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Salvador Parrado (UNED (Spanish Distance University, Madrid)

ECPR, Workshop 23, Uppsala, Sweden, 2004

First draft (Please, do not quote without consulting the author)

The Metropolitan Government of Barcelona and Madrid: National Path Dependencies and Divergent Local Responses

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 2 THE CITIES AND THE FRAMEWORK............................................................................................ 2 THE PATH: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AN UNIFORM LOCAL SYSTEM ............................ 6

The premises before 1978 ....................................................................................................... 7 The transformations after 1978............................................................................................... 9

THE RESPONSES (1): WITHIN THE CITY COUNCIL.....................................................................11

Executive, representative body and administrative machinery ..................................................12

The distribution of power between the centre and the districts .................................................18 THE RESPONSES (2): BEYOND THE CITY COUNCIL ....................................................................22

Spanish local government in the system of Intergovernmental Relations (IGRs) ........................22 Barcelona and Madrid in the IGRs ...........................................................................................24

Participation as a governance principle ...................................................................................28 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ..................................................................................................32 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................33

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INTRODUCTION

Madrid and Barcelona have developed different institutional approaches within a nationally determined local system. The uniformity is based on formal regulation which applies equally to local authorities almost regardless of their size: statutory powers for local authorities, general competence clause, list of compulsory services, national regulatory system, same electoral systems and elections at the same time.

Madrid and Barcelona differ in most of the dimensions chosen for the analysis of the metropolis in this workshop: the relationships between the political and administrative body, the influence of managerial practices on the administration of the city, the distribution of power between the centre and the districts, the participatory approach of society in decision-making and the intergovernmental relationships.

This paper maintains a ‘divergence thesis’ to underline the differences in path-dependencies of both cities, in spite of the fact that international factors, global trends and the same State tradition push theoretically to a ‘convergence thesis’ (see in Schröter and Röber 2004 the discussion on the matter). These differences will be highlighted through the use of written literature, interviews with officials in both cities and focus groups with randomly selected citizens, city officials, entrepreneurs and NGOs representatives from the city of Barcelona1.

There is also another underlying question in the paper: What are the implications of the divergent paths in institutional choice for the quality of life of the city and for its gove rnance? Many government reforms are avowedly addressed at improving the quality of life of a city in terms of economic growth, social cohesion, and sustainability. The question is whether is possible to link the restructuring of the internal elements of a city council and administration with their impacts on the city. Furthermore, to what extent then is helping the city council in improving the principles of governance and the relationships of different stakeholders in achieving a better quality of life?

In order to answer these questions, this paper has been drafted in four sections. In the first section a picture of both cities and the outline of the analytical framework is given. In the second section the legal context in which both cities have to develop their activities is framed. Sections three and four try to outline the different paths that Madrid and Barcelona have undertaken. Section three is devoted to the internal arrangements of the city council: relationships between executive and legislative, between politics and administration and between the centre and the districts. Section four extends the analysis to the outer boundaries of city administration: the place of both cities in intergovernmental relationships and their role in promoting governance through networking and citizen participation.

THE CITIES AND THE FRAMEWORK

Madrid and Barcelona are the two largest Spanish cities with 606 km 2 and 98 km2 and 2,9 and 1,5 million inhabitants respectively. There are big disparities between them in size and in population, but they both rank very high in economic terms in the European context. In a ranking of 250 European cities established by Rozenblat and Cicille (2003; quoted by Rodríguez Álvarez 2002), Madrid and Barcelona were among the first ten cities (see Table 1). While Madrid was placed in the third position, Barcelona shares the sixth position with two other important State capitals like Berlin and Roma. This ranking was established according to the following items: population and its evolution from 1950 to 1990, traffic of maritime ports, airport traffic, traffic accessibility, headquarters of big corporations, headquarters of stock markets, number of tourist nights, number

1 The focus groups material is part of a pilot research undertaken in Barcelona (Spain), Baar (Switzerland), Ulm (Germany) and Calderdale (United Kingdom) by Governance International www.govint.org (directed by Elke Löffler).

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of fairs, number of congresses, number of museums, number of cultural events, number of students, number of edited scientific journals and number of research networks. Without entering in the debate of the choice of indicators, the study gives an idea of the position of Madrid and Barcelona in the international arena.

Table 1 Ranking of European cities (2002)

Ranking City Points

1 Paris 81 2 London 76 3 Madrid 62 4 Amsterdam 59 5 Milano 57 6 Barcelona 55 6 Berlin 55 6 Rome 55

Sources: Rozenblat and Cicille quoted in Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2002

Barcelona, an industrial city badly hit by the crisis of the 1970s, evolved in the last thirty years in order to concentrate its activities in the tertiary sector with special emphasis on the commercial and tourist areas. The city administration has made considerable efforts to strengthen the international position of Barcelona and it has been successful in attracting businesses and visitors. Barcelona is also the capital of the regional government of Catalonia and concentrates a quarter of its population. The rivalry of Barcelona and Madrid is not only economical but also political, as the public authorities of the city claim that Madrid has been preferred by the national government in infrastructure investment.

In recent times, the international position of Barcelona has been enhanced due to the organisation of the Olympic games of 1992. An active political class, an engaged civic society, the use of city strategic planning, the accomplishment of internal city council reform and the synergy of different governmental and non-governmental actors gave the name of the ‘Barcelona model’. Much of the economical success of the city can be traced back to this event and the social cohesion of the city can be understood as being part of the process.

Madrid is the capital of Spain and of the regional government. The seat of all governmental, parliamentary and judicial institutions from the national and the regional governments is there. Its location in almost the centre of Spain has helped to build up a network of radial communications very similar to the one existent around Paris. Its international airport is the gate to Latin America. In spite of the fact that the city council has not been very active in engaging civic society in collective matters, the economic position of the city is very strong in attracting businesses. Without any activity in strategic planning, Madrid has been gaining the economic market to Barcelona. From 250 big Spanish enterprises, in the last two decades Barcelona was the seat of 50 (decreasing from 82) and Madrid grew from 71 to 137.

It seems that the institutional efforts of fostering the civic engagement in developing the economy cannot compete with the global trends of concentrating the centres of economic decision. In the following sections the analysis of the institutions will give account of the divergent paths undertaken by both cities. It also tries to explore the reasons behind and the consequences of these strategies.

Two-fold research questions are guiding this workshop. On the one hand, it should be examined the impact of given institutional arrangements on the capacity of urban governance systems to cope with global economic challenges. On the other hand, the workshop sets out to explore the

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extent to which global trends have been shaping institutional developments in big city government as opposed to locally nationally defined institutional path-dependencies.

In brief, two initial responses can be offered for Madrid and Barcelona. On one side, institutional arrangements of the city council and higher levels of government and a quite articulated civil society have helped to cope with international economic challenges in the case of Barcelona, but his daunting efforts to compete with Madrid have not resulted in a better position of the city in the economic international arena. However, Madrid city council has applied a ‘laissez-faire’ policy, but has benefited from his central geographical and political position to create the context for expanding the economy and the demographic growth.

On the other side, some of the international institutional trends in city government were already in the national path dependencies (strong major for both Madrid and Barcelona), have been an inspiration for reform (introduction of managerial practices in Barcelona), were already part of the civic society culture (citizen participation in Barcelona) or have been included in the political discourse (decentralisation, rather deconcentration of city management and participation in Madrid and Barcelona). In comparative international perspective, the trajectories of Madrid and Barcelona are very similar to one another and would be placed rather in the left-hand side of Figure 1: Institutional Trajectories in Berlin, London and Paris from Röber and Schröter (2004); however, in national comparative perspective, Madrid and Barcelona have followed distinct national paths.

The framework of analysis for the first question will be developed here, while the framework of the second question will be referred to in the next section.

The adaptation of the input-output model of Bouckaert and Van Douren (2003: 129-130) and the work undertaken in Governance International (www.govint.org) will help to set the overall framework for the main argument.

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Figure 1 The management and policy cycle and the government and governance framework

The input-output model of Bouckaert and Van Douren (2003) is meant to give a systemic view of the functioning of an organisation. If the figure is adapted to cover the management and the policy cycle; the institutional arrangements within the local authority and the governance plus quality of life dimension, the description of Figure 1 is as follows. Boxes 1 to 7 of the figure develop objectives setting exercise (boxes 1 and 2); the management cycle (conversion of inputs into outputs through activities – boxes 3 to 5); and the policy cycle (including also impacts and sustainable development of the local area (boxes 6 and 7). Boxes A to E are the institutional arrangements of the city council that influence both the management and the policy cycle. Those boxes are the main subthemes of the workshop and the focus of this paper. Boxes A to C are internal arrangements of the local authority as they involve the relationship between the mayor and the assembly, the elected and the bureaucracy, and the centre and the districts. Box D reflects the intergovernmental relationships between the city council and higher levels of government. Box E, participation, is one principle among others of governance. In a previous book, we defined governance as:

“the set of formal and informal rules, structures and processes by which local stakeholders collectively solve their problems and meet societal needs. This process is inclusive because each local stakeholder

1. City Strategic objectives

2. Operational objectives

3. Inputs 4. Activities 5. Outputs 6. Direct impacts 7. Final impacts

8. Sustainabledevelopment

Policy cycleManagement cycle

Institutional arrangements

NGOs Businesses Media

Higher levels of government Citizens

Politicians and officials from local authority

Stakeholders

A. Executive-Legislative

B. Politics-Bureaucracy

C. Centre-Districts

E. Participation

Transparency

Fair behaviour

Governance principles

Quality of Life of the City

Others

D.I

GR

s

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brings important qualities, abilities and resources. In this process, it is critical to build and maintain trust, commitment and a system of bargaining” (Bovaird, Löffler and Parrado, 2002, p. 12)

Finally, boxes 6 and 7 represent the dimensions of the quality of life of a city, either objectively or subjectively measured: economic development, social cohesion, sustainability and the like. If the framework seems to be straightforward on paper, the difficult question to answer is how internal institutional arrangements of a city, intergovernmental relationships and governance practices account for the improvement of the quality of life on an area. The empirical material available does not allow answering this question for the cities of Madrid and Barcelona; however, there are some clues that might hopefully shed some light on the matter. By trying to answer this, we might be able to discuss the workshop question of the capacity of urban governance systems to cope with the global challenges. In the next section, the framework of the first workshop will be referred.

THE PATH: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AN UNIFORM LOCAL SYSTEM

The use of the concept of path (dependency) might mean a choice in the debate between the ‘convergent thesis’ from rational choice neo-institutionalisms and the ‘divergent thesis’ stemming from the historical neo-institutionalism strand. This introduction of the section has the purpose of adding up to the debate initiated by Röber and Schröter (2004) for this workshop and establishing the confines of the framework used here.

