The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 8 | Number 1 | Article ID 5385 | Apr 15, 2020

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The Illiberal Turn in Indonesian Democracy

Iqra Anugrah

Abstract: Two decades after authoritarianbreakdown and democratic transition in1998, how does the tra jectory ofIndonesian democracy look? By reflectingon the state of Indonesian politics in thelast 15 years, this paper will argue thatdespite many improvements, Indonesiandemocracy has experienced a slow processof decline and a deepening of illiberaltendencies. This poses a major challengefor the quality of Indonesian democracy inthe near future.

Introduction

The series of mass protests that have rockedJakarta and other major urban centers inIndonesia in September and October of 2019and the state’s repressive response to theprotests are indicative of a worrying trendaffecting Indonesian democracy.1 On thesurface, formal political processes seem to beworking – the 2019 concurrent presidential andlegislative elections, despite its massive scaleand a deepening polarization among Indonesianvoters, were held peacefully.2 Furthermore, asa gesture of national unity after a polarizingpresidential election, Joko Widodo, commonlyknown as Jokowi, controversially appointed hisvociferous rival for the presidency in both 2014and 2019 elections, Prabowo Subianto, as thedefense minister in the new cabinet afterwinning a second term.

Jokowi (left) and Prabowo

It is important to assess other recent trends.Toward the end of Jokowi’s first term, theparliament, the People’s RepresentativeAssembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR)attempted to pass several controversial lawsrelating to the criminal code, corruptioneradication, land, labor, mining, and naturalresources. The new corruption eradication law,despite its name, will actually weaken theauthority of the Corruption EradicationCommission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi,KPK). Moreover, the laws on land, labor,mining, and natural resources will pave theway for capital expansion into the countrysideat high socio-ecological cost. The proposed newcriminal code has the potential to criminalizesocial movement activists and infringe on civiland political rights in the name of preservingpublic order. For example, the code containsseveral draconian articles on the followingmatters: 1) insulting the head of state and statesymbols, 2) treason, 3) blasphemy, and 4)consensual cohabitation and sexual activitiesoutside of marriage, among others.3

Such political maneuvering, coupled with the

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government’s heavy-handed approach to massdemonstrations in Papua in protest of systemicracism have triggered the emergence ofperhaps the biggest wave of mass protest since1998.4 A new generation of university andvocational school students, with no memory ofand direct experience in the 1998 reform orreformasi movement, have been at theforefront of this new wave of protest, joined byworkers and a variety of civil society groups.Under the banner of #ReformasiDikorupsi (thereform era is corrupted), this mass movementhas been protesting against the creepingcurtailment of civil, political, and socio-economic rights via the controversial laws.

The government has responded to theseprotests with mass arrests, several killings, thecriminalization of activists, and repressivemeasures against even emergency medicalresponders. The climate of fear created by suchan approach is unprecedented in the last 20years.

Although these developments are worrying,they are just the symptoms of a larger andpossibly more disturbing trend affectingIndonesian democracy. While Indonesia can besaid to be a functioning electoral democracy,there has been a significant contraction ofdemocratic space, especially in non-electoralrealms and in the periphery, accompanied bythe continuing influence of oligarchic power inseveral policy arenas. Combined together, thistrajectory slowly leads to an increasinglyilliberal and oligarchic turn in Indonesiandemocracy.

The analysis here assesses the trajectory ofIndonesian democracy over the past 15 years.The first section lays out the analyticalframework to understand this trajectory. Thesecond and third sections discuss the dynamicsof Indonesian politics under Susilo BambangYudhoyono (2004-2014) and Jokowi(2014-2019) respect ive ly . In thesechronological sections, this paper will assess

the qual i ty of democracy under eachadministration in three arenas: democraticpractices at the national level, oligarchicinfluence in politics, and local agrarian politics.The fourth section offers concluding remarks.

An Analytical Framework to Assess theTrajectory of Indonesian Democracy

To better assess the quality of a democracy, itis necessary to look at more than justinstitutional, attitudinal, and behavioraldimensions of democracy. Analyzing theseindicators alone might give the impression thatIndonesian democracy, generally speaking, isperforming well. There is a regular alternationof power via electoral democracy as “the onlygame in town” with the possibility of not onlywinning but also losing the elections forcompeting parties.5 Moreover, public supportfor democracy remains high.6 However, this isjust one side of the story.

In order to evaluate democratic quality morecomprehensively, it is necessary to considerother dimensions. If democracy is understoodas an opportunity for the expansion of rights,then the notion of democratic quality shouldalso entail the deepening of political space aswell as the extension of rights to previouslymarginalized groups, such as the lower-classes,minorities, and civil society groups.7 Indeed,while the institutional and electoral aspects ofdemocratic politics are important, it is alsoimperative to look at the participatory andsocial dimensions of democracy.8

It is therefore inadequate to merely look atinteractions and conflicts among politicalactors, both among elites and citizens alike.This section will examine the intersectionbetween electoral politics and the broaderdynamics of political economy to betterunderstand the trajectory of Indonesiandemocracy. Political economy is defined here asthe struggle over political power, especially

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state power, and economic resources andbenefits among competing social forces.Indeed, i t has long been posited thatdomination over the commanding heights ofpolitical institutions and economic sectors cansuppress democratic space and quality.9

This is why it is necessary to challenge someexisting observations on Indonesian democracyand electoral dynamics. David Adam Stott’sarticle in this journal which makes a case forcautious optimism for the second Jokowipresidency.10 While Stott’s presentation of whathe considers the key achievements of Jokowi’sfirst term and their broader political, economic,and social context has value, he overlookscertain issues. For instance, how intra-elitecompetition masks their social cohesiveness asa class, the long-standing conflict betweenelites and the electorate’s aspiration for moremeaningful popular participation, and theimpact of these phenomena on Indonesianpol i t ics . He a lso seems to be ratherpreoccupied with macro-indicators rather thanproviding a more convincing explanation ofhow Jokowi’s second term might disrupt the oldpatterns of Indonesian politics that cripple itsdemocracy.

