The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake —Railway Response and ... · Max Toki 327 (145.9 km) 410 passengers Matsukawa inclined shaft On foot By bus Echigo Yuzawa (151.4 km) Deadhead train

Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 200646

Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures

Feature

The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake—Railway Response and Reconstruction

Masahiko Ogura

The Earthquakes

A series of several major earthquakesrocked the Chuetsu region of Niigataalong the Sea-of-Japan coast from 17:56

on 23 October 2004. Some basic figuresare given in Figure 1.Figure 2 shows the JR East track thatsuffered damage and the time it tookbefore services were resumed. Fairly longsections of the shinkansen track between

Echigo Yuzawa and Niigata weredamaged, as well as sections of narrow-gauge track on the Shin’etsu, Echigo andother lines.

Figure 1 Chuetsu Earthquake Seismic Activity Figure 2 Emergency Stops after Chuetsu Earthquake

NiigataNiigata

KoideKoide

Muika-machiMuika-machiToka-machiToka-machi

Echigo KawaguchiEchigo KawaguchiNaoetsuNaoetsu

KashiwazakiKashiwazaki

Tsubame SanjoTsubame Sanjo

NagaokaNagaoka

EchigoEchigoYuzawaYuzawa

Main epicentre Aftershocks epicentres (≥M6)

Date and time of main earthquake: 23 October 2004 at 17:56Epicentre: Chuetsu district of Niigata Prefecture (37°3�N, 136°9�E)Richter Magnitude: 6.8 (Maximum seismic intensity (SI) of 7, registered in Kawaguchi-machi)Number of aftershocks: Four around SI6 Eighteen around SI5 877 large enough to be felt (until 28 December)Peak ground acceleration Non-JR East seismometer: 2515 gal (in Kawaguchi-machi) JR East seismometer: 846 gal (at Shin Kawaguchi transformer substation, Joetsu Shinkansen)

Niigata

Niitsu

Tsubame Sanjo

Nagaoka

KoideUrasa

Muika-machi

EchigoYuzawa

Toka-machi

Echigo KawaguchiNaoetsu

Kashiwazaki

Epicentre (23 October 17:56)Max. SI7 (Kawaguchi-machi)

Naoetsu Kakizaki Kashiwazaki Echigo Line

Yahiko Niigata

Yoshida

Tsubame Sanjo

Yahi

koLi

ne Niitsu

Higashi Sanjo

Shin’etsu LineMiyauchi

NagaokaIiyama LineToka-machi

Echigo Kawaguchi

Urasa

Echigo Yuzawa

Joets

u

Shinka

nsen

Muika-machi

to Tokyo

Joet

su L

ine Koide

Tadami Line Tadami

ShinkansenJR East narrow-gauge lines

Figure 3 Response Timeline

23 O

ctob

er24

Oct

ober

18:00 Response Headquarters established within JR East Head Office

19:40 First Emergency Response Meeting � Ascertained Toki 325 derailment � Ascertained injuries to passengers � Ascertained how many people on board � Ascertained positions of halted trains

22:00 Emergency Response Meeting � Planned passenger relief � Ascertained condition of damaged equipment � Ascertained derailment situation � Decided to send Executive Director to derailment site

Emergency Response Meetings Press Conferences Other Events

03:30 Emergency Response Meeting � Report on derailment � Passenger relief efforts

08:00 Emergency Response Meeting � Report on derailment � Report on equipment damage � Planning 24 October passenger services � Methods to get derailed cars back on track (proposals)

11:30 Emergency Response Meeting � Report on equipment damage � Plans for getting derailed cars back on track � Situation of staff sent to site for recovery efforts

16:00 Emergency Response Meeting � Report on equipment damage � Current passenger operations situation � User situation

17:56 Began gathering information on possible injuries and damage (Director sent from Headquarters)18:19 First report indicates Toki 325 derailed between Urasa and Nagaoka

20:25 Press conference � Overall situation � Toki 325 derailed � No deaths or injuries

22:45 Press conference � Eight carriages derailed � Situation of trains halted between stations � Relief effort plans, etc.

00:27 Press conference � Relief efforts

09:03 Press conference � Derailment situation � Equipment damage � Relief efforts � Plans for 24 October passenger services � Methods to get derailed cars back on track (proposal)

17:05 Press conference � Damaged equipment � Current passenger operations situation � User situation

05:00 Derailment Investigation Committee start on-site investigation

10:30 M. Otsuka, JR East President, arrives at Headquarters (visits site on 25 October)

13:00 Field Response Headquarters established, with Executive Director M. Ogura in charge

21:50 M. Otsuka, JR East President, prepares to return to Japan from London, UK, where on investor relations business.

Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 47

Response on Day 1

Figure 3 is a timeline of events on 23 and24 October. I was in Tokyo at the timeand as soon as we heard that ashinkansen had derailed, JR Eastexecutive officers including myselfrushed to headquarters, with nearlyeveryone arriving by 19:00.As the left column shows, our firstEmergency Response Meeting began at19:40 attended by all executive officerswho had arrived at headquarters by then.By this time, we had confirmed that a trainhad derailed, but fortunately with noinjuries, so the meeting did not have thetension it would otherwise have had.The centre column shows our pressconferences after the meeting at 20:25,22:45, and at 00:27 in the small hours ofthe next day. At the time, we had no clearidea of circumstances in the disaster area.An Executive Director who joined thecompany at the same time as myself andnow in charge of operations andmarketing made it clear that we had to befrank and open about everything that weknew and didn’t know. This was the rightapproach, and set the stage for theexcellent rapport we maintained with themedia over the next 60 days.The column on the right highlights theactivities of our company President,Mr Mutsutake Otsuka. He was in Londonon JR business when the quakes struck,and luckily phoned his wife in Japan thatevening not knowing about the accident.As soon as his wife told him a JR Eastshinkansen had derailed, he beganpreparing to return to Japan immediately,and arrived at headquarters in Japan at10:30 on 24 October, proving just howsmall the world has become! He provedour faith in him as a President who isalways ready to go where he is neededand point us in the right direction. Hisquick return has become something of alegend at JR East.

He put me in charge of the Field ResponseHeadquarters and I flew by helicopter nextmorning to the derailment site. We arrivedthere at about noon and made a numberof arrangements. I was trackside by 13:00serving as Chief of Field ResponseHeadquarters. I must confess now that Ihad no idea how our recovery effortswould go, but thankfully, as I will explain

later, reconstruction has gone almostentirely according to plan.Figure 4 shows the shinkansen stationsfrom Jomo Kogen to the Niigata terminusand the position of trains stopped on theline after the earthquakes.The Toki 325 shinkansen carrying 151passengers derailed close to NagaokaStation and five other trains carrying

Figure 4 Passenger Movement and Evacuation after First Earthquake

Traffic situation7 trains (not including deadheads) make emergency stop• 4 trains halted between stations; passengers disembark there• 1 train halted at platform; passengers disembark from lead car• 2 trains resume operations after inspections

21:47 Trains resume operations

23:23 Passengers begin disembarking under guidance from staff members. Four buses take passengers to Echigo Yuzawa Station.02:00 All passengers disembarked.02:40 All passengers arrived at Echigo Yuzawa Station where spend night in train.

22:20 Passengers begin disembarking under guidance from staff members. Two mini-buses and one taxi take them to evacuation shelter.01:30 All passengers arrive at evacuation shelter.

21:50 Passengers begin disembarking under guidance from staff members and walk to Nagaoka Station.22:28 All passengers disembarked.00:20 All passengers arrived at Nagaoka Station and three buses take 70 or 80 to evacuation shelter.

18:20 Passengers disembark onto platform from lead car and three buses take them to evacuation shelter.