In summary, the ‘convergent theses’ pointed at by neo-institutional economists and the new political economy maintains that the evolution of institutions is driven by efficiency and optimal arrangements from the rationality of actors bounded by institutions. According to Peters (1999: 44),

“in all of these theoretical approaches institutions are conceptualised as collections of rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality, and therefore establish a ‘political space’ within which many interdependent political actors can function”

In these approaches, institutions channel individual preferences in their maximization efforts.

The use of the ‘convergent theses’ in the analysis of two cities according to the input/output and government/governance model presented in the last section poses a problem of rightly interpreting what efficiency means for various stakeholders. If we believe that the quality of life of a local area is the product of actions and inactions of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, the divergent theses should be able to explain which rationality and from which stakeholders are predominant. The statement of the search for efficiency in the convergent theses seems to stress the all-mighty power of public institutions. However, in a governance context, there are more than one set of public institutions (different levels of governments with different concepts of efficiency (managerial, achievement of economic development, achievement of social cohesion) and different stakeholder groups also with different rationales. Moreover, the efficiency statement of the convergent theses raises the question whether the optimal use of resources by institutions mean the efficient conversion of inputs into outputs, the efficient achievement of economical outcomes or social outcomes or all of them. ‘Convergent theses’ are also helped by transfer of knowledge and practices between institutions from different State traditions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

‘Divergent theses’ focus on the idea of path dependencies from historical neo-instituionalists (Krasner 1984) that institutions generate by the time they are created. It is maintained that once governments make their initial institutional choice in a policy area, the patterns created will persist, unless there is some force enough to overcome the inertia introduced when the institution was created. The explicit purpose of the historical neo-institutionalists is to deal with the demands of comparative political analysis. These scholars envisage their approach being able to explain differences across political systems (for instance Hall 1986, Immergut 1992). From these ‘divergent theses’ it follows less cross-national transfers and more unique models and national trajectories.

The use of the divergent theses as stated above also places a problem in the comparison of the institutional arrangements of two cities from the same national trajectory. To what extent can we

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find a different city institutional trajectory within a national trajectory? Is it possible to maintain the ‘convergent-divergent’ argument for cities within the same national trajectory?

For this paper, I have partially adopted the version of rational choice institutionalism of Ostrom (1999) agreeing with Hall and Taylor (1996, 1998) that it is possible to combine historical and rational choice institutionalism in understanding how institutions shape actors behaviour either as individuals or corporate actors. The combination of some elements of both institutionalisms could help to understand the reasoning behind this paper: two cities within the same national trajectories might have undertaken divergent paths as result of different corporate choices.

Ostrom (1999: 59) summarises the ideas behind the three levels of rules that “cumulatively affect the actions taken and outcomes obtained in any setting” from a previous work with Kiser in 1982: operational rules, collective-choice rules and constitutional rules. If these levels are applied to the study of big cities in the context of national government systems, the match of levels could be set as follows. Operational rules that “directly affect day-to-day decisions made by the participants in any setting” are those rules (formal or informal, written or not) that city councillors and officials use in their daily operations in combination with the operational rules of other stakeholders whenever interactions occur. Collective-choice rules that “affect operational activities and results through determining who is eligible and the specific rules to be used in changing operating rules” are, for instance, city charters that define institutional arrangements for internal use or for relationships with other stakeholders, regulations on citizen participation and the like, city strategic planning that orient individual actions and the like. Finally, constitutional-choice rules that “affect operational activities and their effects in determining who is eligible and the rules to be used in crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules” are the constitutional text itself, sectorial basic legislation drafted by central government and local specific basic laws when they exist.

The use of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework would require a further formalisation of physical-material conditions, attributes of community, rules-in-use, actions arenas, patterns of interaction and outcomes (with evaluative criteria). For the purposes of the argument in this paper, however, only the three levels of rules will be used explicitly, while other dimensions of the framework will be used implicitly. The argument goes as follows: while constitutional-choice rules are the same for Madrid and Barcelona, both cities have developed different collective-choice rules that affect their operational-rules and might have an impact on the outcomes that public and private stakeholders achieve.

There is a final caveat to the whole framework and the discussion between ‘divergent versus convergent theses’. Although it is institutively easy to grasp the differences between divergent and convergent trends, the measure of how much ‘closeness’ or how much ‘distance’ means ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ is not straightforward. It seems that it is not easy to agree on a universal definition of this measure. In the concluding remarks, I will try to assess the divergence of the institutional arrangements of Madrid and Barcelona according to contextual criteria.

The premises before 1978

The political centralisation of the Spanish political and administrative system during the dictatorship of Franco inherited the liberal tradition of the French Revolution and Napoleonic influence in the distribution of power in the territory. Local authorities were from 1939 until 1979 an arm’s length of central government. Municipalities were submitted to central power as the centre directly (in the case of Madrid and Barcelona) or indirectly appointed province and municipal authorities and decided on all relevant local matters. This control meant that the centre transferred most of the necessary funds for the minimum level of services that municipalities had to provide and, in fact, the service delivery was mostly provided through peripheral administration of central ministries.

The Spanish political system, embedded in the Napoleonic tradition according to Loughlin and Peters (1997: 46), was built up in antagonistic State-society relations.

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The constitutional-choice rules had implicitly ‘in mind’ the Jacobean principle of ‘one and indivisible’ as a form of political organisation. Policy stile was based on legality and technocracy. Services were centrally delivered and the room for local or provincial autonomy was close to none. Last, but not least, and as a part of the dictatorial essence, freedom to choose the government was not allowed to citizens. In the exchange of resources between the centre and the periphery, local authorities scored low in political, financial, and legal autonomy.

There are two collective-choice rules that developed differently in Madrid and Barcelona during the dictatorship regarding the link between urban planning and the metropolitan area.

In Madrid, urban planning strategy in 1944 was a first attempt away from the uniform legal system. The Law created the ‘Great Madrid’ with the avowed goal of promoting urban planning beyond the municipal borders. A nationally controlled public body was created with representatives from all municipalities of the metropolitan area. This body had the role of managing and coordinating national and local interests in urban planning. This piece of legislation let Madrid to annex 13 municipalities between 1948 and 1954. The area of Madrid grew from 68 km 2 to the present 606 km2.

In 1963 the metropolitan government of Madrid with 22 municipalities and 1706 km2 was established for the coordination of urban functions through the Commission for Planning and Coordination of the Metropolitan Area (COPLACO – Comisión de Planeamiento y Coordinación del Área Metropolitana). This body was dominated by the State with a representative from each local authority. Nonetheless, the municipality of Madrid was allowed to lead the urban planning and created an executive body for coordination purposes (Gerencia de Urbanismo).

Unlike in Madrid, the creation of the Commission for Urban Planning of Barcelona and the County (Comisión de Urbanismo de Barcelona y su Comarca) in 1953 did not involved the amalgamation of the surrounding municipalities, whose existence could not be explained as a part of the history of the big city of Barcelona . The local authorities of the influence area of Barcelona had already their distinctive nature and history. In 1974 the metropolitan entity of Barcelona was created for the execution of the metropolitan urban planning, although the State still exerted certain fiscal control on the entity.

This different approach towards the relationship between Barcelona and other municipalities explain the development of the horizontal governmental relationships within the metropolitan area during the 1980s and 1990s. While the municipalities surrounding Madrid fear any type of cooperation that might involve amalgamation, the patterns of cooperation in Barcelona metropolitan area have fostered the creation of metropolitan entities and municipal associations for dealing with different basic services. The regional government of Madrid undertakes most of the metropolitan work (Rodríguez-Álvarez 2002, Tomàs, 2002). While Madrid can be featured as centralising organisation in relation with entities of the similar level of government, Barcelona qualifies as a partner and network developer in the area, even though its economical strength is overwhelming.

Until the 1960s, Madrid and Barcelona had the same legal regime as the rest of the Spanish cities regardless their size. Nonetheless, some historical events help to understand the evolution of both cities. This brief review draws from Rodríguez-Álvarez (2002: 111-117).

The special Laws for Madrid and Barcelona were collective rules that set the framework in which local stakeholders implemented operational rules. These rules had also the feature of uniformity as national government drafted for both cities similar regulations. For the first time in history, the 1957 Law permitted a distinct organisation from the rest for Madrid and Barcelona. Three aspects merit attention:

1. The 1957 Law did not imply autonomy of the two cities for drafting a municipal charter. The special decrees of Madrid and Barcelona were drafted in 1963 and 1960 respectively.

2. The main goal of both decrees was to strengthen the executive capacity of the municipal government vis à vis the organic democratic bodies of the municipality.

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3. These decrees also envisaged the territorial deconcentration of functions with the creation of city districts.

Strengthening the political executive was a normal consequence of a dictatorship. The chain of command had to be operating not only in the administrative machinery of the State but also between State and territorial entities and within local authorities. The deconcentration measure was implemented in pursuing efficiency in the delivery of services, not with the goal of increasing citizen participation.

The transformations after 1978

The situation changed considerably during the transition to democracy. The period of transition gave way to a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier 1991). The governmental structures had acquired a considerable degree of inertia during Franco’s times, but the political forces that brought about the democracy were able to introduce measures that meant a turning point in the way the State was organised, and in the type of constitutional rules. Nonetheless, the spirit of previous arrangements was maintained.

The dictatorial regime and the Napoleonic State were challenged in the period from Franco’s death (1975) and the approval of Constitution (1978). For the former, the demand was freedom; for the latter, territorial autonomy. Two strategies were at hand for the founders of the Constitution regarding political decentralisation: devolving political power to local authorities and granting only them with autonomy or creating ex novo a regional autonomous level. The second strategy succeeded favouring the pressure of nationalist political leaders from Basque Lands and Catalonia, creating thus the present Autonomic State (Estado de las Autonomías). The 17 Autonomous Communities (AC) were created with their own parliament, government and administration. Besides, two tiers of local government were established: provincial level (53 units including province and island authorities) and municipal level (8,096 municipalities and 3,699 minor local entities, 3 metropolitan areas, 49 comarcas (only in Catalonia) (MEH, 1998a)).

The regional decentralisation strategy won over a local one. Although local corporations acquired the right to self-administration with political legitimacy through elections, the big share of welfare functions went to ACs. The overlooking Napoleonic State has reproduced himself in the regional authorities, denying transfer of functions to local authorities. Whereas local authorities only have statutory powers, Autonomous Communities have got legislative powers. Moreover, Autonomous governments have a say on local matters and constitute a strong financial resource for municipal authorities. For the purposes of analysing local government, the constitutional-choice rules were shared by central government and Autonomous Communities.

