The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Questionof Muslim Identity

Simon Ross Valentine

ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Founder of the Ahmadi Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Establishment of the Jama’at and Internal Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4The Development of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: 1914–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Ahmadi Doctrine and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Organization and Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10The Continuing Persecution of Ahmadis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

AbstractThis article presents a sociological, historical and theological study of theAhmadiyya Jama’at. Despite the considerable contribution made by the Ahmadito the life and development of Pakistan as a nation state, and the group’s notablephilanthropic and charitable work, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at is fiercely persecutedby other Muslims. This article, after describing the history and beliefs of theAhmadiyya, and a brief account of the life of the group’s founder Mirza GhulamAhmad, considers the reasons for such opposition. Two questions are paramountthroughout, namely are the Ahmadi Muslims or a splinter group forming a newfaith, and what does the Movement tell us about Muslim identity?

S. R. Valentine (*)Free-lance religious consultant specializing in political Islam and Muslim minority groups,London, UKe-mail: archegos@btinternet.com

# Springer International Publishing AG 2018M. Woodward, R. Lukens-Bull (eds.), Handbook of Contemporary Islam and MuslimLives, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_10-2

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Introduction

One of the most controversial contemporary sects to arise within Islam is theAhmadiyya Jama’at (or the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association). Originating in Indiain the nineteenth century as a reformist group, responding to concerted Christian andHindu missionary activity, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at presents itself as “the true Islam”and “Islam in its pristine purity” (Chaudhry 1995), created by “Allah to bring aboutthe revival and establishment of the glory of Islam” (Zirvi 2002). The majority ofmainstream Muslims however, perceiving the Ahmadis as teachers of heresy, regardmembers of the Movement as “murtadeen,” apostates, and “Zanadiqa,” heretics(Daily Afaq 2003). Due to the messianic and prophetic claims made by their founderMirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), and certain of their teachings regarded asdeviant, particularly their views on khataman nabiyeen (seal of “prophethood”),Jihad, and the prophet Isa (Jesus), the Ahmadi Movement has been described as a“cult based on innumerable absurdities and profanities” (Fadil Khan 1989).Regarded as “non-Muslim,” the Ahmadis are dubbed derogatively by other Muslimsas the Qadiani, after Qadian, the town in India where the Movement began, orMirzai, Mirza being the first name of the founder of the sect (Gregory and Valentine2009). Theologically and sociologically, there is much debate as to whether theAhmadiyya Jama’at is a legitimate Islamic sect or, due to teachings regarded bymainstream Muslims as deviant, it is a cult, a new religious Movement outside thepale of Islam.

In the absence of specific statistics, estimates of the size of the AhmadiyyaJama’at vary considerably. The Movement itself has published figures claiming atleast 15 million followers in 1980 to a staggering membership of 180 million in 2005(Leaflet AMA). A more reasonable estimate however for 2015 would suggest at least12 million Ahmadis worldwide and (although many Ahmadis refuse to register forPakistani elections) approximately 286,000 in Pakistan (Gregory and Valentine2009). Due to emigration resulting from persecution, and to a lesser extent da’wah(preaching), the Ahmadis are found in as many as 180 countries worldwide, withsignificant numbers in Pakistan, the USA, Canada, and Nigeria.

This article presents a sociological, historical, and theological study of theAhmadiyya Jama’at. Adopting the Troeltsch-Weber paradigm of religious organiza-tions (Dawson 2006), the Ahmadiyya Jama’at is presented as an Islamic “sect”: a“type” of religious group which, being theologically nonconformist and oppositionaland declaring itself to be the only true adherents of Islam, has broken away from thelarger, dominant organization (mainstream Sunni Islam) considering the latter aslapsed and unfaithful and lives in a state of continual existential tension withit. Therefore, adopting the term “sect” as a useful tool of analysis, the articleconsiders the history, beliefs, and practice of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at within Islam.After looking at the life and teaching of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, consideration isgiven to the development of the sect, the establishment of the Khalifate as theMovement’s leadership, and the consequent schism that took place in the sect in1914, resulting in the secession of the Lahori Ahmadis from the main body ofAhmad’s followers, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at.

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The article considers in some detail how, despite the significant contribution theMovement made to the emergence of Pakistan as a nation state, it has faced fiercepersecution within Pakistan. Attention is given to the anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953 andthe subsequent persecution of the sect under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, both prime ministerand president of Pakistan during the 1970s, and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, president ofPakistan from 1978 to 1988, culminating in the anti-Ahmadi legislation that persistsin Pakistan to this day. With particular reference to the doctrines mentioned above –namely, prophethood, jihad, and certain aspects relating to the birth and death ofJesus – the doctrinal stance and beliefs of the group are discussed in some detail.Attention is given to the organization of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: its hierarchy andinfrastructure, the different departments regulating the group, the expectations anddemands made upon its members, and how the Movement is vehemently opposed bymainstream Muslims around the world. The article describes how, partly due to theirwell-orchestrated interfaith campaigns, its efficient technological media apparatus,and highly publicized charitable and philanthropic activities, the Ahmadis haveintegrated well into non-Muslim-majority secular societies. An important sectionof the article describes the fierce persecution faced by Ahmadis in Pakistan andelsewhere. The article concludes with tentative comments and observations regard-ing the Ahmadis, especially the following question: are the Ahmadis Muslims andwhat does the Movement tell us about Muslim identity?

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Founder of the Ahmadi Movement

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at began as a “protest” group within Islam, decrying thefailure of Muslims generally to react strongly and effectively against successfulChristian and Hindu missionary activity in India in the nineteenth century. MirzaGhulam Ahmad, presenting himself not only as a reformer but also the promisedMahdi and other honorific titles (discussed below), called on all Muslims to accepthis distinct and challenging views, thereby bringing about a revival of Islam. One ofnumerous reformers arising within Islam at that time, Ahmad was born at Qadian, inthe Punjab, northwest India, in the mid-1830s, probably 1835. The second son of alocal chieftain, he was raised in a well-to-do Moghul family ensuring him a goodeducation and financial stability (Valentine 2008). Initially working briefly as a courtclerk in the Sialkot district from 1864 to 1868, Ahmad retired to private quarters,living the life of a religious contemplative, studying the Quran and praying.Following the death of his father in 1876, Ahmad claimed to have had “fine visions”in which he said he met “some of the prophets of the past and saints of high rankswho have passed in this ummah” (Ahmad 1996). Claiming to have received ilham(personal divine inspiration) and wahy (a message from God for all mankind),Ahmad not only proclaimed himself to be the Masih-I mawud (“the promisedMessiah”), the Mahdi (the guided one), and the Mujaddid (the expected reformer)(Ali 1984a) but also declared that he was raised as an avatar, a manifestation ofKrishna, for Hindus.

