The Future of the “Islamic State” Provinces and Affiliates · ‘Islamic State’ Provinces and Affiliates: Decline or Continued Impact After the Fall of the ‘Caliphate’ in

The FuTure oF The “IslamIc sTaTe” ProvInces and aFFIlIaTes Decline or Continued Impact after the Fall of the “Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria?

conFerence rePorT

Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs

4 / Conference Report

This conference and publication were completed in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office.

Published by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office.

This report can be obtained from the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs office at the American University of Beirut or can be downloaded from the following website: www.aub.edu.lb/ifi.

The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors, and do not reflect the views of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, the American University of Beirut, or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Beirut, October 2017 © All Rights Reserved

The Future of the “Islamic State” Provinces and Affiliates / 1

The FuTure oF The “IslamIc sTaTe” ProvInces and aFFIlIaTes declIne or conTInued ImPacT aFTer The Fall oF The “calIPhaTe” In Iraq and sYrIa?

conFerence rePorT


conTenTs

04overvIew

08Is aFFIlIaTes In PakIsTan-aFghanIsTan

05IslamIc sTaTe’s core In Iraq and sYrIa

09Is aFFIlIaTes In wesT aFrIca

06Is ThreaT To The neIghborIng counTrIes

10Is Terror neTwork In euroPe

07Is FooTPrInT In norThern aFrIca


overvIew

On March 20th and 21st, 2017, AUB’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, along with Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, hosted a joint conference titled “The Future of the ‘Islamic State’ Provinces and Affiliates: Decline or Continued Impact After the Fall of the ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria.” This conference brought together speakers from 14 countries in the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the US, and Europe, as well as academics, diplomats, civil society members, and students. The aim of the conference was to assess the future of IS provinces and the threat they will continue to represent after a likely military defeat of the organization in Syria and Iraq. The conference examined IS’s ideology, structure and administration of its provinces, as well as the latter’s emergence, appeal, and viability. The speakers touched upon the role of the provinces and the threat that they will represent to the surrounding societies and to the rest of the world.This conference came as both, timely and pertinent to the broader debate on the so-called Islamic State. Furthermore, these discussions occurred at a critical juncture in the fields of both global security and political reconciliation. While the “Islamic State” is certainly in decline seeing its territorial strength plummeting, it is the case that isolated incidents involving self-radicalization are becoming part of a larger trend. To this end, the conference also highlighted the importance of contextualizing individual motives to join the “Islamic State”.

The emergence of the so-called “Islamic State” is certainly a well-documented phenomenon. Increasingly, academic research has provided an array of knowledge on both the psychology of individuals who choose to join the group and on the sociology of the group, allowing for a more in depth understanding of how the group has developed into its present form. Having first emerged in Northern Iraq and then in Eastern Syria, the “Islamic State” – referred to hereafter as IS – has been held responsible for numerous isolated attacks, now increasingly happening in major European cities, stretching from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Even after an upcoming military defeat of IS at its historical core in Iraq and Syria, the remaining battle to be waged by the international community will be ideological in nature, where the IS will continue to outlive its militarily defeated core in the various self-styled twenty IS provinces. Such a “post-mortem” ideological existence of IS will not only complicate the ongoing civil war in Syria as well as the fragile reconciliation process in Iraq, but it will also require the international community to formulate a global strategy in order to accommodate with the increasing complexities and local security particularities that a reality of twenty IS provinces poses .Recent global efforts to retake Mosul and predictions that a similar operation will ensue in Raqqa, have given rise to questions concerning the future prospects of various IS provinces once the Islamic State organization per se has been eliminated. Such operations have also underscored the difficulty the global community has had in transitioning away from an approach on which it has been focused on till now, namely IS’s military defeat, and that has prevented it from adopting a more holistic approach which prioritizes political solutions that prepare societies for long term sustainability. What are the multifaceted dangers that IS provinces represent on the state and society where these provinces were announced? What is the possibility that these individual provinces might be associated/ integrated into a renewed unified state structure again?


The declining potency of IS in its core region results from a number of factors, primarily the overstretched military campaign they are conducting. Manpower shortages have become particularly acute, highlighting this point. With the looming loss of major urban centers within the next year or so, preparations are being made for the group’s transformation into an insurgency model primarily hiding in rural areas rather than the current model of engaging in traditional forms of conventional warfare in pursuit of urban centers.Although the strength of the core provinces is rapidly dwindling as the international campaign against the group moves forward, the relevance of the core remains since the ideological bridge is the only means for the group’s post-core existence. The future of IS will realize itself, although in a different form and maybe under a different name, in a complicated evolution of the various IS provinces yet to be seen: the means by which this organization once emerged and flourished in the core area offers interesting lessons regarding the ability of a once-small, ideologically-rigid group to rapidly expand and enforce its will on large swathes of territory when the context suits. Such a success story is not far from being repeated again in any of the IS provinces.

