THE EUROPEAN UNION

AND PAX DEMOCRATICA

An Assessment of Democracy-Assistance in the Post-National Global

(Dis-)Order

José M. Magone Department of Politics and International Studies

University of Hull Hull

Hu6 7Rx UK

Tel:+44 1482 46 5808 Fax:+44 1482 46 6208

E-mail:J.M.Magone@hull.ac.uk

Paper to be presented at the Workshop 7 “New Roles for the European Union in International Politics?” directed by Ole Elgstrom(Lund) and Michael Smith(Loughborough) at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, University of Uppsala, 13-18 April 2004

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1.Introduction:The Quest for Pax Democratica in post-national international

relations

In the book “The Third Wave” Samuel Huntington made a causal link between

democracy and enhancement of peace in the world. Indeed, he clearly states that

democratic states tend to recur less to warfare than other regimes in order to achieve

solution of international conflicts. Although democracies may conduct wars against

authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, they only exceptionally conducted wars against

other democracies in the twentieth century. Indeed, the continuation of such

phenomenon means that “the spread of democracy in the world means the expansion

of a zone of peace in the world. On the basis of past experience, an overwhelmingly

democratic world is likely to be a world relatively free of international violence.”(1)

This connection between democracy and peace became an important building block

of the discussion on the possibility of the establishment of a world-wide global

governance system. Democratic peace(Pax democratica) clearly is understood as a

replacement of previous superpower imposed peace settlements such as pax

Britannica and pax Americana. Pax democratica draws its legitimacy from the the

United Nations, which is at centre of the emerging new global order. Such claims of a

growing emergence of a democratic world where peaceful negotiated settlements are

preferred to violent ones is documented by the number of countries that made

transitions to democratic regimes in the past three decades.2 Meanwhile, it is thirty

years since Huntington’s third wave of democratization started. Indeed, he puts the

Portuguese Revolution of Carnations on 25 April 1974 at the beginning of this third

wave of democratization. As Huntington asserts:

It was an unwitting beginning because the installation of democracy,much less the triggering of a global democracy movement, was far from the minds of leaders of the coup.3

1 ) Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.(Norman:Oklahoma University Press 1993),p.29 2 ) see Kofi Annan, Democracy as an International Issue.In:Global Governance,8(2002),pp.135-142; John Gerard Ruggie, The United Nations and Globalization:Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation.In:Global Governance, 9(2003),pp.301-321;Charles T. Call and Susan Cook, Introduction: Postconflict Peacebuilding and Democratization.In:Global Governance, 9(2003),pp.135-139;Mark Malloch Brown, Democratic Governance. Toward a Framework for Sustainable Peace.In:Global Governance,9(2003),pp.141-146; James Robert Huntley,Pax Democratica.A Strategy for the 21st century.(Basingstroke:Macmillan 1998) 3 ) ibid, p.4

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Meanwhile in 2000 there are 120 democracies in the world out of the 192 states.

This is an increase from 72 out of 149 states in 1995 and 49 out of 139 in 1985.4

FIGURE 1:DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD 1900-2000

Democracies and Dictatorships 1900-2000

0

50

100

150

200

57 6990

133 138 149

190

19 2239 39 49

72

120

1910-14 1918-39 1945-59 1960-74 1975-85 1985-95 1995-2000

States Democracies Dictatorships

Source: Christian Welzel, Systemwechsel in der globalen Systemkonkurrenz:Ein evolutionstheoretischer Erklaerungsversuch.In:Wolfgang Merkel(ed.), Systemwechsel 1.Theorien,Ansaetze und Konzepte der Transformationsforschung.(Opladen:Leske+Budrich 1996),p.53 ,Own updating for 1995-2000 period Such quantitative figures does not tell us very much about the quality of democracy,

nevertheless it is an impressive trend which seems to continue in the far reaching

future. Many of these democracies are not very strong, in some cases they may be

characterised as façade democracies5, in other cases they are semi-democracies and

in some cases they are patrimonial democracies. They can be characterised bluntly as

“illiberal democracies” as Fareed Zakariah has presented them.6 Nevertheless, it is

important to emphasise that all of them are embedded in a context of global

democratization which clearly creates major obstacles to legitimise a halfway version

of democracy. Countries are facing international pressures to move towards full

fledged democracy. Quite central to this is the United Nations which is a major

4 ) see Christian Welzel, Systemwechsel in der globalen Systemkonkurrenz:Ein evolutionstheoretischer Erklaerungsversuch.In:Wolfgang Merkel(ed.), Systemwechsel 1.Theorien,Ansaetze und Konzepte der Transformationsforschung.(Opladen:Leske+Budrich 1996),p.53 , my updating in relation to 1995-2000 figures 5 ) According to Finer Façade democracies are oligarchical in nature ,they resemble eighteenth Britain Samuel Finer, Comparative Government (Kindon:Allen Lane,The Penguin Press 1970),pp.442-445 6 ) Fareed Zakaria, El Futuro de la libertad.Las democracies “iliberales” en el mundo.(Madrid:Taurus 2003)

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achievement of international society. The United Nations,although still awaiting its

own democratization, is a major motor behind this emphasis on democratic peace.

In sum, democratization became an integral part of global governance, because it is an

important instrument to enhance peace settlements across the world. Attached to it is

a growing technology of democratization which has now become a major social

scientific industry. Democracy-assistance is the more visible part of this technology

of democratization.7

One aspect also highlighted by Huntington is that a divided world would lead to more

conflict. 8 Therefore the collapse of the Berlin Wall and subsequently of the Soviet

Union opened the way for a global governance system.

In this paper, it is my intention to study the impact of the European Union on the

emerging global governance system by analysing the democracy-assistance policy.

The reference to the global governance system is an important aspect of the European

Union which will be highlighted throughout the paper. The next section is dedicated

to the genesis of a more consistent EU democracy assistance. Afterwards the

machinery of EU democracy assistance is analysed. A further section undertakes a

study of democracy-assistance in some regions. Last but not least some conclusions

will be highlighted at the end of the paper.

2.The Development of EU-Democracy Assistance

Although vilified and criticized by many people, the Governance White Paper of the

European Union is an excellent source for discovering the political agenda of the

European Commission. The overall White Paper is a reconstruction of the

contribution of the European Commission to the overall development of the European

Union. As such it also brings to the fore the growing acknowledgment of an

interaction between domestic European goals and the international arena. In this

context the importance of global governance is highlighted: 7 ) for a review see Philippe C. Schmitter, Imco Brouwer, Promozione e Protezione della Democrazia. Il Concetto,Le Rcerche, La Valutazione.In:Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,vol.30, n.2,August 2000,pp.187-256 8 ) Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave,pp.29-30

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The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectively attained at European and global level. This responds to citizens’ expectations for a powerful Union on the world stage. Successful international action reinforces European identity and the importance of shared values within the European Union.

(...)

By acknowledging the global dimension more strongly , the union will strengthen its voice in multilateral negotiations. It should aim to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of global rule making , working to modernise and reform international and multi-lateral institutions in the medium to long term. The goal should be to boost the effectiveness and enforcement powers of multilateral institutions, in the short term the Union should build partnerships with other countries in order to promote greater cooperation and coherence between the activities of existing international organisations and increase their transparency. (...) To achieve these objectives , the Union needs to speak with a single voice. It should strengthen its representation in international and regional fora, including in relation to economic and financial governance, the environment, development and competition policy. Often, important improvements can and should be introduced under the current Treaty, and would considerably improve the visibility of what the Union is doing at global level. In some areas,like finance, a change in the Treaty is required.9

In this sense, the European Union is permanently engaged in pushing forward a

multilateral agenda at which centre is the reinforcement of the United Nations and

their institutions. The European Commission characterises itself as a frontrunner in

the process of building a new world architecture, which we may call here global

governance. In someway, the European Union regards itself as a regional expression

of such global governance which wants to achieve a high level of democratic rule at

all levels of the global system.

In the policy guidelines of the European Commission towards the United Nations it is

clear that the European Commission is passionate about the importance of the United

Nations in the emerging global governance system. This document asserts as follows:

The challenge currently facing the UN is clear:`global governance´ will remain weak if multilateral institutions are unable to ensure effective implementation of their decisions and norms-whether in the `high politics´ of international peace and security, or in the practical implementation of commitments made at recent conferences made at recent UN conferences in the social,economic and environmental fields. The EU has a particular responsibility in this regard. On the one hand, it has made multilateralism a constant principle of its external relations. On the other,it could and should serve as a model to others in implementing – and even going beyond its international commitments.

Two aspects,in particular, of the EU´s contribution to the effectiveness of multilateral legal instruments and commitments established under UN auspices could be further developed. First, the EU´s ability to act as a frontrunner in developing and implementing multilateral instruments and

9 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on European Governance.Brussels 25.7.2001,COM (2001),428 final,pp.26-27

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commitments. And second, support, where necessary, for the capacity of other countries to implement their multilateral commitments effectively. 10

In the same document, the European Commission emphasises that it is the main

contributor to the UN Budget when the contributions of all member-states are put

together. Indeed, the European Union contributes 37 percent to the UN budget and to

50 percent of contributions.11

In this sense, although the European Union is a regional integration project, it is also

very much linked to a global multilateral agenda which may become reality in this

century. It is a future-oriented long term goal to push forward democratic peace

across the globe. Therefore, it is essential to look at the EU democracy assistance

policies since the 1990s and which kind of democracy understanding is intrinsically

associated with such policies. One of the major factors that led to a growing

engagement of the European Union in the global order was the growing confidence in

dealing with democratisation issues in the European continent. This important

experience allowed also for the development of similar plans for other parts of the

world. This interaction between internal democracy-building in the southern,central

and eastern European countries and external democracy-assistance and promotion in

different parts of the world became a major distinctive characteristic of EU policies.

2.1.The Emergence of EU-Democracy Assistance in the 1990s

Although the European Union was engaged in development aid for some time before

1989, it is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union that leads to

the emergence to a proper democracy-assistance policy.

One can broadly, distinguish between two main phases in the development of EU-

democracy-assistance in the 1990s. The first phase between 1991 and 1999 is one of

incrementalism of policies. Nevertheless, this incrementalism of policies was not

followed by an increase of resources, so that democracy-assistance was not

strategically target and without proper evaluation. The second phase after 1999 is

characterised by major reforms and a will to use democracy-assistance within an

10 ) Commission of the European Communities, The European Union and the United Nations:the choice of multilateralism.Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 10.9.2003,COM(2003) 526 final,p.5 11 ) ibid,p.3

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overall framework of enhanced global democratic governance. As such the second

phase is far from complete and a proper assessment may be only appropriate at the

end of the decade.

According to Gordon Crawford, the legal framework for EU-democracy assistance

was established in the June and November councils of 1991. The main decision was

to include clauses on democracy and human rights in all cooperation agreements. In

this sense, the new decade led to a convergence of positions among the member-states

towards the importance to foster democratic values in any relationship with third

countries. Such inclusion did not lead to an overall policy of conditionality. On the

contrary, it was more a formal commitment to democratic and human rights values,

than a consistent policy.(12) The main principles are enshrined in the Treaty of the

European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. One of the major

problems for the European Commission was that the number of regions and tasks

increased considerably in the 1990s. In someway, the development of so many

programmes led to a problem in achieving proper evaluation of any impact on

democracy.

One of the major steps towards a more consistent European democracy-assistance

policy was the establishment of a European Initiative on Democracy and Human

Rights(EIDHR) in 1994 by the European Parliament. Since then, the EIDHR became

a central integrating aspect of adjacent democracy policies. By the end of the 1990s

the EIDHR had eleven different budget lines. It comprises an annual budget of € 100

million. The whole approach of the European Union is one of integration of human

rights and democracy, so that an analytical separation is very difficult to attain. Up

until 1998, there were no proper annual reports done by European Commission or the

Council. The first report under the heading of Human Rights Annual Report of

Human Rights is actually comprising human rights activities as well measures

related to democratization. In this sense, the analytical confusion persists. Although

the emphasis is on human rights, democracy is implicitly part of the actitvities that the

European Union is undertaking.(13)

12 ) Gordon Crawford, European Union Development Cooperation and the Promotion of Democracy.In:Peter Burnell(ed.), Democracy Assistance.International Co-operation for Democratization.(London:Frank Cass 2000),p.91 13 )Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights1999 Brussels:Council of the European Union 1999)

7

The incrementalism of tasks forced the European Commission to begin major reforms

of the external affairs DG and all other departments involved in development aid to

make major reforms in the late 1990s that are still going on. Council resolutions 975

and 976 of 1999 streamlined the procedures related to cooperation aid for

democratisation purposes and cooperation development. In both cases, democracy,

human rights and economic governance are crucial values to be monitored and

respected throughout the cooperation period. From the two resolutions one can

deduce that the European Union is pushing for an advanced type of democracy which

interconnects all kinds of human rights and economic,social and political

development.14 The most recent report becomes more explicit about the overall

policy orientation of democracy assistance:

The European Union is based upon and defined by its commitment to the principle of democracy,liberty, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Adherence to these principles constitutes the foundation and prerequisite for peace, stability and prosperity in any society. The EU firmly believes this to be a legitimate concern and important responsibility of the international community. Despite its active role in the field of human rights, the EU is not always able to counter such negative developments. This means that continued efforts are necessary to improve the EU's human rights policy with a view to realising its main objective: raising the level of human rights protection around the world. First, this requires simultaneous attention for both the internal and external dimension of the EU’s human rights policy. Second, it is important to fine-tune a multidimensional approach to international action, which takes into consideration all instruments at the EU’s disposal,such as, inter alia, demarches, political pressure, dialogue with interested countries, technical assistance, country resolutions and when necessary sanctions. The following chapters provide the background information on both human rights within the EU and actions in international affairs,necessary for a broad-based discussion on all these aspects of the EU's human rights policy.15

A very important framework is the European Union’s role in promoting human rights

and democratisation in third countries which was adopted in 2001. The document

clearly is congruent with all the policies of the United Nations in relation to the

promotion of human rights and democratisation. Quite crucial is also the mentioning

of the European Charter of Fundamental Citizens’ Rights which was adopted in Nice

in 2000. Moreover, the document makes reference to the fact that the European 14 ) Council Resolution 975-99 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.Council Resolution 976-99 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations,other than those of development cooperation,which, within the framework of cooperation policy, contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respective human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries both of 29 April 1999, OJEC,8.5.1999 15 ) Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2003,Brussels 10 October 2003, p5

8

Union itself is engaged in a process of constant improving its democratic governance,

so that the internal and external dimension are complementary. This document also

streamlined considerably the highly fragmented Democracy assistance policies of the

European Union. Indeed, the document emphasises the need to integrate better

human rights and democratisation into the overall external policies of the European

Union in order to achieve more coherence and consistency. Moreover, the document

calls for a more strategic use of the EIDHR funds in order to achieve better results.

One of the major problems so far was that the funding of programmes was not linked

to aspects related to sustainability.16 The document refers also to the efforts of the

European Commission to reform the external relations departments including also a

better articulation between the European Commission and the member-states in order

to create sinergies.17 The document also makes aware of the Community Cooperation

Framework for Country Strategy Papers introduced in 2000. 18 This naturally made

the overall direction of external relations in the European Commission much more

focused. 19The Country strategy papers have to be regarded as complementary to the

overarching regional strategy papers which clearly are designed to structure the

development of cooperation in the different regions.

The document also speaks of sharing the burden of promotion of human rights and

democratisation with the other multi-lateral organisations in order to focus on

countries and regions where the European Union has a particular comparative

advantage in relation to other actors in this field of work.20

In sum, democracy assistance policies experienced a streamlining in the past decade.

It started with an expansive agenda in a first phase and is in the process of

consolidation at the present time.

16 ) European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries.Brussels 8 May 2001,COM(2001),252 final,p.5 17 ) ibid, p.6 18 ) European Commission,EU Working Document of Commission Community Cooperation:Framework for Country Strategy Papers(SEC 2000), 19 ) ibid,p.7 20 )ibid,p.19

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2.2.The Dimensions of Democracy Assistance

In the past decade democracy assistance increased the number of areas in which it is

involved. Apart from the minimalist task of monitoring the running of elections in

democratizing countries, it also comprises programmes in relation to the

strengthening of civil society associations, support for institution-building in the

executive,legislative and judicative branches of government, the support of political

parties and naturally the training of officers for the proper conduct of duties assigned

to them tin any part of the public administration.