Another assessment is put forward by twosenior Indonesia watchers, Edward Aspinalland Marcus Mietzner.11 They argue thatIndonesia is experiencing a slow process ofdecoupling between religious and culturalpluralism and democratic norms, where thecommitment to protect pluralism might rely toomuch on arbitrary state power, therebyjeopardizing democratic norms. Although thisassessment points to several factors leading tounhealthy polarization and democratic declinein Indonesian politics in recent years, it missesthe influence of recent global and nationaldynamics of political economy on democraticdecline and rising illiberal populism. This is asurprising omission given their other analysesof Indonesian politics actually pay greaterattention to political economy.12

Here, this paper tries to offer a more nuancedview. It is fair to say that Indonesia underYudhoyono’s 10 year-tenure was in bettershape politically compared to the tumultuousearly years of the reform period (1998-2001).However , to ascr ibe e i ther the s lowstabilization of democratic process (2002-2004)or the institutional stability of Yudhoyono’syears as “the golden years” of democracywould be an overstatement. 1 3 Such anassessment overlooks the complex trajectory ofpost-Suharto Indonesian democracy. Behindthe veneer of democratic stability lies a set ofproblems with serious consequences for thequality of democracy itself.

Hence, a more political economy-orientedreading of Indonesian democratic trajectoryand quality is needed. In order to do so, thispaper will look at three aspects of democraticpolitics in the last 15 years: national politicaltrends, oligarchic influence in politics, andlocal agrarian politics. Regarding the first, howthe presidents handled the structuralchallenges facing them and exercised theiragencies amidst existing political constellationswill be examined. With regard to oligarchicinfluence in politics, it will be gauged bylooking at the interaction between the state,the capitalist class and wealthy politicians, andthe influence of these moneyed interests onpolitics.14 Lastly, the state of local agrarianpolitics will be used as another importantyardstick to measure democratic quality andilliberalism given the close connection betweenrural democratization and the democratizationof the polity more generally.15 Furthermore,there is ample evidence to suggest that elitedomination over land and rural resources havedetrimental consequences for democratizationand democratic deepening, a point that isespecially pertinent in the Indonesian context.16

Democratic Stagnation under theYudhoyono Administration

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A closer look at the trajectory of Indonesiandemocracy during the presidencies ofYudhoyono and Jokowi reveals worrying signs.This is not to say that Indonesian democracywas not consolidated throughout this period.Again, looking at the major institutionalindicators of democratic consolidation alone –peaceful transfer of power via elections,commitment to political (but not necessarilysocial and economic) democracy, and existingprotection of basic rights in general – one cansafely say that Indonesian democracy has beenconsolidated. However, its quality has beenslowly compromised to the point of reaching acritical level. To understand this process ofquality regression, one needs to look moreclosely at the state of national and local politicsin the last 15 years, especially the last fiveyears under Jokowi’s first term.

The ten years of the Yudhoyono presidency iscommonly seen as the period of solidifyingdemocratic consolidation.1 7 While thisassessment is fairly accurate, Yudhono’s tenureof economic and democratic stability actuallycame with a cost, one that also shaped thecourse of Indonesian politics under the Jokowiadministration.

Yudhoyono, a consensus-seeker and member ofthe late Suharto-era elite, succumbed to thecartelized tendency of Indonesia’s politicalparty system, in which parties and politicianshave miniscule programmatic orientations andprefer to share power liberally across politicaldivisions. He did this by making concessions tothe political elites by forming a grand coalitionthat included both his supporters and some ofhis competitors when he took power after the2004 and 2009 presidential elections.18 He alsogave cabinet positions to parties whopreviously competed against him includingGolkar, the former ruling party of theauthoritarian era.19

However, this moderate political stance andmode of governing also means that Indonesia

missed the opportunity to implement much-needed structural reforms to deependemocracy and move the economy forwardfrom a commodity boom-driven, oligarchs-benefitting economy.20 It is true that Yudhoyonoas president operated under heavy politicalpressures from established political actors, buthis indecisive governing style also contributedto an inability to push for reforms, a consensusshared by many observers of Indonesianpolitics.

The impact of this missed opportunity onIndonesian democracy is clearly visible in threesectors: the overall quality of democracy at thenational level, oligarchic influence in politics,and local agrarian politics. At the national level,while Yudhoyono maintained a degree ofdemocratic stability, his overly cautiousapproach on pressing issues and penchant forappeasing the political class meant that somehard-gained democrat ic ga ins werecompromised.

Such appeasement was most visible inYudhoyono’s response to the nationalparliament’s attempt to pass a regional electionlaw scrapping direct elections for localgovernment heads towards the end of hissecond term in 2014. The proposed law wascontroversial because it attempted to returnthe power to vote for local government headsback to the regional parliaments – essentiallytaking the voting power away from localcitizens.2 1 After much public pressure,Yudhoyono eventually issued a governmentregulation in lieu of law (perppu) that cancelledthe controversial measure.2 2 AlthoughYudhoyono eventually succumbed to the publicpressure, his wait-and-see approach and thetug of war that he had with the parliamentshowed the tendency among political elites tobend the rules for their own benefit. As thepolitical analyst Dirk Tomsa pointed out,Yudhoyono had several opportunities to make aclear stance on this issue, but most of the timehe preferred to take a middle-of-the-road

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position until it was clear that the Indonesianpublic did not welcome either the law or hisindecisiveness.23

Moreover, Yudhoyono’s refusal to act moredecisively on several critical political issues,often for the sake of strengthening his electoralbase, also contributed to the normalization ofilliberal tendencies in Indonesian democraticpolitics. This was apparent in the protectionwomen’s and minori ty r ights , whereYudhonoyo’s seemingly reformist rhetoric wasnot consistent with his lack of effort to combatgender-based discrimination, improve thelivelihood of poor women, and protect religiousminorities.24 Again, this lack of commitmentwas mostly a result of his appeasement of moreconservative elements within his administrationand some religious conservative groups andvigilantes such as the Indonesian UlemaCouncil (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) andthe Islamic Defenders Front (Front PembelaIslam, FPI).25 Yudhoyono himself saw the needfor cultivating an Islam-friendly image – hefounded a prayers’ association (majelis zikir)and tried to build relations with several Islamicorganizations.26 Yudhoyono’s own view of state-religion relations was neither secularist norscripturalist.27 But when it comes to dealingwith rising Islamic conservatism, hisadministration opted to adopt a wait-and-seeattitude, leaving the tensions between religiousconservatives and largely progressive civilsociety actors unresolved.28 Yudhoyono’sappeasement and indecisiveness eventuallycontributed to a political climate that wassupportive of social conservatism and enabledsuch conservatism to become increasinglyembedded.29

