Terrorism as Conflicting Networks & Language Games

8/9/2019 Terrorism as Conflicting Networks & Language Games

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Therefore, see without looking, hear without listen-/ ing, breathe without asking:/ The inevita-

ble is what will seem to happen to you/ purely by chance;/ The Real is what will strike you as

really absurd:/ Unless you are certain you are dreaming, it is certainly/ a dream of your own;/

Unless you exclaim There must be some mistake/ you must be mistaken. - Auden1

But because being here is much, and because/ all this/ thats here. So fleeting, seems to re-quire us/ and strangely/ concerns us. Us the most fleeting of all./ Just once, everything, only

for once. Once and no more./ And we, too,/ once. And never Again. But this/ having been

once, though only once,/ having been once on earth can it ever be cancelled? - Rilke2

Introduction

Can we imagine a world without terrorism? Can we imagine a set of policies that

actually address the root-causes of terrorism; policies that reduce the probability of

terrorist acts occurring; policies that reduce rather than increases their probability.

Could it be that our counter-terrorism policies to date have been ineffectual because

we do not really understand terrorism?3 What follows is a philosophical discussion

of terrorism as a system. By philosophical I mean a conversation that attempts to

clarify our thinking on this topic. To accomplish this conversation I have introduced

grammar that is more familiar to philosophers, especially those who have read Witt-

genstein. I am treating terrorism as a system of interrelated parts, a network.4 The

terrorists who carry out an attack are actually just one small component of this sys-

tem. Focusing our Intelligence gathering to catch these individuals and funding mili-

tary attempts to kill these individuals will do little to destroy the system that com-

prises terrorism.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been fighting two wars in Afghani-

stan and Iraq (both are still ongoing) ascomponents in the war on terrorism. The

United States has spent more than three trillion dollars of U.S. taxpayers income (or

future income). All this for a war on terrorism. Yet, nuclear threats from privatized

terrorist organizations or rogue states today are highly probable. More likely than at

any time in the past. There is no end in sight to potential threats. The likely suspects

whom may one-day carry out an attack against interests of the United States have

exponentially increased. It does not take genius to imagine if the next trillion dollars

might be spent far differently.

Can we imagine more nuanced and productive objectives? Policies that are moral?5

Different policies than those that have been tried and found wanting? To make these

choices on what to allocate capital and how much capital requires dialogue. Are

we captive to our own language concerning terrorism? Is the language that we use

to describe the war against terrorism choking off new, more creative ways for us to

T E R R O R I S M A S C O N F L I C T I N G N E T W O R K S & L A N G U A G E G A M E S

Lyle Brecht DRAFT 2.8 -- Friday, July 9, 2010 CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH Page 1 of 19


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imagine how to deal with the problem of terrorism? Presently, even if the political will

existed, do we lack the grammar for such dialogue?

What should concern us is the grammar some use to describe todays counter-terror

policies of the United States: renditions, secret prisons, concentration camps, tor-

ture, wars of occupation, oil-centrism, and empire, to describe the war against ter-

rorism. Credible surveys of world opinion rank the President of the United States

about equal to Osama bin Laden as among the best-known terrorists in the world.

The United States government, in these surveys, is ranked with al-Qaeda as among

the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world.

Might even discussing counter-terrorism policy from within the monicker, the war

against terrorism, be inappropriate and misleading? The grammar of war denotes a

set of activities that can result in something being won. Whether through occupying

territory or by applying force to make the other side give-up. Neither course is avail-

able to opponents in a contest employing terrorism. Terrorism is not a contest that

can be won in any conventional way of thinking. War can be won through the em-

ployment of violence and counter-violence. Terrorism cannot. Cleaning up our

grammar is important. This requires that we first clean up our thinking; about terror-

ism.

In this discussion I introduce a series of propositions regarding terrorism. I discuss

terrorism as a systems game, the game of terror-ism. Terror-ism is a game that is

being played in real-time by two opposing sides. A game of deadly moves and

counter-moves. For example, one side could open with an attack using tactical nu-

clear weapons. Then, what should the other sides move be? This way of thinking

may illuminate new possibilities. That is my hope. Possibilities for policies to ade-

quately address such threat scenarios. Possibilities for rethinking how funding is

allocated to produce specific results. Most of all, one might consider if this is a

game worth playing at all. Especially, according to the rules established by the op-

posing side.