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 3

To the chagrin of Muslims generally, Ahmad, as well as the excessive claimsreferred to above, made a statement which allegedly rocked the very foundations ofIslamic belief. In contrast to mainstream Islam that teaches the doctrine of khatamannabiyeen, the finality of prophethood, (teaching based on Quran 33:41), the idea thatMuhammad is “the seal,” the greatest, and the last of the prophets sent with amessage by God, Ahmad professed himself to be a prophet, albeit a lesser prophet.At different periods of his life, Ahmad, at times ecstatic and at other timesmanifesting doubt and depression, proclaimed himself to be a nonlegislative, zilliprophet; sirat-i-siddiqui, one who is totally annihilated in the love of the prophetMuhammad; and also one of the muhaddathun, inspired persons, “people who arespoken to” by God. The ulema (Muslim scholars) at the time, regarding such claimsas blasphemous, pronounced a fatwa of kuffar (declaration of heresy) againstAhmad, which has not been revoked.

Initially, Ahmad spent his time writing against Christian missions and the AryaSamaj, a Hindu revivalist Movement. Over a 4-year period, from 1880 to 1884, hepublished his Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya (“the Ahmadiyya proofs”), a highly respectedtheological compendium analyzing the main arguments used by Christians andHindus against Islam, and presented arguments to refute them. He entered publicdebate with many of his opponents, particularly engagement in mubahala, fiercepublic disputations in which a curse would be pronounced on the party proven to be“untruthful.” Ahmad gained a certain notoriety and awe, due to his practice ofissuing death “prophecies” on opponents who refused to enter debate with him,some prophecies of which occurred.

Many Muslims resented not only Ahmad’s teaching and claims but also his policyof cultivating good relations with the British Raj, rulers of India at that time.According to certain conspiracy theories widely believed within the ummah (Muslimcommunity) to this day, the Ahmadis were originally “puppets of the British,”created by the British Secret Service to divide and weaken Islam. Another conspir-acy theory, again believed by many mainstream Muslims, claims that the Ahmadisplan to create a Vatican-style independent state in Pakistan (Fadil Khan 1989). It isargued that the Ahmadis were originally promised by the British government that ifthey declared themselves to be a separate entity from the Muslim majority, theywould be awarded large territories of their own. As with other conspiracy theories,there is little evidence to corroborate such beliefs.

Establishment of the Jama’at and Internal Division

In 1886, after having spent 40 days in “Chilla” (spiritual retreat) at the town ofHoshiarpur, Ahmad claimed to receive further revelations which led to theannouncement of his divine mission of reforming Islam 3 years later (Valentine2008a). Despite strong opposition from mainstream Muslims, on 23 March 1889,at Ludhiana in the Punjab, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at was officially formed when41 followers took bai’at, a pledge of allegiance to Ahmad. On Ahmad’s deathin1908, a Khalifate was established to lead the nascent Movement with Hakeem

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Noor-ud-Din, a close friend of Ahmad, serving as Khalifah. On his death 6 yearslater, in 1914, Mirza Basheer-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmad’s son, wasappointed as the second Khalifah. However, a serious rift occurred within theAhmadi community at this time. A significant number of Ahmadis, not wanting tosee the establishment of a family dynasty, opposed the idea of Khalifate arguing thatthe Movement should be governed by an Anjuman (assembly) and not a single man.Failing to win their case, these dissenters broke away, forming the AhmadiyyaAnjuman Isha’at-e-Islam Lahore or the Lahore Ahmadiyya Association for thePropagation of Islam. With its motto “Allah is with us,” this group is also knownas the Lahori Ahmadis because it left Qadian and established its headquarters atLahore in Pakistan (Valentine 2008a). Rejecting the idea of absolute authority vestedin the institution of Khalifate, the Lahori Ahmadis appoint an Amir or president,elected for life, as their spiritual and administrative leader. Ultimate authorityhowever rests with the Majlis-i-Moatemideen, the “General Council of Trustees,”an elected body.

The Lahori Ahmadis disagree with the Qadiani group on two other major points,as well as the Khalifate. One of these issues concerned the status of Ahmad. TheLahori Ahmadis agree with the Qadiani group that the founder of the Movement wasa Mujaddid (reformer), and the promised Messiah and Mahdi, but reject the idea thathe was a prophet. They regard Ahmad as muhaddath, someone who, althoughhaving the qualities of a prophet, is not actually appointed to prophethood. He is,in the opinion of the Lahori group, a great wali (saint) who made prophesies, and towhom Allah speaks. The Lahori Ahmadis, contrary to the Qadian group, areadamant that Ahmad never actually claimed to be a prophet. As such, similar tomainstream Muslims, they emphasize their belief in Muhammad as the greatest andthe last of all prophets. The two Ahmadi groups are also divided on the issue of, whois and who is not a Muslim. Mirza Basheer-ud-Din Mahmaud Ahmad, the secondAhmadi Khalifah, officially stated that non-Ahmadis are non-Muslim (Muhammadn.d.). The Lahori Ahmadis however reject such a view believing that the declarationof shahada (profession of faith) is sufficient evidence that a person is Muslim. TheLahori group has always remained a very small community, with possibly only30,000 members worldwide.

The Development of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: 1914–2017

Qadian remained the headquarters of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at until the partition of1947 when, a year later, about 60,000 Ahmadis moved to Rabwah in Pakistan,making the city the Movement’s main spiritual and administrative headquarters.Despite being a minority group, members of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at played asignificant part in the creation of Pakistan, actively supporting Muhammad AliJinnah, the founding father of the country. One leading Ahmadi, Sir MuhammadZafrullah Khan, became Pakistan’s first foreign minister, the permanent representa-tive of Pakistan at the United Nations from 1961 to 1964, and the president of theInternational Court of Justice at The Hague. Another leading Ahmadi was

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 5

Dr. Muhammad Abdus Salam, Pakistan’s first Nobel Prize winner, for his work as atheoretical physicist in the area of electroweak unification. It is regrettable that, dueto the fact Dr. Salam was an Ahmadi, Pakistan as a nation refuses to acknowledge hisachievements. Salam’s former house remains derelict and, after his death in 1996, amagistrate ordered the word “Muslim” to be erased from his gravestone.

Due to its alleged doctrinal deviancy (discussed in detail below), particularly itsteaching on prophethood and Ahmad’s claims, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at has experi-enced prolonged and often intense periods of persecution. In February 1953, militantMuslims, mainly belonging to the Majlis-i-Ahrarul Islam (Society of Free Muslims),Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jama’at-e-Islami party, called for the denunciationof the Ahmadis as “non-Muslim” and the removal of Ahmadis from importantgovernment positions. In particular demands were made for the removal of ZafrullaKhan from his post as foreign minister. Abul A’la Mawdudi, the main instigator ofthis unrest against the Ahmadis, published a pamphlet “The Qadiani Question” and abook Finality of Prophethood, both containing vehement criticisms of Ahmadibelief, particularly the Ahmadi teaching on prophethood. These publications gaverise to fierce anti-Ahmadi riots, particularly in the towns and cities of the Punjabregion. During these riots, an assassination attempt was made on the life of thesecond Khalifah who survived a deep knife wound to his neck (Zirvi 2002).

