T7 B2 Lawless- Joseph Fdr- 11-5-03 Interview- Prepared Statement 288

8/14/2019 T7 B2 Lawless- Joseph Fdr- 11-5-03 Interview- Prepared Statement 288

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National C omm ission on Terrorist A ttacks Upon the United StatesInterview of Joseph M . Lawless, November 5, 2003

Opening StatementM y name is Joseph M . Lawless, and I am the forme r Director of

Public Safety for the Massport Authori ty. During my eight-year tenure inthat position, I oversaw Massport security issues at Logan Internat ionalAirport, Hanscom Field , W orcester Regional Airport, the Boston S eaport,th e Tobin Bridge and all other Massport properties. Since October 2001,1have been serving as the Director of Maritime and B ridge Security forMassport operations in and around Boston Harbor, th e Boston Seaport andth e Tobin Bridge. I have had no authority over aviation matters since thatt ime.

At the outset, the record should be clear that, un der my leaders hip,and with the assistance of a dedicated and professio nal staff at M assport andth e Massachusetts State Police, Logan Airport was one of the mo st secureCategory X airports in the country. The FAA certified Logan ' s airportsecurity plan each year during m y eight-year tenure. The MassportDepartment of Public Sa fety regularly received federal and s tate grantmoney because it was among th e best in the nation. The FAA and otherfederal agencies (including NTS B), and aviation industry groups routinely


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cited Loga n and the M assport Security operations as exam ples for otherairport operators from around the country. Du ring my tenure as Massport 'sDirector of Public Safety, Massport had one o f the best and m ost inno vativesecurity programs in the country. (Tab 1). I was commended in my annu alperformance evaluations at Massport fo r establishing "cutting edgestandards" and for my strong leadership in promoting safety and securityconcerns at Massport.

Prior to assuming my position as Director of Public Safety atMassport, I served for thirteen years with the Massachusetts State Police.For six of those years, I worked as a field officer, conducting invest igat ionsand operating as a liaison between State Police field operations and S tatePolice Detectives. I also spent approximately five years as an investigato rfor the Bureau of Investigative Services in the M iddlesex C ounty DistrictAttorney's Office. During my tenure in M iddlesex County, I part icipated inthe investigation of more than 100 hom icide cases, inclu ding several high-profile homicide cases under Thomas Reil lynow th e MassachusettsAttorney Gene ral. I also invest igated numerous complex criminal offensesinvolving white-collar crime, drug trafficking and various organized crimeoperations. Lreceived extensive training in leadership and investigation

_ ir techniques from the FBI.


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In 1991, the Sup erinten den t of the State Police assig n ed me toestablish and direct the Ex ecutive Protection Un it for the Gove rnor and theLieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In thatposition, I was responsible for the planning and oversight of security issuesfor th e Governor, Lieutenant Governor and visiting dignitaries, includingseveral Presidents o f the United States. I supervised security m easures incooperation with th e Secret Service durin g visits of President George H.W .Bush, President William J. Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton,as well as visits by numerous foreign dignitaries. In conn ect ion with thisposition, I received training from an d worked directly with th e United StatesSecret Service, th e State Department, th e Federal A viat ion A dm inis t rat ion ,and other divisions of the federal government . During my tenure in theExecutive Protection Un it, the unit successfully defended the MassachusettsExecutive branch of government from several serious security threatsincluding several specific threats from radical, p ro-life activists. I amparticularly proud of the fact that during my tenure at the ExecutiveProtection Unit there were no breaches of security in the unit's protection ofthese leaders.

In September 1993,1 w as recruited by the Execu tive Director ofMassport to become it s Director of Public Safety. Shortly after taking this


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post, I determined that the deterrence, detection and elimination of terroristthreats would be the fundamental focus of my mission at Massport . Amongm y first official actions was to confer with th e ATLAS consult ing firm,which was operated by a group of leading anti-terrorism experts, to condu cta comprehensive security assessment of Logan Airport. (Tab 2). Thatassessment was the first of ma ny steps taken to improve security at Loganduring m y tenure.

It should be noted that the ATL AS assessment indicated that"terrorists events, similar to the [1993] W orld Trade Center bom bing wil l becarried out in increasing num bers througho ut the United States." The reportstated that "airports and civil aviation are going to face increasing num ber ofterrorist a ttacks directed tow ards m ass de struction and casualties." Thereport concluded that Logan m ust "start the process o f upg radingsystematically [its] security readiness an d preve ntion capab ilities." Theseprophetic words made a distinct impression on me at the time, andthroughout m y career at Massport. Indeed, the ATLAS report onlyreconfirmed my view that anti-terrorism m easures sho uld be the centralfocus of my work.