Building on Agranoff (1994), the features of the Spanish ‘federal’ arrangements relevant to our argument are the following ones:

1. The agreements to achieve autonomy were established on a bipartite regional-national basis among the regions that historically have pressed on the centre to get autonomy: Basques and Catalans on one side, central government, on the other. These negotiations grounded the basis for future agreements of other regions that wished to achieve the same degree of autonomy. From the very beginning, a competitive pattern among regions as opposed to co-operative arrangements was established.

2. Autonomy was obtained through the acquisition of national functions in an ongoing process. Instead of getting an overarching agreement whereby the agreed Central government functions were transferred to regional authorities from the very beginning, the transfer of services has taken place over the years.

3. Asymmetry was the working strategy chosen by the historical regional authorities. The Constitution made it possible for the three historic territories of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia to reach autonomy by a faster route than other potential territories.

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These three regions, besides Andalusia under special constitutional provision, reached autonomy before other communities: the “fast route”. The rest, on the “slow route”, reached autonomy later and was originally granted more limited powers and were made subject to a set of uniform conditions (e.g. size of cabinet, election dates, no-confidence votes). In some cases, there are areas of unique competencies or AC legislation that “stand out” as differences. For instance, the Basques and the Catalonians have their own non-municipal policing arrangements, whereas in the rest of the country two national police forces operate under the Ministry of the Interior.

These ‘federal’ arrangements have two effects in how Madrid and Barcelona have shaped their collective-choice rules. On the one hand, constitutional -choice rules are shared by national and regional government. On the other hand, periphery nationalisms have played an important role in shaping the relationships between central and autonomous government of Catalonia. Besides, nationalist parties also have an important role in municipal governments. In the region of Madrid, however, there are no nationalist parties. The combined effect of the electoral system and the party system and the presence of nationalist parties have helped the formation of coalition governments in Catalonia, while in the region of Madrid, in absence of nationalist parties, most municipal governments are of majority nature.

At the national level, three constitutional-choice options are worthwhile of mentioning:

A) After the first local elections in 1979, the Law from 1985 established the bases for self-government and it returned to the former situation of uniform system with no specific regime for big cities and metropolis. Nevertheless, this Law established that ACs were entitled to create, abolish and regulate metropolitan entities, hearing the State, municipalities and provincial authorities affected by the metropolitan body. It was up to the regional authorities the regulation of metropolitan areas. Further constitutional-choice powers to regions gave them incentives for further centralisation at the level of the AC. Whatever were the aspirations of local authorities to autonomy, they had to struggle for it against their respective Autonomous Community.

B) The special regimes of Madrid and Barcelona from the 1960s were almost abolished in practice in 1985, but a Law of 1999 allows Autonomous Communities to update these special regimes through a regional law if the city councils ask for it. There are limits to the degree of freedom in drafting these regulations.

C) In 2003 a new Law was launched for big cities.

Madrid and Barcelona have developed different paths during this period. Madrid has not moved away from the uniform path neither in the metropolitan status nor in the field of a special law for the city. With the creation of the Autonomous Community of Madrid in 1983, the functions in urban planning of the metropolitan entity, COPLACO, were transferred to the regional government. Although national legislation allows that ACs create metropolitan entities, the constitution of Madrid has not included this possibility. The city possesses 55 per cent of the population of the region and around 90 per cent live in the conurbation. This explains why the regional constitution of Madrid did not include a provision of metropolitan government. This fact would have backed the establishment of a federal district (like in Mexico D.F.) but this was not in the mind of the legislators, because it would have violated much of the historical meaning of the province (like the French departments). Rodríguez-Álvarez (2002) argues that the regional government, which covers just the province of Madrid, is playing very well the role of metropolitan authority that covers the needs of Madrid and the surrounding municipalities.

Moreover, the constitution of the regional government of Madrid envisaged a Law of the Capita l in order to recognise organisational, functional and financial differences of Madrid. Twenty-one years later, Madrid remains without a special Law. Interviewed officials explain the absence of a Capital Law due to the special features of the federal nature of the State. Interviewees in the city of Madrid suggest that Madrid has been loaded with the burden of centralisation and a Law granting a special

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status to the capital, although reasonable in terms of city management, would have been inappropriate in the ongoing federal debate. A new Law for the Capital would have required not only a redefinition of functions between the three levels of government (for instance on policing) but also different financial arrangements.

In absence of a Law of the Capital, Madrid will apply the general law of 2003 for big cities. In fact, the present mayor of Madrid (Ruiz-Gallardón) took actively part in drafting the new law when being president of the regional government at the time the Law was negotiated, as he knew the possibilities of being elected for the Madrid office. Madrid, then has the same Law as other Spanish cities like Valencia, Zaragoza and Sevilla. Barcelona, however, will not apply this law.

Barcelona has experienced a different development both in metropolitan matters and in special regulation for the city. The constitution (Estatuto) of Catalonia of 1979 included a provision for metropolitan entities. The Municipal Metropolitan Organization of Barcelona of the dictatorship became the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation (CMB – Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona) (see details in Luque 2004 for this workshop) with the main function of implementing the Metropolitan Plan. The life of the CMB suffered from internal pressures (the role played by Barcelona in the metropolitan body) and external pressures (the metropolitan entity was made of municipalities governed by the left while the regional government was headed by Jordi Pujol from the nationalist centre-right).

In 1987, one year after Margaret Thatcher abolished the metropolitan councils in England, the Catalan Parliament abolished the CMB. The abolition was probably based on two grounds: different political party majorities in the regional government and in the municipal governments of the metropolitan entity and struggle over competencies. The conurbated area of the CMB covered almost half of the population of the Catalonia and high concentration of power in the metropolitan area would have endangered the position of the regional government.

Their main functions of the abolished CMB were distributed amongst two metropolitan entities for transportation, water and waste treatment services. Besides, the municipalities of the metropolitan entity continued their cooperation with the establishment in 1988 of multi-purpose public partnerships of municipalities (mancomunidades, Vereine) and the establishment of a single purpose partnership in 1997, the consortium for transport (State, regional government and the metropolitan entity for transport).

On the other hand, Barcelona will not apply the 2003 Law for big cities, because it already drafted a Municipal Charter (Carta Municipal de Barcelona), which was approved in 1998. When the Municipal Charter was drafted and approved, it differed from the common regime in several aspects: the mayor was stronger, the Charter included participatory mechanisms and new functions as well as more financial transfers from the centre. The two last features have not been approved yet by central government. The 2003 Law for big cities has also strengthened the executive (although not exactly the mayor) and has included participatory instruments. An interviewee from the national ministry in charge of drafting the 2003 Law suggests that Barcelona has preferred to keep his own Charter for two main reasons: a) form symbolic reasons maintaining the Charter gives certain independence to the management of the city and it also involves certain autonomy from the Catalonian capital from central government; b) the Charter grants more powers to the mayor than the an executive government (as the 2003 Law does). As the Barcelona government has always been formed by a coalition, it seems that it is easier to negotiate the mandate programme at the beginning while having more freedom as mayor of the majori ty party in managing the day-to-day administration.

THE RESPONSES (1): WITHIN THE CITY COUNCIL

In this sections, the analysis of the institutional arrangements that affect the internal structure of the city council: executive and legislative relationships, politics and administrative machinery and centre districts will be addressed (see boxes A, B, C from Figure 1 on page 5 of this paper).

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Many structural reforms at local level in England, Germany and Italy have enhanced in the last ten years the role of the mayor in the municipality. The direct election of the mayor has been introduced with the argument that directly elected leaders are needed in order to enhance the control on the representative body and on the administration, in order to back up the leadership on networks in a governance context and in order to invigorate local democracy. The strength of the mayor is not solely a function of direct or indirect election.

In order to assess the strength of the mayor, the framework crafted by Svara 1990: 47-48; Ross et al. 1991:84-89; Judd and Swanstrom, 1994: 92-94; and Hambleton 1998a: 43-45, summarised and amended by Sweeting (2003: 468-471), and adapted for big cities will be used to assess the relative strength of the mayors in Madrid and Barcelona. The power on the council and the bureaucratic machinery can be measured through five features (see Figure 2). A ‘strong’ mayor prepares the budget, drafts and sets the overall policy framework, appoints senior staff, controls over the work of departments. Besides, in ‘strong’ mayor models, the mayor and the council are the only elected officials.

Figure 2 The strong-mayor/weak-mayor continuum within the organisation

Strong mayor Weak mayor Mayor and council only elected actors Many elected actors Mayor controls budget Mayor and council share control of budget Mayor controls policy Mayor and council share control of policy Mayor appoints staff Council appoints staff Mayor directs bureaucracy Council directs bureaucracy Mayor directs district administration District administration is autonomous Source: Adapted from Sweeting, 2003: 468.

The capacity of the mayor to lead the city council can be studied in several relationships using the categories of Figure 2: the relationship between the mayor and the councillors, its command capacity exerted on the administrative machinery and the relationships with the districts.

A uniform local system predicts similarities in the relative ‘strength’ of the mayor within the city council. However, institutions are not just written rules, but also norms, customs, habits of actors in local settings. Even though constitutional and collective choice rules might be uniform, operational rules (written or not) might differ and imprint a distinct flavour in the relations among the most important stakeholders of an organisation. The analysis of Barcelona and Madrid is undertaken through a description of constitutional and collective rules followed by the different responses at the operational level.

Executive, representative body and administrative machinery

In the typology of Svara (1990: 45-54; Hambleton: 1998a: 43-6), there is a distinction between the council manager model and the mayor-council model. In the council manager model, the electorate votes for a council that appoints a chief executive with considerable authority on the machinery. The chief executive has an important role in the daily activities of the bureaucracy and in the shape of the council policy. This model applies to many American and British cities. According to the typology, in the mayor-council model, the political executive (a mayor directly elected) and the legislative body are separated. In this model, elected politicians have the authority.

Spanish mayors belong rather to the mayor-council model with some differences. Citizens do not directly elect mayors in Spain. Decision-making powers within the commune are vested in a council which is popularly elected every four years. The council (pleno) elects the mayor following each municipal election. The mayor appoints a government commission with councillors from the assembly (from 2003, the government commission can be partially formed by members from outside the elected assembly). Out of this commission, the mayor selects the councillors with

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departmental responsibility in the city administration. In fact the mayor acts like a prime minister and councillors like national ministers with the only difference that councillors must come until 2003 legislation out of the city council. From 2003 on, there is more separation between the mayor and the government commission on one side and the assembly on the other. The model has parliamentary outfit, but presidential blend with extracts of a ‘strong’ mayor.