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1974 while serving as the ninth prime minister ofPakistan, under great pressure from influential militant Mullahs, introduced theSecond Amendment into Pakistan’s Constitution, which declared Ahmadis as“non-Muslim.” The Second Amendment, obviously aimed at members of theAhmadiyya Jama’at, declared that:

A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood ofMuhammad (Peace be upon him) the last of the Prophets or who claims to be a Prophet, inany sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be uponhim), or recognises such claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for thepurposes of the Constitution or the law. (Lau 2006a)

General Zia-ul-Haq, after assuming power in a bloodless military coup andhaving executed Bhutto, became the prime minister of Pakistan in 1978 and contin-ued with the opposition against the Ahmadis. Declaring his aim “that the cancer ofQadianism is exterminated” (The Times 1984), and pursuing a policy of Islamizationin line with the country’s popular militant Mullahs, Zia-ul-Haq enacted furtherstringent anti-Ahmadi legislation. Under Section 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code,Ordinance XX declared that Ahmadis who “pose to be Muslims” or an Ahmadi who“refers to his faith as Islam” would face a prison sentence of up to 3 years.Furthermore, under this legislation, Ahmadis were forbidden from calling theirplaces of worship “mosques” or referring to the call for prayer as “adhan,” prayingaccording to Islamic custom, and inscribing Quranic verses on their mosques, oron anything, including wedding invitation cards. Ordinance XX also prohibitedAhmadis from preaching or propagating their faith, being buried in the samegraveyard as other Muslims, or doing or saying anything that was deemed as

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“insulting the religious feelings of Muslims” (Valentine 2008a). In 1984, due togrowing opposition and violence against the Ahmadis, the fourth Ahmadi Khalifahfled the country taking up residence in London.

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, enacted primarily against the Ahmadis, were furtherextended in 1986, when life imprisonment was pronounced as punishment onanyone insulting the Quran and the death penalty for anyone defiling the name ofthe prophet Muhammad. Under Article 203D of the Pakistan Penal Code, a FederalShariat Court was created with the power to regard any law as void if it was seen tobe “repugnant to Islam.” This power led to the enactment of further laws discrim-inatory toward Ahmadis (and all other minority faith groups, including Christians,Bahai, and Hindus, living in Pakistan), including the call for the death sentence,rather than life imprisonment, for the offense of insulting the prophet Muhammad.For no other reason than apparent spite, in February 1989, the Ahmadis were forcedby the Punjab Assembly to change the name of Rabwah (a name taken from theQuran meaning “the elevated place”) to Nawan Qadian and then to Chenab Nagar(the town of Chenab). Despite international calls for the recognition of religiousfreedom for minority groups in Pakistan, the plight of the Ahmadis has notimproved. Under the Conduct of General Elections Order, 2002, it was stated thatthe “status of Ahmadis, etc.,” as “non-Muslims,” was “to remain unchanged”(Valentine 2008b).

Ahmadi Doctrine and Beliefs

The Ahmadis are orthodox in many of their doctrines and beliefs. Similar to Muslimsgenerally, they believe in and practice the so-called five pillars of Islam: pronouncingshahada (the confession of faith), performing salat (prayer) five times daily, practic-ing sawm (fasting, especially during Ramadan), paying zakat (a percentage of theirearnings to charity), and, when not declaring that they are Ahmadis to Saudiimmigration officials, performing hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. The Ahmadis’ notionof iman (belief) and amal (deeds and practice) is to a great extent identical to thebelief and practice of mainstream Sunni Muslims (Valentine 2008b). In response toallegations made against the Movement by the Gambia Supreme Islamic Council(GSIC) early in 2015, Baba F. Trawally, the Amir of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at inGambia, publicly affirmed the sect’s belief in “the Supreme Being of Allah, theAlmighty and all His attributes as mentioned in the Holy Quran and the Ahadith ofthe Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW)” (All Africa.com 2015). In particular tawhid,“the absolute oneness of God,” is seen by the Ahmadis as “the most important andthe cardinal principle of Islam.” In accordance with Islamic theology generally, theAhmadis believe in the existence of angels, the Tawrat (Torah), the Zabur (Psalms ofDavid), the Injil (Gospel of Jesus), the Quran, the prophets sent by God, and akhirah(judgment day). Also emphasizing tawhid, Ahmadis, similar to orthodox Muslims,stress the importance of the hakimiyyah, the absolute sovereignty of Allah, and theneed to avoid shirk, associating God with anything else. Furthermore, in line withmainstream Islam, as Trawally affirmed, “the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at upholds

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 7

the Holy Quran as the final Divine Law and that nothing can be altered from it by anyhuman being” (All Africa.com 2015). In its aim to win the world to Islam, or morecorrectly to its interpretation of Islam, “the Jama’at has translated the Holy Quran,”declares Trawally with pride, “in more than seventy major languages of the world”(All Africa.com 2015). It should be noted however that the Ahmadis make use of aslightly different version of the Quran, the Farid translation, which, published in1969, has noticeable variants from the classical Arabic text.

Although orthodox in many aspects of its belief and practice, there are howeversignificant differences in teaching between the Ahmadis and mainstream Muslims.In understanding Ahmadi teaching, it is important to consider their overall episte-mology and worldview. Similar to Calvinism in Christian theology and the Calvin-istic belief that they had been adopted by God as a chosen remnant, the Ahmadis(although not using the terms of “election”) likewise believe they are preferred andfavored by God because of their loyalty to beliefs which they argue represent theonly true interpretation of Islam. Although obviously disliking persecution (whowouldn’t), the Ahmadis, to an extent, see such opposition as a verification of theclaim that they are the faithful few, chosen by God. Related to this idea of divineselection, the Ahmadis have both “realized” and “future” aspects in their eschato-logical, historical framework. This is seen in their belief that God’s will is beingrealized in the mission of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the community he formed incalling all Muslims and the world to embrace Ahmadiyyat and, by adopting apassive methodology of da’wah (preaching), in preparing its adherents for akhirah,judgment day.

To the mortification of mainstream Muslims globally, the Ahmadis have“reinterpreted” several salient doctrines integral to the Islamic faith, giving them anew and controversial epistemological slant. As discussed above, the Ahmadis,although acknowledging that Muhammad “was and will ever remain the greatestProphet of all times” (Zirvi 2002), have used considerable exegetical freedom inarguing that he is “the last law-bearing prophet” (Dabbous 1992). Such an interpre-tation of prophethood as taught by the Ahmadis is regarded by the majority ofMuslims, both Sunni and Shia, as blasphemous. Mawdudi, the founder of theJama’at-e-Islami, revealed something of the antipathy of Muslims generally towardthe Ahmadi teaching on prophecy when he described it as “the most dangerous – ofall the conspiracies hatched against Islam in modern times” (Mawdudi 1975).

