THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

O

UR PROBLEM is to examine the sig-nificance of predictability as a cri-

terion for truth and as a measure of free-dom. In connection with this inquiry, weshall also examine the significance oftrue propositions in human affairs .

I. Verbalized ConflictThe abstraction 'Truth' plays a central

role in a broad range of human activity .It is intimately connected with impera-tives of human behavior . In early child-hood we are taught that when we uttercertain words in certain circumstances,we are 'telling the truth,' and that whenwe utter other (or even the same) wordsin other circumstances, we are 'not tellingthe truth' ; and moreover that the formerbehavior is preferable to the latter.'Truth' is further connected with'Reality,' and in this connection has vastramifications. Tremendous outpourings ofmental activity throughout milleniumshad as their object the definition andelucidation of 'Truth' and `Reality .' Meta-physics and later epistemology revolvedaround these objectives . 'Truth' is alsostrongly entrenched in ethics as is evi-denced by identical designations for'truth' and 'virtue' in some languages .'Truth' is supposed to be some objectsought in modern science or at least in

* Captain, U . S. Air Corps, now stationed inIndia ; author of 'Newtonian Physics andAviation Cadets,' ETC ., I, 154-164 . Pianist(concert) ; mathematician (Ph.D .) ; seman-ticist .

1 2 9

ANATOL RAPOPORT *

philosophy of science. So many are theconnotations of this short word that itpervades even esthetics, as is shown inthe expressions 'true art,' 'poetic truth,'etc. Finally 'Truth' is thought to be em-bodied in human conflicts, because almostall conflicts are usually verbalized intoutterances that appear to be propositions .A group of individuals asserts, 'A istrue,' while another group asserts, 'B istrue, therefore A is not true .' The actionsof each are then attempts to curb theactions of the other .

Actually such verbalisms of conflict areseen to be simply declarations of behavioror intended behavior and must be distin-guished from judgments about the ex-ternal world . However, the fact that theyappear as formal propositions, subject toclassification as 'true' or 'false' is signifi,cant, as we shall attempt to show . Thefollowing are examples of verbalizedconflict.

EXAMPLE 1 .First Savage : 'This female is mine'

(where 'mine' as applied to females de-notes certain behavior).

Second Savage : 'No, she is mine (andtherefore not yours) .'

Each then acts in such a way as to denyto the other opportunities of behaviordefined by the expression 'my female .'Such actions result in withdrawal fromthe sphere of influence of one or theother or in injury or death of one orboth or all three .

ETC. : A REVIEW OF

EXAMPLE 2 .

First Tribe : 'This land is ours .' Againour land' is associated with certain be-havior.

Second Tribe : 'No, it is ours (thereforenot yours) .' Each tribe then acts in sucha way as to deny to the other behaviorwhich signifies 'my land.' Result : depopu-lation or impoverishment of one or bothtribes .

EXAMPLE 3.Heretic : 'The earth revolves around

the sun .'Inquisitor : 'No, the sun revolves

around the earth. (Therefore the earthdoes not, etc.) .'

Inside the skin of both the heretic andthe inquisitor both utterances are definedin terms of behavior.-The utterance ofthe heretic is really a declaration of in-tention to behave in a certain way,namely, to imagine a fixed frameworkof space, in which the sun is stationary,while the earth and the planets revolvearound it. Perhaps this declaration in-cludes an intention to induce other peo-ple to imagine a similar picture. It is

this behavior of the heretic which theinquisitor intends to prevent . He firsttries (if he is a conscientious inquisitor)to induce the heretic to behave in anotherway, namely, to imagine within the samefictitious framework of space a station-ary, centrally located earth with the celes-tial sphere revolving around it as de-scribed by Ptolemy . On the verbal leveland in the pictorial imagination the twopictures are incompatible. Finally, the in-quisitor takes other steps to prevent thebehavior of the heretic incompatible withhis own, and the consequences are pain-ful and often fatal for the heretic .

EXAMPLE 4 .First Monarch : 'Prince A is the right-

ful heir to the throne of X .'

GENERAL SEMANTICS

1 30

Second Monarch : 'No, Prince B is, etc .(therefore Prince A is not) .'

Steps are taken by causing groups ofpeople to behave in such a way that sim-ilar groups of people under the controlof the other monarch are curbed orannihilated, and the behavior of peopleindicated by the symbols 'A (or B) isthe rightful heir' is made impossible .

EXAMPLE 5 .Hitler: 'A group of people defined as

Germans are superior and destined tocontrol, rule, etc .'

Others : 'They are not, etc.'Appropriate steps are taken with well

known results .

The verbalized contradictions given inthese examples are contradictions of in-tended behavior and have nothing to dowith 'objective truth .' In fact, if they areto be considered as propositions at all,they are seen to be propositions aboutthe inner state of affairs of the adver-saries, and, properly stated, may all betrue. Contradictions arise when theseutterances are considered as propositionsabout the external state of affairs, inde-pendent of the speaker. Examine the firsttwo examples . The utterance 'This femaleis mine,' made without further assump-tions embodies no verifiable fact . Onlyits grammatical structure gives it the ap-pearance of a 'proposition .' In reality itis only a signal connected with certainacts. The same is true of the utterancesin Examples 4 and 5, taken from actualhistory. But there may be objections tothe assertion that Example 3 is likewiseonly a behavior contradiction. To a mod-ern informed person it might seem thatthe heretic and the inquisitor are arguingabout a verifiable fact, that it is onlynecessary to assume an 'objective point ofview' in order to investigate the questionat hand and decide who is right. Most

informed people suspect the anti-scientificclericals of the Renaissance of sinister'suppression of truth,' fanaticism, etc .However, a somewhat deeper analysisindicates that in pronouncing such judg-ments we make certain tacit assumptions,namely that `objective investigation,' aswe understand it, is a preferable methodof truth seeking than faith in establishedauthority. In other words, to accuse theinquisitor justly of `suppressing the truth,'one must assume that the heretic's concep-tion of `truth' is more justified than theinquisitor's, and if this assumption can-not be further justified, it is again merelya declaration of behavior . It was futile forGalileo to `prove' that objects of differentweights fell at equal speeds . He assumedthat his contemporaries should believewhat they saw, while they were skepticalof observed phenomena, since the lattermight well have been optical illusionsoriginating with the Devil . Is this skepti-cism less justified than the skepticism ofthe modern physicist, who will pronouncea swindle any demonstration of perpetualmotion no matter how convincing, be-cause it is contrary to the `Law of Con-servation of Energy,' i.e., contrary tovested authority? Well, yes, it is less jus-tified, but the justification of the modernpoint of view must be clearly formulated.Yes, the priests of Pisa were wrong, andthe modern physicist right . Yes, the ques-tion of the movement of heavenly bodiesis to a certain extent a question of ob-servable truth and not of individual be-havior, but this must be shown and theextent o f the observer's participation de-termined . It is not at all 'obvious .'

In Haakawa's Language in Action thefunction of language in establishing co-operation between human beings is dis-cussed. This cooperation is established bythe extension of the functions of indi-vidual nervous systems to include byinter-communication the experiences and

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

1 3 1

observations of others . In this article weapproach language from the point ofview of its functions in resolving con-flicts.

11

Human beings engage in two kinds ofconflict, namely `man against nature' andman against man .' Man's success in thefirst kind of conflict depends very largelyon successful cooperation with other men .Here the survival value of language as acooperation establishing agency becomesapparent. But the success of one man inthe second kind of conflict often meansthe failure of another man . ence_ lan-.guage will have a survival value if it alsosucceeds in resolving or eliminating thiskind of conflict . This function of lan-guage will be examined here .

Man-against-man conflicts are usuallyverbalized into utterances that have theappearance of contradictory propositions .Each pair of such utterances seems to beon one of three levels .

CATEGORY 1 . Conflicts of incompatiblebehavior.(1) 'This female

(1) 'She is not .'is mine'

(2) 'This man is (2) 'He is not .'my slave'

The contradictions seemingly embodiedin these utterances arise from the verbalform, which gives them the appearanceof propositions about the external world .When translated into propositions con-cerning the internal state of affairs ofeach speaker, the verbal contradictionsare resolved, for (1) becomes

(3) 'My nervous impulses lead me tobehave so and so toward thisfemale.'_

Proposition (1) becomes :(4) 'My nervous impulses are such

that unfavorable reactions occurinside my skin when you behaveas stated .'

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

Obviously propositions (3) and (4)may both be true. But the 'nervous im-pulses' described will usually themselveslead to conflict. Hence we call the be-havior associated with such pairs of utter-ances-incompatible.

