Strenghtening Nuclear Safety in Canada - Ramzi Jamal, CNSC

Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Canada: Regulatory Perspective Post Fukushima

Ramzi Jammal Executive Vice-President and Chief Regulatory Operations Officer Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission IAEA International Experts’ Meeting March 20, 2012

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment; and to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

65 years of nuclear safety!

IEM Vienna – 2012.03.20 - 2 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Fukushima: CNSC Regulatory Actions

On March 17, 2011, the CNSC issued an order to all Canadian Class I nuclear facilities licensees to:

• Review initial lessons learned and re-examine safety cases CNSC Task Force convened to evaluate operational, technical and regulatory implications: “Canadian Stress Test”

• Short-term actions to confirm readiness of installed equipment • Long-term measures to update safety case of nuclear power plants (NPPs)

CNSC carried out focused inspections at all nuclear power plants on: seismic qualification, fire, flooding, backup power and hydrogen igniters and passive recombiners CNSC staff updates to Commission members through public commission meetings On August 5, 2011, External Advisory Committee established

• Independent review of CNSC actions in response to the Fukushima event • Independent reporting to the President of the CNSC


IRRS Follow-up Mission

The 2011 Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission Follow-up to the 2009 report CNSC’s actions after Fukushima were prompt, robust and comprehensive IRRS Report and Management Response are publicly available on the CNSC Web site http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/about/international/irrt/

Strong support of Canada’s nuclear regulatory framework


http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/about/international/irrt/

CNSC Safety Review Criteria

Considered all available international reports on lessons learned Structured along the lines of defence in depth: • Station design for external hazards

- Confirmation of design basis - Protection against external hazard of lower frequency and

higher magnitude than assumed in design basis • Impact of beyond design basis events (BDBEs)

- Availability of emergency water and power systems - Hydrogen mitigation - Irradiated fuel bay (IFB) cooling

• Severe accident management measures • Emergency preparedness and response • CNSC regulatory framework and processes


CNSC Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion: • “Canadian NPPs are safe and the risk posed to the health and

safety of Canadians or to the environment is small”

Task Force made 13 recommendations subdivided into 3 main categories: • Strengthening defence-in-depth of Canadian NPPs to withstand

events of very low probability • Enhancing emergency preparedness/response in Canada • Improving CNSC regulatory framework and processes

Intended to further enhance the safety of NPPs in Canada and will reduce associated risk to as low as reasonably practicable


CNSC Task Force Recommendations Strengthen Defence in Depth

Containment filtered venting at Point

Lepreau

PARS Seismic route to SCA Emergency power generator


CNSC Task Force Recommendations

Enhance offsite emergency preparedness/ response: • Ensure emergency response organizations will be capable

of responding effectively in a severe event and/or multi-unit accident(s)

• Conduct sufficiently challenging emergency exercises • Review federal and provincial multi-jurisdictions nuclear

emergency plans and programs


CNSC Action Plan - Public and Stakeholder Input

Two rounds of consultation with the public and stakeholders on the: • Task Force Report • Action plan arising from the Task Force (TF) Report

October 28, 2011 – December 1, 2011 (completed) • CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report and Management Response

December 21, 2011 – February 03, 2012 (completed) • Draft CNSC staff action plan and disposition of comments on the TF Report

February 03, 2012 – March 03, 2012 (completed) • Disposition of comments and revision of the draft CNSC Staff Action Plan

February 17, 2012 • Licensees notified of site-specific Fukushima action items (FAIs)

March 02, 2012 – April 03, 2012 (completed) • Posting of Commission Member Document for public comment on the

CNSC Staff Action Plan and disposition report of comments

May 03, 2012 • Commission public meeting on the revised CNSC Staff Action Plan


Implementation of Task Force Recommendations

Site-specific actions will be implemented: • Short term: 12 months – started, to be completed by December 2012 • Medium term: 24 months – by December 2013 • Long term: 48 months – by December 2015 • Implementation by NPPs has commenced for all actions

Fukushima action items (FAIs): • Generic elements • Site-specific items

Tracking of implementation will be monitored by staff Once the action plan is endorsed by the Commission: • CNSC staff will report annually to the Commission on the status of

implementation


Canadian Industry Response

Responded with diligence • Identified lessons learned, performed reviews to identify gaps and

opportunities for improvement, made progress Strong cooperation domestically and internationally

• One Canadian operator (OPG/Pickering) awarded a strength by WANO for the response

Timely response to CNSC orders • All licensees responded by April 1, 2011, on short term actions • All licensees submitted comprehensive assessments to the CNSC in July 2011

Assessments structured along the lines of defence-in-depth, as per CNSC safety review criteria:

• Station design for external hazards • Impacts of beyond design basis events (BDBEs) • Severe accident management measures for BDBEs including severe accidents (SAs) • Emergency planning and response


Canadian Industry Response

Assessments confirmed safety of NPPs • Identified opportunities to further improve defences

for beyond design basis events • Physical improvements to NPPs have commenced • Focus of improvements is on severe accident prevention, in

addition to severe accident mitigation and emergency response

Augmented flood protection Emergency mitigation equipment for alternate cooling to stand-by

generators


What We Have Learned

Nuclear events are no longer considered a local event A global event affecting regulators, operators and all levels of government Global safety is a must: starting with the IAEA


The Path Forward

IAEA: • Commendation to the IAEA on the progress to date and its action plan • Time to review the role of the IAEA

– When was the last time BoG discussed safety issues such as IRRS findings?

Real, transparent peer reviews • Consistent and transparent stress tests with objective and technology

neutral approach to lessons learned • No commercial competition on basis of nuclear safety

Safety standards to include governance and independence of regulator Reporting of non-responsive regulator to highest levels nationally and internationally, similarly to non-proliferation and security Recognition of important role of INPO and WANO, especially in exposing “non-responding” operators and regulators


The Path Forward

Public trust • Regaining of public trust in safety through

communication, openness and transparency

Challenges facing the international regulatory community in the recovery phase • Occupational dose limits are not adequate for

recovery - rehabilitation • Need to develop international/national regulatory

limits for recovery phase – IAEA, ICRP


The Path Forward

Redefining design basis - design extension conditions

• Guidance on Requirement 20 in IAEA SSR-2/1

– Additional scenarios to be addressed

– Severe accident phenomena to be addressed in containment designs

• As part of the life extension in Canada, all licensees have to meet modern safety goals

– Complementary design features for selected beyond design basis and severe accidents

– Containment filtered venting (already installed at Point Lepreau), PARS for hydrogen mitigation, multiple connection points for coolant addition

PARS


Conclusions

CNSC’s response to events in Japan • Timely, transparent and comprehensive • Identified by the Integrated Regulatory

Review Service (IRRS) mission as a good practice that should be used by other regulatory bodies

Canadian industry response • Timely response to CNSC directive

– All licensees responded by April 1, 2011, on short term actions

• One Canadian operator (OPG) awarded a strength by WANO for the response

• Several key actions in the CNSC Action Plan are already complete

Canada’s nuclear power plants are safe


Conclusions

Role of the IAEA • Mandatory safety standards • Design extension conditions

– More explicit extension of the design basis with inclusion of selected beyond design basis and severe accidents in the design

– Enhancement to IRRS modules pertaining to the extension of the design basis

• Safety reporting to the BoG

Role of nuclear industry in continuation of safety • Sharing industry trends with external organizations

Public trust


We Will Never Compromise Safety

Thank You nuclearsafety.gc.ca

Documents

Strenghtening Nuclear Safety in Canada - Ramzi Jamal, CNSC