The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Tra cking on ...cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/dakar_meeting_report_-_13_june_2012.pdf · The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Tra! cking

The IImpaact ooof Orgganized Crrriime andd Drug TTTra! cckiing on Goovernnanccce, Deeveelopmennnnnt & Securitty in WWest Affrica

Expert MMMMeeting

SSummary offff Proceeddingss

DDakarr, SSenegal, 118-20 AAprill 201222

TTTaabble oof CCCCCoonnttennntss

TTThe Impact of OOrrganizzed Crime aaaand Drugg Traa! ckiinng on GGGovernnancee, Deevvelopment & Secccuurity in WWesst Afriicca

DDakar, SSenegal, 118-20 AAppril 2012

EEExecutivve Summmarryy 2

BBBackgroound 2

MMMain Obbservaationsss 3

KKKey Recoommeendattions 5

I. SSustained PPoliticaal EEngagemennnnt 5 II. Policy Formmmulatioon 6 III.. Knowwledggge 7 IV.. Capaacity 9

AAAdditionnal Informaaation 9

TTThe Imppact off Orgaaanized Crrime and DDrrrug Tra! cckingg 10ooon Goveernance, Deeevelopmmeent & Securrrriity in Wesst Africa BBBackgrounnd Papper

TTTables 16

TTTable 1: WWest Afrrica: A DDDecade oof DDevelopmenttsssTTTable 2: Raati! cation of aand Acceession to Relevannnnt UN Conveentionns in Weesst AfricaTTTable 3: Poolitical Systemmm and Coondditions in Westtt AfricaTTTable 4: Soocio-Ecconomicc Condittionns in West Afrrriica

AAAbbreviationns 20

The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Tra! cking on Governance, Development & Security in West Africa

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SSummmaary of PPrroceeddddings

EExperrt MMeettting

TThe Immpaact ooof Orrgaanized CCrime annd Drrrug TTra! ckinng oon Goovvernanccccee, Devveloopmeeent && SSSecurrity iin WWWest AAffrica

DDakar, Seeneeggal, 188-20 Apppppril 20112

EExeccutiive SSummmmary

Over the past decade signi! cant gains have been made in West Africa in terms of peace and democratic consolidation, and some countries have been witnessing an exceptional pace of economic growth. Despite these gains, concerns are mounting regarding the impact of drug tra" cking and other forms of organized criminal activity on political governance and economic and social development across the region. The structure of the political economy in even the most developed countries in West Africa continues to attract and nurture illicit activity. Meanwhile, institutions remain weak and easily corruptible; poverty and unemployment, especially among the young remains high, and access to basic services, such as health and education, limited. These vulnerabilities coupled with West Africa’s convenient location halfway between drug production and consumer markets, have facilitated the rapid expansion of organized criminal activity. At the same time, West Africa is also facing the harsh realities of consumption, with heroine, crack cocaine and methamphetamines entering local markets. In some countries, laboratories producing methamphetamines have been discovered; in others, the cultivation and subsequent consumption and/or trans-shipment of cannabis continue to spread. Many fear that increased consumption of hard drugs or competition for control of the transhipment markets could lead to increased levels of crime and violence, particularly in underdeveloped urban areas largely populated by unemployed youth.

Given the current situation in the region, the absence of public debate on drug tra" cking and organized crime; limited progress on implementing the regional instruments aimed at addressing drug tra" cking, organized crime and drug abuse1; increasing levels of consumption of hard drugs; and the dearth of regionally-led policy relevant research, the main recommendation tabled at the expert meeting was the establishment of a mechanism along the lines of the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy. The mechanism would accompany implementation of existing initiatives and serve as a platform for supporting research, public outreach and advocacy on drug tra" cking, organized crime, drug abuse, and related issues. A proposal for such a mechanism is currently being drafted on the basis of the meeting outcome.

BBackkgroounnnd

Recognizing the need for a better understanding of the impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime on governance, security and development across the region, New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), the Ko! Annan Foundation, the ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the Ko! Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center [KAIPTC] jointly organized a meeting in Dakar, Senegal, from April 18-20, 2012. The meeting brought together some 40 experts from governments, multilateral and civil society organizations, and academia from across West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America and Europe.

The purpose of the meeting was threefold. It sought to:

i. Garner a better understanding of the perceived impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime on governance, security and development in West Africa, and identify gaps in knowledge.

1 In December 2008, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Tra" cking and Organized Crime in West Africa and the Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit drug Tra" cking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa.


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ii. Assess the e# ectiveness and/or shortcomings of di# erent policy and operational responses currently pursued by di# erent actors in relation to existing and emerging challenges.

iii. Discuss potential entry points and key components of a renewed strategy to address the problems identi! ed (for example, through the establishment of a regionally-led mechanism) and discuss di# erent options for moving forward.

Over the course of three days, participants assessed the scope and reach of drug tra" cking and organized crime in West Africa and identi! ed areas for practical knowledge-generation and exchange. They took stock of progress made on regional, national and international commitments to respond to the current situation.

In particular, discussions focused on:

• The perceived impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime on governance, development and security, and the variation of impact across countries.

• Tools and mechanisms used by di# erent stakeholders to monitor and assess impact and how these, in turn, in$ uence responses.

• Challenges to current e# orts to build resilience against drug tra" cking and organized crime.

• Concrete steps to support implementation of the current response architecture and overcome existing challenges.

MMainn Obseeervaations

Despite progress on di# erent fronts, West African states continue to face enormous challenges, including insecurity, fragile political systems, poverty, slow economic growth, health pandemics, and vulnerability to climate change. Recurring violence and political crises have been part of these problems, with Mali and Guinea-Bissau providing the most recent examples. Drug tra" cking and organized crime are compounding political and socio-economic

challenges, and threatening to reverse important peace and development gains made in recent years. Indeed, countries across West Africa continue to provide criminal networks with a fertile operational environment, serving as bases for the onward transhipment of drugs to other regions.

Recent years have seen important drug seizures en route to West Africa, or in di# erent countries in the region (e.g. Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal), yet West Africa continues to be used as a transit area for cocaine and heroin from Latin America and South Asia. While most of the drugs are destined for Europe and – to a lesser extent – the United States, an increasing amount reportedly remains in the region. Cannabis is produced locally and mostly marketed and consumed within the region. In recent years, authorities have discovered production sites for synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamines. Despite a shortage of available systematic data, drug consumption and abuse rates appear to be increasing. Yet, drug treatment and rehabilitation services are sparse, available only in a few countries, notably Ghana and Nigeria, and are predominantly provided through overburdened mental health care systems.

OOn Pooweer, Poooliticcs and Illiicccit Monniees

A predominant focus of the meeting was on the nexus between public authorities and organized criminal groups across the region. Examples were provided of how government, traditional authorities, political parties, judicial and law enforcement o" cials have become involved in organized crime for political or personal gain, or through coercion; and the numerous challenges inherent in responding to these links. Underlying many of these challenges is the nature of the political economy and the fragility of political systems across West Africa. Governments have struggled to put in place (or in some cases, avoided) mechanisms to protect politics from patronage and clientelism. Impunity regarding political corruption only serves to exacerbate this situation.

West African economies are believed to bene! t from illicit ! nancial $ ows, which, given the predominance of


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cash-based economies in the region, is easily hidden or moved into the formal economy. In the context of poor or non-existent delivery of basic services, organized criminal activities are often deemed legitimate sources of funding for services, at times providing income and employment or investment in local communities. The corrosive longer-term e# ects, however, outweigh these short-term positive gains. In particular, drug money can create false pockets of political legitimacy; it can harm the performance of legitimate economic sectors, distort economic performance, and ultimately enrich a few at the expense of many. In addition, increased levels of money laundering are placing pressure on the ! nancial reputation of countries in the region and can ultimately increase the cost of borrowing for both the public and private sectors in international markets. Another concern is the degree to which legitimate business inadvertently facilitates organized criminal activity, including money laundering, in predominantly cash-based economies.