CATEGORY 2 . Compatible behavior lead-ing to conflicts on the verbal levelsonly .

(5) 'Oysters are

(5) 'They aretasty'

not.'

(6) 'The music of Bach is more in-spired than that of I. Berlin .'

Again when these utterances are statedas propositions concerning the internalstates of the speakers, they cease to becontradictory. Verbal conflicts arisingfrom them can be resolved by both sidesrecognizing the 'subjectivity' of their as-sumptions. The conflict o f behavior, how-ever, remains . Usually such conflicts ofbehavior do not lead to destructive strug-gles. They are on the 'tolerance' level .Still it is sometimes desirable to resolvesuch conflicts, especially those of esthetics .Attempts are made to do so by appealsto 'valid esthetic truths .' In this articlewe shall not investigate the question ofexistence of such truths. We shall, how-ever, investigate the question of the pos-sibility of establishing criteria capable ofresolving the conflicts of

CATEGORY 3 . Contradiction about the ex-ternal world .

(7) 'This pencil

(7) 'It is grey.'is red'

_(8) 'Vancouver

(8) 'There is noexists'

_ such city .'(9) 'Gremlins do

(9) 'They do .'not exist'

(10) 'The atomic

(10) 'It is 17 .'weight ofoxygen is 16'

1 3 2

A restatement in the form 'I believethat . . .` does not resolve the contradic-tions between these statements as in thecase of Category 2 . If my friend believesthe propositions (7) through (10) Iconsider him color blind, queer, super-stitious, and misinformed. If he has asufficient number of such beliefs, I con-sider him a menace and insist on his con-finement in an institution or at least seekto eliminate his influence in humanaffairs . But how can I justify my attitude?How am I more right than the bigotsof the Middle Ages or the savages, whopersecuted people for 'rational' notionsthat did not tally with theirs?

We need a universal criterion fortruth . If such a criterion were recognizedby a vast majority of human beings andwere proved of survival value, many con-flicts between man and man and betweenman and nature would be resolved. Utter-ances leading to conflicts could be brokendown into propositions about the externalworld, and the propositions referred tothe criteria and evaluated . In fact, if thecivilizing process is considered as a con-flict-resolving one, this has actually takenplace in many instances, but of course notoften enough .

It is by no means certain that eachassertion and its denial can immediatelyby inspection be placed into either of thethree categories . Even examples given areclassified according to the prevailing no-tions of 1945, that is, in such a way thata majority of the readers of this articlewill probably agree on the category . Thusalmost every one will agree that the ques-tion of Vancouver's existence falls intoCategory 3, but certain quaint people willinsist that gremlins have an 'existence'independent of extensional verification .The pair of utterances

(11) 'God exists' (11) 'God doesnot exist'

will probably be placed in the secondcategory by people said to be 'tolerant,'while not so long ago it belonged to thefirst. On the other hand there was a timewhen the contradiction (2) was clearlyin the third category, when the status ofa man's slavery was a question of objec-tive investigation of facts and definitions .It must be stressed, then, that at differenttimes different contradictions aiff-into

different categories of verbal conflict .Now it is evident that conflict will

be reduced to a minimum if and onlyif as many contradictions as possible fallinto Categories, 2 and 3, and as few aspossible into Category 1 . In fact, it ispossible to make a quantitative definitionof civilization in terms of the distributionof contradictions in the three categories,where, while the significance of the sec-ond category is not at first clear, the leastweight of the first and the greatest weightof the third category can be taken to bethe signs of higher civilization . How-ever, this point of view is connected withserious difficulties, as will appear below .

Very probably the beginnings of sociallife (apart from animalistic family life)began with verbalization of behavior . Itbecame possible for two males to getalong when the simple behavior of takingpossession of a female (simple reactionto environment) was verbalized into asymbol 'This female is mine,' whichwould produce a semantic reaction inthe other male contrary to his natural re-action to environment, namely, an in-hibition against taking possession of thatfemale. This metamorphosis of the be-havior, 'This female is mine' into theproposition, 'This female is mine' is thebeginning of social behavior based onsemantic reactions. This process can beroughly described in terms of the histori-cal semantic systems, taboos, magic, re-

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

1 3 3

ligion, philosophy, science. In a way thesemanifestations indicate a certain shiftfrom the first category of contradictionsto the third and in some cases to thesecond .

One is tempted to assume that any shiftfrom the first to the second and thirdcategories or from the second to the thirdrepresents an advance of civilization ifcivilization is defined by elimination ofconflict and a broadening of knowledge .However, the difficulties of this interpre-tation are many, as was suggested above .

On the basis of this evaluation, itwould, for example, have to be concludedthat a stratified society with well-defined,legally established castes, including acaste of slaves, is more civilized than asociety in which struggles for the aboli-tion of slavery and caste occur, becauseunder the former the question of an in-dividual's status in society would comeunder Category 3, while in the latter itwould come under Category 1 . It wouldalso seem that a society based on rigidtaboos is more civilized than a societywhere great freedom of individual be-havior prevails, because in the formerquestions of behavior come under thethird category, while in the latter theycome under the second . It would alsoseem that physics in which absolute spaceand time frameworks are assumed is moreadvanced than a physics in which theyare not assumed, for certain concepts areprecisely defined in the former (i .e.,simultaneity), while in the latter theydepend on the observer, and thus many'contradictions' involving them comeunder the second category .

In order to clear up these difficulties,let us examine the steps in the resolutionof conflicts .

Contradictions of the first category areeither between man and man or betweenman and nature. An example of struggle

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

between man and man has been givenabove in the verbalized behavior, 'Thisfemale is mine .' Examples of struggles ofman against nature are seen in the verbal-izations of behavior such as 'I am hun-gry,' 'I want shelter,' 'I have a stomachache,' etc. The change of these declara-tions into propositions is the first step inresolving conflict . Thus rules can be setup which determine just when a femaleis 'mine.' If these rules are obeyed, con-flicts do not occur . Similarly rules of be-havior can be established on the basis ofpropositions by the process of -tlirle-binding,' which prescribe the satisfactionof wants, how to obtain food, how tobuild houses, how to cure stomach aches .Thus the behavior symbol, 'I am hungry'becomes associated with knowledge of theexternal world expressed in the proposi-tion, 'If soil is cultivated, seeds sown,etc., bread results, which appeases hun-ger,' or 'If these herbs are eaten, stomachache ceases .'

Note, however, the vital difference be-tween man-man and man-nature relation-ships. Investigations based on experienceand measured by success of predictionswere possible very early in the struggleagainst nature ; but in the case of man-man relationships, the superstructures ofsemantic relations multiply so rapidlythat the notion of 'truth' becomes totallydivorced from prediction . But the man-man relationships have also an influenceon the man-nature relationships and be-come intermingled with them. Thetaboos of social behavior merge with thetaboos of demonology, and the fruitfultime-binding verbalizations of nature-conquest such as 'If seed is sown, breadwill result' are supplemented by or evenreplaced by a maze of magic with nosurvival value .

One must keep in mind that an abund-ance of 'settled' questions does not neces-sarily mean that conflicts between man

1 3 4

and man or man and nature are resolved .Vast civilizations have crumbled and arenow crumbling because of reliance on'settled' questions . In a primitive societythe relationship of each man-to his neigh-bor and of each man to nature is fixed bya system of taboos and rules of behavior .But if these taboos and rules are not re-ducible to more general and fewer rules,they must be classified as declarations ofbehavior (utterances of the first cate-gory) . For example, 'One must not plantseed, because this involves tilling thesoil, and breaking the soil is taboo' is alogical deduction of a 'valid' conclusionand belongs to the third category ofutterances, but the major premise 'Break-ing the soil is taboo' belongs to the first(irreducible) category, and it is on thislevel that conflict is bound to arise . Sim-ilarly 'You must not undertake publicworks, because government must not en-gage in business, because acquisitive com-petition is always preferable to coopera-tive effort' is a 'logical' conclusion basedon a premise of negative survival value .

According to our proposed criterion forcivilizations, a higher civilization con-stantly strives to reduce the number ofits unassailable assumptions, to leave onlythose most generally acceptable . A toler-ant society (with many questions fallinginto the second category), other thingsbeing equal, is more civilized than a rigidone, because all the conflicts in the secondcategory are reducible to a single propo-sition of the first, 'Differences of com-patible behavior are tolerated,' while ina rigid society the patterns of behaviorare supported by an involved system ofarbitrary assumptions, beliefs and super-stitutions of no survival value, potentialinstigators of conflict and inhibiting fac-tors in the quest for greater knowledgeand freedom. Other things being equal,a democratic society is more civilized thana caste society, merely because the funda-

mental postulate of democracy, 'All menare created equal' (a declaration of be-havior) is simpler than the involved pos-tulatesof the caste system and thereforeprobably more generally acceptable .'

It appears further that the problem ofsurvival and elimination of conflict is notsolved by simply verbalizing behaviorinto propositions. Propositions, in orderto be tools of survival, must be 'a reflec-tion of reality,' that is they must be 'true,'and this brings us to the conclusion thatthe elimination of conflict and survivaldepend on the recognition of 'true propo-sitions .' Only in this way will the sub-stitution of semantic reactions for directreactions to natural environment have asurvival value . The vague sensing of thisis probably reflected in the wide pre-occupation with 'truth' characteristic ofhuman thought .

We are now ready to restate our, quan-titative definition of civilization. Thehighest civilization is a state of -affairsin which the maximum number of con-flicts between man and man and betweenman and nature are resolved by verbaliz-ing these conflicts into a series of truepropositions, which serve as a guide forbehavior. In what follows we attempt toshow that the truest proposition (thoseof greatest survival and conflict-resolvingvalue) are those which rest on the fewestassumptions and from which most predic-

- tions are deducible.

'The reader is begged not to confuse thedgdaration of behavior, 'All men are equal'(Category 1) with the proposition, 'All menare equal' (Category 3), In the Declaration ofIndependence it is certainly used in the formersense and remains a valuable postulate (Haya-kawa's directive) for building a conflictlesssociety . Used in the latter sense, it is seen tobe simply a false, proposition . The two cate-gories are often deliberately confused by manyfascists, 'professional Southerners,' etc .

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

13 5

II. The Criterion o f Predictability

In the name of religion and philosophymen have made steps toward the investi-gation of truth. Their systems begin gen-erally with dogmas and tacit assumptions .Around these systems of more or lessfruitful logic, notions of 'truth' arise .None of the systems has been consistentlysuccessful from the point of view ofeither survival value or resolving con-flicts . Only science, especially physicalscience, has succeeded in building a sys-tem of natural knowledge, limited inscope, approximating the ideal indicatedabove. The method of modern theoreticalscience, Assumption - Deduction - Conclu-sion (Prediction) -Verification, has a par-tial analogue in religion and law, Dogma-Interpretation-Judgment . The reasons forthe stratification and inefficiency of re-ligions as bases for elimination of conflictare many ; so are the reasons for the ster-ility of metaphysics and philosophy asmethods of securing knowledge and re-solving conflicts. But their obvious andprominent shortcoming is the shortcom-ing of all non-scientific systems, the totallack of a vital scientific measuring stick,the criterion of predictability .

We should like to show that predicta-bility is the only yardstick of truth ; thaton the basis of predictability and uni-versally accepted undefined terms (termsinvolving structure and order relationsonly), a positivist conception of the uni-verse including man can be gradually ap-proached ; that the positivist conceptionis synonymous with the elimination ofconflict and the acquisition of freedom(defined below) . We should like to showthat the recognition of the criterion ofpredictability for truth may lead to basicprinciples of behavior recognized as tend-ing to preserve the greatest harmony be-tween will and reality (sanity) through

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

the closest adjustment of nervous proc-esses to the structure of the universe .

The introduction of the ethical prob-lem in this connection is not relevant .No one doubts that there exists an opti-mum range of temperature for the humanbody,; -an optimum intensity of reaction6T-the retina to light waves . It is not toofar fetched to assume that there existsan optimum pattern of nervous reactionsto the presence of other human organ-isms, which the old metaphysical apostlesdubbed 'Love thy neighbor .' 'Love thyneighbor' has not been very successfulas a guide to behavior not because it is'contrary to human nature,' etc., but be-cause it has not yet been defined in termso f behavior on the colloidal level . Ethicshas never been effectively geared to otherinvestigations, where predictability couldbe effectively applied. If this were done,it might seem possible to develop a 'gen-eral ethics,' of which the ethics of variouscultures would appear as special casesand would become amenable to evalua-tion in terms of survival value . It canperhaps be shown that 'virtue' as a socialbehavior within a certain social frame-work depends on nervous reactions notmuch different from those of good di-gestion or from favorable reactions tothe sound of a major triad .

Happiness, which a hero of War andPeace defines negatively as the 'absenceof illness and remorse,' may constantlyapproach more precise definitions as thephysical, colloidal nature of both illnessand remorse become known . Social sci-ence may then become a study of condi-tions which will guarantee this state to amaximum number of individuals . It willmerge with medical science, simply di-viding with the latter the spheres of in-fluence.

Present day anthropology in its questfor `objectivity' and as a reaction toearlier naive, self-centered views of the

1 3 6

Occident, often falls into the other ex-treme, namely, that of complete rela-tivity of tall values, in effect a denial ofthe existence,_ or the possibility of exist-ence of general human criteria of evalua-tion. Following Spengler s cue, it oftendenies the existence of any general evo-lutionary principle of culture, allowingonly the evolution of cultures, destinedto go through incipient stages, maturity,old age, and death .

Present-day philosophy of science,frightened by the wreck of Euclidean,Newtonian, and Aristotelian frameworksof thought, falls into what seems a sophis-ticated pessimism and speaks of the 'im-posslttility of complete knowledge .' Itwistfully looks to 'Ultimate Reality'(which no one has ever expressed inoperational terms) as on a promised landforbidden. We suggest the abandonmentof God-seeking. We suggest a steady andinfinite approach to reality _ measuredquantitative y where more knowledgemeans more _,predictability with less as-sumptions. . . In the fields of ethics andsocial sciences our goal is a descriptionof 'happiness' and 'virtue' in operationalterms. Such a description of 'freedom'will be attempted here . It involves thecriterion of predictability .

The criterion of predictability is pos-sibly as old as language. Its consciousand systematic application, however, is arecent thing. The older concepts are theundefined and static terms, 'Truth' and'Reality .' But the history __ of __ humanthought has often been a monstrousgrowth of hopelessly involved networksof propositions, completely divorcedfrom what we today would call 'reality .'To the Greeks a true proposition was averbalism derived by certain rules fromother verbalisms accepted as 'self-evident .'Euclidean geometry was the most glori-ous achievement of Greek thought. Fran-

THE

cis Bacon declared the supreme criterionfor truth to be experiment . All progressin the search for truth" consisted of re-finement of experimental methods, broad-ening the range of experimental activityand developing a language, of deduction-mathematics . Experiment and mathe-matical deduction, supplementing eachother, constitute the chief tools of scien-tific research . This method may be saidto be founded on the criterion of pre-dictability. O»r purpose is to show thatnot only tl- natural sciences but all mean-ingful k edge is based on this cri-terion ;tnd to A up this assertion withthe definition. . of crvili>ation .given above,now restated in q intitative terms :

The highest civiliz `,in is a state ofaffairs among human beings where aminimum of conflict, a maximum of free-dom, and a maximum of knowledgeprevail .

Conflict has been defined above . Free-dom (more fully discussed below) meansmaximum predictability of one's own be-havior. Knowledge means maximum pre-dictability with minimum assumptionsabout the external world. In this connec-tion we shall show that :

1 . Mathematics, the most positivist ofsciences and the most effective (contra-diction-proof) of languages, bases thetruth of its propositions entirely on theprile of predictability .

2 . The hidden contradictio . .of _an-cient dilemmas areeasily laid bare by theapplications of this criterion .

3. The criterion is semantically sig-nificant as a tool of dialectics .

4. It has possible applications to thesocial sciences.

5. It is intimately connected with thenotion of 'freedom„'6. It is connected with the notion of

'real.'The method used will be the transla-

CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

1 37

tion of all meaningful propositions intoa language of verifiable predictions .When prediction is unconsciously incor-porated into meaning, its importance willbe stressed . A proposition will be de-fined 'true' (a quantitative term), 'false,'or 'meaningless' according to whether itcan be stated as a set of predictionswhich are realized (the extent of realiza-tion is the measure of truth), or a set ofpredictions which are not realized, orwhether it cannot be stated as a set ofpredictions.

Our first object of analysis is mathe-matical truth .

III. Mathematical Truth and ItsPhysical Counterpart

The preciseness of mathematical prop-ositions becomes evident through therealization of three , of _,tlwir d ,r cter-istics :

1 . Mathematical notions are definedand propositions deduced from the »n-definables and postulates of the particu-lar system in a finite number of steps .

2 . The Law of Excluded Middle isapplicable to mathematical reasoning.

3 . Each mathematical proposition isimmediately, obviously, and uniquelytranslatable into a prediction, in fact, isequivalent to one.