These propositions suggest a terrorist attack need not occur any more frequently

that every twenty to thirty years. Yet even at this frequency of attack, terrorism re-

mains a top-of-the-mind issue. An issue requiring hundreds of billions of dollars

spent on counter-measures. Money not spent on other pressing problems. This as-

sumes the rules of a game are similar to todays counter-terrorism policies.




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These propositions suggest that both Intelligence and military force (as we presently

imagine these activities) provide limited means for thwarting attacks. Or responding

to threat scenarios. Twenty-first century terrorism is a particular, dispersed, net-

worked activity. It is emergent from the activities of the system within which it is em-bedded. Terrorism is merelya tactic (albeit horrific and immoral) to achieve particular

results. As a tactic, it rapidly evolves (changes tactical forms and strategy). These

tactical forms of post-modern terrorism have evolved specifically as a counter-force

to traditional Intelligence gathering and military force. Traditional Intelligence gather-

ing and military force was developed and perfected for modern state-to-state con-

flict. These institutions may be ill suited to adequately address emergent activities

from systems requiring re-engineering and restructuring, not destruction.

Whether traditional linear-thinking Intelligence and military force can be adapted toevolve quickly enough to counter emergent and non-linear-thinking twenty-first cen-

tury terrorism is unclear. Terrorist attacks in the future are more likely to look different

than knowable attacks imagined today. Groups and individuals that our Intelligence

has no knowledge of will most likely carry out future attacks. And these attacks may

not even employ violence. At least the forms of violence we associate with terrorist

attacks today. Attacks to achieve unrelenting fear and massive disruption. Disruption

of existing systems: of commerce and governance and life-sustenance.

These propositions are just a beginning to create a new grammar concerning terror-

ism. Grammar capable of articulating questions that are hard to ask coherently in

todays talk of terrorism. Questions concerning present policy that might enable

imaginative and creative dialogue of new possibilities. Todays game of terror-ism, to

be played competently at all, requires an abrupt change, ametanoia, from yester-

days decisions; from yesterdays methods and practices. It is past time to stop

waging a war against terrorism that cannot be won. Let us start playing this game

smarter, with a new mind. If we choose to play at all.

Propositions

1. Terror-ism6 is a life-game7 pitting two opposing sides with differing world-pictures8

against one another. The objective of the life-game of terror-ism is to elicit fear of

suffering and pain in the Other.9 A game is won if one side is able to establish and

maintain control over the other side through this fear.




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.1 World-pictures are determinate of life-games. Life-games emerge over time

through trial and error, constrained by our particular world-pictures.

.1.1 Life-games are descriptive of activities that have meaning (and importance)

for participants of a game. Individuals in the West tend to play life-games for

utilitarian reasons. Different life-games compete with one another based on

their utility. This may not be the case for people from other cultural and relig-

ious backgrounds. There are many kinds of games to play with Others rather

than the game of terror-ism.

.1.2 World-pictures are described through contingent language-games10 in use

by followers of a particular world-picture. These language-games delimit

how one describes the slice of reality that one sees or can be shown.

.1.2.1 Language-games are comprised of grammar and the rules for the use of this

grammar. Language-games are used to construct narratives incorporating

symbols and metaphors that describe deep aspects of the reality we can be

shown through our world-picture.

.1.2.2 The particular world-picture in dominant use at any one point in time limits

the context for how language-games might be used to show someone an

aspect of the wider reality around them.

.1.2.3 The particular world-picture in dominant use at any one point in time limits

the meaning for what these language-games might say (the narratives that

can be said; those that have meaning) about the aspect of the wider reality

one is shown.

.2 Terrorism can arise out of almost all types of world-pictures. It is an emergent

activity; a tactic resulting from certain systems thinking concerning reality as

seen through the individual or groups world picture. Few individuals, maybe

none, start out with the intention of becoming a terrorist. Terrorism itself is just

one component, an aspect of an entire system of thought and human activity.

Attempting to stamp out terrorism by interdicting acts of terror or by capturing

or killing individuals is like attempting to stop the spread of bubonic plague by

bloodletting. The entiresystem that is creating the pathology must be ad-

dressed.

.2.1 Terrorism is merely a tactic for engendering fear; fear that produces change.