OOn Crrimee anndd Puuniishmennnnt

Drug tra" cking in West Africa involves both local and foreign criminal networks, which forge alliances to carry out their activities. These networks are highly sophisticated and have access to huge resources, as evidenced by their ability to shift operations in response to e# ective law enforcement e# orts. West African organized criminal networks operate cells worldwide to facilitate the supply of goods, with Diaspora communities playing important roles (e.g. Nigerian diaspora in Brazil). Like criminal groups elsewhere, they in! ltrate or threaten political elites and dispirited public servants to protect and expand their business. To launder the proceeds, they often use shell companies, for example, in the construction or mining sectors, or through car rental services.

Organized crime-related impunity remains a major problem in West Africa. While political interference in high-pro! le cases and the general corruptibility of institutions remains signi! cant, like elsewhere, law enforcement and broader criminal justice systems are struggling to adapt to new challenges posed by sophisticated organized criminal networks. Di# erent legal systems within the region pose a

barrier to speedy cross-jurisdictional collaboration; porous borders present as many challenges as does working with a welter of border security agencies.

Analysis of the few drug-tra" cking related convictions has been limited (e.g. cocaine-related cases in Sierra Leone, Ghana and, more recently, Gambia) not least because case ! les, detainees and sound intelligence are often di" cult to access. At the same time, a large number of drug-related cases involve middlemen or mules, or small-scale cannabis-related peddlers and consumers. Focus on this lower level of operations places enormous pressure on criminal justice systems, shifting much needed attention away from higher level criminals and political corruption on the one hand, and increasing drug consumption on the other.

Some countries are making progress in responding to money laundering. Conversely, limited progress has been made in recovering assets.

OOn Reespoonseees

The region boasts a top-down, multi-layered architecture for responding to drug tra" cking and organized crime, covering regional, national and local levels. While the current Praia Action Plan Against Drugs and Organized Crime is comprehensive in scope, implementation and support thereof have lagged behind and limited progress has been registered. Thus, broad consensus was reached at the meeting that a mechanism is needed to track the implementation of international and regional responses. Such e# orts need to be accompanied by much more rigorous and cross-disciplinary research. More speci! cally and in line with the principle of shared responsibility, signi! cant progress needs to be made to monitor challenges to implementing the existing regional architecture and to ensure the necessary level of political engagement for dealing with these challenges within and beyond West Africa.

A number of states have taken steps toward addressing the problem of drug tra" cking. Examples include reviewing of penal codes, and establishment of anti-drug commissions


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and anti-money laundering frameworks (see table 1). Yet, in many cases, the implementation of such e# orts has been lagging due to lack of political engagement, insu" cient human, material, and ! nancial resources, and limited exchange or $ ow of information.

The role of the UN and traditional development assistance was also debated, with strong emphasis placed on the need for ongoing and future initiatives to re$ ect the multifaceted nature of drug tra" cking and organized crime. This would include linking e# orts aimed at strengthening the capacity of law enforcement, security and intelligence services to e# orts aimed at responding to underlying political, social and economic challenges, including through development assistance. It would also require more targeted political engagement and use of leverage to support on-going e# orts in the region.

Existing mechanisms for collaboration between regional organizations such as ECOWAS (and its specialised institutions, such as GIABA) and representatives from civil society organizations and academia were highlighted as positive, although much emphasis was placed on the need for closer institutional collaboration to improve information gathering and enhance understanding of the scope of the issues. Strategies should pay attention to agents of change at all levels and seek ways to connect these actors.

The meeting further discussed evidence and operational examples from within and beyond the region (Latin America in particular) to determine the bene! ts and weaknesses of di# erent approaches to tackling drug tra" cking and drug consumption. While West African participants noted that countries in the region do not experience the levels of drug-related violence of Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, and Colombia, Latin American participants cautioned that violence would emerge as the competition for the spoils of tra" cking heightens.

Participants placed strong emphasis on the capacity gaps within regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and its specialized institutions such as GIABA, government services, donor partners, and civil society in the

understanding of the dynamics of drug tra" cking and organized crime. Academia was singled out as being largely silent on organized crime, especially drug tra" cking and consumption, and how these issues relate to governance, development and security. This silence is due in part to the lack of investment in tertiary education in general in West Africa, and the glaring lack of political space for academia and think tanks to set and challenge policy agendas.

KKey RReccommmmeenndatioonns

Participants tabled a range of recommendations for future action, clustered around four key areas that should be implemented in conjunction with each other. There was broad agreement that unless progress is made on the ! rst recommendation – sustained political engagement – it will be di" cult to make progress on the others.

I. Sustained Political EngagementII. Policy FormulationIII. Knowledge IV. Capacity

II. Susstaineed Poollitical EEngaggeemeennt

Regional and national e# orts to respond to drug tra" cking and organized crime should be supported by an independent, regionally-led group of “champions” along the lines of the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy or the Global Commission on Drug Policies. The group would accompany the e# orts of regional and international bodies already underway. It could be charged with advocating on issues pertaining to drug tra" cking, drug consumption and organized crime through engagement with political and economic elites across the region, launching awareness campaigns, monitoring progress of the implementation of current initiatives, fund raising for research, information and lessons sharing within the region and between West Africa and other regions, and exploring new and innovative partnerships with the private sector, including social media and information technology companies. Members of the group could include prominent leaders engaged or previously engaged in regional and international a# airs, business, the arts, and the media.


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Participants also discussed the feasibility of an international initiative, such as a Panel of Experts, tasked by the UN Security Council to investigate and monitor illegal drug tra" cking in West Africa. Such a panel could investigate the involvement of political elites in organized criminal activity. Similar mechanisms have been used in the past to address illegal tra" cking of natural resources and sanction violations, among other issues.

Issue Area Summary of Core Recommendations

Sustained political engagement at the regional and national levels to ensure that the challenges related to drug tra" cking and consumption receive the necessary attention and responses based on systematic evidence gathering and support.

Recommendations

• Establishment of a multi-level and multi-faceted consortium like the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy or the Global Commission on Drug Policies.

• Establishment of an Independent, Council-mandated Expert Group to monitor the involvement of political elites in illicit activity.

III. Poolicy Foormmuulationnnnn

Although national governments and regional actors in West Africa have signed various protocols and issued ambitious statements (see table 1), implementation is slow and, in some cases, has not advanced at all. There is limited commitment at the regional and national levels to ensure that drug tra" cking receives broad public attention. As such, the ! ght against drug tra" cking and organized crime should become a priority.

The dynamics of organized criminal groups, their reach, investments and engagement in both legitimate and illicit activities, all point to the need for joint action. Governments must collaborate with all sectors of society through a process of mutual learning, review and assistance. Local authorities, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, academia, regional and international organizations, and the media are all relevant actors. Multi-sectoral, top-down strategies must be complemented by and coordinated with bottom-up initiatives.

E# orts that are too narrowly focused often give a false impression of progress. Instead of diminishing the scope and strength of criminal networks, some counter measures

merely contribute to the relocation of organized crime. To avoid this unintended e# ect, local or national responses should consider broader e# orts at the regional level and exchange experiences with partners in other regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean.

Organized criminal networks rely on secrecy and depend on corruption to protect their activities from government and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, there is a strong need for increasing transparency and taking a stance against corruption and organized criminal activities (see table 3).

Governments and external assistance providers should address the connection between crime reduction and law enforcement initiatives, on the one hand, and social and economic development priorities on the other. Law enforcement e# orts should be accompanied by drug treatment and rehabilitation programs. However, external support continues to favour law enforcement approaches.