The ‘strength’ of the mayor according to Figure 2 is as follows. Councillors have not competitors in the election arena at the local level. There are no other elected agencies for municipal matters. The council would be then a candidate to lead the city administration. However, the mayor is in a better position to lead. In brief, the mayor is responsible for drafting the budget (approved later on by a majority simple of the council), sets the policy framework (also with the decisions taken in the budget), appoints senior staff (political executive body and top civil servants) and controls the activity of departments, delegated in the councillors of the political executive body.

The formal collective choice rules grant a considerable power to the mayor. In operational terms, however, this strength depends on other factors: the composition of the council and the political executive, the (transversal or atomised) control over the bureaucratic machinery and the balcanisation of arm’s length autonomous bodies, municipal enterprises and private firms that deliver local services.

A) The composition of the council and the political executive . The size of the council depends on the population served by the commune, (55) Madrid and (41) Barcelona. Its composition is based on the success of political parties in achieving seats at the local elections. For the majority of Spanish cities (those over 500 inhabitants ), all regions and national parliament, the electoral system is of proportional representation (PR) in which the proportion of votes each party receives determines the number of seats it can fill. The system favours that small parties enter representative assemblies, but it is corrected by the d’Hondt highest average in order to avoid excessive fragmentation.

In Spain, the combination of PR corrected by the d’Hont and small constituencies have favoured throughout the 26 years of the democratic period that two parties (PP Partido Popular (conservatives) and PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (social democrats) get around 80 per cent of the vote in national elections and in regional elections in which there is no strong nationalist parties. In those governments the rule is single party minority or absolute majority government. However, when strong nationalist parties compete in the constituencies for regional or local elections, the rule breaks and coalition governments are quite common.

This factor explains the results in Table 2. In Madrid elections, likewise in general and regional elections, the two most voted parties, PSOE and PP, concentrate 92,7 per cent of the seats (51 councillors out of 55) in 2003. The government has evolved from left-wing coalition in the first two municipal governments to absolute majority of the conservatives in the last three local elections (9 years so far). However, in Barcelona, the vote was distributed in 2003 among five parties with the dominance of social democrats (36,5 percent of seats – 15 out of 41). Besides, a left-wing coalition has led the government since 1979. A stable left-wing coalition in Barcelona and a relative long lasting government of absolute majority in Madrid are likely to have consequences in the strength of the different political actors of the council.

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Table 2 Distribution of councillors and formation of government in Barcelona and Madrid (1979-2004)

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 BARCELONA

Councillors PSC-PSOE 1 16 21 21 20 16 20 15 PSUCÄ IC-V 2 9 3 2 3 3 2 5 CIU 3 8 13 17 16 13 10 9 PP 4 6 3 4 7 6 7 Centrist 8 ERC-EV 5 2 0 0 0 2 3 5 TOTAL 43 43 43 43 41 41 41 Municipal Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition government PSC-PSUC-

CiU (6)-ERC PSC-IC-V PSC-IC-V PSC-IC-V PSC-IC-V,

ERC-EV PSC-IC-V PSC-IC-V,

ERC-EV

MADRID

Councillors 11 11 PSOE 25 25 24 21 16 20 21 AP Ä PP 23 20 30 30 28 30 CDS 6 25 1 8 PCÄIU 9 8 3 6 9 5 4 TOTAL 59 57 55 57 55 53 55 Municipal Coalition Coalition Minority Coalition Abs Majority Abs Majority Abs MajorityGovernment PSOE-PC PSOE-PC PSOE CDS-PP PP PP PP

Sources: www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm Distribution . Acronyms: 1 PSC-PSOE: Social democrats 2 PSUC- IC-V: Left and V- Greens. 3 CiU: Centrist nationalists 4 PP: Conservatives 5 ERC-EV: Left nationalists 6 CDS: Centrists.

Coalition government in Barcelona has brought about alliances, power bargains over budgetary priorities, distribution among parties of government commission seats, allocation of district councillors (see below) among wining parties of the coalition, consultation for appointment of senior officials and the like, while the mayor of Madrid has enjoyed a considerable power in controlling the whole process of appointments at central and district level and shaping after his policies the budget, with the confidence that the assembly will finally approve it.

The agreements of the coalition partners are embedded in the Municipal Action Plan (PAM- Plan de Acción Municipal). Every mandate since 1996 has a four years PAM. This PAM is not compulsory in the legislation. Whenever it exists it should be linked to the Urban Plan. The PAM is a useful planning instrument and it also allows crystallising the political agreements of the coalition. Madrid does not dispose of such a plan, as there is no government coalition that could conflict over goals.

B) The control over the bureaucratic machinery. Most Spanish councillors of the first municipal mandates have been characterised by the councillor-administrator role rather concerned by

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administrative matters. Most city councils of big cities still have an organisational structure that fosters this behaviour. The organisational structure that supports this model is labelled by López Pulido (1998) Ramió (1999) as model of political direction. In most municipal corporations the mayor delegate the management of the administration in councillors who chair the services like ministries. Those councillors follow the tradition of service delegates established in the special laws of Madrid and Barcelona of 1960. While Madrid has maintained this tradition until 2004, Barcelona changed its administrative structure since 1991 transiting from a model of political direction to a managerial model.

An evolution in some Spanish municipalities suggests that councillors are leaving the office and their role as administrator in order to meet citizens on the street. Networking, introducing participatory approaches seem to be more part of the politician role (see Brugué 2002 for Catalonian municipalities).

The patterns of managing the municipal bureaucracy chosen by mayors and councils are responsible for the dominant administrative or political role of councillors. The systems with departmental organisations from the model of political direction foster, in words of an interviewee from Madrid city council, that:

“Councillors [of the government commission] are willing to choose the colour of street lamp bulbs, as if that decision could not safely be taken by the official”.

To have councillor-administrators for the first decades of democracy might have been functional, because the major pressure then was the delivery of services by the council. After twenty-six years of democracy, different pressures are placed now upon local politicians. It is taken for granted that municipal services should be good. Nowadays, it seems that citizens are demanding leaders of the community and not just service deliverers.

The introduction of managerial reforms helps politicians to distance themselves from managers and concentrate on political roles. Public choice school and economic institutionalism have long fostered the introduction of an array of measures: privatisation, contracting out, agencification, downsizing, competition among public and private service providers, letting managers more freedom to manage resources, breaking down hierarchical organisations into flatter ones, empowering staff to take part in organisation decision-making, focusing on client-citizens through quality management, process reengineering, cross functional management versus departmental management and the like.

The possible contradictions in these measures (see Pollitt 1993 for a general discussion) and the difference of scale they apply do not undermine the change caused by them at any level of government. The introduction of NPM (New Public Management) has not had much impact in Spanish central administration. There have been though some experiences of more managerial practices in some regional administrations and in some city councils, especially from the area of Catalonia and Valencia. Although these managerial practices have brought some changes in city administration, fully-fledged NPM reforms have not been launched.

Barcelona played an important role in the introduction of managerial reforms. In Iberian and Latin American cities, Barcelona model has been widely studied and copied. The model (see details in (Ramió 1999, López-Pulido 1998, Ayuntamiento Barcelona 1999) started to originate in 1979 and developed through the years. There are several aspects that conform the ‘Barcelona model’: a clear distinction between political and managerial roles, the implementation of measures oriented to a more efficient use of financial and human resources, and the adoption of a more client-citizen oriented focus. For the purposes of this text, the most important one is the distinction between politics and administration.

The features of the ‘Barcelona model’ can be summarised as follows:

a) The distinction between the political roles of councillors and the managerial roles of administrators took clearly place since 1993. With the division of roles, politicians can devote most of their time to draft strategies, interact with social stakeholders and control the overall products

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and impacts of municipal policies. Likewise, managers have more freedom to arrange resources for daily administration. Although the border between these roles is blurred at times (especially in the districts), it seems that there are certain consensus about basic limits.

The executive organisation of the city administration comprises five sectors and ten territorial districts (see below). Each one is headed by a manager under the sole juridical person of the city council, i. e., they do not have the right to act independently. The sector and territorial managers form an executive committee (Comité Ejecutivo) that channels the co-ordination of the daily administration.

Sector and district managers are granted with the capacity of managing the services, elaborating the programmes to achieve the political goals, the management of their human, economic and material resources and evaluating the results of the unit.

According to López-Pulido (1998), the manager of General Services is a primus inter pares, has horizontal competencies and acts like a chief executive with close working relationships with the major. The president of the executive committee is a vice-mayor (Teniente de Alcalde), who, as delegate from the mayor, coordinates the committee and act as liaison between the managerial and the political body.

A complex set of information and control relationships have replaced the former political and hierarchical relationships between politicians and managers. Besides, each sector manager works with different members of the government commission, as the managerial work is linked to different political sectors. There are then two pools of managers and politicians without direct hierarchical command lines. There is the possibility of negotiating political goals among the coalition partner, while there is also unit of command in the managerial side thanks to the executive committee.

b) The implementation of measures oriented to save financial and human resources. The investments required for the Olympic Games, the general economic crisis of the beginning of the 1990s and the expanding demand of services from citizens compelled the city council to undertake rigid finance management practices like management of the financial debt, rationalisation of current expenditure and improvement of tax collection. Moreover, the city council undertook a process of downsizing. Between 1993 and 2004 the staff from the city council has been reduced from 9,823 to 6,679. Part of the reduction has been absorbed by autonomous organisations, but not all.

d) The introduction of quality management approach. Since 1996 the internal management reforms oriented action towards citizens as clients. From the customer perspective of quality management several service units drafted and implemented citizen charters; ISO 9000 has been widely introduced, and customer satisfaction surveys for both sector services and overall performance of the city council are regularly distributed.

The situation in Madrid differs notably from this picture partly due to the dominant presence of a model of political direction and the absence of party coalition partners in government. The organisation of services in Madrid is shaped after the ministerial model with a functional division of departments. Each department is headed by a councillor as a delegate from the mayor and he leaves most daily matters, not always and not all of them, to the service director. The recently elected mayor of Madrid in 2003, Ruiz-Gallardón, raised high expectations in the administrative machinery. Ruiz-Gallardón had been during eight years president of the Madrid regional government. He had exported an image of the Autonomous Community of an organisation run like business. Thanks to the presidency of the region he participated in the Senate in drafting the Law of 2003, launched in December. The Law enhances the executive capacities of the mayor and the government commission and fosters citizen participation in municipal matters of big cities.

The first appointments of Ruiz-Gallardón shows that his conception of the administrative machinery is far away from a managerial vision. On the one hand, he has maintained the basic functional structure of a typical ministry. Besides he was quite familiar to this structure in the regional

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government of Madrid. It seems that the functional structure of the region of Madrid has had a considerable weight in the draft of the 2003 Law.