Fear is an emotional response. It is internal to the self. What are important




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are the language-games one uses to describe this fear. The language-games

one uses to talk about this fear will most likely drive the moves one makes in

the life-game of terror-ism. What the terrorist wants to do is to get inside our

head; to propel us to think about their case (cause). That is the primaryobjective of a winning move; to force us to rethink our world-picture. The

act of terror is just a means (albeit immoral and horrific) to this end. Thus, all

acts of terror are ultimately political and theological. Despite the in-humane

means (terror), it behooves players to look at the information contained in

the move (act of terror) and the assumptions driving the game of terror-ism.

.2.2 A terrorist attack, to be effective, must be public and symbolic. The act must

be designed to do more than just kill the other. It must establish a narrative

that means something to the opposing side on which this act is perpetrated.Repeated narrative accounts of the act via media and remembrance (anam-

nesis) magnify the importance of the event in the minds of the affected

population. This also spreads the impact of the move beyond the immedi-

ately affected individuals harmed by the attack.

.2.3 It is highly unlikely that government by itself can control the language-

games establishing perception of a terrorist attack. Neither limiting access

to knowledge of the attack nor claiming an event was different than what

actually occurred is typically helpful. No matter what language-games media

reports use to manipulate or government spokespersons spin, what is im-

portant is the narrative account individuals adopt themselves.

.2.3.1 Itis possible for individuals or governments to use a terrorist attack to pro-

duce disproportionate fear, either intentionally or unintentionally, for a time.

.2.3.2 If individuals or governments use means to produce disproportionate fear

intentionally, the outcome from this manipulation cannot be known with cer-

tainty or confidence. Usually, telling the truth (in narrative form), as one un-

derstands it, is the least risky path.

.3 The moves in the life-game of terror-ism do not determine the level of fear felt.

The language-games one personally and collectively uses to express the fear

felt is what establishes the level of fear personally and collectively.




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.3.1 A move (terrorist attack) is just an activity or event in space and time. By

itself, a move means little without interpretation.

.3.2 How a move is interpreted determines the effectiveness of a game move to

produce fear.

.3.3 The objective of each move may not onlybe to create fear. Violence is not

the only means to create fear. Counter-violence is not the only means to

create fear in opponents. (Counter-violence will notstop violence.) However,

violence and counter-violence are often the most readily used moves and

counter-moves. This is not to suggest that these are the best moves.

.3.3.1A game, once started, cannot be stopped using violence or counter-violence

moves.

.3.3.2 The objective of a game cannot be to stop the game.

.3.3.3 The only way to stop a game, once it has started, is to not play.

.4 The moves and counter-moves in the life-game of terror-ism may be capital-

intensive unless one is careful.

.4.1 One sides game strategy may be to elicit particularly expensive and asym-

metric moves by their opponent(s).

.4.1.1 For example, a game strategy of disproportionate spending for counter-

moves might create such financial stress as to weaken the play of the oppo-

nent.

.4.1.2 Disproportionate spending for counter-moves also creates an almost auto-

matic moral advantage for the less-endowed opponent.

.4.2 If a game has no foreseeable ending, one should calculate the available

cash flow available to play a game during each discrete period of play.

.4.2.1 Once the available cash flow for each period is known, capital constraints

should limit the type of moves one instigates to play a game.

.4.2.2 Game moves should be chosen based on their cost-effectiveness in playing

a game. There will never be adequate capital available to fund all desired

moves and counter-moves.

.4.3 Alternatively, one might calculate the capital requirements to stop a game by

not playing.




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.4.3.1 Stopping a game by not playing is highly unlikely because too many vested

interests imagine that by not playing a game they will be worse off.

.4.3.2 If one wishes to stop a game by not playing, capital must be invested to

change the world-picture of game players so that a new game, other than

terror-ism, can be imagined.

.4.3.3 The capital required to change world-pictures so that a new game can be

imagined is probably more than the capital necessary to fund playing the

game in any one play-period.

.5 The moves and counter-moves in a game may be counter-productive unless one

is careful. That is, moves and counter-moves are selected that intensify the fear

and increate the tempo, rather than slow the game down or reduce perceived

fear.

.5.1 A game may lead to an ever-increasing spiral of violence and counter-

violence unless one is particularly careful in designing moves and counter-

move strategy. This spiral-effect means that more people on both sides will

loose their lives in each successive move.

.5.1.1 It is highly unlikely that through moves of violence and counter-violence that

enough individuals on each opposing side can be killed to cause the spiral

of violence to cease. This is one difference between war and the game of

terror-ism.