daY oneIslamIc sTaTe’s core In Iraq and sYrIa

daY one

The opening panel of the conference focused on the development and inner-workings of the “Islamic State” within the “core provinces” of Iraq and Syria. Panelists agreed that the nature of organization within its core provinces reflects the fluid character of the battlefields in which they operate. IS has managed to take advantage of shifting dynamics in order to extend its reach over a vast swath of territory, despite starting with minimal amounts of manpower and resources. Through their ideological appeal, IS managed to seize a great deal of existing infrastructure and rapidly expand its power. This overly ambitious aim of IS strategists, however, has taken a substantial toll on the group itself.The fundamental difference between IS and other ideologically similar organizations was an important theme of the panel. Originally, IS held a unique appeal among militants in Syria, especially foreign fighters. The organization appropriated many of the existing “Al Qaeda”-affiliated structures when it burst on to the regional stage with large numbers of “Al Qaeda” fighters changing their allegiance. However, the two groups, both the “Islamic State” and “Al Qaeda”, have been quite different, most notably in terms of strategy and composition. The ideological intransigence of IS was noted as a driving element in its attractiveness in contrast to alternative groups. Thus, “Al Qaeda” may potentially emerge as a more pragmatic entity as a result of this fundamental ideological restructuring.Unlike “Al Qaeda”, IS pursued a Taliban-esque policy of creating state-like institutions in territories that it had controlled. While IS attempts to depict its bureaucracy as a centralized entity, reality requires that such a bureaucratic apparatus remains highly decentralized to accommodate local leadership. Rather than generating entirely new structures, IS prefers to utilize already existing groups. Efforts aimed at promoting ties between the periphery and the cores are noticeable: The hisba (exchange programs) between various provinces have been conducted, while financial resources in the core are occasionally transferred to the periphery. However, the core does encourage self-sufficiency on the part of its external provinces to reduce the burden on itself. This is why it is difficult to predict how the relative decline in influence of the core will affect the periphery.


Is ThreaT To The neIghborIng counTrIesBoth outside the core in Iraq and Syria as well as within the various officially declared “provinces” throughout the world, regional countries have been substantially affected by varying degrees of its ideological permeation in their societies. Different states, due to their distinct contexts, have proven resilient against the influence of IS. For example, in Lebanon, the nature of the political system constitutionally guarantees political representation to its Sunni population, making the nature of alienation both quantitatively and qualitatively different than that experienced by their respective Sunni counterpart communities in Iraq and Syria. The cosmopolitan composition of society, as well as the delicate demographic balance, is unique in the region. This reality offers a bulwark against sectarian vilification. The most effective resistance of ideological permeation, however, is likely to be the Lebanese Sunni organizations themselves, which provide a political voice for their constituency.For its part, Turkey has certainly not been without incident over the course of the war, yet the role of IS is nowhere near comparable to the conventional-warfare model it employs in the core region. The Turkish priority in the Syrian War is not tackling IS, but rather preventing the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Syria. Due to the opposition between Kurdish parties in Syria and IS, the main target of IS attacks within the territory of Turkey were against Kurdish targets rather than Turkish targets.Comparatively, Saudi Arabia was described as the most important target of the “Islamic State” for symbolic, political and financial reasons. The Saudi establishment is held in particular enmity by the “Islamic State”; many of IS key ideologues are imprisoned in the country, and Saudi religious scholars are potentially the most visible barriers to IS’s ideological propagation. The Saudi security apparatus, indeed, has proven remarkably successful in subverting the activities of IS within their borders.As the panelists agreed, each of these three countries has thus far managed to prevent a full-fledged “Islamic State” insurgency from breaking out, through different mechanisms and strategies. Lebanon’s demographic balance has impeded the growth of the organization, Turkey’s military is simply too strong to counter, and Saudi intelligence has successfully countered the organization’s activities to date. Therefore, these neighboring countries to IS’s have remained relatively above the fray that has engulfed both Iraq and Syria.


Is FooTPrInT In norThern aFrIca

While not facing an insurgency within its own borders, Tunisia – with several terrorist attacks that have happened on its national territory – has generated a large number of foreign fighters for IS. The appeal of such organizations is unusually high in the country, and foreign fighters who go abroad often enjoy familial support. Injustice, a lack of a sense of belonging, and a hatred of the police forces are noted as motivating factors that drive young Tunisians to join extremist groups, and so the foreign fighter phenomenon merely represents the hip of a massive societal problem that must be tackled.