22:25 Passengers begin disembarking under guidance from staff members and walk or take taxis to Mitsuke Station.23:30 All passengers disembarked and three buses and 20 taxis take them to Higashi Sanjo Station.00:15 All passengers arrived at Higashi Sanjo Station.00:20 About 200 passengers depart on local train for Niigata Station.

19:11 Train resumes operations

Max Toki330

(103.2 km)440 passengers

100.5 km—Ground observations (120 gal)

149 km—Ground observations and structural inspections (>200 gal)

Jomo Kogen(119.1 km)

Max Toki327


Matsukawainclined

shaft

On fo

ot

By bus

Echigo Yuzawa(151.4 km)

Deadhead train Urasa(181.0 km)

Deadheadtrain

Max Toki332


Imamachiinclinedwalkway

By busand taxi Evacuation

shelter

Toki 325(208 km)

151 passengers(derailed train) On foot

Nagaoka(213.8 km) Toki 361


On fo

ot

Mitsukeinclinedwalkway

By busand taxi Higashi

Sanjo

Bytrain

Niigata

Tsubame Sanjo(237.4 km) Toki 405


Niigata(269.5 km)

Ground observations and structuralinspections (>200 gal)

Toki 406

By bus

Evacuation shelter Emergency stop

Train permitted toresume operations

Deadhead train



passengers had stopped without derailingbetween stations. Two other trains hadalso stopped temporarily but couldproceed almost immediately thereafter.

from 151 to 410 passengers and everypassenger had to be guided to safety bythe train crews and our employees whorushed from stations and depots. Theevacuation routes were varied, withsome passengers climbing a shaft froma tunnel and others descending from aviaduct. Our employees had undergonerigorous disaster-response training andI was confident of their professionalism.One might have expected passengers topanic, but our crews remained calmduring the evacuation and kept thepassengers calm too. No one wasinjured before or during the evacuation,not even on the derailed train, givinge v e r y o n e a t F i e l d R e s p o n s eHeadquarters a strong sense of pride andencouraging us in our work.Figure 5 shows photographs and adiagram of the derailed train to Niigata(left to right in the picture). The firstcarriage is at the extreme left and 22 of

Passenger Safety First

The first shock halted trains carrying

Figure 5 Situation after Derailment

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

22 of 40 axles derailed. Car No. 1 slipped into waterdrainage channel and came to rest at 30° angle

To TokyoTo Niigata

Car No.1 (tail car) Car No.10 (lead car)

Niigata-bound(down) track

Tokyo-bound(up) track

Train travelling to Niigata

Tokyo-bound(up) track

Niigata-bound(down) track

Car No. 1 (tail car)

Figure 6 Positioning Cars Back on Track—Plans and Implementation

Cars tobe jacked:

22/10 23/10 24/10 25/10 26/10 27/10 28/10 29/10 30/10 31/10 1/11 2/11 3/11 4/11 5/11 6/11 7/11 8/11 9/11 10/11 11/11 12/11 13/11 14/11 15/11 16/11 17/11 18/11 19/11

M7

eart

hq

uak

eat

17:

56

Pressrelease

Pressrelease

Pressrelease

[Derailment situation]� 22 of 40 axles derailed� Car No. 1 tilt: about 30°� Car No. 2 tilt: about 5°� Car No. 4 tilt: about 5°

Proposed repositioning methods� Jacking and cranes

[Media invited to recovery site]� Jacking of cars 10, 9, 8 and 5� Cars 4, 3, 2 and 1 to be lifted by crane beginning on 28 October� Media given illustrated documentation on proposed work

Initial plan

Use jacks and cranes to positioncars on tracks

Cars to be lifted

No. 10No. 9No. 8No. 5

No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4

Site opento media

Revised plan

Cars to be positioned on track by crane

Site to beopen tomedia

M6 Aftershock causesJR to abandon initialjacking plan.12/27

10:40

Revised plan

*New plan calls forpositioning of all derailedcars on track by crane.

[Media invited to recovery site]� Cars to be lifted onto rails between 10 and 16 November� Cars to be moved from site between night of 11 November and before dawn of 19 November

No. 1 No. 2No. 3and 4 No. 5 No. 10 No. 9 No. 8

Cars to be moved from site to depot

Work as carried out

Cars positioned on track by crane

Site opento media

No. 1 No. 2and 3

No. 10and 9No. 5No. 4 No. 8

Cars moved from site to depot

27 October M6 aftershock 10 November cranes lifting car on track

Positioning and car removalcompleted 1 day earlier

than plan


the 40 axles had derailed either left or rightof the track.As I explain in greater detail later, cars 5,8, 9 and 10 were slightly affected, cars 6and 7 were unaffected, and cars 1 through4 were badly derailed with car 1 shiftinga long way towards the Tokyo-bound trackand coming to rest at an alarming angle.

Aftershocks CausedCold Sweats

Soon after I arrived at the site I realizedthat our first task would be to get the carsback on the tracks. Figure 6 is a timelineof our efforts to achieve this. On day 4,we began raising some cars. Our initialplan was to use jacks for slightly derailedcars and cranes for cars further off thetrack. What happened next was widelyreported with headlines like ‘JR WorkersRun for Their Lives.’ Just as we were aboutto start jacking, a violent aftershock ofalmost magnitude 6 rocked the area.During the jacking preparations, I was onthe viaduct giving instructions. There hadalready been a small aftershock, so Idecided to suspend the jacking operation.The site was open to the media and manymedia people had been on the viaduct,but nearly everyone had gone down toground level after I suspended work.About the only people left on the viaductwere near the front cars and they werereporters from two media organizations.They were milling around, some with theircameras at the ready, so we shouted tothem that the situation was dangerous andthat they should get down because thework was suspended. They were slow andwere still near the train as the majoraftershock struck, explaining why theycould take the pictures used as a mediascoop. I guess it goes to show that beinga slowpoke pays off sometimes.The danger was obvious and it sent a chilldown our backs. Without the smallwarning aftershock, if the violent shockhad struck 30 minutes later, many workers

would have been close to jacks supportingthe carriage and some would probablyhave been injured.Scenes of the violent aftershock andscrambling workers were shown on TVthroughout Japan, which was a blessingfor us because until then the media hadbeen very critical, making comments like‘The nearby expressway is back inoperation, but 5 days have passed sincethe earthquake and JR East still hasn’tmoved its derailed cars.’ After TV shotsof the shinkansen cars rocking to and frowere broadcast, the media quieted andtheir stance changed to respect for thedifficult job we faced.We learned that the job was more dangerousthan we had assumed, which led to achange in our strategy. Keeping safety inmind, we decided to lift all the derailed carswith cranes and started on 10 November.Figure 7 shows the main tasks. The areaaround the derailment site is all ricepaddy, and we had to bring three 360- to450-tonne cranes across the paddy froma company in Niigata. Basically, the jobinvolved using two cranes to hoist one car,and the third crane to steady the adjacent

car to prevent it shifting. Each derailedcar was positioned back on track in order,one after the other. The whole operationwas quite a sight!The bottom right photo shows how wepositioned the cranes close to the viaduct,which was difficult in itself. First, weneeded permission to access the land(luckily the rice had just been harvested).Next, we had to lay down metal sheetsand drive piles to create a firm base forthe cranes. This took some time.The local people must have wonderedwhat we were up to. Some thought wewere going to lower the whole shinkansentrain set to the ground. What we did wassimpler—we used the cranes to hoist eachcar from the Niigata-bound track to theTokyo-bound track. This work wasfinished by November 17.Figure 8 shows the track in the generalarea of the derailment. I will explain thegeneral mechanism of the derailmentwithout getting too technical. Figure 8has five parts, the top left shows the trackclosest to Tokyo, the bottom right closestto Niigata. The figure 206 km 191 m(meaning distance from Omiya base) near

Figure 7 Lifting Cars on Track

143 143 143

1

138 80 80

8 5 11 11 11 10 3 3

10 10 10 8390 90

29 29

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sand was spread on soil for levelling and then covered with metal sheets.