These conditions we shall define as theconditions of positivism . All knowledgewill be evaluated in terms of its approxi-mate satisfaction of these conditions .

As an example of positivist knowledge,we shall examine an elenientary -Zisciplineof mathematics, say euclidean geom .The first condition ofpose ivismis obvi-ously satisfied by the propositions of thisdiscipline with the exception of the prop-ositions involving incommensurables andlimits . To establish these, higher dis-ciplines of infinitesimal analysis are in-voked, that is, the postulates not ordi-

ETC . : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

narily among those of euclidean geom-etry are added . The second condition isinvolved in the very method of proof .The third condition is not quite so obvi-ous. What do these propositions predict?The answer is that they predict phe-nomena which take place insideourskins .The only -fruitfuhimeaningof-these prop-ositions is contained in predictions of thefollowing type : 'If you assume these pos-ulates and follow rules of reasoning(w ich also .,must be stated) you will in-evitably come to the conclusion stated inthe theorem .'

To show the significance of this ex-plicit restatement of mathematical prop-ositions, let us examine the confusionwhich is so often associated with mathe-matics. The difficulties of high school andcollege students are well known, butconfusion is not confined to them. Thebalking attitude of the ancients towardinfinity and infinite processes is reflectedin present-day attitudes of the 'intuiition-ists .' There are still people who say thatthe real number system is 'meaningless .'The superstitious fear of 'ij Binaries' isonly half-heartedly disspelled by mostteachers of mathematics . In my own stu-dent days I also gazed at the equation

(12)

q i ---1and suspected it of being a gigantic hoax .My doubts were about the existence ofsuch operations . Their reality becomesclear only through the realization of theircontent, which is nothing more than, 'Ify'ou assume such and such and follow cer-tainrules of reasoning,jpu will concludethis and that .'

The study of mathematics, however,began as a natural science, not a 'psycho-logical' one. To this day many peopleassume the propositions of mathematicsto be propositions about the externalworld, for example about physical space,when as a matter of fact, an additionalassertion is needed to connect the two,

138

such as 'The structure of the universe isreflected in the structure of mathematicalthought.' The omission of this assertionleads to confusion . The Greeks, instead ofgeneralizing their mathematical thoughtto include mathematical analysis, gave upin despair, when they saw that their'mathematical reasoning' did not tallywith the physical situation . In otherwords they did not evaluate the power oftheir mathematics iy the potentiality ofpredictability embodied in it . One of thebest illustrations of this impotence of theGreeks is the Achilles Paradox,2 a situa-tion in which tfie structure of the uni-verse is not reflected in Greek mathe-matics, devoid of infinite processes . Statedas a prediction, Zeno's contention be-comes(13) Achilles

toise .The first step is to realize that this pre-

diction can be on either of two levels,which the ambiguity of ordinary lan-guage - does not disclose. Namely, it canbe a prediction of an external phenome-non, i.e ., one about a physical Achillesracing a physical Tortoise, not overtak-ing it in any specified time . 3 To refute'Although most readers are probably fa-

miliar with this fable, we restate it for thesake of completeness . Zeno says that Achilles,running ten times as fast as the Tortoise, whohas a head start of say 100 yards, cannot passit, because by the time Achilles will have runthe 100 yards, the Tortoise will have advanced10 ; by the time Achilles will have run 10,the Tortoise will have advanced 1, etc ., adinfinitum .

'Mathematicians please note that everymathematical notion involving an infinite proc-ess (explicitly, or implicitly) contains a pre-

eiction. In this case 'never' means, 'Name aninstant, and I shall show that the event hasnot taken place .' Obviously that is not the sensein which Zeno uses 'never .' Compare also the'epsilon' definitions of analysis . 'For everyepsilon greater than zero there exists a deltasuch that, etc .,' can be restated as 'Name anepsilon, and I shall exhibit a delta .' The crucial

will never pass the Tor-

this prediction, one need only performhis or an egiliva1ent experiment Tomany practical' (read unimaginative)people, this is the end of the paradox .But there is also another interpretationof the prediction, namely, as a predictionon the„ logical (mathematical or psycho-logical) level. The prediction does notat all concern Achilles . It concerns eventswhich will take place inside - your skin,i.e ., it maintains that , i.f , you start withassumptions as stated and follow reason-ing as prescribed, then you will come tothe predicted conclusion . What of it?The sophist stated the assumptions ; heset down the rules of reasoning whichwe must follow (i .e., examine the rela-tive positions of the two contestants atmoments specified by him) ; and then heinterprets the result into the conclusion`Achilles will never pass the Tortoise.'The surest way to refute the significanceof the paradox is to accept the conclusionas determined by the sophist's method,but o remind him that the conclusion issimply on the logical' level, where the

is is the sophist's . not ours, and thatif it does not tally with the physical phe-nomenon, it simply means that the soph-ist's `wles_-of-reasoning' lead to predic-tions op-t]ie,_logical_level . _which do nottally_ with phenomena on the . physicallevel i e the structure of his logic doesnot correspond to the structure of thephysical world .

'But is there a better logic?' asks thesophist .

There certainly is . In that better logic,which doestally with physics (at leastin this experiment), it is not true thatan infinite number of finite intervals nec-essaril add up to an infinite interval, asthe soap fist tacitly assumes . It becomesimportance of naming certain quantities firstbecomes apparent in uniform continuity, uni-form convergence, and other refined notions ofmodern analysis .

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

1 39

clear that the infinite sequence of mo-ments examined by the sophist all liewithin a finite interval of time (the timeit takes for Achilles to travel 111 1,6 yards(see footnote) . In that more accuratelogic the prediction `Achilles will notpass the Tortoise' becomes `Achilles willnot pass the Tortoise within the intervalof time examined, i.e ., the time Achillesneeds to run 11119 yards,' and this pre-diction does tally with the physical situ-ation .

It is seldom emphasized that the pre-dictions of mathematics are not predic-tions about the external world but aboutevents inside our skins . In gradee schools(even in high schools) theorems areoften 'demonstrated' to youngsters bymeasurement. It may be that these aresound pedagogic methods as far as theygo. It may be that the immature mindis unable to grasp or is indifferent to`abstraction' (we mean, of course, ab-straction of higher orders) . But it mayalso not be true . And if it is not, thenfre3Jndous amounts of nervous energyare wasted in establishing connectionstacitly between mathematics and the ex-ternal world (two different levels of ab-straction) which later preclude fruitfuldevelopments along the lines of abstractthought, namely, the study of mathe-matics, because paths that are struck inthat direction are obstructed by specialapplications on lower _levels . What effortsare needed later to induce students tothink in terms of_im~inaries, whichcontradict the laws of algebra' (it hasbeen drilled- into them that 'you can'ttake the square root of a negative num-ber'), to think of the calculus withoutgeometric crutches, to develop the habitof conscious abstraction and generalization, the essence of all rational thought!

The connection between a mathemati-cal proposition of, say, euclidean geom-etry and its physical counterpart is not

ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICSan obvious thing . It must be establishedby a proposition involving another pre-diction, connecting the structure of onewith that of the other, eg, 'The space inwhich we live has to the extent of ordi-nary-measurements, euclidean properties,where straight lines are defined by pathsalong which light travels .' This proposi-tion is not at all a proposition of mathe-matics . It is a proposition of physics andinvolves predictions about the externalworld, which may be verified to certaindegrees of accuracy . In particular themeasurement of the sides of a physical`right triangle' would be a verification aof a prediction contained in one of thetheorems about such triangles . The defi-nition of a physical 'straight line' is cer-tainly needed. In our measurements wealways tacitly- . use a criterion for 'straightline,' the path of a beam of light or aline of force of the earth's gravitational,field or some similar thing, which weagree_ to. call a_ straight line . The questionwhether it is 'really' a straight line hasno meaning whatsoever .

In the realm of physics we find thatknowledge which comes closest to satis-fying the conditions of positivism isknowledge expressible by mathematicallanguage. This means that the ultimateverification of the predictions rests onmeasurements of uantities, which, it is Whenever such a contradiction arises,thought, are all reducible to the funda-mental undefinables (space-time and mat-ter-energy) . the aim of positivist philos-ophy of science is the establishment ofmefliods by which it will eventually be-come possible to reduce all knowledge tosuch measurements . The trend of all rap-idly progressing sciences has certainlybeen in that direction. It becomes moreand more evident that all 'qualitative lan-guage' is a temporary fraW=ork in whichsituations are given names_ to be used inmanipulating them until their, quantitativestructure is discovmd . The establishment

140

of the strictly quantitative structure ofsuch seemingly 'qualitative' experiencesas pitch and color are early classical ex-amples of this ten envy . The creation ofni i "mec`hanics, which has completelyreplaced the mystic 'tendencies,' 'wills,'and 'affinities' of matter characteristic ofthe metaphysical approach, is another ex-ample. Another is the chemistry of thenineteenth century, which reduced thedescriptions of compounds to strict quan-titative relations between elements. An-other is sub-atomic physics, which didaway with the qualitative differences be-tween__ the elements' and substituted forthem purely structural formulations .

