContentViewistrue.(2)AnaspectoftheepistemicroleofperceptualexperiencerequiresthatexperiencerepresentstheenvironmentasbeingacertainwayConclusion:theRepresentationalContentViewistrue.

Premise1followsfromwhatitisforanattributetobefundamental(Logue2013).Hereisanargumentforpremise2:oneepistemicroleofperceptualexperienceistoconstrainthecontentofbeliefbyconstrainingthecontentofphenomenallooks.Butexperiencecanputconstraintsonthecontentofphenomenallooksonlyifitrepresentsthingsasbeingacertainway.So,anaspectoftheepistemicroleofperceptualexperiencerequiresthatexperiencerepresentstheenvironmentasbeingacertainway.

4.ConclusionThedebateaboutwhetherthesemanticsoflookstatementsentailsanycommitmentswithrespecttothenatureofperceptionisfarfromsettled.However,thereissomereasontothinkthatphenomenallooksmayplayaroleinanargumentforarepresentationalviewofperceptualexperience.AsSchellenberg(2013)andLogue(2013)pointout,however,anargumentforarepresentationalviewofperceptualexperiencedoesnotbyitselfestablishthatperceptualexperienceisnotalsofundamentallyamatterofbeingrelatedtotheobjectsandfeaturespresentedintheexperience.4

ReferencesAlston,W.P.(1999).BacktotheTheoryofAppearing,PhilosophicalPerspectives13:181203.Brogaard,B(2010).DoLooksReportsReflecttheContentsofPerception?,manuscript.https://sites.google.com/site/brogaardb/Brogaard,B(2013a).PerceptualReports",inMohanMatthen,ed.OxfordHandbookofthePhilosophyofPerception,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.Brogaard,B.(2013b).DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.Byrne,A.(2009).ExperienceandContent.PhilosophicalQuarterly59:429451.Chalmers,D.J.(2004).TheRepresentationalCharacterofExperience,TheFutureforPhilosophy,ed.B.Leiter,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:15381.

4Forcommentsonand/ordiscussionofthepapersideas,IamgratefultoDavidChalmers,KathrinGler,PeterLasersohnandHannesLeitgeb.

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Chisholm,R.,(1957).Perceiving:APhilosophicalStudy,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Gler,K.(2009).InDefenceofaDoxasticAccountofExperience.MindandLanguage24:297373.Gler,K.(2013).Looks,Reasons,andExperiences,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress..Hellie,B.(2013).Onwhichperceptualphenomenahavecontentandwhytheyhaveit,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.Heim,I.(2006).Remarksoncomparativeclausesasgeneralizedquantifiers,Ms,MIT.Jackson,F.(1977).Perception:ARepresentativeTheory,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Langsam,H.(1997).TheTheoryofAppearingDefended,PhilosophicalStudies87:3359.Logue,H.(2013).ExperientialContentandNaveRealism:AReconciliation,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.Martin,M.G.F.(2010).What'sinalook?InBenceNanay(ed.),PerceivingtheWorld.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Peacocke,C.(1983).SenseandContent,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Postal,P.(1974).OnRaising.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.Schellenberg,S.(2013).TheRelationalandRepresentationalCharacterofPerceptualExperience,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality,CambridgeUniversityPress.Siegel,S.(2010).TheContentsofVisualExperience,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Thau,M.(2002).ConsciousnessandCognition,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Travis,C.(2004).TheSilenceoftheSenses,Mind113:5794.Travis,C.(2013).ThePreserveofThinkers,inBeritBrogaard,ed.DoesPerceptionHaveContent?,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress.

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