Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought

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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought

Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought

Angela MendeloviciThe University of Western Ontario and the Australian National

University

Melbourne University, March 1, 2012

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Overview

1 Phenomenal intentionality theory

2 The content of concepts

3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought

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Overview




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Intentionality

The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at leastsometimes notice introspectivelyOstensive definitionMental states with intentionality can be said to representA mental state’s content is what it representsThere might be other distinct semantic properties, such asreference, truth conditions, and truth

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Intentionality


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Intentionality


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Theories of intentionality

Tracking theoriesFunctional role theoriesPhenomenal intentionality theory

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Phenomenal intentionality theory

Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (orsubject’s) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties

Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mentalstate (e.g. redness, painfulness)

We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them

Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter

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Basic idea: What your mental states represent is a matter ofwhat it’s like to be you

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Motivations for PIT

In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1

To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together

1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and MichaelTye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.

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Motivations for PIT




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Motivations for PIT




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Motivations for PIT




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PIT in perception

Perception is a good case for PIT

1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentionalproperties PIT wants to identify them with

2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to matchco-occurring perceptual intentional contents

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PIT in perception




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PIT in perception




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Matching

Phenomenal characters match intentional contents iff theyhave

a similar structurea similar “quality”

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Matching in perception

It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional contentE.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness

Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit)

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Complex perceptual states have intentional contents thatmatch their phenomenal characters too

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PIT in thought

For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,

1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with

2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought

I’ll grant (1)2

But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of

Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.

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PIT in thought




I’ll grant (1)2



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PIT in thought




I’ll grant (1)2



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PIT in thought




I’ll grant (1)2



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PIT in thought




I’ll grant (1)2



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The apparent failure of matching in thought

Similar structure: It seems that thoughts havefairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters

Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent

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Example

Modal realism is true.

Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worldsexist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simplephenomenal characterDifferent “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about thephenomenal character

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Example

Modal realism is true.

Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worldsexist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simplephenomenal characterDifferent “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about thephenomenal character

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Possible solutions

1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)

2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3

Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters

3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.

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Possible solutions





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BackgroundThe problem of multimodal experiences

SummaryExtras

The roles of content and modalities in thephenomenology of sensory experience

David Bourget

Institute of Philosophy

University of London

Monash University, March 2, 2012

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Possible solutions





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Possible solutions





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Possible solutions





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Overview




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The basic idea

Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behaveas if they represented complex contentsSo we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them

Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts

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The basic idea



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The basic idea



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Candidate complex contents (CCCs)

What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?

DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties

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Candidate complex contents (CCCs)

What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?

DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties

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How might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts?

They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior

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How might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts?

They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior

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Concepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology

Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other

(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.

(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.

In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents likepossible worlds and likenessBut not in thinking (Tables 1)

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Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior

Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions

What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?

Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience

Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved

This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks

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Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?

One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inertResponse:

There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, butthey don’t

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Concepts don’t represent CCCs

Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCsSo we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contentswould be inertSimilar points apply to other concepts

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Two questions

1 What do concepts represent?2 What is the status of CCCs?

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2. The status of CCCs

Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4

Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions tounpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts

4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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2. The status of CCCs

Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4

Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions tounpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts

4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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Example of derived content

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Circumstances

In different circumstances, we might accept different contentsas the contents of our conceptsE.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor asunmarried man, in others as man available for long-termrelationshipWe might consider certain circumstances authoritative,e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc.

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Circumstances


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Circumstances


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Pluralism about derived content

Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.

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1. What concepts really represent

There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:

In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior

Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)

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Which fairly simple contents? Some options

Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)

Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)

Chris Viger, others who think we think in words

New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good

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Which simple contents? Some options

Different options might be true of different conceptsAll these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them

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Which simple contents? Some options

Different options might be true of different conceptsAll these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them

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Back to thoughts

Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent conceptsSo it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead

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Back to thoughts

Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent conceptsSo it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead

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Overview




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Challenge

The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to matchtheir intentional contents

Different structureDifferent “qualities”

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Challenge



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Challenge



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Response

Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal charactersSimilar features: Some options:

Intentional content Phenomenal characterwords verbal phenomenology

perceptual perceptualnew simple content new simple phenomenology

parts of intuitive content depends

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Response





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Response





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Response





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PIT meets the challenge

Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contentsThis removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought

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PIT meets the challenge

Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contentsThis removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought

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PIT about thought

Intentional properties are phenomenal propertiesBut the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not thecomplex content we intuitively associate with thoughtsSome of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughtsare derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mentalrepresentation is a matter of dispositions to unpack conceptsand dispositions to accept certain unpackings

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PIT about thought


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PIT about thought


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The End

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Technology

Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought