The Emerging Global Identity & Tracking System

October 28, 2004

Barry Steinhardt

Director, Technology & Liberty Project

American Civil Liberties Union

“Policy Laundering”

Cycling policies through international bodies that can’t be

enacted directly at home

Biometric Passports

• Required by US Congress

• Standards created by ICAO

Biometric Passports

• Face-Recognition set as the standard

• RFID chips included too• Standards allow for

optional use of other biometrics

RFID Chips

• Can be read at a distance (20m in tests)– see http://tinyurl.com/46vml

• No encryption

• Could enable tracking

Face Recognition

• Highly unreliable biometric

• Allows tracking-at-a-distance

Once created, biometric passports will:

• Become gold standard of identity verification around the world

• Become template for domestic National ID systems

• Increasingly be demanded for more and more purposes, abroad and domestically

• Be subject to private sector “piggybacking”

• Eventually they may become practical necessities

Expansion is inevitable

• Be used for more and more purposes

• Contain ever-more information

• Incorporate more biometrics, such as fingerprints and iris scans

Once created, passports are likely to:

Passports won’t exist in a vacuum

• National Identity systems

• Immigration database systems

• Passenger profiling systems

“Policy Laundering”

• National ID proposals failed in US• US sets standards for allies• US prods international body (ICAO) to

set standards• US complies with international standards

NGO input could have improved the product

• Biometrics can be implemented in ways that prevent use for surveillance or tracking

• Local storage• 1-1 checks• biometric systems related to physical

characteristics which do not leave traces (e.g. shape of the hand but not fingerprints)

Attempts to participate were rebuffedNGOs Ignored

Passenger Screening

February 2002:

CAPPS II (version 1.0)Data mining, wide sharing, the works

August 2003

CAPPS II (version 2.0)Commercial data, Red light/Green light,

August 2004

“Secure Flight”CAPPS version 3.0: Watch lists, commercial data

Secure Flight Compared to CAPPS II

Program Elements CAPPS II

Secure Flight

Provides no protection against terrorists with Fake IDs √ √ Provides no meaningful way for individuals to challenge their security designation √ √ Centers around reliance on secret, inaccurate government terrorist watch lists √ Checks personal information against private databases √ √ Requires collection of personal information from travelers making reservations √ √ Expands program beyond terrorists √ *Uses computer algorithms to rate individuals’ “threat to aviation” √ *

Passenger Screening Foisted On Canada & EU

• Must be international to work

• EU-US agreement reached over parliamentary objection – Canada too

• International agreements reached while domestic program still embattled

For More Information:

www.aclu.org/privacy