Finally, and in support of existing ECOWAS initiatives, a comprehensive update of West African international commitments regarding organized crime, drug tra" cking

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and consumption needs to be conducted and made publicly available; a review of penal codes and codes of procedure, judicial action, sentencing for drug-related o# ences, judicial training, and so forth is also urgently needed.


Strengthen regional and multi-stakeholder capacity to monitor the e# ectiveness of policy responses and prepare for unintended consequences.

Recommendations

• Under the principle of shared accountability, develop more e# ective mechanisms aimed at ensuring accountability of both international and regional actors when policy implementation lags behind.

• Strengthen policy formulation processes, including through investment in more rigorous and multi-disciplinary research (and researchers) within the region.

• Strengthen top-down and bottom-up policy links between crime reduction/law enforcement policy initiatives and social and economic development priorities and community needs.

• Ensure that regional initiatives are coherent with broader international e# orts to mitigate unintended e# ects.

• Support national and regional e# orts underway to review and align current policy responses and ensure they are consistent with other obligations and commitments.

IIII. KKnowwleeedgee

While the expansion of organized crime and drug tra" cking is widely acknowledged, little is known about the impact on governance, development and security, and how they di# er from one country to another. Thus, there is a need to strengthen and improve the reliability and validity of data. It will also be imperative to address the full spectrum of issues, without focusing exclusively on enforcement or a speci! c type of narcotic, such as cocaine.

Research should be conducted on how the spoils of criminal activity and drug tra" cking are in! ltrating and in$ uencing various levels of society. There is a need to improve our understanding of the degree to which drug money is in$ uencing calculations made by actors within the political and economic spheres, and how local communities engage with and perceive drug tra" ckers.

The linkages between the collection and subsequent use of data must be improved. State agencies should, where appropriate, facilitate access to databases on drug seizures, arrests and convictions. Researchers, in turn, should move beyond general assumptions as much as possible and conduct evidence-based primary research

at the local, national and regional levels, using consistent and transparent sets of indicators.

To identify issues for decision-making and priorities for action, stakeholders should seek out or contribute to research on the topics needed for informed policy making. Local knowledge o# ers useful perspectives and should be systematically included in the research process.

Increasing public awareness is key. It can help build pressure and social resilience for political change and also serve as a check against political involvement in drug tra" cking and organized crime. Greater e# orts should be made to inform citizens about the health, economic and security risks associated with drug tra" cking and consumption. This requires working with the media and research institutions to reach and educate a broader audience.

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Develop a more systematic, regionally-led research agenda on issues pertaining to drug tra" cking in West Africa. Current research gaps include:

General

• Systematic, up to date and, above all, accessible information on the types of drugs being tra" cked and routes used in West Africa; and the criteria for understanding the vulnerability to drug tra" cking and its impact on related challenges such as unemployment, violence and drug abuse across the region.

• Population-based household surveys on perceptions of drug tra" cking (local groups/individuals vs. foreign groups/individuals), drug consumption and drug-related violence are imperative for the development of initial baselines.

Governance and the Rule of Law

• Criteria for assessing the degree to which drug-related money is in! ltrating politics and formal and informal governance structures; for determining how the spoils of organized criminal activity and, particularly, drug tra" cking are ! lling gaps in the presence and commitment of the state; and how they are undermining the legitimacy of formal and/or informal state institutions.

• Criteria for understanding formal responses to drug tra" cking and consumption (for example, the motivation and incentives of drug enforcement o" cials and health o" cials – i.e. how they are setting benchmarks and targets to combat drug tra" cking and consumption).

• Regular monitoring and analysis of trial proceedings, trial transcripts, judicial and administrative commissions of inquiry to better understand gaps in current systems, how responses have been formulated and how they are being implemented.

• Analysis of the diversity of o# ences and scales of sentencing in legislation across the region; of witness protection challenges in organized crime, drug tra" cking and money laundering-related cases; of challenges related to asset recovery in traditional societies, and the challenges and limitations of capacity building e# orts in this area.

Economic development

• Criteria for developing a more informed understanding of the impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime on formal and informal economies in West Africa and how these change over time.

• Systematic information on variations of laundering of drug money within and across countries in the region; how money laundering is nurtured by the informal economy and potential longer-term developmental impacts of money-laundering.

• Systematic information on how illicit actors interact with legitimate business.

General Monitoring and Assessment of Impact

• Criteria for assessing the mid- and long-term impact of regional, sub-regional and international responses to drug tra" cking and related issues in the region.

IIV. Capaacittty

Despite signi! cant international and regional investments in training and capacity building in West Africa (for ! ghting organized crime and tra" cking or counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, border control, governance, rule of law, justice and security sector reform or ! nancial management) capacity gaps are still substantial. At a time of dwindling resources and in line with broader international policy shifts, a deeper understanding of challenges and the limited impact

of training and capacity building e# orts in these areas needs to be achieved to enable the development of more e# ective responses.

Signi! cant investment (human and ! nancial) is required to develop more sustainable capacities within government agencies (for example, developing career enhancement opportunities within specialized policing units, developing

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speci! c modules on organized crime, drug tra" cking and its consequences for training newly elected o" cials, political parties, parliamentarians, and civil servants). The mapping of current drug tra" cking capacity building initiatives might be an opportune way to go about identifying gaps, challenges and opportunities.

Investment in the monitoring capacity of civil society and the media is important for responding to drug tra" cking and organized crime. E# ective monitoring can help track and advance the impact of policy responses and prepare for unintended consequences. Similarly, strategies should be devised to increase the costs of colluding with criminal networks.


• Before making huge investments in additional capacity building e# orts, an extensive mapping exercise in necessary to determine the current focus of drug tra" cking and organized crime-related capacity building initiatives, where capacity building e# orts are perceived to have had an impact, how that impact is measured, and where capacity gaps and challenges lie.

• Over time, signi! cant investment (human and ! nancial) is required to develop more sustainable capacitieswithin specialized units, parliamentary committees, political parties, civil servants, social service agencies, civil society and the media on drug tra" cking and organized crime-related issues.

• The region needs to develop the capacity to conduct systematic research in di# erent areas (see issue area III), particularly on the impact of drug tra" cking on governance and development, and more speci! cally on drug consumption and variations in impact and response across the region. Such initiatives should be anchored in academic and other research institutes across the region.

AAAddiitioonaall Inffoormatiiooon

Agence France PresseANGOP (Angola Press) Au Fait MarocCentre Afrique PresseConakry Times (Guinea)C.R.I.D.E.M. (Mauretania) Dallas Morning NewsIbrabiga (Burkina Faso)

Jeune AfriqueLa Libre (Belgium)Radio NetherlandsSenego (Senegal)Slate AfricaBBC West AfricaBBC Radio

To date, the expert meeting has received coverage in the following media outlets:

CAPA

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BBackkgroounnnd PPaaper

TTThe IImppaccct off OOrganiiized CCrime andd DDrug TTTra!! ckkinggg onn GGovernnnnancee, DDevveeloppmment &&& Seecurrityy in WWWest Afffrrica

““The ccarteels hhave nnoot yet cooorrruptedd thhe gooovernmment’s ssseniorr levvels, bbut sooooner or lllaater they will, bbecausse they hhhave mmilliionss of doolllars anddddd you neeedd to bbe a saaint to rrreject themm.”1

SSummmaary

In less than one and a half decades West Africa has become a major transit and re¬packaging hub for cocaine and heroine $ owing from the Latin American and Asian producing areas to European markets.2 While organized crime and drug tra" cking already existed in the region, the phenomenon rapidly expanded in the mid-2000s as a result of a strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates towards the rapidly growing European market in part due to the operational ‘successes’ of U.S. law enforcement agencies in mitigating the $ ow of drugs into the United States.3 West Africa presented an ideal choice as a logistical transit center: its geography makes detection di" cult and facilitates transit; the region boasts well-established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates; and a vulnerable political environment. The latter has its roots in the region’s colonial history and includes endemic poverty as well as a combination of weak institutions and systems, instability, and ill-equipped and corruptible political party representatives, law enforcement and intelligence o" cers, and judicial authorities.