The Ahmadi teaching on Jesus has similarly given rise to vehement criticism bymainstream Muslim scholars. Traditionally Islamic scholars, in line with the Quran(3:45–47), have taught the virgin birth, the idea that Isa (Jesus) was born of Marymiraculously by the command of God. Additionally, contrary to Christian theology,Islam has taught that Jesus was not crucified on the cross for “it was the plan ofJesus’ enemies to crucify him, [but] God saved him and raised him up to Him. Andthe likeness of Jesus was put over another man” (Quran 4:157). As such, mainstreamMuslims believe that “Jesus’ enemies took this man and crucified him, thinking thathe was Jesus” (Islam.guide 2015). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, faced with claims byChristian missionaries that Jesus must have been superior to Muhammad as he(Jesus) had no earthly father and did not die, denied the virgin birth and taught

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that Jesus died a natural death. Ahmad argued, as do Ahmadis today, that Jesus,having miraculously escaped from his Roman and Jewish captors, undertook apreaching mission in Asia before going to Kashmir, eventually dying in old age atSrinagar, where his alleged tomb can be seen to this day (Ahmad 1989).

The Ahmadis claim that their Khalifah is the leader, not only of the AhmadiyyaJama’at but also of the Muslim ummah worldwide. The Ahmadis regard theirKhalifah as Amir al-Muminin (leader of the faithful) and Khalifatul Masih (succes-sor of the Messiah) and nothing less than the successor of the prophet Muhammad.He is believed to be the divine agent for uniting the world under Islam, albeitthe Ahmadi interpretation of Islam. Today Hadhrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad, thepresent Ahmadi Khalifah, resides in London and is the supreme spiritual head ofthe Ahmadiyya Jama’at. Using the latest Internet technology, the Ahmadis, on theirvarious websites, present him as “Khalifah of Islam.” The official Ahmadi websitepublicizes worldwide “Hazoor’s latest Friday sermon as well as an archive of theprevious Friday sermons in English language” and “a section introducing HisHoliness including his Peace Initiatives, Public Service and his devotion, love andcommunication with the community members as well as the world.” Eager topropagate their faith, the website gives “easy access to books written by His Holinesson the most important topics and issues of life including World Peace, NationLoyalty, and respect for other faiths, etc.” (Al Islam 2015). These and other publi-cations, online and elsewhere, have caused deep resentment and anger amongmainstreamMuslims. “Their leader is not my leader,” remarked a former ISI official;“he is simply the Head of a blasphemous party, to say otherwise in this direct, openway is both offensive and arrogant” (email 2015).

Another theological difference between the Ahmadis and mainstream Islamconcerns the doctrine of jihad. Ahmad, although recognizing three instances whenviolence was justified, wars “undertaken in self-defense,” wars undertaken as “chas-tisement for aggression,” and wars “undertaken for the establishment of freedom ofconscience, that is to say for breaking up the strength of those who inflicted deathupon such as accepted Islam” (Chaudhry 1996), emphasized “Jihad bil qalam”(Jihad of the pen) rather than violent jihad. Advocating the Quranic principle that“there is no compulsion in religion” (Quran 2:256), the Ahmadis, following thetheology of Ahmad, “strongly reject violence and terrorism in any form and for anyreason” (Ali 1984b). The Ahmadi’s rejection of violence extends to the condemna-tion of Arab terrorism in the Jewish state. Sheikh Muhammad Sharif Odeh, a leaderof the Ahmadiyya branch of Islam in Israel, in condemning the terrorist activities ofHezbollah and other extremist groups, explained:

‘When Allah, exalted be He, gave permission for the Muslims to fight, he did so in order thatthey might defend complete freedom of religion. He emphasized to them that it was theirduty to defend, first of all, the churches, houses of worship and monasteries of their fellowmen, even before their own mosques’. Such shameful acts (viz., the terrorist activities ofHezbollah), he stated, do ‘not conform to our glorious Islam and contradicts its principles oftolerance’. (Arutz Shva 2015)

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 9

It is interesting to note that the Ahmadis, similar to the Deobandi and Salafi-Wahhabi traditions within Islam, disapprove of certain popular practices amongMuslims such as reverence shown to pirs or holy men and visiting the tombs ofsuch men for spiritual blessing and favor, practices common among Sufi and BarelviMuslims (Valentine 2008a, 139). Such are seen as “bida,” harmful innovations in thefaith. Similarly, Ahmadis reject the use of taweez and other amulets to ward off theevil eye (the envy and malice of others), practiced by those in the Barelvi tradition,and belief in harmful jinn (spirits). Unlike mainstream Islam however, Ahmadisbelieve that jinn are human and not spiritual, and contrary to popular Islamic belief,Ahmadis suggest that jinn have a fiery temperament rather than being made from fire(Farid 1994). There are, according to the Ahmadis, two types of such jinn. There arerighteous, important people, either Muslims or God-fearers generally, who use theirpower for good, and those people who are arrogant, who reject the Quran and usetheir power and influence in a wrong way.

Although usually characterized by a public face of tolerance toward others andopenly campaigning for freedom of religious expression and conscience, it was amatter of concern to some that “Ahmadis not only refused to join in the ‘je suisCharlie’ campaign following the massacre of the staff of the Paris based CharlieHebdo magazine in 2015” but “their spokes-people called for banning expressions ofridicule against any religious figure” (Jihad Watch 2015). Again, in the context of theCharlie Hebdo massacre, the Head Imam of the Ahmadiyya community in Ottawa,Canada, arguing that the satirical depictions of religious leaders should be illegal,stated: “there should be limits placed on freedom of speech to prevent the publicationof offensive material. . ..” The Movement’s Canadian national president reinforcedthis demand, imploring people around the world to boycott Charlie Hebdo “becausethe holy prophet is very dearly loved by Muslims. This love is so deep that peoplewould sacrifice their lives if they think that the Holy Prophet is being insulted” (JihadWatch 2015). As a report published by Jihad Watch informs us, the AhmadiyyaMuslim community has opposed such illustrations in the past. On 22 September1895, Ahmad published a circular demanding that the government amended theIndian Penal Code 298 to make blasphemy against any religious founder a punish-able offense. Similarly, in 1927, Ahmadis vehemently protested against RangilaRasul (“Promiscuous Prophet”), a book describing the marriages and sex life ofMuhammad by the Hindu writer Raj Pal, and demanded that it be banned.

Organization and Discipline

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at is a highly organized community with a well-definedhierarchy, bureaucracy, and infrastructure. Although London has grown in impor-tance for the Ahmadis as a media center and as the residence of the Khalifah, themain administrative departments of the Jama’at are to be found at Rabwah and alsoat Qadian. Such departments include the Sadr Anjuman, the supreme governingbody for the “propagation of Islam,” the Tehrik-e-Jadid for fund-raising, and theWaqf-e-Jadid department for Tabligh, preaching, and moral training and discipline

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of members. Each national Jama’at has an Amir, a national president, and regionalpresidents and different departments organizing the Movement within that country.At the local level, individual mosques, led by a president and a well-trained Imam,organize activities for each group – male, female, young, and old – within theJama’at. A strong sense of unity, and collective identity, is maintained withinthe Jama’at, not only by the aforementioned groups and departments but also bythe Jalsa Salana, an international assembly, held once a year, at “Islamabad,” aformer school in Surrey, in the UK, an event usually attended by 25,000 people fromaround the world. Unity, and doctrinal conformity, is further maintained within theJama’at by the publication of the daily newspaper, Al Faz, regarded as the Jama’at’s“special educational and religious paper” (Valentine 2008a).