In addition to such lukewarm support fordemocratic norms, Yudhoyono also underminedthe quality of Indonesian democracy by leaningon oligarchics for support. As a member of theold political elite who had first served inparliament under the authoritarian New Orderregime, he chose the route followed by many

other New Order-era elites post-Suhartopolitics: building his own oligarch-backedpolitical party, the Democratic Party (PartaiDemokrat, PD).30 Later, he became an oligarchhimself, extended his influence in politicsthrough his party and related media outlets asa kingmaker, and finally built his own dynastyby promoting his children into politics – hisoldest son, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, ran as agubernatorial candidate in the 2017 Jakartagubernatorial election, whereas his second son,Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, has been serving asa national Member of Parliament (MP) from PDsince 2009.31

Lastly, the trajectory of local democracy underYudhoyono’s two terms was hardly glowing, asseen in agrarian politics under his presidency.Yudhoyono branded himself as a champion ofthe rural poor armed with an expertise in ruraleconomy – he holds a PhD in agriculturaleconomics from Bogor Agricultural University,a premier university for agricultural and rurals tud ies in Indones ia . But under h isadministration, Indonesia experienced a steepincrease in instances of agrarian conflict.According to the 2014 report from theConsortium for Agrarian Reform (KonsorsiumPembaruan Agraria, KPA), there were some1500 agrarian conflicts involving almost onemillion agricultural households and more than6.5 million hectares of land during Yudhoyono’stenure (2004-2014).32 Furthermore, the samereport shows that the number of cases ofagrarian conflicts also increased significantly,from 89 in 2009 to 472 in 2014, or more thanfive times. Most of these conflicts weredisputes over land ownership and accessbetween local communities versus state andcorporate authorities. In addition, the share ofemployment in agriculture also droppedsignificantly while the total area of agriculturalland remained more or less the same inYudhoyono’s second term, suggesting theincreasing rate of agrarian dispossession in hissecond term.33

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These data reveal not only the severity ofagrarian confl ict under Yudhoyono’sgovernment but also the contraction of localdemocratic space due to the domination ofrural political and economic resources by eliteinterests. It is important to note that many localregions, despite rapid urbanization across thecountry, retain small town and ruralcharacteristics. Hence, the state of localagrarian politics has a major influence on thequality of local democracy.

In these agrarian conflicts, the contraction oflocal democratic space occurs mainly throughthe use of polit ical manipulation andintimidation from state and corporateauthorities against poor communities in landdispute cases. This form of soft repressionmight be sporadic and overall does notdecrease the vibrancy and fairness of electoralpolitics at the local level. Nevertheless, thecommon deployment of e l i te -backedintimidation creates a sense of fear andvigilance among the local citizenry and civilsociety actors.34

This might seem an unfair assessment ofYudhoyono’s legacy in local and rural politics.After all, he implemented several policiesdesigned to benefit the rural population in far-flung areas, such as conditional cash transfersand accelerated land title certification.35

However, these policies are best seen as asemi-technocratic way to cushion the negativeimpacts of market forces and elite dominationin local regions rather than an attempt topromote a more assertive citizens’ participationand seriously address structural politicaleconomy challenges that limit such popularparticipation. Whatever benefits these policiesbrought were also offset by Yudhoyono’sneglect of rural livelihoods to the detriment ofthe quality of local democracy.

In the end, the balance sheet for the quality ofIndonesian democracy under Yudhoyono’s ten-year presidency is a mixed one: Indonesian

democracy successfully consolidated at the costof stagnation. This opened the way for an anti-systemic challenger to attempt to break thedemocratic system through authoritarian orilliberal means. This was manifested by the riseof an oligarchic authoritarian populist, PrabowoSubianto, who fought Jokowi in the 2014presidential election.36

A Dimming Hope under Jokowi ’ sPresidency

The fiercely contested 2014 presidentialelection between Jokowi and Prabowo was seenas a watershed moment in Indonesiandemocracy. At that time, the two candidatesprovided contrasting political visions. Theformer, virtually an outsider in Indonesia’sentrenched elitist politics, had a notable recordin local governance as the mayor of Solo andthe governor of Jakarta and was seen by someas a symbol of hope. The latter, by contrast,was a prominent member of the New Orderelite with a questionable human rights record,a populist demagogue longing for a return toauthoritarian rule. After a fierce electoralbattle and a massive last-minute civil societymobilization, Jokowi won the presidentialelection, a sign of the continuation ofdemocratic stability and the possibility ofdemocratic deepening for many.

Soon, however, this hope was dashed. Jokowimight be the popularly-elected president, buthe faced a hostile parliament as well as vestedinterests in his own political party andcoalition. In other words, he was held captiveby these political constellations since day one.Faced by this possible deadlock, Jokowi hadtwo options at the start of his first term: eitherto push for a clean break with the oldestablishment and further mobilize his voters,who had been galvanized by his civil society-backed campaign, or play the same old game –capitulating to the oligarchic interests.

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Jokowi opted for the latter option, a move thatdisappointed many of his supporters. Uponcloser inspection, however, this should notcome as a surprise: Jokowi, who is part of theemerging and increasingly politically-assertivemiddle class, has a penchant for technocraticand developmentalist solutions for politicalproblems.37 This means that while Jokowi’srealm of action has been indeed limited by thepolitical constellation surrounding him, hispolicy decisions are also shaped by his ownagency and pol i t ical preferences, asdemonstrated by his performance at nationaland local levels.

At the national level, this interplay betweenstructural forces of political circumstancesaround Jokowi and his own agency is reflectedin two areas. First, Jokowi chose to form agrand coalition cabinet, a pattern that hecarried on from his predecessors.38 He decidedto include some of the opposition parties intohis cabinet. This implies not only the continuingdecline of check and balance mechanism, butalso the repetition of what has been termed'promiscuous' power sharing among politicalelites.39 Secondly, Jokowi quickly ignoredelements of civil society-supported humanrights and social justice agenda in his electioncampaign and subsequent policies and insteadfocused on a p ro - i nves tmen t , p ro -infrastructure, and pro-stability agenda.40 Whilea massive push for economic growth and socialstability is needed for a middle-incomeeconomy such as Indonesia, such a push canonly become sustainable if it also promotespopular participation among the lower classesand a social democratic, redistributionistagenda. Unfortunately, these participatory andredistributionist elements have been absent inJokowi’s developmentalism.

An example of this is Jokowi’s refusal to takedecisive action on a number of contentiousissues, such as public debates surrounding thelegacy of the 1965 massacre and thecontroversial construction of a cement factory

in Kendeng mountainous region of Central Javathat dispossessed local communities from theirland.41 Jokowi stayed silent for the most partwhen conservative groups tried to silencepublic discussion on the 1965 massacre orwhen members of the army tried to intimidatedissenting opinions by labelling themcommunist sympathizers. With regard to thecontroversial cement factory construction, hemet some representatives of communitymembers affected by the construction inKendeng region, but did little beyond hearingtheir complaints and essentially let theconstruction proceed.