Piles were driven into the ground where cranes would be positioned.

The three cranes were moved sequentially to position one car after another back on the track.

To Tokyo To Niigata

Three cranes (min. 360 tonnes)



the middle of the second section from thetop was where we found marks indicatingthat wheels had mounted the right rail.The rails were badly deformed from thearea shown on the left of the fourthsection. Because the construction is a slabtrack, it was obvious that the rail fastenershere had been ridden over by the wheels.The rail was broken in three places asshown in the bottom of the figure.The train ran about 1.6 km from wherethe wheels first mounted the rail to whereit finally came to a stop.

Many ContradictedAssumptions

Next, I went to inspect the track wherethe dera i lment began. My f i r s timpression was that although the railswere badly twisted and had beenseverely thrown out of alignment inplaces, the concrete slab track itself wasin good condition. The train had run onthe slab, causing some damage, but theslab remained almost unbroken. Basingmy judgment on past experience, I

assumed that if we simply replaced therails and repaired the area where themetal fasteners hold the rails to the slab,we could have the shinkansen fullyoperational in about 2 weeks. As far asthe track condition was concerned thismay have been on target, but otherproblems—including a need to changeour system for hoisting the cars—slowedprogress considerably. In addition,although I was on site, we discoveredonly later that the tunnels betweenthe derailment and Urasa Station were

Figure 8 Damage to Railway Infrastructure near Shinkansen Derailment Site

To Tokyo

205 km 900 m

206 km 300 m

206 km 500 m

206 km 700 m

3‰6‰

206 km 900 m

206 km 700 m

206 km 500 m

206 km 300 m

206 km 100 m

205 km 960 m to 206 km 206 mDistance between rails begins widening

Near 206 km 217 mScoring on head of left rail

Near 206 km 191 mScoring on head of right rail

Near 206 km 207 mMarks on right side of right rail, presumably from right wheel

Near 206 km 206 mFasteners of right rail begin showing damage

206 km 741 mRight rail broken

206 km 717 mRight rail broken

Near 206 km 828 m to near 207 k 580 mMarkings on top surface of up slab, presumably caused by Car No.10

Near 206 km 696 mWelded joints on left and right rails separate

206 km 211 mVicinity of 206 km 227 mFasteners of left rail begin showing damage

Near 206 km 160 mMaximum sinkage of 3 cm below normal rail level at Toka-machi Viaduct T3

Near 206 km 070 mDistance between rails widened about 11 mm

206 km 014 m to 206 km 057 mMaximum sinkage of 7 cm below normal rail level at Jodo Bridge

To Niigata


Figure 9 Major Damage to Aboveground Structures—Joetsu Shinkansen

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa

Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo

Urasa TunnelTo Tokyo

To Niigata

Horinouchi Tunnel

Muramatsu Viaduct

No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct

Uonogawa Bridge

� Fallen concrete

� Fallen concrete

� Fallen concrete� 4 columns damaged � 2 columns damaged

� Slab track deformed� Fallen pieces from arch and side walls� Side wall of central passageway damaged

� 8 columns damaged

No. 1 Wanazu Viaduct

Uonuma Tunnel

Between Echigo Yuzawa and Urasa stations� 44 catenary poles tilted� 2 snow-melting stations damaged

Urasa Station� 11 catenary poles tilted

Between Urasa and Nagaoka stations� 70 catenary poles tilted� 2 snow-melting stations damaged

Myoken Tunnel Takiya Tunnel

� Slab track deformed� Fallen concrete� Cracks in central passageway

Katada Viaduct

� 28 columns damaged1 column damaged

� Subsidence in two places, on Jodogawa Bridge and Toka-machi Viaduct

Near 206 km 230 m to 207 km 820 m� Slab and rail fasteners damaged

Near 206 km 600 m to 207 km 500 m� Rails thrown off track

Toki 325

� Subsidence at one place on Kamishima Viaduct

Nagaoka Station� 37 catenary poles tilted

No. 1Fukuro-machiViaduct

� 1 column damaged � 1 column damaged� 1 column damaged � 1 column damaged

SoridaViaduct

Between Nagaoka and Tsubame Sanjo stations� 14 catenary poles tilted� 5 snow-melting stations damaged

HayamiViaduct

KaibamiViaduct

Between Tsubame Sanjo and Niigata stations� 1 snow-melting station damaged

Damage to track caused bypassage of derailed Toki 325

Uonuma Tunnel Myoken Tunnel

No. 1 Wanazu Viaduct No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct Uonogawa Bridge

badly damaged. This was certainly arude awakening!Figure 9 shows the track between EchigoYuzawa, Urasa, Nagaoka and Tsubame

Sanjo stations, with Niigata Station off tothe right. The most damaged section wasbetween Urasa and Nagaoka stations,near the epicentre.

There are five tunnels between Urasa andthe derailment site. Proceeding from thestation we have the Urasa and Horinouchitunnels, about 800 m of aboveground



Figure 10 Operation Restart Timeline—Joetsu Shinkansen

23 October 2004: Earthquake strikes and services suspended on entire Joetsu Shinkansen

24 October 2004: Passenger services resume between Tokyo and Echigo Yuzawa stations

30 October 2004: Passenger services resume between Tsubame Sanjo and Niigata stations

4 November 2004: Passenger services resume between Nagaoka and Tsubame Sanjo stations

28 December 2004: Passenger services return to full operation

Shin Yuzawatransformer

station125 gal

Shin Muika-machifeeder station

270 gal

Shin-Kawaguchitransformer station

846 gal

Shin Nagaokasupplementaryfeeder station

466 gal

Shin Oshikiri feeder station

203 gal

Shin Nakanokuchitransformer station

116 gal

Shin Toyanosecondary

feeder station87 gal

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata




Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo

Services suspendedServices resumed

Niigata

After-quake operation restriction loweredone level, permitting precautionary services

After-quake operation restriction loweredone level, permitting precautionary services

track, then the Uonuma, Myoken andTakiya tunnels, and then the derailmentsite. From the last tunnel to the derailedtrain and on to Nagaoka Station is allabove ground.The worst hit areas were the Uonuma,Myoken and Takiya tunnels, with theformer two in especially bad shape. Whatthe figure does not show is that there aresnow shelters over the track between theUonuma and Myoken tunnels, andbetween the Myoken and Takiya tunnels,so this whole section is really one longtunnel. This made the remedial workdifficult, because we could only use theentrances at the two extremities to enterthe tunnels with equipment. The No. 1Wanazu Viaduct, No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct,and Uonogawa Bridge beyond theUonuma Tunnel on an abovegroundsection of only about 800 m between thetwo tunnels were all quite damaged too.The Uonuma Tunnel, which is slightly

more than 8-km long, was badly damagedin three places, with cracks in the tunnelarch and upheaval in the slab. TheMyoken Tunnel was quite seriouslydamaged in two places.Some viaduct columns suffered shear-induced damage, with concrete fallingaway to expose the reinforcing bars. TheUonogawa Bridge (Fig. 9, bottom right)looked awful with exposed reinforcingbars after concrete broke off about halfwayup the columns.We repaired the structures in methodicalorder. The solid black lines in Figure 10show track sections where there were nopassenger services, while the shaded linesindicate sections with resumed services.Immediately after the earthquake, wesuspended services on all sections frombefore Echigo Yuzawa Station to NiigataStation. The day after the earthquake,trains were running from Echigo Yuzawafrom Tokyo.