This widespread number of tasks forces the EU to make strategic choices about the

areas in which it can be useful for democratizing countries. Such a more reflective

approach towards democracy assistance became visible after 1997. The European

Union began to realise that they had to work in complementarity with other

international and national institutions in order to achieve more successful outcomes in

such engagements. One aspect that is quite important, is that in the second half of the

1990s several evaluations of the different programmes that were running for some

years began to show the weakness of the whole European approach. In particular the

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States(TACIS) showed

that the actual democracy programme had only partial impact on the democratization

of the country. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that patterns of behaviour may

have been changed through the cooperation in other more technical areas.

Since 1998 one can see an effort to reduce the number of objectives as well as to

develop more strategic and flexible instruments for democracy assistance.

In the EIDHR programming for 2002 to 2004 such reduction of the areas became

quite concrete. The European Union is now engaged in shaping the world according

to the democratic governance system that is emerging across the European continent.

The three areas of involvement are:

1.The Strengthening of democratization, good governance and the rule of law: The strengthening the capacity of civil society,Human rights education and training ; freedom of expression and independent media; actions concerning elections ;the legal system and strengthening institutions; governance ;Conflict prevention and resolution. 2.Activities in support of the abolition of the death penalty: support for the fight against torture and impunity and for international tribunals and the International Criminal Court ;torture ; international justice and fighting impunity;

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3. Combating racism and xenophobia and discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples This concentration of areas of activities is quite important to avoid a wide dispersal of

resources. All these three areas are naturally interconnected and fit into the overall

strategy of the European Union to push for a democratic governance system across

the globe.

The reforms also led to a rethinking of the way programming is done. Indeed, the

new EIDHR includes both targeted projects as well as microprojects. The latter are

now devolved to the European Commission delegations in the different countries.

There are now over 120 delegations across the world, some very tiny relying very

much on local staff,other quite large and playing a major role in project management

in these countries.

There is also a general attempt to be involved at different levels of the global multi-

level governance system. Indeed, the revamped EIDHR funds projects at

global,regional and in focus countries. These focus countries are selected according

to criteria of interest for the European Union in general, and in complementarity to

democracy assistance efforts of other institutions. In the programming of the EIDHR

for the period 2002 until 2004, 29 focus countries were selected to be funded. 21 The

annual reviews led afterwards to the inclusion of further countries rising the number

to 32. Due to the Iraq War in March-April 2003, this country was also included in the

EIDHR programme.(22)

The EIDHR programme has naturally to be understood as a complementary tool to

the regional strategies and the country strategies that are in place. In some cases, such

as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and Mercosur include other forms of technical

assistance that go beyond mere democracy assistance.

There is a constant review of the programme, so that projects can adjusted to new

needs. Quite important is the call for proposals instrument which clearly asks for a

more proactive role for interested parties. On the other hand, the microprojects have

been an important tool to respond fast to the needs of civil society in the country. The

21 ) European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.17 22 ) ; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2004.Approved by Commission Decision on 1 December 2003

11

global activities are more restricted to awareness of certain global issues such as

global justice and awareness of international conventions.

By far the most important area of engagement of the European Union is related to

democratisation, good governance and the rule of law. It clearly draws most of the

resources and comprises a lot of tasks. This area of funding is present in all focus

countries. The European Commission makes huge efforts to build sustainable

networks among non-governmental organisations as representatives of civil society in

the corresponding country. This becomes quite clear in the way funding is handled in

the Mediterranean region. The Euromediterranean partnership clearly established a

parallel civil society forum which is an important element for the establishment of

stronger civil societies in these countries.

When we compare the present programming of the European Union,one has to

acknowledge that there was a substantial improvement, particularly due to the fact

that the reduction of budget lines and the streamlining of the strategic outlook allowed

for a better assessment of the goals intended by the EIDHR. The crucial difference is

that now democracy,good governance and rule of law are intrinsically part of any

strategy paper, programming of the European Union and cooperation with third

parties.

FIGURE 2:ANNUAL ALLOCATION ACCORDING TO PRIORITY 2002-4

AVERAGE ANNUAL ALLOCATION OF EIDHR ACCORDING TO AREA 2002-

2004

60%4%

13%

17%6% Dem

Death PenTortureRacismContingenc

European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.11

12

EIDHR SUPPORT FOR COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO REGIONS(2002=€60millions; 2003=€58millions; 2004=€68millions

35.2

10.813.6 11.3 12.33

2.8 2.58

3.3

39.3

7.5

17.1

10.7 10.73

2.9 2.76.2

2.9

29.3

8.6

15.510.34

13.8

05

1015202530354045

Africa Mediterran Asia LA NIS Caribbean Pacific SEastEur Turkey

200220032004

Source:European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.17; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2003. 20 ; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2004.Approved by Commission Decision on 1 December 2003

13

FOCUS COUNTRIES IN EIDHR ACCORDING TO REGIONS

11

4 43 3

1 12

12

45

3 31 1

2

12

56

3 31 1

2

02468

101214

Afric

a

Med

iterra

n

Asia LA NIS

Carib

bean

Pacif

ic

SEas

tEur

200220032004

Source:European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.17; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2003. 20 ; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2004.Approved by Commission Decision on 1 December 2003

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FIGURE 5:INDICATIVE FUNDING ACCORDING TO INSTRUMENTS OF EIDHR(2002-4)

INDICATIVE FUNDING ACCORDING TO INSTRUMENT(2002-2004)

65

52.5

42.5

14

14.9

12.3

15

14.9

13.2

6

1.98

1.9

15.8

6.6

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2002

2003

2004

CfPMicroprojElectionsConting.Other

Source:European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.17; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2003. 20 ; European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2004.Approved by Commission Decision on 1 December 2003

15

3.The Organisation of EU-Democracy Assistance

One of the reasons why EU Democracy Assistance had to underwent a major

overhaul was the fact that the performance of the distributed funds was not very

efficient. Indeed, the overall development aid, particularly in the disbursement of

grants and implementation of funds, was characterised with substantial delays. A

major review was undertaken which led to the conclusion that the European Union

external relations DG and all other DGs responsible for the management of funds

were not up to the job. The review led to the publication of a White Paper on the

management of external assistance which was firmly embedded in the overall reform

drive of the European Commission under the leadership of Vice-president Neil

Kinnock. 23 Chris Patten,the external relations commissioner, was instrumental in

achieving a more efficient apparatus in the external relations area.

The reform of the DG external relations in general and of external assistance in

particular was embedded in an overall effort of the European Union to streamline their

external policies in view of the Amsterdam Treaty and the creation of a High

Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP). The appointment of

Mr. Javier Solana to the position of High Representative led to a stronger cooperation

between the Council and the European Commission. This cooperation forced

Commissioner Chris Patten to enhance the efficiency of his DG in order to coordinate

better the policies with the Council.

One of the findings of such a review is that the European Commission was

understaffed in comparison to other major international organisations such as the

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ratio of case workers to

project was much lower in the European Commission,than in other international

organisations. According to the White Paper, in the World Bank or in the member-

states there were at least 4 to 9 people to manage 10 million, in the European

Commission it was 2.9 persons. The review clearly indicated that the European

Commission was short of manpower. It pesented a figure of 1 300 persons that were

needed to fill the gap. The consequence was that delays in the disbursement of funds

increased on an average from 3 to 4.5 years in the period between 1995 and 2000.

23 ) Commission of European Communities,Communication to the Commission on the Reform of the Management of External Assistance.16 May 2000.

16

This outcome was not very positive and actually damaging for the reputation of the

European Commission.

A further factor that contributed to this inefficiency of programme management was

the lack of evaluation and monitoring of the programmes. Indeed, one aspect that was

now becoming evident is that the European Commission did not have mechanisms to

make sure that the project cycle was properly followed by the services. The

fragmentation of tasks and programmes among different DGs contributed to a lack of

transparency and accountability.

TABLE 1:Comparative Analysis of External Relations Group:Financial Responsibilities and Staffing Levels before 2000 Directorate-General

Financial Responsibilities

Forecast Commitments (in €) 1999

HQ Staffing HQ Staffing(per € 10 million )

External Relations

TACIS MEDA ALA Balkans Human Rights

2170 769 2.8

Development DG

EDF Food Aid NGO´s Thematic Budget lines

3540 394 1.1

Enlargement Service

Pre-accession instruments

1318 (2000:3166)

228 1.7

ECHO Humanitarian assistance

558 130 2.3

Common Service for External Relations(SCR)

Common ServiceFor External Relations(SCR)

5570 650 1.2

SOURCE:Aidan Cox,Jenny Chapman,The European Community. External Cooperation Programmes. Policies, Management and Distribution.Report prepared by the Overseas Development Institute for the European Commission(Brussels:Office of the Official Publications of the European Union 2000),p.23. Indeed the report drew much of the evidence from a preliminary study undertaken by

Aidan Cox and Jenny Chapman. 24 In the study, it became clear that one of the major

problems of EU external assistance was the lack of importance given to the following

up of the project cycle.