Another step that Jokowi took that contributedto the deeper illiberal turn in Indonesianpolitics was his heavy-handed response to theincreasingly combative Islamist mass protestssurrounding the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorialelection.42 This mobilization, which wastriggered both by the comment regarding theuse of Koranic verses for political gains by thethen governor of Jakarta, Basuki TjahajaPurnama or Ahok, and his massive urbaneviction policy, was a reaction born out ofsocial and economic marginalization that tookincreasingly nativist and racist undertones.While this wave of Islamist populism wasindeed illiberal, the government’s responsetoward it was also illiberal, indiscriminatelyprosecuting Islamist and populist figures,including those who express their dissentpeacefully. In the words of the veteranIndonesia analyst Marcus Mietzner, “Jokowi’sadministration pursued a criminalizationstrategy against populists that violatedestablished legal norms. As a result thegovernment’s attempt to protect thedemocratic status quo from populist attacksturned into a threat to democracy itself.”43

Moreover, Jokowi also did very little to balanceoligarchic influence in politics. It is true that hepromoted an expansion of basic public services,such as the public healthcare system andeducation expansion.44 However, he did little to

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promote a more redistributive developmentagenda. In fact, his first term coincided withgrowing inequality between both the rich andthe poor and also between urban and ruralareas. A report from Oxfam, a leading povertyeradication organization, shows that in 2016“the wealthiest 1 percent of the populationowned nearly half (49 percent) of total wealth”and in the same year “the collective wealth ofthe richest four billionaires was…more than thetotal wealth of the bottom 40 percent of thepopulation.”45 The same report also shows thatunequal access to basic electricity services androad networks between rural and urban areasas well as land ownership domination bycorporations and wealthy individualsexacerbate rural-urban inequality.46 Otheranalyses have also echoed these findings andunderlined how increasing inequality mighthurt economic growth in the long run.47 Hisemphasis on macroeconomic stability, an areain which he scored pretty well, overlooks howsocio-economic inequality and dispossessioncan t rans la te in to fur ther po l i t i ca lmarginalization of middle-class and lower-classcitizens.

Nowhere is this more visible in the influence ofoligarchs on both local and national elections inrecent years. Numerous civi l societyorganizations and coalitions report that miningand energy corporations, plantation estates,and oligarchs with ties to them have been theprimary source of campaign financing for manycandidates in local executive head elections.These are the local politicians that have thepower to grant licenses for mining andplantation operations once they enter office.48

At national level, such corporations andoligarchs also provided a large part ofcampaign financing for both Jokowi andPrabowo in both the 2014 and 2019presidential elections. 4 9

Such oligarchic influence, combined withJokowi ’ s emphas i s on po l i t i ca l andmacroeconomic stability, confines the scope of

policy influence of ordinary citizens and civilsociety by tilting the balance of power evenfurther in favor of powerful establishedinterests. This leaves little or no room for moreprogressive candidates from civil society tocontest elections. Jokowi was initially seen assuch a candidate but has himself been co-optedby oligarchs having entered national-levelpolitics It also means the continuation of thesame pattern of freewheeling patron-clientelism in which the “free market” logic ofvote buying reigns, connecting politicians andvoters in a non-programmatic, transactionalrelationship.

Lastly, Jokowi’s record in agrarian politics alsocontributes to the deterioration of localdemocracy. He claimed that his flagshipagrarian policies – land titling, social forestryand budget allocation for village governments –would solve the many problems that localcommunities face. However, these policies donot address the structural inequality in landownership and access and the contraction ofdemocratic space that it creates, not to mentionthat are merely just the continuation ofYudhoyono’s agrarian policy package.50

Jokowi's pro-capital orientation in ruraldevelopment also outweighs the supposedbenef i ts of h is agrar ian pol ic ies , asdemosntrated by the continuing eruption ofagrarian conflicts, many of which emerged inprotest at his signature infrastructural projectsduring his first term.51 In many cases, Jokowi'sadministration has responded to these ruralprotests rather repressively, thereby revivingthe climate of fear that limits the developmentof a more assertive and autonomous rural civilsociety in local democratic spaces.52

Herein lies the irony of the Jokowi presidency:elected as a political outsider with a pro-reformplatform, he has succumbed to pressure fromoligarchs and other conservative elites.Admittedly, Jokowi’s position within his ownpolitical party, the Democratic Party ofIndonesia-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi

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Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P) has beentenuous, as he had to secure support from thelong-time matriarch of PDIP, MegawatiSoekarnoputri, for his nomination as apresidential candidate in 2014.53

Inadvertently, this capitulation to elite vestedinterests paved the way for the resurgence ofilliberal tendencies in Indonesian politics andled to perceptions of a decline in Indonesiandemocracy. This also meant that the 2019presidential election was conducted in adifferent atmosphere to that of 2014: far frombeing a battle for a more democratic future, the2019 presidential election represented an intra-oligarchic competition, albeit couched inpluralistic or populist rhetoric.

The 2019 Presidential Election and ItsAftermath

The popular enthusiasm that animated the2014 presidential election and the early days ofthe Jokowi presidency now have been replacedby increasing cynicism across Indonesia’spolitical spectrum. In the regional context isespecially noteworthy that the logisticallychallenging election was held successfully andpeacefully. Moreover, the mass mobilization ofthe Indonesian public to participate in the 2019concurrent presidential and legislativeelections demonstrates the depth of popularsupport for the post-Suharto democraticprocess. According to Saiful Mujani Researchand Consulting (SMRC), a leading pollster inIndonesia, the voter turnout rate reached 80percent, well above the 2014 elections (69percent for the presidential election and 75percent for the legislative election).54 However,as in 2014 the electoral process was marred bymisinformation and fake news, and wasnoteworthy for the lack of substantive policydebates between the Jokowi and Prabowocamps.

What came after the election, however,

surprised many especially those active in civilsociety. Prior to the parliament’s passing ofseveral controversial laws, the governmentarrested several activists in a workers’demonstration criticizing the pro-capitaldirection of the proposed revisions of theexisting law on labor relations and at anotherprotest demanding the end of militarism inPapua and racism against Papuans.55 In bothcases, the police arrested the protesters ondubious pretexts and by doing so might haveundermined the rule of law and civil rights ofthe demonstrators.56

The situation then worsened when theparliament proposed several laws that wouldweaken the power of the KPK and the broaderanti-corruption campaign, substantively limitcivil and political rights, restrict workers’ rightto strike and ease the expansion of corporateinvestment in rural areas. The parliament alsorefused to approve an anti-sexual violence billand a domestic workers’ rights bill, two draftlaws seen as crucial for many in civil society.This, coupled with parliament’s lack oftransparency in discussing the laws, soontriggered a cross-class protest movement, oneof the biggest mass protests since the fall of theauthoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998.