.5.1.2 The game of terror-ism feeds on violence. The strength of a game intensi-

fies. Violent moves and counter-moves tend to produce a self-perpetuating

game.

.5.2 A game may lead to an ever-increasing requirement for capital to fund

moves and counter-moves unless one is particularly careful in designing

moves and counter-move strategy.

.5.2.1 The tempo and intensity of a game determine the capital requirements of the

financially dominant opponent in a game. The less financially able opponent

can get by with significantly less funds, yet play the game well.

.5.2.2Any specific move in a game can be extremely inexpensive, yet produce

disproportionate financial damage if one of the opponents is a nation state

and the other a group of privatized individuals. Nation states that are nuclear




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security states are particularly vulnerable to the costs of terrorism. More so

than non-nuclear states.

.6 It is risky to conflate non-game objectives with game objectives when making

moves.

.6.1 For example, initiating moves that acquire oil reserves may be a solid na-

tional strategic objective. But claiming this move should be made for

counter-terror purposes is dangerous. It is destructive of game-play, with

unforeseen consequences.

.6.2 Playing the game is hard enough. Introducing other strategic considerations

into the game only hobbles the play of the side adding the complexities.

Playing the game competently requires fixity of purpose and clear vision, not

multiplexed purposes.

2 A game of terror-ism is always played for deeper reasons than to control the

Other through fear. These reasons may always be explainedusing rationality and

objective language. However, these reasons may be best able to be understood

non-rationally (theologically) using subjective language. This applies to both

sides playing the game. By theologically I mean the use of subjective grammar

that describes themeaning of particular motivations and aspects of reality.

2.1A game of terror-ism is arationalgame played byboth sides for real reasons

like: human freedom, self-determination, access to natural resources, a better

life, the basic requirements for living (e.g. food, clean water, shelter), etc.

Games of terror-ism are almost never played for evil reasons, from the perspec-

tive of each player.

2.1.1 The probability (P) of any one imagined move in a game of terror-ism will

approach certainty (P = ~0.96t) over a specific planning period.

2.1.2 What cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty or confidence are

the results from any imagined move.

2.1.3 The only means of reducing the probability (P) of any imagined move in a

game is to invest capital to remove the pre-conditions for that move.

2.1.4 Intelligence is an inadequate means for removingallpre-conditions for a

specific move. At most, Intelligence can uncover a small percentage of data




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concerning the actors who may wish to participate in a game of terror-ism

and their specific plans during any one game-period.

2.1.4.1Terrorist attacks in the future are more likely to look different than knowable

attacks imagined today. The probability of accurately anticipating an attack

and adequately planning for its counter valence is very low, almost negligi-

ble. The only attacks that we are capable of averting are known or knowable

attacks.

2.1.4.2The organizational structure of Intelligence affects the quality of Intelligence

gathering and analysis less than the mission parameters for the Intelligence

agencies being coordinated, all else being equal. Data is collected and ana-

lyzed based on its utility to the perceived mission. Aberrant data is dis-

counted until a paradigm shift occurs (a change in world-picture) that ren-

ders the previously aberrant data obvious and discussable.

2.1.4.3Intelligence mission budgets typically do not accurately reflect the relative

importance of various missions. Usually missions that are established and

known receive the bulk of available funding. Important new missions are

almost invariably under-funded. The level of funding for a mission also is not

determinate of the quality or results for that mission. The level of dedication

and capabilities of specific individuals assigned to a mission is often a

greater determinant of results than funding levels.

2.1.4.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.

2.1.4.5Future attacks are most likely to be carried out by groups and individuals

our Intelligence has no knowledge. The probability of accurately anticipating

an attack by specific, unknown individuals or groups is very low, almost

negligible. The only attacks that we are capable of averting are attacks by

known or knowable attackers.

2.1.4.6The occurrence of a terrorist attack in any one period does not mean that

inadequate Intelligence was gathered prior to the attack. The attack does

not indicate that Intelligence efforts have failed. The absence of an attack

during any one period does not mean that adequate Intelligence was gath-

ered to thwart future attacks. The gathering and use of Intelligence has little

bearing on the probability of future terrorist attacks overall. However, the




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gathering and use of Intelligence does affect the probability of terrorist at-

tacks byspecific individuals and groups, andspecific threat scenarios.

