The Bakun Hydroelectric Project in Malaysia - The Damned Dam

04 JUNE 2007[Technology in Society] | 421-609

[Vigneswaran KUMARAN] | 277492

Aim

This essay is intended to provide a critical analysis on the aspired Bakun Dam construction in Malaysia. The significance of the technology and its impact on the indigenous society of Sarawak, and its environment is the main content of the analysis. The essay will attempt to address the following elements:

Technological need of rural society and the people of Malaysia, in particular of Sarawak

Energy requirement vis-à-vis state development

Chronological events of the dam construction and the political scenarios

The societal interaction, environmental needs and development requirement

Public participation and involvement in socio-environmental decision making

Coordinator: Dr. Lu AyeCivil and Environmental Department

THE BAKUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: THE DAMNED DAM

THE BAKUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT IN MALAYSIA: THE DAMNED DAM

Other elements of threat or barriers in societal need for alternative technologies in favour of the dam construction

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Contents

Aim 3

1.0 Introduction 7

Conclusion 20

References and Notes 21

FiguresFigure 1 Industrial Fuel Intensity in Selected ASEAN Countries 1980-2000 13

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The right to prosper in life beyond survivalism could be an ideal aim of every human being

and every nation on earth. Development in a society at a primary level, should address the

basic needs of the members of the society and it should be at the willingness of the society

to embrace the development, but not as an imposition due to external forces. The people of

Sarawak, a sovereign state of Malaysia is provided with the option of such development,

and it is important that the basis of such provision is critically reviewed and the implications

understood in its whole. Sarawak is the largest state in Malaysia being situated on the East

Malaysia, with massive tropical rainforest (though dwindling rapidly), and endowed with

large petroleum reserves [1]. It is one of the world’s largest exporters of tropical hardwood

timber [2], and the deforestation had depleted almost 90 % of the forested area.

The people of Sarawak, in particular the indigenous and locals along the Balui River of

Sarawak have been provided with the opportunity to develop to the standards considered in

par with other Malaysians. The opportunity came in the form of construction of a dam

which would consume a catchment area twenty times the size of Singapore and a reservoir

that would submerge Singapore in entirety [3]. This opportunity will displace the ten

thousand indigenous from their ancestral native land, their association with the

environment, and provide alternate source of income from the project. Their forced

relocation [4: www.rengah.c20.org] had undermined fundamental human rights in its basic

form, with threats of reduction in compensation, forced purchase of homes, and non-

transparent legal acquisition of native land.

The conception of Bakun Hydroelectric Project, in its feotal stage could be dated to the early

1960s, where the initial survey of hydroelectric potential in Sarawak was initiated under the

Colombo Plan aid programme. The survey was carried out by the Snowy Mountains Hydro-

Electric Authority of Australia. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the detailed examination

of the Bakun site and preparation of development proposals. The feasibility study was

carried out by German-Swiss consultants and had involved an expenditure of US$ 15 million

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http://www.rengah.c20.org/


(1985). The construction of the 204m height dam and the power generation facility

(inclusive of eight power tunnels of 8.5m diameter) was estimated to extend over a period

of 12.5 years.

In 1986, although the nation was affected by recession, the government announced the

decision of proceeding with the Bakun project. The funds required for the project was

thought to be sourced from World Bank or Asian Development Bank (ADB). The general

public and the natives were infuriated by this uncouth action of the elected government.

However, in June 1990, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia (Tun Dato Seri (Dr.) Mahathir)

announced the cancellation of the project during an international conference on

conservation of tropical biodiversity, purportedly demonstrating Malaysia’s commitment to

conservation. However, this decision was more at the economic interest of the country,

rather than earnest environmental concern, which had been made obvious by the decrease

in electricity demand projection as an outcome of recession post 1985.