The Jokowi government responded to thesemass protests repressively, in a manner notseen since the anti-Suharto protests of 1998.However, this response also escalated theinitially sporadic protest movement into anationwide campaign to return to the heyday ofthe 1998 post-Suharto democratic reforms. Themovement made several demands of thegovernment – to uphold the hard-earnedachievements of democratic reforms; endmilitarism and criminalization of activistsincluding in Papua; address corporate-ledenvironmental degradation; and resolve humanrights violations.57 This movement garneredsubstantial public support and sympathy. Arecent empirical study shows that Indonesiansacross the political divide support tougher anti-

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corruption measures and feel unrepresented bythe existing political class, a sentiment sharedb y m a n y w h o a c t i v e i n t h e m a s sdemonstrations.5 8 Indeed, the protestmovement, at least in its initial stage, wasbacked by a wide range of groups that typicallydo not get along with each other in politics.

It is not difficult to gauge the logic behind thegovernment’s repression of the protesters. It issimply the extension of Jokowinomics: politicalstability through electoral means and economicgrowth d r i ven by a commod i t y andinfrastructural boom. Bitter quarrels betweenthe president and an assertive parliament havebeen replaced by a coalescing of interests andgoverning notions between the two that alsoreinforces the dominance of the oligarchs.Jokowi also stressed that he will not issue agovernment regulation in lieu of law or aperppu regulation to replace the newly-passedcorruption eradication law that hampers thework of the KPK, despite criticism from thepublic and civil society.59 While Indonesia stillhas a robust electoral politics, this growingreactionary conservatism nonetheless showsthe longevity of what the late BenedictAnderson called “bourgeois electoralism.”60

Jokowi’s new developmentalism is alsoreflected in the make up of his new cabinet.61

While some old faces remain, some of his newministerial appointments have sparked intensepublic debate.62 The former general-turned-businessman, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, retainshis portfolio as the coordinating minister ofmaritime and investment affairs, suggestingthat he will continue to serve as the unofficialpolitical adviser for the president. The market-friendly economist, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, alsocontinues as finance minister, showing Jokowi’scommitment to macroeconomic stability. ButJokowi also appointed some new figures. Somenew appointments show Jokowi’s continuingcommitment to a stable investment climate. Forexample, Bahlil Lahadalia, the currentchairperson of the Association of Young

Indonesian Businesspeople and a self-madeentrepreneur focusing on natural resources,becomes the new head of the investmentcoordinating board. Jokowi also surprisinglyappointed Nadiem Makarim, the young founderof the ride-hailing service start-up, Gojek, asthe new education minister, presiding over aministry which, critics argue, is the symbol ofthe deepening of market logic in the educationsystem.

Other appointments potentially threaten thepractice of participatory politics. For instance,Jokowi appointed Tito Karnavian, the nationalpolice head who had gained notoriety for hishandling of various mass demonstrations, asthe internal affairs minister. He also tappedanother former general, Fachrul Razi, as thereligious affairs minister. These appointmentsare controversial because these are supposedto be held by civilians. The appointment offormer high-ranking military and police officersto these portfolios violates the spirit of civiliansupremacy and harks back to the Suharto era.

By far the biggest surprise has been theappointment of Prabowo Subianto as thedefense minister. This is alarming not only froma human rights viewpoint, but also from anaccountability perspective – what was the pointof having an election if the leader of theopposition accepts a major appointment in thegovernment instead of performing the role ofwatchdog from outside the government?Prabowo’s appointment also nullifies therationale of supporting Jokowi as the lesser-evilbetween the two, since the lesser-evil has nowappointed his authoritarian rival to his cabinet.Prabowo’s fiery persona, military background,and familiarity with international affairs mighthelp Jokowi’s handling of defense affairs, buthis brashness might also pose a challenge toJokowi’s dream of stable governance.63

Observers have rightly warned that Prabowomight overstep the boundaries beyond hisministerial portfolio in his attempt to dominatesecurity affairs and prepare his political

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comeback.64 The omens for Jokowi’s secondterm and, more importantly, Indonesiandemocracy, are not good.

Concluding Remarks

A reassessment of Yudhoyono’s legacy andJokowi’s track record shows how the long slowprocess of democratic stagnation, increasingilliberalism, and declining quality unfolds overtime. Initially there were high hopes for theimprovement of democratic quality under thesupposedly pro-reform president, Jokowi. Alas,these turned out to be empty hopes. Jokowicapitulated to oligarchic and conservativeinterests instead of pushing for bold reformsthat characterized his term as Jakartagovernor. He has matured as a politician, butnot as a reformer that many expected him tobe. Worse, his administration counteredilliberal Islamist mobilization with its ownversion of nationalist and statist illiberalism.Therefore, in the span of five years, Indonesiawent from an energized democratic polity to alow-quality democracy. For example, from aninstitutionalist perspective, the Freedom Houseannual report now ranks Indonesia as a “partlyfree country.”65 This erosion of the institutionalquality of democracy is a sign of the broaderdemocratic decline stemming from structuralissues affecting Indonesian politics.

Indonesia still performs relatively wellcompared to many of its regional neighbors andother Asian democracies. After all, Indonesiahas twice elected Jokowi as president ratherthan someone like the Hindu nationalist Modiin India.66 There is a degree of truth in thisassessment. Indeed, with the notable exceptionof enduring anti-Chinese sentiment and itsuncivil political implications, the politicizationof ethnic sentiments for illiberal political endshas largely subsided.67 Indonesia also faresbetter than some other Asian democracies,despite – or perhaps because of – the

endurance of its patronage politics. 6 8

However, stability itself does not guaranteethat democratic quality will remain stable andunchanged. This is the point of this article.While post-authoritarian Indonesia has notproduced a Rodrigo Duterte, Hun Sen, JairBolsonaro, or Viktor Orbán, Jokowi is not acommitted pluralist and reformist democrat.His track record so far shows that he is morethan happy to discard democratic norms for adhoc technocratic solutions and politicalappeasement. This approach, a result ofenduring intra-oligarchic competition,ultimately contributes to a further decline inIndonesian democratic quality. Viewed fromboth regional and global perspectives,Indonesia is part of the new wave of illiberalpopulist mobilization in both established andnewer democracies.69