We continued inspecting each area andrepairing the viaducts, making it possibleto resume passenger services in onesection after another. The Tsubame Sanjo–Niigata section was reopened on 30October followed by the Nagaoka–Tsubame Sanjo section on 4 November.Excluding the track between EchigoYuzawa and Nagaoka, we were back inoperat ion jus t 12 days af ter theearthquakes. Buses were used to carrypassengers between Echigo Yuzawa andNagaoka until the entire line was madefully operational again on 28 December.Figure 11 shows Uonuma Tunnel withdamage in three places. The damage inthe middle looks serious, but actually onlysome 5 to 10 m was badly damaged withabout 100 m of the concrete substructuredamaged by heaving. Even so, this wasunusually serious for a tunnel boredthrough a mountain and we decided thatwe would not resume services until we


had made the tunnel stronger than it wasbefore. Figure 11 shows how we insertedrock bolts into the bedrock to reinforcethe tunnel structure and prevent liningcollapse. We also installed fibre-reinforced concrete plates from the inside.In some cases we also inserted rock boltsthrough the tunnel flooring into thebedrock, making tunnel stronger than ithad ever been.

Announcing Resumption ofFull Service

We hesitated over announcing a date forresuming services over the entire line andwaited until 19 November before doingso. Prior to this date, we were extremelybusy determining how badly the tunnelswere damaged.The illustration in the top right of Figure11 gives an idea of the complex structureof a tunnel. Concrete inverts are installedfor the arch, tunnel walls and substructure.Next, the roadbed concrete is poured, andthen 5-m slabs are installed on that. Allthese components make for quite acomplicated structure.We were most worried about fissures orgaps between the concrete inverts,roadbed concrete and bedrock, but therewas no way of knowing without peelingback the concrete facing. There was notime to peel back the facing throughoutthe entire tunnel, so we drilled holesevery 20 m to obtain samples. This waslong and frustrating work, but it helpedus to eventually decide to tell the publicon 19 November when we hoped toresume services.The top left photograph in Figure 12shows some of the damage to UonogawaBridge. Damage to the mid-level of thepiers looks extensive, but from a civilengineering viewpoint they were notdifficult to repair. The rough drawingsshow how we plugged the fissures withshotcrete, applied reinforced concretejackets around the piers above the water

line and steel jackets below it. This madethe structure more quake-resistant. Thework was a little more difficult than Idescribe, but you can see the repairedstructure in the bottom photograph.In the derailment area, the slabs werebasically in good condition, so remedial

work consisted mainly of replacing themetal fasteners. This job went accordingto plan.Repairing the slab track in the tunnel wasmore complicated. The photographs inFigure 13 do not show the structuralcomponents or remedial process clearly,

Figure 11 Damage at Uonuma Tunnel

Damaged

Recovered

Damage(1) Fallen pieces of arch (about 5 m)(2) Separation in side wall (about 10 m)(3) Upheaval of roadbed concrete (about 100 m)(4) Tilted concrete side walls of central passageway (about 50 m)(5) Cracks in some inverts (about 20 m)

Damage

Remedial work

(1) Fallen pieces of arch

(2) Separation in side wall

Void

Uptrack

Downtrack

(5) Cracks

* Tests on invert adherence to rock

(4) Tilted concrete side walls of central passageway

Back-fill grouting Rock bolts

Sidewall pinned to inverts

Sidewall pinned to inverts

Fissures plugged with concrete

Fast reinforcing shotcrete grouting

Inner surface reinforce-ment

Roadbed concrete

Down track Up track

Figure 12 Damage at Uonogawa Bridge

Damaged

Recovered

Damage Repair and reinforcement

(1) Longitudinal reinforcement bars buckled and loosened(2) Cracks in concrete(3) Fallen concrete

(1) Concrete inserted into fissures(2) Reinforcement bars reinserted(3) Section repaired

Remedial work tooriginal structure

Increasingquake-resistance

ConcreteConcretejacket appliedjacket appliedConcretejacket applied

Steel jacketSteel jacketappliedappliedSteel jacketapplied



are laid one-by-one on top of the base.We had to lift about 300 of these slabs,remove them from the tunnel, repair theconcrete base and slabs, then bring theslabs back in four or five at a time andrealign them. This was hard and longwork, but we finished it on schedule.Figure 14 shows the final running tests inlate December af ter most of theconstruction and remedial work wasfinished. We began the speed tests on24 December, starting at about 30 km/hand increasing in increments. Thephotograph on the right shows an East-itrack inspection car that used to benicknamed Dr Yellow. On day 1, we beganreturn runs at 30 km/h, then increasingsequentially to 70, 110, and 160 km/h.Most of our attention was focussed on themost damaged track section between Urasaand Nagaoka. Although our test runs wentas high as 160 km/h, the first resumedpassenger services ran at a reduced speedof 110 km/h over this section. All safetyverification tests are generally conductedin this fashion, but we were restricted inthis case because of the fast-approachingservice resumption date. We managed tofinish the running tests in 2.5 days, runningback and forth on 26 and 27 December.Then, the first day of full services came on28 December.

Back to Full PassengerServices

The first passenger-carrying train to passthrough Uonuma Tunnel leaves NiigataStation at 05:40 each day. CompanyPresident Mr Otsuka was determined toride this train. I am sure he didn’t intendto become a human sacrifice, but he saidhe wanted to ride in the lead car of thefirst passenger train to use the track hiscompany had repaired. He boarded ingood spirits and I joined him in thelead car.The driver was quite young. Many of ourdrivers had been at the controls during

Figure 13 Repairs at Derailment Area and Tunnel Track

Remedial work to derailment track

Remedial work to slabs and roadbed

Track remedial work in Uonuma Tunnel

� Slab T-bolt repairs� Roadbed repairs� Rail surface adjustments

Slab T-bolt repairs, rail replacement, rail surface adjustments

Breaking up concrete base

Figure 14 Running Tests on Joetsu Shinkansen between Urasa and Nagaoka

30 km/h

70 km/h

110 km/h

160 km/h

Test runs

Decision-making factors permitting higher speed trial runs

EchigoYuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Niigata

TsubameSanjo

Day 1 (24 Dec)

Day 2 (25 Dec)

Day 3 (26 Dec)

Work time slot

Work time slot

Work time slot

Work time slot

Speed increase

30 km/h→70 km/h

70 km/h→110 km/h

110 km/h→160 km/h

Track Infrastructure Electric supplysystem Signalling system

Test running by East-i

(1) Car vibration� Vertical and horizontal vibrations(2) Track displacement� Distance between rails, level, unevenness, ease of passage, smoothness

Measurement of extent of subsidence on No. 1 Wanazu Viaduct, No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct, Uonuma Tunnel and elsewhere

(1) Catenary height(2) Catenary tilt(3) Catenary gradient

(1) ATC Signal transmission verification(2) Verification of train wireless system field strength

so I will explain. After the concrete baseis poured during the original construction,

concrete slabs, each measuring about2.34 x 5 m and weighing about 5 tonnes


the more than 2 days of running teststhrough Uonuma Tunnel, although somehad driven only at lower speeds. But ourdriver had not. I didn’t know this andasked, ‘You must have been on the testruns, eh?’ but he replied, ‘No, today’s thefirst time.’ President Otsuka then askedhim, ‘Are you nervous?’ He said nothing.On this first commercial run through thetunnel since the earthquake, I thought hemight say, ‘No, not nervous at all!’ at leastif that was the case. Of course, he couldhardly say ‘Yes, I’m nervous’ to thePresident—so he remained silent.Mr Otsuka rose to the occasion. ‘MrOgura here, his staff and many workersdid what was necessary to repair thetunnel and make it stronger than before,so there’s no need to worry. Just relaxand take us to Tokyo!’ The driver listened,obviously only half believing him, but Iwas very glad to hear Mr Otsuka expresshis confidence in our workers and me.During the 3 days of running tests anumber of interesting things happened,but I will save discussion of those eventsfor another time.