The triumphs of quantitative analysisare not confined to the physical sciences .By means of powerful statistical methodsand recognition of fractional predicta-bility (mathematics of probability), hu-man affairs en masse are likewise de-scribed and predicted . Developed in itsapplications to the social sciences, statis-tical robability now returns to physicalscience to explore the sub-atomic reality .To what is this unmistakable success ofquantitative methods to be attributed?To answer this question is to examinehow the criterion of predictability oper-ates in resolving contradictions of judg-ment .

and both parties desire to come to thesame conclusion, the invariable procedureis to appeal to 'proof,' that is, to make(tacitly or explicitly) predictions basedon each judgment, where it is agreedthat the realization of a particular pre-diction is equivalent to the vindication ofthe judgment on which it is based . Butit is important that both parties agree onwhat shall constitute proof . We shallanalyze some trivial examples .

I maintain that one of two pencils isred, the other green, and my color blindfriend maintains that both are grey . If

my friend is aware of his affliction, theauthority of a third disinterested partywill determine the issue, or, if he be-lieves that I am disinterested, he will takemy word for it. My friend may be aphysicist and willing to test the color ofthe pencils by a spectroscope . At any rate,to agree, my friend and I must find acommon ground on which we can makeou"r pfeilid ions. Let us examine othercases .

How can I prove the existence of Van-couver, where neither my friend nor Ihave been? I can appeal to the authorityof maps, to the authority of newspapers,to the authority of other men, or to thesenses of my friend, if he is willing totake the trip . But are such authoritiesalways reliable criteria? I probably ap-pear very unreasonable to the funda-mentalist preacher, who quotes 'authori-ties' on the six-day creation, and to theNew Guinea native, who quotes equallyunimpeachable 'authorities' on sorcerers .Th eal,to .,t&s~ep ,,s~no meansadquate. It is not appeal to the sensesthat established the heliocentric descrip-tiQti of the solar system. On the con-trary, it was the breaking of bonds im-posed by _the,Aenses . If we establish theexistence of microbes by appeal to thesenses (refined) and refute the existenceof gremlins by the same appeal, what canwe say about the existence of atoms?

The question arises, does there exist auniversal yardstick, a language of experi-ence common to all human beings, sogeneral that those to whom it does notapply _may be termed insane, and theirinfluence justifiably eliminated? Doesthere exist a criterion so basic that ifpredictions made in terms of it are rea-lized, the truth of the proposition onwhich the predictions are based is imme-diately established?

The search for such universal criteria

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

141

has gone on for a long time. The invoca-tions of the 'Word of God,' declarationsex cathedra, and philosophical systems areattempts to establish such criteria . Thehomely maxim 'seeing i~ 's believing' is arough _ statement about the conclusivenessof experimental evidence. However, it isfar too uncertain. What is , Howabout illusions and hallucinations? Howabout the vast realm_ of the invisible onwhich the modern notion off the universeis built? An appeal to the senses is cer-tainly a first approximation in the searchfor reality, but we must go far beyond .The mechanics of the senses must itselfbe analyzed and vast networks of validinference established. A chain of truthsmust be sought, backing each propositionabout the external world, each truth beingon a more fundamental, more generallevel than the preceding . An 'appeal tothe senses' is only . a l ink . in that chain.What then is the last link? What are theundefinables of the system?

At least one such category of universaljodgment is known to exist, the raf gpryof order and structure . To all humans3 is more than 2 . In the configurationA-B-C, B is between A and C. Thesenotions are crude and subject to infiniterefinement, but no refinement disturbsthe order of the elements once estab-lished. Superstructures of measurementsother than space come next : stronger-weaker, lighter-darker ; louder-softer,where 'measurement' means the reduc-tion of inaccurate 'subjective' perceptionsto abstract quantities involving order andstructure only. Multidimensional meas-urements, structure relations based onsystems other than the real number sys-tem, such as the complex number field,matrix algebra, etc., flow logically out ofthe development of the language basedon structure alone (mathematics) . Theseare the undefinables on which every

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

meaningful prediction must be based .Obviously, it is not possible at the pres-ent time to reduce all knowledge topositivist utterances . Our present state ofknowledge is a vast collection of suppo-sitions, rules of thumb, working hypoth-eses,__ beliefs. We rely heavily on au-thority, because certainly verification inall or even in a significant number ofcases is impossible . But a firm establish-ment of the fundamentals as attemptedhere is necessary to establish or to refuteauthority.

The greatest contribution of the Westto humanity is science, the critical ap---- ---proach, the .extensional investigation . An-

thropology has shown us that our moresare as much infested with shibboleths ofdoubtful or negative survival value asthose of many primitive societies. Wemust obviously reject the trader and mis-sionary approach to the pre-literate society,which confined the `civilizing process' toendowing the latter with shotguns, syph-ilis, and arbitrary taboos on his sex be-havior based on Christian word-magicsuperimposed on his home-grown kind .Anthropologists, constantly confrontedin their field work with tragedies of thistype, are inclined to negate any 'absolute'standards in the evaluation of civilizationand especially of ethics. This reaction isunderstandable considering the failure ofapplying 'our' standards to other cultures .Yet there is no reason why general stand-ard, s cannot be found by which both ourculture and othercultures could be evalu-ated. These standards have already beensuggested in the existing literature ofgeneral semantics . According to them weevaluate our western science as havinggenuine survival value. Science can prob-ably be safely 'sold' to every human be-ing, properly approached . We must there-fore firmly establish our 'authorities'based on the scientific approach. We

must show why the contention of thephysician is more reliable than that of themedicine man ; the statement of the bi-ologist more reliable than that of a funda-mentalist preacher ; the theories of FranzBoas truer than those of Alfred Rosen-berg. To test the reliability of authorities,criteria of knowledge must be universallyestablished .

We have maintained above that the cri-terion of predictability is synonymouswith the criterion of truth, and this leadsto a definition of reality in these terms .The problem of establishing this, how-ever, is vast. It involves the entire taskof semantics, i .e., that of clearly estab-lish_npabstraction levels in all reasoning,judgment, investigation, and discourse .

The task of education becomes athorough con i coning of the human ner-vous system to permit it to establish habitsonly,

-in accordance with this rationality,

to reject any authority except that basedon rational investigations, and, above all,to recognize and to resist the irrationalactively and uncompromisingly (as 'ra-tional and `irrational' are here employed) .The aim is the establishment of a newmaterialism and a new dialectics, morepowerful than the -off, a-materialismwhich instead of minimizing the import-ance of that which is called the 'spiritual,'brings it within the sphere of its investi-

gations by intimately linking psychologyand-physiology, physiology with bio-chemistry and biophysics, which in turnrest on operational positivist foundations .The answer to persistent believers in the`supernatural' (there are surprisinglymany of them among scientists) is thatthe 'supernatural' is a self-contradiction,because everything that happens is ex-tensionally defined as the 'natural .' Sim-ilarly the postulation of the existence ofuunnknowables' is simply a declaration ofbehavior that inhibits the search for

142

truth (greater predictability) . The un-known should be regarded only as the'n~nj_ ;Et_known,' while the 'unknowable'simply becomes meaningless .

IV. Predictability and FreedomSo far we have attempted to establish

a quantitative description of civilizationand have pointed out that 'truth seeking,'i .e ., investigation of criteria for truepropositions (conflict resolving) is a vitalactivity in the civilizing process. Not theleast important result of establishing suchcriteria is the abandonment of meaning-less verbalisms, w fo lack of ,_ an

effective critique of meaning wereou ht to be unsolvable dilemmas . We

have alreadyexploded the Achilles para-dox by applying the criterion of pre-dictability . We wish to examine in thislight one of the most significant of theold dilemmas, the so-called ' ee will s .eterminism' cg gye As a prelim-

inary study, we shall take up the wellknown barber paradox, which provokedmodern thinkers to doubt the validity of'propositions, about all propositions' andhas, had reverberations in the recentcritique of the foundations of mathe-matics. The paradox rests on a statementmade about every inhabitant of a village :

(14) 'The barber shaves all those andonly those who do not shavethemselves.'