2.1.4.7Future attacks may not even employ violence, at least the forms of violence

we associate with terrorist attacks today. We might expect that future oppo-

nents develop non-violent moves. Even though these moves are non-violent,

they may produce unrelenting fear and massive disruption of existing sys-

tems: of commerce, governance and life-sustenance.

2.1.4.8Maintaining the strictest secrecy regarding counter-moves primarily assists

the gaming strategy of the opponents in the terror-ism game. Secrecy slows

down constructive learning and accountability for playing the game better.

Also, terrorism, due to its dispersed and networked structure must rely on

the eyes and ears of non-professionals to gather data. Over attentiveness to

secrecy only aids opponents in the game of terror-ism.

2.1.4.9Todays mission for Intelligence may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

on humanocentric threats of intentional violence, Intelligence ignores the

greater threats from natural sources and unintentional humanocentric vio-

lence. By focusing on threats of terror and bad guys, Intelligence misses

non-political, non-violent counters to these threats that are naturally occur-

ring or that could be fostered through investments in human corrective ac-

tion.

2.1.5 Military activities designed to kill specific terrorist actors or destroy interest

on the part of potential participants in a game of terror-ism is an inadequate

means for removingallpre-conditions for a specific move.

2.1.5.1The use of counter-violence and force for game-moves, at best, may slow

the tempo of counter-moves in a game. Counter-violence and force cannot

stop a game. The use of counter-violence and force for moves can increase

the tempo of the terror-ism game.

2.1.5.2The use of force and counter-force for game moves does nothing to direct

the world-picture, language-games or grammar of ones opponent(s) to-

wards peace. What the use of force and counter-force does is to accentuate

and reinforce the language-games of violence used by ones opponents.

2.1.5.3Military mission budgets typically do not accurately reflect the relative im-

portance of various missions. Usually missions that are established and




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known receive the bulk of available funding. Important new missions are

almost invariably under-funded. The level of funding for a mission also is not

determinate of the quality or results for that mission. The level of dedication

and capabilities of specific individuals assigned to a mission is often agreater determinant of results than funding levels.

2.1.5.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.

2.1.5.5The occurrence of a terrorist attack in any one period does not mean that

inadequate countervailing force was used prior to the attack. The absence

of an attack during any one period does not mean that adequate force was

used to thwart future attacks. The use and intensity of force has little bearing

on the probability of future terrorist attacks overall. However, the use of force

does affect the probability of terrorist attacks byspecific individuals and

groups andspecific threat scenarios.

2.1.5.6Todays mission for the military may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

narrowly on violence and counter-violence manpower roles, training, weap-

ons systems and mission, the military ignores the greater threats from natu-

ral sources and unintentional humanocentric violence. For example, the mili-

tary spends over a million dollars per capita to train special forces opera-

tives to excel in difficult combat operations. Yet, there is no comparable mili-

tary program, with similar per capita spending to train individuals to excel in

difficult negotiating circumstances in order to avoid violence as the solution

to a conflict.

2.2The moves of each side have alogicalstructure. However, oftentimes a move is

determined more by the institutional structure of participating actors in a game

than by the tempo (cadence) and tactical requirements of a game itself.

2.2.1 Making moves that are based on theinstitutionalstructure of the side play-

ing a game rather than the tempo and tactical requirements of the game it-

self often leads to moves that are nonsense (illogical or irrational).

2.2.2 Making moves that are based on sectarian religious objectives often leans to

moves that are nonsense (illogical or irrational), as well as encourages tor-

ture.




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2.2.2.1Each move in the game has a theological component. This theological

component describes themeaning one might attribute to this action. This

meaning is subjective, not objective. That is, theological discourse is non-

rational, not rational discourse (also, not irrational discourse). Theologicaldiscourse is able to discuss things that rational discourse misses. Theologi-

cal discourse is necessary to explain and understand the meaning of things

in ones world-picture. Theological discourse is helpful to elucidate the logi-

cal structure of a game.

2.2.2.2Sectarian religiosity and religious discourse is not the same as solid theo-

logical discourse. While solid theological discourse is subjective, sectarian

religious discourse is often objective and ideological. Whereas solid theo-

logical discourse is non-rational, sectarian religious discourse is often irra-tional. Solid theological discourse can be accomplished successfully in set-

tings where the Other is embraced. Sectarian religious discourse is often

initiated to exclude the Other. Sectarian religious discourse often attempts to

arrive at certainty when there is none; to apply conformance while inde-

pendent thinking is what is needed; to apply sectarianism where plurality is

necessary. Sectarian religious discourse does not elucidate thelogicalstruc-

ture of a game.