24 ) Aidan Cox,Jenny Chapman,The European Community. External Cooperation Programmes. Policies, Management and Distribution.Report prepared by the Overseas Development Institute for the European Commission(Brussels:Office of the Official Publications of the European Union 2000),

17

In this sense, new structures were created to achieve a better coordination of external

assistance. On 1st of January 2001, a new body EuropeAid Cooperation

Office(AIDCO) was established of which the main tasks was to oversee and monitor

projects from design to full implementation, in order to keep track of the project

cycle. Only in few areas such as in ECHO,Phare and macro-financial aid remained

outside the scope of AIDCO. Furthermore in September 2000 an inter-departmental

quality service group was created to assist in the whole process of development aid

and grants.(25)

Another important part of the reform was to reduce the level of concentration and

centralisation in the disbursement of structural funds. The 128 delegations of the

European Commission were an excellent network to manage projects on site. The

only problem in this respect was naturally the size of such delegations. In this sense,

depending on the ability of the delegation to cope with increased demands from the

centre, the reform envisaged their stronger involvement. According to an excellent

study by Michael Bruter there was a considerable increase of delegations across the

world since 1988. Indeed, between 1988 and 1998 there was an increase of 240

percent, or 56 new delegations were created.26 The vast majority are development

oriented delegations, a second type fulfils the tasks of trade representations in the

United States, Japan or Switzerland, while a third type are based in central and eastern

European countries with several tasks including monitoring progress made the

applicant countries in their pursuit to join the European Union, in the Mercosur

countries and in the Mediterranean.27 Most of them are small, but numbers oscillate

between one or two to twenty.28

In sum, the reform is part of an overall thrust of the European Commission to increase

its efficiency in the management of external assistance, including democracy

assistance. One can make a proper assessment of the success of the reform in the

25 ) European Commission,The Reform of the Management of the European Community´s External Assistance.An Overview. October 2002, 26 ) Michael Bruter, Diplomacy without a state:the external delegations of the European Commission.In:Journal of European Public Policy,6:2,June 1999,pp.183-205; p.183 27 ) ibid,p.198 28 ) ibid,pp.187-189.

18

4.EU Democracy Assistance in Action

After looking at the overall strategy of the European Union in relation to democracy

assistance and its administrative implications, it is now time to look at certain

selected regions where the European Union has been engaged. In this paper, we are

interested in looking how actually democracy assistance contributed to some kind of

democratisation of these regions. The European Union developed regional and

country strategies for all parts of the world. In some cases, the European Union

developed ambitious policies towards certain regions, in particular in relation to the

Mediterranean which is regarded as a major target area for the United Nations.

4.1.The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

One of the most important projects of the European Union for the next decades is the

Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Although policies towards the Mediterranean

existed before 1995, it is only afterwards that the European Union steps up its

engagement. There are different reasons for the renewed interest of the European

Union for the Mediterranean. First of all, the Mediterranean is regarded as a very

volatile which poses new dangers for the southern European states Greece, Italy,

Spain and Portugal. Indeed, two aspects are relevant in this respect:immigration and

the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism which may or may not be connected with

terrorism. The recent bombings on three-eleven in Spain show that radical groups

exist in Morocco which were able to establish in Madrid and carry out this

horrendous deed.29

Immigration has also become a major problem both for Spain and Italy. Indeed, one

characteristic of immigration is the socalled constant crossing of the Gibraltar by

boat(pateras in Spanish). This “boat people” try to escape a desperate situation in

their countries of origins and trust immigration mafias to transport them to Spain.30

Similarly Kurds from Turkey were put in large boats by immigration mafias and sent

to Italy.

After a decade of joint Italian and Spanish foreign policy such concerns were

internalised by the European Union policy makers. It was particularly the

protagonism of Spain that led to this perception shift at the European level. In this

29 ) El Pais,13.3.2004,pp.14;26-42; El Pais,21.3.2004,p.22;pp.30-31 30 ) José M. Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics.(London:Routledge 2004),pp.47-48

19

context, one has to mention the leadership of Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

who chaired the presidency of the European Union in the second half of 1995 and

pushed forward the Barcelona process, which led to the Euro-Mediterranean

partnership(Euro-Med).31 The Euro-Med is a significant change of policy towards the

Mediterranean, because it includes both multi-lateral as well as bi-lateral agreements

and institutions. It is also designed to establish a Mediterranean free trade area by

2010 comprising the members of the European Union and 12 partners of the southern

rim of the Mediterranean. The overall design of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership

emulates closely the “baskets” structure of the Conference for Security and

Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) which was now upgraded to an organisation. The

three baskets of the Euro-Med are:

I.Political and Security Partnership: main aim is to create a common area of peace and stability. It is the intention to create confidence-building measures. There is the ambition of establishing a „Charter for EuroMediterranean Peace and Stability“. Behind the agenda is also an incentive to open the patrimonial democratic regimes towards genuine democratization. II.Establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area:Most of the funding of the European Union is invested in creating the conditions for a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. This is quite a difficult chapter, because integration of markets among the Maghreb, Masheq and Near East countries is very incipient. Some countries are better integrated to the European Union than their neighbours. It will take a long time to create also a market culture in these regions. The conceptualisation of market integration is naturally dominated by the European Union. The time span is also quite short. Probably in 2010 there will be the deadline to really start with a long-term market integration. III.Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs: More relevant than the two other chapters is the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. It focuses particularly on improving living conditions in the region. This also includes naturally political projects of creating qualitative inclusive democracies. It is not only the dialogue among cultures that matters, but within the countries themselves. The role of civil societies is quite crucial. If there is the possibility to create a regional civil society, than by 2025 it would comprise probably over 700 million persons. 32

31 ) Richard Gillespie, Spain and the Mediterranean.Developing a European Policy towards the South.(Basingstroke:Macmillan 1999); Richard Gillespie,Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative.In:Richard Gillespie(ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.Political and Economic Perspectives.(London:Frank Cass 1997),pp.33-48 32 ) See Jean-Pierre Derisbourg,The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Since Barcelona. In:Richard Gillespie(ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economic Perspectives (London:Frank Cass 1997),pp.9-11

20

Inspite of a promising euphoric beginning, soon it became clear that the Euro-Med

project was moving slower towards implementation than envisaged. The main issue

was the fact that most of the Mediterranean partners were socalled semi-democracies

or even façade democracies. In this sense, there was a clash of cultures and worlds

when the proper negotiations and works of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership

started. One of this aspects was the lack of accountability and transparency in these

regimes. All countries were far from being functioning democracies. Each one of

them was characterised by patrimonial rule,where the rule of law and human rights

were not properly respected. Although human rights and democracy were included in

the agreements, political and diplomatic considerations led to lax interpretations of it.

In this sense, the Euro-Med Ministerial Conferences are not properly used to raise

these concerns.33

The strategy of the European Union is to use all three baskets which are

interconnected to achieve a development towards democracy in these countries. So

far both the economic cooperation as well as the social and cultural and human affairs

is working at a slower pace than expected. Less success has been achieved in political

and security matters, although the terrorist attacks across the Mediterranean brought

all these countries closer together, due to the fact that they perceive terrorism as a

danger to the stability of their regimes.

According to Richard Youngs if the funding is directed and channelled through the

governments of the regions there is an increasing possibility that the EU is

strengthening patronage and the powers of elites. 34 Indeed, the inadequate funding of

about 6 billions further undermines progress. The continuing stagnation of the Euro-

Med project is due to a low level of economic growth and the lack of integration of

the region. This naturally leads for high levels of unemployment. According to

estimates of the European Commission the market size of the three Maghreb

countries Morocco,Tunisia and Algeria combined “hardly equals that of Portugal.”