In some countries, the legacy of civil wars led to diminished human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development assets. They also gave way to a rise in the number of armed groups operating in the region and the circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Many of these challenges are slowly being overcome, with countries across the region enjoying transitions to, and consolidation of democratic rule in addition to positive economic growth. Yet, at the same time, new threats have emerged, compounding existing political and security

challenges in West Africa. These threats include drug tra" cking, and increasingly, drug consumption, broader organized criminal activity such as human tra" cking, illicit logging, illicit capture of resources, piracy, money-laundering, and terrorism. Combined with intense urbanization and youth unemployment, these threats and challenges are having a corrosive e# ect on democratic institutions and processes, security and economic development across the region and driving violence and reemergence of con$ ict.

Conversely, research shows that the evidentiary base underpinning perceptions of challenges remains weak, as do mechanisms to assess and respond to vulnerabilities, threats and challenges that enable organized crime and drug tra" cking. Indeed, despite several positive developments, there is still limited evidence of e# ective, strategic responses to the multi-faceted challenges posed by organized crime and drug tra" cking in the region. While declarations and action plans from within and beyond the region abound, many continue to lament the absence of a comprehensive strategic framework that goes beyond mere technical assistance to more e# ectively encompass the underlying global, regional and national political economy factors that enable organized crime and drug tra" cking in the region. Operational level strategies are also said to be weak, not least because they are developed on the basis of weak and siloed analysis. Existing strategies tend to omit the importance of ensuring that security centered e# orts are accompanied by e# orts aimed at strengthening political institutions and processes, justice and health institutions, and responding to widespread youth unemployment. Even less focus and investment is being placed on developing the capacity of civil society and academia to monitor and analyze trends and e# ects of organized crime and tra" cking across the region. Meanwhile, the private sector remains largely removed from current debates on the issues.

In this regard, the objective of the expert meeting will be to focus on the impact of organized crime (and drug tra" cking in particular) on governance, security and development across West Africa in order to:


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i. Garner a better understanding of the perceived impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime on governance, security and development in West Africa; and identify gaps in knowledge.

ii. Assess the e# ectiveness and/or shortcomings of di# erent policy and operational responses currently being implemented by di# erent actors in relation to identi! ed and emerging challenges.

iii. Identify potential entry points and key components of a renewed strategy to address the problems identi! ed, for example, through the establishment of a regionally-led mechanism; and discuss di# erent options for moving forward.

More speci! cally, the meeting will focus on responding to several questions that remain unanswered. For example, what mechanisms and tools are currently being used to track, monitor and assess the impact of organized crime and drug tra" cking on key areas such as governance, security and development? How are the ! ndings of these processes used to inform the development of integrated strategic and operational responses at the national and regional levels (particularly regarding law enforcement, citizen security, justice, and health)? How do academia, civil society and the private sector engage with public policy makers to inform decisions? What gaps in knowledge and strategic and operational responses currently exist, and how might they be more e# ectively addressed and supported? By whom (international, regional, national levels) and how?

The meeting is a joint e# ort of the Ko! Annan Foundation, ECOWAS-GIABA, NYU’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), and the Ko! Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC). Participants will include experts from West Africa, Latin America, North America and Europe.

BBackggrouundd

Neither organized crime nor drug tra" cking are new to West Africa, yet the degree to which they have grown in

the region over the past decade is. Indeed, the enormous value of drugs and other illicit goods and services vis-à-vis the value of local economies in West Africa has allowed tra" ckers to penetrate the very highest levels of government, the justice and security services and the economy, and are said to be wreaking havoc on already weak political, economic and social structures.4 In response to strong evidence that in some countries drug money was in! ltrating the highest levels of power, in 2007 the African Union adopted an Action Plan and accompanying Mechanism on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. The stated primary goal of the Action Plan was to reverse “the current trends of drug abuse and tra" cking, organized crime, corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security and to achieve tangible improvement in the social and personal well-being of the people of Africa and their communities.”5 Spurred by the growing number of drug seizures in the region (which indicated the degree to which West African countries were serving as cocaine and heroin transit routes), ECOWAS shortly followed suit, adopting a range of declarations, action plans and policies to respond to the growing threat of drug tra" cking in the region.6 More recent evidence points to the progression of the West African drug scene from a mere transit hub for cocaine to processing and amphetamine production; to the expansion of the trade routes through the Sahel and Sahara and a purported increase in cooperation between drug-tra" ckers and terrorist groups such as AQIM.7

Over the past few years, the UN Security Council has been periodically appraised of the growing threat posed by drug tra" cking in Africa and more recently, West Africa and the Sahel Region, leading to several important UN Security Council Presidential Statements (PRSTs). The latter include the PRSTs of December 2009 (under Burkina Faso), February 2010 (under France) and February 2012 (under Togo). Each has highlighted the danger that drug tra" cking and other forms of organized crime represent for regional and international security.8 Meanwhile, the United Nations O" ce for West Africa (UNOWA) has increasingly used its convening authority, political leverage and transnational reach to raise awareness of the impact of transnational threats in West Africa, especially drug


12

tra" cking, and to broker support from the international community for responses designed to mitigate those threats.9 Other UN agencies such as UNODC continue to develop assessments and provide technical assistance to institutions across West Africa. In addition to these e# orts, many bilateral donors have launched di# erent initiatives to support the region either at the multilateral or bilateral levels. Some of the initiatives such as the West Africa Coastal Initiative (WACI) are being implemented in partnership with ECOWAS, while others are being implemented directly by the supporting partners.10 The African Union, the European Union, AFRICOM, a range of bilaterals from Western Europe and North America, private and semi-private security actors are also engaging is some form or other.

Yet, despite all these e# orts to respond to organized crime and drug tra" cking, concerns continue to be raised in the region and beyond, suggesting that e# orts to respond to challenges to date have had limited impact. For example, concerns regarding the criminalization of politics have not dissipated.11 In settings such as Guinea-Bissau, the highest levels of political and military leadership became embroiled in a ! ght over access to resources, including the spoils of cocaine tra" cking, resulting in the assassination of the President in 2009.12 Across the region, political parties are increasingly accused of using illicit monies emanating from the drug trade to fund electoral campaigns. Weak or inexistent party campaign ! nancing, asset disclosure and anti-money laundering regulatory frameworks and implementation mechanisms make it extremely di" cult to con! rm these claims, providing even more fodder for political polarization.13

Underpinning some of these political challenges is the reality that in some West African states the underlying political settlement is still relatively weak, in the sense that di# erent stakeholders have not been able to devise an acceptable system through which “competing political and economic interests are channeled by means of state institutions in a routine, smooth and violent-free manner.”14 In this regard, the easy access to resources that drug tra" cking and other forms of organized criminal activity allow can place additional pressures on vulnerable

political and social systems and has the potential of increasing the risk of polarization and violence, including around electoral contest and particularly in countries that have recently emerged from con$ ict.15 In addition, in settings where access to power and resources is still limited to informal and clientelistic relations, the spoils of drug tra" cking can inadvertently enhance the legitimacy of both formal and traditional political and economic elites. In many cases the absence of the state and weak service delivery means that organized crime and drug-related rents represent the only source of resources and therefore a blind eye is turned to their illicit nature. Such important subtleties in state-society relations make it all more di" cult to assess impact and formulate coherent and e# ective policy responses.