With such a well-organized administrative and authoritative structure, theAhmadiyya Jama’at provides for its members a veritable Weltanschauung (world-view), and the strength, support, and ideology needed, to live within, what is often(as seen in the case of Pakistan), a confrontational if not hostile society. For theAhmadis, there is a clear locus of definitive authority in the teaching of the Quran,hadith, and sunnah, as interpreted by the sect itself and in the official pronounce-ments of the Khalifah. Little or no credence is given by Ahmadis to teachingsbeyond the confines of their own coherent organization. With such a rigid theolog-ical perspective, and plausibility structure, the Jama’at establishes social boundaries,delineated by a well-defined discipline code and norms, governing membership,group activities, and individual behavior. These boundaries, by clearly accentuatingthe differences between members and nonmembers, maintain the Jama’at as a close-knit community which, although coexisting and interacting well in secular societygenerally, is separate from mainstream Islam and (to a large extent) the influence ofnon-Muslims. Membership with the Ahmadiyya Jama’at is of course voluntary, butindividuals are admitted only on affirmation of a conversion experience or recom-mendation of members in good standing. Continuing affiliation rests on evidence ofcommitment to the sect’s beliefs and practices. Once admitted and accepted, everymember of the Jama’at is expected to give total allegiance and submission to theKhalifah and his pronouncements. Members of the Khuddam (the organization formen aged 16–40), for instance, make the Khuddam-ul-Ahmadiyya or pledge to be“ready to sacrifice my life, wealth, time and honour for the sake of my faith, countryand nation.” Also they pledge to be “ready to offer any sacrifice for guarding theInstitution of Khalifatul-e-Ahmadiyya” and to abide by any “maroof” (decision)made by the Khalifah (Valentine 2008a). Exclusiveness is emphasized; other Muslimgroups are seen either as lapsed or non-Muslim.

The Ahmadis maintain a high level of “religiosity” as seen in the commitment toreligious observance, the strength of member’s religious convictions about God andtheir faith, and the degree to which they feel their interpretation of Islam is personallyimportant. Similar to Islam generally, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at encompasses a com-plete moral system that not only provides the cognitive, evaluative, and expressiveguidelines for the continuance of the Movement but which also regulates every areaof life. Looking to the Quran, and regarding the prophet Muhammad as al-Insānal-Kāmil (the perfect human) and uswa hasana (the perfect model to follow), a high

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 11

standard of personal morality is expected from all members of the Jama’at, eachmember under a duty to keep a watch on the moral behavior of his coreligionists. Thesect similarly places great emphasis on purity of doctrine and with the depth ofgenuineness of the “religious feeling” of its members. Requiring all members to“refrain from following un-Islamic customs and lustful inclinations,” the thirdKhalifah emphasized how “it is the duty of every Ahmadi family to uproot all badpractices from their homes and throw them out” (Al-Baseerat, December 1991).Previous to this, in 1934, the second Khalifah announced what later became knownas the “New Scheme,” a plan to encourage the “spirit of sacrifice” of the Ahmadipeople and to develop their spirituality. Under this scheme, various activities includ-ing dancing at weddings and the practice of Mehndi, (common among Muslimsgenerally), of staining the bride’s hands and feet with henna at a marriage, wereregarded as being “contrary to Islam” (Valentine 2008a). Each local Jama’at has itsown regionally based Islahi committee which is “responsible for identifying moraldangers before they affect the Jama’at” and which has the “endeavour to deal withany ills [problems] among Jama’at members.”

Although recognizing the legal system of the country in which they live, Ahmadisare expected to submit also to Nizam-e-Jama’at, the regulations and rules of theAhmadiyya community. As such, in accordance with these rules, Ahmadis take theirdisagreements – marital, financial, and domestic – before the Darul Qada (internalcourts), where decisions are made on the basis of Sharia law. In a mosque, the qadi,or judge, can pronounce fatwa (legal opinions) or mas’ala, lesser legal decisionswhich can act as precedents in later disputes. Expulsion is exercised, althoughinfrequently, against those members who contravene doctrinal, moral, or organiza-tional precepts.

Although the Movement accepts grants and other financial support, theAhmadiyya Jama’at is, in the main, self-supporting and independent. Each memberof the Jama’at is expected to contribute regularly from his monthly income, givingchanda (either compulsory or voluntary payments) for the maintenance of theorganization. All members contribute to the Movement, not only financially butalso in terms of labor, giving his or her time working at all the Jama’at’s activitiesand functions. All such work is carried out voluntarily under the system of waqar-i-amal, or “dignity of labor,” a system which involves all members of the Jama’atirrespective of class, education, or occupational background.

Due to the fact that Khidmat-e-khalq (welfare of people) is an important aspect ofthe religious life for Ahmadis, and, it must be said, because of their strong desire towin the support of the majority non-Muslim population, the social interaction ofAhmadis with Western host societies is characterized by a keen philanthropic spirit.This is revealed in various charitable activities organized by the Jama’at for local,national, and international (not necessarily Muslim) concerns, such as fun runs andcollections. The money raised by such activities is usually presented to localcharities at official presentations, often when large cardboard checks are given torepresentatives of the charity concerned, at well-orchestrated and publicized photoshoots. “Goodwill ventures” and other activities are also organized such as visitsto local hospitals and homes for the elderly when gifts of food, or presents at

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Christmas, are given to the patients or residents. Every year an Eid Milan party isheld at every local mosque when people from all walks of life – local MPs,academics, councilors, etc. – are invited, not only as an opportunity for Ahmadisto share their faith with others but also as a gesture of friendship to the localcommunity.

Da’wah, preaching, inviting others to Islam, and the extension of the faith are notonly crucial aspects of the Movement’s ideology but are in fact the very reason forthe Jama’at’s existence. All members of the Movement, irrespective of gender orage, are encouraged to become dai’ilallah, “callers to God,” those who must do theirutmost to do tabligh, to preach, and to share their faith. In this capacity members ofthe Jama’at are encouraged to undertake waqfe arzi, “temporary dedication,” wherean Ahmadi will dedicate his or her private time, usually periods of 2–6 weeks, toundertake evangelistic work for the Jama’at. Every year, each region of the Jama’atdraws up an annual tabligh plan based on the request for converts made by theKhalifah. A target is given to each district to be achieved in the coming year, basedon its adult membership. As such, active dai’ilallah teams meet regularly in eachregion, to discuss how to improve tabligh activities and gain members. Variousproselytizing activities are arranged including the aforementioned annual Eid Milanparty when local dignitaries are invited to share a meal and listen to a talk extollingthe virtues of peace, philanthropy, and of course the merits of Ahmadiyyat. Ahmadisregularly organize “interfaith dialogues,” often at universities, on topical themessuch as jihad, peace, and the true nature of Islam. An important aspect of suchevangelism is the use by Ahmadis of their own satellite TV network MTA (MuslimTVAhmadiyya International), which transmits programs 24 h a day in several majorlanguages. Their programs of evangelism and their constant efforts to counter anti-Ahmadi propaganda are greatly aided by a developed acumen for marketing andpublicity.