Intra-regional trade account only for 5 percent of all trade. The European Union

continues to be the major trade partner with a share of 54 percent. There was only a

slight change of 2 percent since the establishment of the Euro-mediterranean 33 ) For an assessment for the first five years see Alvaro Vasconcelos, George Joffè(eds.), The Barcelona Process.Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community.Special issue of Mediterranean Politics, Vol.5,Spring 2000,n°1 34 ) Richard Youngs,European Union and the Promotion of Democracy. Europe’s Mediterranean and Asian Politics.(Oxford:OUP 2001),pp.68-69.

21

partnership. Indeed, the intra-regional integration continues to be quite low in the

southern Mediterranean and dependency from northern markets is extremely high.

This has consequences for the economies of these countries, which have very high.

The most recent regional strategy paper for the period 2002 to 2006 acknowledges

these problems in the Euro-Med project. They make comparisons of investment in

the region and in other emerging markets such central and eastern Europe and Latin

America and the conclusion is that there was no major change or taking off of

forthcoming international investment since the European Union moved towards the

Euro-med strategy.35

One major problem is the lack of investment in the region,apart from Morocco and

Tunisia. One of the main reasons is that this region is perceived of being far away

from the principles of good economic governance. The lack of transparency and

accountability further reinforces this perception.36

FIGURE 6 DISTRIBUTION OF EURO-MED FUNDS(1995-2000)

€=4.314 billion

5%17%

5%

6%4%

19%3%12%

16%

13%

AlgeriaEgyptPalestineJordanLebanonMoroccoSyriaTunisia TurkeyRegional

Source: European Commission,Euro-Med Partnership. Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004.(Brussels:European Commission 2001), accessed 19 March 2004

35 ) European Commission,Euro-Med Partnership:Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Regional Indicative Programme.2002-2004. 6 December 2001 36 ) Youngs, European Union, ibid,p.62-64

22

The regional paper remained quite economistic in their priority areas. Five priority

areas were selected:

1.Making the Euro-Med Free Trade Zone a Reality; 2.Promoting Regional Infrastructures Initiatives; 3.Promoting the Sustainability of the Euro-Mediterranean Integration; 4.Enhancing the Rule of Law and Good Governance; 5.Bringing the Partnership Closer to the People37

Although democracy and human rights are not explicitly mentioned in the five

priority areas, they are implicitly included. Particularly the last two priorities

contribute to an overall democratization of these societies. The last allows for the a

stronger engagement of the European Union with these national civil societies.

The systems of government in the Mediterranean region mostly vary between Monarchies and presidential Republics, each with different forms of constitutions, which reflect their varied historical experiences and aspirations for the future. Following a period of instability after independence, over the past twenty years most partners have been strongly centralist, authoritarian and conservative in character, with the army traditionally playing a preponderant role in political life whilst the Parliaments tend to play a secondary role. The Head of State generally concentrates power in his person to a very high degree. There is now an increasing recognition of the need to liberalise the political systems across the region in order to harness the energies and increase the participation of the populations concerned. The commercial and civil justice system is also_often overstretched and inadequate to handle the demands placed on it. The EU has increasingly underlined that respect of human rights is a fundamental element of the Euro-Med Partnership. Overall, the challenge faced by the new generation of political leaders in the region is to revitalise the process of government, and to develop democracy and the rule of law whilst maintaining stability. This has to be done in the context of the risks to stability posed by significant social tensions due to economic inequalities, and the lure of fundamentalism, which has arisen in certain parts of the region.38

Across the Mediterranean there is still a long way to go until proper alternance in

power is achieved. Although Morocco is slowly moving towards democracy, hopes

that Muhammed VI would speed off reforms were somewhat misplaced.

Nevertheless the recent elections in November 2002 were regarded as fair. The

fragmentation of parliamentary assembly clearly strengthens the royal house.39

Less transparent and fair were the elections in Algeria organised by Bouteflika in

2002. Indeed, many of the political parties asked for a boycott of the elections leading

37 ) European Union,Euro-Med Partnership:Regional Strategy,p.3 38 ) ibid,p.9 39 ) El Pais,domingo,22.9.2002:1-3; Montabes,Juan, Maria Angustias Parejo e Inmaculada Szmolka(2003), La transitada transición:continuidades y cambios en la política marroqui.In: Economia Exterior, n°24,Spring ,pp.77-88.

23

to an official 46.9 percent turnout. Political violence and the continuing civil war

against the Islamic fundamentalists were not conducive for democratic legitimacy.

Moreover, the growing resistance and protest from Kabylia further contributed to a

negative image of the whole electoral process. Algeria continues to be a major

problem for the region,due to the continuing importance of the Islamic

fundamentalists who won the elections of 1992, but were not allowed to power by the

military.40 In other countries we can find similar obstacles to full democracy. In

Egypt there is a continuing issue of violation of human rights. More positive are the

developments in Jordan which are slowly moving towards democracy, although the

weak civil society has a long way to go.41

Although the European Union has to be sensitive in relation to the positions of the

governments in the southern Mediterranean, it is nevertheless very keen to push

forward the democracy-agenda. Meanwhile, this democracy-agenda has been

reinforced by the United Nations Development Programme which since 2002 is

publishing a specific Arab Human Development Report. The whole approach is not

so much to focus explicitly on democracy and human rights, but to emphasise the

quality of human development in these countries. These figures are much more

specific and technical than the more difficult issue of democracy and human rights. In

the end, economic,social,political and cultural development are regarded as inter-

connected. 42In this sense, the European Commission is interested in having a direct

impact on the populations in the Mediterranean region. The overall long term strategy

is that improvement of quality of life will in the end produce effects on the political

superstructure still characterised by high levels of patrimonialism.

One thing that the UNDP Arab development report is that there is a need to empower

women in the region, so that they may trigger more initiatives at local level. This call

for empowerment of woman is reflected in the regional strategy paper. Basically, the

programme envisaged within priority area three wants to increase opportunities for

women:

40 ) Youcef Bouandel, Algeria:A Controversial Election.In:Mediterranean Politics,vol.7,n.2(summer 2002),pp.92-102. 41 ) Mustafa, Hamarneh Democratization in the Mashreq:The Role of External Factors(77-95) In:Alvaro Vasconcelos, George Joffè(eds.), The Barcelona Process.Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community.Special issue of Mediterranean Politics, Vol.5,Spring 2000,n°1,pp.77-95 42 ) United Nations Development Programme, Arab Development Report 2002.(New York:UNDP 2002)

24

(1) fostering capacity building and awareness including the development of instruments for monitoring the active participation of women in economic life (2) providing frameworks for exchanging best practices.43

This is congruent with the Arab Development Report which clearly wants to reduce

the feminisation of the unemployment situation.

The EIDHR programme is also involved in the Mediterranean and is naturally

embedded in the overall regional paper strategy. One of the crucial strategic decisions

was actually to focus on building civil society capabilities by creating regional

networks. In this the EIDHR is pushing for a more bottom up approach towards the

democratization of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Four countries

are actually targeted in this region by the Initiative: Israel, West Bank and Gaza,

Algeria and Tunisia. Israel is regarded the best functioning democracy in the Middle

East, but according to EIDHR there are still deficits in the protection of human rights,

the fight against racism and discrimination of minorities and the access to the legal

system. In this sense, projects target these EIDHR 1 and 4 priority areas. West Bank

and Gaza which are under the administration of the Palestinian Authority are targeted

by the EIDHR due to deficits in governance issues and the freedom of press. It

clearly wants to improve the transparency and accountability of the Palestinian

institutions which were characterised by high levels of corruption. The main

involvement of EIDHR in Algeria is also related to governance and the strengthening

of the civil society organisations. There are also projects to overcome the practice of

torture,violation of human rights and the high level of impunity in relation to these

acts. Projects in Tunisia focus mainly on improving access to the legal system and to

achieve an overall reform of the judiciary. Moreover, it is also focusing on financing

projects designed to enhance the freedom of expression in the country. The allocation

for the four countries has been € 5 million. All countries are now required to develop

national plans related to protection of human rights,but it is very difficult to assess if

they are properly monitored.44

43 ) European Union,Euro-Med Partnership:Regional Strategy,p.31 44 ) European Commission,Commission Staff Working Document. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights .Programming Update 2004.Approved by Commission Decision on 1 December 2003,p.40

25

According to the continuous evaluation of programmes, there are still many problems

of implementation related to the absorption capability of funds, the lack of

transparency and accountability and the lack of sustainability of

programmes,particularly related to civil society projects.45

In sum, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is still characterised by many human

rights and democracy deficits which can be overcome over a long term period. Both

the Euro-Med as well as the EIDHR needs to streamline their procedures, but

substantial improvement was already achieved. The main problem for any success of

a democracy and human rights assistance policy will be the cooperation of the

governments. Otherwise, instead of leading to more democracy and respect of human

rights it will reinforce the patronage and clientelistic practices of most of these semi-

authoritarian regimes.