Damage to Narrow-gaugeTracks

So far, I have discussed only damage toour shinkansen, but our narrow-gaugelines were also badly affected as you cansee in Figure 16. Damage to theshinkansen stole much of the limelightfrom our conventional lines, explainingwhy not much was reported about them.The top right photograph in Figure 16shows a line along the Shinano Riverwhere the track paralleling the riversuffered dramatic damage at cliffs andslopes. Altogether, our narrow-gaugetrack was damaged at 86 locations. Asshown, the tracks were washed out,leaving what appears to be a rope ladderinstead of a railway. Quite a few trainswere on the affected tracks, but all stoppedbefore or after damaged track, so luckilynot one train derailed and no passengerswere injured.The bottom of Figure 17 shows dates andplaces of service resumption afterremedial work was completed. Thecolumns from left to right show the datesand affected sections of the Shin’etsu,Joetsu, Iiyama, Tadami and Echigo lines.The top bar shows that sections on all five

lines shut on 23 October. Services on theaffected sections resumed gradually—theEchigo Line on 26 October, part of theJoetsu Line on 2 November, the Joetsu Lineas far as Koide on 13 November, theTadami Line on 20 November, and theShin’etsu Line on 29 November.Finally, on 27 December, 1 day before fullJoetsu Shinkansen services resumed, trainsbegan running again on affected sectionsof the Joetsu and Iiyama lines. Somehowwe found a way to get all our narrow-gauge lines back in operation.The photographs on the left of Figure 15show the slope failure and roadbedcollapse on the Joetsu Line next to theShinano River. The scene of tracksuspended in mid-air like a rope ladder istypical. The photographs in the centrewere taken after the remedial work.The two diagrams on the right show newretaining walls with earth laid behindthem, using the popular ReinforcedRailroad with Rigid facing (RRR)construction method, taking into accountsoil drainage. Thanks to these solidembankments, passenger services areonce again operating smoothly.The Uonogawa Bridge on the Iiyama Line(Fig. 18) is quite old and was severelydamaged, as the photograph shows. Thebridge dates from another era beforereinforcing; pier 13P in the foregroundexperienced considerable failure in itsupper section and the next pier (14P) wassevered in the middle, because the topsection shifted laterally by about 50 cm.This is a textbook failure.The diagrams at the bottom right show theapplication of a layer of concrete aroundthe pier, followed by a grid of reinforcingbars around the pier, covered by aconcrete jacket. The resulting structureis now stronger than ever. The photographat the bottom left was taken aftercompletion of the remedial work.

Figure 15 Embankment Failure on Joetsu Line

Tenno Tenno Tunnel (up)Tunnel (up)

Track damage

After remedial work

After remedial work

Vicinity of 220 km 500 m

Track damage

After remedial work

After remedial work

Vicinity of 221 km 000 m

[RRR Construction method] Shotcrete

Rock bolts

Tenno Tunnel (up)Down track

[RRR Construction method]

Down track Up track

Drainage blanket

Cement-mixed soil

Ground anchorsSlope reconFigureuration (separate construction project)

Sediment

Drain pipe

Drain pipeSediment Drainage blanket

Rock bolts



Figure 17 Service Resumption on Narrow-gauge JR Lines

Services suspended Services resumed

Shin�etsu Line Joetsu Line Iiyama Line Tadami Line Echigo Line23 October 2004: Earthquake strikes; services suspended

26 October 2004: Services resume on Shin�etsu Line between Nagaoka and Higashi Sanjo, and on Echigo Line between Kashiwazaki and Yoshida

2 November 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Minakami and Muikamachi

13 November 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Muikamachi and Koide

20 November 2004: Services resume on Tadami Line between Koide and Tadami

29 November 2004: Services resume on Shin�etsu Line between Kashiwazaki and Nagaoka

7 December 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Koide and Miyauchi, and on Iiyama Line between Echigo Kawaguchi and Tokamachi

Kashiwazaki Nagaoka Minakami Muikamachi

Minakami Muikamachi

Koide

Minakami Muikamachi Koide

Miyauchi

Minakami Muikamachi Koide Miyauchi

Echigo Kawaguchi Tokamachi

Echigo Kawaguchi Tokamachi

Koide Tadami

Koide Tadami

Kashiwazaki Yoshida

Kashiwazaki Yoshida

HigashiSanjo

Kashiwazaki Nagaoka HigashiSanjo

Nagaoka HigashiSanjo

*Services between Echigo Kawaguchi and Echigo Takiya resume on single track

Figure 16 Major Damage to Narrow-gauge Infrastructure

MiyauchiMiyauchiIiyama Line

Iiyama Line EchigoEchigoKawaguchiKawaguchi

Echigo Line: Some damageat Izumozaki Station

Shin�etsu Line: Collapsed embankmentnear 54 km 800 m

Iiyama Line: Deformedcolumns, Uonogawa Bridge

Joetsu Line: Collapsed embankmentnear 221 km 000 m

Joetsu Line: Collapsed embankmentnear 220 km 500 m

Tadami Line: Some damageat Echigo Suhara Station

Kashiwazaki Echigo Line

Yahiko Niigata

Yoshida

Tsubame Sanjo

Yahi

ko L

ine

Niitsu

Higashi SanjoNagaoka

Miyauchi

Shin�etsu Line

Iiyama LineTokamachi EchigoKawaguchi

Urasa

Joets

u Shin

kans

en

EchigoYuzawa

Muikamachi

Joet

su L

ine Koide

Tadami LineTadami

Epicentre (23 October around 17:56)Max. seismic activity: SI7 (Kawaguchi-machi)


Figure 18 Infrastructure Damage on Uonogawa Bridge, Iiyama Line

Damaged piers

After remedial work

1P 2P 3P

1A

4P 5P 6P 7P 8P 9P 10P 11P 12P 13P 14P 15P 16P 17P 18P 19P

2A

To Toka-machi To Echigo Kawaguchi

Over road Over river Over road Over road

Peeling and collapse in crown concrete

Peeling and collapse in stone masonry

Peeling and collapse in crown concretePeeling and collapse in stone masonry

Failure and lateral slippage at mid-pier

Peeling and collapse in crown concrete

Shearing in abutment facing

Peeling and collapse in concrete structure

Damage to14P and15P

Required horizontal level for roadbed

Late

ral s

lippa

ge

Remedial work

Fissure plugged with shotcrete; sandblasting; reinforcing bar grid work

Concrete jacket reinforcement

Only Single Track onJoetsu Line

The last section of our narrow-gauge linesto resume services was between EchigoKawaguchi and Echigo Takiya stations onthe Joetsu Line (Fig. 19) and this sectionstill has only single-track operations. Wehope to have both tracks operating by theend of March 2006. The top right aerialshot shows Enoki Pass where a car wasburied by a landslide and only a small boywas rescued alive. The photograph showsour two tracks to the right of that road.The tunnel entrance for the down trackon the left remains completely blockedby landslide debris. Luckily, the up trackto the right of it is free of debris and weare now using it for both up anddown services.