The Continuing Persecution of Ahmadis

As with sects generally within any religion, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at exists in a stateof perpetual “tension” with the dominant culture in society, particularly where thatdominant culture is Muslim. As discussed above, this is clearly seen in Pakistanwhere the Ahmadis – similar to other Islamic minority groups such as Ajlafs andArzals (lower castes in Muslim society), Alawites, and other Shia Muslims –experience psychological, physical, social, and cultural opposition. However, innon-Muslim-majority countries – as seen in the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK,and many European countries – the Ahmadiyya Movement coexists well with thesecular host society, yet retaining its own distinct identity. Due to Ahmadi beliefs(teachings regarded by the majority of Muslims as deviant if not blasphemous), andthe alleged political aims of the Movement suggested by unsubstantiated yet widelybelieved conspiracy theories, Ahmadis are marginalized and persecuted by main-stream Muslims in most Muslim-majority countries. This ongoing persecution is tobe seen in the context of an Islamic eschatological framework, in which opposition is

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 13

raised against the Movement for declaring itself to be a divinely appointed agent ofreform and calling Muslims to accept its belief system as the “true Islam,” therebyallegedly preparing the ummah for Yawm ad-Dīn, “the Day of Judgment.” Suchpersecution carried out by mainstream Muslims is largely counterproductive how-ever, as such opposition and martyrdom are regarded by Ahmadis as vindication oftheir truth claims.

Persecution of Ahmadis is fiercest in Pakistan where, as discussed previously,Ahmadis are denied their freedom of speech, worship, assembly, and even identity.According to a report published in April 2015 by the US Commission on Interna-tional Religious Freedom, Pakistan continues to “experience chronic sectarianviolence targeting Shias, Christians, Ahmadis, and Hindus” (Kashmir Monitor2015). The report emphasized how “the government failed to provide adequateprotection to targeted groups or to prosecute perpetrators and those calling forviolence.” It is claimed that “as many as 237 Ahmadis have been killed sinceOrdinance XX was passed (in 1984) while 193 attempted murders have takenplace. Furthermore, some 27 Ahmadi mosques have been demolished and 31 sealedby the authorities” (IBN Live 2014).

The animosity of mainstream Muslims against Ahmadis in Pakistan is exempli-fied in the words of Muhammad Ilyas Chinioti, an MPA (Member of the ProvincialAssembly), when, in March 2008, he proclaimed: “Qadianiat is a cancer; there is notreatment except operation” (Express Tribune 28 February 2015). In 2009, Chinioti,classing the Ahmadiyya Jama’at as a political and not a religious Movement, calledfor an armed jihad against the Ahmadis, referring to them as “the worst enemies ofIslam and Pakistan.” Among other things he urged the chief of army staff to outlawthe recruitment of Ahmadis in the Pakistan Army, claiming that members of theMovement could not be relied upon to defend the country as they contested theIslamic teachings on jihad (holy war). In February 2015 Chinioti, expressing more ofhis venom, stated that merely declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslim was not enoughto curb the sect. “They must give up their faith and become Muslim,” he declared,“or face consequences” (Express Tribune 28 February 2015).

Chinioti is not alone in holding such vitriolic, anti-Ahmadi views. Prominentclerics continue to demonize the sect, castigating the Ahmadis as blasphemers andapostates and declaring them to be wajib-ul-qatal, “worthy of death.” Syed Arif ShahOwaisi, one such prominent cleric, speaking on the popular Amir Liaquat HussainTV show, declared the Ahmadis to be “the open enemies of Pakistan.” In December2014, without any corroborating evidence, he made the scurrilous claim that“Ahmadis and Jews were behind the Peshawar attack that killed 132 children”(Ary.news December 2014). Due partly to the influence of such militant clerics,anti-Ahmadi views are rife throughout Pakistan. It is not uncommon to see the wallsof Ahmadi homes daubed with paint saying “Qadianis wajibul qatal” (it is justified tokill Ahmadis) and “jo Qadiani ka yaar hai ghaddar hai” (friends of Ahmadis aretraitors) (TNS, October 2014). It has been reported that in certain areas of Pakistan,“schoolchildren are given stickers to put on their books saying they refuse to betaught by Ahmadi teachers,” while stickers on shops declaring “No Ahmadisallowed” are frequently put up in shopping centers (TNS 2014). Ahmadi tombstones

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with Islamic verses, those bearing the kalmia (the six basic oaths or beliefs of Islam)or bismillah (“in the name of Allah”), are often targeted for particular violence byextremists, particularly by members of the Khatme Nabuwwat organization. Declar-ing the Ahmadi faith (named derogatively as Qadianism and Ahmadism) as “apseudoreligion whose leadership exploits its members socially, psychologically,and financially” and accusing the Ahmadiyya Jama’at of aiming “to steal the identityof Islam by misinterpreting the original sources of Islam,” Khatme Nabuwwat isone of several mainstream Muslim groups which has created websites specifically“to expose the tactics and logical fallacies” of the Ahmadis (Khatme Nabuwwatwebsite 2015).

The persecution of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at in Pakistan has had an understandableeffect on all aspects of the daily life of its members. As well as the prohibitions listedabove, under the anti-Ahmadi legislation enacted since 1974, Ahmadis have beenprohibited from holding public conferences or gatherings and denied permission tohold their Jalsa Salana. The blasphemy laws (outlined above) are often misused tosettle personal scores against Ahmadis and members of other minority groups.Ahmadi businessmen, for example, and solicitors are occasionally accused ofblasphemy if seen as a successful rival or ostracized by other members of theirtrade or profession and by the local community, simply because of their faith.Ahmadis face discrimination in relation to the national identity card which everyPakistani citizen must have in order to vote. Those wishing to be listed as a Muslimmust affirm on oath their belief in the idea of khataman nabiyeen (Muhammad as theseal, the last of the prophets) and their denunciation of the Ahmadiyya Movement. In2002 President Musharraf abolished this requirement but, due to public pressure, andfear of militant Mullahs, later reversed his decision, resulting in a boycott of thegeneral elections taking place that year by the Ahmadiyya community. The samerestriction applies to passports and attempts to go on Hajj or umrah, the greater andlesser pilgrimages to Mecca. Applicants are required to sign a declaration that they“consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani to be an imposter nabi (prophet) and alsoconsider his followers, whether belonging to the Lahori or Qadiani group, to beNon-Muslim” (Application 2015).

Discrimination against Ahmadis also occurs in education as students must like-wise declare their religious affiliation, and belief in Muhammad as the final prophet,on application forms for entrance to state universities and private educationalinstitutions. Career prospects and promotion are another issue. It is regularly arguedby the Ahmadis that there is effectively a “promotion ceiling” for them in many areasof employment, preventing promotion to senior positions. Although there are noofficial barriers to promotion in the Armed Forces, Ahmadis rarely rise above therank of a brigadier in the Pakistan Army, a commodore in the Pakistan Navy, or anair commodore in the Pakistan Air Force, and they are not assigned to politicallysensitive positions (Valentine 2008b).