It might be too soon to predict the trajectory ofIndonesian democracy under the second Jokowipresidency. However, looking at the currentpolitical situation, it seems that state elites andtheir associated economic backers arepositioned to promote their own narrow self-in terests a t the expense o f popularparticipation, as shown in the government’srepressive handling of mass protests of October2019. This deepening of oligarchic and illiberalcurrents in Indonesian politics – two sides ofthe same coin – is likely to continue throughoutthe remaining period of Jokowi’s second term.The proof? The government’s proposed pro-capital omnibus laws that aim to promoteinvestment expansion by sidelining publicparticipation, a move that triggered anotherwave of demonstrations by labor unions andcivil society organizations.70

Students, activists, and members of variouscommunity organizations and unions havealready expressed grave concern about thefuture of democratic rights in Jokowi’s secondterm. I am afraid that they might be right.

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Iqra Anugrah is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Postdoctoral Fellow atthe Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. His main research interests dealwith questions of democracy, development, statecraft, social movements, and political theory,with a focus on agrarian politics in contemporary Indonesia. He thanks the reviewers for thecritical and constructive comments on the manuscript. The writing of this article was madepossible by institutional and financial support from JSPS.

Notes1 Devina Heriyanto, “No, Indonesian students are not taking to the streets only to fight sexban”, The Jakarta Post, 27 September 2019(https://www.thejakartapost.com/community/2019/09/27/no-indonesian-students-not-taking-to-streets-only-to-fight-sex-ban.html).2 Ben Bland, “Indonesia’s incredible elections: why Indonesian elections are unlike any otherin the world”, Lowy Institute, 2019(https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/indonesia-votes-2019/); Ben Bland, “Indonesia:don’t over react to Jakarta violence”, The Interpreter at Lowy Institute, 24 May 2019(https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-don-t-over-react-jakarta-violence).3 For more details, see Addi M Idhom, “Isi RUU KUHP dan Pasal Kontroversial PenyebabDemo Mahasiswa Meluas”, Tirto.id, 25 September 2019(https://tirto.id/isi-ruu-kuhp-dan-pasal-kontroversial-penyebab-demo-mahasiswa-meluas-eiFu).4 On mass protests and riots in Papua, see Marchio Irfan Gorbiano and Karina M.Tehusijarana, “Jokowi sidesteps riots, human rights on Papua trip”, The Jakarta Post, 28October 2019(https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/28/jokowi-sidesteps-riots-human-rights-on-papua-trip.html).5 On the notion of democratic stability understood as democracy becoming the only game intown, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal ofDemocracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 14-30, especially 15-16. On the idea of democratic consolidationas the system where parties lose power, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market:Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), 10.6 Saiful Mujani, R. William Liddle, and Kuskridho Ambardi, Voting Behavior in Indonesia sinceDemocratization: Critical Democrats (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).7 Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1986), 12.8 Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. “The Paradoxes ofContemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” ComparativePolitics 29, no, 3 (1997): 323-342.9 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) and John T.Sidel. “Economic Foundations of Subnational Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence fromQualitative and Quantitative Research,” Democratization 21, no. 1, (2014): 161-184.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/community/2019/09/27/no-indonesian-students-not-taking-to-streets-only-to-fight-sex-ban.htmlhttps://www.thejakartapost.com/community/2019/09/27/no-indonesian-students-not-taking-to-streets-only-to-fight-sex-ban.htmlhttps://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/indonesia-votes-2019/https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-don-t-over-react-jakarta-violencehttps://tirto.id/isi-ruu-kuhp-dan-pasal-kontroversial-penyebab-demo-mahasiswa-meluas-eiFuhttps://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/28/jokowi-sidesteps-riots-human-rights-on-papua-trip.htmlhttps://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/28/jokowi-sidesteps-riots-human-rights-on-papua-trip.html

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10 David Adam Stott. “Indonesia’s 2019 Elections: Democracy Consolidated?” The Asia-PacificJournal: Japan Focus 17, no. 6 (2019): https://apjjf.org/2019/06/Stott2.html11 Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. “Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Nondemocratic Pluralism inIndonesia,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 104-118.12 For instance see Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Democracy for Sale: Elections,Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019)and Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia: Why Democratization Has not Reduced Corruption,” inHandbook on the Geographies of Corruption, ed. Barney Warf (Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing, 2018), 350-364.13 Keep in mind, for example, that the Megawati presidency (2001-2004) relaunched a massivecounterinsurgency effort against the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan AcehMerdeka, GAM) in Aceh Province, a policy that caused substantial internal displacement oflocal residents and numerous human rights violations. On this issue, see Husein Abdulsalam,“Catatan Kekerasan HAM pada Zaman Megawati Berkuasa,” Tirto.id, 8 September 2017(https://tirto.id/catatan-kekerasan-ham-pada-zaman-megawati-berkuasa-cwbD).14 For key references on oligarchic interests in Indonesian politics, see Richard Robison andVedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age ofMarkets (London and New York: Routledge, 2004) and Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2011). On the importance of measuring the influence ofmoney in democracy, see Adam Przeworski, “Capitalism, Democracy, Science,” in Passion,Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, eds. Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 456-503.15 Jonathan A. Fox. “Editor’s Introduction-The Challenge of Rural Democratization:Perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines,” Journal of Development Studies 26, no.4 (1990): 1-18.16 See for example Frances Hagopian, “The Politics of Oligarchy: The Persistence ofTraditional Elites in Contemporary Brazil” (PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, 1986) and Adaner Usmani. “Democracy and the Class Struggle,” AmericanJournal of Sociology 124, no. 3 (2018): 664-704l.17 Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa, “The Moderating President:Yudhoyono’s Decade in Power,” in The Yudhoyono’s Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade ofStability and Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore:ISEAS, 2015), 1-21.18 On cartelistic tendencies among Indonesian political parties, see Kuskridho Ambardi,Mengungkap Politik Kartel: Studi Tentang Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia Era Reformasi(Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2009) and Dan Slater. “Party Cartelization,Indonesian Style: Presidential Power Sharing and the Contingency of Democratic Opposition,”Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (2018): 23-46.19 Dan Slater and Joshua Wong. “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties andDemocratization in Developmental Asia,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (2013): 729 andBBC News Indonesia, “SBY perkuat Koalisi, Aburizal jadi ketua harian,” 8 May 2010(https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/05/100508_sbyperkuatkoalisi).20 On Indonesia’s commodity boom under Yudhoyono’s presidency especially in coal and palmoil sectors, see Hal Hill, “The Indonesian Economy during the Yudhoyono Decade,” in TheYudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall,

https://apjjf.org/2019/06/Stott2.htmlhttps://tirto.id/catatan-kekerasan-ham-pada-zaman-megawati-berkuasa-cwbDhttps://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/05/100508_sbyperkuatkoalisi