This statement supposedly determines theshaving habits of each inhabitant. Theshaving habits of the barber as a par-ticular inhabitant must then be inferred .But both the statements,

(15) 'The barber shaves himself,' and(15) 'The barber does not shave him-

self.'are incompatible with (14) . This seemsto destroy the 'law of excluded middle'and the syllogistic process of inferringthe particular from the general .

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

143

The paradox becomes perfectly trans-parent when the proposition (14) isstated as a prediction, the veracity of theinhabitants being explicitly assumed . Theprediction is about the result of a polltaken among the villagers . If every vil-lager is asked to fill out a questionnaireconsisting of two questions,

(16) 'Do you shave yourself?' and(17) 'Does the barber shave you?'

then (14) is equivalent to the prediction,(18) 'In every ballot "Aye" to one of

the questions will be accom-panied by "Nay" to the other .'

Now `every' bla„meansJones ' ballotand Smith's ballot, and . . . . the barber'sballot. But to the barber (16) and (17)are equivalent. Therefore he must answer'Aye' and 'Nay' to both, if he is tellingthe truth as assumed . Therefore predic-tion (18) cannot be realized .The technique of proApositional func-

ti ons, of course, resolves the paradox .withequal success. The object here is simply topresent semantic_ analysis in slightly dif-ferent terminology linked with the pre-dictability criterion of science, and whichin other situations may prove simpler andmore immediately applicable to experi-ence. The challenge to the dilemmas ofmetaphysics, to babbling politicians, ad-vertisers, advocates of White Supremacy,and other savages should be 'snake a rea-lizable prediction' instead of a vague'prove it or defineyour terms,' becausethe latter are simply invitations to morebabbling .

The serious paradox which concernsus here is the old one about 'free willvs. determinism,' a favorite of theologybut prominent in modern philosophy ofscience.

The question was usually blandly statedas 'Is there such a thing as Free Will oris every phenomenon including the ac-tions of every individual predetermined?'

In idle verbal arguments, the exponents

ETC . : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

head, take off, chirp, etc. Suppose nowthat another observer knows more aboutbirds than about stones . Does that meanthat 'to him' the stone is more free? Thequestion immediately arises about the'real' degree of freedom of bird and stone .Again there is a quantitative definition of'reality .' Judgments based on greaterreality are judgments based on greaterpredictability. If the knowledge of thetwo observers is combined, greater pre-dictability of the behavior of both thestone and the bird results . Comparativefreedom of bird and stone determined bythis greater knowledge is then more'real .' 'Ultimate reality' can only meanjudgments based on 'complete' pre-dictability, a limiting concept .

What then is the degree of freedom ofman? It is measured in terms of the pre-dictability of his behavior and always in-volves an observer. The confusion arisingfrom this question arises from the formu-lation 'Am I free?' Here both the objectand the observer are taken to be identical .Actually the situation is very similar tothat in the barber paradox . The latter isclarified by the recognition of the factthat whereas to every one else in the vil-lage the two propositions jshavemyself'and 'The--barber shaves me' are incom-patible, to the barber they are identical .Similarly the statement 'I can predict yourbehavior' is to me equivalent to 'You arenot free,' while 'I can predict my be-havior' is equivalent to 'I am free .' Aprediction of behavior is connected withthe notion of 'I will,' or control. I cansay 'This stone will now describe a para-bolic arc' and then throw it. I have cer-tainly proved that the stone is not freein this respect. But have I also shownthat I am not free, since I have to a cer-tain extent predicted my own behavior?If this point of view is assumed, the

bird's behavior cannot (1945) be pre- whole argument about freewill becomesdicted, such as whether it will turn its ! devoid of content, especially since it is

144

---- ._

of determinism are always able to estab-lish an 'irrefutable case.' In answer tocontentions such as 'I raise my arm byfree will, because it is in accordance withmy intention,' they are always ready toreply, 'But your intention is also phe-nomenon and was determined by a pre-vious cause.' This, of course, contradictsthe 'intuitive' feeling of free will ('ButI can choose either to move or not tomove my arm'), which in turn is coun-tered by 'But your choice is again "deter-

mined," ' etc., ad nauseam .The question has meaning only if Ee-

sdictions are made based on each conten-tion. We find that predictions about 'freewill' and 'determinism' are predictionsabout predictions .What do we mean when we say that

the stone is not free in its flight, but the

bird is free-or at least, is more freethan the stone? As far as we can analyzethese judgments, we see that we are com-paring simply the degrees of predicta-bility concerning the behavior of the stoneand the bird. In comparing the 'freedom'of any two individuals (entities whosebehavior as a whole is studied), threebodies are involved, the two bodies com-pared and the investigator, who makes

the predictions . From such a standpointfreedom can be quantitatively_ defined .

Let us now return to the bird and thestone. The observer, studying the habitsof each, can now significantly say thatthe bird is more free than the stone .There is a wide range of conditions underwhich the beh-dvt6F"oFthe stone can bepredicted. It can be placed in a situationwhere the forces acting on it are known,and its motion can then be predicted .The effects of temperature and pressurecan be predicted, etc . The behavior of thebird can also be predicted, but far lessprecisely. Innumerable details of the

THE CRITERION

shorn of its emotional connotations,which gives it its vital historic signifi-cance. To say 'I shall do so' and do itdemonstrates what people always havecalled 'freedom .' There is no reason whythese connotations should not be kept.But their clarification_ involves a defini-tion of freedom in terms of predictability .When thea_observer and the observed aredifferent, greater predictabih means less

fre_ edc~nl ; w'~en 'tliey are 'i entieal,'greater predictability means greater free-dom .

Let us examine the process of self-predictability further. Let us suppose thatby a tremendously developed techniqueof observation, it becomes possible topredict the behavior of an organism com-pletely. pletely. To be specific, let us imagine anapparatus into which the observed or-ganism is placed and which projects theimmediate future behavior of the organ-ism on a screen-a fortune-telling ma-chine. Fantastic as it seems, there appearsno logical impossibility for the existenceof such a machine . Let us now supposethat our illustrious scientist, the inventor,decides to perform an awesome experi-ment on himself, and he sees that he is'destined' to commit murder or to bekilled in an accident or to be involvedin something equally unpleasant, a favor-ite and gruesome theme of romantic fic-tion. The fantasy immediately involvesthe old arguments about 'fate,' etc . Thewhole notion is immediately explodedwhen it is realized that self-observationin the ultimate sense of the word is im-possibIe - I can contemplate my hand ormy navel, but notmy' self.' In the state-ment 'I contemplate myself,' 'myself' cannever be identical with 'I' (Korzybski'snon-identity) tluestion 'What am Ithinking of?' can have only a trivial an-swer 'I am thinking, "What am I think-ing of?" ' The story of the well-knownabsentminded professor illustrates this

OF PREDICTABILITY

145

point . Deciding to overcome his handi-cap, the professor wrote down the where-abouts of his things when he retired .Upon rising he was gratified to findeverything at hand. 'The clothes are inthe closet,' he read, 'the shoes are underthe bed ; that watch is on the mantel-piece. Quite correct . But where am I?The last entry is "I am in bed," but thebed is empty!'

The recognition of the fact that 'self-observation' is impossible at once dispelsthe dilemma of 'fate.' Predictions aboutone's 'self' are not based .on_'.observation 'in- the sense that the predictions aboutthe stone are. Therefore there is no suchthing as inevitability_ of _ one's own .be-havior except where the knowledge (pre-dictability) of this behavior is absent . Itfollows that the ability to predict one'sown behavior i t e uiva ent , to re- ec7om,in act is the onl _con_tent_ _ freedom, !

The range of such predictions is ofcourse decisive in determining the degreeof freedom . This tallies with the popularnotions. If Smith is in jail, he is to a cer-tain extent not free, because the prediction'I shall go to Vancouver' is unrealizablefor Smith in a Chicago jail . It may seemat first thought that Smith in jail canpredict more about himself than Smithout of jail, because of routines, etc. Butin considering Smith's freedom we mustconsider also the range _ of predictionsrealizable for Smith, in other words, therange of his activities, the repertoire ofhis attainable desires, etc .

If Smith has learned to predict the be-havior of Jones, Jones is not free relativeto Smith . But if Jones is also able to ac-quire this knowledge about himself, thenhe becomes free, and Smith's knowledgeof Jones"next move is again restricted .As an example, let us suppose that Smithhas placed Jones into our prediction ma-chine and finds that Jones is 'destined' to

FTC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

raise his arm. If Smith is silent about it,i.e ., if knowledge is denied to Jones, it isconceivable that Jones' raising his arm is'inevitable .' But if this knowledge is im-parted to Jones, Jones immediately ac-quires the freedom not to raise his arm .This example finds its counterpart inpsychoanalysis, which strives to impart toJQnes hci owledge about Jones accessible tothe physician but not to Jones .