On the other hand, Ruiz-Gallardón has tried to release the councillor, ultimate head of the department, from daily administrative matters. For that purpose, he has created three new positions between the service director and the councillor, directly accountable to the mayor. In 2003 there were 47 service directors plus one manager for urban planning (see Table 3). In March 2004, the number of service directors (politically appointed) has increased to 70. Besides, 87 new appointments have filled the levels between the service director and the councillor. All these new appointments, except 18, have the label of manager (gerente), but until 31st of March, when the new internal regulations have been approved, they cannot sign administrative regulations.

Table 3 Appointments in Madrid city council (2003 and 20004)

Before Ruiz-Gallardón After Ruiz-Gallardón April 2003 March 2004

Councillor-Delegates 0 10 Chief executives (Director Gerente) 1 48 District manager(Gerente Distrito) 0 21 Secretario Técnico (Technical Secretary) 0 8 Service Director (Director Servicios) 47 70

Total 48 157

Source: Internal report from Ayuntamiento (mimeo)

According to one interviewee in Madrid:

“the administration is becoming fatter, not flatter. Through this process the administration is losing muscle and gaining fat, not added value. Every process now is simply taking more time. Each new post inholder has to justify the salary by looking into the documents. Meetings of managers frequently deal only with simple matters. While organisations are striving to get flatter hierarchies, our mayor is making it longer…”

In Madrid, an absence of managerial structure goes parallel to the lack of managerial practices: there is no quality management in the municipal services, sector service surveys have only started in 2003, there are no four year Municipal Action Plans and there is not envisaged a rationalisation of the personnel. On the contrary, at least more than 3000 new jobs are planned for the next two years.

A final comparison of personnel and finances in both cities can offer new insights in the analysis (see Table 4). As a result of streamlining the amount of personnel, Barcelona has undergone important cuts in staff, which has resulted in rate of one city council employee per 237 inhabitants while Madrid has one employee per 155,5 inhabitants. On the other hand, the amount of euros per inhabitant is almost 300 euros higher in Barcelona (1036) than in Madrid (781). In Table 8 shows though, that the capacity of Madrid of taxing its citizens is higher than Barcelona. Barcelona has cut costs in staff but has increased the taxation level, while Madrid has maintained or increased staff levels but limited the taxation level.

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Table 4 Staff and expenditure of Madrid and Barcelona in 2002

Barcelona Madrid

Civil servants (1) 5742 19002 Labour contracts 863 642 Appointees 33 194 Elected 41 55 Total 6679 19893

Inhabitants per employee 237 155.5

Expenditure in euros 1,640,082,802 2,414,861,900 Expenditure per capita in euros 1036 781

Sources: For Barcelona: http://www.bcn.es/estadistica/castella/dades/anuari/cap19/index.htm. For Madrid, internal report (mimeo).

The distribution of power between the centre and the districts

Compared to London, Berlin and Paris (see Schröter and Röber 2004), Barcelona and Madrid are similar to the model of Paris (see Table 5 for district figures). The Spanish cities basically portray a centralised metropolis where some functions are deconcentrated to the districts. The district authorities do not have decision-making power autonomy on competencies nor planning functions and the governing body of the district is not elected directly by district citizens. In contrast to this, Berlin districts act almost like self-governing entities and London boroughs are completely autonomous. The similarities between Madrid and Paris do not come as surprise, although there are also important differences. In Spain, the gain of federal status brought about the fall of the Napoleonic State tradition and started to resemble the Prussian tradition at the national level. However, Napoleonic tradition did not fully disappear from the Iberian landscape, as it was transferred to the new Autonomous Communities and remained at local level.

Table 5 Territorial divisions of Madrid and Barcelona in comparative perspective

Territorial division Madrid Barcelona Paris London Berlin

Name of districts Distrito Distrito Arrondissement Borough Bezirke No of districts 21 10 20 33 12 Average area of district in km2 28.8 9.8 5.3 47.8 74.3 Average population per district 152719 144930 105,000 218,000 283,000

Source for Paris, London and Berlin: (Kuhlmann 2004 for this workshop)

From the six possible objectives identified by Hambleton (1992) and Hambleton, Hogget and Burns (1994) (quoted in Amorós 1994) in transferring services to lower levels of government (improvement of services, strengthening local accountability, improvement of distribution among different areas, encouragement of political awareness, development of staff and control of costs), the Barcelona government stated the first three while Madrid has stressed so far only the first one. The way in which the deconcentration goals have been achieved through the institutional arrangements differ in Madrid and Barcelona, even though they are fashioned after the same national trajectory.

The national legal status of the districts first appeared in the special Laws of Madrid and Barcelona in the 1960s. Afterwards, the Law of 1985 conferred the district the status of a territorial body of the city council with desconcentrated administrative powers. The 2003 Law for big cities has also regulated the districts.

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The first wave of territorial divisions of Madrid from the XIVth to the XVIIIth centuries followed either religious or military patterns. The first administrative arrangements dates back to the kingdom of Isabel II (1830s) and started to grow during the XXth century (12 in 1955, 18 in 1968 and 21 in 1987). The first expansion in the 1960s reflected the amalgamation of municipalities from previous years, while the second growth adjusted the city administration to the natural growth of the city. Two conclusions can be drawn from this evolutionary sketch. On the one hand, the districts have a long tradition. According to an interviewee, citizens, when visiting the district administration, do not go to the junta (name of the governing body of the district) but to the ayuntamiento (mairie or city council). For decades, they have been used to go there for registration services and they level the junta to the whole council. On the other hand, the development of the districts has not followed a rational plan or a consensual debate. Changes in district administration have appeared as a piecemeal reform with decisions taken by the political party of the government at the time.

The structure of each district was established in 1983. The governing body of the district is the District Board (Junta Municipal de Distrito). In Madrid, the district board comprises of three bodies: the president (a councillor appointed by the mayor), the neighbourhood board (with 18 neighbour representatives appointed by the political parties according to their weight in the overall municipal election) and the sector councils (consultative bodies of citizens). The composition of the board reflects the local electoral results at the city level. The electoral winner has the majority in the city council, appoints the delegated councillor of the centre in the district and has the majority of the neighbourhood board. The election results do not affect then the composition of the district assembly, which is not directly elected. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that there is a political responsiveness line between the administration of the district and the electorate.

There are some differences in the Barcelona arrangement of districts. Several authors (Amorós 1994; Gomà and Brugué 1994; Ayuntamiento Barcelona 1999) coincide that the municipal government of Barcelona had the avowed goals of improving service delivery and of introducing participatory mechanisms with the deconcentration process. Those authors label the process as decentralisation, which implies a transfer of political and decision-making power from the centre to the periphery. However, in continental language, deconcentration defines more accurately a decentralisation of administrative functions, while decision-making and planning remain at the centre. In comparative terms, the deconcentration gives a better account than decentralisation even though some regulatory functions have been transferred to the district administration. The whole process has three features: match of the supply with the demand side of service, consensus and planning.

A) Match of the supply side with the demand side of the service. The political debate on deconcentration started short after the first local democratic elections in 1979. The process put efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery on the political agenda. On the supply side, the deconcentration should imply a new organisational form and a re-arrangement of services. On the demand side, the process would involve an increase of responsiveness in dealing with urban problems of districts.

B) Consensus. Unlike in Madrid, the deconcentration in Barcelona was consensual and carefully planned. The consensus involved political parties, civil servants and the support of civil associations. Firstly, the consensus among political parties has produced different results than in Madrid in the board of the district. The governing body of the district reflects the election results in the district. Unlike Madrid, the winning party in the district will appoint the councillor-president of the district, who has rather representative and ceremonial functions. Secondly, the consensus has informed the whole process of deconcentration: agreement on the territorial division and the number of districts, on the contents of the transfer of tasks and on the city regulation about citizen participation.

C) Planning. Finally, the process of administrative deconcentration in Barcelona was carefully planned. An in-depth analysis of the allocation of resources and of the design of the service in the new situation was undertaken prior to the transfer of functions to the districts. At the same time,

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the city administration was experimenting the transition from a bureaucratic departmental and multiple-level hierarchical model to a more managerial, interdepartmental and flatter model. The implementation of this plan has been executed throughout several years.

The city was divided from 1949 to 1984 into 12 administrative areas prior to the deconcentration process. Those areas were no longer maintained. The process started from a clean slate and it was phased as follows. The consensus on deconcentration among political parties took place between 1983 and 1984: division of the city in 10 districts and share of executive and representative district positions among winning political parties at municipal elections. The largest bulk of services was transferred to districts from 1985 to 1987. The introduction of managerial practices and the implementation of participatory instruments started in 1987.

At the end of the process the districts are in charge of delivering the municipal welfare policies, take part in the implementation of territorial programmes of the city administration and develop minor regulatory functions.

The organisation of each district is relatively similar in Barcelona and in Madrid, although with some differences. In Barcelona , the political structure of the district comprises a district councillor, a district council (15 members), a president of the district council, a district government commission, and advisory council of associations, working commissions and sector participatory councils. The mayor appoints an elected city councillor as district councillor with the approval of the city council. In the eve of coalition government, the district councillors are distributed among the coalition parties. The district council represents the interest of the districts. The political parties appoint its 15 members according to their results in the district. The district council elects its president, whose functions are basically ceremonial of representation of the district. The district government commission, with functions allocated by the district council, is an executive body made of some members of the district council. Most of its work is undertaken through working commissions. Moreover, the advisory council of associations and the sector participatory councils allow consultation among NGOs (non-governmental organisations) representatives.

Districts, both in Barcelona and in Madrid, deliver different general (population registry), technical (licensing for industrial, commercial and building activities among others) and personal services (social services, sports, culture, youth services and health prevention). In theory, central departments are in charge of planning and policy design, evaluation and capacity building of district staff. Districts implement policies at the territory level, deliver services and make proposals regarding their area.

In Madrid, the district council (Pleno de la junta) has 23 members whose distribution is made among the political parties according to the share of their electoral results at the city level, not at the district level like in Barcelona. In the absence of a body of managers and of cross-department management, the administrative organisation resembles the provincial delegations of ministries with a person in charge of administrative matters.

From a comparative perspective, there are three divergent paths so far encountered in the relationships between the centre and the districts in Madrid and Barcelona: a) Service delivery seems to be more decentralised in Barcelona; b) Coordinating mechanisms are stronger in Barcelona than in Madrid; c) Accountability to electorate is more direct in Barcelona than in Madrid and, d) Experiences of participation are more numerous and more intense in Barcelona.