Meanwhile, drug tra" cking and associated corruption is perceived to be having an increasing impact on economies in West Africa. The size of the informal sector across the region and the fact that most of the economies function on a cash basis presents signi! cant challenges to assessing impact. Notwithstanding, there is increasing evidence that vast sums of money have been laundered in real estate, tourism and casinos in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, for example, and that most of the other countries in the region are also being $ ooded by illicit funds stemming from drug tra" cking and other illicit activity. As a recent ECOWAS/GIABA report highlighted, the main problem appears to stem from the top of the pyramid, where large quantities of funds fall into the hands of important political operators who are aided by external groups such as Diaspora communities, and work with intermediaries such as large scale cash smugglers, banks, businesses and important international traders. In the long run, economic dependence on illicit drug money and the penetration of drug tra" cking into the highest levels of power leaves few incentives to combat the trade, even if legitimacy vis-à-vis the general population is low.

While the security, economic and political impacts of organized crime and drug tra" cking have been discussed in many di# erent forms and fora over the past decade, much less is known about their longer-term developmental impacts. For example, increasing concern


13

is being voiced in relation to the increase in actual drug consumption in countries across the region. Until recently, drug consumption in West Africa and in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa had been linked to either marijuana and/or khat, and was o" cially recognized as a problem and one of seven actionable priorities in the African Union’s 2007 Revised Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention.16 Since then, however, consumption of cocaine and heroine on the continent is said to have spiraled, not least because many of the cartels operating in the region prefer to pay for services in kind.17 Indeed, the UNODC has noted a “tremendous increase” of drug use in the region, estimating that a third of the cocaine that passed through the region was being consumed locally and that by mid-2011 as much as 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of heroin had been consumed in West Africa in 2011. According to the regional representative, these levels of consumption have become “a huge issue for public heath.”18 The health and welfare problems associated with drug consumption have been prioritized in di# erent policy frameworks. Conversely, the region (and broader continent) currently lacks national level policies that focus on harm reduction as well as the necessary treatment centers, and the resources necessary to establish and sustain them. This situation is exacerbated by a serious lack of data on consumers across the region, including the degree to which drug consumption is exacerbating existing health problems such as HIV-AIDS.

Underpinning many of these challenges is a weak empirical base. Policy and operational responses should be developed on the basis of a sound understanding of the nature and extent of organized crime and tra" cking across the region. They should also be based on a sound understanding of their structural impact, particularly on political and economic governance, citizen security and development and in relation to speci! c contexts. However, most assessment and analysis has been narrow in focus. For example, policy-oriented organized crime literature generally fails to make reference to how organized crime interacts with formal political institutions (forms and structures of government, political parties, legislatures etc.) or traditional decision-making structures. Meanwhile, studies of democracy and political transitions have “traditionally sidestepped the question of organized crime

and drugs and have focused primarily on the emergence of formal democratic institutions …and markets…as well as the relationship between them.”19 To many, this has produced “an analytical and political myopia when it comes to studies of, and responses to topics such as organized crime and drug tra" cking that operate outside this formal arena.”20 Similarly, over the past decade, strategic and security experts have increasingly focused on the study of organized crime, particularly its transnational dimension and potential linkages to transnational terrorism. However, they appear to be equally myopic on the political dimension of these issues, leading to policy and operational responses grounded in a narrow interpretation of security, and limited consideration of the political, social and economic aspects of organized crime and drug tra" cking.21

This ‘myopia’ means that international and regional initiatives often fail to consider the aforementioned issues. When they are considered, it is usually through the prism of one of the many con$ ict and political economy analysis tools developed over the past decade. For understandable reasons, not least the ! rewall of sovereignty, operational responses seldom touch on the structural political issues that tend to be at the core of the problems at hand. A brief review of some of the judicial processes or commissions of inquiry that have been implemented to address several of the high-pro! le cocaine smuggling cases in West Africa has shed light on the fact that very few political actors have been tried and sentenced for their involvement in drug tra" cking even when there is su" cient evidence pointing to their involvement.22 When important political ! gures involved in illicit activity are eventually caught, it is often due to the policies and pressures implemented and exercised by third countries.

Conversely, responses continue to be formulated from a security/law enforcement perspective, with little consideration for a state’s underlying political and cultural dynamics, questions of oversight, legitimacy, and the potential impact of di# erent responses on state-society relations or on general health and welfare. In relation to post-con$ ict settings, more recently analysts have stressed the need to engage in longer-term initiatives, including


14

strengthening institutions such as political parties as a means to “ensure structural and normative transformation of the political economy and remove the comparative advantage that violent criminal entrepreneurs and organizations enjoy.”23 However, most actors engaged in peacebuilding or statebuilding e# orts fail to consider these institutions in their program activities. On the other hand, political party assistance providers rarely coordinate some of the important work they have carried out on issues such as political corruption and party campaign ! nancing with actors involved in investigating organized crime. Many of the same critiques can be made in relation to the manner in which key social issues, particularly health, tend to be omitted from any of these e# orts.

Finally, there is a broad perception in the region that many of the existing initiatives are broadly conceived outside West Africa and that there is limited ownership of the existing policy framework and operational responses in the region. Both civil society and the media have had limited opportunity to discuss these challenges with key decision makers in the region hence further reducing ownership of and response to the issues.

CCConcclussionn

Regional actors and the broader international community continue to issue statements and declarations on organized crime and drug tra" cking in the region suggesting that despite e# orts to date, signi! cant concerns remain. This lack of progress recently led the Permanent Representative of Togo to the United Nations to lament in February 2012 that “none of these e# orts appears to have had a major deterring impact on the development of tra" cking networks in West Africa and the Sahel region. On the contrary (…), the situation may have now become worse than before these initiatives were carried out.”24 He also acknowledged though that “many o" cials across the region who are concerned about the e# ects of the drug trade have their hands tied, not least because they “are often confronted by people and networks more powerful than they are, and with other priorities.” A sounder and more comprehensive base for monitoring and assessing the impact of drug tra" cking and organized crime

across the region might help ensure that e# orts are more e# ectively channeled, and that leaders, both traditional and formal, governmental and non-governmental, are more strategically accompanied in their e# orts.

In this regard, in June 2011 and in reference to the situation in West Africa, the Global Commission on Drug Policy stressed that for responses to be e# ective, they need to “integrate existing approaches (security and judicial) with social, development and con$ ict prevention policies – and involve governments and civil society alike.”25 Over the past ! ve years, the UN O" ce in West Africa has made several calls for such a strategic shift. In light of more recent developments in West Africa and the Sahel region and in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the President of Togo recently reiterated these calls. A regionally led and multi-faceted mechanism may indeed help secure these necessary shifts.