The progressive study of nature by manconstantly reveals nature to be less and lessfree* (unpredictable) . But the study of aman by himse~f.-on the contrary reveals(makes) him more and more free (self-predictable) . Resolution of conflict be-tween man and man through the increaseof total individual freedom (self-knowl-edge) possessed by mankind, and be-tween man and nature through the sub-jugation of nature to man is the object ofcollective existence . In this light we de-fine civilization .

The seemingly insoluble difficulty in the'free will vs. determinism' problem layin the tacit assumption of the existenceof an observer relative to whom man'sfreedom was considered . Since there isnot tlie'slightest evidence of such an ob-server, he must go the way of the 'sup-ports' on which the earth was presumedto rest, the First Cause, the Ether, andsimilar semantic disturbances . In fact theverb 'exist' is meaningless when appliedto things about which no predictions canbe made. Man unconsciously assumedthe role of that 'observer.' He was thentalking in terms of self-observation andgot entangled in a monster barber para-dox. The tacit assumption of an 'observer'will appear again in the last context inwhich we shall examine predictability,namely, in connection with 'reality .'

' See the comment on 'unpredictability inmodern physics' in the Resume .

146

V. Predictability and RealitySir James jeans in a recent book tells

a gloomy parable. Somewhere a man whohas no contact with the civilized worldexcept a radio listens to signals given outby ships at sea, giving their name andposition. The hermit records these co-ordinates and after years (or centuries)of such recording begins to build theories .His theories are both mathematical andempirical. For example he hears regularsuccessions of pairs of coordinates and onthe basis of their regular recurrencebuilds his mathematical theories . He willnever record a longitude greater than 180,nor a latitude greater than 90 in absolutevalue. Furthermore, he will tend to hearmore rapid changes of longitude at higherlatitudes. Now this man begins to con-struct a mathematics, in which no num-ber is greater than 180 in absolute value.He may make certain assumptions aboutspace, time, and derive rules for handlingthe complex notions derived from these .He may discover a 'law of nature' which`makes' the ships travel faster in the east-west direction at high altitudes. Later hemay develop a 'theory of relativity,' whereby assuming a curvature of his space, hecan dispense with this 'law of nature .'Each successive development of histheories will enable him to predict moreand more accurately the position of eachship, or, to be more exact, the signalwhich he will receive at the time t + A tafter having received a certain signal atthe instant t .

'But,' implies Sir James jeans, 'do thesepredictions, no matter how accurate, en-able our physicist to know what a shipis and why they should travel at all?'

The picture seems tragic, because itdenies this presumably knowledge-lovingobserver the knowledge of very interest-ing objects, namely ships, and the veryinteresting world in which ships are built

and sent on journeys . But in fact a tacitassumption is made that such knowledgecould be available to him, if, say, hecame in contact with the world .

This fable has an obvious connectionwith questions of 'ultimate reality,' whichare still confronting some outstandingscientific philosophers, particularly thosewho saw the world of Newton crumbleand fall about them, which must havebeen a painful experience for people notconditioned to the view that the collapseof man-made universes is a normal, harm-less, in fact, a desirable occurrence in theprogress of knowledge . The wistful state-ment is often made that man is doomedto ignorance of the world except for in-significant peeps, because his nervous sys-tem is so constructed that he is unableto grasp 'ultimate reality .' The isolatedobserver's 'knowledge' of the ships is in-deed pitiful. A whim of the skipper,whose existence our physicist does noteven suspect, will shatter all his pains-taking calculations . However, even as Iwrite these lines, I write them from thepoint of view of one who has seen shipsand met skippers, and this is also thepoint of view of Sir James Jeans . If ananalogy is to be permitted between oursignal collector and the modern physicist,who presumably records nothing moresignificant than signals coming from 'ulti-mate reality,' then necessarily a tacit as-sumption is made that a point of viewexists, from which both the physicist andthat 'ultimate reality' are visible, andfrom which it can be seen that the 'ulti-mate reality' is hidden from the physicistforever because of his limitation .

We deal here with purely metaphysicalexistence, i.e ., an 'existence' which meansabsolutely nothing, as the 'existence' ofNewton's 'Absolute Space' or the 'exist-ence' of 'ether.' It means nothing becauseit is impossible to verify, that is, it is im-possible to make a prediction concerning

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

147

it. I stress especially the sense in which'impossible to make a prediction' is usedhere: it is used in such a way as to besynonymous with 'meaningless .' It is notused in the sense of 'physically impossibleto verify,' as for example it is at present(1945) impossible to verify whetherthere are planets around Arcturus . Thislatter 'impossibility' is not intrinsic in thequestion, because it is conceivable (1945)that next year or next century telescopesor other means can be derived which willmake it possible to determine the exist-ence of such planets . By verificationwhich makes a proposition meaningful Imean potential verification, i .e ., the possi-bility of making meaningful (1945) pre-dictions . Once more it is stressed that nomeaningful (1945) prediction can bemade about 'ultimate reality' nor aboutan 'intelligence' to whom alone this 'ulti-mate reality' is discernible .

When philosophers speak of 'unknow-able' reality, they mean 'knowable butnot by us.' This unconscious assumptionis expressed in analogies similar to theabove. This in turn implies the existenceof a recipient of knowledge of whom weknow and can know nothing . But thisagain brings up the same ambiguity ona different level, because this 'undiscov-erable recipient' if mentioned at allmeans 'discoverable but not by us .' Thechain has no end .

Unknowable reality is as barren as anymetaphysical ghost which contains a con-tradiction in its very definition : 'immov-able objects,' 'infinite forces,' 'omnipotentbeings' (can such a being create a stonewhich it cannot lift?) . All of these areproducts of semantic disturbances . Butlet the rejection of the 'unknowable' neverbe construed as a vulgar point of viewwhich denies the meaning of everythingnot in the range of immediate compre-hension. On the contrary, the rejectionof the unknowable brings vast undiscov-

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

ered worlds into the realm of the know-able. Allowances should be made fortotal revisions of verbal structures andmethods. No meaningful question shouldescape investigation. No conclusionshould escape doubt . No shibbolethshould be held sacred except the one juststated. In the last analysis mankind mustset up undefinables and unassailables,forming the foundation of its collectivestriving . Some of them, although not yetclearly formulated, are now being estab-lished or rather defended by force ofarms. The object is to keep them as fewand as general as possible . In this prin-ciple lies the answer to the dilemma oftolerance and democracy in its dealingwith intolerance and demagogy. Does theprinciple of tolerance proclaim the toler-ance of intolerance? It most certainly doesnot. Intolerance, of intolerance, is not in-tolerance, . Hatred, of hatred, is nothatred,. Similarly the establishment of auniversal criterion of knowledge which isoperationally equivalent to the destruc-tion of shibboleths, is not a shibboleth .

RESUME

The first step toward the resolution ofconflicts associated with incompatible be-havior is the verbalization of behavior .

Primitive verbalizations are 'declara-tions of behavior .' If they are proposi-tions at all, they are propositions aboutthe inner state of the speaker, not aboutthe external world.

Verbalizations become propositions,i .e., statements about observable reality5

'At some future date it may become possibleto observe directly the inner state of affairs ofan individual . At present, for example, the stateof hunger of an individual can be roughlyestablished by observing the contents of hisstomach . Similarly the presence or absence of'mental' and 'emotional' processes may someday be likewise established . At that time state-ments about the inner state will become propo-sitions about observable reality, subject to pre-diction and verification .

148

when they tacitly or explicitly contain aprediction, the verification or the refuta-tion of which establishes the truth of theproposition .

Contradiction of propositions can beresolved if the predictions they containconcern experiences common to both par-ties concerned.

One of the objects of general semanticsis or should be the search for ultimatelyprimitive experience common to all menand having the intrinsic structure similarto the structure of the universe .

It is hoped that such experience existsand can be made the foundation of alanguage whose structure is similar to thestructure of the universe, i.e ., that sucha language will enable men to predict allphenomena of nature of which man isa part (positivism) .

The significance of 'unpredictability'in modern physics does not make mean-ingless the search for more and more gen-eralized knowledge, because a clear rea-lization of the 'unpredictable' is alsoknowledge . What is unpredictable indi-vidually becomes predictable en masse .Fractional predictability (probability) isa useful generalization. Moreover 'un-predictability' should be dated . Even ifwe discover that macroscopic predicta-bility is composed of submicroscopic 'un-certainty,' it does not preclude some fu-ture more refined methods of both ob-servation and reasoning, which will estab-lish a higher level of predictability for theindividual particles.