4.2.EU Democracy Assistance in the republics of the former Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed this once stable region, into a very

volatile situation. From the very beginning the European Union along with other

agencies were engaged in stabilising this region by offering technical assistance.

Implicitly democracy assistance was also included in the overall package of the

programme. The socalled Technical Assistance for the Community of Independent

States(TACIS) became an important instrument to push forward reforms of the

economic and political system. About one percent of all the funding was allocated for

the democracy programme. In 1997, the European Commission commissioned an

important evaluation of the democracy programmes included in the Poland and

Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy(PHARE) and TACIS. This

evaluation was undertaken by a team of scholars from the University of Sussex in 45 ) EvInfo on MEDA Global Allocation evaluation - 02/2001 - ref. 951577;Independent appraisal of the EC Investment Partners (ECIP) Financial Instrument - 12/1999 - ref. 951482;Evaluation of the structural adjustment programmes in the Southern Mediterranean countries - 04/1999 - ref. 951461;Evaluation of the MEDA democracy programme - 04/1999 - ref. 951460;Evaluation of the MEDA regulation - 02/1999 - ref. 951439;Evaluation of the EU programme of assistance to the West Bank / Gaza Strip - 01/1999 - ref. 951403;Evaluation of EU development aid to the MED region - 11/1998- ref. 951405 to befoundhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/program/medrep.htm, Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy.Europe´s Mediterranean and Asian Policies.(Oxford:OUP 2001),pp.68-78; Maurizio Gianmusso, Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development:The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks.In:Mediterranean Politics, vol.4,1,Spring 1999,pp.25-52; Annette Juenemann, Die EU und Barcelona-Prozess-Bewertung und Perspektiven.In:Integration, 24 Jg., 1/2001,pp.42-57

26

Brighton and Germany. The leaders of the programme were Mary Kaldor and Peter

Wilke. The overall view is that inspite of weakness the democracy programme of the

European Union had a positive effect on the non-governmental organisation sector

strengthening so grassroots democracy in these countries. Basically, they found out

that the EU label is quite important in central and eastern Europe and in the CIS.

They constitute a protection against the intervention of authorities in some of the

semi-authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the bottom-up approach focusing mainly on

strengthening civil society organisations has been regarded as very positive. In

particular, the micro-projects were regarded as very positive. Last but not least, the

democracy programme was more successful in the central and eastern European

countries than in the CIS. There are several factors that account for this different

outcome. According to the authors more funding was available for the central and

eastern European countries which clearly led to better results. Moreover, there were

more civil society organisations in central and eastern Europe, while the CIS countries

were lagging behind in this field. Another factor was the lack of adequate local

partners in the CIS countries in comparison to countries in central and eastern Europe.

Last but not least, the allocation of funding according to macro-projects and micro-

projects was quite important. Indeed, central and eastern European countries

dedicated more of the funds to the micro-projects which were bottom-up achieving so

better results than the CIS countries.46 The evaluators also found out that the whole

allocation of funds in micro-projects, macro-projects and adhoc projects was adequate

to achieve the necessary results.

46 ) ISA Consult European Institute,Sussex University,Final Report.Evaluation of the Phare and Tacis Programme 1992-1997.(Brighton,Hamburg:ISA Consult November 1997),p.6

27

FIGURE 7.ALLOCATION OF FUNDING FROM DEMOCRACY PROGRAMME FOR PHARE AND TACIS PROGRAMMES(1992-1997)

DEMOCRACY PROGRAMME FOR PHARE AND TACIS(1992-1996)

5

14

2022

20

0

5

10

15

20

25

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Million Ecu

Source: ISA Consult European Institute,Sussex University,Final Report.Evaluation of the Phare and Tacis Programme 1992-1997.(Brighton,Hamburg:ISA Consult November 1997),p.11 The evaluators differentiated between a mere formal and a substantive democracy

concept. In this sense, they were able to look at different categories and make a

proper assessment of the quality of democracy in the different countries. From the

thirteen CIS countries, the evaluators selected Russia, Belarus, Georgia and

Kazakhstan. All of them were characterised by problems,particularly in relation to

the rule of law and the protection of human rights. All of them were characterised by

patrimonial leadership styles which created problems for the establishment of

substantive democracy.47

The focus on the bottom up approach is probably the most salient aspect of the overall

assessment of the evaluators. The largest part was spent on macro-projects directed

towards non-governmental organisations. The rest was scattered between different

categories such as human rights, public administration and independent media.

According to the figures 70 percent was spent on macro-projects, 30 percent on

adhoc projects. Micro-projects were only introduced in 1996. Fifty percent were

spent on NGO activities, followed by Awareness building,independent media and

human right each amounting 12-13 percent.Other areas received between 3 and 5

47 ) ibid,p.21

28

percent.48 One major aspect that came out of the qualitative analysis is that in all

countries NGOs are extremely dependent on this foreign assistance.49

In another more comparative evaluation on human rights,good governance and

democracy several aspects were highlighted. The overall Tacis and Phare Democracy

Programme was regarded as positive,because it focused very much on a bottom-up

approach. Inspite of this positive aspect, the programme should use the information

gathered through these partnerships to improve the overall knowledge of the European

Union on these countries. Although the management of funds by the European

Human Rights Foundation(EHRF), which was founded by the European Parliament

and the European Commission in 1980, is efficient and value for money, the overall

decision-making process takes too long and is still inefficient. On average projects

are approved in a eighteen months to two years period. One aspect that is emphasised

is that there is still a lack of reporting on the existing projects. The lack of

transparency in the allocation of funds for the adhoc projects is mentioned also in the

report. Such lack of transparency is less common among the macro-projects.

Moreover, it asks for a stronger inclusion of local non-governmental organisations in

the annual meetings of the partnership, in particular the non-governmental

organisations working outside the capital. In the small projects the assessment is that

too much emphasis was given to the transfer of knowledge, but less on the

management of processes of change. One crucial aspect that is mentioned is that

actually the overall democracy programme tends to neglect the difficult social

situation in these countries. There is a general recommendation to take into account

welfare aspects in the programme. A further recommendation is to focus more on

partnership model, even if it is difficult, than already existing state institutions and

structures. The bottom-up approach is the best way to achieve concrete results,

because the experience with governmental institutions is that they feel this as an

intrusion into their domaine. The mid-term programme Link Inter-European

NGOs(LIEN) was also evaluated. Once again, the overall view of the evaluators is

that the bottom up partnership model is very positive. Nevertheless, similar to other

programmes the delay in the decision-making process and the time frame of the

48 ) ibid,p.33 49 ) ibid,p.60

29

projects is still inefficient,preventing a proper sustainability of the cooperation.

Although some cooperation between the government and the NGOs is wishful, the

evaluators emphasise that NGOs have to continue to be central in the delivery of

programmes. They advocate also more synergy with the democracy programme and

the small projects programme. They also stress the importance to decentralise both

management,monitoring and evaluation of the programmes to the particular CIS

country.50 Such a critical evaluation of technical assistance in Russia was also

undertaken in the Tacis Country Programme Russia by the Linden Consulting Group.

The report stresses that many mistakes were made in the first period of technical

assistance(1991-1994). The main problem was the focus on top-down transfer of

knowledge approach of this first period, which clearly led to a reluctant cooperation

of the Russian authorities and non-governmental organisations. The second

period(1995-1998) led to a change of approach towards a bottom-up reciprocal

partnership approach. The European Union adopted more of a project and process

facilitator role . This policy learning was reciprocal, similar processes could be found

among Russian partners involved in the technical assistance programmes. It was also

in the second period that the Tacis programme concentrated more on a bottom-up

approach by engaging more with non-governmental organisations.51 The evaluators

issued also several policy recommendations:

1.Improving the Policy Framework of Russian Federation-European Union Technical and Economic Cooperation: The evaluators call for a change of the overall pattern of cooperation from mere one-way technical assistance to one of reciprocal partnerhip. 2.Improving the strategic focus and partnership capacity of Tacis instruments in Russia: More decentralisation and flexibility within the larger programmes. Larger programmes should also have small projects facilities that may have long to medium term duration.

