Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf by Joshua M. EpsteinReview by: Gregory F. TrevertonForeign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Fall, 1987), p. 191Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043302 .

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RECENT BOOKS 191

STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING: THE CASE OF THE PERSIAN GULF. By Joshua M. Epstein. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 169 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

Recent attention to conventional forces again has produced the usual

pronouncements of doom and gloom about Western capabilities, and con

cerning no place more than the Gulf, so far from the United States and so

relatively close to the Soviet Union. Yet those pronouncements are often more rhetoric than analysis. Using detailed models Epstein argues that an

American force smaller than the currently planned Rapid Deployment Force could mount a credible defense of Iran against a Soviet attack, by exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities.

AMERICAN ESPIONAGE AND THE SOVIET TARGET. By Jeffrey Richelson. New York: Morrow, 1987, 383 pp. $18.95.

Richelson tells how the U.S. has collected intelligence on the Soviet

Union, often in cooperation with allies?from the early postwar recruiting of Soviet agents to today's near-total reliance on satellites and other tech nical means that consume the bulk of the $20-billion annual intelligence budget. As with Richelson's other books on intelligence, his ferreting of information from a variety of sources is impressive. Unlike his other books,

however, this one provides information, not analysis, and the reader would like him to venture conclusions beyond the suggestion that, in the 1990s,

American intelligence ought to concentrate less on Soviet military capabil ities, more on that nation's political evolution.

STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Ed ited by Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Robert S. Litwak. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 232 pp. $29.95 (paper, $16.95).

THE TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS OF SDL Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 252 pp. $27.50. PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. Edited by Steven W. Guer rier and Wayne C. Thompson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 358

pp. $29.95 (paper). THE SDI CHALLENGE TO EUROPE. By Ivo H. Daalder. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 185 pp. $19.95.

SDI is in political ebb, but books about it are in flow?all without our

knowing exactly what it is. Of the edited volumes, that by Wells and Litwak is the best, with a relatively brief introduction that sets SDI in the context

of both history and American offensive force modernization. Charles Glas er's chapter and the ensuing panel discussion on the problem of transition are especially interesting. The Cimbala volume, most of whose authors are of more conservative bent, is strongest in its treatment of point defenses. The Guerrier and Thompson volume is a source book, with short analyses and statements of position by political figures, for and against SDI. Daalder has the benefit both of single authorship and of being a European who knows American strategy well. He understands strategy but gives primacy to politics. This long essay is the best discussion of SDI and Europe so far.

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