2.2.2.3Letting sectarian religiosity determine game moves makes no more sense

in this game than in a game of chess.

2.2.2.4Torture cannot be logically used as a means for eliciting truth or discerning

the certainty of specific data. For example, there is no way to ascertain with

certainty the probability that information obtained through torture is accu-

rate. The only means to determine if torture produces accurate retrieval of

information in any particular situation is to alreadyknow for certain the data

the tortured subject provides, before they provide it. That is, the data must

be known in some other, objective fashion than through torture to be known

with any certainty at all. Torture and the proclivity to torture may result from

sectarian religiosity to engage in retributive justice, topunish the evil

Other. Torture is an irrational counter-terror activity. It is merely a form of

barbarous terrorism; a means to produce terror.




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2.2.3 Game moves may produce a political result. But this result cannot be calcu-

lated with any degree of certainty or confidence.

2.2.4 Game moves must be decided usingrationalmeans based on the particular

logic of the move being played. Neither religious nor political dialogue is

useful for determining the best next move.

2.2.4.1Political dialogue is useful for initiating conversation to decide whether to

play a game or not. Whether or not to play a game of terror-ism cannot be

made on purely rational calculus. This decision is ethical in nature. Ethics

defies rational analysis. Likewise, the ethics of specific moves cannot be

decided using a rational calculus. Political dialogue (along with theological

considerations) is necessary to arrive at whether specific moves in the game

are ethically acceptable.

2.2.4.2Political dialogue is also useful to establish levels of available capital that

might be invested to play a game and that spent on specific game moves.

However, the opportunity costs for playing a game and each move should

also be calculated (e.g. What are we giving up by playing this game at this

level of intensity, at this time?).

2.2.4.3Letting political dialogue determine game moves makes no more sense in

this game than in a game of chess.

3 A game of terror-ism comes in at least three different flavors. All are emergent

from prevailing world-pictures of players at the time a game is being played. All

comprise terror-ism, based on their potential fear-inducing results.

3.1One flavor is a game of terror-ism played by two human opponents, where there

is a perceived Other.

3.1.1 This flavor of game has an enemy. The Other is the enemy. The enemy is

described as evil; polluted with strange and bizarre ideas that are foreign

to our world-picture.

3.1.2 An example is al-Quida, which orchestrated the 9-11 attacks on the United

States.

3.2A second flavor is a game of terror-ism played, by default, against the odds of

an event occurring. The Other are those who fail to act.

3.2.1 This flavor of game has no real enemy outside or other than.




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3.2.2 An example that illustrates this flavor of the life-game of terrorism is the

problem of global warming. The terrorists in this flavor of game are those

officials who promote inaction because of self-interested, self-enriching

considerations. They fail to act for the public good. Their inactions causedeath and produce fear, just as any more-conventional terrorist attack may.

It only sometimes occurs more slowly, over a protracted period of time. This

still meets the conditions of a game of terror-ism.

3.3A third flavor is a game of terror-ism played by two human opponents where

there is no perceived Other.

3.3.1 This flavor of the terror-ism game has no enemy outside, but an enemy on

the inside; one of us.

3.3.2 Examples that illustrates this flavor are some key executives of the failed

ENRON Corporation. These individuals looted the company and destroyed

billions of dollars in employee pension funds, caused the death of numerous

citizens in California by disrupting electric power service, and consumed

millions of dollars in public funds through protracted legal proceedings. If

the deliberate and premeditated actions of these individuals can create as

much death and destruction as any more-conventional terrorist act, why

would we not imagine these people as our opponents in a game of terror-

ism?

4 A hermeneutics of hope best describes the thinking required for mapping the

best moves in a game of terror-ism. This is because a primary component of the

game is the use of symbolic and metaphoric narrative, not war planning strat-

egy. These narratives are ultimately theological narratives. That is, they supply a

deep meaning for moves and counter-moves in the game. The best moves ask

deeply penetrating questions of each others world-pictures.

4.1We live daily with violence all around us. Why some forms of violence and not

others become constituted as moves in a terror-ism life-game is due to the

language-games used to describe the violence. If the language-games discuss

the violence as symbolic and associated with specific deeper objectives that

challenge the world-picture of those to whom the violence is being done, then

oftentimes the violence is referred to a terror-ism.