50 ) Emery Brusset, Emma Achilli et Christine Tiberghien, Rapport de Synthese des Activités de la Communauté Europeenne dans le Champ des Droits de l’Homme, de la Bonne Gouvernance et de la Democratie.(Brussels:Commission Européenne 10 Aout 2001), pp.34-37; on problems facing other programmes see the excellent article Richard Sakwa, Russia’s Experience as Recipient.In:Peter Burnell(ed.), Democracy Assistance.International Cooperation for Democratization.(London:Frank Cass 2001),pp.288-314; He makes the case that the programmes were mismanaged. The European Audit Court criticized about mismanagement of programmes(pp.290-291), also American foundations lost considerable amounts of funding to corruption(pp.294-295) and it contributed to the enrichment of the oligarchy(pp.300-301). 51 ) Linden Consulting Group, An evaluation of the Tacis Country Programme in Russia.Final Vol.1:synthesis report. January 2000.(Brussels:TACIS 2000),pp.26-36 a more detailed report on the individual programmes can be found in volume two

30

3.Strengthening the policy dialogue and the programming process: A stronger cooperation between the different levels of the Russian political system and the importance to have high profile leaders of the Tacis programme on both sides. 4.Improving member states’ participation and donors’ contribution 5.Increasing the strategic consistency of the programme at sectoral level 6.Launching an information campaign in Russia 7.Improving database and Programme information52

The Common Strategy of EU in relation to Russia adopted in the Cologne Council of

1999 is clearly a more stable framework to strengthen this reciprocal partnership.

One of the main aspects of the Common Strategy is naturally to achieve a stable and

democratic Russia as a neighbour of an expanded European Union. Democracy

issues are extremely embedded in the strategy which is also financed by the EIDHR.

Indeed, the EIDHR concentrated on three main focus countries:Russia,Ukraine and

Georgia. For the period 2002-2004 €3 Million were allocated to Russia,€2.5 Million

to Ukraine and €1.9 Million to Georgia. In all three, aspects of institution-building,

protection of human rights and the strengthening of civil societies capacities are

emphasised.53

The most important partner remains naturally Russia which is still in a process of

democratisation. The continuing features of neo-authoritarian rule prevent a more

closer relationship. The recent legislative elections in December 2003 and the

presidential elections of March 2004 did not lead to more confidence of the European

Union institutions in the overall democratisation process in Russia.54 Although the

European Union is certain that Russia is moving towards the path of stability, it is less

sure if it is making major progresses towards democracy. The presidential style of

Vladimir Putin bears earmarks of patrimonial rule which are worrying for a long term

confident relationship between Russia and the European Union. 55

52 )ibid,pp.68-72 53 ) European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.61,64,67. 54 ) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Implications of the Russian Parliamentary Elections, http://www.ceip.org/files/events/events/asp?pr=2&EventID=659 accessed on 26.3.2004; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Post-Election briefing, Tuesday March 16,2004,12-2pm In: http://www.ceip.org/files/events/2004-03-16-postelectionbrief-tscrip.asp accessed 26.3.2004 55 ) Sarah E. Mendelson, The Putin Path.Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Retreat.In:Problems of Post-Communism,vol.47,n.5,September-October 2000,pp.3-12;Alexander Lukin,Putin’s Regime.Restoration or Revolution?In:Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 2001,vol.48,4,pp.38-

31

The European Union expressed concerns about the restrictions of press freedom

particular in the broadcasting sector in their monthy reviews on human rights.56

In sum, the CIS countries continue to be major matter for concern for European Union

democracy promotion policies. The transitional character of most these democracies

create long-term assessments of risk and uncertainty which may affect the bottom-up

democracy efforts of the European Union. Probably, only after end of the second

term of president Putin we will know to where Russia is moving to.

4.3.EU Democracy Assistance in the Balkans

The European Union has been present in the Western Balkans since the early 1990s,

but developed only a more strategic approach of technical assistance, which included

democracy assistance aspects after the Kosovo war. Indeed, the hesitations of the

European Union member-states to intervene in the former Yugoslavia throughout the

1990s, led to a more pro-active engagement after in the beginning of the new

millennium. Through Phare the European Union allocated about €5 billion between

1990 and 2000 in former Yugoslavia, in particular in war-stricken Bosnia-

Herzegovina. Although democracy aspects were part of the overall allocated funding,

most of it went for reconstruction. In the aftermath of the Kosovo War the European

Union was instrumental in pushing for a Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe which

is now in place.57 In December 2002 the Phare programme was replaced by the

Community Assistance Reconstruction,Development and Stabilisation(CARDS)

programme which is targeting now these former Yugoslav republics. The main aim is

to prepare the countries of the region to become in long term perspective members of

the European Union. The first stage is to assist them to take part in the Stabilisation 48;Timothy J. Colton, Michael Faul, Russian Democracy Under Putin.In:Problems of Post-Communism,vol.50,n.4,July/August 2003,pp.12-21;Thomas M. Nichols, Presidentialism and Democracy in Russia. The First Ten Years.In:Problems of Post-Communism,vol.50,n.5,September-October 2003,pp.37-47;Timothy J. Colton,Michael McFaul,Are Russians Undemocratic?Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper,n.20,June 2001;Michael McFaul,Party Formation and Non-Formation in Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Working Paper,n.12,May 2000. 56 ) European Commission, monthly review on human rights and democratisation. December 2001.Brussels, January 2002,p.8;European Commission, monthly review on human rights and democratisation..January-February 2002. Brussels, 15 March 2002, B1/JMI D(2002),p.8; 57 ) On the making of the stability pact see Andreas Wittkowski, Der Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa und die „Führende Rolle“ der Europäischen Union.In:Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,B29-30,2000,pp.3-13; Marie Janine Calic, Der Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa. Eine erste Bilanz.In:Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,B13-B14,2001,pp.9-16.

32

and Association Process(SAP).58 For the period 2000 to 2006 there were € 4.5 billion

allocated to the region. The political objectives are to facilitate a return of refugees to

their homes, the fight against the growing criminality in the region, in particular

human trafficking, money laundering and other illegal activities. The main economic

aim is to reconstruct the war-torn economies. Quite important is the fact that the

European Union is embedded in a group of countries that are committed to achieve a

stabilisation of the region. Meanwhile a Bank for the Reconstruction of the Balkans

emulating the Bank for Reconstruction and Development for central and eastern

Europe was created in Thessaloniki,Greece.

After a decade of war, it is very difficult to democratise the region. In particular,

ethnic tensions are a major problem for the region. Recently, ethnic tensions between

Kosovar Serbians and Kosovar Albanians came to the fore again showing that still

there is still a lot to be done to bring these different ethnic groups to cooperate with

each other for the benefit of all.59

CARDS has an extensive institution-building programme in which several countries

in particular the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In 2002, this amounted to € 43.5 million and included also aspects of democratic

stabilisation.

FIGURE 8 .COMMITMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TOWARDS EUROPE IN 2002

DEVELOPMENT AID IN EUROPE IN 2002=€1.133 billion

4.9912.02

5.215.23

46.9425.6

AlbaniaBosn-Hz.

CroatiaFYROM

FRYOther

2002

Source: European Commission,Annual Report 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EC development policy and implementation of external assistance in 2002.Brussels 9.3.2003,COM(2003), 527 final

58 ) European Commission,Phare Annual Report 2000.(Brussels:European Commission 2000), p.110-116;European Commission, CARDS Assistance Programme to the western Balkans. Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006.(Brussels:European Commission 2000),pp.17-18 59 ) The Economist, 27th of March ,2004:45

33

There was a substantial shift towards the southern parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Although the figures are related to all technical assistance of the year 2002, it shows

that Serbia and Montenegro are now main targets of development aid, in particular

due to the Kosovo region. The annual report 2003 on development assistance makes

aware that the year 2002 was a turning point in the financing of the region. Indeed,

until 2002 there was general emphasis on the building of infrastructures. In 2002,

funding shifted towards improving the capacity building of institutions in the pursuit

of further European integration. This also includes aspects of human rights and

democracy enhancement.60 The focus countries of the EIDHR programme are the

Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The programme allocates

€ 2.5 Million for FRY and €2.3 million for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main areas of

involvement are democratisation and good governance, the rehabilitation of victims of

torture and projects related to conflict resolutions between different ethnic groups.