After receiving the AT LA S report, the De partment of Pu blic Safetyimplemented a variety of changes at Logan, including the follow ing:


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Controls on the distribution of airport secu rity identificationpasses were tightened;The State Police assigned to Logan received training in anti-terrorism methods, along with new equipment; andThe level of restricted area access fo r airport employees wastightened to operational necessity.

In January 1994, in an effort to strengthen my expertise regard inganti-terrorist security m easures, I traveled to Ben Gurion InternationalAirport in Tel Aviv, Israel in order to study security techniques an d tactics atthat airport, wh ich was unquestionab ly the model of state-of-the-a rt security.While there, I met with th e Director of Israeli Nationa l Police force, th eDirector of Security for the airport and the Director of Security for El AlAirlines. I also was able to observe th e impressive coordination of thevarious security entities an d personnel that were responsible fo r protectingBen Gurion. Upon returning from Israel, I sought to implement many ofthose same security practices.

In April 1994,1 was contacted by the FBI Boston field office about aMassport employee working as an interpreter in the airport who wasallegedly a member of the terrorist organization He zbollah. A fter thatemployee was terminated, I contacted ATLAS to review Massport 's hiring


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practices. (Tab 3). The results of AT LA S' assessment caused me to initiatesteps designed to revam p Massport back groun d checks, to increasecoordination with the FB I and to institute strict guideline s for the hiring ofall interpreters w orking in the L ogan intern ational term inal. In Novem ber1994,1 coordinated an d oversaw a multi-agency hijacking exercise at LoganAirport that involved th e FBI, th e FAA, th e State Police and Massport. Alsoin 1994, Massachusetts State Police Troop F (the State Police Troopassigned to Massport) obtained accreditation from th e InternationalAssociation of Airport and Seaport Police (IAASP), mak ing Troop F thefirst police force in the world to obtain such accreditation by passingrigorous state-of-the-art standards issued by a world-class securityorganization. (Tab 4).

In early 1995, as a result of my relationship with INTERPOL, I wasinvited to attend a debriefing conducted by the French government about anAir France hijacking by rad ical Islamic terrorists w ho sought to crash anairliner into th e Eiffel Tower. (Tab 5). The French security forces hadsuccessfully thwarted that effort by storming th e hijacked plane inMarseilles where it had stopped for refueling. During m y trip to Paris, I metwith security officials at Charles De Gaulle Airport to review and discusstheir security and anti-terrorism procedures and tactics.


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In 1996, with the assistance of my dedicated Publ ic Safety staff, Ideveloped the Logan Airport Security Enhancement Review (LASER)Program, a m ulti-faceted program designed to address and respond to theincreased terrorist threat to Logan. (Tab 6). The LASER Program becameone o f the lead ing an ti-terrorism airport security programs in the U nite dStates, and it has b een the recipient of a major grant from the Edw ard ByrneCriminal Justice Program. Am on g other activities, th e LASER Programcreated teams of uniformed and und ercover officers who regularly tested theeffectiveness of Massport airport security systems. These un derco ver teamsconducted face-to-face security identif ication checks with thousands ofairport employees. The LASE R program also paid for new explosivedetection technology at Logan, and implemented a comprehensive trainingprogram designed to prepare Massport employees to respond to threatspresented b y w eapons o f m ass destruction (WM D), inclu ding biolog icalhazards. In connection with the LASER Program, I developed a protocoldesigned to train the firefighters and State Police at Logan to respond to apotential anthrax threat. (Tab 7) In connection w ith that protocol, Logansecurity teams have trained w ith teams from the U.S. Department of Defensein order to.ensure ihat any biological threat is dealt with expeditiously. A s aresultuidike^nany other major-airports in this countyLogan was (and is


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today) extraordinarily well-prepared to respond to a potential biologicalattack.

A s a result of the development an d successful implementat ion of theLAS ER program, Massport 's stature as a leader in the Un ited Statesincreased steadily over th e years. Logan A irport was routinely cited as amodel for other Category X Airports around the country, and Massportrepresen tatives w ere regularly asked to provide inform ation and givelectures to mem bers of the airport security community. As recently asA ugus t 2001,1 was asked to m ake a presentation on airport secu rity at theAirport Security Summit in San Francisco, California. (Tab 8).

In January 1997, Massport Director of Aviation Thomas Kinton and Iwere invited by Vice President Albert Gore to participate in a mee tingregarding airport security issues prior to the release of the Gore Com m issionReport. (Tab 9). After that report was issued, th e Department of PublicSafety took a pro-active stance at Massport to address an d implement th eCom m ission's various recomm endations at Logan. These efforts included:

an expansion of the LASER program to include thedevelopment of WM D protocols an d joint drills with th e

. . National Gu ard; - -, .- expansion of the K-9 explosive detection unit; , -r


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the development and imp leme ntat ion of the first in the nationfamily assistance program, which became a national modelused by the NTSB;implementation of stringent background checks including anexpanded fingerprint ing program;participation as one of five select airport represe ntat ives in aFAA-sponsored technology evaluation/airpor tvulnerabi l i tyassessment planning program in Virginia in July 1999.