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4.1.1 Insurgencies may or may not incorporate terrorist actions in their tactics. But

insurgencies are not games of terror-ism. For example, would the fight for

independence by American colonists against the British be categorized as a

terrorism or an insurgency? It was an insurgency. The insurgency in Iraq isan insurgency. It is not a game of terror-ism.

4.1.2 Virtually all wars include terrorist actions. For example, the fire-bombing of

Dresden during WWII; the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki; the resulting death of 49 million people from the National Social-

ists policies in Nazi Germany, most of whom were civilians: including six

million Jews, hundreds of thousands of Poles, homosexuals, Soviet prison-

ers, Gypsies (Romas) and handicapped German nationals. This does not

make wars the same as a game of terror-ism.

4.2The grammar of terror-ism works in two directions. If counter-moves involve

counter-violence, the party to whom terror was done, now becomes a perpetra-

tor of terror-ism (from the perspective of third parties). The contest then be-

comes one of two terrorist groups doing terror-ism to one another. There are

no objectively-determined good guys vs. the bad guys in this scenario. Both

act as terrorists. The fact that either side does not wish to acknowledge their

terror-ism, but imagine instead that they are acting/reacting in self-defense,

does not change this systemic perception.

4.2.1 There is a difference between seeing and showing. Seeing involves a know-

ing (both explaining and understanding) internal to the self. We cannot see

what cannot be explained, nor understood. Showing, on the other hand,

involves having something demonstrated outside the interiority of the self.

Thus, this something is publicly knowable by those outside the confines of

the life-game being played. One perspective is not necessarily more real

than anothers, but what one can see, or what one can be shown at any par-

ticular point in time, does not constitute the entirety of what is real and true.

Neither what one can see or be shown can be known with certainty.

4.2.2 What is real and true is that terror-ism life-games, where moves and

counter-moves revolve around violence and counter-violence for their sub-

stance, are games between two terrorist-like sides. Both parties are engag-

ing in a game of terror-ism.




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4.2.3 To play the terror-ism game with violence entails one becoming like a ter-

rorist from someones perspective.

5 A game of terror-ism is built upon a philosophical dualism of the Other that is

philosophically, scientifically, and theologically nonsense (from a post-modern

perspective).

5.1The philosophical assumption is that the Other is universally and incontrovertibly

different than and less than our self and those who constitute our reference

group. There is little truth to this statement. There are no known laws of physics,

biology, or psychology, or other sciences that confirm this belief. This belief of

exclusion, rather than embrace of, the Other is usually based on fear. If fear was

not already evident, the Other would not be able to engage in a game of terror-

ism to build on this pre-existent fear. Theologically speaking, this is idolatry.

5.2Usually, Others are more similar to ones own self than different or less than.

5.2.1 World-pictures can be radically divergent between two different representa-

tives of the human race, yet exhibit fundamental similarities in human pur-

poses and desires for what constitutes a good life.

5.2.2 Oftentimes the prevailing problem with those having divergent world-

pictures has to do with issues of power. If an aspect of the world-picture of

one group is that they are obviously superior to other groups of humans, or

have access to a disproportionate amount of world resources, or are looking

for obsequiousness from the other group, then this is an inherently con-

flicted situation.

5.2.2.1Conflict does not necessarily lead to violence and counter-violence. Con-

flict does not usually lead to a game of terror-ism.

5.2.2.2For a game of terror-ism to begin, two parties must be willing and ready to

play. Also, other dialogic options to a game of terror-ism either must have

been exhausted, or not be available to both parties.

6 If we are playing a game of terror-ism, we may not be playing other games that

may be more interesting, more important life-games (e.g. liberal democracy,

education, health-care, commerce, managing our finances so that future genera-

tions are not burdened by our consumption, etc.).




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6.1Winning is not useful grammar for describing outcomes from playing a game

of terror-ism. This game cannot be won by either side. That is, playing a game

of terror-ism long enough will transform both sides into different actors from

whence a game began. Neither side may retain the same world-picture withwhich they began a game. Both sides world-pictures will most likely change by

playing a game of terror-ism.

6.1.1 The change of world-picture enabled by playing the game might result in

new possibilities for human freedom that could be viewed as either positive

or negative from todays vantage point by different constituencies.

6.1.2 However, it is impossible to calculate whether or not new possibilities for

human freedom could have been reached in the future by alternate, less

costly means than by engaging in a game of terror-ism today.