A) Service delivery seems to be more decentralised in Barcelona. Madrid officials from districts or from coordinating units, interviewed for this paper, believe that the level of services accomplished at the district level in Madrid is higher than in Barcelona. A closer look might tell something different. The amount of deconcentration depends on the amount and type of service delivery, and the resources (personnel and budget) that each level enjoys. The range of services provided in both cities at district level is very similar from an analysis of the regulations that frame the subject. The proportion of the budget under the responsibility of the districts (see Table 6- row 24) is almost the same in Barcelona (10,9 per cent of overall budget – column G) and in Madrid (9,4 per

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cent column M). However, the size of staff at district level (26,1 per cent of city administration) is higher in Barcelona than in Madrid (12,6). Barcelona city council, undermanned in overall comparative terms (1 employee per 228,7 inhabitants; in Madrid per 153), has though a better ratio per employee at district level (876,2; 1211,6 in Madrid).

B) Coordinating mechanisms are stronger in Barcelona. Through the meetings of district managers with sector managers there are regular contacts for coordination in Barcelona. In Madrid, there is a councillor at central level in charge of the coordination, but he is not always in a strong position to impose his/her view on district matters when sector councillors of the centre have direct interest in district affairs.

C) Accountability between district authorities and electorate is not direct because they are not directly elected. However, at least in Barcelona, the district council appointed by the political parties reflect the electoral results in the district.

D) Participation in Barcelona districts is more intense and of higher quality than in Madrid. This question will be addressed later on.

Table 6 Districts in Barcelona and Madrid

Barcelona Madrid A B C D (2) E G H I (1) J (2) K M

No Name Popul. Staff C/D €/inhab Name Popul. Staff I/J €/inhab

1 Ciutat Vella 97282 200 486,4 244,8 Centro 139431 193 722,4 144,22 L’Eixample 251497 175 1437,1 92,4 Arganzuela 137022 206 665,2 98,03 Sants-Montjuïc 169821 208 816,4 131,6 Retiro 124888 117 1067,4 80,04 Les Corts 81951 113 725,2 148,6 Salamanca 147350 114 1292,5 77,85 Sarrià-Sant Gervasi 134241 126 1065,4 114,0 Chamartín 139987 106 1320,6 92,06 Gràcia 114853 138 832,3 151,7 Tetuán 144700 114 1269,3 103,37 D’Horta-Guinardó 166655 202 825,0 117,7 Chamberí 148570 112 1326,5 81,48 Nou Barris 164309 188 874,0 116,9 Fuencarral-El Pardo 207748 127 1635,8 88,79 Sant Andreu 136867 176 777,7 139,8 Moncloa-Aravaca 112278 127 884,1 139,210 Sant Martí 209714 217 966,4 130,8 Latina 255545 130 1965,7 87,211 Carabanchel 226138 124 1823,7 95,212 Usera 121130 104 1164,7 132,313 Puente Vallecas 232520 152 1529,7 81,114 Moratalaz 107405 105 1022,9 121,815 Ciudad Lineal 227799 123 1852,0 75,316 Hortaleza 148035 97 1526,1 108,617 Villaverde 130417 114 1144,0 142,718 Villa de Vallecas 62978 91 692,1 156,619 Vicálvaro 54477 76 716,8 192,820 San Blas 137445 103 1334,4 134,721 Barajas 37672 77 489,2 235,7

22 District total/average1527190 1743 876,2 130,8 3043535 2512 1211,6 105,323 City (council) total 1527190 6679 228,7 1204,9 3043535 19893 153,0 1125,524 % district/ city 26,1 10,9 12,6 9,425 Average districts 152719 174 88 144930 120 58

Sources: For Barcelona http://www.bcn.es/estadistica/castella/dades/anuari/cap19/index.htm C / D= Data from 1-01-2002; D / J= Data from 31-12-2002 E/G/K/M= Budget data for 2004: personnel, current expenditure, transfers, investments. Population data for 1-01-2002. For Madrid: www.munimadrid.org and internal reports (mimeo).

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THE RESPONSES (2): BEYOND THE CITY COUNCIL

The analysis of the external institutional arrangements either shaped by other levels of government (intergovernmental relations) or outlined by the municipality (with other city stakeholders) will be addressed in this section (see boxes D and E from Figure 1 on 5).

The analysis of IGRs follows the power dependence model from Rhodes (1981: 100-101) to highlight the place of Madrid and Barcelona in relationships with higher and equal levels of government. The model postulates that organizations depend on each other for resources (legal, hierarchical, financial, political, informative) and for exchange relationships. Local and higher levels of government play complex ‘games’ in which both central and local participants manoeuvre for advantage. The size limit of the text does not allow giving a full account of these games in the Spanish system. However, the position of local government and, especially Madrid and Barcelona, in the system according to the different resources will help to understand the IGRs in which these metropolis interplay.

Spanish local government in the system of Intergovernmental Relations (IGRs)

The distribution of financial resources shows that local government stays in a weak position in comparison to other levels of government. In the last 25 years public expenditure has grown as a part of the GDP from around 25 per cent to 39 per cent. Its distribution among levels of government shows:

a) Central government is no longer in monopoly of service delivery and public expenditure in Spain as its share of expenditure has decreased from 91 per cent in 1979 to around 54,1 per cent in 2003.

b) ACs expenditure has increased at most rapid pace and has grown more than overall expenditure of local authorities (from 0 in 1979 to 30,9 per cent in 2003).

c) The expenditure of local government has grown in absolute terms but has remained stable between 10,8 per cent and 15 per cent in the last 20 years.

The devolution process has not reached local authorities. The claim of municipalities for a bigger share of public resources (achieving 25% of public sector expenditure) finds the opposition of regional authorities that have so far avoided to decentralise further down.

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Figure 3 Distribution of public sector expenditure among governmental levels (1979-2003) (in %)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Central Government 91,2 76,6 65,8 65 59,1 54,1

Autonomous Communities 0,1 12,6 20,2 23,1 27,4 30,9

Local Authorities 8,7 10,8 14 12,3 13,6 15

1979 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003

Sources:

For public expenditure in 1979 and in 1985: (MEH, 1998b); from 1990 onw ards (MAP, 2003) (1) Pensions of the Social Security and passive classes are included. (2) Expenditure as a consequence of passive financial expenditures is not included.

* Estimated

Human resources have been also unequally distributed among levels of government. While central government accounts for 43.5% of total public personnel, ACs and local corporations have respectively 34.8% and 21.7% in 2000. The increasing trend of regional employment and the stabilising tendency of local staff replicate somehow the evolution of the distribution of public expenditure among levels of government.

The distribution of functions between national government and regions favours the implementation of services at the regional level, while planning and evaluation remains at central level. There is a mixture of uniform national programs, shared programming with subnational variation, and programmes with substantial areas of regional variation. The Constitution and the arrangements on bipartite basis have established a system of shared and exclusive powers according to different functions. For around 80 per cent of the cases, legislation may be exclusive of central government or shared with ACs. If it is shared with ACs, basic legislation is a central governmental function and development legislation falls in the domains of ACs. ACs normally perform implementation and direct delivery of services. Most welfare state functions, including social services, education, health, have been transferred to the ACs. Local government has received the ‘left-overs’. Only social services that account for welfare state expansion are mandatory services to be provided by municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants (12.7% of municipalities with 64% of Spanish population). Most compulsory local services are basic (refuse collection, water supply, street cleaning, etc). A general clause allows municipalities to deliver any kind of service based on a local interest. Thus, local corporations may also administer welfare state policies. In any case,

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municipalities are the nearest governmental units to citizens and their demands so that local authorities must stand pressures for new services, even though they overlap with the services provided by regional authorities. Many local authorities have articulated employment and economic development services even though they are not part of their compulsory tasks.

In terms of legal resources, national basic legislation from 1985 applies to local authorities established a homogeneous system that applies to all cities regardless their size and nature. There are some peculiarities in relation to the compulsory provision of services according to size, but the political and administrative structure, local taxes and personnel system follow the same general patterns.

Barcelona and Madrid in the IGRs

Barcelona plays their role in different territorial arenas: international, national, regional and provincial. Madrid, the political capital of the country, has a similar position in those arenas, except that the region and the province have the same boundaries and only one authority. This subsection focuses on vertical IGRs.

Three aspects will be considered in the analysis of the vertical IGRs: financial autonomy, legal room of manoeuvre and conflict over competencies and political relationships between governments.

A) Financial autonomy. One indicator to measure financially the degree of autonomy of higher levels of government is the proportion of grants of higher levels of government as percentage of total income from local authorities. In comparative terms, Madrid and Barcelona are placed in the middle range of local authorities in the reception of grants (see Table 7). According to this indicator, Swedish cities would be the most autonomous while the British one experiment a high degree of centralisation. In 2003, the percentages of Madrid (39) and Barcelona (44) were relatively similar. Moreover, most of the grants that Madrid and Barcelona receive are non-conditional to the delivery of certain services. This increases the autonomous capacity of local government in Spain.

Table 7 Grants from higher levels of government (as a % from total income)

2002

Suecia1 19.1 Francia1 34.2 Alemania1 34.6 Estados Unidos1 37.6 Madrid2 39.0 Barcelona2 44.0 Italia1 48.2 Reino Unido1 70.1

Source: 1 Parrado 2002. From: International Monetary Fund (annual) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund (monthly). International Financial Statistics. 2 Data for 2003: Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Presupuestos municipales para 2003. Ayuntamiento de Barcelona. Presupuestos municipales para 2003.

More than half of income from Madrid and Barcelona is locally raised through taxes or obtained through financial markets. The national government has the capacity to limit the income generated through taxes. Annual budgetary laws include a 2 per cent limit on expenditure in order to comply with the criteria of the Stability Pact. The Madrid city council has still an important room for increasing the taxes, because the relative fiscal effort of Madrid citizens is one of the lowest in

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Spain, and much lower than in Barcelona (see Table 8). For instance, in property tax, Barcelona is already collecting 76,72 per cent of its legal limit, while Madrid has only collected 43,21 per cent.

The new elected government of Ruiz-Gallardón from PP in 2003 planned a raise in local taxes for the budget and the national government of Madrid, also from PP, placed considerable obstacles on this measure, because the avowed policy of the party has been the reduction of the tax level. In the end, the budget has increased enormously both in personnel expenditure and in investments.

Table 8 Grants and relative fiscal effort in municipal taxes 2003 (maximum 100%)

Barcelona Madrid Grants from higher levels of government as % of total income 44% 39%

Property tax 76.72 43.21 Economic activity 58.09 28.97 Tax on vehicles 100 52.47 Building works 75 100 Taxes on property transactions 100 96.67

Sources: Direcció Adjunta per a Inversions i Pressupostos. Gerència Municipal. Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2003. http://www.bcn.es/estadistica/castella/dades/anuari/cap19/index.htm (visited on 31 March 2004). Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Presupuestos 2003. Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Ranking Tributario Municipios Españoles 2003.