Figure 19 Services Reduced to Single Track Only on Joetsu Line

Aiming for quick resumption of double-track services

Collapsed embankment (220 km 500 m from base) Landslide blocking Enoki Pass Tunnel portal

Installed turnout (Echigo Takiya Station)

(Down track)

(Up track)

Hand signalling devices for authorizing train departure

Echigo Kawaguchi

Tenno Tunnel

Ojiya

New interlocking devices installedNew signalling equipment installed

Echigo Takiya

Turnout installed

Modifications required for single-track operations� Tablet/block system for up track� Turnout and signalling devices newly installed at Echigo Takiya Station� Level crossings modified at 9 locations to accommodate single-track operations� Level crossings at 2 of 11 locations in single-track section closed to road traffic for winter�these modifications coordinated with road authorities

Level crossings modified to accommodate single-track operations

Level crossings closed to road traffic (until end of March)



Of all transportation corridors blocked bylandslides, this JR East line is the only onestill being cleared of debris despite theheavy winter snows. We couldn’t waitfor the roads department to get round toclearing winter snow, so we are going allout to keep access open with the aim ofgetting both tracks running again.

Restoring ShinanogawaPower Plant

Moving away from rail services for amoment, I’d like to discuss the majordamage sustained by our ShinanogawaPower Plant (Fig. 20). This hydropowerplant has three large storage reservoirsthat draw water from the River Shinanoto power three generators making the

electricity that we need for morningpeak operations. Nearly all thesefacilities were severely damaged. Wehave drained the reservoirs and are nowexamining how best to repair theinfrastructure. Unfortunately, the areais now under deep snow and weprobably cannot get everything backinto full operation before late 2006.However, we need the power and can’twait until then, so from last February westarted drawing water directly from theriver into the races to generate somepower without filling the reservoirs.This is providing about 35% of theplant’s normal capacity.

Dealing with Crisis

Figure 21 summarizes bus services thatreplaced the lost rail section. From 31October, buses ran between the EchigoYuzawa and Tsubame Sanjo shinkansenstations, as well as over the shorter gapbetween Echigo Yuzawa and Nagaokastations. Two JR companies, Kanto Busand Tohoku Bus, did everything theycould as did many other companies. Weadjusted fares so that the combination oftrain and bus would not exceed whatpassengers would have paid if going byshinkansen only. But passengers couldnot enjoy the speed and convenience ofshinkansen services only and we greatlyregretted this inconvenience.

Figure 20 Damage to Shinanogawa Power Plant

Shin Ojiya Generating Station

Miyanaka IntakeMiyanaka IntakeSedimentation basinSedimentation basin

No. 3 Asagawara Spillway TunnelNo. 3 Asagawara Spillway Tunnel

No. 1 Asagawara No. 1 Asagawara Spillway TunnelSpillway Tunnel

Phase 5 TunnelPhase 5 TunnelAsagawara ReservoirAsagawara ReservoirPhase 1 Pressure TunnelPhase 1 Pressure Tunnel

MinafujiyamasawaMinafujiyamasawaAqueductAqueduct

Phase 2 Pressure TunnelPhase 2 Pressure Tunnel

Diversion FacilityDiversion Facility

Tomoshige Discharge ChannelTomoshige Discharge Channel

Ojiya Generating StationOjiya Generating Station

Senju Generating Station

Damage to lightening arrester

Shin Yamamoto Reservoir

Cracks in levee riprap

Ojiya Generating Station

Collapsed dischargechannel wall

Power transmission line

Steel pylon foundation exposed

Asagawara Reservoir

Cracks in earth levee

No. 3 Asagawara Spillway

Tunnel water infiltration

Leakage from pressurizedsteel conduit

Damage todistribution panel

Damage to main transformerMiyanaka Intake Dam

Shin Miyanaka Intake

Miyanaka IntakeSedimentation basin

Phase 1 Tunnel

Phase 2 TunnelNo. 3 Asagawara Spillway Tunnel

No. 2 AsagawaraSpillway Tunnel

No. 1 Asagawara Spillway Tunnel

Link CanalDiversion Facility

Phase 5 TunnelAsagawara ReservoirPhase 1 Pressure Tunnel

MinafujiyamasawaAqueduct

Shin Masatosawa Aqueduct

Phase 2 Pressure TunnelSurge Tanks

Senju GeneratingStationPressurizedSteel Conduits

Discharge Lagoon

Discharge Channel Diversion Facility

Tomoshige Discharge Channel

Phase 3 Tunnel

Phase 4 Tunnel

Shin Masatosawa Aqueduct

Water Tank

Spillway

Ojiya Generating Station


Table 1 shows the losses to JR East causedby the earthquakes. Lost fares amountedto about ¥13 billion (¥115 = US$1), whichis not surprising. Remedial work has costabout ¥20 bil l ion so far and theShinanogawa Power Plant will requireconsiderable investment of a so-farunknown amount. Another problem isthat since we cannot generate sufficientpower, we are depending on electricityfrom many thermal plants and are buyingpower from Tokyo Electric Power. Thiswill cost another ¥5 billion. These coststotal about ¥40 billion and we expect theentire bill to come in at under ¥100billion, including the cost of repairing theShinanogawa Power Plant. In any event,the financial burden is very heavy.We intend to minimize it in several ways,including drawing on reserve funds, so weexpect to start next fiscal year in arelatively healthy financial state.

Rights and Wrongs

After everything settled down, we drewup lists of things that went right, and othersthat went wrong. The first list (Table 2)relates to emergency information given topassengers and passenger evacuation. AsI mentioned before, our employees on

site, our train crews and our stationpersonnel all showed true professionalismin handling the situation.As the first item on the list shows, onething that went well was our use of radioand TV to give passengers information onthe situation as it developed.The pocket body warmers and blanketswere a success because we had set asidemany in case of an emergency in winter.Food supplies ran low in NiigataPrefecture because of the earthquake, but

Nagano, Takasaki and other places sentenough to make up the difference.On a personal note, the day after the quake,I went to the derailment site and quicklyrealized that the area had no electricity andlittle food. I saw convenience stores butmost were closed. I had a cell phone butthe battery soon died. Although I wantedto buy batteries, the local people had rightlysnapped them all up. In Nagaoka andneighbouring communities, it wasimpossible to buy a ready-made box lunch

Figure 21 Bus Transport Replacing Suspended Joetsu Shinkansen Services

About 100 buses from 22 companies in Niigata Prefecture and from JR Kanto Bus and JR Tohoku Bus borrowed on temporary basis for daily use.

Immediately after the earthquake, the expressway was closed to buses and other ordinary vehicles. JR East submitted a letter to the Japan Highway Public Corporation and received permission exempting them from restrictions in force at the time to use vehicles on the expressway.

The bus service was an express service that would ordinarily require passengers to pay an express charge, but this would have raised fares above what they would have paid if travelling only by shinkansen. The fare was adjusted to prevent this.

Challenges and Response

Ensuring sufficient buses

Setting fares

Use of expressway forbus transport for days

immediately after earthquake

Other measures: Directions given passengers at stations; precautionary measures taken during period of aftershocks; parking lots provided

Table 1 Financial Burden of Chuetsu NiigataEarthquakes (FY2005)

Table 2 Emergency Information for Passengers andTheir Evacuation

� Lost fare revenues Approx. ¥13 billion

� Cost of remedial work forrailway infrastructure(cost of replacement busservices not included) Approx. ¥20 billion

� Cost of remedial work forShinanogawa Power Plant Still unknownPurchase of electricity, etc. Approx. ¥5 billion

� Lost revenues from stationkiosks, etc. Approx. ¥1 billion

Things that went right Things that went wrong

� Radios, and TVs powered by emergency power supply were useful in explaining the overall emergency situation to passengers. This helped relieve their anxiety somewhat.