On September 9, 1993, the government of Malaysia had decided to revive the project of

building the dam. The reason could have been due to incessant lobbyist and strong political

push from the state government, as well in the rise of electricity demand. In January 1994,

the project was awarded to the Sarawak timber tycoon, Tan Sri Ting Phek Khiing under

Ekran Berhad, without formal protocol and bureaucracy associated with most government

linked project. This was a business entity without prior experience in dam construction or

power sector. In April 1995, Ekran (and the consortium formed) completed the EIA for the

project, however, the EIA was not released for public scrutiny.

The project with a capacity of 2400 MW is to cost US$ 2.5 billion and expected to be

completed by 2003. Additionally, a 670 km HVDC power transmission cable was to be laid

on the seabed to supply power from Sarawak to the West Malaysia. Ironically, Ekran

announced that the reports have been approved by Department of Environment (DOE),

which at the time, the reports have not been subjected to public scrutiny. This approval

reflected mismanagement at government level, whereby the jurisdiction of EIA at federal

level has been transferred to Sarawak state government by the Minister of Science, Energy

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and Technology and backdated to September 1, 2004. The state level EIA does not require

public feedback for the EIA approval. The EIA had been divided into four parts, defying the

purpose of EIA, and were to be approved in stages, while preliminary works at site such as

land clearing to proceed in order to meet the project milestones. The local society and

public were not provided the opportunity to voice their concerns, and humiliatingly the final

approved EIA was provided to the public four months later. This act by the government

reflects arrogance and complete disregard of public welfare, and EIA once again becomes a

piece of ineffective document, rather than a dynamic process for socio-environment

assessment. This preferential act also mirrors a socially corrupted political institution,

maximizing private profit against social welfare.

The EIA was later reviewed by a team of experts brought together by the International

Rivers Network (IRN) at the request of local society. The evaluation exposed some fallacies

and inadequacies in the project’s approved EIA, in which the project was reputed to supply

the nation with cheap, clean and reliable electricity. The team also concluded that the EIA’s

“usefulness is severely limited by basic methodological flaws”. The approved EIA had also

claimed that the dam would reduce loss of forests, whereas the site clearance would leave

hectares of land deforested. Apart from that, the EIA had not considered the no-project

alternative, long-term impact, and effect of water quality on fisheries. The IRN effectively

summed the EIA as not meeting the accepted international standards for environmental

assessments.

In 1997, during the Asian financial crisis, the project was halted. The government had

already made US$ 1.22 billion payment to the consortium on various completed works. The

resuscitation of the project for the third time took place in May 2000, via a government

owned company, Sarawak Hidro. However, numerous changes had taken place within the

past five years, in terms of the overall project development. In November 2007, a new

merger will allow Synergy Drive with a market capitalization of US$ 8 billion to takeover the

Bakun project, and the submarine HVDC cable to West Malaysia to be revived. The

projected time of completion is February 2008. Thus the actual cost of project estimated at

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US$ 2.5 billion in 1995 is now estimated to have overrun to US$ 4 billion, if it is completed at

the aforementioned date. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the World Commission on

Dams (WDC) states that the construction overrun cost for large dams are typically about 56

%, which could lead to a larger sum.

The social benefit cost analysis was not adequately undertaken by the Malaysian

government. Nonetheless an independent study by Hope and Morimoto (Cambridge) shows

that the project’s mean probability of Net Present Value (NPV) is negative throughout the

project life, assuming the facility’s life of 100 years. The 95 th percentile indicates the project

to have positive NPV only from the tenth to the thirtieth year, and subsequently lose its

economic value. This study and other similar propositions show that the Bakun was not a

project to maximize social economic welfare, but intended by a few in power for the benefit

of the elite few.