B) Legal room of manoeuvre and conflict over functions. The main features of the uniform legal system were described in a previous section. The system has evolved from historical uniformity for all local authorities with some peculiarities regarding the level of compulsory services to a two tier-system in December 2003 with different regulation for big cities.

Barcelona and Madrid, in the context of general and regional legislation, might have opted out the uniform system with special laws. They did so in the 1960s. Barcelona approved its Citizen Charter and it was passed in 1998 by the Catalonian regional government. However, some parts of the legislation concerning further functions and financial resources for the city council from central government have not been enforced yet because the national parliament has not endorsed the Citizen Charter. Since 1983 Madrid could have had the Law of the capital. This Law has not materialised due to the feeling that this Law will draw a close attention from those that claim that politics in Spain is too centralised. A new Law of the capital will undoubtedly imply further functions and finances for the capital, as holder of the main seat of national, regional and municipal government.

The destinies of both cities are tied in this front. A further decentralisation of functions and finances from national government will happen or not at the same time for both. The response of central government to further decentralisation of functions and funds addresses the responsibility of regional governments to do so. Central government has reduced dramatically its participation in service delivery in favour of Autonomous Communities. They are now unwilling to decentralise further and achieve the 25 per cent of public expenditures that local governments claim.

Barcelona and Catalonian authorities have demanded further infrastructure investments in the port (for becoming the most important international hub of the Mediterranean), in the airport (for competing internationally on intercontinental flights), and in high speed train (which will arrive in Barcelona 12 years later than in Sevilla). A focus group participant from the business sector in Barcelona criticised this argument:

26

“Dear friend [responding to another participant who made similar claims to the paragraph below], we have had the chance to exert influence in Madrid national government during many years of support of CiU to the national government [parliamentary support of the governments between 1993 and 2000 with both PSOE and PP]. We had the key then and we could have got all the infrastructures you mention…”

However, the most important arguments in IGRs of Madrid and Barcelona are maintained with their respective regional authorities.

C) Political relationships. Focus groups participants from the business sector in Barcelona in 2003 argued that Madrid businesses had it easier because there was a match of political parties in national, regional and local government. However, the Catalonian and the Barcelona government have started to coincide in terms of party government only since 2003, when the left gained both regional and local elections (see Figure 4 Type of government).

Figure 4 Type of government in Barcelona, Madrid, their regions and Spain (1979-2004)

Governments in Catalonia and in Barcelona have not coincided in 24 out of 25 years. The regional government headed by Jordi Pujol since 1980 belonged to CiU, a centrist nationalist coalition party. Barcelona city council has been led by a left wing coalition with PSOE (social democrats) as a leading party under the mandates of Narcís Serra, Pasqual Maragall and Joan Clos.

The abolition of the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona in 1987, encouraged somehow by the example of M. Thatcher, helped to diminish the competencies of a city council that started to control almost half of the population in Catalonia.

A focus group participant of the commercial sector perceived the relationships between the two governments as follows:

Nat. Gov

02 03

Madrid Reg

Madrid city

Nat. Gov

Catalunya

Barcelona

040100999897969594939291908988878685848382818079

Nat. Gov

02 03

Madrid Reg

Madrid city

Nat. Gov

Catalunya

Barcelona

040100999897969594939291908988878685848382818079

No government

Legend

Coalition UCD>CDS + Others

UCD>CDS (centre)

CiUPP (conservatives)

Coalition PSOE / PSC + Others

PSOE (social democrats )

No government

Legend

Coalition UCD>CDS + Others

UCD>CDS (centre)

CiUPP (conservatives)

Coalition PSOE / PSC + Others

PSOE (social democrats )

27

“… I have worked in many enterprises and I have witnessed the same kind of reacion… - No! We cannot do that because Madrid has not given the approval… My reply was always: You’re wrong… It’s you who did not take the decision… We’re looking forward to the day in which Generalitat (Catalonian Government) and the city council start to add up. The façades of their headquarters should be changed to foster cooperation and not opposition [both buildings share the Sant Jaume square in Barcelona]

There are examples in which both governments have favoured different strategies. For instance, while Barcelona city council was demanding the expansion of metro lines, the regional government has promoted surface trains, and in many aspects there has not been a synergy in investment efforts. A focus group participant from an environmental association of Barcelona said during the debate:

“Generalitat [regional government] and the city council deal separately with environmental matters… they compete with investments in different ways and are unable to cooperate… For instance, if a project has received financial support from the Generalitat, it cannot receive support from the other and vice versa.”

It remains to be seen whether a recent change in 2003 in the Catalonian regional government, politically aligned with the municipal government, will have consequences in the vertical relationships. Both Pasqual Maragall (regional president) and Joan Clos (city mayor) claimed since 1999, before the Catalonian elections in 2003, the need of giving life back to the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona. Now, they can comply with these claims. If the MCB is grounded and covers the area of the Metropolitan Area of the Municipalities associations for the environment [street cleaning, trash collection and the like], it would imply that 33 local authorities join together with an overall population of 2,972,870 (2002) inhabitants and 585 km2. These figures would be quite similar to the present population and area of Madrid city council.

The situation in Madrid faces similar problems in the struggle over competencies, but the help of central government and regional government has been decisive in converting Madrid in an economical city of highest importance. Likewise in Barcelona, the struggle over competencies between the regional government and the city council stretches over different topics: urban planning, housing, environmental protection, and social services. However, in Madrid, investments have been focused and the help of central government has been invaluable. Investments in the city have helped to build up an important city network of communications (dramatic expansion of the Metro that connects several municipalities of the conurbated area, new motorways and rings around the city, expansion of the international airport), intercity network of communications (all high speed trains start in Madrid) and to promote the investment in culture (expansion at the same time of Prado, Thyssen and Reina Sofia museums), just give some examples.

Another dimension of the political relationships is the circulation of elites and the accumulation of mandates. Unlike France, there are limits in Spain to accumulate representative mandates between different levels of government. Besides, local authorities do not form part of the territorial chamber (Senate). The Senate has a mixed system of election and appointment. Most of the members are elected and a small portion is appointed by the regional governments. There are many voices that criticise the inability of the Senate of representing territorial (meaning regional) interests.

Unlike France, a seat in the mairie of the capital has not fostered so far a career for the presidency in national government. Candidates from PSOE and PP for the mayoral office have not had national relevance. They were not thought as future candidates for national government. The mairie of Madrid, more than a promotional position, represents a menace in the political career. Political chronics seem to suggest that candidates will see their chances for the government career burnt if elected mayor of the capital. This might explain why Madrid municipal candidates have a low profile in national politics.

Matters are slightly different between the regional and the local government both in Madrid and in Barcelona. Barcelona city council career has certainly been an important platform for Pasqual

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Maragall, the mayor of the Olympic games of 1992, in his career for the regional presidency, which finally achieved in autumn last year.

In Madrid, the career of the present mayor has been rather unorthodox. Ruiz-Gallardón started his career as councillor in Madrid city council. Later on, went to the regional assembly and he got the regional presidency from 1995 to 2003. Since 2003 Ruiz-Gallardón. It is still unclear the downward movement of Ruiz-Gallardón from the regional presidency to the mairie, and its interpretation goes beyond the purposes of this paper.

There is no enough accumulated experience yet to suggest that an office in lower levels of governments could be an advantage in big cities, especially in Madrid and Barcelona, for achieving the premiership of the next level. However, recent developments seem to suggest that the links of the political arenas between these two big cities and the regional government are coming closer, although it is a recent phenomenon that started to happen just in 2003 and simultaneously in both cities. It remains to be seen whether this circulation of elites will bring about more cooperation than conflict. In any case, the mayors of both cities want to have a role as their own right without interferences from the regional government.

This subsection on IGRs has tried to suggest that there are tensions over competencies both in Madrid and in Barcelona, but investments from different levels of government have converged in Madrid, while in Barcelona there has been less cooperation and the feeling that both institutions have wasted some years in developing the city and the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Participation as a governance principle

In a nutshell, the participatory approach and results of this approach in Barcelona have been steadier and more relevant than in Madrid. To assert that there is a participatory approach in Madrid would be an exaggeration. The comparison in this dimension is not very favourable for Madrid. In this section, the comparison of participation will be limited in scope. A high number of studies focus on participatory experiences of the city council in Barcelona (Gomà and Brugué 1994, 2001; Sarasa y Guiu 2001; Blanco y Rebollo 2002; Font, Font and Subirats 2002). The paper from Luque (2004) gives a good account of participation in Barcelona.

Participation is just one mechanism of governance (see box E from Figure 1 on page 5). Governance is about the process, the mechanisms of relationships between different stakeholders, governmental and non-governmental, public and private. It is believed that adequate mechanisms of government can improve the quality of life apart from improving the quality of stakeholder relationships. The improvement of governance mechanisms is a partial end in itself, but the final goal should be the improvement of the quality of life of the area. Governance principles range from participation to transparency and ethic and honest behaviour of stakeholders.

In a context of governance, the role of the city council is no longer just a service deliverer but a leader of the community, a promoter of the improvement of the quality of life in the area. There are many possible ways to enhance the leadership capacity of the city council (Bovaird and Löffler 2002), but this section is only devoted to participation of stakeholders.

The adaption of the analytical framework used by Gomà and Brugué (1994) (taken from Gyford 1991), will help to assess the overall participatory experience of Barcelona and Madrid (see Figure 5). Two basic fields of activity and an active and passive dimension in which individuals interact help to develop 2 x 2 dimensions of ideal roles.

Firstly, individuals can be seen as voters in their passive roles and as citizens in their active role ¡n the political arena. Secondly, as service recipients, individuals can be portrayed as administered (passive role) or as clients (active role).

Gyford also uses the traditional continuum of participation for the active role with three categories (see more in depth discussion of participation categories and democracy in Van Assche 2004 for

29

this workshop). Another category will be added also classical in participatory typologies: information (access to information from public authorities), consultation (individuals are heard by public authorities), concertation (there are stable mechanisms for citizen consultation through panels or citizen councils) and decision-making (citizens co-decide with public authorities).

Figure 5 Active and passive individuals

Political dimension Service dimension Passive role Voter Administered Active role Citizen Client

Degree of participation for citizen and client

Information Consultation Concertation Co-decision

Source : Adapted from Gomà and Brugué 1994 and Gyford 1991.

There are several instruments that would fit in the analysis. Three will be used here: electoral turnout, city strategic planning and citizen participation in consultation or decision-making processes.