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Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 281-302.21 Michael Buehler, “The reassertion of the state,” New Mandala, 30 September 2014(https://www.newmandala.org/the-reassertion-of-the-state/)22 Sabrina Asril, “Batalkan Pilkada Tak Langsung, Presiden SBY Terbitkan 2 Perppu!”Kompas.com, 2 October 2014(https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.)23 Sabrina Asril, “Batalkan Pilkada Tak Langsung, Presiden SBY Terbitkan 2 Perppu!”Kompas.com, 2 October 2014(https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.)24 Melani Budianta, Kamala Chandrakirana, and Andy Yetriyani, “Yudhoyono’s Politics and theHarmful Implications for Gender Equality in Indonesia,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency:Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, andDirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 199-216 and Robin Bush, “Religious Politics andMinority Rights during the Yudhoyono Presidency,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’sDecade of Stability and Stagnation, eds Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa(Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 239-257.25 Robin Bush, “Religious Politics and Minority Rights during the Yudhoyono Presidency,”245-254.26 Liputan 6, “Majelis Zikir SBY Berdoa buat Bangsa,” 11 February 2005(https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/95426/majelis-zikir-sby-berdoa-buat-bangsa).27 Sasaki Takuo, “The Politics of Moderate Islam: From the Rise of Yudhoyono to theAhmadiyah Decree,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, eds OtaAtsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEASKyoto, CAPAS, 2010), 255-281, especially 266-268.28 See for instance Abubakar Eby Hara, “Pancasila and the Perda Syari’ah Debates in the Post-Suharto Era: Toward a New Political Consensus,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islamand State in Indonesia, eds Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy(Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEAS Kyoto, CAPAS, 2010), 35-75, especially 60 andAbdur Rozaki, “The Pornography Law and the Politics of Sexuality,” in Islam in Contention:Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, eds Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and AhmadSuaedy (Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEAS Kyoto, CAPAS 2010), 121-138,especially 133.29 Secular or religiously-moderate politicians’ appeasement to Islamist pressure and agenda isnot unique to Yudhoyono. They feel the need to do so because they perceive that Islamicgroups with conservative agendas have the ability to mobilize voters. Whether these groupsreally have mass bases might not matter so much; what matters is the aappearance of it. Fora thorough treatment on this topic, see Michael Buehler, The Politics of Shari’a Law: IslamistActivists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2016).30 Jeffrey Winters. “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” Indonesia 96 (2013): 11-33,especially 27-28.31 John McBeth, “SBY’s dynastic ambitions,” The Strategist, 27 February 2017

https://www.newmandala.org/the-reassertion-of-the-state/https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Presiden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/95426/majelis-zikir-sby-berdoa-buat-bangsa

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(https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sbys-dynastic-ambitions/)32 Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, Catatan Akhir Tahun 2014: Membenahi Masalah Agraria –Prioritas Kerja Jokowi-JK Pada 2015 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Nasional Konsorsium PembaruanAgraria, 2014).33 On these agricultural statistics, see Pusat Data dan Sistem Informasi Pertanian, StatistikLahan Pertanian Tahun 2010-2014 (Jakarta: Kementerian Pertanian, 2015).34 This sentiment is confirmed by many members of peasant unions and agrarian activists invarious regions whom I interviewed during fieldwork in Indonesia from mid-2015 to mid-2017and from late-2018 to mid-2019.35 On Yudhoyono’s conditional cash transfer and land title certification policies, see ChrisManning and Riyana Miranti, “The Yudoyono Legacy on Jobs, Poverty and IncomeDistribution: A Mixed Record,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stabilityand Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS,2015), 303-324, especially 313-316 and Noer Fauzi Rachman, “The Resurgence of LandReform Policy and Agrarian Movements in Indonesia” (PhD Dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, 2011, especially chapter 4) respectively.36 On Prabowo’s profile and oeuvre, see Edward Aspinall. “Oligarchic Populism and EconomicNationalism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy,” Indonesia 99 (2015):1-28.37 For further elaboration on the social base of Jokowi’s political ascendancy and hisdevelopmentalist orientation, see Max Lane, Decentralization and Its Discontents: An Essayon Class, Political Agency and National Perspective in Indonesian Politics (Singapore: ISEAS,2014) and Eve Warburton. “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism,” Bulletin of IndonesianEconomic Studies 52, no. 3 (2017): 297-320 respectively.38 Dan Slater. “Party Cartelization, Indonesian Style.”39 On the notion of promiscuous power sharing, see Dan Slater and Erica Simmons. “Copingby Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia,”Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 11 (2012): 1366-1393.40 Eve Warburton. “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism.”41 See for instance Vedi R. Hadiz. “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a NewPhase of Deepening Illiberalism?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53, no. 3 (2017):261-278 especially page 274 and Ihsanuddin, “Bertemu Jokowi, Petani Kendeng ini MenangisTuntutannya Tak Dipenuhi,” Kompas.com, 22 March 2017(https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/22/15154681/bertemu.jokowi.petani.kendeng.ini.menangis.tuntutannya.tak.dipenuhi?page=all).42 Tom Power. “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline,” Bulletin ofIndonesian Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (2018): 307-338.43 Marcus Miezner. “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and DemocraticDeconsolidation in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 91, no. 2 (2018): 261-282, especially page 261.44 David Adam Stott. “Indonesia’s 2019 Elections: Democracy Consolidated?”45 Luke Gibson. “Toward a More Equal Indonesia,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2017,1-47, especially 2.46 Luke Gibson. “Toward a More Equal Indonesia,” 2.47 Matthew Wai-Poi, “Rising Divide: Why Inequality is Increasing and What Needs to be

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sbys-dynastic-ambitions/https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/22/15154681/bertemu.jokowi.petani.kendeng.ini.menangis.tuntutannya.tak.dipenuhi?page=allhttps://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/22/15154681/bertemu.jokowi.petani.kendeng.ini.menangis.tuntutannya.tak.dipenuhi?page=all