Outside of the core region, IS has been most prominent in North Africa in terms of its organizational capacity and propaganda operations. Formal affiliates exist in both Egypt and Libya, while recruits flow from nearly all countries into the North Africa IS provinces. Egypt and Libya are experiencing their own full-fledged insurgencies by IS affiliates. North Africa is, therefore, a key region of strategic relevance for the “Islamic State”, where Tunisia seems for instance of specific vital importance to an accurate and complete understanding of the foreign fighter phenomenon.The 2014 pledge of allegiance to the “Islamic State” by what was known as “Ansar Bait al-Maqdis” at the time, expanded the “Islamic State” enterprise later into Egypt as “Wilayet Sinai”. The regional affiliate was enthusiastically supported by the core organization, which provided both material and media support. Most Egyptians are relatively disconnected from the events in the Sinai; this lack of visibility has granted the security forces carte blanche to tackle the insurgency as they see fit. However, considering that “Wilayet Sinai” likely only consists of one to one and a half thousand fighters, it is notable that the substantial might of the Egyptian security forces are encountering so much difficulty in countering the group. Ultimately, Sinai remains a relatively small branch of “Islamic State”.On the other hand, Libya is widely considered to be the host of the most important IS affiliate organization in the world outside the IS core. Indeed, little time has passed between the formation of the IS core and the emergence of the Libyan affiliate, and IS members were dispatched from the core to assist in the development of the Libyan affiliate. However, even within Libya, the actual behavior of Islamic State appears more regionally focused rather than constituting itself on the scale of a Libyan national struggle. Similarly to the core, the group established governance structures in Derna, and their expulsion later on from Derna did little to combat extremist sympathies. This meant that the basic conditions for individuals to join IS remained ever present.


Is aFFIlIaTes In PakIsTan-aFghanIsTanThe IS province of Khorasan, which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, was announced in January 2015. It was the first time IS would spread outside the Arab world. IS took over five provinces in Afghanistan within a matter of few weeks, with Nangarhar becoming IS capital. Nangarhar possesses a geographical proximity to tribal leaders in Pakistan and a population influenced by Salafism, both of which allowed IS to try to link with South Asian militants through the province. Henceforth, IS came to wage an open conflict with the Taliban, with whom they became embroiled in a protracted struggle for the control of resources. IS rapid spread there was reinforced by physical realities such as the porous border between the two countries, with 70% of IS fighters coming over from Pakistan, in addition to the tribal dimension existing along the border. Mostly, the war against IS was exacerbated by the fact that Afghanistan remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world, something that makes the goal of fighting IS all the more formidable. Currently, Pakistani, Afghan and Indian officials all blame each other for the rise of IS and the lack of action against it. This situation has pushed countries such as US, China, and currently Russia to negotiate with the Taliban to counter IS. Despite the fact that social mistrust between the Pakistani government and the people of Pakistan remain present, people-centric/military-centric dual policies may be successful in defeating IS. These policies, such as the National Action Plan (people-centric) to counter extremist ideology and house-to-house searches (military-centric), were implemented by the Pakistani government, and have cleared more than 95% of IS territory.

daY Two


Is aFFIlIaTes In wesT aFrIcaThe panel on IS affiliates in West Africa discussed the prospects of the IS’s decline in the region. The existence and proliferation of additional extremist groups working in conjunction with IS was also central to the discussion. Notably, prospects of Boko Haram’s institutional capacity and likelihood of short term growth were not only topics of careful consideration, but were critically examined as viable future outcomes. In an attempt to contextualize the debate on the proliferation of terror – something much of the discourse has either avoided or blatantly left out – various social and economic factors were examined as catalysts for mobilizing the growth of extremist groups, namely failures of governance and substantial economic disparities. Rebranded as the West African Province, Boko Haram’s amalgamation with the “Islamic State” has been more than just an ideological process, and it reflects a practical decision on the part of the group to retain both legitimacy and appeal amongst the people it rules. However, panelists agreed that the group’s partnership with the “Islamic State” has not yielded the rewards it had expected, and has caused an institutional weakening of Boko Haram. The group has been forced to withdraw from the villages it once controlled, causing individual members to seek refuge. Given the precarious security situation in southern Libya, many suspect that Boko Haram will rebrand itself out of the Fezzan region in the southeastern parts of Libya. The regional spillover has not been limited to Boko Haram’s expansion into Libya. Groups that use the Islamic State’s branding do so out of an attempt to instill fear in those they rule and in order to develop a veneer of legitimacy as an institution. In 2007, a group which referred to itself as the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” (GSPC) rebranded itself as “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”. Before obtaining the branding of Al-Qaeda, GSPC had established robust connections with Tuareg rebels who at that point were engaged in active combat against the Malian central government, giving it instant legitimacy among locals and strategic ties with an institution fighting the central government. Similarly, the “Islamic State” of the Greater Sahara emerged as a regional threat, but this group, according to the panelists, has no legitimate connection with the core of IS leadership. According to the panel of experts, the main threat to the Western Sahara remains “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, and not groups linked to the “Islamic State”.