Each of these init ia t ives were successfully implem ented during m y tenure asth e Director of Pu blic Safety at Masspor t .

In Au gus t 1997, th e Depar tment of Public Safety formed a PublicSafety Emergency Committee at M assport that included representat ivesfrom all public safety and operational units. The mission of that Comm itteewas to perform a needs analysis on em ergency consequence m anagem ent.The efforts of this comm ittee includ ed the creation o f a new em ergencyoperations center at M assport Fire/Res cue headquarters and substant ia lrevisions to the airport emergency plan.

A significa nt portion of m y job responsibilit ies as Massport's Directorof Public Safety w as devoted to the review and implementation ofappropriate security measures in connection with Logan Airp ort ' s ongoing


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construction projects - including th e construction of a new internat ionalterminal. In connection with these projects, m y staff regularly commentedon design documents and made recommendations to incoiporate securitytechnology into that new construct ion. In A u g u s t 1995 , M assport contractedWeidel inger Associates to conduct an explosion structure vulnerabilityassessment of the Logan control tower and the passenger terminals. M ydepartment 's efforts also included a recommendation in 1998 that the newterminal adopt the 100 % baggage screening standard that had been adoptedin the United Kingdom. (Tab 10).

During my tenure as Massport 's Director of Public Safety, I was amember of the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network (ALEAN), th eAmerican Association of Airport Executives (AAA E), and the AirportCouncil Internat ional (AC I)N orth Am erica Pub lic Safety and Securi tySteering C omm ittee. A s a member of the AC I Security Steering CommitteeI reviewed and provided comments to the FAA's proposed revisions to Part107 of its regulations. I also served as one of three U.S. representatives onth e A C I World Security Committee, which addresses worldwide issuesrelating to airport security. I was also one of three airport representatives onth e FAA's Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT), acom mittee established to oversee the implementation of new security

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technology at our nation's airports. Through that position, I was ab le toincrease significantly Logan A irport 's access to new Ex plosive D etectionSystem (EDS) screening technology. I have also served as a guest lectureron airport safety and security topics for the Airport Security Summit, th eNational Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB), th e Internat ionalAssociation of Airport and Seaport Police, and an AAAE EuropeanWorkshop on Airfield Safety. (Tab 11).

Another critical component of my mission at Massport was toimprove th e training of all airport em ployees ( including both Massportemployees and airline personnel) regarding security awareness and publicsafety matters and procedures. To that end, beginn ing in late 1999 and early2000, the Department of Public Safety initiated a multi-phased trainingprogram that involved the airlines, FAA, U.S. Customs and Massportpersonnel. (Tab 12).

M y department also took an aggressive stance in connection w ith thebadging and ide ntification process for all airport personnelincluding th ebadging process for the security personn el hired by the various airlines toma nage the passenger che ckpoints. Am ong other things, I insiste d uponcriminal background checks that far exceeded th e minimal standardsestablished by Lthe FAA. Indeed, in May 2001 , the FAA asked me to limit

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the scope of the background checks p erformed by my office on airlineemp loyees and baggag e and passenger screeners. (Tab 13). Despite theFAA's object ions and numerous object ions from th e var ious airl ines, Icontinued to insist on these more e xpa nsiv e bac kgrou nd checks in orde r toenhance the safety of the traveling public at Logan. (Tab 14).

In April 2001, Massport was contacted by the FOX-TV local new soutlet regarding an undercov er operation that they had conducted regardin gthe passeng er screening checkpoints operated by the airlines at LoganAirpo rt. Du ring this operation, FOX personnel were able to smugg leweapons and other contraband through the checkpoints without detection byairline security personnel w ho were staffing th e checkpoints. As a result ofthis information, I worked with th e M assachuset ts S ta te Pol ice to design asecuri ty checkpoint test ing protocol that wo uld use undercover pol iceofficers to test the proficienc y and systems of the airline securitycheckpoints. In June 2001 ,1 met with airline representatives and showedthem the FOX report . I also explained the unde rcover securi ty checkpointtesting protocol that we had developed and in tended to implement . Thetesting protocol was met with substantial resistance from the airlines and theFAA. Despite these protestations, I intended to start th e testing program in

' J u ly 2001 . (Tab 17). How ever, after Massport 's senior staff was briefed, on

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the program and the objec t ions from the airl ines and the FA A , I was orderednot to proceed w ith th e testing program at that t ime .