6.1.3 Secrecy inhibits new ideas for developing game strategy. Instead, secrecy

tends to encourage the game be played around fairly narrow, known strate-

gies with fairly conventional tactics, with limited usefulness. That is why the

opponents in the game may be viewed as creative and resourceful when

they really are not. They only appear as such relative to the uncreative and

lack of resourcefulness of the conventional secret tactics used to thwart

attacks in the game of terror-ism.

6.2Loosing is useful grammar for describing outcomes from playing a game of

terror-ism. The game of terror-ism cannot be won in any conventional way of

thinking about winning.

6.2.1 No particular move in the game can be accurately classified as a terrorist

move or a counter-terrorist move. Each move is just a move or a

counter-move in the game of terror-ism being played.

6.2.2 All moves in the game entail loosing something: freedom of movement,

capital, human lives, opportunities, world-pictures, reputation, respect, faith,

hope, etc.

7 What we cannot speak about, we cannot imagine. Illiteracy and incompetence in

interpreting the text of our opponents moves of terror breeds unimaginative

pain and suffering from inappropriately-chosen game moves/counter-moves

gone bad.11




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ENDNOTES



1 W. H. Auden, For the Time Being, in W. H. Auden, Collected Longer Poems (New York:

Random House, 1969), 138 quoted in John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval: Towards a

Theology of Story(Polebridge Press, 1988), 39.

2 Rainer Maria Rilke, Selected Works: II. Poetry, trans. J.B. Leishman (New York: New Direc-

tions, 1967), 244 quoted in Crossan, 2.

3 Since 9/11, despite the massive effort of the expensively funded U.S. war on terrorism,

terrorism world-wide is at an all-time high; magnitudes beyond pre-9/11 levels.

4 These self-organized networks of terror.... obey rigid laws that determine their topology,

structure, and therefore their ability to function. They exploit all the natural advantages of self-

organized networks, including flexibility and tolerance to internal failures and disruption

through normal means. See Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks

(Cambridge, MA: Persius Publishing, 2002), 223.

5 Can we rightly imagine that the present war on terrorism waged on behalf of the American

people is moral? Since 9/11, Americas war on terror, waged to preserve the American way

of life, has killed an estimated 30,000 to 100,000 people, wounded another 250,000 people,

and displaced more than a million people from their homes, the vast majority of those killed,

wounded or displaced being women and children.

6 Terror-ism indicates that we have objectified and reified this activity and turned it into an

aberrant life-game. Terrorism, as a human activity, is almost as old as human civilization.

What is new today is how we talk about terrorism. We have changed our world-picture to in-

clude terrorism as a central aspect, almost a doctrine, for how we view reality. This is new.

7 Games of importance played against one or more opponents that have non-trivial out-

comes (i.e. life or death).

8 World-picture, according to Ludwig Wittgenstein, might be thought of as a frame orframework through which we look to discern what is real and what is not, and what is impor-

tant, from our vantage point. Ultimately, this looking creates a picture of the world that we

use to decipher new data. New data needs to fit this picture. It must make sense within

our world-picture. Otherwise, new data (ideas, experiences, paradigms) are nonsense, even

though they are real in a larger sense.

9 Used in this context, Others are the opponent(s), in all his/her manifestations, in a game.

Other describes someone different than our self and our preferred reference group. Other-

ness is typically perceived as a symptom of godlessness and degeneration. Others are

those who inhabited the camps of Auschwitz and the Gulag. Others are those whom the

modern state wages genocide, the categorical killing of those who are classified as Other.

See Zygmunt Bauman, A Century of Camps? (1995) in Peter Beilhartz, ed., The Bauman

Reader(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 277, 280.

10Language-games, from Ludwig Wittgenstein, highlights the reality that individual words

and sentences have different meanings and connotations based on context. Also, these

meanings evolve over time; word and sentence meanings are not static but dynamic, requir-

ing interpretation to convey meaning.


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11 An account of the meaning of the situation is in no way given, but must be constructed

in light of the system of interests revealed as the policy-maker addresses issues of contin-

gency and particularityrelated to the crisis situation engendered by the treat of terrorism. See

Paul H. Ballard, Pastoral Theology as Theology of Reconciliation, Theology91, 1988, 375

quoted in Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: HarperCollinsPub-

lishers, 1992), 556, 562.

Documents

Terrorism as Conflicting Networks & Language Games