While conflicts in the Western Sahara have seemed protracted and endless, the nature of conflict in the region has been evolving from one of interstate warfare to that of intrastate conflicts. The emergence of groups linked to the Islamic State and the growth of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will certainly influence these conflicts, however the framework of such conflicts will remain largely intact. It is important to underscore that while the Islamic State’s military presence remains limited in the Western Sahara, its military defeat is an important psychological victory in the fight against terrorism. The African continent, in part due to the institutional strength of ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States), is now much better equipped to adequately deal with security challenges. While ECOWAS remains strong and while the Islamic State’s military presence remains limited in scope, preserving sustainable security necessitates significant attention toward economic and political solutions.


Is Terror neTwork In euroPe

Several independent cells operate with relative autonomy in Europe, but the emergence of the “Islamic State” has afforded these cells with new opportunities to funnel recruits, raise money, and commit terror. The challenge facing the global community will be to successfully integrate disenfranchised communities into mainstream society and to pursue both political and national security solutions in the European context.

The concluding panel on the Islamic State’s terror network in Europe brought together diverse perspectives on the sustainability and viability of the “Islamic State” brand in Europe. Lone incidents related to the social and theological influence of the “Islamic State” organization have become prevalent across Europe, but have adversely affected the countries of France, Belgium, UK and Germany. While France and Belgium remain most susceptible to isolated incidents of terror, France has become the largest exporter of Jihadists, while Belgium also remains a top exporter, but does so in terms of proportion. While not as prevalent, Germany is also facing similar problems, particular issues of homegrown extremism. Estimates suggest that the Salafi community in Germany has grown to approximately 10,000 individuals, while 2,000 of them have been labeled as ‘violent Salafists’. The problem in the UK is different from the rest of Europe, since the majority of the Muslim population is South Asian rather than Arab. It has been the case that pre-IS extremist “Al-Qaeda” networks – that existed for 10 years in the UK before 2014 – were behind the recruitment of more than half the foreign UK fighters. An example of that is the Muhajirun group, set up by the once UK, now Lebanon-based, Omar Bakri Muhammad (born Omar Bakri Fustuq). With such networks that will always exist in Europe, it is expected that they will keep providing foreign fighters to the IS provinces, no matter how different the name of that project may be from the IS name. While it is certainly critical to concentrate on foreign fighters who join the “Islamic State” Organization, panelists put forward a current dichotomy between those who self-radicalize in their home country and those who emigrate to fight. This dichotomy has caused confusion in how to effectively deal with terror-related threats. The “Islamic State” Organization’s operations in the West have been deliberately designed to be cost-effective, preferring outsourcing to lone wolves over sacrificing core members of the leadership. Interestingly enough, according to the panelists, most attackers have never indicated a strong religiosity, leading panelists to believe that factors such as a strong link to petty crime and systemic disenfranchisement played strong mobilizing roles in fueling incidents of terror.


Creative Economy, Social Justice and Urban Strategies: The Case of Mar Mikhael / 5

AUB Policy Institute (Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs) American University of Beirut Issam Fares Institute Building (Green Oval)P.O.Box 11-0236 Riad El-Solh I Beirut, Lebanon961-1-350000 ext. 4150+961-1-737627

[email protected]

www.aub.edu.lb/ifiaub.ifi@ifi_aub

abouTThe ProgramArab & International Affairs The Arab & International Affairs Program studies general trends of world politics from the perspective of their influence on Arab realities. More specifically, it examines the impact of policies designed and pursued by major international actors, states and international organizations, on policies in Arab countries. The program focuses on the analysis of foreign policies in Arab countries as they are shaped by regional and national developments. It seeks to contribute towards informing the making of foreign policy drawing on research-based activities, contacts with the diplomatic community and other exchanges with actors concerned.

abouT Theaub PolIcY InsTITuTeThe AUB Policy Institute (Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs) is an independent, research-based, policy-oriented institute. Inaugurated in 2006, the Institute aims to harness, develop, and initiate policy-relevant research in the Arab region.

We are committed to expanding and deepening policy-relevant knowledge production in and about the Arab region; and to creating a space for the interdisciplinary exchange of ideas among researchers, civil society and policy-makers.Main goals

▸ Enhancing and broadening public policy-related debate and knowledge production in the Arab world and beyond

▸ Better understanding the Arab world within shifting international and global contexts ▸ Providing a space to enrich the quality of interaction among scholars, officials and civil

society actors in and about the Arab world ▸ Disseminating knowledge that is accessible to policy-makers, media, research communities

and the general public

Documents

The Future of the “Islamic State” Provinces and Affiliates · ‘Islamic State’ Provinces and Affiliates: Decline or Continued Impact After the Fall of the ‘Caliphate’ in