In late 1999 and 2000,1 became increasingly concerned about thegrowing threat of global terrorism and the increased risk of a terrorist attackat Logan. Du ring that period, the FAA had heighten ed security levels atU.S. airports. There w ere also increased con cerns about terrorist threatsrelating to the mil lenn iumincluding a plot targeting Lo s A ngelesInternational Airport. An d, in October 2000, the U.S.S. Cole w as bombed inYemin. The Cole bombing allegedly invo lved an ind iv idua lwho hadpreviously worked as a cab driver in Boston. In March of 2001 ,1 at t endedan FAA classified intell igence brief in g in Washington, DC. Shortly afterthat brief ing, I rev iewed th e February 2001 testimony of CIA DirectorGeorge T enet, in w hich Tenet em phasized the " immed iate and seriousthreat" posed by increased terrorist threat to US interests. (Tab 15)

During this same period, several incidents at Logan increased m yconcerns about th e safety and security of the airport. In July 1999, a teenageboy boarded a British Airways flight from Logan as a stowaway and flew toHeathrow Airport, w here he w as apprehende d. In early 2000, a manclimbed th e airport pe rimeter fence and gained access to the airport fuelfarm, which is located in the air operations area, And;;on tw o separate

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occasions in 2000, individuals circumvented th e security checkpointsoperated by the airlines at Loganrequir ing th e affected concourses to beevacuated. Finally, in October 2000, Moshe Levy, a New Jersey-basedsecurity expert accompanied me on a tour of Logan Airport and ident i f ied aseries of poten tial security weak nesses. These inc idents, coupled w ith m yawareness of increased terrorist activity worldwide and in the metropolitanBoston area, increased my concern abo ut the risk of a terrorist attack atLogan.

Also in April 2 0 0 1 , 1 articulated my heightened concerns regardingLogan's vulnerabilities in a memorandum to Virginia Buckingham, the then-Executive Director of Massport. (Tab 16). In that memorandum , Iaddressed m y concerns regarding a variety of critical securi ty-related issues

confronting Massport at that t im e, inc lud ing : (1) the inconsistent perimetersecurity around the air operat ions area, including th e need for closed-circui ttelevision (CCTV) monitoring, (2) the inconsistent access control systems inplace in various locations thro ugh out the airport, (3) the need for stepped-u panti-terrorism training programs and technology, (4) the need for improvedidentification and control procedures for all airport em ployees and ten ants,(5) the inconsistent and unreliable performance of screeners working at theairline-operated passenger screening points, as we ll as the need for new and

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improved baggage screening technology, (6) inconsistent emergencyresponse procedures relating to the E - 9 1 1 procedures, and (7) improvementsrequired to minimize potential w orkplace violence.

In 2001, Massport contracted with Counter Technologies Incorporated(CTI) to conduct another comprehensive security assessment of Massportfacilities. That review w as in process when the events of September 11,2001 occurred. In November 2001, CTI issued the first draft of itsassessment. (Tab 19) Notably, in that draft, CTI concluded that "[a] majorchallenge fa cing M assport and [Logan] will be the unde rstanding of why noaction has apparently occurred on the many previous safety and securityrecomm endations submitted from mult iple sources, including i ts ownDepartment of Pub lic Safety." The report noted that, "[although extremelylimited in . . . critical resources . . . the M assport Pub lic Safety Dep artmenthas worked exceedingly well at keeping it s secu rity program efficient andcompliant w ith all applicable laws, rules and regulation s despite the hur dlespresented to them."

During th e period that I served as the Director of Public Safety atMassport , my department was c onstantly confronted with the challenge ofenhancing the safety and security of the airport with a l imited budget . Manyof the pmblicPsafety initiatives that were proposed during m y tenure were -

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approved by Massport. Others were not funded or approved or, in someinstances, were only partially funded or deferred well in to th e future. (Tab18). Du ring this entire period, the Massport Pu blic Safety Departmentfunctioned in an extraordinary fash ion du ring that period and w as able tomaintain a safe and secure environment for travelers at Logan.

During my tenure at Massport, my staff and I consistently developedstrategies to keep Logan Airport on the cut t ing edge of aviation security.W hile M assport m ade great progress in enhancing secu rity at Logan duringmy tenure, there were m any security in itiatives that were aff ected not onlyby the significan t limitations that were placed upon M assport b y the federalregulations governing al l United States airports, bu t also by Massport 's ow npriorities. Indeed, I concur with the conclusion in the December 2001

Report the Special Advisory Task Force on M assport that "in recent yearsM assport's mission has centered on cu stomer satisfaction, economicexpansion an d development" an d that "there is a need for substantiallyincreased attention to security m atters." As we look to the future, in whatadmittedly is a changed environment for security issues concerning ournation's airports, it is m y hope that there will be a continued emphasis onsecurity issues on the national an d local level in order to ensure that the

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public traveling through Logan can h ave c onfid enc e that everythin g pos sibleis being done to guarantee their safety and security.

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Documents

T7 B2 Lawless- Joseph Fdr- 11-5-03 Interview- Prepared Statement 288