� We had established emergency reserves of disposable body warmers and blankets for any emergency winter service suspension. These supplies were most useful.

� A nearby JR branch office quickly responded by delivering food, disposable body warmers and other relief supplies early next morning after the quake.

� Cell phone reception was extremely poor, so Personal Handyphone System (PHS) phones communication were most useful.

� Staff had previously undergone training in passenger evacuation using inclined passageways, so evacuations went smoothly.

� Flashlights used during evacuation from trains halted between stations were not bright enough.

� We should have sent staff from stations to Disaster Response Headquarters to request the help of local municipal governments in establishing evacuation shelters, etc.

� The cell phones of many employees and passengers ran out of battery power.

� We saw a need for more emergency reserves of blankets, pharmaceuticals, batteries, etc.



we used to test the ability of infrastructureto support higher speeds. But until werepaired Uonuma Tunnel, we could notget it onto track on the Niigata side of thetunnel, the section where we neededspeed tests. Keihin Electric’s trains runon the same gauge as shinkansen, andtheir EM30 track inspection car runs atspeeds up to 30 km/h. We made gooduse of it until services resumed over theentire line. Without it we would have hadto use far simpler inspection devices andprobably could not have resumed fullservices on 28 December.The Japan Railway Construction,Transport and Technology Agency(formerly Japan Railway ConstructionPublic Corporation—JRCC) loaned ustheir Oiran inspection car for checkingstructural clearance. Actually, we do nothave such an inspection vehicle forshinkansen track, because we normallydon’t need one.The predecessor JRCC built the JoetsuShinkansen, explaining why its successorcould lend us Oiran, without which weprobably couldn’t have resumed servicesas early as 28 December. In addition tothe t remendous help f rom othercompanies, we could also draw on ourpast experiences coping with disasters.

Challenges at Derailment Site

The right column in Table 3 lists our maindifficulties during the remedial work. Asone example, the last item on the list dealswith removal of the shinkansen rollingstock. As I mentioned before, weeventually repositioned it on the oppositetrack and then had to remove it from thescene. A maintenance vehicle arrived todo this but it was immediately apparentthat the couplers were different, so we hadto make a special device to link the two.The second item in the column, long-wave track irregularities, did not stop usfrom resuming services on 28 December,

Table 3 Remedial Work


� Helicopter flights made it possible to take aerial photos and videos used to rapidly assess damage over wide areas.

� A civil engineering project team was set up in the stricken area immediately after the quake, making it possible to provide humanitarian aid in an organized fashion.

� Other companies quickly arranged supplies for us and leased us heavy-duty maintenance machinery.- Keihin Electric Express Railway leased us their EM30 track

inspection vehicle, greatly improving our inspection efficiency.- The Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology

Agency leased us a shinkansen track inspection vehicle for clearance inspections, greatly improving our infrastructure inspection efficiency.

� Our �Aluminium Cart� (a bicycle built to run on track) was most useful for infrastructure inspections.

� Communications and cooperative efforts with police were excellent. During the emergency, patrol cars provided us with road information and greatly helped with evacuations.

� JR East�s Structural Engineering Center formed an emergency technical team that quickly established a reconstruction plan based on the damage, making it possible to take on-site decisions rapidly.

� Giving on-site personnel greater authority over and responsibility for remedial work made it possible to base remedial work decisions on the actual situation, helping reconstruction proceed faster.

� We used technical know-how gained from experience after the 2003 Sanriku-Minami earthquakes (north-east Honshu) and elsewhere, making remedial work proceed faster.

� There was little snow even in December�unusual for Niigata Prefecture�so weather did not slow reconstruction work very much.

� The extensive damage and series of aftershocks made it difficult to obtain a clear understanding of the damage.

� After repairing tunnel roadbeds, we discovered it was necessary to rectify long-wave track irregularities in many locations.

� We did not fully realize the importance of investigating the derailment, so we were slow in establishing investigation mechanisms. Also, we found it difficult to find staff with sufficient expertise to conduct such an investigation.

� We had difficulty establishing contractual agreements with electric power utilities for emergency supply of electricity.

� We had difficulty buying gasoline and other supplies in the stricken area. (Gasoline stations were closed during the blackout.)

� Just when we were jacking up carriages to position them back on the track, an aftershock measuring almost SI6 struck created a very dangerous situation.- We decided to use only cranes to

reposition all cars.

� We used a maintenance vehicle to tow the repositioned carriages away, but structural differences made coupling difficult.- We had to make a special device to

couple the maintenance vehicle and shinkansen.

for a few days. Luckily, the local JR branchoffice sent us meals.The last item in the ‘Things that went right’column reads: ‘Staff had previouslyundergone t raining in passengerevacuation using inclined passageways,so evacuations went smoothly.’ By greatgood luck, just 2 days before the quake,our Niigata office had run a trainingsession on evacuating passengers from ashinkansen train and giving on-boardemergency announcements. Quite a fewemployees who were caught up in theemergency had participated in that sessionand were able to put what they hadlearned into practice. The column on theright lists things that went wrong,including cell phones losing power.The left side of Table 3 lists things thatwent well during remedial work. Onesuccessful strategy was the numeroushelicopter flights to examine the effectsof the earthquake.

The Joetsu Shinkansen was not the onlypart of our operations to receive acrippling blow. As I mentioned, ournarrow-gauge track sustained damage inmore than 80 locations. Some probablywould not have been discovered asquickly if we had not taken aerialphotographs and video. Our head andbranch offices were able to make anoverall assessment of the damage beforelocal authorities on the ground hadsimilar information.

Tremendous Helpfrom Other Companies

The third item that ‘went right’ is that othercompanies were quick to lend a hand. Forexample, Keihin Electric Express Railway,which operates mainly in the Yokohama–Tokyo area, kindly loaned us their EM30track inspection car.I have already mentioned our East-i that


but there are still some small irregularitiesin the slab track. Although we could runtrains at 240 km/h over the track withoutcompromising safety, ride comfort wouldsuffer so we are still operating at slightlylower speeds. This shows that a slab trackrequires more careful final adjustmentsthan ballasted track.Table 4 examines the emergency responsetaken at the organizational level. Onething listed as going well is ‘A FieldResponse Headquarters was establishedand JR East’s Executive Director was sentthere as Headquarters Chief.’ I was theHeadquarters Chief, so I should bepleased with this comment. The sameitem continues: ‘This organizationalmeasure created a responsible position fordirecting recovery efforts and workingwith the media on site.’ In truth, I did nothave to do much after arriving—I probablywould have been busier at JR EastHeadquarters in Tokyo. As it was, manyqualified, experienced personnel came tothe derailment site where they workedadmirably, greatly simplifying my task ofoverseeing the recovery.One function that I could fulfil ase x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r w i t h o n - s i t eresponsibility was to grant or refuseadmittance to the many people whowanted to get close to the derailed train.The scene was unique and dramatic—aderailed shinkansen—and the site couldbe easily seen from a nearby road, so wenaturally attracted a lot of attention.People wanting a close-up view includedCabinet Ministers on two occasions, morethan 30 pol i t ic ians , the media ,bureaucra t s , exper t s , non-pro f i torganizations—and of course I can’t forgetthe curious bystanders. Everyone wantedto get up on the viaduct to ‘take a look,’and it was my job to say who could andcouldn’t. Anyone other than an executiveofficer would have had a hard time saying‘No’ to some of those people!But when it came to directing the actualrecovery work, we had specialists who

were highly qualified in their respectivefields and it was they who did what wasr e q u i r e d . I w a s r e p r e s e n t i n gHeadquarters, and my presence indicatedto everyone working on site that JR Eastwas naturally anxious that the recoveryand reconstruction proceed smoothly.