A) Electoral turnout. Page (1991: 79) expects that higher levels of participation will occur where there is greater legal localism. He bases this expectation on the assumption that citizens will vote when their vote might influence an institution with a wider range of powers. Page follows the reasoning of Robert Dahl, who suggests “effective participation is greater, other things being equal, where the institution in which citizens participate has itself greater power”.

Table 9 Electoral turnout (1983-2003)

Elections 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 Average

Barcelona 68.9 55.5 66.2 51.5 59.2 60.3 Madrid 70.1 59.4 71.2 60.0 68.9 65.9 Local (average Spain) 69.8 72.1 66.0 71.3 64.0 67.4 68.4 Regional (average Spain) 69.8 72.1 66.0 71.3 66.7 73.7 69.9

Source: www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm

The average turnout in Barcelona and Madrid rounds up the 60 and 65 per cent respectively (see Table 9 and Table 10) and the percentage is closer to the trend observed in the Nordic countries (between 60 and 80 per cent) than in Great Britain (from 30 to 40 per cent). An exam of Table 10 with previous Table 7 from page 24 with data on fiscal autonomy from higher levels of government would suggest that Spain should be placed rather in the lower part of the local vote turnout, because its autonomous financial capacity is low like in Great Britain. The local turnout in Spain does not fully support Dahl’s and Page’s assertion and it seems that local voting goes independently from links to other levels of government.

30

Table 10 local vote turnouts in some European countries

Country Vote Turnout

Barcelona 50-60% - trend decreasing Madrid 60-70% - trend stable Spain 60-70% - trend stable

Nordic countries2 60-80% - trend decreasing Germany2 50-60% - trend stable Netherlands2 50-60% - trend stable France2 50-60% trend decreasing Great Britain2 30-40 % - trend stable

Source: Vetter 2000: 439 2 Levels of vote turnout refer to the 1990’s; trend data refer to the period from the 1970’s to the mid 1990’s

B) City strategic planning. City planning is another instrument of participation. According to Font and Rivero (1999: 365), a strategic plan is an important device for engaging social actors in the continuous adaptation of the city to the environment. The experiences of strategic planning in Madrid and in Barcelona are quite different. The only experience of Madrid has been a strategic plan prepared by Arthur Andersen Consulting in the 1990’s. The plan did not have citizen participation and it was not implemented.

Barcelona, on the contrary, has been a pioneer in strategic planning (Font and Rivero 1999). Strategic planning has been linked to international events in Barcelona. The Universal Exhibition in 1888 and 1929 are the embryo examples of the participation of the civil society in planning the international location of Barcelona. The Olympic games of 1992 also acted as a catalyst to increase the international presence of Barcelona. The first strategic plan of Barcelona was drafted in 1988 and approved in 1990. It helped to join governmental and non-governmental efforts in planning the city. The civil society played an important role in the planning exercise and the impact of the Olympic games has been enormous. On the one hand, the games caused the urban regeneration of one important area of Barcelona. On the other hand, they placed Barcelona in the map. In 1998, Barcelona launched the third strategic plan. The strategic process has not been a one-time event, but a sustainable process. The immediate results of strategic planning have been the improvement of the international image of Barcelona, the development of urban tourism and the regeneration of urban areas with the investments of higher levels of government.

C) Citizen participation. The comparison in this dimension is straightforward. There is hardly any experience of citizen participation in Madrid, while Barcelona has intensively experienced different participatory instruments (Gomà and Brugué 1994, 2001; Sarasa y Guiu 2001; Blanco y Rebollo 2002; Font, Font and Subirats 2002), although scholars are some times critical with the results (Gomà and Brugué 1994). Most instruments still have a consultative role and some of them are of concertation, as there are regular meetings in which opinion from neighbours and associations is consulted.

A city official summarised in a focus group the approach of Barcelona to participation and to conflict management among stakeholders:

“In my opinion, there are three instruments that help governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to manage conflict. I am not implying t hat we do it perfectly, but those instruments are there and are useful: a) with the decentralisation to the districts we have been able to bring the administration closer to the citizens; b) there are 25 or 26 institutionalised consultative councils in the city. They might be boring, solemn… whatever… some work well, others don’t… but any problem we might have, we are able to discuss it around a table, on a table where social stakeholders have a seat. These councils do not solve conflicts by themselves, but the offer dialogue. Some councils work very well and are very positive to foster cooperation; c) The civic pacts are the third instrument. For

31

instance, the pact for mobility within the city has helped to achieve minimal agreements. Other pacts like 21 Agenda, against domestic violence or for a clean city have also given good results…”

This institutional view is also critic with consultative forum with fewer results than expected. However, the city official offers a consensual view also signed up by other stakeholders that participation help to increase social cohesion among citizens and among different stakeholders. However, the energy and the freshness of participation from the Olympic games era have faded away.

The international Forum of the Cultures 2004 that is taking place this year has also had an impact on urban regeneration and urban tourism. However, citizen participation and participation of civil society has been minor or at least perceived as minor. Many focus groups participant brought the view that somehow citizen participation has not had the same nature than during the Olympic games. It is perhaps understandable that participation has not been so enthusiastic. The reason behind this lack of interest can be two-sided: a) authorities have lost some impetus in giving floor to civil society; b) the Forum itself is not able to attract the same interest as the games.

A focus group participant from a neighbourhood association said:

“the Olympic games were wonderful in terms of participation, this cannot be a model for an active civil society, because Olympics are one-time event in history and life goes on…”

Another person added:

“the project of an active civil society requires that public authorities believe in participation… They have drafted the regulations for citizen participation, but they have done it with the fear of participation… they [city council] do not believe in it…”

In spite of the fact that participation is a lot higher in Barcelona than in Madrid, there is still room for improvement and a lot of civil society potential that the authorities can realise. Even though if Barcelona citizens think that participation is fading away, one can safely assert that there are many interesting forums in which citizens and stakeholders can meet in order to build up social cohesion and to improve the quality of life of the city.

Combining the analysis of this section with the exam of the introduction of managerial techniques in city management from another section, the comparison of Madrid and Barcelona according to the amended typology of Gyford is portrayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Active and passive individuals in Madrid and in Barcelona

Political dimension Higher degree in: Service dimension Higher degree in: Passive role Voter Madrid Administered Madrid Active role Citizen Barcelona Client Barcelona

Degree of participation for citizen and client

Information Consultation Concertation Co-decision

Source: Adapted from Gomà and Brugué 1994 and Gyford 1991.

In Barcelona, the active roles of individuals (as citizens and as clients) are better highlighted than in Madrid because the approach of the city council is much more open to civil society and it has shown so in different matters: the organisation of international events, strategic planning and the implementation of different participatory measures in the city. However, according to focus group participants, there is still much room for citizen participation, as the participation still focus on the middle points of the scale: consultation and concertation.

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SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Call for Papers of the workshop posed two research questions: the extent to which global trends have been shaping institutional developments in big city government as opposed to locally and nationally defined institutional path-dependencies and the impact of given institutional arrangements on the capacity of urban governance systems to cope with the above global challenges. These questions have been translated into a framework set in Figure 1 on page 5 that allows to compare Madrid and Barcelona in terms of institutional arrangements and the effect of these institutional arrangements on the quality of life of the city. Quality of life has numerous dimensions and it can be subjectively and objectively measured. For Barcelona, a pilot study of Governance International has measured the quality of life according to the main stakeholders group. For the economic dimension of the quality of life, indicators have been used both for Madrid and Barcelona.

The institutional arrangements have been included in a government-governance model. Three arrangements (relationships between executive and legislative, between politics and administration and between centre and districts) are considered internal or governmental arrangements. Two institutional features (intergovernmental relationships and participation) are external or governance related matters.

The exam of the similarities and differences between Madrid and Barcelona has followed the division of levels of rules set by Ostrom (constitutional choice rules, collective choice rules and operational rules).

Constitutional-choice rules have had the imprint of uniformity for local systems in Spain. However, collective choice rules and operational rules have developed in different ways in most institutional arrangements for Madrid and Barcelona. In a brief and simplistic way we could summarise the arrangements of both cities as follows.

Barcelona has made an intensive effort in changing the relationships between the mayor, the government commission, the assembly, the administration and the districts. The reforms has eased the work of the government coalition for 26 years, has made more professional the administrative machinery, has implemented more accountable managers and a more coordinated management system and has introduced measures to treat individuals as clients and not as administered. Moreover, the city council has fostered citizen participation in city strategic planning, in international events and in the solution of problems from the city. By and large, more than a hundred focus group participants from different stakeholder groups from Barcelona believe that the people of Barcelona shows solidarity, there is social cohesion in the city and the authorities make a great effort to include society in collective arrangements. There is still room to improve the decision capacity of citizens, but there is general satisfaction and they consider that the quality of life of Barcelona is good. Even the focus group of immigrants shared these general statements. The Olympic games have portrayed the spirit of the civic society in Barcelona and the joint achievement of common goals. Finally, the efforts in bringing investment and economic development have yielded results, especially in the tourist area. However, intergovernmental problems with the regional government might have hindered further development in the economical arena.

Madrid has not made much effort in changing the internal institutional arrangements of the cities. There have been some deconcentration efforts between the centre and the districts but the rest has remained unchanged for the last 26 years, and with the exception of elections after the transition to democracy, almost without important changes in the last 50 years. Although I have not empirical material from surveys or focus group sessions from Madrid, an anthropologist work of direct observation from the last 20 years would safely allow me to assess the social situation of Madrid rather negatively in contrast to Barcelona. While the social cohesion and public participation in collective matters in Barcelona is high, in Madrid there is a feeling of ‘jungle life’ with public authorities that have not regarded at all the view of the citizens in the matters they care. Social

33

cohesion and immigrant integration are becoming a problem and they might not be sustainable in the long run.

Madrid has won the battle on the economic field, as most economic indicators are favouring the city (see the study from Rozenblat and Cicille 2003). Economic forces have concentrated their investments and presence in Madrid, the stock market of Madrid is much more important than the one in Barcelona, and the demographic growth of the city and the metropolitan area in the last years has been more important than in Barcelona and its conurbated area. If the Olympic games of 1992 portray the success of the city of Barcelona, the business oriented football team of Real Madrid is a metaphor of the development of Madrid, economically and socially.

This paper tries to suggest that institutional arrangements and reform have mattered in Barcelona. They have certainly fostered economic development and social cohesion, but the full success of the economy depends also on global trends beyond the limits of one single big city.

Anyone familiar with the institutional arrangements of Madrid and Barcelona would probably agree that they are different in spite of evolving within a very uniform system. However, it is necessary to refine the analytical tools in order to be able to measure convergence and divergence. In international comparison, Madrid and Barcelona are very close to Paris, but it would be too risky to assume that there is a convergent path with London and Berlin. Further discussions should clarify this point.

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