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at is a regular target for the Taliban in Pakistan. Examplesof attacks by militants on Ahmadis and their property are numerous. In 1989 mediaattention focused on the bloody anti-Ahmadiyya riots which took place at Nankanaand Chaksikandar, in Punjab, resulting in the deaths of many Ahmadis. An extreme

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 15

case of militant violence against the Ahmadi Movement occurred in May 2010 whenmembers of the extremist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan massacred 86 Ahmadiworshippers, and injuring many more, during Friday prayers at two Ahmadimosques in the Ghari Shahu and Model Town districts of Lahore. It was reportedthat two teams of gunmen, some wearing suicide vests, and armed with AK-47 rifles,shotguns, and grenades, simultaneously stormed the mosques strafing the worship-pers with bullets while holding off police (World Bulletin 2015).

Militants regularly stir up people throughout Pakistan to molest, and often kill,Ahmadis. In July 2014 a blasphemy accusation was brought against “Aqib Saleem,an 18-year-old Ahmadi who allegedly uploaded a Facebook photo of the Kaaba, thescared shrine in Mecca toward which Muslims turn when they pray, with a semi-nude white woman sitting on top” (New York Times 2014). A mob of about 1000people stormed through an Ahmadi community in the city of Gujranwala, in thePunjab, setting fire to houses and indiscriminately attacking residents, after beingalerted to the Facebook photograph by militants. Consequently, in one torchedhouse, three members of the Ahmadi Movement – a 55-year-old woman, BushraBibi, and her two granddaughters, Hira, aged 7, and Kainat, aged 7 months – wereburnt to death (New York Times 2014). It was alleged by local people that the policestood by and watched as these riots took place.

Although Ahmadis are often victims of discrimination and violence, militants arerarely convicted for such attacks. A “culture of impunity” exists in Pakistan wherethose who do persecute minority groups like the Ahmadis act in full knowledge thatthe police and governing authorities, often agreeing with the anti-Ahmadi views ofthe culprits, are usually reluctant to take legal action. Recently however there havebeen exceptions to this general trend. In January 2015, two terrorists, members ofTehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, were sentenced to death by an anti-terrorism court, for theaforementioned attacks on the Ahmadi community in Lahore in May 2010 (WorldBulletin 2015).

The rights of Ahmadis under Pakistan Law have been the subject of several legalcases tried by the Pakistan courts. In the case of Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiriv. The State of West Pakistan,1969, it was held that Ahmadis as Pakistani citizenswere guaranteed by the Constitution the same freedom to profess and proclaim theirreligion as any other citizen of Pakistan and that Ahmadis are within the fold of Islam(Lau 2006b). Further support for the Ahmadis to practice their faith was given in thecase of Abdur RahmanMobashir v. Amir Ali Shah in 1978 in which the Lahore HighCourt, in defining the nature of proprietary and legal rights, decided that no injunc-tion could be granted barring Ahmadis from continuing to perform religious prac-tices, although such practices contradicted practices and beliefs taught by themajority of Sunni Muslims. It was further decided that religious terms are not tobe considered as intellectual property and, as such, could not be protected by statuteor legislation. Therefore, the plaintiffs (the opponents of the Ahmadis) had no rightin law to debar the defendants (the Ahmadiyya community) “from freedom ofconscience, worship, or from calling their places of worship by any name theylike” (Lau 2006b). The court further held that neither public nuisance law nor any

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direct application of Islamic law based on “equity, justice and good conscience”could be used so as to prevent Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims.

Interestingly, the court in the Abdur Rahman Mobashir case held that the judi-ciary was incapable of determining who is a Muslim, stating that there is an “absenceof any legal right . . . to have this abstract question determined by any right legalprocess, unless it is somehow linked with any right to property or right to an office. . ..” The court asserted that Islam and the Quran guarantee freedom of religion andconcluded that the acts of persecution of Ahmadis “are sad instances of religiouspersecution against which human conscience must revolt, if any decency is left inhuman affairs” (Lau 2006a).

However, the Ahmadiyya Jama’at received a major legal setback in1993 with thedecision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Zaheeruddin v. The State.Among other things, this case considered the fundamental right to freedom ofreligion, the legal definition of religion, and the legality of Ahmadis to practicetheir faith. Certain Ahmadis had been charged and convicted under Ordinance XXand the anti-Ahmadi legislation passed by General Zia Ul Haq and had appealedagainst those convictions. By a majority decision of four to one, the State rejected theappeals controversially arguing that the Ordinance was not in violation of any of thefundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, thereby legitimizing the contin-ued persecution of members of the Ahmadiyya community.

State-sanctioned discrimination and persecution of Ahmadis is prevalent in otherMuslim-majority countries as well as Pakistan. Early in 2014, the Ministry ofReligious Affairs in Bangladesh, mainly due to pressure from militant Mullahs,banned the publication, sale, distribution, and preservation of all books and bookletson Islam published by the Ahmadiyya Jama’at. The Ahmadi community, numberingabout 10,000 in Bangladesh, faces continued hostility, especially from groups suchas Hifazate Khatme Nabuwat Andolon which calls for the government to declare theAhmadiyya Jama’at non-Muslim (BBC News 2014).

Similarly in Malaysia, the Ahmadi community, with approximately 1500 mem-bers, mainly ethnic Malays based in Sabah on the island of Borneo, faces constantattempts by militant Muslims to declare the Movement “non-Muslim.” In recenttimes, the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (Selangor, 1 of the 13 states ofMalaysia) has acted with impunity, harassing Ahmadis and forbidding them toperform Friday prayers at their mosques (NUTGraph 2009). In 1975 the Selangorfatwa council, in direct contradiction of Section 6 of the Selangor Syariah CriminalOffences Enactment, which says that it is illegal to declare any Muslim non-Muslim,declared the Ahmadis to be precisely that. The fatwa also said that ideally, if theAhmadis did not “repent and return to the true teachings of Islam, they should bekilled by the Imam which is the King” and recommended that the AhmadiyyaJama’at be stripped of all special Malay privileges (NUTGraph 2009).

In Saudi Arabia, the Ahmadis are not recognized as being Muslim by Wahhab-ism, the form of Islam prevalent in the desert kingdom. Schools in KSA openlydescribe members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community as “heretical,” andAhmadis are usually forbidden entrance into the kingdom to perform Hajj orumrah (Valentine 2015).