15

EEndnnottes 1The Minister for Foreign A# airs of a West African country (Feb. 2009). 2 West Africa includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 3According to recent research, it appears to have stabilized today at some 50-60 tons annually, with a wholesale value of close to US$ 2 billion, representing some 25-30% of the European cocaine market. 4For example, as much as 80 metric tons of cocaine, worth $1.2 billion, might pass through West Africa to Europe this year, Manuel de Almeida Pereira, legal adviser to the Vienna-based anti-crime unit of the UN, said in an interview on May 17. Bloomberg News, West Africa’s Cocaine Trade Has Doubled in Five Years, UN Agency Estimates. Drew Hinshaw - May 25, 2011.5CMDCCP/EXP/3 (III) Para. 1.1 Fundamental Objectives. 6Between 2001 and 2007, cocaine seizures in West Africa increased from approximately 273 kilos to an estimated 47,000 kilos (see Cockayne 2011). ECOWAS has taken a number of policy and operational steps to address many of the challenges enumerated above. For example, in 2008, ECOWAS, in collaboration with the UNODC and other partners, organized a Ministerial conference to consider and approve a regional action plan (The Praia Plan of Action) and a political declaration against illicit drug tra" cking and organized crime for the region. The action plan and the political declaration were adopted and endorsed by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government in December 2008. Another initiative developed in the wake of the increased in! ltration of drug-related monies in politics in the region and the lack of relevant regulatory frameworks and accountability mechanisms is the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa which includes a provision on preventing the ! nancing of political parties and their campaigns by criminal networks, particularly drug tra" cking networks.7Kwesi Aning (2011), Security Links between Tra" cking and Terrorism in the Sahel in Africa South of the Sahara, London: Routledge. 8Encouraged through the 2010 PRSTs to ensure that drug tra" cking is “mainstreamed as a factor in con$ ict prevention strategies, con$ ict analysis, integrated missions assessment and planning and peacebuilding support” in February 2011, the UN Secretary-General established a Special Task Force on Organized Crime and Tra" cking co-chaired by the Department of Political A# airs (DPA) and UNODC. It is still early days to determine whether the Task Force will provide the much-needed support suggested in the PRSTs, particularly since it is quite removed geographically from the crux of the problem (West Africa, Central Asia, Central America etc.). Notwithstanding, it could provide much needed support and analysis to UN o" ces strategically placed in the region such as UNOWA, and potentially support the development of a similar capacity within ECOWAS. 9James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh (2011). 10The WACI is a program co-led by UNODC, UNDPA, UNDPKO and Interpol. The WACI is helping ECOWAS establish Transnational Crime Units in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.11Across the region, parties are increasingly accusing each other of using drug-related monies to fund their campaigns and gain advantage over their adversaries. See, for example, the polarization that has emerged in Ghana following suggestions by the head of the Narcotics Control Board that some political parties have been using drug-related monies to bolster their position ahead of the 2012 elections. No progress has been made in the country to adopt party ! nancing legislation despite the challenges the lack of legislation gives rise to.12James Cockayne (2011).13Kwesi Aning, Comprehending West Africa’s Security Dilemmas: State Fragility, Narco-Terrorism and Oil Politics. Forthcoming. 14See, for example, Lassana Gberie (2010), ISS Situation Report on Sierra Leone.15James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh, CIC Annual Review of Political

Missions 2011, Thematic Essay on Transnational Threats (forthcoming).16See Priority Area 2.5 in CMDCCP/EXP/3(III), p.9. 17CPPF Summary Note, Meeting on Drug Tra" cking in West Africa, July 2009. 18Bloomberg News, West Africans Consume One-Third of Tra! cked Drugs, UN Drugs O! ce Says, 20 June 2011.19Yashar (2010).20Yashar (2010).21Interviews Washington D.C. and N.Y Oct. 2010.22For example, in Sierra Leone the former Minister of Transport and Aviation was alleged to have been linked to a broad cocaine network that his brother was involved in, including in relation to the seizure of 700 kilos of cocaine in 2008. The Attorney General and Minister of Justice allegedly blocked his arrest after it had been ordered. In his report on the case in which 16 people, including several Latin Americans, were sentenced, Judge Nicholas Browne-Stone implied that the government had been guilty of obstruction of justice in preventing the trial of the former Minister and noted that in his view “the state prosecution was withholding vital evidence and was prepared to jeopardize the case in order to save one person [the minister], constituting an act of perjury.” See Lansana Gberie (2010), ISS Situation Report, Sierra Leone: Business More than Usual.23Cockayne (2009).24See S/2012/83, Letter dated 8 February 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Togo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.25Global Commission on Drug Policy, p. 14.


16

TTTabl

e 1:

Org

aaniz

ed CC

rim

e, D

rug

Tra!

ckki

ngg a

nd R

elat

ed C

hhhaaalle

nges

in W

esst A

fric

a: A

Dec

aade

of D

eveel

oppm

ents

Wes

t Afri

ca R

egio

nal A

ctiv

ities

Intr

a-Re

gion

al A

ctiv

ities

Extr

a-Re

gion

al A

ctiv

ities

In

tern

atio

nal A

ctiv

ities

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

STAT

EMEN

TS

AND

PO

LICY

GU

IDEL

INES

UN

Con

vent

ion

agai

nst T

OC

&

Prot

ocol

s A/

RES/

55/2

5

UN

CN

D R

ES o

n lin

ks b

etw

een

DT

and

TOC

CND

/RES

/44/

8

The

Bang

alor

e Pr

inci

ples

of

Judi

cial

Con

duct

UN

Con

vent

ion

agai

nst

Corr

uptio

n A/

RES/

58/4

1

UN

Act

ion

agai

nst

Corr

uptio

n A/

RES2

005/

18

UN

Rep

ort b

y H

LP o

n Th

reat

s, Ch

alle

nges

&

Chan

ge

ECO

WAS

Co

nven

tion

agai

nst S

mal

l Ar

ms &

LW

Dire

ctiv

e on

AM

L by

Cen

tral

Ba

nk o

f WA

Stat

es (B

CEAO

)

UN

SC P

RST

on

ECO

WAS

& D

T E!

ort

sS/

PRST

/200

8/37

UN

SC P

RST

on

WA

Situ

atio

n &

Ch

alle

nges

S/

PRST

/200

9/20

UN

OD

C Pr

ogra

m

for W

est A

fric

a20

10-2

014

UN

SC S

peci

al

Repo

rt N

o. 1

on

Em

ergi

ng

Thre

ats i

n W

A

UN

SC P

RST

on T

OC

in W

A &

the

Sahe

l PR

ST/2

012/

2

UN

GA

RES

on

Coop

erat

ion

agai

nst D

rugs

A/

RES/

54/1

32

ECO

WAS

Pro

toc.

on

Dem

ocra

cy &

G

over

nanc

e A/

SP1/

12/0

1

WAE

MU

Law

on

the

Figh

tag

ains

t ML

07/2

002/

CM

AU C

onve

ntio

n ag

ains

t Co

rrup

tion

EU D

rugs

St

rate

gy

2005

-201

2 EC

/150

74/0

4

Wor

ld S

umm

it O

utco

me

Repo

rt

A/59

/265

UN

OD

C Re

port

on

DT

as

Secu

rity

Thre

at

in W

est A

fric

a

UN

SC P

RST

on

TOC,

DT

and

(In-)

secu

rity

S/PR

ST/2

009/

32

WAC

I Fre

etow

n Co

mm

itmen

t on

DT

& O

C in

WA

G8

Dec

lara

tion

on th

e Fi

ght

agai

nst I

llega

l D

rug

Tra"

cki

ng

WCO

/INCB

MoU

on

Dru

g Co

ntro

l &

Coo

pera

tion

UN

ECO

SOC

Coop

erat

ion

agai

nst I

llici

t Tr

a" c

by

Sea

CND

/RES

/43/

5

WAE

MU

Dra

ft

unifo

rm la

w o

n Co

unte

ring

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Terr

oris

m

UN

OD

C Re

port

on

Tra"

cki

ng &

the

Rule

of L

aw

in W

est A

fric

a

Euro

pean

Act

to

Com

bat D

rug

Tra"

cki

ngEu

rope

Cou

ncil

Bam

ako

Dec

l. on

Impu

nity

, Ju

stic

e an

d H

R in

Wes

t Afr

ica

UN

SG L

ette

r on

Pira

cy in

G

ulf o

f Gui

nea

S/20

12/4

5

Vien

na

Dec

lara

tion

on C

rime

and

just

ice

ECO

WAS

Co

n# ic

t Pre

ven-

tion

Fram

ewor

k (E

CPF)

UN

CN

D R

ES o

n Co

oper

atio

n LA

C-W

A CN

D/

RES/

52/1

0

U.S.