Organizational Response andInformation Sharing

Another ‘went well’ item is ‘The frequent

Emergency Response Meetings ensuredthat information was shared. Themeetings provided an opportunity for topexecutives to make rapid decisions thatspurred recovery and reconstructionefforts.’ It is commonly known thatdifferent departments in a company cansquabble over decision-making powersand work for their own interests againsteach other. However, in our case,members of each department cametogether for the meetings and worked as

Table 4 Organizational Response: Sharing Information


� A Field Response Headquarters was established immediately after the quake, and JR East�s Executive Director was sent there as Headquarters Chief. This organizational measure created a responsible position for directing recovery efforts and working with media on-site.

� The company intranet (Joi-Net) was quickly connected to the Field Response Headquarters at the derailment site, permitting efficient information sharing.

� Coordination made train crew announcements more effective.

� Trackside telephones were used to gather information at the derailment site.

� When cell phones could not be used for voice communications, they could still be used to send text messages, providing an effective means of communication.

� The frequent Emergency Response Meetings ensured that information was shared. The meetings provided an opportunity for top executives to make rapid decisions that spurred recovery and reconstruction efforts.

� Frequent press conferences gave the media much information. This established a good rapport with the media.

� Train crew used wireless devices to ask superiors for directions, leading to overloaded telecommunications circuits making it difficult to give passengers required emergency information.

� Cell phones often could not be used for voice communications, and in many cases batteries went dead quickly.

� Since telephone lines were often busy, we could not quickly learn whether employees were safe. (Employees did not contact us to report their own situation.)

Figure 22 Countermeasures after 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

Viaduct column reinforcementReinforcement efforts prioritize columns at risk of major damage through shear failure in earthquake as severe as Hanshin-Awaji or Chuetsu Niigata earthquakes.

ShinkansenPlans call for aseismic reinforcement of about 18,500 out of approx. 82,100 columns. � Approx. 12,300 columns (66%) to be reinforced during FY2004 � Additional 6,200 columns (approx.) to be reinforced by end of FY2007

Narrow-gauge linesPlans call for aseismic reinforcement of about 12,600 out of approx. 42,400 columns in South Kanto and Sendai areas. � Approx. 9,800 columns (78%) to be reinforced during FY2004 � Additional 2,800 columns (approx.) to be reinforced by end of FY2008

Tohoku Shinkansen

Joetsu Shinkansen

[Narrow-gauge lines]Sendai areaSouth Kanto region



Figure 24 Niigata Tourism Campaign—We’re Getting it Done!

� More travel promotion specials, discount fares, across-the-board discounts of ¥2,000� �Come to Niigata� tickets with some unrestricted boarding/disembarking privileges� Campaign logo displayed on MAX Joetsu Shinkansen rolling stock� Campaign prizes� Campaign kick-off attended by representatives of promoting organizations

Joetsu Shinkansen trains are once more running between Tokyo and Niigata, but things will return to normal only when the same number of tourists are riding the rails again. JR East and local governments in Niigata Prefecture are working together to promote tourism in the prefecture. The campaign lasted until the end of March 2005.

The Niigata prefectural government, local municipal governments and tourist agencies are organizing events and offering special attractions.

70,000passengers

110,000passengers

180,000 passengers

JR East Tourist agencies

a team for early resumption of services. Iknow I am blowing the JR East horn, but Imust say that we took the best approach—our departments cooperated andcompromised very well, placing theinterests of our passengers ahead of theirown interests. I said at the beginning, JREast’s frequent and frank press conferencesestablished a good rapport with the mediafor the benefit of all.

Safeguarding Lives Next Time

Figure 22 shows our plans to reinforceviaducts to make them more earthquake-resistant. We are making considerableinvestments in this endeavour and havedecided to implement reinforcement plansearlier than first scheduled.Figure 23 gives information on ourinstallation of more seismometers in ourUrgent Earthquake Detection and AlarmSystem (UrEDAS) and our efforts to reduceresponse times from 3 to 2 seconds.The information in these two figures hasbeen published elsewhere, so I will notgo into greater detail here.

Raising Ridership toPre-disaster Levels

Figure 24 highlights our ‘Niigata TourismCampaign—We’re Getting It Done!’programme. The weeks of interruptedshinkansen services in the Niigata areagreatly inconvenienced the travellingpublic, so we are trying to make it up tothem through special offers.By February 2005, our Joetsu Shinkansenridership returned to similar levels as theprevious year. This is a great turnaroundafter the recent slump.

Further Study andCountermeasures

Our remaining main tasks are examiningthe dera i lment mechanisms and

Figure 23 Early Earthquake Detection System Improvements for Shinkansen

System improvement objective: Shorten time required to detect seismic activity, thereby permitting faster power transmission cut-off and train braking

Seismometer location

Track section Existing New Total

Trackside

Coast

Tohoku ShinkansenJoetsu ShinkansenNagano ShinkansenPacific-Ocean sideSea-of-Japan side

2813896

82

4422996

90

1693- -

28Total

Trackside (existing)Trackside (new)Coast

Additional installation of trackside seismometers [FY2006]

(1) Earlier warning using P-wave detectionDetection of P-waves, which arrive before S-waves, permits earlier warning.

(2) Use of coastal seismometers in earlier earthquake detection Warning triggered by coastal seismometers located closer to epicentre of undersea earthquake

Earthquake

P-waves

Shorter warning lag (using coastal seismometers, lag shortened from 3 to 2 s) [FY2005]

S-waves

Time

Arrival of seismic wavesP-wave warningS-wave warning

Location

Trackside seismometers

Hachinohe

Niigata

Nagano

Tokyo

ChoshiMiura

Coastal seismometers

Time

Operation control method: Trackside seismometers indicate the earthquake magnitude, forming the basis for a decision to stop operations.

In FY2005, JR East changed its seismic activity index from gal to kine (SI), and, without sacrificing safety, changed its Operating Rule Criteria to more accurately predict possible damage to track infrastructure.

Operation restarts: <80 galSpeed restrictions: 80 to <120 galOperation stops: 120 gal

Operation restarts: <9 kineSpeed restrictions: 9 to <18 kineOperation stops: 18 kine +


Masahiko Ogura

Mr Ogura is a JR East Executive Director. After graduating in civil engineering from the University of

Tokyo in 1974, he joined Japanese National Railways where he later served as Head of the Track

Maintenance Division at the South Tokyo Railway Operating Division. After transferring to JR East,

he served in various capacities, including Head of the Engineering Works Department at JR East�s

Morioka Branch Office. He was appointed Director of the Yokohama Branch Office in 2002 and has

been an Executive Director, and Deputy Director of Railway Operations Headquarters since 2004.

infrastructure failure, and developingc o u n t e r m e a s u r e s . We h a v edocumentation covering these issues, butI am not going to describe it here.The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport is involved in ongoing safety-related discussions, so some matterscannot be made public yet. Futureinvestigations will focus mainly on howto prevent a derailment, how to preventcarriages from causing harm if they doderail, and how to prevent major damagein so many tunnels . The JoetsuShinkansen has resumed operations, butwe expect that the hardest part of our jobis still ahead. ■

Pamphlets of 'Niigata Tourism Campaign�We're Getting It Done!' (JR East)

AcknowledgmentsThe article is based on a lecture given at a

Transportation Research Committee seminar on 15

February 2005 organized by Japan Transportation

Association.

Documents

The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake —Railway Response and ... · Max Toki 327 (145.9 km) 410 passengers Matsukawa inclined shaft On foot By bus Echigo Yuzawa (151.4 km) Deadhead train