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Done,” 31 May 2016(https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/rising-divide-why-inequality-is-increasing-and-what-needs-to-be-done/) and Asep Suryahadi, “Is Higher Inequality the New Normal forIndonesia?” 27 November 2018(https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/is-higher-inequality-the-new-normal-for-indonesia/).48 Koalisi Bersihkan Indonesia, Coalruption: Shedding Light on Political Corruption inIndonesia’s Coal Mining Sector (Jakarta: Koalisi Bersihkan Indonesia, 2018).49 Jaringan Advokasi Tambang, “2019 Election is Driven by Mining and Energy’s BusinessInterest,” 12 February 2019(http://www.jatam.org/2019/02/12/2019-election-is-driven-by-mining-and-energy-s-business-interest/).50 Iqra Anugrah, “Movements for Land Rights in Democratic Indonesia,” in Activists inTransition: Progressive Politics in Democratic Indonesia, eds. Thushara Dibley and MicheleFord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 79-98.51 Iqra Anugrah, “Farmers, fishers and local folk a casualty in Indonesia’s embrace withvested interests,” Channel News Asia, 22 June 2019(https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/farmers-fishers-local-folk-interested-in-indonesia-elections-11535260)52 On Jokowi’s handling of rural protests, see for example Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria,Masa Depan Reforma Agraria Melampaui Tahun Politik: Catatan Akhir Tahun 2018Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (Jakarta: Sekretariat Nasional Konsorsium PembaruanAgraria, 2019).53 Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. “Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s CloseCall,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 50, no. 3 (2014): 347-369.54 “Indonesia Sees Record Turnout in Historic Election, Braces for Fallout,” The Jakarta Globe,17 April 2019(https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-sees-record-turnout-in-historic-election-braces-for-fallout).55 Personal conversation with activists in Jakarta, August 2019.56 See Akbar Ridwan, “Satu Buruh dan 8 Mahasiswa Masih Ditahan Polisi,” Alinea.id, 16August 2019(https://www.alinea.id/nasional/satu-buruh-dan-8-mahasiswa-masih-ditahan-polisi-b1XkZ9m2S) and KontraS, “Bebaskan Semua Tahanan Politik Papua dan WujudkanPerdamaian di Papua Berdasarkan Undang-undang Otonomi Khusus Papua,” Kontras.org, 13September 2019(https://kontras.org/2019/09/13/bebaskan-semua-tahanan-politik-papua-dan-wujudkan-perdamaian-di-papua-berdasarkan-mandat-undang-undang-otonomi-khusus-papua/).57 Devina Heriyanto, “No, Indonesian students are not taking to the streets only to fight sexban.”58 Eve Warburton, “Indonesia’s pro-democracy protests cut across deep political cleavages,”New Mandala, 3 October 2019(https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-pro-democracy-protests/).59 Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia president says no plan to drop controversial anti-graft bill,”

https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/rising-divide-why-inequality-is-increasing-and-what-needs-to-be-done/)https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/rising-divide-why-inequality-is-increasing-and-what-needs-to-be-done/)https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/is-higher-inequality-the-new-normal-for-indonesia/https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/is-higher-inequality-the-new-normal-for-indonesia/http://www.jatam.org/2019/02/12/2019-election-is-driven-by-mining-and-energy-s-business-interest/http://www.jatam.org/2019/02/12/2019-election-is-driven-by-mining-and-energy-s-business-interest/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/farmers-fishers-local-folk-interested-in-indonesia-elections-11535260https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/farmers-fishers-local-folk-interested-in-indonesia-elections-11535260https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-sees-record-turnout-in-historic-election-braces-for-fallouthttps://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-sees-record-turnout-in-historic-election-braces-for-fallouthttps://www.alinea.id/nasional/satu-buruh-dan-8-mahasiswa-masih-ditahan-polisi-b1XkZ9m2Shttps://www.alinea.id/nasional/satu-buruh-dan-8-mahasiswa-masih-ditahan-polisi-b1XkZ9m2Shttps://kontras.org/2019/09/13/bebaskan-semua-tahanan-politik-papua-dan-wujudkan-perdamaian-di-papua-berdasarkan-mandat-undang-undang-otonomi-khusus-papua/https://kontras.org/2019/09/13/bebaskan-semua-tahanan-politik-papua-dan-wujudkan-perdamaian-di-papua-berdasarkan-mandat-undang-undang-otonomi-khusus-papua/https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-pro-democracy-protests/

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Reuters, 1 November 2019(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-corruption/indonesia-president-says-no-plan-to-drop-controversial-anti-graft-bill-idUSKBN1XB43K).60 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and theWorld (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 267.61 For a full list of Jokowi’s new cabinet, see Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, “Breaking: Jokowiannounces his new Cabinet. Here’s the line up,” The Jakarta Post, 23 October 2019(https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/23/breaking-jokowis-new-cabinet-announced-here-is-the-lineup.html).62 Liam Gammon, “What was that election for again?” New Mandala, 25 October 2019(https://www.newmandala.org/what-was-that-election-for-again/)63 Curie Maharani and Evan A. Laksmana, “Prabowo’s Uphill Tasks as Indonesia’s NewDefense Minister,” The Diplomat, 31 October 2019(https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/prabowos-uphill-tasks-as-indonesias-new-defense-minister/).64 Aaron Connelly and Evan A. Laksmana, “Jokowi Offers Prabowo a Piece of the Pie,” ForeignPolicy, 31 October 2019(https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/31/indonesia-democracy-general-jokowi-offers-prabowo-a-piece-of-the-pie/).65 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/indonesia.66 Dan Slater and Maya Tudor, “Why Religious Tolerance Won in Indonesia but Lost in India,”Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2019(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-07-03/why-religious-tolerance-won-indonesia-lost-india).67 Edward Aspinall. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journalof East Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319.68 Edward Aspinall. “The Surprising Democratic Behemoth: Indonesia in Comparative AsianPerspective,” Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (2015): 889-902.69 On this point, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “Southeast Asia Recap 2018: Democracy Continuesto Suffer,” Council on Foreign Relations, 21 December 2018(https://www.cfr.org/blog/southeast-asia-recap-2018-democracy-continues-suffer), Robert R.Kaufman and Stephen Haggard. “Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can WeLearn from Middle-Income Backsliding?” Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 2 (2019): 417-432,and Vedi R. Hadiz and Angelos Chryssogelos. “Populism in World Politics: A ComparativeCross-Regional Perspective,” International Political Science Review 38, no. 4.70 Jefferson Ng, “Jokowi’s Macron Moment: Moving Fast of Moving Together?” New Mandala,29 January 2020 (https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-macron-moment/).

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