Str

ateg

y on

Com

batt

ing

TOC

ECO

WAS

Pra

ia

Dec

l. on

Dru

g Ab

use,

DT

&

OC

in W

A (w

ith

UN

OD

C)

LA/W

A/U

NO

DC

MoU

on

join

t in

vest

igat

ion

of

OC

case

s

U.S.

Wes

t Afr

ica

Coop

erat

ive

Secu

rity

Initi

ativ

e (W

ACSI

)

ACTI

ON

PLA

NS

AND

TO

OLS

WCO

Cus

tom

s En

forc

emen

t N

etw

ork

(CEN

)

AU P

lan

of

Actio

n on

Dru

g Co

ntro

l in

Afric

a AP

D 2

002-

2006

UN

OD

C/W

CO

Cont

aine

r Co

ntro

l Pro

gram

(C

CP)

UN

OD

C/W

HO

TR

EATN

ET

Initi

ativ

e on

D

rug

Abus

e

Proj

ect C

OCA

F to

ass

ist P

olic

e &

cu

stom

s o"

cers

re. D

T fr

om W

A to

EU

(Int

erpo

l)

UN

OD

C 3-

year

Tr

ansa

tlant

ic

inte

llige

nce

ex-

chan

ge p

roje

ct

LA &

WA

ECO

WAS

Re

gion

al A

ctio

n Pl

an o

n D

T &

OC

2008

-201

1

UN

Con

vent

ion

agai

nst T

OC

&

Prot

ocol

sA/

RES/

55/2

5

Dak

ar In

itiat

ive

on h

arm

oniz

ed

$ ght

aga

inst

DT

and

Dru

g Ab

use

G8+

Dra

ft

Actio

n Pl

an o

n tr

ansa

tlant

ic D

T

INCB

Mis

sion

to

Sen

egal

INCB

Mis

sion

to

Mal

iIN

CB M

issi

ons t

o Ca

pe V

erde

and

G

hana

INCB

Mis

sion

to

The

Gam

bia

INCB

Mis

sion

to

Libe

riaAI

RCO

P O

pera

- tio

n CO

CAIR

1

UN

OD

C, W

CO,

Inte

rpol

ECO

WAS

Ope

ra-

tiona

l Pla

n(R

oadm

ap fo

r 20

08 R

egio

nal

Actio

n Pl

an)

LA a

nd E

U

Coop

erat

ion

in

anti-

drug

(CO

-PO

LAD

) pol

icy

GIA

BA S

econ

d St

rate

gic

Plan

of

Actio

n 20

11-2

014

ECO

WAS

Ear

ly

War

ning

and

Re

spon

se to

Co

n# ic

ts

(ECO

WAR

N)

Inte

llige

nce

Shar

ing

Wor

king

G

roup

LA-

EU(IS

WG

) 20

06-2

009

GIA

BA F

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Stra

tegi

c Pl

an

of A

ctio

n 20

07-

2009

UN

OD

C/W

B St

olen

Ass

et

Reco

very

In

itiat

ive

(StA

R)

Coca

ine

Rout

e Pr

ojec

t (L

AC &

WA)

20

09-2

011

AIRC

OP

Ope

ra-

tion

COCA

IR 2

U

NO

DC,

WCO

, In

terp

ol

AIRC

OP

Ope

ra-

tion

COCA

IR 3

U

NO

DC,

WCO

, In

terp

ol

Inte

llige

nce

Co-

oper

atio

n LA

&

WA

(CO

-LAC

-AO

) 20

06-2

010

AU P

lan

of

Actio

n on

Dru

g Co

ntro

l & C

rime

Prev

entio

n AU

PA 2

007-

2012

EU D

rugs

Act

ion

Plan

200

9-20

12

EC/3

26/0

9

Proj

ect W

hite

Fl

ow o

n D

T fr

om

LA to

Eur

ope

via

WA

Inte

rpol

INST

ITU

TIO

NAL

AR

RAN

GEM

ENTS

Actio

n G

roup

ag

ains

t Mon

ey

Laun

derin

g (G

IABA

)

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

O"

ce fo

r Wes

t Af

rica

(UN

OW

A)

Mar

itim

e An

alys

is a

nd

Ope

ratio

ns

Cent

er-N

arco

tics

(MAO

C-N

)

UN

Con

vent

ion

agai

nst T

OC

&

Prot

ocol

sA/

RES/

55/2

5

WA

Coas

t In

itiat

ive

(WAC

I) U

NO

DC,

DPK

O,

DPA

/UN

OW

A,

Inte

rpol

UN

Task

For

ce

on O

rgan

ized

Cr

ime

and

Tra"

cki

ng

Wes

t Afr

ica

Join

t O

pera

tions

Ini-

tiativ

e (W

AJO

)

WA

Dru

g Re

gula

tory

Au-

thor

ity N

etw

ork

(WAD

RAN

)

Inte

rpol

Glo

bal

Secu

rity

Initi

a-tiv

e (G

SI)

ECO

WAS

WA

Anti-

Corr

uptio

n Au

thor

ities

N

etw

ork


17

TTTabl

e 2:

Rat

i" ca

tion

off a

nd A

ccces

ssion

to R

elevvv

aaant U

N C

onvve

ntio

ns in

WWWes

t Afr

ica

üRa

ti! e

d an

d ac

ceed

ed

(ü)

Sign

ed b

ut n

ot ra

ti! e

d%

Nei

ther

sign

ed n

or ra

ti! e

d

Acce

ssio

n to

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

Con

vent

ions

1988

UN

ITD

üü

üü

üü

üü

üü

üü

üü

ü

2000

UN

TOC

üü

ü(ü

)ü

%ü

üü

üü

üü

(ü)

ü

2003

UN

CAC

üü

ü(ü

)%

ü(ü

)ü

üü

üü

üü

ü

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo


18

TTTabl

e 3::

Pol

ittica

l SSSys

temm

aand

Con

ditttio

ns in

WWes

t Afr

icaaa

1 So

urce

: Int

erna

tiona

l Mon

ey L

aund

erin

g In

form

atio

n N

etw

ork

(IMoL

IN):

http

://w

ww

.imol

in.o

rg

3

Sour

ce: T

rans

pare

ncy

Inte

rnat

iona

l: ht

tp://

cpi.t

rans

pare

ncy.

org

and

Free

dom

Hou

se: h

ttp:

//w

ww

.free

dom

hous

e.or

g2

Sour

ce: I

nter

natio

nal I

nstit

ute

for D

emoc

racy

and

Ele

ctor

al A

ssist

ance

(ID

EA):

http

://w

ww

.idea

.int/

polit

ical

-! na

nce/

inde

x.cf

m

Cons

titut

ion

and

Elec

tora

l Leg

isla

tion

(Mos

t Rec

ent W

here

App

licab

le)

Elec

tora

l law

(yea

r)19

9920

0120

1020

0019

9619

9619

9119

9819

8620

0620

1020

0619

9220

0220

00

Polit

ical

par

ty la

w/g

uide

lines

2001

2001

N/A

2008

N/A

2000

1991

1991

2005

2005

2010

2011

1989

2002

N/A

Polit

ical

! na

nce

law

/gui

delin

es20

0120

09N

/A20

04N

/A20

00N

/AN

/A20

1120

00N

/A20

11N

/A20

0220

00

Anti-

mon

ey la

unde

ring

law&

2006

2006

2009

2005

2003

2008

2007

2006

2002

2006

2004

2004

2004

2005

2007

Is th

ere

a...