Predictability becomes freedom of thepredictor and lack of freedom of thatwhose behavior is predicted .

Predictability is the sole content andcriterion of knowledge (a definition ofknowledge in operational terms) .

Knowledge (predictability of the ex-ternal world) and freedom (self-pre-dictability) are the goal of collective

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

existence . Elimination of conflict through states,' and other more or less metaphysi-the establishment of very few and very cal notions are held to be changes ofgeneral universals serves to channelize the state in the colloidal structure of, cells .efforts of humanity toward these ends. It is hoped that such changes will eventu-

ally be discovered and minutely studied .

Elementalistic : Based on a false beliefthat various aspects of the same phe-nomenon are or can be completely sepa-rated. In alchemy a 'substance' was be-lieved to exist independently of its 'prop-erties' ; in theology a 'soul' was believedto exist independently of the 'body,' inNewtonian physics time was believed toexist independently of space, etc.

Ethics : An attempt to evaluate humanbehavior, in particular behavior involvingrelations between humans, in terms ofgeneral principles stated in advance.

Freedom : Defined in the article .

Knowledge : Defined in the article .

Magic: A semantic disturbance inwhich certain patterns of behavior areassociated with certain wish reactions insuch a way that the performance of theformer is believed to be accompanied bythe fulfillment of the latter, e.g., prayerabout the occurrence of external events .

Metaphysics : A system of inquiry aimedat the discovery of 'ultimate reality.' Itsgoals, assumptions, undefinables, andmethods were never clearly stated . It con-sisted largely of manipulations of words,confusing grammatical structure with thestructure of 'reality' which it sought . Itsquestions often began with 'What is. . . .?' where the answer simply equatedtwo sets of terms. It is assumed in thisarticle that since these 'equations' pro-vided no increase of predictability, thetotal value of metaphysics was at mostzero. However, viewed in its historicalperspective, it must be considered as astep in the development of the faculty offruitful inquiry. Whether it did moreharm than good is an open question .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND GLOSSARY

The basic formulations of this articlewere inspired by the works of AlfredKorzybski and S. I. Hayakawa. Thisshould be evident to any one familiarwith them. A great deal of the termin-ology is taken bodily out of Korzybski sScience and Sanity . Specific credit is notgiven in footnotes, because the authorconsiders both the formulations and theterminology as firmly established in gen-eral semantics . However, as a precautionagainst possible misinterpretation, a glos-sary of the terms is appended . Perhaps insome cases the author deviates fromother writers in the field in the use ofthese words . Some may have somewhatmore specific, some more general, mean-ings than those originally associated withthem. The meanings indicated here arethose of the terms as used in the contextof this article. They should not be re-garded in the sense of dictionary defini-tions but as the author's attempts to indi-cate extensionalization of the terms setforth here.

Behavior : Any discernible change of stateof an object, particularly of an organism,e.g., motion, digestion, change in tem-perature, etc. It is assumed here that moreand more processes of life will eventuallybe described and explained in terms ofbehavior only . It is thought that the rela-tive lack of success of the behavioristschool of psychology was due chiefly tothe failure to discover the significance ofbehavior on the colloidal level .

Civilization : Defined in the article .

Colloidal level : Phenomena involving'sensations,' 'consciousness,' 'emotional

149

ETC. : A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMAN rICS

Multi-ordinal terms : Those whose mean-ing changes with the level on which theyare considered . In this article a techniqueis suggested for establishing the level ofmeaning by means of specific predictions .A very important multi-ordinal term is'exist.' For example, the existence ofwomen truck drivers can be established bythe prediction, 'You will see a womanwho drives a truck' To prove the exist-ence of witches on the same level ofexistence, a similar operational predictionmust be made (c f. 'reality') .

Non-elementalistic : (Cf. 'elementalistic')Applied to formulations which considerphenomena as a whole, e.g., in modernchemistry 'properties' and 'substance' arenot considered separately .

Reality : (multi-ordinal!) That aboutwhich verifiable predictions can be made .The level of reality, then, is determinedby the events predicted . For example,horses are real on the 'sensory' level, be-cause a prediction can be made and rea-lized about them at that level ('You cansee, touch, etc. a horse') . Unicorns maybe said to exist on a different level, butnot on the same level as horses, becauseof the nature of realizable predictionsabout unicorns ('You will encounter themin literature,' etc .) . The number r existson a still different level . It is assumedin this article that each true propositionis reducible by a series of predictions toa prediction involving structure relationsonly. For example, 'You can touch ahorse' involves the notion 'touch,' whichagain breaks down into predictions con-cerning nerve impulses traveling alongcertain channels, and this in turn involvesphysio-chemical changes, changes of en-ergy states on submicroscopic levels, etc .,down to considerations of structure only .Structural relations are considered hereas the most fundamental (general)known reality.

1 50

Quantitative definition : An establishmentof an evaluation in which a scale of orderexists. Examples of terms quantitativelydefinable are relative humidity, elasticity,infant mortality, rank in the militaryhierarchy, etc. An attempt is made in thisarticle to establish a quantitative defini-tion of civilization .

Religion : Behavior based on the postula-tion of 'existence' (level of existenceusually not specified) of beings to whomwish reactions are attributed which arereflected in the phenomena of the externalworld. This behavior is very broad in itsscope, ranging from semantic disturb-ances of magic and taboos to extensiveand more or less consistent postulationsof systems of ethics . A cosmology isoften included in the fields of experienceinfluenced by religion .

Science : All systems of inquiry character-ized by investigations of observable phe-nomena, attempts at clear differentiationof existence levels, attempts at reductionof assumptions, verification by experimenton the sensory level, and heavy relianceon the criterion of predictability .

Semantic disturbance : Semantic reactionof zero or negative survival value, e .g.,magic, numerology, chauvinism, prudery .

Semantic reaction : Reactions induced byconditioning, whether to features of thenatural environment or to signs, sign-situations, symbols, or symbol-systems .Semantic reactions may be of a low de-gree of conditionality (i.e., the samestimulus always, or almost always, pro-ducing the same response), or of a highdegree of conditionality (i .e ., the re-sponse to the stimulus being conditionalupon many other factors, such as internalstate of the organism, time, place, context,etc .) . Language is an elaborate system ofsymbols, each involving semantic reac-

tions, As such it may have tremendoussurvival value, e.g., the reaction to thesounds `There's a bear!' may prepare onefor, or enable one to avoid, the actual en-counter with the bear . Semantic reactionsof zero or negative survival value are re-actions to symbols or signs evaluatedwithout reference to reality, e .g ., super-stition, racial prejudice, etc .Survival value : It is at present almostimpossible to measure quantitatively thesurvival value of various modes of be-havior except in very simple cases . It ishoped that methods may be developedby which the survival value (relative) ofsemantic reactions can be experimentallyor statstically determined : Of course thesurvival value for the race as well as forthe individual is to be considered .

1

THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

Structure : In this article the term is usedsimply as multi-dimensional order. Allpropositions of mathematics involve struc-ture only .Taboo : A semantic reaction inhibitingcertain behavior . Also the enforcementof such inhibitions by prohibition, e.g.,the prohibition of appearance on a mo-tion picture screen of a girl clothed in atight fitting woolen upper garment, etc .True proposition : Defined in this article .Verbalization o f behavior : Utteranceswhich transmit a rough knowledge of aninner state of one individual to another,e.g ., 'I am hungry,' 'This female is mine .'Animal sounds are also primitive verbali-zations of behavior if they induce uniformresponse in other individuals, e.g ., criesof fear, anger, etc .

The men most disdainful of theory get from it, without suspect-ing it, their daily bread ; deprived of this food, progress wouldquickly cease, and we should soon congeal into the immobility ofold China .

H. POINCARt, The Foundations o f Science

If a distinction is to be made between men and monkeys, it islargely measurable by the quantity of the subconscious which ahigher order of being makes conscious . That man really lives whobrings the greatest fraction of his daily experience into the realmof the conscious .

MARTIN H. FISCHER,'Spinal Cord Education .' Ill. Med. jour. Dec., 1928 .

The curr ennaccounts of perception are the stronghold of modernmetaphysical difficulties . They have their origin in the same mis-understanding which led to the incubus of the subs ncP_a , alitycategories. The Greeks looked at a stone, and perceived that it wasgrey. The Greeks were ignorant of modern physics ; but modernphilosophers discuss perception in terms of categories derived fromthe Greeks .

A. N. WHITEHEAD, The Principle o f Relativitywith Applications to Physical Science

151