They are used in complementarity to the CARDS programme.61

A major survey undertaken by the Stockholm based Institute for Democracy and

Electoral Assistance(IDEA) in late 2001 led to interesting results. It seems that the

European Union has gained good reputation as the central institution pushing for the

modernisation and democratisation of these countries. This can be found in Kosovo,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia. Only the Republic Srspka and Croatia

were more distrustful of the European Union. In general terms, there is now more

concern about the economic situation, than actual ethnic tensions and conflict. 62 In

someway, corruption is still a major worry for most countries, so that the EU

democracy assistance has to address more these aspects in institutional building. In

sum, inspite of growing stability in the region, there is still long way to go in order to

ensure a stronger integration of the region and their compliance with human rights and

democratic principles.

60 ) European Commission,Annual Report 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EC development policy and implementation of external assistance in 2002.Brussels 9.3.2003,COM(2003), 527 final,pp.109-127. 61 ) European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document.European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2002-2004.Brussels,20 December 2001,rev.1-Final,p.55,60. 62 ) Mark Thompson, Southeastern Europe.New Means for Regional Analysis.IDEA,Policy Brief 2,May 2002.

34

4.4.EU Democracy Assistance in Latin America

In the past decade Latin America has gained considerable importance for the

European Union. The main reason is that the European Union is engaged in pushing

forward the democratisation of these societies. The European Union is a major

investor in these countries along with the United States. Moreover, the European

Union is trying to establish a transatlantic free trade area with the southern cone

market in Latin America, the socalled Mercosur. As such the regional strategy of the

European Union in relation to Latin America is related to these growing north-south

integration as a free trade area. Inspite of that, many aspects of democracy and human

rights policy are targeting other parts of Latin America as well. One important aspect

is naturally the strengthening of civil society. This is fully integrated in the by far

more important technical assistance of the European Union in Latin America. Indeed,

€48 million are allocated to the regional integration of Mercosur. The European

Union has developed several programmes which cover the whole of Latin America

such as the ALFA programme for cooperation between EU-Latin American

universities,the AL-Invest for European investment in small and medium sized

enterprises, the AL-Urb for partnership between European and Latin American cities,

ALURE for a better use of energy and

35

FIGURE 9:COMMITMENTS OF CARDS PROGRAMME 2001 AND 2002

COMMITMENTS OF CARDS PROGRAMME 2001=€ 701.3 million and 2002= €653.9million

6.9

6.9

16.8

13.04

8.55

9.02

8.01

6.35

32.8

31.3

24.5

25.5

8.01

6.65

1.14

1.29

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2001

2002

AlbaniaBosnia-HzCroatiaFYROMSerbia/MKosovoRegionalOther

Source: European Commission,Annual Report 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EC development policy and implementation of external assistance in 2002.Brussels 9.3.2003,COM(2003), 527 final,p.110

36

ATLAS for cooperation between chambers of commerce in Europe and Latin

America.63 In sum, the European Union is strengthening most Latin American

economies towards a viable partnership. Human rights and democratization is very

important in Latin America due to still growing inequalities in most democracies.

Indeed, apart from Chile and Costa Rica most Latin American political systems are

characterised by high levels of political corruption.64 Moreover, there is a strong level

of dissatisfaction of democracy, because it is not able to deliver the expected

improvement of life. Indeed, there is a deficit in governmental performance to reduce

inequalities, political corruption,poverty and criminality.65

Therefore one of the priorities of EU democracy assistance in Latin America is to

focus on a bottom-up approach in which non-governmental organisations are

preferred partners. There is a general attempt to strengthen civil society, so that

pressure from below may lead to transformation and change at governmental level.

Indeed, the three main areas of involvement are the support for a social dimension of

the Mercosur with the social partners, the promotion of information society and

education,culture and the audiovisual sector. This is complementary to the other

objectives of completion of the Mercosur internal market and its further

institutionalisation.66

On top of the agenda in the engagement of the EU in Latin America are naturally

human rights and processes of democratisation. In this sense, the EIDHR programme

focused on a few countries in order to achieve more concrete results. Common

strategy papers in relation to Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico emphasise aspects

related to strengthening civil society and the fight against torture or discrimination of

indigenous people. The allocations for the different countries for the period 2002 to

2004 was €2.5 Million for Mexico and Colombia each and € 1.8 million for

Guatemala.67

63 ) European Commission,Overview of AL Invest Programme In:http://www.europa.eu.int 64 ) Carsten Q. Schneider, Prospects for the Consolidation of Latin American Democracies:Rethinking the Role of Corruption and Institutional Trust.In:Sociologia.Problemas e Practicas,vol.42,2003,pp.65-90. 65 ) Daniel Zovatto, Valores, percepciones y actitudes hacia la democracia.Una vision comparada latinoamericana 1996-2002.In:América Hoy, 32,diciembre 2002,pp.29-53. 66 ) This becomes evident in the Regional Paper for the Mercosur see European Commission, Mercosur-European Community Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006.CSP Mercosur 10 September 2002,pp.30-32 67

37

Since 2001, the European Union has established a strategic partnership with the Latin

American countries. They are covered by bilateral country strategy papers, three

subregional strategy papers(Mercosur,Andean Community and Central America) and

an overall strategy paper for Latin America.

FIGURE10:COMMITMENTS TO LATIN AMERICA 1996-2002

COMMITMENTS TO LATIN AMERICA €millions(Total=€3.1 billion)

506.8 484.7 486.4418.7 425.5

315.7382

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

millions

Source:own graph based on data of European Commission,Annual Report 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EC development policy and implementation of external assistance in 2002.Brussels 9.3.2003,COM(2003), 527 final,p.225 FIGURE 11:COMMITMENTS ACCORDING TO REGIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

SHARE OF ALLOCATION ACCORDING TO SUBREGIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

37%

27%

17%

16% 3% Mex/CAAndeanSout.ConeLat.Amer.Reserve

Source:own graph based on data of European Commission,Annual Report 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EC development policy and implementation of external assistance in 2002.Brussels 9.3.2003,COM(2003), 527 final,p.226

38

In sum, the European Union is a major partner in the democratic consolidation

processes in Latin America. The European Union is quite relevant in areas such as

the rehabilitation of victims of torture. Programmes are not only running in the focus

countries,but also in other parts of Latin America. The linkage between economic

development aid,institution-building capacity and the strengthening of civil society

has become an important trade mark of European Union democracy assistance

policies.

CONCLUSIONS:THE PLACE OF EUROPEAN UNION DEMOCRACY

ASSISTANCE IN GLOBAL ASSISTANCE

This paper wanted to make an assessment of the democracy assistance policies of the

European Union in the context of the changing new international order. The

continuing importance of the paradigm of democratic peace within a global

governance approach was highlighted by the efforts of the European Union. Although

the United Nations is at the centre of this emerging global governance system, it is the

European Union that it is its major partner pushing forward policies towards

democratic peace and global governance.

One of the reasons is the fact that it is easy for the European Union to push forward a

democratic peace paradigm is that the whole approach of European integration is

geared towards such way of thinking. The development of a security community in

the past fifty years is now coming to show first results. Although there are still many

problems related to the EU multi-level governance system, one has to acknowledge

that this is normal. The European Union represents a political system sui

generis,which allows for multiple identities within its territory, but at the same bring

populations together towards common universal values related to respect of human

rights,democracy and peace.68 As such it is a forefront of several innovative strategic

partnership that will come to fruition in three to four decades. At the core of the

strategic partnership is democratic peace, which is not used as a one-sided

relationship, but as a reciprocal one. As such the cases of democracy assistance

68 ) see Gustaaf Geeraerts, and Patrick Stouthuysen(eds.), Democratic Peace in Europe.(Brussels:VUB University Press 1999)

39

policies towards the CIS countries, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Latin America

clearly show a growing streamlining and structuring of democracy assistance policies

towards long lasting partnership within an interdependent global governance system.

The European Union can be regarded as the most advanced regional building block of

this emerging multi-level governance system.Instead of utopia, what we are

witnessing is the emerging of a heterotopia located within the next three decades. As

the European Commission clearly acknowledges, the alternative would be a

catastrophy for the world.69

69 ) Commission of the European Communities, The European Union and the United Nations:the choice of multilateralism.Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 10.9.2003,COM(2003) 526 final,p.3

40