P

oliti

cal P

arty

Fin

ance

2

...ban

on

fore

ign

dona

tions

?N

oN

oYe

sYe

sN

oYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sN

oYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sN

o

ban

on a

nony

mou

s don

atio

ns?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

ban

on st

ate

reso

urc.

as s

ourc

e?Ye

sN

/AYe

sYe

sN

/AYe

sN

/AYe

sYe

sN

/AYe

sN

/AN

/AYe

sN

/A

ban

on o

ther

(illi

cit)

sour

ces?

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

ceili

ng o

n do

nor c

ontr

ibut

ions

?Ye

sN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

oN

o

ban

on v

ote

buyi

ng?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

regu

lar r

epor

t on

part

y ! n

ance

?Ye

sYe

sN

/AYe

sN

oYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

s

repo

rt o

n ca

mpa

ign ! n

anci

ng?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

repo

rt o

n do

nor i

dent

ity?

Y/N

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

publ

ic re

port

on ! n

anci

al in

fo?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Y/N

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Corr

uptio

n Pe

rcep

tion

Inde

x (C

PI) 2

011

and

Pres

s Fre

edom

3

CPI (

0 - c

orru

pt; 1

0 –

very

cle

an)

33

5.5

2.2

3.5

3.9

2.1

2.2

3.2

2.8

2.5

2.4

2.9

2.5

2.4

CPI R

ank

(out

of 1

83)

100

100

4115

477

6916

415

491

118

134

143

112

134

143

Pres

s fre

edom

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Free

Not

Fre

eN

ot F

ree

Fre

ePa

rtly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Free

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Part

ly

Free

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo


19

4 So

urce

: The

Wor

ld B

ank

(pop

ulat

ion

ages

): ht

tp://

data

.wor

ldba

nk.o

rg a

nd F

reed

om H

ouse

: Fre

edom

Hou

se: h

ttp:

//w

ww

.free

dom

hous

e.or

g5

Sour

ce: T

he W

orld

Ban

k (e

cono

mic

per

form

ance

): ht

tp://

data

.wor

ldba

nk.o

rg6

Sour

ce: H

uman

Dev

elop

men

t Rep

ort 2

011:

htt

p://

hdr.u

ndp.

org/

en/m

edia

/HD

R_20

11_E

N_T

able

1.pd

f and

The

Wor

ld B

ank

(HIV

rate

): ht

tp://

data

.wor

ldba

nk.o

rg

L-M

Low

er M

iddl

e In

com

e

TTTabl

ee 4:

SSoc

io-E

ccoono

mic

CCCon

dittio

nns innn

Wess

t Afr

ica

Popu

latio

n Fi

gure

s4

Popu

latio

n (2

010)

in m

io. p

eopl

e9.

117

0.49

623

1.8

2510

1.6

4.1

1516

162

135.

45.

8

2010

Urb

an p

op. (

% o

f tot

al)

4220

6150

5852

3530

6233

1750

4338

43

2010

Pop

. age

s 0-1

4 y.

(% o

f tot

al)

4445

3241

4439

4341

4347

4943

4443

40

2010

Ref

ugee

s (co

untr

y of

orig

in)

442

1,14

525

41,7

582,

242

20,2

0311

,985

1,12

770

,129

3,66

380

315

,642

16,2

6711

,275

18,3

30

Econ

omic

Per

form

ance

5

Coun

try

inco

me

leve

lLo

wLo

wL-

ML-

MLo

wL-

MLo

wLo

wLo

wLo

wLo

wL-

ML-

MLo

wLo

w

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

) 199

7-01

5.1

5.0

6.2

2.3

5.4

8.4

4.9

3.2

7.1

5.0

8.7

6.0

3.3

5.5

2.4

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

) 200

2-06

3.8

3.5

3.6

3.8

6.2

4.7

-0.3

3.0

4.6

4.5

-1.2

7.0

2.2

3.2

3.2

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

) 200

7-11

3.0

9.2

5.4

3.0

5.0

6.6

1.9

3.5

5.5

4.5

8.8

7.9

4.2

4.9

3.4

Hum

an D

evel

opm

ent (

HD

) and

Hea

lth6

2011

HD

Inde

x (to

tal:

187)

167

181

133

170

168

135

178

176

182

175

186

156

155

180

162

2011

Mea

n ye

ars o

f sch

oolin

g3.

31.

33.

53.

32.

87.

11.

62.

33.

92.

01.

45.

04.

52.

95.

3

2009

Lite

racy

(% o

f tot

al, a

ge 1

5+)

42N

/A85

5546

6739

5259

N/A

N/A

6150

41N

/A

2009

Ele

ctric

ity a

cces

s (%

of p

op.)

24.8

14.6

N/A

47.3

N/A

60.5

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

50.6

42.0

N/A

20.0

2011

Life

exp

ecta

ncy

(in y

ears

)56

.155

.474

.255

.458

.564

.254

.148

.156

.851

.454

.751

.959

.347

.857

.1

2009

HIV

rate

(% o

f tot

al, 1

5-49

y.)

1.2

1.2

N/A

3.4

2.0

1.8

1.3

2.5

1.5

1.0

0.8

3.6

0.9

1.6

3.2

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo


20

AIRCCOP Airport Communication Project

AMLL Anti-Money Laundering

APD African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control

AU African Union

AUPAA AU Plan of Action on Drug Control & Crime

Prevention

BCEAAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de

l’Ouest

CCP Container Control Program

CEN Customs Enforcement Network

CNDD Commission on Narcotic Drugs

COCAAF Cocaine Africa

COCAAIR Cocaine Route Operation

COPOOLADDD Cooperation Program between LA & EU on

Anti-Drugs Policies

CPI Corruption Perception Index

CTF Counter-Terrorism Financing

DT Drug Tra" cking

EC European Council

ECOWWARNN ECOWAS Early Warning and Response

Network

ECOWWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECPFF ECOWAS Con$ ict Prevention Framework

EU European Union

FATFF Financial Action Task Force

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIABBA Action Group Against Money Laundering in

West Africa

GSI Global Security Initiative

HD Human Development

HLP High-Level Panel

HR Human Rights

IMoLLIN Intl. Money Laundering Information Network

IMPAACT Intl. Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting

Task Force

INCBB Intl. Narcotics Control Board

Interrpol Intl. Criminal Police Organization

ISWGG Intelligence Sharing Working Group

JAITF Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force

LA Latin America

LAC Latin America and the Caribbean

LW Light Weapons

MAOOC-N Maritime Analysis and Operations Center -

Narcotics

ML Money Laundering

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

PRSST Presidential Statement

RESS Resolution

StAAR Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative

TOCC Transnational Organized Crime

TREEATNNET Network of Drug Dependence Treatment &

Rehabilitation

UN United Nations

UNCCAC UN Convention Against Corruption

UN DPAA UN Department of Political A# airs

UN DPKKOO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

UN ECOOSSOC UN Economic and Social Council

UNGGA UN General Assembly

UNIITD UN Convention Against Illicit Tra" c in Narc.

Drugs & Substances

UNOODCC UN O" ce on Drugs and Crime

UNOOWAAA UN O" ce for West Africa

UNTTOC UN Convention Against Transnational

Organized Crime

UNSSC UN Security Council

WAA West Africa

WAACI West Africa Coast Initiative

WAACSI West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative

WAADRAAN West Africa Drug Regulatory Authority

Network

WAAEMUU West African Economic and Monetary Union

WAAJO West Africa Joint Operations

WB World Bank

WCCO World Customs Organization

WDDR World Drug Report

WHHO World Health Organization

AAbbbbbrrevvvvviaattioonnss


21

Documents

The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Tra cking on ...cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/dakar_meeting_report_-_13_june_2012.pdf · The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Tra! cking