The energy requirement in West Malaysia and Sarawak as indicated in the Ninth Malaysia

Plan 2006-2010 has a reserve margin of 25.4% and 23.5%, respectively. The reserve margin

for Sarawak includes the power generation from Bakun, however this contribution is only at

400MW against a design capacity of 2400MW. The capacity being underutilised is an

economic loss, and even if the Bakun operates at 76% (as indicated in the Knowledge Base

of WCD) by 2008, the reserve margin would exceed by 60%. This extra margin is non-

consumable power, which ultimately reflects in the financial sheet of the project a huge

hole, and may eventually be covered with tax-payers money, as practiced in other

government linked operations. Arguably, the intention of the state and federal government

in carrying out such massive project with tax-payers money (the US$ 2.2 billion in payment

done) and blatant disregard of public concern has little to do with national development. As

shown by the number of attempts to revive the damned project, the societal need has least

importance in this short-term economic gain by the elite few.

Alternative sources of power generation have not been considered in replacement of this

project. To err is human, but to repeatedly err is ignorance, and the leaders of this

government have little thought or inclination to retract their failing acts. A massive project

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such as Bakun is becoming obsolete in developed countries such as Canada, Europe and

France, however developing countries such as Malaysia is willing to buy this obsolete yet

highly expensive technology to become an industrialised nation. A project which extends

over more than 12 years, had largely been exposed to severe economical constraints and

mismanagement should be reviewed conscientiously by good political governance. Sarawak

has large reserves of natural gas, and clean combined heat and power technology, and to

use latest state-of-the-art operations would have less capital requirement and

environmental impact, compared to submerging and deforesting a land that could

accommodate the whole nation of Singapore in its scarcity for land.

The Bakun project had taken away the indigenous people’s right by creating legislative rights

against their Native Customary Rights (NCR). The society had been displaced 50km from

their native land, with least compensation and against their preference. Development

against the need of the society is exploitation of the society for private profits, and such

development leads to social degradation more rapidly than if the society had been left

without development. The displaced Kenyah, Kayan, Ukit, Penan and Kajang ethnics have

been deprived of their ancestral land using the legislative interpretation by the state

government for the interest of a few in power. Until today, some of these people have not

even received their compensation, nor have their plights been consciously addressed.

In the name of development, these people are forced to strip their cultural inheritance,

their way of life and finally their identity as the indigenous who had been the rightful

owners of the Bakun. In the name of development, a society with rich traditional values,

worth more than any economic return is asked to sacrifice for the whole nation that lives in

cities and homes that knows not how much of fauna and flora of thousands of years

evolution is destroyed for the need of a few. It is disheartening that the plights of the

displaced people are yet to be attended. The following song (a ‘parap’ – offering in song and

rice wine) from a Kenyah indigenous aged women highlights the ill fated society’s plight:

“We are happy you came among us.For soon, we worry, we may drown

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Because of Bakun.We are mourning, due to our problems.Share your ideas with us, so we can have courage.Please help us, please tell yourFriends, and others in the world outside, That we have our problemsSo that you and they can help usOne way or the other.Please remember us and our plightWherever you go, wherever you may be.”

Technology is worth less than its economic value in a fading society, when the development

is imposed on the society, against their will and interest. The people of Balui River will be

forgotten as soon as the damned Bakun Hydroelectric generates power, but a technology

that displaces a culturally rich society, and diversified fauna and flora will leave a scar that

will remain in Malaysian history in pursuit for the title of developed nation.

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REFERENCES

1. MIEEIP, MEC

2. Achieving Industry Energy Efficiency in Malaysia, UNDP

3. The Ninth Malaysia Plan (RMK9), Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia

4. The Star Online, Friday, March 31, 2006

5. World Energy and Economic Outlook, International Energy Outlook 2006, Energy Information Administration, USA

6. A. Rahman Mohamed, K.T. Lee / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 2388–2397

7. Energy, The Eighth Malaysia Plan (RMK8), Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia

8. Concept Paper on EE Business Opportunity in Malaysia, R. Ponnudorai, PTM, Malaysia

9. Potential of Gas Fired CHP in the Manufacturing Sector in Malaysia, Malaysian-Danish Environmental Cooperation Programme, Ir. Phang Ah Chee, CHP Energy Services, Malaysia

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The Bakun Hydroelectric Project in Malaysia - The Damned Dam