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 17

In the Western world (the USA, UK, and Europe), the Ahmadi generally facesdiscrimination and marginalization by mainstream Muslims, rather than direct vio-lence and aggression. In the UK, for example, mainstream Muslims continue torefuse to allow Ahmadis to be members of, or participate in, Council of Mosques ineach town or city. Taking Bradford, West Yorkshire, as an example, the BradfordCouncil of Mosques, refusing to accept the Ahmadiyya Jama’at as a Muslim group,in the 1970s and 1980s regularly organized protests to disrupt Ahmadi events. Morerecently however, as in other British cities, the Ahmadis are simply ostracized byother Muslims, with mainstream Muslims usually refusing to trade or deal with theAhmadi in anyway. Sometimes however, the Ahmadis are subject to direct violencesimilar to that seen in the Asian subcontinent. In March 2016, Asad Shah, an Ahmadiliving in Glasgow and working as a shopkeeper, was brutally stabbed to death by aMuslim from Bradford who disliked Shah sharing his Ahmadi views on the Internet(The Guardian 2016).

Conclusion

The Ahmadi Jama’at is one of the most active yet controversial minority groupswithin contemporary Islam. The existence of the Movement raises pertinent issuesfor Muslim scholars and non-Muslim academics alike. First, the Ahmadiyya Jama’athighlights the need for theological reflection on the nature of persecution generallywithin religion but specifically on persecution of minority groups within the Islamicfaith. The history of the Ahmadi sect from its inception in the latter half of thenineteenth century provides us with illustrative examples of how minority groupsnot only arise, develop, and evolve within Islam but also how they react to opposi-tion. The Ahmadis, similar to other persecuted minority groups, instead of receding(as its opponents have hoped) has grown, using such opposition to legitimize andvindicate its “truth” claims.

Fig. 1 Murza GhulamAhmad. Source: (Information|Description={{en|1=MirzaGhulam Ahmad of Qadian,photograph taken inc.1897}}) |Source=Originallyposted to [www.flickr.co,Flickr] as [http://flickr.com/photos/ahmadzakariyya/2219977317/ Hazrat MirzaGhulam Ahmad of Qadian(AS)]

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Second, the Ahmadis, in the lifestyle they have adopted in the West, present aninteresting sociological paradigm of integration by a Muslim group in secular,multicultural societies. As indicated above, although setting clear theological andritualistic boundaries with the host, mainly secular society, the Ahmadis have, to agreat extent, successfully preserved their faith, values, and identity.

But most importantly, the Ahmadis give rise to certain questions concerning thevery nature of Islam itself, namely, what is a Muslim? And does one Muslim havethe right to call a fellow believer “non-Muslim”? For the vast majority of mainstreamMuslims, the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are harmful bida’, corrupting inno-vations, and as such the Ahmadis are regarded as non-Muslims. As Muhammadstated in a well-attested hadith: “the worst of all things are innovations, everyinnovation is heresy, every heresy is error, and every heresy leads to hell”(Al-Tirmizi). Traditionally within Islam, it is usually agreed that no human beingor organization has the right to declare an individual or a group as kafir (unbeliever)as long as he or she declares himself or herself a Muslim. Likewise it is argued thatonly Allah knows the intentions of the human heart and He alone will judge andreward individuals on the Day of Judgment. The appearance of the Ahmadishowever highlights the fact that identification of a Muslim believer apparentlyrequires more than the utterance of the shahada, the confession of faith.

In the context of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at, and whether that group is Muslim ornot, various judicial bodies have made legal decisions concerning the nature of“belief” in Islam. The Munir Court of Enquiry in 1953–1954 investigated the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances that occurred in the Punjab at that time and considered thefollowing question: what is a Muslim? Having examined the evidence put forward

Fig. 2 Roza Bal, Khaniyar Street, Srinagar, the building allegedly containing the body of Jesus

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 19

by leading members of the ulema, the court decided that “no two learned divines areagreed on this fundamental” question (Aziz 1987). Between 1982 and 1985, a courtin South Africa deliberated over the question of whether Ahmadis could claim to beMuslim. The final verdict, given after 3 years of litigation by a non-Muslim court,was pronounced in favor of the Ahmadis concluding that the sect was “Muslim.” In adocument titled the Mahzarnama (“The Memorandum” of 1974), the Ahmadispresented an outline of their doctrinal beliefs to the Special Committee of NationalAssembly of Pakistan. The Ahmadis asked the committee can it be legitimate:

to declare someone to be outside the pale of Islam notwithstanding someone’s belief in thefive pillars of Islam, just because one’s interpretation of a few verses of the Holy Quran isunacceptable to some Muslim divines of certain sects; or if one is declared to be outside thepale of Islam for entertaining a belief which runs counter to Islam in the view of certainsects. . .. (Memorandum 2003)

After the submission of the memorandum, the head of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at,Hadhrat Khalifatul Masih III, and his four assistants were questioned for 11 days bythe Attorney General of Pakistan and leading religious clerics. Although stillcondemning the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, the commission produced no reportaccessible to the public explaining the term “Muslim.”As the continuing persecutionof the Ahmadiyya Jama’at illustrates, the issue of Muslim identity remainsunresolved to this day (Figs. 1 and 2).

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The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Question of Muslim Identity 21

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Valentine, S. R. (2008b). The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A persecuted sect in Pakistan, briefing paper 87535, PSR Unit, Peace Studies, Bradford University

Valentine, S. R. (2008c). ibid., (p. 57).Valentine, S. R. (2008d). Islam & the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, belief, practice (p. 139). op.cit.Valentine, S. R. (2008e). Islam & the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, belief, practice (p. 90). op.cit.Valentine, S. R. (2008f). ibid. (p. 97).Valentine, S. R. (2008g). ibid. (p. 116).Valentine, S. R. (2008i). ibid., (p. 230).Valentine, S. R. (2008j). The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A persecuted sect in Pakistan, briefing paper

35, PSR Unit, Peace Studies, Bradford University.Valentine, S. R. (2008k). The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A persecuted sect in Pakistan, briefing paper

35, PSR Unit, Peace Studies, Bradford University, op.cit.Valentine, S. R. (2008l). The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A persecuted sect in Pakistan, op.cit.Valentine, S. R. (2015). Force & fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and beyond. London:

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jihadwatch.org/2015/02/why-moderate-muslims-balk-at-je-suis-charlie. Accessed 21 Feb 2015.Why Moderate Muslims balk at “Je suis Charlie”. (2 February 2015). Jihad Watch, op.cit.Zirvi, K. (2002) Welcome to Ahmadiyyat: The true Islam (Ahmadiyya movement in Islam, p. 11).

Silver Springs: Islamic Publications.Zirvi, K. Welcome to Ahmadiyyat: The true Islam (p. 309). op.cit.Zirvi, K. Welcome to Ahmadiyyat: The true Islam (p. 285). op.cit.

Suggested Readings

Ensor, J. (2007). Rabwah: A place for martyrs. London: Parliamentary Human Rights Group.Friedmann, Y. (1989). Prophecy continuous: Aspects of Ahmadis religious thought and its medieval

background. University of California Press.Jones, K. W. (1989). Socio-religious reform movements in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.Lavan, S. (1974). The Ahmadiyah movement: A history and perspective. Delhi: Manohar Book

Service.Valentine, S. R. (2008). Islam & the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, belief, practice.

London/New York: Hurst & Co/Columbia University Press.

22 S. R. Valentine